My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named. — ucarr
Disclaimer: I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else..........................Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition. — noAxioms
Sounds like combining them would create contradictions, not just convolution. — noAxioms
This topic is about ontology and realism, and not about perception. — noAxioms
My notion of time is that it is a concept. Can concepts be said to exist? We have concepts, and use them. But they don't exist like trees and cups do.What needs clarification then is your notion of 'time'. — noAxioms
The list of 6 definitions of Existence you listed are made up of ambiguous words, that need to be clarified.I said nothing so ambiguous as any of the definitions being applicable or not to time. — noAxioms
Where are the 3 definitions of time you listed? I cannot locate them in the thread, and I have not been reading all the posts in the thread but just have been replying to your posts to me. Could you list them again?I listed three very well known and very different kinds of time, all three of which are heavily defined, used, and discussed in literature, and are not obscure at all. Hence my ability to render a meaningful opinion about how the various definitions of 'exists' might apply to each or not. — noAxioms
It is not the tooth fairy at all. If time is a concept, then how we use the concept in our statements and propositions reflect time. If our temporal statements are to be meaningful, then time must be real in the statements.Interestingly, your description of time in the prior post seems to correspond to my third kind, the kind whose existence I put on par with the tooth fairy. I suspect that it is this definition of 'time' is how you're using the word. — noAxioms
Now you are trying to clarify the definitions of Existence, which is good. E1 saying thatFor instance, what do you mean by "part of objective reality"?
That's E1, which I did not list for anything, since I do not identify as a realist. As for what it means, that is unclear. The meaning needs to be clarified by anybody who asserts it, but from my standpoint, a thing that has this property is indistinguishable from a things that doesn't have it, but is otherwise identical. — noAxioms
sounds like tautology or circular. Objective reality sounds also unclear. Isn't reality supposed to be objective, if there is such a thing as reality. But what is objectivity? What is reality? Can we ever get to know the reality? If E1 doesn't make sense, should it not be dropped, and move on to E2?E1 "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — noAxioms
E2 "I know about it" — noAxioms
If you know something, is it Existence? I know a name called Pegasus. Is Pegasus existence, because you know, and I know it? Pegasus has predicates too. It is a horse, has wings and suppose to fly.E4 "Is part of this universe" or "is part of this world" — noAxioms
Exactly !!Type 4 is more of an E1 definition: All that exists or all that is real. I find that pretty meaningless. — noAxioms
Not a standard definition afraid.This is a classical example of a definition that comes from quantum mechanics. — noAxioms
Existence is also nonexistence, and nonexistence is also existence. Something cannot exist without possibility of nonexistence. Nonexistence cannot exist without possibility of existence.E5 denies the principle of counterfactual definiteness which states that systems are in a defined state even when not measured. — noAxioms
Existence of X means that X was perceived. Perceiving X means perceiving of the time X was perceived. Hence all existence exists in time, and time is perception."existential quantification"? Surely that is not time itself is it?
No, it has nothing to do with time. 35 is not prime because (∃x) (x is non-trivial factor of 35). That's straight up existential quantification, and an example that makes no reference to time. — noAxioms
"existential quantification"? Surely that is not time itself is it?
No, it has nothing to do with time. 35 is not prime because (∃x) (x is non-trivial factor of 35). That's straight up existential quantification, and an example that makes no reference to time. — noAxioms
Nowhere am I claiming that we have no perceptions. This topic is simply not about them.Your disclaimer makes the OP logically impossible to answer.
If we had no perceptions, we would have nothing to reason about. — RussellA
Again, I never claimed otherwise.Our only knowledge about ontology and realism is founded on our perceptions, and our only understanding of the metaphysical depends on the epistemological/empirical.
It's actually quite easy if you follow my disclaimer since understanding of such a world does not require the understander to lack a mind. It just requires the world under consideration to lack the mind.It is logically impossible because any such understanding of a mind-independent world depends on the mind understanding something that is mind-independent.
I didn't even list the ideal of time as one of my options since I don't consider concepts to be time. It doesn't take an hour of concept to bake my brownies. Your other topic seemed to want it to be an object, something you could see with a location and color or whatever. "But still I cannot see time. I only see the movement.". But movement is a concept as well then, no? How can you see a concept? If not, why is time a concept but movement is not?My notion of time is that it is a concept. Can concepts be said to exist? We have concepts, and use them. But they don't exist like trees and cups do. — Corvus
Yes, they do. Thus there are more than 6 definitions, depending on those clarifications. But most notions of existence fall into those 6 categories, and few would choose say E5, but that one was unique and is sort of derived from Rovelli.The list of 6 definitions of Existence you listed are made up of ambiguous words, that need to be clarified.
The reply was directly to you here. The relevant bit:Where are the 3 definitions of time you listed? I cannot locate them in the thread, and I have not been reading all the posts in the thread but just have been replying to your posts to me. Could you list them again?
I didn't say it was the tooth fairy. I said that in my opinion, it shared the same ontology with the tooth fairy, which also exists only under E2 and E3.It is not the tooth fairy at all.
Exactly so, but you're the one defining time to be a concept, not me.If time is a concept, then how we use the concept in our statements and propositions reflect time. If our temporal statements are to be meaningful, then time must be real in the statements.
I agree, especially with the circular part.E1 "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — noAxioms
sounds like tautology or circular.
Too many people assert it to do that.If E1 doesn't make sense, should it not be dropped, and move on to E2?
Under E2 definition, yes. There seems to be no distinction between a horse and a unicorn under E2 or E3.E2 "I know about it" — noAxioms
If you know something, is it Existence? I know a name called Pegasus. Is Pegasus existence, because you know, and I know it?
This gets into identity. Pegasus isn't just 'a flying horse', it's a specific one, but other entities can be similar or share its name. Both might exist in the same way, but only one is the actual Pegasus typically referenced and the other is not.Or if someone comes along and say he is a Pegasus, is he the real Pegasus? Or is he someone pretending to be a Pegasus, therefore a fake Pegasus?
Something pretending to be a certain identity does not (arguable) alter the ontology of the actual thing with that identity.Can he be qualified as the existence of Pegasus?
What do you think the 'standard' definitions of existence are under quantum mechanics then? I admit it comes from one of the interpretations and not from the theory proper since the theory proper doesn't make metaphysical assertions. E5 did not fit into any of the other categories, and it's important.This is a classical example of a definition that comes from quantum mechanics. — noAxioms
Not a standard definition afraid. — Corvus
Not so. While I didn't list it, E8 could be "is possible", which is similar to Meinong's 'subsist' category. E8 could then be worded as "anything that subsists", thus merging his two highest categories. Point is, anything that subsists by definition has no possibility of nonsusbistence.Existence is also nonexistence, and nonexistence is also existence. Something cannot exist without possibility of nonexistence.
Similar counterexamples falsify this assertion.Nonexistence cannot exist without possibility of existence.
No. There is similarly no mention of perception either in my example of E6. You're using E2 again.No, it has nothing to do with time. 35 is not prime because (∃x) (x is non-trivial factor of 35). That's straight up existential quantification, and an example that makes no reference to time. — noAxioms
Existence of X means that X was perceived.
None of this is logically valid. I might think of something while being totally unaware of the time. Even if I was aware of the time, only under E4 or E5 would existing things be in time, and not even then since proper time itself exists under E4 and yet does not exist in time.Perceiving X means perceiving of the time X was perceived. Hence all existence exists in time, and time is perception.
Fine, but per my disclaimer, my example was about 35 and not about the idea of 35. My example was of a mind independent kind of existence. Only E2 is mind dependent.When 35 is perceived or stated as a non prime, its instantiation of the idea emerges with time perceived. — Corvus
Perceiving X means perceiving of the time X was perceived. Hence all existence exists in time, and time is perception.
None of this is logically valid. I might think of something while being totally unaware of the time. Even if I was aware of the time, only under E4 or E5 would existing things be in time, and not even then since proper time itself exists under E4 and yet does not exist in time.
Your assertion doesn't even work under E2 (the only one based on perception) since you consider time to be a concept, and your mind does not exist within a concept. — noAxioms
It's actually quite easy if you follow my disclaimer since understanding of such a world does not require the understander to lack a mind. It just requires the world under consideration to lack the mind. — noAxioms
Sure I do. It's an object. It's on your desk. You just perceive more details than do I.I am looking at an object on my desk right now. I can say I know what it is because it exists in front of me. But you can't. You don't see it, and you don't know what it is. — Corvus
It doesn't exist in you either, unless you ate your desk.Hence, the object I am seeing, doesn't exist in you.
Since this topic isn't about epistemology, no, I don't see any problem. Said object exists under E2,3,4,5,6, and perhaps meaninglessly under E1. That's the whole list.Where do you see problem in my argument here?
But you indicated that the telling of time was necessary, not just an option, for said object to exist. Maybe you meant something else by that wording, but rather than clarifying, you seem to be doubling down on the assertion.When I see the object, I can also tell the time of seeing it.
And other domains besides those two. Not sure if you agree with the validity of other domains, but E6 examples have referenced some of them.We agree that there is the domain of the mind and the domain of a mind-independent world. — RussellA
No. ... to understand the existence OF a mind independent world, not that anything IN that world is doing the understanding. So no problem at all.The problem remains that your disclaimer requires the mind to be able to understand something that we agree by defintion is independent of the mind ie, to understand existence in a mind-independent world.
The point is that you don't know anything about it apart from it is an object. And you know even that much, because I told you about it.Sure I do. It's an object. It's on your desk. You just perceive more details than do I. — noAxioms
"It doesn't exist in you." means it doesn't exist in your mind, not in your stomach.Hence, the object I am seeing, doesn't exist in you.
It doesn't exist in you either, unless you ate your desk. — noAxioms
Existence is the result of perception. Of course it is about epistemology too.Since this topic isn't about epistemology, no, I don't see any problem. Said object exists under E2,3,4,5,6, and perhaps meaninglessly under E1. That's the whole list. — noAxioms
Time is always implicated in perception. You just don't seem to be able to understand it.But you indicated that the telling of time was necessary, not just an option, for said object to exist. Maybe you meant something else by that wording, but rather than clarifying, you seem to be doubling down on the assertion. — noAxioms
I do know more. It exists in relation to your desk. That's the only predicate that matters for this topic.The point is that you don't know anything about it apart from it is an object. — Corvus
That is not a very mind-independent view. This topic is meant to discuss the meaning of mind-independent existence. Do you have anything to contribute to that besides assertions of definitions not compatible with the topic subject?Existence is the result of perception.
That sounds like gross dishonesty to keep pretending to know, when not knowing anything about it.I do know more. It exists in relation to your desk. That's the only predicate that matters for this topic. — noAxioms
Mind-independent existence? Tell us some examples of mind-independent existence.That is not a very mind-independent view. This topic is meant to discuss the meaning of mind-independent existence. Do you have anything to contribute to that besides assertions of definitions not compatible with the topic subject? — noAxioms
So you just told me something and now I'm being accused of being grossly dishonest when I indicate that I know what you just told me. Strange claim there. For the record, even if you define existence by perception, I have perceived your object precisely via your telling me about it. That perception told me the one predicate of the object that I care about.That sounds like gross dishonesty to keep pretending to know, when not knowing anything about it. — Corvus
The object on your desk is such an example.Mind-independent existence? Tell us some examples of mind-independent existence.
Totally agree, which is why I reference one of the six main definitions whenever I use the word, and then I wonder why you don't follow your own advice when you make assertions like this one:In order to understand what existence prior to predicates, you must first understand what existence means. Would you not agree?
Despite stressing the importance of what 'existence' means, you didn't define the word there, so non-sequitur. The object on your desk presumably doesn't have perception, and yet I suspect that you consider it to exist, in direct contradiction to the literal wording of that assertion.The point is that without perception, you don't have existence.
E1 - "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — noAxioms
Material things vis-á-vis existence describes a part/whole relationship. Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things. — ucarr
This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms
E4 - "Is part of this universe" or "is part of this world" — noAxioms
Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. — ucarr
You start by presuming your conclusion directly? It is not going to in any way justify how we know what exists or not if you presume the list right up front rather than conclude it by some logic and/or evidence. — noAxioms
The implications are more interesting. Existence itself becomes a property, or gets redefined to something other than the typical presumption of 'being a member of <objective> reality'. What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it? — noAxioms
So you just told me something and now I'm being accused of being grossly dishonest when I indicate that I know what you just told me. Strange claim there. For the record, even if you define existence by perception, I have perceived your object precisely via your telling me about it. That perception told me the one predicate of the object that I care about. — noAxioms
My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named. — ucarr
My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named. — ucarr
I will further qualify my answer to say that if we say or determine that the number 1 is real and not just in the sense that it represents a real concept in a mind, but it is real as a number and exists separate from mind, then I agree. But the problem arises to this question or point. It's being argued in other threads and in this thread by other posters essentially. If existence encompasses everything that is materially real and everything that can be thought of or imagined then it is the largest all encompassing context. If existence is reserved for only things that exist materially then it is not. — philosch
People have attempted arguments for the existence of god in this manner. They prove that the concept of God exist and mistakenly thought that through clever semantics, they have proved the existence of god in a material sense and they have not. As we all know, there is no rational proof that a material being that is "god" can be or has been made. So it is very important to try and categorize or definitions and concepts. It's the Harry Potter example all over again. Harry Potter does exist in a context. He doesn't exist in the set or real, literal material things. He exists in the context of a fictional, mind generated character. Those are different contexts, one being more "real" if you will allow me that term. This relationship between these contexts and realness and other definitions causes much confusion in these forums in many threads and topics. — philosch
It doesn't 'sound like' dishonesty either. There statement is perfectly reasonable.If you read carefully, it says "That sounds like". It doesn't mean that "That is". — Corvus
I have no visual perception of the object on your desk, and never claimed to have it. Please stick to what I said and not what you unreasonably imply from what I said.You are also still in confusion between the sentence in the post to you with your own visual perception of the object on my desk.
I did not disagree with your point. Your point was simply irrelevant to the existence of the object, which is what this topic is about.You have no perception of the object on my desk, hence you have no idea what the object is, was the point.
If I parse that correctly, I think you're saying that what I posted didn't sound quite right to you. That's acceptable. You are trapped in a mode where you seemingly cannot assess the validity of a statement that uses a different definition of 'exists' than E2. But if that's the case, why are you contributing to a topic that explicitly states up front that it is not about mind-dependent views?But your saying that you know the object relation to my desk sounded something not quite right.
Depends on the definition of 'exists'. That's always going to be my answer if I don't know the definition. Your first statement says if it is material, it exists. OK, but that doesn't mean that if it exists, it must be material. So it does not imply an assertion of existence only of material things, leaving me with no clear definition from you of what you think 'exists' means.If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist? — ucarr
No. I don't deny the meaningfulness of the word, even if there's no context here to narrow it down to a specific definition of the word.Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations?
Depends on the definition of 'exists', but you seem to be leaning heavily upon an anthropocentric definition, in which case, no, I don't deny their existence given such a relational definition.Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?
1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."
Yea, that's a pretty good reading of E1.Regarding my reading of E1 - quoted above - "member of all" tells me existence as "member of all" participates as a presence in "all that is part of objective reality."
Objective reality being accessible to a specific consciousness depends probably on if said consciousness is part of that reality or not. There seems to be no test for being part of objective reality or the exact same thing not being part of that reality. That's not your problem, it's the problem of the E1 definition.Unless you entertain some arcane notion, such as, "Objective reality is inaccessible to consciousness." then I see the definition as simple and clear.
One does not travel in spacetime. One travels in space, and one traces a worldline in spacetime. 'Travel' implies that the thing is no longer at point A once point B is reached, and this is not true of a worldline in spacetime.If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime
I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. As for the two words not meaning the same thing, 'distance' is frame dependent, and 'interval' is not.Regarding frame dependence WRT distance and interval, can you show logically that distance and interval are not both framed between different states?
With what part are you in disagreement. I assure you that existence becoming a property follows from denial of EPP. Disagreeing with EPP on the other hand is an opinion, one which is logically valid. The question is, how justified is that opinion?What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it? — noAxioms
I'm examining your question presented in bold immediately above. I don't agree that Meinong, by arguing against EPP and thereby setting up, "...allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent
things..." establishes existence as a property.
OK, but I don't accept (let alone understand) your premises, so I don't accept that existence needs to be emergent. It does seem to be emergent under say E5 at least.Existence is not a property because it is not emergent. This is one of the important implications of "Eternal universe uncaused."
If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist? — ucarr
Depends on the definition of 'exists'. That's always going to be my answer if I don't know the definition. Your first statement says if it is material, it exists. OK, but that doesn't mean that if it exists, it must be material. So it does not imply an assertion of existence only of material things, leaving me with no clear definition from you of what you think 'exists' means. — noAxioms
This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms
Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations?
No. I don't deny the meaningfulness of the word, even if there's no context here to narrow it down to a specific definition of the word. — noAxioms
Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?
Depends on the definition of 'exists', but you seem to be leaning heavily upon an anthropocentric definition, in which case, no, I don't deny their existence given such a relational definition. — noAxioms
All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."
1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms
2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms
If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime... — ucarr
One does not travel in spacetime. One travels in space, and one traces a worldline in spacetime. 'Travel' implies that the thing is no longer at point A once point B is reached, and this is not true of a worldline in spacetime. — noAxioms
I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. — noAxioms
You got it backwards. Given EPP, a thing with defining attributes necessarily exists since existence is prior to those attributes. So the answer would be 'no' given EPP since nothing is added.My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. — ucarr
So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception?For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr
If perception defines existence, then measurability seems to define presence, not the other way around.Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable.
This seems to suggest existence as being part of a domain (the universe perhaps) and not at all based on perception. This seems to utterly contradict your definition above. OK, so perhaps you are using E4 as a definition. X exists if X is a member of some domain, which is our material universe perhaps. That's a common enough definition, and it is a relational one, not a property. A thing doesn't just 'exist', it exists IN something, it is a member OF something.I think I can answer your question, "What meaningful difference is made by having this property (existence) vs the same thing not having it?"
...
If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library.
I never claimed that. I said distance would not exist given a definition that only material things exist, and the fact that while distance might be a relation between material things, it is not itself material. Anyway, I would never use that definition, so I don't claim anything about the existence of distance.Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist?
In a world like this one but without humans in it at all, a planet orbits one light-hour from its star. Of course I had to use human concepts (including one of our standard units) to say that, but the distance is between objects that have no anthropocentric existence.Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic?
No. The question seems to be a category error, treating the universe as an object that 'does things'.Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially?
Well, light was one of my examples, arguably not a material thing since it is massless. My material eyes react to light, so that's a relation.How do immaterial things relate to material things?
I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material.how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes?
Light travels on a geodesic, so it doesn't curve. As for heat, light has energy. If energy is considered to be material, then I guess light is considered to be material.Since you believe light is not material, how do you understand light bending around a gravitational field, and how do you understand laser light generating heat?
No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location.Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?
If we're talking spacetime, points in spacetime are called events. If we're not talking spacetime, then there is no meaningful interval between the points.We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B.
If I'm reading you correctly, then I understand you to be saying a concept of the number two within the mind is not material, whereas one stone beside another stone is a material display of the number two. I'm saying both are real and both are material. The concept of the number two within the mind has no less material reality than the number two expressed by two stones side-by-side. — ucarr
The argument for this claim says, “No brain, no mind.” The mind, like the brain, is emergent. — ucarr
The ache in the pit of your stomach was real, and so was the pounding of your heart. For these reasons, we go to the movies. The mind and its experiences are physically real. No brain, no mind. — ucarr
What is an object, for you? — Banno
My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. — ucarr
You got it backwards. Given EPP, a thing with defining attributes necessarily exists since existence is prior to those attributes. So the answer would be 'no' given EPP since nothing is added. Meinong denies EPP, and therefore existence is not necessary for a thing to have attributes. So Meinong would say 'yes' (as do you), existence is optional and thus in addition to those attributes. — noAxioms
For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr
So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception? — noAxioms
For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. Presence and its detectability are the results of an existing thing being a system with capacity for different states being emergent from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable. — ucarr
If perception defines existence, then measurability seems to define presence, not the other way around. — noAxioms
If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library. The book has its own attributes, and the library that houses it probably has no material effect on its particulars, even so, most readers who borrow library books think it useful to know the book's library. — ucarr
This seems to suggest existence as being part of a domain (the universe perhaps) and not at all based on perception. This seems to utterly contradict your definition above. OK, so perhaps you are using E4 as a definition. X exists if X is a member of some domain, which is our material universe perhaps. That's a common enough definition, and it is a relational one, not a property. A thing doesn't just 'exist', it exists IN something, it is a member OF something. — noAxioms
The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical. — noAxioms
Here again, the unicorn exists by E4 (it's out there somewhere in this universe) and perhaps under E2 (because our imagination is arguably perception of it). The horse and the unicorn share the same ontology. — noAxioms
Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist? — ucarr
I never claimed that. I said distance would not exist given a definition that only material things exist, and the fact that while distance might be a relation between material things, it is not itself material. Anyway, I would never use that definition, so I don't claim anything about the existence of distance. — noAxioms
This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms
Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic? — ucarr
In a world like this one but without humans in it at all, a planet orbits one light-hour from its star. Of course I had to use human concepts (including one of our standard units) to say that, but the distance is between objects that have no anthropocentric existence.
2nd example: In a very different universe of conway's game of life, a Lightweight spaceship is of length (distance) 5 at all times. There is no people in that universe since it has but 2 spatial dimensions, but an observer is possible. — noAxioms
1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms
Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially? — ucarr
No. The question seems to be a category error, treating the universe as an object that 'does things'. — noAxioms
How do immaterial things relate to material things?
Well, light was one of my examples, arguably not a material thing since it is massless. My material eyes react to light, so that's a relation. — noAxioms
Another example is the fine-structure constant (α) which relates to me since material of any sort cannot form with most other values of it. Universe with different values of it might just be fading radiation. — noAxioms
If you only know about immaterial things through the reactions of your body, then how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes? — ucarr
I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material. — noAxioms
Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?
No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location. — noAxioms
We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B.
If we're talking spacetime, points in spacetime are called events. If we're not talking spacetime, then there is no meaningful interval between the points. — noAxioms
Pegasus is mythical, so any real creature claiming to be Pegasus is a con. — Banno
Troy was a mythical city. Is the Troy they discovered a con then? It certainly didn't have all the embellished events happen there, but some of them are based on real events. Just saying that being mythical does not necessarily equate to not real. Hard to argue with Pegasus though.How can a mythical creature be real? Mythical already implies not real. — Corvus
Only if you don't define object as that to which words have been assigned. If this restraint is lifted, there are (E4 say) more unnamed objects than named ones. There are waaaay more given a non-athropocentric definition like E5.So Pegasus is a word without its object? Are there objects without their words / names? — Corvus
It's a statue of X, not X. There's a difference, kind of the same difference between the concept of 14 and 14.An object can be both mental and physical. If you imagined a winged horse, that winged horse is your mental object. If you saw one made of physical matter in Disney, it is a physical object of a winged horse. It is not the real Pegasus, but it is still a winged horse, and one can name it as Pegasus. No? — Corvus
Adjective yes, and for argument sake, noun, yes. Does that thing playing that role need to 'exist' to have that adjective apply to it? Depends on definition of 'exist' (nobody ever specifies it no matter how many times I ask), and it depends on if EPP applies to the kind of existence being used.Attributes exist as characteristics that don't characterize anything? They embody the role of an adjective, but they don't attach to any existing thing playing the role of a noun or pronoun? — ucarr
Only as a concept/experience, hardly as a 'thing' in itself, much like 'sweet' exists (E2). It didn't exist relative to my father, but blue did, which is why he always played the blue pieces in a game of 'Sorry' or something. When he was able to do something mean to one of the other pieces, he couldn't play favorites since he didn't know whose pieces the other colors were. There was just blue and not-blue.The color read exists
I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton.What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?
OK, that's fine. To be honest, why did you wait this long to state this? Does a unicorn being horny make it exist then? If so, what definition of 'exists'? If not, how is that consistent with EPP?I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from.
Sounds like both of us actually don't know then, in which case it seems too soon to draw conclusions about how existence is dependent on perception.For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr
So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception? — noAxioms
I don't deny mind-independence outright in accordance with a hard-edged yes/no binary. I allow my still developing thinking upon the subject to include a gray space that accommodates thoroughgoing nuancing.
Agree. I have appealed to logic rather than inference, but even that doesn't supply a helpful solution. Hence I don't lay claim to realism. Mind dependent existence has pragmatic value and humans simply forget that it is a relation.Speculation about mind-independent reality cannot even be supported by inference because that too is mind dependent.
I did not quote the whole but, but it sounds like you are actually exploring this area, more than most of the posters to this topic.We cannot do any organized perceiving without injecting ourselves into the perceived reality per our perceptual boundaries.
I thought it meant 'not absence', and not 'perceived'. The opposite of that is unperceived.Since perceive means to become aware of something
Not impossible. It's just a little more indirect is all. Dark matter is not perceived, but we measure it nonetheless by its effects on other more directly perceived things. Time dilation is not perceived, but it can be measured/calculated.If it's impossible to measure something not present
The most inclusive context would include Pegasus, and there's not much utility to a definition that doesn't exclude anything. Not saying it's wrong, just that it lacks utility.I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named.
Mine was a relational definition. If X doesn't exist in domain D1, it might exist in domain D2, so your a) doesn't follow. It seems to be more of a rule for E1: absolute existence, a property that is had or is not had, period.The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical. — noAxioms
Your statement raises logical issues: a) if something doesn't exist, it doesn't exist anywhere — ucarr
Sorry, I don't follow this notation. All I see is one domain 'A', and it is unclear if these 'two things' are part of it or not.b) if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A').
1) They're not claims, they're consequences of some of the various definitions. Secondly, I live my life to a very different set of definitions and beliefs than what I rationally have concluded. I hold pragmatic beliefs for the former, even if these are demonstrably false. We all do this. I'm just more aware of it than most.I don't believe you live your life according to the integrity of your claims here.
Distance is not a journey. That word implies that a separation isn't meaningful unless something travels (which drags in time and all sorts of irrelevancies).Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them.
True, but characterization isn't necessary for the planet to orbit at that distance. The part that I find anthropocentric is where we say words like 'the universe' or 'our universe' which carries the implication that ours is the only one, that our universe has a preferred existence over the others due to us being in it. That's the sort of thinking that prompts me to label a definition as anthropocentric, not the inability to conceive of the mind-independent thing without utilizing a mind, and not just 'a mind', but 'my mind' in particular.In my view, your two examples demonstrate the impossibility of humans talking about mind-independent situations. Sans observers, the orbits of planets around suns cannot be characterized as such, nor can they be characterized by us in any way.
The time for a rock to hit the ground depends on a relation with the immaterial gravitational constant. That seems to be an example of material things interacting with something not material.Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact.
Common misconception. Space expands over time, but the universe, not being 'over' time, does not expand, and doesn't meaningfully have a size or an age. This is presuming of course the consensus model of spacetime and not something weird like aether theory under which the universe kind of is an object and very much does have an age.Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding?
There you go. That is not a description of travel.A world-line is a four-dimensional manifold with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.
OK. Different definition of 'interval'. I was using the spacetime interval definition from physics.In math, an interval is a set of numbers that includes all real numbers between two endpoints.
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.