How could "the cat is on the mat" be truth-apt? We don't even know which cat it is.

A) An extensional analysis of rejection regarding a statement p( x ) must rely on the following claim: asserting the statement ¬p( x ) is equivalent to rejecting p( x ).
B) The equivalence in ( A ) requires that an asserter of p( x ) would commit themselves to all and only the same claims that a rejecter of ~p( x ) would. — fdrake

I appreciate the style here. Yes, in an extensional context, ⊢~p ≡ ~⊢p, so far as I can make out. And belief is not an extensional context. So for beliefs, ⊢~p ≢ ~⊢p.

One could also reject a claim like "abortion is a sin" in a manner which believes in sin and a manner which does not believe in sin. — fdrake

Yes, the first being within the "judgement stroke", the second outside it, and the whole not being amenable to extensional analysis. This is Frege's contribution, to see that setting the judgement stroke to the side permits extensionality. And keeping in mind, extensionality is what makes 'p' the very same thing in the various expresions within the scope of the judgement stroke. So in your example, the protagonists are not talking of the same thing in using the word "sin".

How could "the cat is on the mat" be truth-apt? — frank

Isn't it apt to be true, or perhaps false? Couldn't it be true, or perhaps false, in suitable circumstances? What more could you want?

Isn't it apt to be true, or perhaps false? Couldn't it be true, or perhaps false, in suitable circumstances? — Banno

Exactly. You need context to turn a sentence into a proposition.

If you like. I disagree. A proposition is best thought of as a sentence that is truth apt. "The cat is on the mat" can be given a truth value, and hence counts as a proposition.

On your account, a proposition's truth value must be fixed by context. I submit that there are propositions for which the truth value is unknown, and yet these count as propositions. Consider "There is life on other planets". I take this to have a truth value, but not one we know. I count it as a proposition. Do you? Is it only a proposition if one specifies which planet?

"The cat is on the mat" can be given a truth value, and hence counts as a proposition. — Banno

How can it be truth-apt if we don't even know which cat it is?

How can it be truth-apt if we don't even know which cat it is? — frank

What do you think "apt" means?

What do you think "apt" means? — Banno

It means it can be either true or false.

It means it can be either true or false. — frank

...given the right circumstances.

So "Put the cat on the mat!" is not truth apt, nor is "Is the cat on the mat?". They are not the sort of sentences that ordinarily might be considered true or false. But "The cat is on the mat" is.

This pleases me.

...given the right circumstances — Banno

Exactly. The only way I can make sense of Frege's idea of a proposition (a thought) that is disconnected from assertion is to imagine that we're looking at humans as if they're robots and we're examining the programming to see where the meaning is coming from. That's wild.

They are not the sort of sentences that ordinarily might be considered true or false. But "The cat is on the mat" is. — Banno

Sentences aren't usually considered to be truth-apt. There's a good SEP article that explains why.

The only way I can make sense of Frege's idea of a proposition (a thought) that is disconnected from assertion is to imagine that we're looking at humans as if they're robots and we're examining the programming to see where the meaning is coming from. That's wild. — frank

I agree. Wild. But is this anything more than an odd piece of of biography?

If you are incapable of entertaining a statement without deciding if it is true or if it is false, then you and I are different. I can.

Folk seem too keen on claiming that one cannot understand what a statement is about without deciding if it is true or false.
— Banno

I don't think anyone has made that claim. You probably need to understand the truth conditions, but not whether it's true or false. — frank

If you are incapable of entertaining a statement without deciding if it is true or if it is false — Banno

You keep saying this in spite of protests from both me and Leontiskos that no one has claimed this.

But you just did.

But you just did. — Banno

You misunderstood. I have never said that.

Rejecting a claim can carry, therefore, a rejection of the expected conditions under which that claim is expressed rather than forcing a commitment to the negation of the rejected claim on the speaker. I believe that is the kind of non-logical factor Martins was referring to.

I believe what marks this flavour of thing as a "non-logical" factor is that it is "extra-logical" to implied context of an assertion. One rejects the rules of the implied game. Rejecting the pin-angels claim comes from rejecting the operations of thought and expression - language use, deduction, informal reasoning, gut feelings - that would enable its expression in the first place, rather than negating it in its assumed context of expression. One rejects the it-makes-sense-to-think-about-angels-on-pins-to-begin-with rules. — fdrake

This could indeed be a special case where Martin's account of the unity of propositionally complex propositions with the form ~p applies. Again, his account, roughly, is that in judging (asserting) ~p, one presents p for the sake of rejection within the overarching negative judgment. The reason why one presents p for the sake of rejection could indeed be that one rejects the rules of the implied game (whereby p is presented as a content that is a suitable target for truth evaluation).

Likewise, in the example I had suggested where p can be expressed demonstratively as "this apple is on the table", and the singular content purports to express a de re sense, the rejection of the claim might present it for the sake of rejection on the ground that there is no de re sense available to be thought (since the presence of an apple is merely an illusion).

In this case, however, unlike the pin-angels case, it is unclear that there is a common content expressible as (some) linguistic form p that is asserted in one case and presented for the sake of rejection in the other. What would it be? While I may understand what it is that someone who falls under the illusion that there is an apple on the table means, in denying the truth of their claim on the ground that there isn't an apple for them to refer to, I can't express my denial as "~p" (i.e. "It is not the case that this apple is on the table"). So, in this case, my suggestion doesn't appear to be a specific application of Martin's proposal. I'm rather attending to the function in a specific language game where the denial is meant, not to present the content of a thought for the sake of rejection (for whatever reason), but rather to deny that the putative thought being expressed is a thought at all (and hence deny it having so much as a content). My denial rather consists in presenting the overarching "act" of the asserter as a failure to actualise their general capacity to refer demonstratively to specific apples for the purpose of communicating their locations.

If you are incapable of entertaining a statement without deciding if it is true or if it is false, then you and i are different. I can. — Banno

@frank's beef is different. I think he is simply wondering about the manner in which the singular term "the cat" functions in the sentence such that a statement being expressed by means of this sentence (on a particular occasion of use) doesn't leave it indefinite what cat is at issue. Now knowing what cat is being talked about isn't the same as withholding judgement regarding what is said about a determinate cat.

In this case, however, unlike the pin-angels case, it is unclear that there is a common content expressible as (some) linguistic form p that is asserted in one case and presented for the sake of rejection in the other. — Pierre-Normand

So, in this case, my suggestion isn't a specific application of Martin's proposal. I'm rather attending to the function in this specific language game where the denial is meant, not to present the content of a thought for the sake of rejection (for whatever reason), but rather to deny that the putative thought being expressed is a thought at all (and hence deny it having so much as a content). — Pierre-Normand

To be clear - are you saying that there is common content between the assertion and rejection but that this common content is inexpressible as (some) linguistic form p, or are you saying that there is no common content between the assertion and rejection which could have been expressed in any linguistic form whatsoever, in virtue of there being no common content between the assertion and the rejection?

I suppose strictly speaking you are expressing uncertainty regarding one of the above claims, rather than committing yourself strongly to either.

What would it be? While I may understand what it is that someone who falls under the illusion that there is an apple on the table means, in denying the truth of his claim on the ground that there isn't an apple for them to refer to, I can't express this denial as "~p" (i.e. "It is not the case that this apple is on the table"). So, in this case, my suggestion isn't a specific application of Martin's proposal. I'm rather attending to the function in this specific language game where the denial is meant, not to present the content of a thought for the sake of rejection (for whatever reason), but rather to deny that the putative thought being expressed is a thought at all (and hence deny it having so much as a content). My denial rather consists in presenting the overarching "act" of the asserter as a failure to actualise their general capacity to refer demonstratively to specific apples for the purpose of communicating their locations.

Am I right in thinking that you are construing that in order for an expressive thingybob containing a singular term expressing a de re sense to count as a thought, the singular term expressing a de re sense must be a successful act of reference to the entity associated with the de re sense - in this case the apple? And you are rejecting the claim "this apple is on the table" distally because there isn't an apple on the table but proximately because the singular term with the de re sense doesn't successfully refer as it is desired to, since there is no apple on the table?

To be clear - are you saying that there is common content between the assertion and rejection but that this common content is inexpressible as (some) linguistic form p, or are you saying that there is no common content between the assertion and rejection which could have been expressed in any linguistic form whatsoever, in virtue of there being no common content between the assertion and the rejection?

I suppose strictly speaking you are expressing uncertainty regarding one of the above claims, rather than committing yourself strongly to either. — fdrake

I am committing myself to this claim in the cases where unproblematic demonstrative references can be made to ordinary objects and identifying illusory cases (of reference failure) is likewise clear. The pin-angels case is less certain because it depends to what extent we are willing to grant some intelligibility to the idea that there is a way the world could possibly be such that there are determinate numbers of angels dancing on the heads of particular pins, in order to grant that someone who "thinks" this about some particular pin is entertaining an intelligible thought content at all.

Am I right in thinking that you are construing that in order for an expressive thingybob containing a singular term expressing a de re sense to count as a thought, the singular term expressing a de re sense must be a successful act of reference to the entity associated with the de re sense - in this case the apple? And you are rejecting the claim "this apple is on the table" distally because there isn't an apple on the table but proximately because the singular term with the de re sense doesn't successfully refer as it is desired to? — fdrake

That's a very nice way to put it. The content of a thought ought to specify its truth conditions. Hence, the content of a simple predicative thought must have a referent to its singular term such that its truth or falsity depends on how things are with the referent.

To be clear, Frank seems to be saying that since we do not know which cat is being spoken of, "the cat is on the mat" is not an example of a proposition. Might be OK to think of "The cat sat on the mat" as a variable ranging over propositions.

The content of a thought ought to specify its truth conditions. Hence, the content of a simple predicative thought must have a referent to its singular term such that its truth or falsity depends on how things are with the referent. — Pierre-Normand

Natural enough. For a lot of cases, we usually say we need two elements for assertion: what we're talking about (to be picked out by a referential expression) and what we're saying about it (the predication).

Two small points about this though.

1. If you think of this in terms of communication, there's a fairly clear sense of "picking out" or "specifying" available: you negotiate until you agree on the subject; enough for your audience to know what you're talking about is enough for you to say what you want to say.

There is no standard as clear that doesn't consider communication. If someone is just expressing their views in language for fun, speaking their beliefs to the universe at large, what standard do they meet to count their referential expressions as successful?

Negotiation can be really one-sided. Suppose you tell me you have to take care of something and then we can go; I wait by the car and when you arrive I ask, "Did you take care of it?" If you say, "Take care of what?" all I have is "Whatever you told me you had to take care of!" I take myself to be talking about something that only you can pick out.

2. Principally for descriptions (with a bound variable) but even for names, we can sometimes choose -- to use the programming language terminology -- between early binding and late binding, between fixing reference at "compile time", when we first speak, and at "run time", which can vary.

Consider a direction like "Don't forget to put your tools away after". The tools that are already where they should be can't be put away, so the intention is to pick out whichever tools are out at the time you're carrying out the directive. That can also be expressed as a conditional --- something like, "For all members of your tools, if it's out then put it away." The variable is singular now, but it's still not going to be bound until run-time, and then a number of times, also not known until run-time. Same thing.

This example is similar to the example in the first point, but one person gives the criterion and the other applies it; together they fix the reference, but not immediately.

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Both points are intended to cast a bit of doubt on the presumption that our propositions are always referentially determinate, and thus their truth conditions too, at the time of our choosing, or that they need to be. (And I didn't even mention vagueness.)

There are similarly open-ended options for predication.

None of this matters to Frege or Kimhi, I'm sure. I don't know if it helps with @Banno's cat.

Negotiation can be really one-sided. Suppose you tell me you have to take care of something and then we can go; I wait by the car and when you arrive I ask, "Did you take care of it?" If you say, "Take care of what?" all I have is "Whatever you told me you had to take care of!" I take myself to be talking about something that only you can pick out. — Srap Tasmaner

I quite appreciate your examples. In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans discusses the case where someone who overhears other people talking about "Nicole"(?) (or some other name) — and who isn't acquainted with Nicole and isn't either already party to the practice of referring to this person as Nicole — can think about her rather in the way you can make reference to this "it" that I needed to take care of without knowing what "it" is under any other description than whatever it is that I had in mind when I mentioned "it". Reference functions because you effectively defer to me for fixing the referent of your thought. Likewise the compiler can defer to (i.e. can have the function to enable the processing of) data only available to running instances at runtime. In offering to explore varieties of reference, rather than offering a unified theory of what what it is that the activity of referring to things consists of in all cases, Evans was very sensitive to the Wittgensteinian warning Martin also pays heeds to: "against a 'craving for generality' and a 'contemptuous attitude towards the particular case' as a source of philosophical confusion." But Evan's overarching theme, which seems relevant to Frege (and Kimhi's) preoccupation, consists in situating our referential practices within the activity of individuating the things being referred to in ways that are quite inconsistent with representationalist assumptions that seek to connect thought with the world in ways that make the world "external" and ready made.

:cool:

Consider a direction like "Don't forget to put your tools away after". The tools that are already where they should be can't be put away, so the intention is to pick out whichever tools are out at the time you're carrying out the directive. That can also be expressed as a conditional --- something like, "For all members of your tools, if it's out then put it away." The variable is singular now, but it's still not going to be bound until run-time, and then a number of times, also not known until run-time. Same thing. — Srap Tasmaner

That's damn cool.

yep.

Putting this discussion in terms of thought rather than statements or propositions is problematic in all sorts of ways, to do with the sort of issues you raise here, and mostly avoided since the first half of last century by talking about language rather than thinking. Seems a retrograde step.

Both points are intended to cast a bit of doubt on the presumption that our propositions are always referentially determinate, and thus their truth conditions too, at the time of our choosing, — Srap Tasmaner

If you express a proposition you just need to be pointing to some state of affairs. Precision isn't really the issue.

talking about language rather than thinking — Banno

I guess you could read my examples that way, but it wasn't my intention.

It's a little harder to show collaborative thought, but I expect most of us have had an experience like this: you're trying to express or even explain something you don't quite have a grasp of, and the person you're talking to puts it in such a way that it clarifies your own thinking for you. (I've already posted elsewhere Fry & Laurie's "That's It!", so only a link this time.)

Well I suspect not just our language use but almost all of our thinking is just as collaborative as in this example, it's just usually harder to see. "I think ..." "I judge ..." Bullshit. Tens of thousands of years have gone into every thought you've ever had, every word you've ever uttered.

the view from anywhere is eccentric, looking to account for what others say they see, while seeking broad consensus . . . It acknowledges that what we are doing here is inherently embedded in a community and extends beyond the self. — Banno

Very good. Would you agree that both the VA and VN are attempts to capture some concept of objectivity? (read "intersubjectivity" in the case of VA)

A hodgepodge...

I have gotten so frustrated with Kimhi over the past month that I've literally screamed, trying to untangle him. But I insist it's worth it. — J

At this point I very much want to know what motivates you to have faith in Kimhi. Or more precisely, "Suppose Kimhi's arguments fail. How would you try to salvage his project, and what would the aim be?" What's the target here, for you?

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- This is informative and helpful, but I am still curious about the question I asked, "Where, historically, would you say that essential connection gets dissolved or weakened?"

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the magnitude of the platonism at issue. The old war still rages — Srap Tasmaner

but I truly don't think platonism (including Fregean platonism) needs to be anyone's opponent. — J

And I would say that Kimhi is not occupying the Platonist position; Frege is. Kimhi is offering the Aristotelian alternative, or at least attempting to.

Note too that the starting point for Aristotle is that we do know things and we do grow in knowledge (i.e. learn things). For Aristotle logic is simultaneously an explanation of how this is possible and a roadmap to learning. By the time we get to Wittgenstein it is not. Frege is somewhere inbetween.

Kimhi talks about "pragmatic contradiction" as the reason you can't attach a judgment stroke to "p & ~p"; if you use the stroke, you show that you know what it means to understand a logical expression. — J

I still maintain that <this thread> is a great testament to Kimhi's point here. It is living proof of the deep problems that arise in a truth-functional context.

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If thoughts as such are tied to some force or other, while embedded thoughts (e. g. p qua part of not-p) do not directly come along with a force of their own, it must be clarified how the indirect connection to force, which embedded thoughts must indeed come along with, is to be understood. That is, it must be clarified how dependent logical acts that have an embedded thought as their content, and the overarching logical act that does indeed bear a force of its own interlock with each other such as to provide for the unity of a propositionally complex thought." — Pierre-Normand

Yes, good. :up:

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I would assume it does, until something stops it. — bongo fury

:up:

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Is it my imagination, or is Frege sounding a bit defensive here? — J

He is, and that makes sense in context, for he is responding to a criticism similar to yours. Still, it's a good question whether one can be more than defensive in such a situation.

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whether their accounts of this self-conscious propositional unity constitutes an improvement over the charitable accounts, put forth by Evans and McDowell, of what Frege was trying to accomplish when he sought to individuate thought/proposition — Pierre-Normand

Right.

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It might be closer to the argument given to say that Frege, in particular, does not set aside force (even if other and later logicians do) but that he brings it in in a way that is somehow at odds with the unity of force and content in our utterances. — Srap Tasmaner

I think so. :up:

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- Good posts, and we spoke about the difference between denial and negation earlier. Kimhi (and Wittgenstein) accuse Frege of flubbing this distinction, but Rombout points out that Frege never did, since he allows negation but not denial (i.e. not judgments of falsity at the level of the judgment-stroke). What's curious is that, if I am right, Frege didn't understand the difference between denial and negation and sort of "got lucky" insofar as he thought denial would be superfluous.

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I just think we should quit throwing around 'proposition' and 'judgment' and 'inference' in ways that allow people to give those words their preferred reading. — Srap Tasmaner

Yep. :up:

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Kimhi believes that Fregean logic doesn't permit the inference (1) S is F; (2) A thinks that S is F; (3) Thus, A truly thinks that S is F. — J

I don't think Kimhi appreciates the objectivity of Frege's judgment-stroke, and therefore this critique seems misplaced. I think that inference holds for Frege, it's just that he may not want to draw out such metalogical implications.

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So the words are a bit wooly because Frege's allegedly made a model of something wooly that has no wool in it, and our fellow travellers are seeking and analysing the wool. — fdrake

:up: