Are you assuming that all thoughts could be sensibly prefixed with "I think"? — creativesoul

Wouldn't an example of a thought that cannot be appended to "I think..." be a thought that could not be thought?

The play here is on the lack of a clear idea of what a thought is.

Frege’s contention is that the content of thought (<p>) can be entirely objective and independent of any particular subject. Frege’s emphasis is on the idea that thoughts exist as abstract, objective entities in a “third realm,” independent of whether anyone thinks them. According to Frege, thoughts are, in principle, accessible to any rational being, and their validity does not depend on any individual subject’s act of thinking. Frege lays this out in a famous essay called ‘The Thought’ (in translation).

Without that background none of this makes a lot of sense.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thought_(essay)

Cheers.

So was he right? I think not. Nor, I suspect, are the ideas he expresses a commonplace.

http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Frege%20-%20The%20Thought%20a%20Logical%20Inquiry.pdf

Are you assuming that all thoughts could be sensibly prefixed with "I think"?
— creativesoul
Wouldn't an example of a thought that cannot be appended to "I think..." be a thought that could not be thought?

The play here is on the lack of a clear idea of what a thought is. — Banno

:razz:

I see. I wondered where you were headed. I didn't realize you were frolicking. Your example already showed a kind/species of thought that doesn't seem to sensibly accept such an appendage.

I would have thought you’d agree with:

Frege’s contention that the content of thought (<p>) can be entirely objective and independent of any particular subject.

Nice clarification. That helped me to understand quite a bit better how narrowly focused the scope of the claim at the heart of the OP really is. I appreciatchya!

:pray:

Is the contention from both Kant and Rödl simply that any thought that <p> is necessarily entertained by a conscious subject? Meaning that the subject is implicit in any thought? Which is aimed at Frege’s contention that the object of thought can be entirely independent of any subject. — Wayfarer

I read Kant to be saying at minimum that representations are unified in relation to the subject which has them. For a more detailed exegesis than that I would defer to @Mww, who is much more accustomed to Kant's language than I am. Surely there are a lot of different things going on in that passage.

I don't have any reason to believe that Kant is responding to Frege. In the thread on Kimhi's critique of Frege, the general takeaway seemed to be, "Well, Frege's distinction may be imperfect, but it is also very important and useful, and Kimhi doesn't seem to have any clear alternative on offer." I think Frege's distinction is probably more relevant to contemporary philosophy than @Banno would like to believe, but that is a separate question.

Frege lays this out in a famous essay called ‘The Thought’ (in translation). — Wayfarer

Do you take Rödl to be criticizing a position that Frege lays out in that paper?

I don't have any reason to believe that Kant is responding to Frege. — Leontiskos

No, Frege was much later than Kant and was critiquing Kant. And Frege is indeed mentioned right at the outset of Rödl’s book. Remember the title of the book is ‘an introduction to absolute idealism’. We’re not up to that yet - the quote in question is from p 55 - but the title is significant.

Again google preview https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VERMDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&source=kp_read_button&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&gboemv=1&redir_esc=y

I didn't realize you were frolicking. — creativesoul

Always.


Didn’t follow your reply though.

Another thing, from your quote: if there is representation given before all thought, re: phenomenon from the faculty of intuition, and representation which arises spontaneously, re: conception from the faculty of understanding, which is the same as arising without being thought, then it follows that whatever must accompany all representation does not necessarily accompanying all thought. If such is the case, Rödl’s footnote exposé, is misconceived.

Thought is an activity, in the synthesis of conceptions into a possible cognition; “I think” represents the consciousness of the occurrence of the activity, but not the activity itself.

Unsurprising. I'm tired, and I may not have understood your objection in its entirety. I'm sure I do not grasp the depth of it. Nonetheless, I was referring to this...

When you ask if the Oak is shedding its leaves, are you thinking that the oak is shedding it's leaves?

If so, why ask the question? — Banno

Roughly, I took this approach to indicate that we do other stuff with words besides state our thoughts/beliefs, to which attaching "I think" is relatively unproblematic. Questions/interrogatives being just one of those other speech acts. Seems odd to attempt to prefix some of those acts with "I think".

Thought is an activity, — Mww

Indeed. I prefer "process", but probably because I'm trying to eliminate/avoid/exhaust "mental" without using it.

:wink:

No, Frege was much later than Kant... — Wayfarer

Yes, good point. :nerd:

-

...then it follows that whatever must accompany all representation does not necessarily accompanying all thought... — Mww

I suppose what is tripping me up here is the question of whether thought is a form of representation. Thought is, "the synthesis of conceptions into a possible cognition," and conceptions are the representations of understanding, and therefore thought synthesizes one kind of representation without itself being a representation. Is that right?

Thought is an activity, in the synthesis of conceptions into a possible cognition; “I think” represents the consciousness of the occurrence of the activity, but not the activity itself. — Mww

Okay, that makes sense. I think Aquinas would agree with this. Then is the "I think" a sui generis kind of representation?

Nuh, that's good, I wrote a post on much the same thing before my last, and then dropped it becasue it needed more work.

Is the tree dropping leaves? Is that a thought? I think the tree is dropping leaves against I think "Is the tree dropping leaves?". Should it be that I think "The tree is dropping leaves".

Seems to me again that 's OP is dependent on the ascendency of assertions. That looks unjustified to my eye.

Then is the "I think" a sui generis kind of representation? — Leontiskos

That sounds reasonable, yes. It is said to be representation, it is said the representation “I think” “….in all acts of consciousness is one and the same….”.

You can’t have a 700-page treatise on the bare-bones purity of human cognition without accounting for it, but you can’t account for it with any of the faculties by which human cognition is possible. It isn’t even present to immediate awareness in fully half of the total of human intellectual activity, the empirical half concerned with perception.
(Sensation being physiological, hence we are physically aware but not cognitively)

And you most certainly cannot ignore its pervasiveness in human interaction.

If you can’t account for it with the faculties of human cognition, and you can’t ignore it, you are left with accounting for it by the essence of humanity in general. From there, you escape the requirement that “I think” actually do anything within the cognitive system, thus doesn’t need to belong to any of the relevant method-specific faculties.

Because it doesn’t belong to any relevant faculty, it is not the case “I think” can ever be a cognition of its own, and insofar as “….thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions…”, it is clear “I think” is no conception, which immediately relieves it from belonging to understanding, the faculty responsible for the spontaneity of conceptions as its representations, and it follows necessarily that we never ever think “I think” in the formulation of immediate cognitions.

The p/“p” simultaneity, the dualism implied, cannot stand. At least, according to the originating speculative metaphysics referenced herein. But not all are the same, so there’s room for others with sufficient affirmative explanatory power.

The play here is on the lack of a clear idea of what a thought is. — Banno

...and what an "I" is.

Think about when you are watching a really good movie or TV show, or reading a good book. You might be so engrossed in the story that you lose your sense of self. You become part of the story. It is only when someone calls your name while in the middle of that story does your awareness loop back upon itself creating that sense of self-awareness.

Say you're reading a good book and someone says, "Hey Banno, what do you want for lunch?" Your awareness changes from the story to yourself and your wants, in particular what you want for lunch. Are thoughts like, "I want..." or "I like..." the same as thinking, "I think..."?

What about other animals? Do they have a sense of "I think..." that accompanies their thoughts? If not, then what is required for self-awareness, and is self-awareness necessary for thinking?

I don't think you can think about your thinking. — Corvus

It hinges on the ambiguity of the word "thought". We commonly use the word to mean two distinct things: a mental event occurring at a particular place and time, and the content or import of said event ("proposition," in Fregean terms). — J

Linguistically
Linguistically, I can think about my thinking. For example, I can think about my thought that Paris is always crowded. A thought must be about something, even if that something is my thought that Paris is always crowded.

The problem
Pat says that when she has the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves, she is not simultaneously thinking that she has the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves. IE, when I think, am I simultaneously thinking that I think?

Metaphysically, what are thoughts
The act of thinking is inseparable to what is being thought about. As we cannot have an act of thinking without an object of thought, we cannot have an object of thought without the act of thinking. The act of thinking is the object of thought.

In the same way, the subjective act of thinking about the colour red cannot be seperated from the objective red that is being thought about

When stung by a bee, I am immediately conscious of pain. Subsequently, I can have the thought "bees sting". A thought may be regarded as a proposition that is potentially shareable as an objective fact, such as "bees sting", rather than a subjective feeling that is unshareable, such as pain (Britannica - Thoughts and Propositions).

The relation between "I" and thoughts
"The oak tree is shedding its leaves" is a valid proposition but not a thought. "Think the oak tree is shedding it leaves" is not a valid proposition, as it doesn't indicate who is having the thought. "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves", "they think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" and "he thinks the oak tree is shedding its leaves" are valid propositions expressing thoughts.

A thought cannot be had without someone having that thought.

It is the case that "I am my thoughts", rather than I have thoughts. If it were the case that "I have thoughts", not only would lead into the infinite regress homuncules problem but also would lead into the problem of how the "I" could have a thought that was external to it.

The relation between thoughts and consciousness
If I were not conscious I would have no thoughts, and if I had no thoughts I would not be conscious.

The relation between "I" and consciousness
If I was not conscious there would be no "I", and if there was no "I" there would be no consciousness.

The relation between "I", consciousness and thoughts
Therefore, "I", being conscious and thoughts are all aspects of the same thing. "I" cannot exist without being conscious or having thoughts. Being conscious wouldn't be possible without an "I" and thoughts. Having thoughts would not be possible without an "I" and being conscious.

Conscious beings are able to think, and self-conscious beings are able to think that they think
When stung by a bee, I am my immediate consciousness of pain, such that I am the pain. When subsequently I have a propositional thought, such as "bees sting", I am the propositional thought "bees sting".

As I am both conscious of pains and thoughts, but at the same time I am these pains and thoughts, I am a self-conscious being.

As a conscious being I think, but as a self-conscious being I think I think.

"The oak tree is shedding its leaves" is a valid proposition but not a thought. "Think the oak tree is shedding it leaves" is not a valid proposition, as it doesn't indicate who is having the thought. "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves", "they think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" and "he thinks the oak tree is shedding its leaves" are valid propositions expressing thoughts.

A thought cannot be had without someone having that thought. — RussellA

Yes, these reflections are in the spirit of the problem Rödl is considering. You're right to connect it with the ambiguity of "thought" as "event of thinking," which requires a thinker, and "thought" as "proposition" (this is how Frege used it), which is supposed to be available to us objectively, without needing to indicate a thinker.

Yes, I read Sartre that way too.

Kant's failure to draw and maintain the distinction between thought and thinking about thought. — creativesoul

Truly, I wasn't aware there was a problem here. Can you say more about Kant's failure? I know you feel you've said what needs to be said already, but I'd be grateful for a little more explication.

I mean, the dude himself said, “Kant said, more precisely…” at the expense of his own statement’s accuracy.

But he’s got letters after his name and I don’t, so….there ya go. — Mww

Heck, I don't care about anybody's letters -- if it's wrong, it's wrong. I think you know Kant very well; would you say that Rödl's qualification here ("more precisely") does affect the accuracy of the statement "The I think accompanies all my thoughts"? And I'm still struggling to understand what's at stake in contrasting "representation" with "thought" in this context. Any help with that?

I'm not sure if Kant had that in mind, but I'm pretty sure that's what Rödl means. Sorry to be a broken record, but once again it's the ambiguity of "think" that is critical. Rödl wants to take "think" and "thought" in the sense of "a mental event occurring to an actual thinker or subject." And not only does he not take it in the sense of "propositional content," he's trying to construct an argument to the effect that this sense isn't meaningful.

Kant, on my best reading, is asking for a structural interpretation of the term "accompany". For him, it isn't a matter of the self-consciousness of the thinker, a la Rödl. Rather, I read him as saying that for me to have a thought at all, there must be something he calls the I think that makes the thought possible for me -- the same way space and time structure perceptual experience. Once again, we're talking "thought" as mental event, not propositional content.

Thanks, that's it exactly.

- Great, thanks. That is helpful. :up:

Linguistically
Linguistically, I can think about my thinking. For example, I can think about my thought that Paris is always crowded. A thought must be about something, even if that something is my thought that Paris is always crowded. — RussellA

When I think, I am thinking in either sentences or images.  I cannot think without either of these two elements.  When I make statements or propositions, I express the contents of my thoughts in language.
But if I try to think about my thoughts,  I don't have any content but the thought is my object of thought.  Because the contents of the thought is either shielded by the thought, or is empty.  

I am supposed to think about my thinking, but I am not sure what it is about.  You may say well I am thinking that I am thinking about the oak tree.

But that is absurd, because I don't need to think that I think about the oak tree.  I just think about the oak tree.  So, when I say the oak tree is shedding the leaves, I already have thought about the oak tree shedding the leaves.  Why do I have to say I think the oak tree is shedding the leaves?  I just say the oak tree is shedding the leaves.

If you asked me, why did I say that the oak tree is shedding the leaves, then I would say, well I think that the oak tree is shedding the leaves to make clear that my statement was based on my thinking.  But before that I don't need to make clear on that fact, because it is already implied in my statement that I think the oak tree is shedding the leaves.

When I think about I am thinking the oak tree shedding the leaves, I am not thinking anymore.  At that moment, I am reasoning or reflecting on my thought that the oak tree was shedding the leaves, or why was I thinking that I was thinking the oak tree was shedding the leaves.

When I think, I am thinking in either sentences or images. I cannot think without either of these two elements. — Corvus

I want to make a bit of a tangential, Off-Topic comment about that. We usually have no problems in visually imagining something. For example, I can close my eyes, and I can imagine a wooden table. People usually don't have problems remembering sounds either. For example, when I'm walking down the street, I can remember the lyrics of a song that I like. So, the senses of sight and sound are quite memorable, in a literal sense. But with the other three senses (aroma, taste, tactile sensations) it is much more difficult, at least in my case. I can remember aromas, for example how a rose smells. I can also remember what a lemon tastes like. And I can remember what the sensation of cold water feels like. But these three senses are somehow "less memorable" than the senses of sight and sound, it is easier for me to remember the latter instead of the former.

But with the other three senses (aroma, taste, tactile sensations) it is much more difficult, at least in my case. I can remember aromas, for example how a rose smells. I can also remember what a lemon tastes like. And I can remember what the sensation of cold water feels like. But these three senses are somehow "less memorable" than the senses of sight and sound, it is easier for me to remember the latter instead of the former. — Arcane Sandwich

I suppose smell, touch and taste are more difficult to think about than sounds or images. We can remember and think about them, but it would be difficult to express them in linguistic form accurately. Could it be due to their abstract nature of the entities? i.e. they tend to be temporally passing ephemeral fleeting transit sensations with no physical forms.

Or are the sensations inbuilt in our senses rather than in the objects? When you feel cold, the coldness is not in the air, but your body is feeling cold. When you smell perfume, the sensation of feminine richness is in your nose rather than in the perfume .. etc? Could this be the case? I am guessing here.

But these three senses are somehow "less memorable" than the senses of sight and sound, it is easier for me to remember the latter instead of the former. — Arcane Sandwich

I agree. :up:

if it's wrong, it's wrong. — J

It may not be wrong; it just isn’t what Kant said. If anything, it’s wrong that he said Kant said it. Kant never once…that I’m aware….said “I think” accompanies all my thoughts, but it must be conceivable to finagle that notion out of “I think” must accompany all my representations, because Rödl’s apparently constructed a metaphysic based in its validity.

I'm still struggling to understand what's at stake in contrasting "representation" with "thought" in this context. Any help with that? — J

Maybe not, in that the only context for which I suppose for myself enough understanding to address, is Kantian. I can’t speak to Rödl’s philosophy. Or Frege, for that matter. And now that I think about it the word “representation” isn’t even used anywhere in the OP, which kinda implies there is no context to which it belongs with respect to this particular domain of discourse. It’s almost as if I put words in your mouth.

That being said, representation is absolutely necessary for any and all Kantian speculative metaphysics, but that only appears in this particular domain of discourse, as the initial major premise, re: “Kant says….”. I suppose the struggle might manifest in the disparity between the major premise requiring a representational context insofar as it is Kantian, and the body of the discussion, the context of which is Rödl’s, which doesn’t.

Apples and oranges? Mountains and molehills? I accept responsibility for the dialectical misdirect.