Then what of the head transplant? My head is removed and kept alive (and conscious) by one machine and my torso kept alive by another machine. Are there now two people instead of one? Which one is me? The same procedure is also performed on Jane. Which one is Jane? My head is then attached to Jane's body and Jane's head is then attached to my body. Which organism is Jane and which organism is me? The person with my head and Jane's body will have all of my memories and will think of itself as me, and the person with Jane's head and my body will have all of Jane's memories and will think of itself as Jane. And that's all the matters.
All human being go through that stage, just as many of them go through the stage of childhood. Zygotes, neonates, children, adults—these are stages, not different organisms. — NOS4A2
If I woke up with amnesia or hallucinating I was Jesus, with no accurate Hanover memory, I'm still Hanover. — Hanover
Isn't this just a Ship of Theseus question? — Hanover
I think that if we take any one part of the Ship of Theseus and replace it with a new part then it's still the Ship of Theseus, but that if we "replace" my head (and brain) with a new head (and brain) then it's no longer me, it's someone else. I'm the disembodied head living in a jar like in Futurama. There certainly can't be two of me, which would seem to follow from NOS4A2's position. — Michael
Any position which entails a) I am the person with a body, b) I am not the person in the jar, or c) I am both the person with a body and the person in the jar is wrong. — Michael
I would re-write your statement to be: If I am my brain, then "Any position which entails a) I am the person with a body, b) I am not the person in the jar, or c) I am both the person with a body and the person in the jar is wrong."
We then just have to find situations where the antecdent is not satisfied or at least calls it into question. — Hanover
And then suppose we could download your brain contents to another brain such that it replicated the mental contents of the first one and gave that other entity the exact feeling of Michaelness you have? Would we have two Michaels? What if the download from Michael 1 to Michael 2 was an actual transfer such that Michael 1 was empty of thoughts once Michael 2 was filled up? Who would be Micheal then? — Hanover
If you were in a vegetative state on a table and your brain was removed to the jar, there'd be no distinction between the you on the table and the you in the jar. That is, there is a position that entails you are the person with the body, you are the person in the jar, and you are the person in the body and the jar. If you say you are not both on the table and in the jar, then which one is you? — Hanover
There would be two people who each identify as being Michael, and we would identify one as being the original and the other as being a copy (and they would perhaps identify themselves the same way). — Michael
Are you identifying the brain as Michael, or just the contents of that brain? — Hanover
The brain in the jar is you if it contains your thoughts, which is why a vegetative brain is no different than you arm. Your essence isn't the brain. It's what the brain happens to be storing, which means you could be you in someone else's brain or on a USB drive. — Hanover
Consider it from your perspective. You undergo the operation. When you wake up do you start identifying as Jane simply because you have her arms and legs and chest and organs? Or do you continue to identify as NOS4A2, having grown up in wherever it is that NOS4A2 grew up in, your (only) parents being NOS4A2's parents? You don't have Jane's memories, not because you forgot, but because you're not Jane.
What if it was just a limb transplant? What if it was just a heart, lungs, kidneys, and liver transplant? How much of the body (excluding the brain) would it take for you to "become" someone else?
But to answer your question, the only "biological marker" that matters to me is the brain because that's where my consciousness is found, either reducible to neurological activity or as some supervenient phenomenon. The rest is incidental.
I would be deceased. Jane would identify as Jane because it is Jane that is still surviving, still alive. I say this because one’s person’s body, via the immune system, would reject the other’s. I suspect that it would be Jane’s immune system rejecting my tissue, meaning my tissue is foreign, ie. not of the person. — NOS4A2
So long as the survival of the organism or animal is maintained I remain the same organism or animal. — NOS4A2
If we could split your brain, put one half in body A, the other half in body B, where is your location as a person? — NOS4A2
So, for you, a brain transplant is a memory and personality transplant? Jane receives your brain and with it loses her memories and personality but gains yours in their place?
What counts as an organism?
We've mentioned before that there are five "vital" organs; brain, heart, lungs, liver, and kidneys. At the very least we both appear to accept that we can replace the heart and still be the same person, replace the lungs and still be the same person, replace the liver and still be the same person, and replace the kidneys and still be the same person.
So let's say we separate your body into two, one part containing the brain, liver, and kidneys, and another part containing the heart and lungs. Each part's missing organs are replaced with artificial alternatives, sufficient to keep them all alive.
Are there two living organisms? Which one are you? I say the one with the brain.
I don't think either would be me. I'd be dead (even if the rest of my body is kept alive by machines), and there'd be two new people (assuming that half a brain is capable of supporting a sufficient level of consciousness).
I'm curious; let's assume that brain transplants are possible and easy and that you have been diagnosed with terminal brain cancer. Would you accept a brain transplant as a cure (with your diseased brain being destroyed)?
Because I certainly wouldn't. I understand that this would mean my death.
An upload is just a copy, it's not me. It's not like there's some physical substance that is literally removed from my brain and placed on a computer for safekeeping. — Michael
I've never been a brain. My memories and personality have only ever related to a certain organism. — NOS4A2
I would remain as one organism, except I'd be one that's been cut in half. So I guess I'd have to choose both sides as me. — NOS4A2
How would you die? Split-brain patients can live through such a procedure. — NOS4A2
I wouldn't because it would be extremely painful and debilitating. I would choose death before that. But if I did I don't think I'd be numerically identical to someone else. — NOS4A2
That doesn't answer my question. Jane's brain is removed and replaced with yours. According to you, it's still Jane. But given that memories are stored in the brain, it would then follow that Jane no longer has her (original) memories and instead has yours. So she remembers growing up as a boy named [your name] rather than as a girl named Jane.
But there are two unconnected bodies. How can they be one organism?
"Split brain" patients aren't fully split. They are still joined at the stem. It's only the connection between the hemispheres that is removed.
In this scenario it isn't extremely painful and debilitating. We're advanced enough that it's like a kidney transplant.
But my point is that it would be death, so it's not a choice between living (in pain) or dying; it's a choice between dying of brain cancer or dying of brain extraction-and-destruction, i.e. you're opting for euthanasia.
The body that's kept alive by a new brain just ain't you.
I doubt she remembers anything. She’d have to form new memories. — NOS4A2
You cut it in half. — NOS4A2
So how did you as a person die if both halves of your brain survived and were placed in two different heads? — NOS4A2
I just don’t see how I would die if I was still alive after such a procedure. — NOS4A2
A brain transplant or whole-body transplant is a procedure in which the brain of one organism is transplanted into the body of another organism ... Theoretically, a person with complete organ failure could be given a new and functional body while keeping their own personality, memories, and consciousness through such a procedure.
It just gives us the extremely uncomfortable conclusion that (for example) in a situation of teletransportation, you die. You don't come to in place 2. You simply die. Someone new, with your same memories, exists in place 2. — AmadeusD
Why do I have to use teleportation? — Hanover
Why can't I just say I existed as a baby at Time 1, Location 1 and now I'm at Time 1,000 at Location 1,000? — Hanover
I still think they're just Ship of Theseus problems dealing with identity. — Hanover
In your case, you DO have the memories. — AmadeusD
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