You haven’t shown it. You just asserted it.

Do you think it is possible to know whether the claim that there are unknowable truths is true?

“All truths are knowable” cannot be unknowably true.

Therefore one of these is true:

1. “All truths are knowable” is knowably true
2. “All truths are knowable” is false

The anti-realist believes (1) and the realist believes (2).

You haven’t justified (2), only asserted it.

So pragmatically that leaves us with (4) and (5). How do we decide between them without knowing any unknown truths? — Michael

1. “All truths are knowable” is knowably true
2. “All truths are knowable” is false — Michael

Answer the question I posed:

Do you think it is possible to know whether the claim that there are unknowable truths is true? — Janus

It is obviously impossible even in principle. because no matter how many truths we know there could always be an unknowable truth.

But then if the truth as to whether there are unknowable truths is known to be unknowable, then we know that there is at least one unknowable truth. Address that and stop with the red herrings.

Answer the question I posed: Do you think it is possible to know whether the claim that there are unknowable truths is true? — Janus

I don't have a position, but here are the options:

1. "there are unknowable truths" is knowably true
2. "there are unknowable truths" is unknowably true
3. "there are unknowable truths" is knowably false
4. "there are unknowable truths" is unknowably false

Anti-realists believe (3). (4) is a contradiction.

That leaves you with either (1) or (2).

If (1) is true then (2) is false and so you cannot use (2) to justify (1), which is what you appear to be trying to do.

It is obviously impossible even in principle. because no matter how many truths we know there could always be an unknowable truth. — Janus

This is begging the question.

“….The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a representation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned….” — Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Legacy

“….. France's greatest thinker, Rene Descartes, gave transcendental phenomenology new impulses through his Meditations; their study acted quite directly on the transformation of an already developing phenomenology into a new kind of transcendental philosophy. Accordingly one might almost
call transcendental phenomenology a neo-Cartesianism, even though it is obliged — and precisely by its radical development of Cartesian motifs — to reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy….”
(Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, Intro,1931, in Cairns, 1960)

“…. the idea of science and philosophy involves an order of cognition, proceeding from intrinsically earlier to intrinsically later cognitions, ultimately, then, a beginning and a line of advance that are not to be chosen arbitrarily but have their basis "in the nature of things themselves"….”
(Ibid, 1 Med, #12)

“…. By this preliminary work, here roughly indicated rather than done explicitly, we have gained a measure of clarity sufficient to let us fix, for our whole further procedure, a first methodological principle. It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence , from "experiences" in which the affairs and affair-complexes in
question are present to me as "they themselves"….”
(Ibid 1Med, #13)

So…apparently, not representation of mind-independent things, but mind-independent things as such? Which I suppose must be done, if the object is to make Husserl-ian transcendental metaphysics a science in itself, which prior Enlightenment analytics had already established as being impossible.
————

All well and good…it’s what philosophers do, make what was once determined as impossible seem possible after all. But having been exposed to a situation…..

“….. Instead of a unitary living philosophy, we have a philosophical literature growing beyond all bounds and almost without coherence. Instead of a serious discussion among conflicting theories that, in their very conflict, demonstrate the intimacy with which they belong together, the commonness of
their underlying convictions, and an unswerving belief in a true philosophy, we have a pseudo-reporting and a pseudo-criticizing, a mere semblance of philosophizing seriously with and for one
another. This hardly attests a mutual study carried on with a consciousness of responsibility, in the spirit that characterizes serious collaboration and an intention to produce objectively valid results. "Objectively [objektiv] valid results" — the phrase, after all, signifies nothing but results that have been refined by mutual criticism and that now withstand every criticism. But how could actual study and actual collaboration be possible, where there are so many philosophers and almost equally many
philosophies? To be sure, we still have philosophical congresses. The philosophers meet but, unfortunately, not the philosophies. The philosophies lack the unity of a mental space in which they
might exist for and act on one another….”

….it stands to reason the won’t ever be a “unitary living philosophy”, given the propensity for none of them being able to “withstand every criticism”, a sorrowful vastness of which is “mere semblance of philosophizing seriously”.

Besides….what would the alleged transcendental ego be, if not the immediate precursor for that very “mental space in which they might exist for and act upon one another”? I find it quite odd the two majority shareholders of transcendental idealism posit such conception, but only one of them doesn’t subtract from it in his theory, what he’s already prescribed for it in his speculative deductions.

All that to express interest in a forthcoming (?) metaphysical heuristic predicated on abandonment of “the very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a representation of something mind-independent…”, at least with regards to empirical knowledge.

1. Deny the existence of mind-independent objects and/or

2. We cannot grasp the features of external objects which happen to be mind-independent and/or

3. We cannot justify our knowledge of mind-independent objects — Sirius

Imo, I want to remove 1. because I don't see how you can do this in a way which [doesn't] either suggests you hold a view like idealism or is just something that has been expressed by 2.

Regarding 2.? I think the problem is that realists and anti-realists will often assent to the same "facts" about reality or at least acknowledge them. The issue is that they have different notions of what it means to "grasp" which in a way is kind of subjective. I feel like realists may actually agree with an anti-realists analysis of how science works but they just consider this enough to "grasp". Then again, when asked what "grasp" means or related terms like "ontology you just get into dead ends imo that compromise whether "real" has any kind of useful, distinctive meaning beyond use in contexts which are just that... context-dependent, dependent on one's personal use of language and perception and envisioning. Ofcourse, the Davidsonian/Banno-ian does not consider this a barrier to realism as long as you can seemingly, coherently say things are 'true' or 'false'. I have sympathy for this because I have no problem with people saying things are 'true' or 'false' or making similar assertions, including myself. I just don't think such things have a determinate, unambiguous meaning when you look at it in higher order terms. Its not clear what people mean when they say things are 'true' or 'false' or whatever in a way which is[n't] context-dependent or relies on prior assumptions or relies on other people just agreeing or understanding you, which doesn't necessarily imply anything else about reality imo, [at least not in a metaphysically fundamental sense, albeit perhaps still in the sense that you can agree where Paris is and behave coherently in a physical world because of that. If you want to be extremely blunt and coarse and commonsensical you might then say that we agree that Paris has an objective physical existence].

Regarding 3. ? Similarly, I have no idea what justify means and I don't think anyone can give me a good version of that which anymore overcomes the drawbacks of my analysis in my preceding paragraph. Similarly to before, realists and anti-realists all agree on things like problems of induction and that people often are wrong.

I think realists then rely on the idea that someday we may come across unique "correct" descriptions of reality. But I don't see how a realist can overcome the fact that pluralist descriptions are ubiquitious. It then comes down to whether you think empirical adequacy can be identified with truth. Then again, what 'truth' means rears its head again. Our use of 'truth' is nothing over its use like a 'tool' in how biological organisms use words, communicate, behave. Exactly the same can be said for all facets of theories, ontologies, sciences, folk knowledge.

The whole thing is under-self-specified like some strange loop. [Easy example of this when I make a statement about what truth is... I am clearly acting within the paradigm to making a statement about the paradigm, which risks contradiction given I am trying to deflate 'something is the case' but using it at the same time. But I don't see any conflict since I am acknowledging that when I say these statements, they are about 'use'... but I did it again! Smells like Munchausen trilemma! - correction and to clarify, the Munchausen trilemma reference maybe isn't the best one. I think the strange loop analogy better describes what I meant there maybe. But there is something trilemma-ish about it. The fact that I end up using the same 'something is the case' just clarifies that it really is something one just uses almost automatically if anything, without explicit foundations. And this was always the case! So by clarifying the deflation is not to change something about the way one is using words]

Edited: additions in [ ]

It is obviously impossible even in principle. because no matter how many truths we know there could always be an unknowable truth.
— Janus

This is begging the question. — Michael

What question is it begging?

1. "there are unknowable truths" is knowably true — Michael

I have shown that we know there is at least one unknowable truth. The question is are there unknowable truths apart from the unknowable truth about whether there are other unknowable truths. If there is a truth as to whether there are unknowable truths, then that truth is an unknowable truth. So we know there is at least one unknowable truth. If you think there is something wrong with the reasoning, then say what it is.

I have no doubt there are other unknowable truths, but all that needs to be shown is that there is at least one.

All that to express interest in a forthcoming (?) metaphysical heuristic predicated on abandonment of “the very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a representation of something mind-independent…”, at least with regards to empirical knowledge. — Mww

As I keep saying, there is need for a value judgement, a qualitative criterion of what is best. In Platonism it was the Idea of the Good, later subsumed into theology by the Church Fathers. In Indian philosophy (which is actually a misnomer, as those schools are called darsana. Unlike the term “philosophy,” which originates from the Greek word for “love~wisdom,” darsana emphasizes direct seeing or experiential realization. It is not merely speculative or discursive reasoning but involves an intimate and transformative understanding of the nature of being). Which is what, for example, Heidegger drew attention to with ‘forgetfulness of being’ and ‘alētheia’ or unconcealment.

In any case philosophy as now generally understood has lost sight of that qualitative dimension, on the whole, and with notable exceptions. But the import is that the acuity of perception to see ‘what is’, is an ethical discipline rather than an objective methodology, let’s say.

I have shown that we know there is at least one unknowable truth. — Janus

No you haven't. You've just asserted it, hence why you are begging the question.

If there is a truth as to whether there are unknowable truths, then that truth is an unknowable truth. So we know there is at least one unknowable truth. If you think there is something wrong with the reasoning, then say what it is. — Janus

I explained it in that previous post.

You go from a) "there are unknowable truths" is unknowably true to b) "there are unknowable truths" is knowably true. This is a contradiction. If (a) is true then (b) is false and if (b) is true then (a) is false.

You go from a) "there are unknowable truths" is unknowably true to b) "there are unknowable truths" is knowably true. This is a contradiction. If (a) is true then (b) is false and if (b) is true then (a) is false. — Michael

You are not addressing the argument, I don't say as a starting premise that it is unknowably true that there are unknowable truths I say that at first glance it simply appears to be unknowable—that is it could be true or false and we have no way of knowing which. However if the starting assumption is that the truth or falsity regarding the existence of unknowable truths is unknowable then we know that there is at least one unknowable truth. We don't have to know if there are others because one is enough. There is no contradiction

However if it is right that the truth or falsity regarding the existence of unknowable truths is unknowable then we know that there is at least one unknowable truth. There is no contradiction — Janus

That is literally a contradiction.

The first part in bold is saying that "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable and the second part in bold is saying that "there are unknowable truths" is knowable.

I edited it while you were replying to avoid the contradiction. The first is merely a starting assumption which proves to be false. The point is only that we can show that we know there is at least one unknowable truth. We cannot know whether there are others perhaps, I don't know.

What about all the truths regarding what happened in the pre-human past? Are they unknowable? You might say they are not unknowable in principle.

Whether there are other unknowable truths may be unknowable but that doesn't contradict the fact that we know there is at least one. In fact it is the very fact that we can know whether there are other unknowable truths which proves that we can know that there is at least one.

Perhaps I should have simplified by saying that the claim that there are no unknowable truths is knowably false because we know there is at least that one.

However if the starting assumption is that the truth or falsity regarding the existence of unknowable truths is unknowable then we know that there is at least one unknowable truth. — Janus

You assume "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable and then conclude "there are unknowable truths" is knowable.

This is still a contradiction.

You must pick one of these:

1. "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable
2. "there are unknowable truths" is knowable

If you pick (1) then you cannot conclude (2).
If you pick (2) then you cannot use (1) to justify it.

What about all the truths regarding what happened in the pre-human past? Are they unknowable? You might say they are not unknowable in principle. — Janus

They will likely say that propositions about the past are neither true nor false because they (and their negations) are unverifiable.

You assume "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable and then conclude "there are unknowable truths is knowable". — Michael

I provisionally assume that "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable and then show that this leads to a contradiction, which shows it must be false.

I provisionally assume that "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable and then show that this leads to a contradiction, which shows it must be false. — Janus

Remember that there are four options, not two:

1. "there are unknowable truths" is knowably true
2. "there are unknowable truths" is unknowably true
3. "there are unknowable truths" is knowably false
4. "there are unknowable truths" is unknowably false

(4) is a contradiction so we can rule that out.

If (2) leads to a contradiction, as you say, then we can rule that out.

But that still leaves both (1) and (3). Your suggestion that if (2) is false then (1) is true is a non sequitur.

There are really only two options. Try this:

1. The truth or falsity regarding "there are unknowable truths" is knowable
2. The truth or falsity regarding "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable

2. leads to a contradiction so 1. must be true.

3. and 4. are redundant because being able to or not being able to know the falsity is logically equivalent to being able to or not being able to know the truth

so 1. must be true. — Janus

Yes.

The truth or falsity of "there are unknowable truths" is knowable.

The realist will say that it is knowable that "there are unknowable truths" is true.
The anti-realist will say that it is knowable that "there are unknowable truths" is false.

These are my (1) and (3) respectively.

The anti-realist will say that it is knowable that "there are unknowable truths" is false. — Michael

But that has been shown to be false, so the anti-realist is wrong.

But that has been shown to be false — Janus

No it hasn't.

What do you think the truth or falsity of "there are unknowable truths" is knowable means?

It means that one of these is true:

a) "there are unknowable truths" is true and we can know that it's true
b) "there are unknowable truths" is false and we can know that it's false

You haven't shown that (b) is false.

As an example to explain this, the truth or falsity of "there is a cat in the box" is knowable means that one of these is true:

c) "there is a cat in the box" is true and we can know that it's true
d) "there is a cat in the box" is false and we can know that it's false

There seems to be some sort of self-reference paradox going on here. So let's reframe the question in the hope of gaining more clarity. We know it is impossible to answer the question as to whether there is more than one unknowable truth. We might have an opinion either way but we cannot know. But the very fact that it is impossible to answer the question shows that there is at least one unknowable truth.

Please explain how it could be possible to know whether there is more than one unknowable truth.

We know it is impossible to answer the question as to whether there is more than one unknowable truth. — Janus

This is the very thing that the anti-realist disagrees with. The ant-realist claims that we can know that there are no unknowable truths. In fact, the anti-realist claims that we do know that there are no unknowable truths. To many anti-realists, the very concept of an unknowable truth is incoherent. To many anti-realists, "X is true" means "X is verifiable".

Knowledge, belief, and so on are relations between us and propositions. They are two-placed predicates.

Truth is not relational. It is a single-placed predicate.

One way to think of antirealism is as looking for ways to treat truth as a relation.

The antirealists must be wrong though because they cannot rule out the possibility that unbeknownst to us there might be unknowable truths. Just stipulating that truths are only truths if they are known seems obviously wrong as it does not accord with the common notion of truth. Is there any way they could know rather than merely opine that the common notion of truth is incoherent?

What if the question is changed to whether there are unknowable actualities instead? What about, for example, the question regarding the existence of God? We know we cannot know the answer to that, no matter how plausible or implausible the existence of God might seem. Would you say there cannot be a truth about whether or not God exists, despite that fact that it is obviously impossible to know?

This seems right to me.

But the import is that the acuity of perception to see ‘what is’, is an ethical discipline rather than an objective methodology, let’s say. — Wayfarer

Shouldn’t I then question phenomenology in general, and Husserl in particular, for the notion of a first methodological principle towards a further procedure, as given in the Introduction quote? Just seemed like you were advocating for it, albeit with a Zahava proxy.

I haven’t grasped a form of qualitative value judgement, in keeping with an ethical discipline, in phenomenology, even if some sort of specialized perception for what is, is its objective.

Anyway…thanks. Don’t want to take you any more away from the thread.

The antirealists must be wrong though because they cannot rule out the possibility that unbeknownst to us there might be unknowable truths. Just stipulating that truths are only truths if they are known seems obviously wrong as it does not accord with the general notion of truth.

What if the question is changed to whether there are unknowable actualities instead? What about, for example, the question regarding the existence of God? We know we cannot know the answer to that, no matter how plausible or implausible the existence of God might seem. Would you say there cannot be a truth about whether or not God exists, despite that fact that it is obviously impossible to know? — Janus

You're just asserting that antirealism is "obviously" wrong. It's not obvious to the antirealist. The antirealist will argue that it is your "common sense intuition" that it wrong.

According to the antirealist, if God exists then we can know that God exists, and if God doesn't exist then we can know that God doesn't exist.

If God exists then we can know that God exists, and if God doesn't exist then we can know that God doesn't exist. — Michael

And yet we obviously cannot know either of those. We cannot know whether there are multiple universes. Would you think a claim that our inability to know whether there are rules out the possibility that there are multiple universes is reasonable?

In any case it seems like the disagreement merely comes down to the definition of truth. Is there any way to know which definition of truth is correct? is there any truth as to whether one or other definition of truth is correct?

A simple account would be to first argue that "'it is raining' is true" means "it is raining", and then to argue that "it is raining" is meaningful only if it describes a verifiable event. It would then seem to follow that "'it is raining' is true but unverifiable" makes no sense.

At least I believe that's the general gist of Dummett's antirealism.

I haven’t grasped a form of qualitative value judgement, in keeping with an ethical discipline, in phenomenology, even if some sort of specialized perception for what is, is its objective. — Mww

Maybe not but isn’t existentialism generally concerned with ethical normativity post Death of God?