Philo-babble usually precedes unfortunate conclusions.


The question is whether or not you think potential life has value, and whether or not it can be terminated with impunity.

AND

Whether or not you feel like governments should get a say in any of it.


'Yay for 1 (ergo. potential life has value, and cannot be terminated with impunity) and 'Nay' for 2 (governments should not be given the power to decide whether or not women shall give birth).


So the question becomes, how do we deal with moral issues that cannot be arbitrated by governments?

Well, we can't, really.


It turns out some things should be left to people to figure out amongst themselves, because governments can't be trusted with the kind of power that would allow them to decide otherwise.

Then what of the head transplant? My head is removed and kept alive (and conscious) by one machine and my torso kept alive by another machine. Are there now two people instead of one? Which one is me? The same procedure is also performed on Jane. Which one is Jane? My head is then attached to Jane's body and Jane's head is then attached to my body. Which organism is Jane and which organism is me? The person with my head and Jane's body will have all of my memories and will think of itself as me, and the person with Jane's head and my body will have all of Jane's memories and will think of itself as Jane. And that's all the matters.

I don't know. I don’t get similar intuitions. I suppose these beings would neither be you nor jane, but a mix of the two, a chimera. On the one hand you have Jane’s fingerprints, her body, on the other hand she has a different eye, hair color, and dental records. The biological markers of this person’s identification are skewed. But only one part of her is different. And given that you have a female body, and most of the markers of her identification (height, weight, sex), I can only say that you are mostly Jane. This suggests to me that Jane is mostly still Jane, even with your head.

Does your notion of identity not include biological markers of identity?

All human being go through that stage, just as many of them go through the stage of childhood. Zygotes, neonates, children, adults—these are stages, not different organisms. — NOS4A2

No, it's not the same organism, because it isn't identical. You aren't strictly identical to the NOS4A2 of yesterday: some cells have died, some replaced. On the other hand, the only thing you have in common with the zygote from which you emerged is a similar (but not identical) sequence of DNA. So what does it mean to share an identity with something that is not identical?

A 2-inch diameter ball of pure snow rolls down a snow-covered mountain. During the descent, more snow is compacted into it, and it picks up dirt and pine needles on the way, growing into a 20-ft diameter ball of snow and other debris. Does the 20-ft diameter ball share an identity with the 2-incher? If it hit a tree on the way down and split in half, which half gets the identity of the 2-inch original? Does it matter how much of that original is contained in each half?

If an identity endures over time, what is it that is actually enduring?

Consider it from your perspective. You undergo the operation. When you wake up do you start identifying as Jane simply because you have her arms and legs and chest and organs? Or do you continue to identify as NOS4A2, having grown up in wherever it is that NOS4A2 grew up in, your (only) parents being NOS4A2's parents? You don't have Jane's memories, not because you forgot, but because you're not Jane.

What if it was just a limb transplant? What if it was just a heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver transplant? How much of the body (excluding the brain) would it take for you to "become" someone else?

But to answer your question, the only "biological marker" that matters to me is the brain because that's where my consciousness is found, either reducible to neurological activity or as some supervenient phenomenon. The rest is incidental.

This is hte crux; good stuff.

When you wake up, would you think "where is my mind?". Surely not. Would you look down - see two legs and think "where are my legs"?

Are the ones you now have Jane's legs? Then you're still you. Are they your legs? Then you're Jane.

If I woke up with amnesia or hallucinating I was Jesus, with no accurate Hanover memory, I'm still Hanover.

Isn't this just a Ship of Theseus question?

If I woke up with amnesia or hallucinating I was Jesus, with no accurate Hanover memory, I'm still Hanover. — Hanover

I'm not saying that he's not Jane because he doesn't have Jane's memories; I'm saying that he doesn't have Jane's memories because he's not Jane.

Isn't this just a Ship of Theseus question? — Hanover

I think that if we take any one part of the Ship of Theseus and replace it with a new part then it's still the Ship of Theseus, but that if we "replace" my head (and brain) with a new head (and brain) then it's no longer me, it's someone else. I'm the disembodied head living in a jar like in Futurama. There certainly can't be two of me, which would seem to follow from NOS4A2's position.

I think that if we take any one part of the Ship of Theseus and replace it with a new part then it's still the Ship of Theseus, but that if we "replace" my head (and brain) with a new head (and brain) then it's no longer me, it's someone else. I'm the disembodied head living in a jar like in Futurama. There certainly can't be two of me, which would seem to follow from NOS4A2's position. — Michael

I don't know. I think you can play with these analogies to come up with anything, which is why essentialism is hard to maintain in any form. If you awoke with all your memories in Jane's body, you'd say you were you now in Jane's body even if your brain matter were entirely different. You also say you're you today even though you share no atom in common with your childhood self. If you lost all your memories when you were 10 years old and now had all new memories at 30 years of age, you'd still say you've maintained identity over time even though you share neither memories or cells with your former self.

If you took boards off the Ship of Theseus and rebuilt a new ship with those boards slowly (as you also replaced boards on your original ship), you could argue you've simply moved the ship piece by piece, and you could also argue that the other ship remained the Ship of Theseus because it maintained the same design and functionality over time. That is, you'd end up with two Ships of Theseus.

I'm not denying the significance of brains and memories in how they define identity, but there's always a counterexample that can be found to whatever definition you arrive at.

I'm just considering a very simple example; Jane and I are decapitated, but our heads (and so brains) are kept alive. Jane's head (and so brain) is attached to my body and my head (and so brain) is placed in a jar.

Given that I cannot be two people it cannot be that I am both the person with a body and the person in the jar. Either I am one of them or neither of them.

My claim is that I am the person in the jar and that Jane is the person with a body. I think that any reasonable person should accept this, showing that the brain plays a special role in establishing identity that is very unlike that of any other organ.

Any position which entails a) I am the person with a body, b) I am not the person in the jar, or c) I am both the person with a body and the person in the jar is wrong. — Michael

If you were in a vegetative state on a table and your brain was removed to the jar, there'd be no distinction between the you on the table and the you in the jar. That is, there is a position that entails you are the person with the body, you are the person in the jar, and you are the person in the body and the jar. If you say you are not both on the table and in the jar, then which one is you?

The reason we get this result is because you are equating the brain to the contents of the brain, namely the memories and the phenomenal state of consciousness. That is, you are positing your memories and consciousness as your essence, and so when I remove those things from the brain, the body tissue and brain tissue become equal under an essence analysis.

But that creates even more complexities because even if those memories and the feeling of personal identity linked to your being Michael were to corrupt, we'd still say you were Michael. That is, if we took your brain out and put in the jar and that made you think you were someone else, we'd still assert yourself to be you because you had the same brain. But who is the person on the table?

And then suppose we could download your brain contents to another brain such that it replicated the mental contents of the first one and gave that other entity the exact feeling of Michaelness you have? Would we have two Michaels? What if the download from Michael 1 to Michael 2 was an actual transfer such that Michael 1 was empty of thoughts once Michael 2 was filled up? Who would be Micheal then?

I would re-write your statement to be: If I am my brain, then "Any position which entails a) I am the person with a body, b) I am not the person in the jar, or c) I am both the person with a body and the person in the jar is wrong."

We then just have to find situations where the antecdent is not satisfied or at least calls it into question.

I would re-write your statement to be: If I am my brain, then "Any position which entails a) I am the person with a body, b) I am not the person in the jar, or c) I am both the person with a body and the person in the jar is wrong."

We then just have to find situations where the antecdent is not satisfied or at least calls it into question. — Hanover

As discussed in the other thread, if the antecedent is false then the material conditional is true, i.e “if P then Q” is true if “P” is false.

And then suppose we could download your brain contents to another brain such that it replicated the mental contents of the first one and gave that other entity the exact feeling of Michaelness you have? Would we have two Michaels? What if the download from Michael 1 to Michael 2 was an actual transfer such that Michael 1 was empty of thoughts once Michael 2 was filled up? Who would be Micheal then? — Hanover

There would be two people who each identify as being Michael, and we would identify one as being the original and the other as being a copy (and they would perhaps identify themselves the same way).

If you were in a vegetative state on a table and your brain was removed to the jar, there'd be no distinction between the you on the table and the you in the jar. That is, there is a position that entails you are the person with the body, you are the person in the jar, and you are the person in the body and the jar. If you say you are not both on the table and in the jar, then which one is you? — Hanover

I’m not sure specifically about a vegetative state, but in the case of brain death there is no person any more, just a body.

In the case I was considering the head is kept alive, like on Futurama. It can think and see and talk.

If I cut off my arm, the arm on the table isn’t me. If I cut out my liver, the liver on the table isn’t me. If I cut off both arms, both legs, and cut out every organ except my brain, heart, and lungs then all the pieces on the table aren’t me. If I cut out my heart and lungs (using a machine to keep oxygenated blood flowing to my brain) then the heart and lungs on the table aren’t me.

There would be two people who each identify as being Michael, and we would identify one as being the original and the other as being a copy (and they would perhaps identify themselves the same way). — Michael

Are you identifying the brain as Michael, or just the contents of that brain? If I download a pdf to your computer, why does the original RAM where the pdf was stored matter in terms of pdf identity? Does it matter if I cut and paste the pdf or if I copy and paste the pdf in terms of where the true pdf is?

When Frank reads my post and you read my post, which post is the original that is being read?

I'd say the program is the code regardless of where it's stored in terms of identifying the program.

The brain in the jar is you if it contains your thoughts, which is why a vegetative brain is no different than you arm. Your essence isn't the brain. It's what the brain happens to be storing, which means you could be you in someone else's brain or on a USB drive.

What we then need to do is itemize all your thoughts, emotions, perceptions, and whatever else is stored in that hard drive and then zap them dead one at a time. Once you stop being you, we can then know what essential thought made you you once and for all. But we're talking about internal feeling now, not brains. The brain is just vehicle with a person behind the wheel in your example, but not the person itself, right?

Are you identifying the brain as Michael, or just the contents of that brain? — Hanover

I'm undecided. I don't know whether consciousness is reducible to neurological activity or if it's some (non-physical?) supervenient phenomenon.

I am only explaining that a brain transplant is unlike a heart transplant. I can replace my heart with another's but I cannot replace my brain with another's.

The brain in the jar is you if it contains your thoughts, which is why a vegetative brain is no different than you arm. Your essence isn't the brain. It's what the brain happens to be storing, which means you could be you in someone else's brain or on a USB drive. — Hanover

I don't think that's quite right. There's a difference between a working clock and a broken clock, but it's not like the working clock has some additional entity that can be taken from it and added to a different clock; it's just the case that a different clock can be made to behave in the exact same type of way.

Brains are perhaps just very complicated clocks. I am a specific (living) brain. Any other brain made to behave in the exact same type of way is a different token individual.

Sorry, I thought I hit “post” days ago.

Consider it from your perspective. You undergo the operation. When you wake up do you start identifying as Jane simply because you have her arms and legs and chest and organs? Or do you continue to identify as NOS4A2, having grown up in wherever it is that NOS4A2 grew up in, your (only) parents being NOS4A2's parents? You don't have Jane's memories, not because you forgot, but because you're not Jane.

I would be deceased. Jane would identify as Jane because it is Jane that is still surviving, still alive. I say this because one person’s body, via the immune system, would reject the other’s. I suspect that it would be Jane’s immune system rejecting my tissue, meaning my tissue is foreign, ie. not of the person.

What if it was just a limb transplant? What if it was just a heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver transplant? How much of the body (excluding the brain) would it take for you to "become" someone else?

All of it could be changed. So long as the survival of the organism or animal is maintained I remain the same organism or animal.

But to answer your question, the only "biological marker" that matters to me is the brain because that's where my consciousness is found, either reducible to neurological activity or as some supervenient phenomenon. The rest is incidental.

If we could split your brain, put one half in body A, the other half in body B, where is your location as a person?

I would be deceased. Jane would identify as Jane because it is Jane that is still surviving, still alive. I say this because one’s person’s body, via the immune system, would reject the other’s. I suspect that it would be Jane’s immune system rejecting my tissue, meaning my tissue is foreign, ie. not of the person. — NOS4A2

So, for you, a brain transplant is a memory and personality transplant? Jane receives your brain and with it loses her memories and personality but gains yours in their place?

So long as the survival of the organism or animal is maintained I remain the same organism or animal. — NOS4A2

What counts as an organism?

We've mentioned before that there are five "vital" organs; brain, heart, lungs, liver, and kidneys. At the very least we both appear to accept that we can replace the heart and still be the same person, replace the lungs and still be the same person, replace the liver and still be the same person, and replace the kidneys and still be the same person.

So let's say we separate your body into two, one part containing the brain, liver, and kidneys, and another part containing the heart and lungs. Each part's missing organs are replaced with artificial alternatives, sufficient to keep them all alive.

Are there two living organisms? Which one are you? I say the one with the brain.

If we could split your brain, put one half in body A, the other half in body B, where is your location as a person? — NOS4A2

I don't think either would be me. I'd be dead (even if the rest of my body is kept alive by machines), and there'd be two new people (assuming that half a brain is capable of supporting a sufficient level of consciousness).

I'm curious; let's assume that brain transplants are possible and easy and that you have been diagnosed with terminal brain cancer. Would you accept a brain transplant as a cure (with your diseased brain being destroyed)?

Because I certainly wouldn't. I understand that this would mean my death.

Because I certainly wouldn't. I understand that this would mean my death. — Michael

What if they could upload your consciousness and store it until the new body is ready?

What if they could upload your consciousness and store it until the new body is ready? — frank

An upload is just a copy, it's not me. It's not like there's some physical substance that is literally removed from my brain and placed on a computer for safekeeping.

So, for you, a brain transplant is a memory and personality transplant? Jane receives your brain and with it loses her memories and personality but gains yours in their place?

I've never been a brain. My memories and personality have only ever related to a certain organism.

What counts as an organism?

We've mentioned before that there are five "vital" organs; brain, heart, lungs, liver, and kidneys. At the very least we both appear to accept that we can replace the heart and still be the same person, replace the lungs and still be the same person, replace the liver and still be the same person, and replace the kidneys and still be the same person.

So let's say we separate your body into two, one part containing the brain, liver, and kidneys, and another part containing the heart and lungs. Each part's missing organs are replaced with artificial alternatives, sufficient to keep them all alive.

Are there two living organisms? Which one are you? I say the one with the brain.

I would remain as one organism, except I'd be one that's been cut in half. So I guess I'd have to choose both sides as me.

I don't think either would be me. I'd be dead (even if the rest of my body is kept alive by machines), and there'd be two new people (assuming that half a brain is capable of supporting a sufficient level of consciousness).

How would you die? Split-brain patients can live through such a procedure.

I'm curious; let's assume that brain transplants are possible and easy and that you have been diagnosed with terminal brain cancer. Would you accept a brain transplant as a cure (with your diseased brain being destroyed)?

Because I certainly wouldn't. I understand that this would mean my death.

I wouldn't because it would be extremely painful and debilitating. I would choose death before that. But if I did I don't think I'd be numerically identical to someone else.

An upload is just a copy, it's not me. It's not like there's some physical substance that is literally removed from my brain and placed on a computer for safekeeping. — Michael

Physical substance is removed pretty regularly from your brain, though. Brain cells eat and poop like all other living things. Do little bits of you go down the toilet with the neuron poop?

I've never been a brain. My memories and personality have only ever related to a certain organism. — NOS4A2

That doesn't answer my question. Jane's brain is removed and replaced with yours. According to you, it's still Jane. But given that memories are stored in the brain, it would then follow that Jane no longer has her (original) memories and instead has yours. So she remembers growing up as a boy named [your name] rather than as a girl named Jane.

I would remain as one organism, except I'd be one that's been cut in half. So I guess I'd have to choose both sides as me. — NOS4A2

But there are two unconnected bodies. How can they be one organism?

How would you die? Split-brain patients can live through such a procedure. — NOS4A2

"Split brain" patients aren't fully split. They are still joined at the stem. It's only the connection between the hemispheres that is removed.

I wouldn't because it would be extremely painful and debilitating. I would choose death before that. But if I did I don't think I'd be numerically identical to someone else. — NOS4A2

In this scenario it isn't extremely painful and debilitating. We're advanced enough that it's like a kidney transplant.

But my point is that it would be death, so it's not a choice between living (in pain) or dying; it's a choice between dying of brain cancer or dying of brain extraction-and-destruction, i.e. you're opting for euthanasia.

The body that's kept alive by a new brain just ain't you.

That doesn't answer my question. Jane's brain is removed and replaced with yours. According to you, it's still Jane. But given that memories are stored in the brain, it would then follow that Jane no longer has her (original) memories and instead has yours. So she remembers growing up as a boy named [your name] rather than as a girl named Jane.

I doubt she remembers anything. She’d have to form new memories.

But there are two unconnected bodies. How can they be one organism?

You cut it in half.

"Split brain" patients aren't fully split. They are still joined at the stem. It's only the connection between the hemispheres that is removed.

So how did you as a person die if both halves of your brain survived and were placed in two different heads?

In this scenario it isn't extremely painful and debilitating. We're advanced enough that it's like a kidney transplant.

But my point is that it would be death, so it's not a choice between living (in pain) or dying; it's a choice between dying of brain cancer or dying of brain extraction-and-destruction, i.e. you're opting for euthanasia.

The body that's kept alive by a new brain just ain't you.

I just don’t see how I would die if I was still alive after such a procedure.

I doubt she remembers anything. She’d have to form new memories. — NOS4A2

The brain has all the connections it had before it was removed from your body, so she will have your memories.

And I think that's absurd. It's not the case that Jane forgets her life and remembers yours; it's the case that Jane is dead and you're alive in her body.

You cut it in half. — NOS4A2

Yes, and in doing so it became two organisms, such as what happens naturally with some worms.

So how did you as a person die if both halves of your brain survived and were placed in two different heads? — NOS4A2

I can't be a single person in two disconnected bodies with two disconnected brains, and neither half is somehow privileged such that one is me and the other isn't. So it must be that neither is me. Therefore I'm dead.

I just don’t see how I would die if I was still alive after such a procedure. — NOS4A2

You wouldn't still be alive, you'd be dead. The body would still be alive, but the body isn't you. The body now belongs to someone else (the person whose brain replaced yours).

There's a reason that a "brain transplant" is also called a "whole-body transplant".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_transplant

A brain transplant or whole-body transplant is a procedure in which the brain of one organism is transplanted into the body of another organism ... Theoretically, a person with complete organ failure could be given a new and functional body while keeping their own personality, memories, and consciousness through such a procedure.

I think this is the proper way to understand it.

No, not at all. Your example does the same as mine, but the 'biological method' is different. If you simply cannot remember who you are - look down and go "whos legs are these?" you're not the owner of those legs. In this case, I just don't have a name for hwo you are - your psychology has only just now come into existence. Name yourself!
This isn't particularly difficult to grasp, I don't think. It just gives us the extremely uncomfortable conclusion that (for example) in a situation of teletransportation, you die. You don't come to in place 2. You simply die. Someone new, with your same memories, exists in place 2. For some, that is comforting. As long as someone who will be you continues to drive toward your goals and desires, all is well. For me, its terrifying.

Now, that runs counter to most intuitions about identity, for sure. But that is likely irrelevant. As regards Ship of Theseus, no. I am expressly avoiding that question. The body is not that relevant - it just a way of testing the conclusion as against the opposite (i.e "oh! Those are my legs" would indicate no change in psychological continuity in the Jane example).

It just gives us the extremely uncomfortable conclusion that (for example) in a situation of teletransportation, you die. You don't come to in place 2. You simply die. Someone new, with your same memories, exists in place 2. — AmadeusD

Why do I have to use teleportation? Why can't I just say I existed as a baby at Time 1, Location 1 and now I'm at Time 1,000 at Location 1,000? This creates the same situation. I have nothing in common with myself across all those times and locations, not even a consistency of memory. Do I die and get reborn every time I shed my old body for my new one?

You don't have to interrupt the time/space continuim to create these questions. I still think they're just Ship of Theseus problems dealing with identity.

Still clinging to essentialism. There need be no specified thing that makes you, you. If you lose your memory, who is it who can't recall? The rope is a rope, even though no specific thread runs it's whole length.

Why do I have to use teleportation? — Hanover

I didn't say you did. It was an example. Which is what I posited it as. Bizarre question.

Why can't I just say I existed as a baby at Time 1, Location 1 and now I'm at Time 1,000 at Location 1,000? — Hanover

Because you wouldn't think this was the case. It wouldn't be open to you in my example, which is clearly, and vastly different to yours. You wouldn't be saying it. You'd be dead.
In your case, you DO have the memories. You have psychological continuity. You're free to say you were not 'you' before, say, age 4 when clear memories coalesced. That is another semi-discomforting conclusion from the Relation R take (i.e psychological continuity) which terrifies me, and comforts others. These two ways of thinking aren't really in any kind of conflict.

It's always very hard to know what hte heck Banno is trying to say, as he tends to do drive-by thought-wanking but it seems he's pointing hte same out.

Your continuity as you is all that matters. If that continuity is irreversibly broken (i.e there is no one alive who remembers being you) then you don't exist anymore. This doesn't require any essentialism. It requires a vague, but obviously felt, reality of psychological continuity.

I still think they're just Ship of Theseus problems dealing with identity. — Hanover

Then I'd say you're not adequately contending with the ideas put forward. Mine are specifically designed to avoid that insurmountable sorities issue.

In your case, you DO have the memories. — AmadeusD

I'm really not following. I'm not just trying to be difficult. Why do you lose memories when you teleport and why do you posit that I have a continuous memory from birth to now? You're distinguishing your example from mine, and I don't see how teleporting erases memory and I don't see why moving slowly through life preserves it.

I thought teleporting challenged identity because it was not possible to show what of the same matter existed from Point A to Point B. Everything disappeared and went away and then popped back. I get how that causes an indentity problem.

But if I go from Point A to Point B over 50 years and not a single same cell or single same memory exists from age 1 to age 50, then don't I have the same identity problem as you noted in the teleporting?

And then how isn't all this Ship of Theseus problems?

Here is a thought experiment - I do not think it is mine, but I cannot remember whose it is - that seems to imply something important about the nature of the self or mind.

I should say, in my limited experience most people seem to start out with a view about what the self is and then just stick to it, rather than trying to extract the implications of our intuitions about cases. I take it to be obvious that this is a wrong-headed approach as, by hypothesis, we are trying to find out what kind of an entity the mind is and so shouldn't start out thinking we already know.

Imagine there's a machine made by someone famous. Turing, say. As such it is worth a fortune. Imagine we start the machine working. And now imagine that, without interrupting its functioning, we start gradually replacing its parts (the machine has some redundancy built in, so this is possible - that is, we can remove individual parts without stopping it working, so long as we do so bit by bit, replacing them as we go).

Eventually all the parts have been replaced. There is still a functioning machine there. All the parts that were removed were then reassembled. So now there are two machines side by side, and one of them is functioning away and has never ceased functioning.

There's an auction coming up. Which of the two machines is worth a fortune? The second one, obviously. The one that is made of the parts crafted by Turing. So, not the machine that's functioning, but the one beside it.

What can we conclude? That the 'valuable' machine is the one made of the parts that Turing crafted. That's why the value tracks the bits, not the functioning.

Applied to brains and minds, if our minds are our brains, then minds track brain matter. And that would mean that if we engaged in the same procedure as that outlined above - so gradually removed parts of a brain without interrupting its functioning and reassembled them beside it, so that eventually we have two brains - then it would be the reaassmbled brain that would be the mind that was previouisly in the position of the functioning mind.

On the other hand, if the mind stays with the functioning, then the mind stays where it is and the reassembled brain is either just a lump of meat or another mind, but it isn't the original one.

I don't know about you, but my reason represents - and represents very clearly - the original brain whose functioning has not been interrupted to remain the bearer of the mind. That seems to me to imply that my mind tracks my consciousness, not the matter of my brain.

But it also seems clear that whether consciousness is interrupted or not also makes no difference, for it seems counter-intuitive to suppose that if there was an interruption the mind would suddenly go with the material of the brain and not stay where it is.

In that case, this seems to imply that my mind is not the matter of my brain, nor is it my consciousness, but is instead something that (sometimes) has consciousness

I don't really see how this illuminates the abortion issue, however, as whatever the mind is - whether material or immaterial - the question of whether the fetus has one remains.

It's not as if belief in the soul commits one to thinking that the soul is in the fetus from the moment of conception, or at any other point, up to and including birth.

This is something that puzzles me over the abortion debate. Those on the 'soul' side seem to think they're somehow committed to thinking the fetus is a person....why? Whatever kind of a thing the mind is, this doesn't seem to me to shed light on the morality of abortion...