- Not even 36 hours have elapsed since we began section 3. I have reiterated my desire to move slowly, in large part so that those who do not have as much time still have an opportunity to participate. Not everyone has time to write dozens of posts a day, as you do. I don't see why it is so burdensome to average two days per section. It's great you're enjoying the thread so much, but to be so impatient as to ignore the OP while constantly writing posts that don't engage with other users at all is a bit strange. I suppose if you don't care about engaging with others then there is no need to move slowly and encourage participation. But in that case what you need is a diary, not a discussion forum. Or Twitter, where you just spam out content and no one reads anything. I figured the Reading Groups section was for reading things as a group.

(And the fact that you haven't even been been reading carefully is rather ironic here. For example, that you did not even understand that the proof was a reductio until it was explicitly pointed out to you. That's what happens in a fast-paced thread: you "read" a proof, argue about it for 26 days, and then on day 27 you figure out that it was a reductio and the entire analysis was hopelessly confused.)

Meh. You've squandered much of what good will I may have had towards you with your insults, but now that you have actually expressed your needs, I will do you the kindness of holding off on posting my thoughts on section five, and any concluding remarks, despite your plain rudeness.

- It is not a "kindness" to hijack the thread and skip to section 4, but refrain from skipping to section 5.

Part of this thread is experimental: are we allowed to have focused reading groups that move at a consistent and controlled pace? Will moderators honor an OP that wishes to do this? If not, then obviously a thread like this is not worthwhile to conduct, and this sort of endeavor is not possible on TPF.

:wink:

Enjoy the melodrama.

- Thanks Kazan. Good to know that there are others paying attention. :up:

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Something along these lines is perhaps the inevitable result of the sustained critique of the Argument - that it has an historical, "metaphysical" place or a place in devotion.

@Banno,

Of course, melodrama is a fringe benefit or smoko break from the clash that philosophic debates tend to take the form of.

wry ( sans any sense of superiority) smile

@Leontiskos,

Oh, we're here.

apprehensive smile

Surely a perfect God, or at least one "than which &etc, would not have unnecessary or superfluous powers, so omnipotence directly implies something to be omnipotent about - something, a task, that needs doing for something to be perfected. And only God can do it, and thus thereby Himself obliged. — tim wood

"God is omnipotent, therefore he is obliged to do stuff (and anyone obliged to do stuff isn't as great as someone who is not obliged to do stuff)."

I don't follow this reasoning at all. Is there an argument behind it?

Perhaps, another way of looking at Omnipotence is that of being outside of/unrestrained by time. That is, there is no limits of causation, there just "is" for that which is omnipotent. Hence, it is difficult to argue any moral obligation (such as to be perfect, for example) upon an omnipotent (anything)...be it a god, idea, reality, as that would de-omnipotent that which it is claimed is omnipotent.

Perhaps, it could be argued that the omnipotent could not be named nor conceived of as omnipotent because that would reduce/take away its omnipotence through that interaction.

It all depends upon how omnipotence is understood and differentiated from such terms as perfect, all being, all knowing, etc. that are often associated with that which it is claimed is omnipotent.

Just a hurried thought.

a 2 cent smile

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- So are you saying that if someone wanted to be great, they would have to choose between being powerful and being moral, because to be powerful is to lack moral constraint and to be moral is to lack power? Put differently, "The greatest thing is powerful and the greatest thing is moral, but something cannot be both powerful and moral, therefore the greatest thing does not exist." Is that about right?

(I think this gets at @tim wood's point as well.)

Part 4. Intentional Identity and Parasitic vs. Constitutive Reference

In this section Klima appeals to his intentional theory of reference in order to provide the atheist with a way to think about the same thought object that Anselm’s theist is thinking about, while simultaneously rejecting the idea that the theist’s description applies to that thought object.

He begins by situating the theory in the context of Russell and Kripke; he then draws our attention to one of Kripke’s examples, then fiction, and then guessing games. After that he claims that the theory “sidesteps the problem of trying to find criteria of intentional identity in terms of the properties thought objects have.” He goes on to compare this “parasitic reference” to “constitutive reference.” He then finishes by bringing this theory to bear on the question of the atheist who rejects Anselm’s argument.

Here are the first few sentences:

At this point, however, we have to notice that precisely the theory of reference outlined earlier as being implicit in Anselm’s argument offers the atheist a way out of his predicament. According to this theory, we should recall, what determines reference is primarily the intention of the speaker, whence it may be called the intentional theory of reference. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 4

Some questions regarding section 4:

1. Is parasitic reference coherent?
2. Does parasitic reference adequately account for the atheist’s position?
3. Does this mean that Anselm’s proof can be sound for the theist while being unsound for the atheist?


I think parasitic reference is coherent in general, but I am not yet convinced that it adequately accounts for the atheist’s position. Consider:

But then, the same thought object may be intended also by another mind, which may not endow the same thought object with the same properties, i.e. it may conceive of the same thought object, but not as having the same properties.

…

The atheist, however, can then think of the same thought object, but not think that the description applies to it, whence he is not forced to conclude to whatever valid implications the description may have concerning that thought object. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

What is unclear is how the thought object is related to its properties. That is, if the atheist is thinking of a thought object with different (intentional) properties, then why should we think he is thinking of the same thought object?

Anselm himself brings this up, and Klima echoed Anselm’s concern:

Anselm claims that when the Fool said in his heart: “There is no God”, he could do so only because he did not know correctly what he was speaking about […], as he simply did not understand the word “God” properly. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

Anselm is giving a dilemma: Either you are thinking of something other than God or you are thinking of God (as I have defined ‘God’). If you are thinking of something other than God, then you can deny its existence but you have not denied God’s existence. If you are thinking of God, then you cannot deny his existence on account of my proof.

Klima’s parasitic reference attempts to split the horns of the dilemma. Klima thinks the atheist can think about the same thought object and yet, “not endow the same thought object with the same properties,” or, “not think that the description applies to it.” Isn’t Anselm just going to say that if he is thinking about an object that can be thought not to exist, he is not thinking of the same thought object?

Along similar lines we have a form of ampliation entering in here. The atheist takes the thought object and understands that existence attaches necessarily to this thought object, but he nevertheless brackets or prescinds from this existence-description.

Another question: what is it that explains the difference between parasitic and constitutive reference insofar as these two forms of reference differ with respect to whether one is committed to perceived implications of the thought?
(This is presumably where Roark wants to talk about "conceptual closure," which Klima also speaks to in his reply to Roark (both of which have now been linked in the OP.))

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It's simple. You appear to think that omnipotence is the greater. That in order to be the than which & etc., the than which & etc must be omnipotent. But I conceive of a being that has no need of omnipotence, and that being the greater. — tim wood

Then premise (1) does not involve omnipotence for you. So what? As I said:

(This subject is interesting because a lot of new forms of theism reject omnipotence. But does that mean they would find Anselm's first premise incompatible with their God?) — Leontiskos

-

As to the good or morality, your being must be absolutely good and moral, yes? — tim wood

I addressed this in my . If you want to talk about Anselm's argument, then you have to address that. If you don't want to talk about Anselm's argument and you just want to argue against God, then there is probably a thread for that. (No, of course I don't think that being powerful and being moral are incompatible, and so when I think of Anselm's concept I don't have to choose between the two. I want to know if you and @kazan really think you have to choose between the two.)

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Collingwood viewed metaphysics as unearthing the foundational assumptions behind our scientific theories - behind our understanding of how things are. He viewed the Ontological argument as one such supposition, hence "A man who has a bent for metaphysics can hardly help seeing, even if he does not wholly understand it, that Anselm’s proof is the work of a man who is on the right lines" - that is, someone who agrees with Collingwood's view of metaphysics will see the argument as an expression of that seeking for foundational explanations.

They will not be put off by the fact that the argument fails.

The following appears mistaken:

For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.

Kripke showed that speaker's reference may differ from semantic reference. However, he also showed that a name may refer to it's referent regardless of any description, and indeed in the absence of any description.

Consider Sarah, a philosophy student who sees Kaplan at a conference and mistakes him for Kripke. She says, pointing to Kaplan, "Kripke is a great philosopher, but he did not write Naming and Necessity". The speaker's reference here is to the man pointed to - Kaplan. The semantic reference is to Kripke, in virtue of the name used. Sarah believes that she is referring to Kripke, but she is instead referring to Kaplan. Kaplan did not write Naming and Necessity, so her description is true.

The speaker's reference, given by pointing to Kaplan, is Kaplan. The intended reference, given by the name "Kripke", is Kripke. Hence it is not always the case that the speaker's reference is the one that satisfies the speaker's intent. Which is to make the obvious point that what someone is talking about does not always align with what they think they are talking about.

This is a generic problem with accounts of reference in terms of speaker's intent. Reference is a communal activity, and so not reliant simply on the intent of the speaker.

1. Is parasitic reference coherent? — Leontiskos

You might first explain what you think parasitic reference is. Do you agree that it is something like referring to the thought-object in someone else's mind?

Do we think that a being which is omnipotent is greater than a being that is not? Because maybe someone would say, "If it is an evil being then the omnipotence would make it lesser, not greater." — Leontiskos

Yes, that's why I included "all other things being equal".

Yes, viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be an oxymoron.

Roark has his own critique. I would have to look at it more, but on first glance his main counter seems too strong. He argues that the atheist should be happy to allow that they are only engaged in parasitic reference because the theist's definition requires a framing that at least allows for the possibility of liar's type paradoxes. However, showing the mere possibility of paradox is far weaker than demonstrating a paradox. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Roark's paper is quite good. When I saw that it was hosted on Klima's page, I checked and found a response from Klima (both of which are now linked in the OP). Especially helpful is the way in which Roark gives additional explication of Klima's basic ideas (in sections 1 and 4 of Klima's paper).

He is good at putting his finger on things. The "ambiguity" he tries to untangle is something that I had also noticed, and in particular, for me it manifested in the way that the word "can" functions in Klima's rendering of Anselm's thought concept. His pointing up of the Modest "genie" is also perceptive, along with the "conceptual closure" that accompanies it. And Klima is quite familiar with the Liar's Paradox, even through the medieval Buridan (see for example his chapter, "Logic without Truth: Buridan on the Liar"). ...There are pretty strong themes of univocity vs analogy running though the exchange, particularly when we get into questions about the relation between the object language and the metalanguage. This is especially interesting given that Klima's expertise is Buridan and the late medieval period, which was quite comfortable with univocity.

In fact the question I posed to you about how one is to untangle God's existence from an acknowledgment of God's existence gets straight into the follow-up exchange between Klima and Roark, which makes sense since it was Roark who gave you the idea to phrase it that way.

For now I am just going to quote something simple from Roark that may help shed light on section 4, and which is also related to the question I posed to you:

And so we are now situated to appreciate the dialectical weight of the proper conclusion of Klima’s argument, as it was specified in Section 3. The consistent atheist should be quite comfortable admitting that one cannot think of God as a mere thought object (i.e. as existing only in the intellect) when one conceives of God under Anselm’s description. In fact, we ought to regard Klima’s argument (properly understood) as a way of making this point explicit insofar as it derives in a formal way from the Anselmian concept of God the impossibility of thinking that He does not exist in reality. So when the atheist denies that God exists, he is not saying of the thing than which nothing can be thought greater, that it (conceived as such) does not exist; rather, he is saying of the thing that the theist (mistakenly, by his lights) thinks of as that than which nothing greater can be thought, that it does not exist. He does not himself think of God as the thing than which nothing greater can be thought. After all, he is an atheist, and to think of anything as that than which nothing greater can be thought requires thinking of it as an existing thing. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 9

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I should like to see the demonstration of this. That or at least a somewhat rigorous definition of what it means to exist

There is the ens reale versus ens rationis distinction at the beginning. Roark takes it as analytic that something that really exists is "greater," "better," or "more perfect" than something that doesn't exist (the Latin word gets us "major" as well as "mayor," the position of top authority).

The existence between a real thing and a mere object of thought can be had by thinking of having an ice cream sundae, or a sail boat, or a Porsche, or anything else you might consider pretty great, and contrasting its mere mental existence with what it would mean to really have it. For me, it's the Star Trek holodeck; all the perks of time travel with none paradoxes.

Another way to think about it is in terms of truth. If one understands what it means for it to be true that anything is really the case, then one must have some understanding of "is really the case."

I am not sure if it works to respond to Anselm's charge of intransigence by refusing to accept that one knows what is meant by "is" or "true." Presumably, the critic wants to prove that it is "really the case" that Anselm's argument is defective, which presupposes a distinction between whatever they think is the case and what is really the case. If there was no distinction, thinking Anselm is wrong would be enough, no need to argue.

The speaker's reference, given by pointing to Kaplan, is Kaplan. The intended reference, given by the name "Kripke", is Kripke. Hence it is not always the case that the speaker's reference is the one that satisfies the speaker's intent. Which is to make the obvious point that what someone is talking about does not always align with what they think they are talking about.

This is a generic problem with accounts of reference in terms of speaker's intent. Reference is a communal activity, and so not reliant simply on the intent of the speaker.

I don't see how this is at odds with what Klima has said.

At any rate, isn't the "intended reference" also the "speaker's reference?" The pointing and naming are equally intentional. Hence the distinction between "intended" and "semantic" reference, although one could also frame it in terms of "intentions versus conventions."

In some cases, someone uses the wrong name and their intended reference is still communicated clear as day. That's how these examples usually work, by setting up scenarios where both the intended reference and what is referenced according to convention (and the difference between the two) are readily apparent to any competent speaker of the language. In which case, if both intentions and conventional meaning are clearly communicated, why try to claim only one is signified? Why not both? Language is redundant and people do things like point because its a clear sign of intentions that will overcome errors in convention. It's a false dichotomy to suppose that words either signify a speaker's intent or they signify according to convention, but never both, so "simply" is the key word in your last sentence. But no one outside of a joke character in a children's book has ever proposed that words "simply" mean what is intended by them.

In fact the question I posed to you about how one is to untangle God's existence from an acknowledgment of God's existence gets straight into the follow-up exchange between Klima and Roark, which makes sense since it was Roark who gave you the idea to phrase it that way.

I had the thought before finding the paper; however I don't think it's a terribly original insight on my part, because IIRC this is how some people have read St. Anselm himself from early on, and I might just have been recalling that. I get the impression that Roark is not terribly familiar with Anslem and that he is working his way back to the same insight in a rigorous way, but it also sort of "pops out" in a natural language analysis.

To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation.

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The existence between a real thing and a mere object of thought can be had by thinking of having an ice cream sundae, or a sail boat, or a Porsche, or anything else you might consider pretty great, and contrasting its mere mental existence with what it would mean to really have it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, it's pretty basic. A real Porsche is greater than the idea of a Porsche. I haven't seen anyone present an argument against this.

In some cases, someone uses the wrong name and their intended reference is still communicated clear as day. That's how these examples usually work, by setting up scenarios where both the intended reference and what is referenced according to convention (and the difference between the two) are readily apparent to any competent speaker of the language. In which case, if both intentions and conventional meaning are clearly communicated, why try to claim only one is signified? Why not both? Language is redundant and people do things like point because its a clear sign of intentions that will overcome errors in convention. It's a false dichotomy to suppose that words either signify a speaker's intent or they signify according to convention, but never both, so "simply" is the key word in your last sentence. But no one outside of a joke character in a children's book has ever proposed that words "simply" mean what is intended by them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, you give great clarity to this. :up:

To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I was thinking the exact same thing when I was looking at section 5. Let me open that up so that everything is on the table and then come back to this...

Part 5. Conclusion: Parasitic Reference, Natural Theology and Mutual Understanding

(Expedited for the impatient.)

In this final section Klima reads his notion of parasitic reference, which he sketched in section 4, into Aquinas and Gaunilo’s responses to Anselm’s proof. He begins by saying that parasitic reference is especially important in cases of basic beliefs, including religion (and non-religion) of all kinds. He then brings in Aquinas along with the idea of one’s “universe of thought objects.” After that he brings in Gaunilo and the “conceptual buildup” that is required for real dialogue and the possibility of changing one’s mind through that dialogue.

(It is a bit of a wonder that Klima does not reference Newman’s real vs. notional assent in this section.)

The first few sentences of section 5:

Parasitic reference to each other’s thought objects between people not sharing each other’s beliefs seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon. The most sensitive cases are, of course, those that involve people’s most basic beliefs, such as religious belief. Accordingly, parasitic reference is a phenomenon to be seriously reckoned with not only in dialogues between theists and atheists, but also between people of different religious faith. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 5

I thought section 5 was helpful in filling out section 4. By the time Klima finished the quote from Gaunilo I thought his case was quite strong.

Aquinas’ response to Anselm in the Summa Contra Gentiles is quite interesting. On the one hand, it is of the weaker “question-begging” form that we spoke about earlier, given that it does not directly address Anselm’s proof. On the other hand, it is quite different from the other similarly weaker replies that we have seen. In particular, Aquinas’ approach takes the dialogical nature of the exchange as being fundamental, as opposed to the idea that Anselm has simply transgressed an inferential law (e.g. “no-existence-from-words,” which is reminiscent of “no-ought-from-is”).

Let’s compare the standoff between Anselm and Aquinas to the earlier standoff between the theist and the atheist:

• If Anselm's thought is thought, then God exists
• Anselm's thought is humanly thinkable
• Therefore, God exists

• For any thought a greater is thinkable
• Anselm's thought is a thought
• Therefore, Anselm’s thought is not what it claims to be

We could also phrase the two options this way:

• God is that than which a greater cannot be thought
• That than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought not to exist
• Therefore, God exists

• For any thought object a greater is thinkable
• ‘That than which a greater cannot be thought’ is a thought object
• Therefore, ‘That than which a greater cannot be thought’ is not thinkable

(Note the inverted commas within the second premise and conclusion, which in some sense are themselves the whole issue.)

So for Aquinas someone could simply hold the premise, “For any thought a greater is thinkable,” in a way that overpowers Anselm’s argument. Indeed, Aquinas himself may hold the premise in this way.

But there is still an important cleavage or equivocation between Anselm and Aquinas insofar as the mode in which Anselm’s thought refers is equivocal between the two of them. This doesn’t map exactly to Klima’s parasitic vs. constitutive reference (unless one reads Klima’s parenthetical remark on constitutive reference in a special way – a remark that may have been added for this specific issue). The essence of this difference is this: Anselm would not see himself as referring to God constitutively with his definition, at least if by “constitutively” we mean that he would think that the thought conceived exhausts or comprehends God. Put differently, Anselm’s thought is ultimately pointing to the limits of thought qua thought, not thought qua Anselm (or whichever individual is doing the thinking).

When Klima glosses Aquinas in terms of one’s “universe of thought objects,” a bit more clarity is brought to the issue. Note that what Klima is assuming both in this and when he splits the horns of Anselm’s dilemma is that there is more than one level of thought objects, which on Klima’s view are conceived as intentional. That is, we have our universe of thought objects, and we also have knowledge of the other’s universe of thought objects, and these two universes do not occupy the same intentional space. This is how the atheist can think about Anselm’s thought object as necessarily existing without committing to its existence.

Thus I would depart from Klima when he claims that for the atheist Anselm’s thought lacks a certain property or description, and prefer instead to say that it contains the same property or description under a different intentional mode. If it did not contain the property of necessarily existing under this secondary intentional mode, then the atheist would be unable to see why the theist sees Anselm’s thought as necessarily existing (and in fact in some ways he does see why and in some ways he does not). Note that in most cases the difference of opinion is self-consciously accounted for by a disagreement on some premise, but in this case it isn’t quite that simple (because a “meaning-postulate” is not inherently contentious or truth-apt). (Cf. )

I really liked the quote from Gaunilo, which is highly reminiscent of Newman’s Grammar of Assent. And there is plenty to be said on the final paragraphs about concept-acquisition. But I will leave it there for now.

It is worth noting how the medievals think in terms of argument, intention, and one’s interlocutor, and how this extends even to notions of reference. It is in this way that Aquinas asks whether one can reject Anselm’s argument while avoiding inconsistency, rather than imposing a paradigm of logic or thought onto the proof itself (except insofar as Aquinas and Klima permit the atheist a mode of reference that Anselm does not grant, but there is nothing particularly idiosyncratic or system-based about this move).