A) An extensional analysis of rejection regarding a statement p( x ) must rely on the following claim: asserting the statement ¬p( x ) is equivalent to rejecting p( x ).
B) The equivalence in ( A ) requires that an asserter of p( x ) would commit themselves to all and only the same claims that a rejecter of ~p( x ) would. — fdrake
Yes, the first being within the "judgement stroke", the second outside it, and the whole not being amenable to extensional analysis. This is Frege's contribution, to see that setting the judgement stroke to the side permits extensionality. And keeping in mind, extensionality is what makes 'p' the very same thing in the various expresions within the scope of the judgement stroke. So in your example, the protagonists are not talking of the same thing in using the word "sin".One could also reject a claim like "abortion is a sin" in a manner which believes in sin and a manner which does not believe in sin. — fdrake
...given the right circumstances — Banno
They are not the sort of sentences that ordinarily might be considered true or false. But "The cat is on the mat" is. — Banno
I agree. Wild. But is this anything more than an odd piece of of biography?The only way I can make sense of Frege's idea of a proposition (a thought) that is disconnected from assertion is to imagine that we're looking at humans as if they're robots and we're examining the programming to see where the meaning is coming from. That's wild. — frank
Folk seem too keen on claiming that one cannot understand what a statement is about without deciding if it is true or false.
— Banno
I don't think anyone has made that claim. You probably need to understand the truth conditions, but not whether it's true or false. — frank
Rejecting a claim can carry, therefore, a rejection of the expected conditions under which that claim is expressed rather than forcing a commitment to the negation of the rejected claim on the speaker. I believe that is the kind of non-logical factor Martins was referring to.
I believe what marks this flavour of thing as a "non-logical" factor is that it is "extra-logical" to implied context of an assertion. One rejects the rules of the implied game. Rejecting the pin-angels claim comes from rejecting the operations of thought and expression - language use, deduction, informal reasoning, gut feelings - that would enable its expression in the first place, rather than negating it in its assumed context of expression. One rejects the it-makes-sense-to-think-about-angels-on-pins-to-begin-with rules. — fdrake
If you are incapable of entertaining a statement without deciding if it is true or if it is false, then you and i are different. I can. — Banno
In this case, however, unlike the pin-angels case, it is unclear that there is a common content expressible as (some) linguistic form p that is asserted in one case and presented for the sake of rejection in the other. — Pierre-Normand
So, in this case, my suggestion isn't a specific application of Martin's proposal. I'm rather attending to the function in this specific language game where the denial is meant, not to present the content of a thought for the sake of rejection (for whatever reason), but rather to deny that the putative thought being expressed is a thought at all (and hence deny it having so much as a content). — Pierre-Normand
What would it be? While I may understand what it is that someone who falls under the illusion that there is an apple on the table means, in denying the truth of his claim on the ground that there isn't an apple for them to refer to, I can't express this denial as "~p" (i.e. "It is not the case that this apple is on the table"). So, in this case, my suggestion isn't a specific application of Martin's proposal. I'm rather attending to the function in this specific language game where the denial is meant, not to present the content of a thought for the sake of rejection (for whatever reason), but rather to deny that the putative thought being expressed is a thought at all (and hence deny it having so much as a content). My denial rather consists in presenting the overarching "act" of the asserter as a failure to actualise their general capacity to refer demonstratively to specific apples for the purpose of communicating their locations.
To be clear - are you saying that there is common content between the assertion and rejection but that this common content is inexpressible as (some) linguistic form p, or are you saying that there is no common content between the assertion and rejection which could have been expressed in any linguistic form whatsoever, in virtue of there being no common content between the assertion and the rejection?
I suppose strictly speaking you are expressing uncertainty regarding one of the above claims, rather than committing yourself strongly to either. — fdrake
Am I right in thinking that you are construing that in order for an expressive thingybob containing a singular term expressing a de re sense to count as a thought, the singular term expressing a de re sense must be a successful act of reference to the entity associated with the de re sense - in this case the apple? And you are rejecting the claim "this apple is on the table" distally because there isn't an apple on the table but proximately because the singular term with the de re sense doesn't successfully refer as it is desired to? — fdrake
The content of a thought ought to specify its truth conditions. Hence, the content of a simple predicative thought must have a referent to its singular term such that its truth or falsity depends on how things are with the referent. — Pierre-Normand
Negotiation can be really one-sided. Suppose you tell me you have to take care of something and then we can go; I wait by the car and when you arrive I ask, "Did you take care of it?" If you say, "Take care of what?" all I have is "Whatever you told me you had to take care of!" I take myself to be talking about something that only you can pick out. — Srap Tasmaner
Consider a direction like "Don't forget to put your tools away after". The tools that are already where they should be can't be put away, so the intention is to pick out whichever tools are out at the time you're carrying out the directive. That can also be expressed as a conditional --- something like, "For all members of your tools, if it's out then put it away." The variable is singular now, but it's still not going to be bound until run-time, and then a number of times, also not known until run-time. Same thing. — Srap Tasmaner
Both points are intended to cast a bit of doubt on the presumption that our propositions are always referentially determinate, and thus their truth conditions too, at the time of our choosing, — Srap Tasmaner
talking about language rather than thinking — Banno
the view from anywhere is eccentric, looking to account for what others say they see, while seeking broad consensus . . . It acknowledges that what we are doing here is inherently embedded in a community and extends beyond the self. — Banno
I have gotten so frustrated with Kimhi over the past month that I've literally screamed, trying to untangle him. But I insist it's worth it. — J
the magnitude of the platonism at issue. The old war still rages — Srap Tasmaner
but I truly don't think platonism (including Fregean platonism) needs to be anyone's opponent. — J
Kimhi talks about "pragmatic contradiction" as the reason you can't attach a judgment stroke to "p & ~p"; if you use the stroke, you show that you know what it means to understand a logical expression. — J
If thoughts as such are tied to some force or other, while embedded thoughts (e. g. p qua part of not-p) do not directly come along with a force of their own, it must be clarified how the indirect connection to force, which embedded thoughts must indeed come along with, is to be understood. That is, it must be clarified how dependent logical acts that have an embedded thought as their content, and the overarching logical act that does indeed bear a force of its own interlock with each other such as to provide for the unity of a propositionally complex thought." — Pierre-Normand
I would assume it does, until something stops it. — bongo fury
Is it my imagination, or is Frege sounding a bit defensive here? — J
whether their accounts of this self-conscious propositional unity constitutes an improvement over the charitable accounts, put forth by Evans and McDowell, of what Frege was trying to accomplish when he sought to individuate thought/proposition — Pierre-Normand
It might be closer to the argument given to say that Frege, in particular, does not set aside force (even if other and later logicians do) but that he brings it in in a way that is somehow at odds with the unity of force and content in our utterances. — Srap Tasmaner
I just think we should quit throwing around 'proposition' and 'judgment' and 'inference' in ways that allow people to give those words their preferred reading. — Srap Tasmaner
Kimhi believes that Fregean logic doesn't permit the inference (1) S is F; (2) A thinks that S is F; (3) Thus, A truly thinks that S is F. — J
So the words are a bit wooly because Frege's allegedly made a model of something wooly that has no wool in it, and our fellow travellers are seeking and analysing the wool. — fdrake
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.