My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named. — ucarr

Now this I find is an interesting question. I find myself initially at least, in agreement with your position on this although I'd like to give it further thought before I affirm that. I'm not sure of your use of the word obverse here but it may not matter. For now, I think I agree. Existence is the "maximum" or primary or most inclusive context. I'll have more on this after I give it some thought. There is an issue having to do with things that are real and things that are fictional concepts in our minds. Harry Potter exists and is real as a fictional character but is he "real" in the common use off the term real. Does he exist only as a concept? Does it matter? I'll have to ponder this.

Your disclaimer makes the OP logically impossible to answer.

Disclaimer: I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else..........................Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition. — noAxioms

If we had no perceptions, we would have nothing to reason about. But we do have perceptions. Idealism reasons that there is no mind-independent world. Indirect Realism reasons that our perceptions are only representations of any mind-independent world. Direct Realism reasons that our perceptions are a one to one correspondence with the mind-independent world.

As you say, any reasoning about E1 to E6 combining Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realist would result in contradictions.

Sounds like combining them would create contradictions, not just convolution. — noAxioms

Only the Direct Realist argues that we can understand existence independent of the mind, yet this is a logical impossibility. It is logically impossible because any such understanding of a mind-independent world depends on the mind understanding something that is mind-independent.

This topic is about ontology and realism, and not about perception. — noAxioms

Our only knowledge about ontology and realism is founded on our perceptions, and our only understanding of the metaphysical depends on the epistemological/empirical.

What needs clarification then is your notion of 'time'. — noAxioms

My notion of time is that it is a concept. Can concepts be said to exist? We have concepts, and use them. But they don't exist like trees and cups do.

I said nothing so ambiguous as any of the definitions being applicable or not to time. — noAxioms

The list of 6 definitions of Existence you listed are made up of ambiguous words, that need to be clarified.

I listed three very well known and very different kinds of time, all three of which are heavily defined, used, and discussed in literature, and are not obscure at all. Hence my ability to render a meaningful opinion about how the various definitions of 'exists' might apply to each or not. — noAxioms

Where are the 3 definitions of time you listed? I cannot locate them in the thread, and I have not been reading all the posts in the thread but just have been replying to your posts to me. Could you list them again?

Interestingly, your description of time in the prior post seems to correspond to my third kind, the kind whose existence I put on par with the tooth fairy. I suspect that it is this definition of 'time' is how you're using the word. — noAxioms

It is not the tooth fairy at all. If time is a concept, then how we use the concept in our statements and propositions reflect time. If our temporal statements are to be meaningful, then time must be real in the statements.

For instance, what do you mean by "part of objective reality"?
That's E1, which I did not list for anything, since I do not identify as a realist. As for what it means, that is unclear. The meaning needs to be clarified by anybody who asserts it, but from my standpoint, a thing that has this property is indistinguishable from a things that doesn't have it, but is otherwise identical. — noAxioms

Now you are trying to clarify the definitions of Existence, which is good. E1 saying that

E1 "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — noAxioms

sounds like tautology or circular. Objective reality sounds also unclear. Isn't reality supposed to be objective, if there is such a thing as reality. But what is objectivity? What is reality? Can we ever get to know the reality? If E1 doesn't make sense, should it not be dropped, and move on to E2?

E2 "I know about it" — noAxioms

E4 "Is part of this universe" or "is part of this world" — noAxioms

If you know something, is it Existence? I know a name called Pegasus. Is Pegasus existence, because you know, and I know it? Pegasus has predicates too. It is a horse, has wings and suppose to fly.
Or if someone comes along and say he is a Pegasus, is he the real Pegasus? Or is he someone pretending to be a Pegasus, therefore a fake Pegasus? Can he be qualified as the existence of Pegasus? Hence these definitions present us further questions than firm definitions.

Type 4 is more of an E1 definition: All that exists or all that is real. I find that pretty meaningless. — noAxioms

Exactly !!

This is a classical example of a definition that comes from quantum mechanics. — noAxioms

Not a standard definition afraid.

E5 denies the principle of counterfactual definiteness which states that systems are in a defined state even when not measured. — noAxioms

Existence is also nonexistence, and nonexistence is also existence. Something cannot exist without possibility of nonexistence. Nonexistence cannot exist without possibility of existence.

"existential quantification"? Surely that is not time itself is it?
No, it has nothing to do with time. 35 is not prime because (∃x) (x is non-trivial factor of 35). That's straight up existential quantification, and an example that makes no reference to time. — noAxioms

Existence of X means that X was perceived. Perceiving X means perceiving of the time X was perceived. Hence all existence exists in time, and time is perception.

"existential quantification"? Surely that is not time itself is it?
No, it has nothing to do with time. 35 is not prime because (∃x) (x is non-trivial factor of 35). That's straight up existential quantification, and an example that makes no reference to time. — noAxioms

When 35 is perceived or stated as a non prime, its instantiation of the idea emerges with time perceived. When the perception ends, and the statement is forgotten, the instantiation disappears or fades away into nonexistence and the associated time fades away too.

Hence it is too simple to say X doesn't exist means there is nothing to it, or X exists means we know it and use it. There are more involved in existence.

Your disclaimer makes the OP logically impossible to answer.

If we had no perceptions, we would have nothing to reason about. — RussellA

Nowhere am I claiming that we have no perceptions. This topic is simply not about them.

Our only knowledge about ontology and realism is founded on our perceptions, and our only understanding of the metaphysical depends on the epistemological/empirical.

Again, I never claimed otherwise.

It is logically impossible because any such understanding of a mind-independent world depends on the mind understanding something that is mind-independent.

It's actually quite easy if you follow my disclaimer since understanding of such a world does not require the understander to lack a mind. It just requires the world under consideration to lack the mind.

That you cannot distinguish the difference is pretty hard evidence that you're an idealist, despite whatever label you pin on yourself.

My notion of time is that it is a concept. Can concepts be said to exist? We have concepts, and use them. But they don't exist like trees and cups do. — Corvus

I didn't even list the ideal of time as one of my options since I don't consider concepts to be time. It doesn't take an hour of concept to bake my brownies. Your other topic seemed to want it to be an object, something you could see with a location and color or whatever. "But still I cannot see time. I only see the movement.". But movement is a concept as well then, no? How can you see a concept? If not, why is time a concept but movement is not?
You don't seem to have sorted yourself out.

The list of 6 definitions of Existence you listed are made up of ambiguous words, that need to be clarified.

Yes, they do. Thus there are more than 6 definitions, depending on those clarifications. But most notions of existence fall into those 6 categories, and few would choose say E5, but that one was unique and is sort of derived from Rovelli.

Where are the 3 definitions of time you listed? I cannot locate them in the thread, and I have not been reading all the posts in the thread but just have been replying to your posts to me. Could you list them again?

The reply was directly to you here. The relevant bit:
1) proper time, that which clocks measure
2) Coordinate time, that which dilates
3) Progression of the present, one's intuitive sense of the flow of events.

Of course, to an idealist, a clock is a concept, and concepts don't measure proper time. Concepts don't dilate, but per my disclaimer, I'm talking about time and not just about the concept of time.

It is not the tooth fairy at all.

I didn't say it was the tooth fairy. I said that in my opinion, it shared the same ontology with the tooth fairy, which also exists only under E2 and E3.

If time is a concept, then how we use the concept in our statements and propositions reflect time. If our temporal statements are to be meaningful, then time must be real in the statements.

Exactly so, but you're the one defining time to be a concept, not me.

E1 "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — noAxioms

sounds like tautology or circular.

I agree, especially with the circular part.

If E1 doesn't make sense, should it not be dropped, and move on to E2?

Too many people assert it to do that.

E2 "I know about it" — noAxioms
If you know something, is it Existence? I know a name called Pegasus. Is Pegasus existence, because you know, and I know it?

Under E2 definition, yes. There seems to be no distinction between a horse and a unicorn under E2 or E3.

Or if someone comes along and say he is a Pegasus, is he the real Pegasus? Or is he someone pretending to be a Pegasus, therefore a fake Pegasus?

This gets into identity. Pegasus isn't just 'a flying horse', it's a specific one, but other entities can be similar or share its name. Both might exist in the same way, but only one is the actual Pegasus typically referenced and the other is not.
Notice that I said 'a unicorn' above, which is not a particular the way 'Pegasus' is.

Can he be qualified as the existence of Pegasus?

Something pretending to be a certain identity does not (arguable) alter the ontology of the actual thing with that identity.

This is a classical example of a definition that comes from quantum mechanics. — noAxioms

Not a standard definition afraid. — Corvus

What do you think the 'standard' definitions of existence are under quantum mechanics then? I admit it comes from one of the interpretations and not from the theory proper since the theory proper doesn't make metaphysical assertions. E5 did not fit into any of the other categories, and it's important.

Existence is also nonexistence, and nonexistence is also existence. Something cannot exist without possibility of nonexistence.

Not so. While I didn't list it, E8 could be "is possible", which is similar to Meinong's 'subsist' category. E8 could then be worded as "anything that subsists", thus merging his two highest categories. Point is, anything that subsists by definition has no possibility of nonsusbistence.

Nonexistence cannot exist without possibility of existence.

Similar counterexamples falsify this assertion.

I will try to reword your assertions to something that might make sense:
Existence is meaningless without distinction from something that doesn't exist.
That renders totally empty an assertion like "everything exists" or "nothing exists". The latter is perhaps nihilism, which is perhaps more of an awareness of the meaningless of the notion of existence than it is an assertion that there is a reality, and that reality is empty.

No, it has nothing to do with time. 35 is not prime because (∃x) (x is non-trivial factor of 35). That's straight up existential quantification, and an example that makes no reference to time. — noAxioms

Existence of X means that X was perceived.

No. There is similarly no mention of perception either in my example of E6. You're using E2 again.

Perceiving X means perceiving of the time X was perceived. Hence all existence exists in time, and time is perception.

None of this is logically valid. I might think of something while being totally unaware of the time. Even if I was aware of the time, only under E4 or E5 would existing things be in time, and not even then since proper time itself exists under E4 and yet does not exist in time.
Your assertion doesn't even work under E2 (the only one based on perception) since you consider time to be a concept, and your mind does not exist within a concept.

When 35 is perceived or stated as a non prime, its instantiation of the idea emerges with time perceived. — Corvus

Fine, but per my disclaimer, my example was about 35 and not about the idea of 35. My example was of a mind independent kind of existence. Only E2 is mind dependent.

Perceiving X means perceiving of the time X was perceived. Hence all existence exists in time, and time is perception.
None of this is logically valid. I might think of something while being totally unaware of the time. Even if I was aware of the time, only under E4 or E5 would existing things be in time, and not even then since proper time itself exists under E4 and yet does not exist in time.
Your assertion doesn't even work under E2 (the only one based on perception) since you consider time to be a concept, and your mind does not exist within a concept. — noAxioms

I am looking at an object on my desk right now. I can say I know what it is because it exists in front of me. Or conversely, because I see it exists, I know what it is.

But you can't. You don't see it, and you don't know what it is. Hence, the object I am seeing and is existing concretely and solidly, doesn't exist in you. You don't even know what it is. Where do you see problem in my argument here?

When I see the object, I can also tell the time of seeing it. The time I read belongs to the concept of time. It is not a concept of time. It is a read time, which instantiated at the moment of reading and noticing. So you seem to be confusing between the concept of time and read time.

It's actually quite easy if you follow my disclaimer since understanding of such a world does not require the understander to lack a mind. It just requires the world under consideration to lack the mind. — noAxioms

We agree that there is the domain of the mind and the domain of a mind-independent world.

The problem remains that your disclaimer requires the mind to be able to understand something that we agree by defintion is independent of the mind, ie, to understand existence in a mind-independent world.

This is the same problem of how is it possible to know the unknown.

I am looking at an object on my desk right now. I can say I know what it is because it exists in front of me. But you can't. You don't see it, and you don't know what it is. — Corvus

Sure I do. It's an object. It's on your desk. You just perceive more details than do I.

Hence, the object I am seeing, doesn't exist in you.

It doesn't exist in you either, unless you ate your desk.

Where do you see problem in my argument here?

Since this topic isn't about epistemology, no, I don't see any problem. Said object exists under E2,3,4,5,6, and perhaps meaninglessly under E1. That's the whole list.

When I see the object, I can also tell the time of seeing it.

But you indicated that the telling of time was necessary, not just an option, for said object to exist. Maybe you meant something else by that wording, but rather than clarifying, you seem to be doubling down on the assertion.

We agree that there is the domain of the mind and the domain of a mind-independent world. — RussellA

And other domains besides those two. Not sure if you agree with the validity of other domains, but E6 examples have referenced some of them.

The problem remains that your disclaimer requires the mind to be able to understand something that we agree by defintion is independent of the mind ie, to understand existence in a mind-independent world.

No. ... to understand the existence OF a mind independent world, not that anything IN that world is doing the understanding. So no problem at all.

Any realist (of the physical universe) believes in a mind-independent world, that is, something not dependent on (supervenes on?) mind. Our own world is such a world, but hardly the only one.

This presumes that 'understanding' is only something that a 'mind' can do, else said world could be understood by some non-mind thing contained by that world.


Edit: I thought about it and ours is a mind-dependent world. It has minds in it (presuming a non-supernatural definition of 'mind'), and had it not those minds, it would be a different world. Ergo, ours is a mind dependent world in the same way that it is a Betelgeuse dependent world.

Sure I do. It's an object. It's on your desk. You just perceive more details than do I. — noAxioms

The point is that you don't know anything about it apart from it is an object. And you know even that much, because I told you about it.

Hence, the object I am seeing, doesn't exist in you.
It doesn't exist in you either, unless you ate your desk. — noAxioms

"It doesn't exist in you." means it doesn't exist in your mind, not in your stomach.

Since this topic isn't about epistemology, no, I don't see any problem. Said object exists under E2,3,4,5,6, and perhaps meaninglessly under E1. That's the whole list. — noAxioms

Existence is the result of perception. Of course it is about epistemology too.

But you indicated that the telling of time was necessary, not just an option, for said object to exist. Maybe you meant something else by that wording, but rather than clarifying, you seem to be doubling down on the assertion. — noAxioms

Time is always implicated in perception. You just don't seem to be able to understand it.

The point is that you don't know anything about it apart from it is an object. — Corvus

I do know more. It exists in relation to your desk. That's the only predicate that matters for this topic.

Existence is the result of perception.

That is not a very mind-independent view. This topic is meant to discuss the meaning of mind-independent existence. Do you have anything to contribute to that besides assertions of definitions not compatible with the topic subject?

I do know more. It exists in relation to your desk. That's the only predicate that matters for this topic. — noAxioms

That sounds like gross dishonesty to keep pretending to know, when not knowing anything about it.
The point is that without perception, you don't have existence.

That is not a very mind-independent view. This topic is meant to discuss the meaning of mind-independent existence. Do you have anything to contribute to that besides assertions of definitions not compatible with the topic subject? — noAxioms

Mind-independent existence? Tell us some examples of mind-independent existence.

Assertions of definitions not compatible with the topic subject? It has been noticed some folks resort to this claim when they run out of ideas on what to say, or don't want to admit their claims are wrong. A typical act of self defense mechanism motivated by dishonesty.

In order to understand what existence prior to predicates, you must first understand what existence means. Would you not agree?

That sounds like gross dishonesty to keep pretending to know, when not knowing anything about it. — Corvus

So you just told me something and now I'm being accused of being grossly dishonest when I indicate that I know what you just told me. Strange claim there. For the record, even if you define existence by perception, I have perceived your object precisely via your telling me about it. That perception told me the one predicate of the object that I care about.

But this topic is about definitions of existence other than E2, and only under E2 does existence require perception. In a world like this one in every way except absent perceiving things, that object (assuming it is not itself a perceiving entity) would still exist upon your desk in the same ways (E1,3,4,5,6) that it did with the presence of the perceiving entities. Only it's existence under E2 would not be satisfied.



All this seems very strange coming from somebody claiming to be a realist. I really don't think you know what the term means.

Mind-independent existence? Tell us some examples of mind-independent existence.

The object on your desk is such an example.

E1 The object exists if the desk exists.
E3 The object has the property of being on your desk, so it exists.
E4 The object is in the universe, so it exists.
E5 The object being at rest is a function of the desk exerting a force on it, so that makes the desk exist in relation to the object.
E6 (∃x) (x is on your desk) Your object satisfies that, so your object exists by E6.

Not one of those examples mentions or relies on perception by a mind. Only the reading and understanding of those words requires perception, but the existence of the object by any of the above definitions doesn't require those words to be perceived or understood.

In order to understand what existence prior to predicates, you must first understand what existence means. Would you not agree?

Totally agree, which is why I reference one of the six main definitions whenever I use the word, and then I wonder why you don't follow your own advice when you make assertions like this one:

The point is that without perception, you don't have existence.

Despite stressing the importance of what 'existence' means, you didn't define the word there, so non-sequitur. The object on your desk presumably doesn't have perception, and yet I suspect that you consider it to exist, in direct contradiction to the literal wording of that assertion.

E1 - "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — noAxioms

Material things vis-á-vis existence describes a part/whole relationship. Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things. — ucarr

This is one of my premises.

~E1- Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality. My premise above is an elaboration of this definition. Distance examples existence in two modes: a) distance as an interval of spacetime is a material reality; b) distance as an abstract thought is a cognitive reality.

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist?

Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations? Consider: You're planning a trip to another city. The distance from your home to the other city has no meaning for you in terms of the cost of gas, the amount of time for travel, and the best route to take? Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?

E4 - "Is part of this universe" or "is part of this world" — noAxioms

This is leveraging E4, not E1. All the examples are relative to our universe. Your prior definition was that it was 'material'.

Your meaning here is unclear. All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material." Regarding my reading of E1 - quoted above - "member of all" tells me existence as "member of all" participates as a presence in "all that is part of objective reality." Unless you entertain some arcane notion, such as, "Objective reality is inaccessible to consciousness." then I see the definition as simple and clear.

BTW, distance is a coordinate difference in spatial coordinates, not a spacetime interval. Distance is frame dependent, and an interval is not. Irrelevant to the topic, I know.

If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime, there is an empirically detectable change of state regarding your position, whether or not you know math.

Regarding frame dependence WRT distance and interval, can you show logically that distance and interval are not both framed between different states?

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. — ucarr

You start by presuming your conclusion directly? It is not going to in any way justify how we know what exists or not if you presume the list right up front rather than conclude it by some logic and/or evidence. — noAxioms

The implications are more interesting. Existence itself becomes a property, or gets redefined to something other than the typical presumption of 'being a member of <objective> reality'. What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it? — noAxioms

I'm examining your question presented in bold immediately above. I don't agree that Meinong, by arguing against EPP and thereby setting up, "...allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent
things..." establishes existence as a property. Existence is not a property because it is not emergent. This is one of the important implications of "Eternal universe uncaused." It possess two fundamental properties that it attaches to material things: symmetries and their conservation laws. These two fundamentals support all properties emergent from uncaused existence.

Arvin Ash_Symmetry Fundamental

I have three premises: a) Axiomatic eternal universe uncaused is my starting point; b) Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things; c) Existence adds the context of symmetry and conservation to an emergent thing that has properties.

My conclusion says, "Every existing thing has two parts: a) the local part individualized with defining properties; b) the non-local part which is its ground of symmetry and conservation from which it emerges."

So you just told me something and now I'm being accused of being grossly dishonest when I indicate that I know what you just told me. Strange claim there. For the record, even if you define existence by perception, I have perceived your object precisely via your telling me about it. That perception told me the one predicate of the object that I care about. — noAxioms

You seems to be taking the statement too personally. If you read carefully, it says "That sounds like". It doesn't mean that "That is". What makes you think "sounds like" is "is", is a mystery to me. There was NO accusation on anyone, but it was just describing about the post with a simile form of expression.

You are also still in confusion between the sentence in the post to you with your own visual perception of the object on my desk. You have no visual perception on the object on my desk, hence you have no idea what the object is, and the object doesn't exist in your mind or perception, and that was the point. But your saying that you know the object relation to my desk sounded not quite right, which SOUNDED LIKE some kind of pretention or dishonest assertion,

I will respond to further points in rest part of your post later.

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named. — ucarr

I will further qualify my answer to say that if we say or determine that the number 1 is real and not just in the sense that it represents a real concept in a mind, but it is real as a number and exists separate from mind, then I agree. But the problem arises to this question or point. It's being argued in other threads and in this thread by other posters essentially. If existence encompasses everything that is materially real and everything that can be thought of or imagined then it is the largest all encompassing context. If existence is reserved for only things that exist materially then it is not.

People have attempted arguments for the existence of god in this manner. They prove that the concept of God exist and mistakenly thought that through clever semantics, they have proved the existence of god in a material sense and they have not. As we all know, there is no rational proof that a material being that is "god" can be or has been made. So it is very important to try and categorize or definitions and concepts. It's the Harry Potter example all over again. Harry Potter does exist in a context. He doesn't exist in the set or real, literal material things. He exists in the context of a fictional, mind generated character. Those are different contexts, one being more "real" if you will allow me that term. This relationship between these contexts and realness and other definitions causes much confusion in these forums in many threads and topics.

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named. — ucarr

I will further qualify my answer to say that if we say or determine that the number 1 is real and not just in the sense that it represents a real concept in a mind, but it is real as a number and exists separate from mind, then I agree. But the problem arises to this question or point. It's being argued in other threads and in this thread by other posters essentially. If existence encompasses everything that is materially real and everything that can be thought of or imagined then it is the largest all encompassing context. If existence is reserved for only things that exist materially then it is not. — philosch

If I'm reading you correctly, then I understand you to be saying a concept of the number two within the mind is not material, whereas one stone beside another stone is a material display of the number two. I'm saying both are real and both are material. The concept of the number two within the mind has no less material reality than the number two expressed by two stones side-by-side. The concept of the number two is perhaps more complicated than two stones side-by-side, but it is material. The argument for this claim says, “No brain, no mind.” The mind, like the brain, is emergent. Both emerge from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. As we know, no mind works without consuming energy. Mind is the material dynamism of the everyday world internalized. Consider: You went to a racetrack in the afternoon. That night, while asleep, you dreamt of horses rounding the track and entering into the final stretch. You heard the thundering of the hooves through the dirt. All of this mental activity is the motion of the world internalized within your brain_mind. No brain, no memory, so it’s physical.

People have attempted arguments for the existence of god in this manner. They prove that the concept of God exist and mistakenly thought that through clever semantics, they have proved the existence of god in a material sense and they have not. As we all know, there is no rational proof that a material being that is "god" can be or has been made. So it is very important to try and categorize or definitions and concepts. It's the Harry Potter example all over again. Harry Potter does exist in a context. He doesn't exist in the set or real, literal material things. He exists in the context of a fictional, mind generated character. Those are different contexts, one being more "real" if you will allow me that term. This relationship between these contexts and realness and other definitions causes much confusion in these forums in many threads and topics. — philosch

Have you ever watched a good movie and experienced a stirring emotional ride through the journey of the story? Maybe it was an adventure tale. When the hero carefully inches out onto the string bridge suspended over a deep valley where a rushing river crashes over boulders far below, with close shots of the frayed strings of the bridge unraveling, and the girl in distress screaming in fear, afraid he won’t reach her in time, you may have felt an ache in the pit of your stomach. If the movie is truly a classic, you might’ve reached a point where you forgot you were in a theater watching a movie. It was as if you were living in the world of the story.

The ache in the pit of your stomach was real, and so was the pounding of your heart. For these reasons, we go to the movies. The mind and its experiences are physically real. No brain, no mind.

If you read carefully, it says "That sounds like". It doesn't mean that "That is". — Corvus

It doesn't 'sound like' dishonesty either. There statement is perfectly reasonable.

You are also still in confusion between the sentence in the post to you with your own visual perception of the object on my desk.

I have no visual perception of the object on your desk, and never claimed to have it. Please stick to what I said and not what you unreasonably imply from what I said.

You have no perception of the object on my desk, hence you have no idea what the object is, was the point.

I did not disagree with your point. Your point was simply irrelevant to the existence of the object, which is what this topic is about.

But your saying that you know the object relation to my desk sounded something not quite right.

If I parse that correctly, I think you're saying that what I posted didn't sound quite right to you. That's acceptable. You are trapped in a mode where you seemingly cannot assess the validity of a statement that uses a different definition of 'exists' than E2. But if that's the case, why are you contributing to a topic that explicitly states up front that it is not about mind-dependent views?

If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist? — ucarr

Depends on the definition of 'exists'. That's always going to be my answer if I don't know the definition. Your first statement says if it is material, it exists. OK, but that doesn't mean that if it exists, it must be material. So it does not imply an assertion of existence only of material things, leaving me with no clear definition from you of what you think 'exists' means.

Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations?

No. I don't deny the meaningfulness of the word, even if there's no context here to narrow it down to a specific definition of the word.

Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?

Depends on the definition of 'exists', but you seem to be leaning heavily upon an anthropocentric definition, in which case, no, I don't deny their existence given such a relational definition.

All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.
2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe.

Regarding my reading of E1 - quoted above - "member of all" tells me existence as "member of all" participates as a presence in "all that is part of objective reality."

Yea, that's a pretty good reading of E1.

Unless you entertain some arcane notion, such as, "Objective reality is inaccessible to consciousness." then I see the definition as simple and clear.

Objective reality being accessible to a specific consciousness depends probably on if said consciousness is part of that reality or not. There seems to be no test for being part of objective reality or the exact same thing not being part of that reality. That's not your problem, it's the problem of the E1 definition.

If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime

One does not travel in spacetime. One travels in space, and one traces a worldline in spacetime. 'Travel' implies that the thing is no longer at point A once point B is reached, and this is not true of a worldline in spacetime.

Regarding frame dependence WRT distance and interval, can you show logically that distance and interval are not both framed between different states?

I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. As for the two words not meaning the same thing, 'distance' is frame dependent, and 'interval' is not.
So to translate between frames, a Lorentz transform is used which says that x' = λ(x - vt) which shows x' (the distance in the 2nd frame) not to be equal to the x (distance in 1st frame).
The interval on the other hand is invariant over a Lorentz transform. You can verify the algebra if you look it up. All this is since you asked, but is off topic.

What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it? — noAxioms
I'm examining your question presented in bold immediately above. I don't agree that Meinong, by arguing against EPP and thereby setting up, "...allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent
things..." establishes existence as a property.

With what part are you in disagreement. I assure you that existence becoming a property follows from denial of EPP. Disagreeing with EPP on the other hand is an opinion, one which is logically valid. The question is, how justified is that opinion?

Existence is not a property because it is not emergent. This is one of the important implications of "Eternal universe uncaused."

OK, but I don't accept (let alone understand) your premises, so I don't accept that existence needs to be emergent. It does seem to be emergent under say E5 at least.

If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist? — ucarr

Depends on the definition of 'exists'. That's always going to be my answer if I don't know the definition. Your first statement says if it is material, it exists. OK, but that doesn't mean that if it exists, it must be material. So it does not imply an assertion of existence only of material things, leaving me with no clear definition from you of what you think 'exists' means. — noAxioms

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. Presence and its detectability are the results of an existing thing being a system with capacity for different states being emergent from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable.

Whether or not non-material things exist is a deep topic with many believers who have important things to teach us all. I'm not going to make a conclusive statement of judgment about what I think is the correct answer to the question because I think I can answer your question, "What meaningful difference is made by having this property (existence) vs the same thing not having it?" without making such an announcement within this conversation. Instead, I'll make a short argument for using physics in my attempt to answer your question. Our minds, our language and most of our empirical experience trade in the currency of physics, viz., the quintet WRT what we experience as the world around us. If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library. The book has its own attributes, and the library that houses it probably has no material effect on its particulars, even so, most readers who borrow library books think it useful to know the book's library.

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations?

No. I don't deny the meaningfulness of the word, even if there's no context here to narrow it down to a specific definition of the word. — noAxioms

Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist?

Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?

Depends on the definition of 'exists', but you seem to be leaning heavily upon an anthropocentric definition, in which case, no, I don't deny their existence given such a relational definition. — noAxioms

Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic?

All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially?

2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

How do immaterial things relate to material things? The purpose of this question is to get from you a description how immaterial things connect to your body. If you only know about immaterial things through the reactions of your body, then how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes?

Since you believe light is not material, how do you understand light bending around a gravitational field, and how do you understand laser light generating heat?

If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime... — ucarr

One does not travel in spacetime. One travels in space, and one traces a worldline in spacetime. 'Travel' implies that the thing is no longer at point A once point B is reached, and this is not true of a worldline in spacetime. — noAxioms

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?

I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. — noAxioms

We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B. This is a description of distance and interval being framed between two different states.

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. — ucarr

You got it backwards. Given EPP, a thing with defining attributes necessarily exists since existence is prior to those attributes. So the answer would be 'no' given EPP since nothing is added.
Meinong denies EPP, and therefore existence is not necessary for a thing to have attributes. So Meinong would say 'yes' (as do you), existence is optional and thus in addition to those attributes.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr

So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception?

Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable.

If perception defines existence, then measurability seems to define presence, not the other way around.

I think I can answer your question, "What meaningful difference is made by having this property (existence) vs the same thing not having it?"
...
If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library.

This seems to suggest existence as being part of a domain (the universe perhaps) and not at all based on perception. This seems to utterly contradict your definition above. OK, so perhaps you are using E4 as a definition. X exists if X is a member of some domain, which is our material universe perhaps. That's a common enough definition, and it is a relational one, not a property. A thing doesn't just 'exist', it exists IN something, it is a member OF something.

The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical.

Here again, the unicorn exists by E4 (it's out there somewhere in this universe) and perhaps under E2 (because our imagination is arguably perception of it). The horse and the unicorn share the same ontology.

Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist?

I never claimed that. I said distance would not exist given a definition that only material things exist, and the fact that while distance might be a relation between material things, it is not itself material. Anyway, I would never use that definition, so I don't claim anything about the existence of distance.

Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic?

In a world like this one but without humans in it at all, a planet orbits one light-hour from its star. Of course I had to use human concepts (including one of our standard units) to say that, but the distance is between objects that have no anthropocentric existence.
2nd example: In a very different universe of conway's game of life, a Lightweight spaceship is of length (distance) 5 at all times. There is no people in that universe since it has but 2 spatial dimensions, but an observer is possible.

All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."

Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially?

No. The question seems to be a category error, treating the universe as an object that 'does things'.

How do immaterial things relate to material things?

Well, light was one of my examples, arguably not a material thing since it is massless. My material eyes react to light, so that's a relation.
Another example is the fine-structure constant (α) which relates to me since material of any sort cannot form with most other values of it. Universe with different values of it might just be fading radiation.

how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes?

I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material.

Since you believe light is not material, how do you understand light bending around a gravitational field, and how do you understand laser light generating heat?

Light travels on a geodesic, so it doesn't curve. As for heat, light has energy. If energy is considered to be material, then I guess light is considered to be material.

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?

No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location.

I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. — noAxioms

We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B.

If we're talking spacetime, points in spacetime are called events. If we're not talking spacetime, then there is no meaningful interval between the points.

If I'm reading you correctly, then I understand you to be saying a concept of the number two within the mind is not material, whereas one stone beside another stone is a material display of the number two. I'm saying both are real and both are material. The concept of the number two within the mind has no less material reality than the number two expressed by two stones side-by-side. — ucarr

The mental construct of "2" in the brain is not material. Again this is definition dependent. Material has a meaning that excludes mental constructs and so literally the number 2 is not material. The rocks can be quantified by a mind as another concept. The quantity(2) of rocks has no meaning outside of a mind. The difference is central to this argument. I believe there are 2 categories of real where subjective experience is concerned. "Real" in common terms means material. It's a blurring of it's definition to include mind constructs as the same kind of "real" as a material object like a table. You can say a construct in a mind may have quantum state correlates which are material and those correlates may indeed be material, that's why I can see where a confusion about what is real comes from. Nevertheless it is inaccurate to say all mental constructs are real. 2 is a symbol. It represents a concept or construct. It is a real "symbol" in that I can right it on a piece of paper but it is only a representation of what it symbolizes.

Here's another example: Harry Potter is a construct in a mind. The word "table" is also a construct in a mind. They both exist. One represents and imaginary character that is not real. The other represents a physical, material structure that is real.

The argument for this claim says, “No brain, no mind.” The mind, like the brain, is emergent. — ucarr

This is not completely true either. A brain by definition is the primary organ of the central nervous system of all higher animals after the single cell stage is passed. It is biological, organic material. The mind emerges from the activity in a brain, that is true. So No mind, no brain is true but not because they are both emergent. It's because mind depends on it's organic substrate which is a brain.

The ache in the pit of your stomach was real, and so was the pounding of your heart. For these reasons, we go to the movies. The mind and its experiences are physically real. No brain, no mind. — ucarr

The experience is real. That does not mean the characters in the movie are real. They are only real as constructs, not literally. There is no "real" wizard named Harry Potter with magical powers even though the movies about Harry Potter made you feel emotions and have real physical reactions. Unless of course you want to "fuzz" the meaning of "real" which brings us right back to why I responded to the post in the first place. Harry Potter exists as an imaginary character. Imaginary characters are by definition, NOT REAL. They do exist as mind constructs, not as literal objects. This means of course that existence and being "real" are not synonymous which is what I have been contending. It may be of more benefit to to say there are different categories of existence as well as different types of "real".

It's like arguing about the realness of a thought. Thoughts certainly exist. The thought is only "real" as a set of electrical signals traversing your neural pathways but what the thought represents linguistically is not literally "real". I can imagine(thought) a horrible 7 headed winged beast the size of a football stadium and that thought may give me a nightmare with a pounding heart and night sweats. The thought's physical reality or "realness" is a set of quantum state correlates, ie. electrical signals being propagated through neuronal receptors in a brain. What the thought represents (the monster) is not literally real. I'm not sure why you can't see the categorical difference.

So the mind and it's experiences exist yes, but the mind can have experiences that are triggered by imaginary things which are by definition "not real". To deny this is to the alter the meanings of these words.

Nice. Like Ross Ryan.

But he is not Pegasus. Pegasus is mythical, so any real creature claiming to be Pegasus is a con.

Nice. Like Ross Ryan. — Banno

:up:

But he is not Pegasus. Pegasus is mythical, so any real creature claiming to be Pegasus is a con. — Banno

How can a mythical creature be real? Mythical already implies not real.

Yep.

So Pegasus is a word without its object? Are there objects without their words / names?

What is an object, for you?

Pegasus was the mount of Bellerophon. Therefor something was the mount of Bellerophon.

Whether that something was an object or not depends on how you use "object".

What is an object, for you? — Banno

An object can be both mental and physical. If you imagined a winged horse, that winged horse is your mental object. If you saw one made of physical matter in Disney, it is a physical object of a winged horse. It is not the real Pegasus, but it is still a winged horse, and one can name it as Pegasus. No?

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. — ucarr

You got it backwards. Given EPP, a thing with defining attributes necessarily exists since existence is prior to those attributes. So the answer would be 'no' given EPP since nothing is added. Meinong denies EPP, and therefore existence is not necessary for a thing to have attributes. So Meinong would say 'yes' (as do you), existence is optional and thus in addition to those attributes. — noAxioms

Thanks for the correction.

Attributes exist as characteristics that don't characterize anything? They embody the role of an adjective, but they don't attach to any existing thing playing the role of a noun or pronoun? The color read exists, but it doesn't colorize anything, not even empty space?

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from. In line with my thinking, existence is the reality of faces uncountable.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr

So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception? — noAxioms

I don't deny mind-independence outright in accordance with a hard-edged yes/no binary. I allow my still developing thinking upon the subject to include a gray space that accommodates thoroughgoing nuancing. The question is especially difficult from the standpoint of perspective, given that no sentient can perceive anything without its mind. Speculation about mind-independent reality cannot even be supported by inference because that too is mind dependent.

How does a mind-enclosed sentient describe mind-independent reality with any authority? I take recourse to Kant's noumenal realm for guidance. My mind instinctively goes to a conception characterized by unlimited, undiminished stimuli that resembles a computer screen displaying raw data unformatted by a software program. Therefore, when a tree falls in the forest sans observer, it doesn't make a sound. Instead, it makes a proto-sound, which is the totality of all possible sounds unformatted by an observer. This seems to support the notion from QM that the observer's identity is entangled with the environment it perceives. Working backwards from here, we go to a scenario wherein no observer is present within an unlimited, undiminished reality that examples hyper-presence, viz., presence unmeasurable. Reverse direction again and I'm backwards engineering from mind-independent reality to mind-dependent reality that fraternizes with solipsism. We cannot do any organized perceiving without injecting ourselves into the perceived reality per our perceptual boundaries.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. Presence and its detectability are the results of an existing thing being a system with capacity for different states being emergent from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable. — ucarr

If perception defines existence, then measurability seems to define presence, not the other way around. — noAxioms

Since perceive means to become aware of something; to realize or come to understand something, it's reactive rather than proactive. If it's impossible to measure something not present, and if, therefore, presence precedes measurement, then measurability and measurement are reactive rather than proactive.

If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library. The book has its own attributes, and the library that houses it probably has no material effect on its particulars, even so, most readers who borrow library books think it useful to know the book's library. — ucarr

This seems to suggest existence as being part of a domain (the universe perhaps) and not at all based on perception. This seems to utterly contradict your definition above. OK, so perhaps you are using E4 as a definition. X exists if X is a member of some domain, which is our material universe perhaps. That's a common enough definition, and it is a relational one, not a property. A thing doesn't just 'exist', it exists IN something, it is a member OF something. — noAxioms

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named. So life is a part of existence; existence contextualizes life as an encompassing container in parallel with a library encompassing a book.

The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical. — noAxioms

Your statement raises logical issues: a) if something doesn't exist, it doesn't exist anywhere; b) if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A').

Here again, the unicorn exists by E4 (it's out there somewhere in this universe) and perhaps under E2 (because our imagination is arguably perception of it). The horse and the unicorn share the same ontology. — noAxioms

I don't believe you live your life according to the integrity of your claims here.

Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist? — ucarr

I never claimed that. I said distance would not exist given a definition that only material things exist, and the fact that while distance might be a relation between material things, it is not itself material. Anyway, I would never use that definition, so I don't claim anything about the existence of distance. — noAxioms

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them. That journey, being as it is a relation that costs time and energy to traverse, expresses itself as a physical relation between the two locations. Moreover, this concept of distance as an abstract thought has a referent of two locations separated by time and energy. No referent no thought/no brain no thought and thus abstract thought is also physical. Yes, abstract thought is emergent, but it can't exist without its material ground, and thus it belongs to the world of physics.

Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic? — ucarr

In a world like this one but without humans in it at all, a planet orbits one light-hour from its star. Of course I had to use human concepts (including one of our standard units) to say that, but the distance is between objects that have no anthropocentric existence.

2nd example: In a very different universe of conway's game of life, a Lightweight spaceship is of length (distance) 5 at all times. There is no people in that universe since it has but 2 spatial dimensions, but an observer is possible. — noAxioms

In my view, your two examples demonstrate the impossibility of humans talking about mind-independent situations. Sans observers, the orbits of planets around suns cannot be characterized as such, nor can they be characterized by us in any way. There's nothing we perceive that doesn't become anthropocentric.

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially? — ucarr

No. The question seems to be a category error, treating the universe as an object that 'does things'. — noAxioms

Since, as you say above, "...the universe may arguably contain material things... the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe..." Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact. If you can't do that, then you must consider whether our universe is a case of material inter-relating with material. Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding?

If "...treating the universe as an object that 'does things (like expand)'." is a category error, then does it follow that pairing immaterial universe with material things is also a category error?

How do immaterial things relate to material things?

Well, light was one of my examples, arguably not a material thing since it is massless. My material eyes react to light, so that's a relation. — noAxioms

Photons possess energy, force and momentum, material properties.

Another example is the fine-structure constant (α) which relates to me since material of any sort cannot form with most other values of it. Universe with different values of it might just be fading radiation. — noAxioms

I read this as alpha equal to an unchanging value. The value I take to be a measurement of something material, given my belief you can't measure immaterial things directly, but only indirectly in relation to material measurements.

If you only know about immaterial things through the reactions of your body, then how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes? — ucarr

I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material. — noAxioms

I don't see how these two sentences are consistent.

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?

No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location. — noAxioms

A world-line is a four-dimensional manifold with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.

We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B.

If we're talking spacetime, points in spacetime are called events. If we're not talking spacetime, then there is no meaningful interval between the points. — noAxioms

In math, an interval is a set of numbers that includes all real numbers between two endpoints. Intervals are important in many areas of math, including algebra, calculus, and statistics.

There are 3 types of interval notation: open interval, closed interval, and half-open interval. The interval with no infinity symbol is called a bounded interval. The interval containing the infinity symbol is called an unbounded interval.

Intervals in Math

Pegasus is mythical, so any real creature claiming to be Pegasus is a con. — Banno

How can a mythical creature be real? Mythical already implies not real. — Corvus

Troy was a mythical city. Is the Troy they discovered a con then? It certainly didn't have all the embellished events happen there, but some of them are based on real events. Just saying that being mythical does not necessarily equate to not real. Hard to argue with Pegasus though.

There was likely for instance a real King Arthur, but the legend about the sword&stone is almost certainly mythology.

So Pegasus is a word without its object? Are there objects without their words / names? — Corvus

Only if you don't define object as that to which words have been assigned. If this restraint is lifted, there are (E4 say) more unnamed objects than named ones. There are waaaay more given a non-athropocentric definition like E5.

An object can be both mental and physical. If you imagined a winged horse, that winged horse is your mental object. If you saw one made of physical matter in Disney, it is a physical object of a winged horse. It is not the real Pegasus, but it is still a winged horse, and one can name it as Pegasus. No? — Corvus

It's a statue of X, not X. There's a difference, kind of the same difference between the concept of 14 and 14.

Attributes exist as characteristics that don't characterize anything? They embody the role of an adjective, but they don't attach to any existing thing playing the role of a noun or pronoun? — ucarr

Adjective yes, and for argument sake, noun, yes. Does that thing playing that role need to 'exist' to have that adjective apply to it? Depends on definition of 'exist' (nobody ever specifies it no matter how many times I ask), and it depends on if EPP applies to the kind of existence being used.

The color read exists

Only as a concept/experience, hardly as a 'thing' in itself, much like 'sweet' exists (E2). It didn't exist relative to my father, but blue did, which is why he always played the blue pieces in a game of 'Sorry' or something. When he was able to do something mean to one of the other pieces, he couldn't play favorites since he didn't know whose pieces the other colors were. There was just blue and not-blue.

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton.

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from.

OK, that's fine. To be honest, why did you wait this long to state this? Does a unicorn being horny make it exist then? If so, what definition of 'exists'? If not, how is that consistent with EPP?
17 is prime, so 17 exists? Same questions.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr

So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception? — noAxioms

I don't deny mind-independence outright in accordance with a hard-edged yes/no binary. I allow my still developing thinking upon the subject to include a gray space that accommodates thoroughgoing nuancing.

Sounds like both of us actually don't know then, in which case it seems too soon to draw conclusions about how existence is dependent on perception.


The question is especially difficult from the standpoint of perspective, given that no sentient can perceive anything without its mind.[/quote]A machine can perceive stuff without what most would call a 'mind', but I suppose it would not qualify as a sentient thing.

Speculation about mind-independent reality cannot even be supported by inference because that too is mind dependent.

Agree. I have appealed to logic rather than inference, but even that doesn't supply a helpful solution. Hence I don't lay claim to realism. Mind dependent existence has pragmatic value and humans simply forget that it is a relation.

We cannot do any organized perceiving without injecting ourselves into the perceived reality per our perceptual boundaries.

I did not quote the whole but, but it sounds like you are actually exploring this area, more than most of the posters to this topic.

Since perceive means to become aware of something

I thought it meant 'not absence', and not 'perceived'. The opposite of that is unperceived.

If it's impossible to measure something not present

Not impossible. It's just a little more indirect is all. Dark matter is not perceived, but we measure it nonetheless by its effects on other more directly perceived things. Time dilation is not perceived, but it can be measured/calculated.
Sorry, just looking for counterexamples.

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named.

The most inclusive context would include Pegasus, and there's not much utility to a definition that doesn't exclude anything. Not saying it's wrong, just that it lacks utility.

The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical. — noAxioms

Your statement raises logical issues: a) if something doesn't exist, it doesn't exist anywhere — ucarr

Mine was a relational definition. If X doesn't exist in domain D1, it might exist in domain D2, so your a) doesn't follow. It seems to be more of a rule for E1: absolute existence, a property that is had or is not had, period.

b) if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A').

Sorry, I don't follow this notation. All I see is one domain 'A', and it is unclear if these 'two things' are part of it or not.

I don't believe you live your life according to the integrity of your claims here.

1) They're not claims, they're consequences of some of the various definitions. Secondly, I live my life to a very different set of definitions and beliefs than what I rationally have concluded. I hold pragmatic beliefs for the former, even if these are demonstrably false. We all do this. I'm just more aware of it than most.

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them.

Distance is not a journey. That word implies that a separation isn't meaningful unless something travels (which drags in time and all sorts of irrelevancies).

In my view, your two examples demonstrate the impossibility of humans talking about mind-independent situations. Sans observers, the orbits of planets around suns cannot be characterized as such, nor can they be characterized by us in any way.

True, but characterization isn't necessary for the planet to orbit at that distance. The part that I find anthropocentric is where we say words like 'the universe' or 'our universe' which carries the implication that ours is the only one, that our universe has a preferred existence over the others due to us being in it. That's the sort of thinking that prompts me to label a definition as anthropocentric, not the inability to conceive of the mind-independent thing without utilizing a mind, and not just 'a mind', but 'my mind' in particular.

Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact.

The time for a rock to hit the ground depends on a relation with the immaterial gravitational constant. That seems to be an example of material things interacting with something not material.
Greed (not a material thing) drives much of the actions of people (material things).
A shadow (not a material thing) has a length, and often relates to a material object.

Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding?

Common misconception. Space expands over time, but the universe, not being 'over' time, does not expand, and doesn't meaningfully have a size or an age. This is presuming of course the consensus model of spacetime and not something weird like aether theory under which the universe kind of is an object and very much does have an age.

A world-line is a four-dimensional manifold with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.

There you go. That is not a description of travel.

In math, an interval is a set of numbers that includes all real numbers between two endpoints.

OK. Different definition of 'interval'. I was using the spacetime interval definition from physics.