What is the reason for existence? — Fooloso4

If you mean the reason for the existence of a particular thing, then the type of reason is given in the OP under the section "PSR in Metaphysics". In short, there are 3 types of reasons:
1. Internal reason: The existence of a thing is explained by logical necessity or inherently.
2. External necessary reason: The existence of a thing is explained by causal necessity.
3. External contingent reason: The existence of a thing or action is explained by a free choice that is motivated by an end goal.

Or if you mean "existence" as the general concept, then that's just a concept. Concepts are not concrete existing things that need reasons.

What is the reason for thinking that there must be a reason for what is? — Fooloso4

The reason is given in the OP under the section "Argument in defence of the PSR". In short, it follows from the premise that "Reason finds truth".

Thanks for sharing!

The outcome “4” exists from “2+2” by logical necessity

Basically you're saying if you give me an answer I can come up with an equation that comes up with that answer. — LuckyR

Not quite. What I meant was, if we inquire why 2+2 results in 4, then the explanation is that 4 follows out of logical necessity. We could not say that 2+2 causes 4, as though they are separate things. So the point is that, alongside causes, logical necessity is also a type of explanation that fulfills the PSR.

BTW, many, many actual explanations don't initially seem to be the most reasonable explanation. — LuckyR

We can come to reasonable conclusions that are not true — Philosophim

Yes I agree. This occurs when we don't have enough data that points in the right direction. But given enough data, the most reasonable explanation will tend towards the actual explanation. So the trick is to continually gather data and conduct empirical tests (when possible) until we reach a high level of confidence.

Of course the scientific revolution introduces a wholly different conception of reason as mechanical causation. With the banishing of teleological reasoning the idea of reason in that classical sense fell out of favour. — Wayfarer

Yes, the "intellect as a whole" as the image of the cosmos versus "the mathematical model." — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is true that the two models give different types of reasons for the existence of things in the physical world. The old model gives teleological reasons (type 3 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics"), and the new model gives reasons of causal necessity (type 2 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics"). Both types of reason fulfill the PSR. And I personally side with the new model, at least when it comes to physical things.

Or if you mean "existence" as the general concept, then that's just a concept. Concepts are not concrete existing things that need reasons. — A Christian Philosophy

I mean the reason why there is anything at all.

The reason is given in the OP under the section "Argument in defence of the PSR". In short, it follows from the premise that "Reason finds truth". — A Christian Philosophy

A premise is the reason why there must be a reason for what is?

Although we do employ reason in our search for truth, it may lead us astray. Your example of swans is a good case in point. We might conclude that all swans are white based on the fact that all the swans we have ever seen are white, but there are black swans. Reason does not simply explain what is observed, observation finds truth.

You posit "laws of nature" as an explanation, but this is problematic for two reasons. First, we might ask what the reason is for the laws of nature. Second, what is the explanation for the causal power of these laws?

P1 - Let there be an event which could be either event 1 or event 2, where event 1 and event 2 are different.
P2 - The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that if event 1 occurs there must be a reason.
P3 - By the Law of Non-Contradiction, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could not have occurred.
P4- Suppose event 1 occurs without reason.

C1 - From P4, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could have occurred.
C2 - C1 and P3 are contradictory.
C3 - Therefore, if the Law of Non-Contradiction is valid (P3), then events occurring without reason is invalid (P4). — RussellA

I still hold that the relevant propositions must have "at the same time" added to them. So:
P3 - By the Law of Non-Contradiction, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could not have occurred at the same time.
C1 - From P4, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could have occurred, but not at the same time.
C2 - C1 and P3 are no longer contradictory.

So what is the sufficient reason (why) for the "PSR" (Why) or any so-called "sufficient reason" (why) as such?

Mind or nous as the governing principle, arranging things according to what is best, is not the same as a world governed by reason.

For Aristotle, the question of the intelligibility of the natural world faces two problems, the arche or source of the whole and tyche or chance. We have no knowledge of the source and what happens by chance or accident does not happen according to reason. — Fooloso4

Thanks, interesting distinctions. Tyche shows up as Pierce’s ‘tychism’ which I too believe is intrinsic to the order of things.

I still hold that the relevant propositions must have "at the same time" added to them — A Christian Philosophy

It could be that the phrase "at the same time" is crucial to the argument defending the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Parmenides pointed out that if the world had come into existence from nothing, there is no answer to the question as to why the world didn't come into existence earlier or later than it did. From this he concluded that the world has always existed (Edit - From this he concluded that the world did not come from nothing) (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason)

P1 - Let event 1 be a lamp on the table turning on and event 2 be the same lamp turning off.
P2 - The Law of Non-Contradiction states that the lamp cannot turn on and off "at the same time"
P3 - Assume that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not valid, and the lamp turns on and off for no reason.

C1 - If there is no reason why the lamp turns on, then there is no reason why the lamp turns on earlier or later than the lamp turning off.
C2 - However, if there is no reason why the lamp turns on, then there is no reason why the lamp cannot turn on "at the same time " as the lamp turning off, other than the Law of Non-Contradiction.
C3 - Therefore, it cannot be the case that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not valid, as there is a reason limiting when the lamp turns on and off, and that reason is the Law of Non-Contradiction.

Parmenides pointed out that if the world had come into existence from nothing, there is no answer to the question as to why the world didn't come into existence earlier or later than it did. From this he concluded that the world has always existed (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason) — RussellA

The problem, as I see it, is the assumption that if one asks a question there must be an answer to that question. There are several conclusions that might follow from not being able to answer a question. They include the possibility that:

C1 - Reason and our capacity to understand is limited.
C2 - The question itself is the problem.
C3 - Any conclusion that follows is questionable.

There are several conclusions that might follow from not being able to answer a question. They include the possibility that: C1 - Reason and our capacity to understand is limited. C2 - The question itself is the problem. C3 - Any conclusion that follows is questionable. — Fooloso4

All those things are true:
C1 - I could try to explain Hemingway's novel The old man and the sea to my pet cat until "the cows come home" without any glimmer of understanding on the cat's part. In the same way, a super-knowledgeable alien could try to explain the nature of the universe to a human, also without any glimmer of understanding on the humans' part
C2 - As Dr Lanning's Hologram in the film I, Robot says "I'm sorry, my responses are limited. You must ask the right questions"
C3 - As with a dictionary definition, even if a question is answered, the answer in its turn may be questioned, ad infinitum.

However
C1 - The fact that my cat cannot understand The Old Man and the Sea does not mean that the book isn't understandable
C2 - The fact that a question is the wrong question doesn't mean that there isn't a right question
C3 - The fact that every answer can be questioned doesn't mean that there isn't an answer.

C1 - The fact that my cat cannot understand The Old Man and the Sea does not mean that the book isn't understandable — RussellA

Maybe a superior intelligence might understand it, maybe not. In either case we do not, and based on our ignorance we cannot conclude that the universe is what we might regard as reasonable.

C2 - The fact that a question is the wrong question doesn't mean that there isn't a right question — RussellA

Sure, but the right question might lead to a rejection of the PSR.

C3 - The fact that every answer can be questioned doesn't mean that there isn't an answer. — RussellA

C3 - The fact that every answer can be questioned doesn't mean that there isn't an answer. — RussellA

I was referring to what you originally had as Parmenides conclusion, that the world has always existed. But your corrected conclusion is no better. Both are based on the wrong question (C2) - when did it come into existence? And (C1) - our inability to conceive how something can come from nothing marks a limit of our thinking, but should we assume that our limits are the measure of reality or possibility?

Randomness simply means that there isn't any self repeating pattern or patterns to be found. — ssu

Sure, a random outcome can have a cause, but it also means there is no reason to have outcome 1 vs outcome 2. Thus, the particular outcome lacks a sufficient reason.

And (C1) - our inability to conceive how something can come from nothing marks a limit of our thinking, but should we assume that our limits are the measure of reality or possibility? — Fooloso4

Yes, it would be unrealistic to assume that our limits are the measure of reality.

As a cat may never understand the symbolism within The Old Man and The Sea, humans may never understand the nature of reality. But then again, as a cat doesn't need to understand the symbolism within The Old Man and The Sea, humans don't necessarily need to understand the nature of reality.

I may believe that everything has a reason, even though I have no concept of what these reasons are. For example, I believe that a stone when released falls to the ground for a reason, even though I have little concept of the nature of gravity.

It depends on the meaning of "reason" (Using SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason)

Does "reason" mean 1) "an explanation of why a stone falls to the ground when released", an Unrestricted PSR and a rejection of brute or unexplainable facts.

Or does "reason" mean 2) that "when released a stone falls to the ground" in the sense of Petito Principii, doing no more than duplicating the fact.

It is more likely the case that "reason" is being used in sense 2, where "gravity" means no more than "when released a stone falls to the ground".

I mean the reason why there is anything at all. — Fooloso4

If all objects in a set are explained, then the set is also explained. Thus, if all objects in existence are explained, by 1 of the 3 types of reasons as per the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", then existence is also explained.

A premise is the reason why there must be a reason for what is? — Fooloso4

On the epistemology side, yes, that is, our knowledge of the PSR is defended by that premise.

Although we do employ reason in our search for truth, it may lead us astray. — Fooloso4

Yes I agree. This occurs when we lack data. The best way I know to counter this is to perform empirical tests (when possible) and continue to gather data. Despite that, I still would not go against the laws of reason to find truth.

You posit "laws of nature" as an explanation, but this is problematic for two reasons. First, we might ask what the reason is for the laws of nature. Second, what is the explanation for the causal power of these laws? — Fooloso4

That's fine. Things under the laws of nature are explained by those laws, and the laws themselves also need to be explained. Since there are only 3 types of reasons in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", the laws of nature would be explained by 1 of the 3 types.

Thus, if all objects in existence are explained, by 1 of the 3 types of reasons as per the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", then existence is also explained. — A Christian Philosophy

This is question begging.It assumes what is in question, namely whether everything in existence can be explained. These three types of reason are based on the existence of things. They do not explain why there is anything at all.

On the epistemology side, yes, that is, our knowledge of the PSR is defended by that premise. — A Christian Philosophy

Well, if we rejected the idea that there is a reason then we would not look for for one, but it does not follow that there must be one.

This occurs when we lack data. — A Christian Philosophy

That is the point. Where is the data that is sufficient to conclude that everything must have a reason?

Since there are only 3 types of reasons in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", the laws of nature would be explained by 1 of the 3 types. — A Christian Philosophy

Again, this is question begging. It assumes what is in question. It does not explain why there are laws of nature and does not demonstrate that those laws are prescriptive rather than descriptive.

So what is the sufficient reason (why) for the "PSR" (Why) or any so-called "sufficient reason" (why) as such? — 180 Proof

On the epistemology side (knowledge), the reason defending our knowledge of the PSR is provided in the OP section "Argument in defence of the PSR".


On the metaphysics side (reality), indeed the PSR also needs a sufficient reason or explanation for existing. Note that since we know the PSR is true on the epistemology side, we know there must be an explanation for the existence of the PSR even if we don't know what that explanation is.

Nevertheless, here is my suggested explanation: Since the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics, like logic, then it is part of the fabric of reality. As such, the existence of the PSR is explained inherently (reason type 1 as described in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics").

It depends on the meaning of "reason" — RussellA

In accord with the OP it means that there is an explanation.

Did you mean 'petitio principii', begging the question?

C1 - If there is no reason why the lamp turns on, then there is no reason why the lamp turns on earlier or later than the lamp turning off.
C2 - However, if there is no reason why the lamp turns on, then there is no reason why the lamp cannot turn on "at the same time " as the lamp turning off, other than the Law of Non-Contradiction. — RussellA

This is a false dilemma: either everything has a reason or nothing has a reason. Deniers of the PSR do not claim that nothing has a reason; only that not everything has a reason. Most people accept the laws of logic, and accept logical inferences as valid reasons. But they might still also believe that some brute facts exist without reason.

They are still the same. In the principle of parsimony, it is reasonable to pick the simplest of 2 explanations that account for all the data because the less simple explanation is superfluous, that is, more than sufficient. Both principles demand that the explanation or reason be just sufficient, not more, not less. — A Christian Philosophy

No, the principle of sufficient reason says that everything that exists has a sufficient explanation of its existence. It says nothing about simplicity. Note, the more complicated of two explanations is still sufficient to explain. (I think you're conflating sufficiency with efficiency)

The principle of parsimony is clearly a distinct principle of Reason from the principle of sufficient reason. Note, one could quite consistently reject one and not the other.

I agree that a thing cannot be its own cause, yet a thing can explain itself. — A Christian Philosophy

How?

You have two options and neither constitute self-explanatory objects.

The first is to insist that some things exist 'of necessity' and hope that this will somehow pass as an 'explanation' of why the thing exists.

Problem: that's no explanation at all. On the contrary, a necessary existence - if there are such things - is something that has no explanation. It's not self-explanatory. It's incapable of explanation. Those who believe in necessary existences are denying the principle of sufficient reason, not endorsing it. The principle of sufficient reason says that EVERYTHING that exists has a sufficient expalnation of its existence, not just some things and not others. So that's not going to work at all.

The other option is to suppose that there are some things that exist and have not come into being. that is, there are some eternal existences. The problem is the same though: that's not an explanation at all.

The PSR is a reasonable epistemological principle (up to a point), but in terms of metaphysics, I think grounding is a more suitable term.

Reasons are explations- semantic descriptions that carry meaning to intelligent minds. Atoms are grounded in their constituents (quarks and electrons). Of course, we can explain the nature of atoms in terms of their constituents (more or less supporting the PSR), but IMO we should draw sharper boundaries between ontology and epistemology than the PSR suggests.

“Reason finds truth." — A Christian Philosophy

Rather: reason directs us toward truth. Induction doesn't necessarily fund truth, but it tends to lead in the proper direction.

It is correct to think logically because reality behaves logically. If it wasn’t the case, there would be no reason to think logically.
It is correct to look for reasons to things because reasons exist in reality. If it wasn’t the case, there would be no reason to find sufficient reasons. — A Christian Philosophy

This sounds like you're reifying logic; logic is semantics- it applies to propositions, not to reality. We devise propositions that describe reality, and apply logic to these propositions, but logic itself is not part of the ontological fabric of reality. The world operates per laws of nature, and because of this - we are able to draw correct (or truth-tending) inferences from observations.

It is correct to look for reasons to things because reasons exist in reality. If it wasn’t the case, there would be no reason to find sufficient reasons. — A Christian Philosophy

We look for "reasons" - i.e. prepositional descriptions of the grounding of some aspects of reality, and we are successful because such groundings exist.

I have always been entirely unimpressed by this kind of cosmological argument for God. For even if its premises are true - and they seem highly questionable - it does not imply God at all. Where atheism and theism are concerned, it does not tell more in favour of one than the other.

The principle of sufficient reason states that everything - everything, not just some things and not others - has an explanation for its existence.

That principle is by no means obviously true. For after all, if it true, then it generates an infinite regress. A cannot be explained by A, and so B has to be posited. But B cannot be explained by B, and so C has to be posited. And on and on for an actual infinity.

So, it seems false upon reflection. And if one thinks it is not false, for one thinks there is nothing problematic about there being actual infinities, then it does not lead to God, but to an actual infinity of prior explanations. God isn't in the picture at all.

If one modifies the principle so that it is only contingent existences that require explanation, then all you get to conclude is that there exists at least one necessary existent. But there's no reason to suppose that necessary existent is God. That's like concluding that becuase 'someone' clearly shot Kennedy, then it must have been Mrs Smith at 28 Acacia Avenue.

In fact, it is worse than this. For it seems self-evident that we - minds - are not necessary existences, but contingent ones. I am a contingent existence. So why assume that a necessary existent would be a mind? Minds seem no more or less contingent than physical stuff, and so to suppose God - a person, a mind - is the necessary existent is not just a huge leap, but an implausible one.

And it gets worse still. For consider this. Necessary existences confer necessity on what they cause. And thus a necessary existent can only explain other necessary existences (and it woldn't really be an explanation either, as by hyothesis if something is necessary, it does not need explaining). To see this note that a necessary existent either contingently causes something else to exist - but if it does that, then it was contingent whether it would cause it or not, and thus no explanation is provided. In order not to generate a need for explanation, the necessary existence must be supposed necessarily to cause what it causes. But if it necessarily causes what it causes, then what it causes to exist, exists of necessity as well. Yet necessary existences are supposed to explain contingent existences! They can't - as nothing a necessary existence explains will be contingent, but will be necessary too.

Necessary existences are actually quite useless explanatorily, for all they do is confer necessity on what they cause, but as what needs explaining are 'contingent' existences, they are useless.

But again, even if they weren't useless explanatorily, there is just no reason to suppose any necessary existent is God and positive reason to think it wouldn't be, given that all the other persons of our acquaintance are clearly contingent existences not necessary ones.

Since the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics, like logic, then it is part of the fabric of reality. — A Christian Philosophy

Fallacy of misplaced concreteness (i.e. mapmaking =/= terrain). At most the PSR is, "like logic", a foundational property of reason.

In accord with the OP it means that there is an explanation. Did you mean 'petitio principii', begging the question? — Fooloso4

The OP describes the PSR as "For any thing that exists or is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true."

There are different definitions of "reason"

The Merriam Webster gives one definition of reason as "a statement offered in explanation or justification" and another definition of reason as "a rational ground or motive".

Using the SEP article on PSR:

As regards "reason", i) Archimedes attributed the fact that equal weights at equal distance remain in equilibrium because there is no reason why either side of the balance should move up or down and ii) Leibniz wrote: “This is rightly observed, and agrees with what I am accustomed to saying that nothing exists but that for whose existence a sufficient reason can be provided”.

As regards "ground", i) Hegel argued for the Principle of Sufficient Ground, and ii) Dasgupta proposed that the PSR can be reformulated in terms of grounds.

There are different type of PSR.

In the Unrestricted PSR, every fact requires an explanation.

In the Restricted PSR, various restrictions can be placed on the PSR, such as i) requiring a sufficient reason for every true proposition or ii) requiring a reason only for the existence or non-existence of entities.

Example One
Why does a rock fall to the ground when released. The reason is gravity. What is gravity. Gravity is something that causes a rock fall to the ground when released. An example of petito principii.

Example Two
A stone hits a window and the glass shatters. As I see it:

As regards cause, a cause is something in the world that is prior to an event, such that the cause of the glass shattering was a stone hitting the glass.

As regards reason, a reason is something in language that describes an event in the world, such that the reason the glass shattered was that it was hit by a stone

As regards ground, which is not cause, ground is contemporaneous with the event, in that there is an event with constituent parts. For example, glass of a certain thickness and a stone of a certain kinetic energy. According to Dasgupta, this avoids the Agrippan Trilemma of circularity, infinite regress and dogmatism because the event is autonomous and independent of anything prior to the event.

Example Three
4 = 2 + 2.

As 4 is contemporaneous with 2 + 2, the 4 was not caused by the 2 + 2, no more than the 2 + 2 was caused by 4.

The reason 2 + 2 = 4 is linguistic, as numbers don't exist in the world.

4 is grounded in 2 + 2, which is neither cause nor reason, because autonomous and independent of anything prior.

The OP describes the PSR ... — RussellA

From the OP:

In this way, the PSR is also called “Principle of Parsimony” or “Occam’s Razor”: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one. — A Christian Philosophy

We posit three explanations — A Christian Philosophy

From the OP — Fooloso4

What are you saying?

According to the original poster by reason he/she means explanation.

Are you claiming that there are reasons that do not involve explanations?

The principle of sufficient reason states that everything - everything, not just some things and not others - has an explanation for its existence.

That principle is by no means obviously true. For after all, if it true, then it generates an infinite regress. A cannot be explained by A, and so B has to be posited. But B cannot be explained by B, and so C has to be posited. And on and on for an actual infinity. — Clearbury

I agree. It seems to me that, based on the reasoning above, there has to be a bedrock of facts which have no further explanation.

There's something on the tip of my tongue that touches on this idea - maybe Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems, not sure.

edit: this was what I was thinking: Münchhausen trilemma

Are you claiming that there are reasons that do not involve explanations? — Fooloso4

Suppose someone said that the reason a rock falls to the ground when released is because of gravity. Is "gravity" an explanation as to why the rock falls to the ground when released when "gravity" means no more than a rock falls to the ground when released.

Similarly:
The reason he is ambitious is because he is driven
The reason it is chilly this evening is because it is cool.
The reason the job was complex was because it was complicated.
The reason she is an advocate for three-yearly driving tests is because that is something she supports.
The reason the tree is in a state of decay is because it is rotten.

when "gravity" means no more than a rock falls to the ground when released. — RussellA

But gravity means more than that.