You've given yourself a way to refer to the content of an assertoric utterance -- what's asserted is a belief -- but you've left yourself no way to refer to the content of a belief.
If I believe that lighthouses are lovely, the content of my belief is "Lighthouses are lovely," not "I believe lighthouses are lovely," unless you like infinite regresses.
My believing lighthouses are lovely is a fact about me; lighthouses being lovely is not a fact about me. — Srap Tasmaner
Sentences as well as actually being said are in potentia as things that could be said. The existence of a language means (in the sense of 'entails' in case you are confused) that there are potentially an infinite number of sentences that could be said; each with at least one literal meaning. — Janus
The thing is, that you are removing the utterance of the statement — Metaphysician Undercover
. But the utterance of the statement is an action which must be respected as real and very necessary — Metaphysician Undercover
We have to be able to make a real distinction between what the utterance means to me, and what it means to you (differences of interpretation), so we cannot say that the content is "lighthouses are lovely", because this assumes that the same content is within your mind and mine. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, it's an action. Actions are not truth-apt. — Srap Tasmaner
Or you could take that as proof that the content is not something in my mind or yours. Can we both believe that Donald Trump is President? I think so. How is this possible on your view? We can't have the same thing in our minds, so how can we share a belief? — Srap Tasmaner
How do we agree or disagree about anything? How do we even communicate? — Srap Tasmaner
These potential sentences you refer to have no existence, because they have not been created, They have no meaning because they do not exist. You continue to back up this nonsense train of thought with more meaninglessness. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you deny that there are many possible sentences that have never yet been spoken? — Janus
The thing is, that you are removing the utterance of the statement — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you recognize a meaningful distinction between thought/belief and reports thereof? — creativesoul
No I don't deny this but I don't see how it is at all meaningful. And I don't see how a potential sentence has meaning, nor does "meaning in potentia" have any meaning either. Just like a potential sentence does not exist as a sentence, and is therefore not a sentence, potential meaning is not actual meaning and therefore does not have any meaning either. — Metaphysician Undercover
The reason why "It is raining" implies belief but isn't equal to "I believe it is raining" is because sometimes "I believe" implies doubt/uncertainty. — creativesoul
None of this deals directly with truth. I'm just trying to clarify what assertion amounts to.) — Srap Tasmaner
Think about a poem you are yet to read; does it not have a potential meaning? — Janus
MU claims that writings only have meaning in the act of being interpreted. — Janus
I asked:
Is your report of another's belief equal - in content - to the other's belief?
You answered:
I think "yes," although I'd also want to gloss "content" as "semantic value"-- the content that counts for truth, reasoning, etc.
If you and I watch a cat chasing a mouse, and an open-top box falls over trapping the mouse underneath, like an opaque cake-keeper, I would attribute to you and to me and to the cat the belief that the mouse is under the box. What else is there to do?
Tom has no conception of truth, and yet has true belief. — creativesoul
Tom does not think in statements, and yet we report upon Tom's thought/belief. The content of our reports is not equivalent to the content of Toms thought/belief. — creativesoul
I follow your clarification. It is my argument that it is within this certainty which is inherent within the assertion, that we find the essence of truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
Tom has no conception of truth, and yet has true belief.
How, exactly can it be the case that Tom has true belief? — creativesoul
If true belief requires truth, and truth is prior to language, then Tom can have true belief despite not being able to talk about it, and we can accurately report upon it by virtue of properly taking account of it. — creativesoul
If our reports are accurate then it must be the case that true belief is capable of being formed and/or held by a language-less agent. — creativesoul
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