:wink:

Propositions are next on Quine's hit list.

(41) The proposition that 9 > 7 = the proposition that 9 > 7
goes over into the falsehood:
The proposition that the number of the planets > 7 = the proposition that 9 > 7
under substitution according to (24). Existential generalization of (41) yields a result comparable to (29)-(31) and (40). — p. 157

The response I gave above what that once we take into account that (24) is not a necessary truth, that 9 is not the number of planets in every possible world, we can see why the substitution fails for this particular case. It's a bit harder to see how this might work in the case of propositions. Partly that's becasue what a proposition is, is somewhat ambiguous, and what a proposition is is central to the argument. It's clear, for example, that

The utterance that the number of the planets > 7 = the utterance that 9 > 7

is false, as is

The sentence "the number of the planets > 7" = the sentence "9 > 7"

Now a proposition is supposedly different to an utterance or a sentence, in that it is what the sentence stands for or refers to, and not the sentence itself, so that for instance the sentence in English and the sentence in French may differ, while the proposition each expresses remains constant. So we might ask if it true that

The number of the planets > 7 = Le nombre de planètes > 7

I'm not sure there is any one answer to this.

As a result of such considerations I tend to use sentence rather than proposition.

The number of the planets > 7 = Le nombre de planètes > 7

Just to be clear: Do you read the '=' sign here to mean 'says the same thing as' or 'expresses the same proposition as'? Or would this difference, if any, not be significant? I'm looking for paraphrases that don't use "proposition."

Rather, that the ambiguity you point to is the very thing at issue, and provides a reason for not making use of "proposition". That is, whether the number of planets is the same as Le nombre de planètes depends on quite what one is doing.

I'm inclined to say that 'says the same thing as' is ordinary-language-speak for 'expresses the same proposition as'. The key idea in common is that there is a something -- meaning, sense, content -- that can persist despite differing verbal articulations of it. Are there uses of 'same thing' that would come out with a different truth value than 'same proposition'? Likewise for 'says' and 'expresses'? Until we think of one, I'm going to consider them cognates, one in slightly fancier dress.

there is a something -- meaning, sense, content -- that can persist despite differing verbal articulations of it. — J

Well yes - the planets.

We may end up with "The number of the planets > 7" and "Le nombre de planètes > 7" both referring to the proposition, while neither of them is the proposition; and then it is the proposition that refers to planets and perhaps to numbers. Why multiply entities unnecessarily? Both "The number of the planets > 7" and "Le nombre de planètes > 7" are about the number of planets, without the need for a proposition as intermediary. What they have in common is not some other entity we call the proposition, but that they say the same thing about the number of planets.

This is a good question. What would you say? — J

So back to the distinction between properties and attributes and classes.

(41) yields a result comparable to (29)-(31) and (40). Most of the logicians, semanticists, and analytical philosophers who discourse freely of attributes, propositions, or logical modalities betray failure to appreciate that they thereby imply a metaphysical position which they themselves would scarcely condone. It is noteworthy that in Principia Mathematica, where attributes were nominally admitted as entities, all actual contexts occurring in the course of formal work are such as could be fulfilled as well by classes as by attributes. All. actual contexts are extension& in the sense of page 30 above. The authors of Principia Mathematica thus adhered in practice to a principle of extensionality which they did not espouse in theory. If their practice had been otherwise, we might have been brought sooner to an appreciation of the urgency of the principle.

Beads {1,2,3} and the beads with the attribute "being red" are extensionally equivalent. In the domain of beads, being red just is being bead 1, 2, or 3. Any "why" as to those beads and not 4, 5, or 6 or 7, 8 or 9 is for extensionally besides the point.

What they have in common is not some other entity we call the proposition, but that they say the same thing about the number of planets. — Banno

But are you entitled to the phrase "say the same thing" without explaining what it means? Synonymy again. Is this meant to be a brute fact? Some statements simply "say the same thing" and that's as far as we can go with it? This is where the proposition comes in handy.

But as I said, I'm happy with "says the same thing" and "expresses the same proposition" being equivalent.

But are you entitled to the phrase "say the same thing" without explaining what it means? — J

The explanation is that they are extensionally equivalent. Planets = planètes.

OK, let's fill this out. If planets and planètes have the same extension, then "The number of planets is greater than 7" means the same thing as "The number of planètes is greater than 7". Is there any intermediary step that would show this to be true? (Not necessarily doubting you, just checking your work. :wink: )

Is there any intermediary step that would show this to be true? — J

I don't see a need. Planets = Planètes = {mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune}.

Well, the need would be to bridge the gap between planets, which are physical objects, and statements about them, which are not, to say nothing of synonymy, which looks to be yet a different thing.

To put it differently, do we know that we're "saying the same thing" about X by checking X and comparing it to what you and I have said? A kind of rough-and-ready extension of a correspondence theory? Doesn't that presuppose that you and I mean the same thing?

Gotta get offline now but I'll keep in the conversation, very interesting.

Take another look at the beads. I've claimed that {1,2,3} is extensionally equivalent to "...is red". Now, do you agree with this? Seems most folk do, and so we can move on. If folk do not agree, we can have a further conversation - perhaps about colour blindness or differences between screen settings. But the point is that if there is agreement we need explain nothing further.

Some folk insist that Pluto should be included amongst the planets. There's a conversation to be had there, as well.

Notice that this is not about correspondence, so much as what we take as granted. Not meaning, but use. We use "red" to refer to {1,2,3} and "Planètes " to refer to the planets.

Take another look at the beads. I've claimed that {1,2,3} is extensionally equivalent to "...is red". . . The point is that if there is agreement we need explain nothing further. — Banno

I see the attractiveness of this position. But there's a synonymy problem still. {1,2,3} may be extensionally equivalent to "is red", but would you really want to say that "{1,2,3}" means the same thing as "red"? What about the lack of substitutivity? If the items {1,2,3} were green rather than red, we would discover "the same" extensional equivalence, but it would now be with "is green". Any number of items can be 1, 2, and 3, but that won't necessarily make them red.

In short, how is this different from the number-of-planets problem, where we agree that, as Quine says, "failure of substitutivity reveals merely that occurrence to be supplanted is not purely referential" (140)?

Not sure what's so hard to understand

30 Modalities The modalities of necessity and possibility are not overtly mentalistic, but still they are intensional, in the sense of resisting substitutivity of identity. Here again we have the interplay between de dicto and de re. Thus ‘nec (7 < the number of the planets)’ is true de re, since nec (7 < 9), but false de dicto...

28 Propositional Attitudes: (1) There are some whom Ralph believes to be spies, not just that (2) Ralph believes ‘∃x(x is a spy)’. If rendered quotationally, (1) goes incoherent. (3) ∃x(Ralph believes ‘x is a spy’). The quotation in (3) is just a name of a string of seven letters and three spaces; its ‘x’ has nothing to do with the outlying ‘∃x’. (1) ascribed belief de re; quotation ascribes it de dicto. Between (1) and (2) we sense the vital difference between spotting a suspect and merely believing, like all of us, that there are spies. — Quine's Pursuit of Truth.

Quite simple... de dicto is incoherent cause it's a quotational account, so who knows what exactly he's referencing...

You cant tell which total set of receptors are triggered for the words in a quotational account... hence the popularity of disquotation. Apollonians flock to disquotation because of its form.

But in truth, every language is a quotational account... what observation sentences are true for every person in the world are very few. Even science as its truths delve deeper and deeper. Overturning older ways for the newer, better, faster, stronger method...

In reading Quine, there are times when the man will use phrases direct from Nietzsche, that trigger a total set of receptors (example "leading to strange new vistas") and it's my belief that Quine would consider his own perspective from his opposite under the mask of Nietzsche, to scrutinize his works. To overcome this problem of subjectivity from "Stimulus to Science."

...means... — J

That word. If everything hat applies to {1,2,3} applies to "...is red", then what more is there to "meaning"?

And yes, it is not necessary that {1,2,3} are red. They might have been blue. That's kinda the point, isn't it?

I think the power of an extensional first-order language is easily underestimated. It'll not do to just assume that extensional contexts are inadequate, it must be shown. It is not clear that there is ""failure of substitutivity" in the instances Quine lists. The whole substitutivity issue doesn’t pose a deep problem if we understand "meaning" in terms of systematic extensional correspondence rather than some mysterious intensional essence.

But doubt this will convince you.

That's pretty opaque. You seem to see everything through Nietzsche. I don't find that at all helpful.

Because I see that Quine has read Nietzsche and I see Quine attempting to overcome aspects Nietzsche would harp on doesn't mean I see everything through Nietzsche. That means I know Nietzsche's phrases and when I read it in another author, I'm like "ah, hes read Nietzsche." Because it's a stimulus that triggers a total set of receptors...

Just as I realized Quines philosophy is based on Set Theory and Mathematics to inform him on linguistics... with hardly any ability in set theory none the less. I simply realized that what I was learning about Ordinals is how Quine orders linguistics from the top down. His "total set of receptors" was the same as the total set of nodes in which one can say this references that

1. I'm going to throw shit on you vs. 2. I'm going to throw "shit" on you... what am I referring to by "shit" in number 2? I'll give you three guesses. If you can not get it right, then it's likely cause it's incoherent because I quoted shit... and thus, modality and reference do not trigger all the same set of receptors from De Re vs De Dicto.

That I detail every language as its own quotational account... well, you cannot know wtf "hintegedanke" means without knowing it in German because there is no word for it in any other language, or even "Aristeuein" for that matter but for the Greek. Even without that... how many words are there for a Bird? In other languages? I don't know... and I dont even know 1/10th or probably 1/100ths of all the words for Bird... the different modality of a language can render something incoherent just as a quotational account...

Unless you know the meaning within that modality... the same total set of receptors wont fire...

And thus if I switch modalities from English to French w/ That oiseau is flying... the plane? the insects, ... what exactly is flying when I don't know what "oiseau" is? I can make an educated guess based on faith and "what I know that can fly?"

Thus modalities have a certain resisting against identity when substituted...

The modalities of necessity and possibility are not overtly mentalistic, but still they are intensional, in the sense of resisting substitutivity of identity. — Quine's Pursuit of Truth.

If that's opaque then I can see why you take Russel's boneheaded criticism of Nietzsche. Because you're out here substituting your meanings and words for Nietzsche's own...

And as Wittgenstein shows us, every philosopher has his own language, a language that you have to familiarize yourself with otherwise you wont know wtf they're saying.

But doubt this will convince you — Banno

It's not so much a matter of being convinced. I feel as you did, in an earlier thread, where you said something to the effect of, I'm frustrated because I can't see a point that is so obvious to others. (This might have been in regard to Rodl's concerns about Frege.).

If everything that applies to {1,2,3} applies to "...is red", then what more is there to "meaning"? — Banno

This would be the source of my frustration, here. No matter what angle I squint at it from, I keep seeing a need for "meaning" in order to give a convincing account of how intension works. But . . . better philosophers than I have contested this, so I'm going to keep pondering it.

I keep seeing a need for "meaning" in order to give a convincing account of how intension works. — J

One cannot use words without knowing the meanings.

Intension is the total set of receptors intrinsic to the physical form of a word.

One cannot use words without knowing the meanings — Corvus

True, though, ultimately the meaning of a word is dependent upon the sentence it shows up in.

Is there more here than the collapse of "meaning" that occurs as one attempts to say what meaning is? That circularity is answered by looking to use, or, which is the same thing, by showing rather than saying. So if what you are after is the bit of intentionality that is inexpressible, then what one can do is acknowledge that inexpressibility and carry on.

One cannot use words without knowing the meanings. — Corvus

If that were so, no one would ever learn the meaning of a word.

I can't decide if your talk of receptors is anachronistic or just incongruous. Let's keep this conversation to the PM - it's a bit too off-topic here.

If that were so, no one would ever learn the meaning of a word. — Banno

Nonsense. Meanings can be learnt via inferences from observations on the real world and how others use the words in social situations.

Meanings can be learnt via inferences from observations on the real world and how others use the words in social situations. — Corvus

Yep - The meanings of words are learned by using them...

Is there more here than the collapse of "meaning" that occurs as one attempts to say what meaning is? — Banno

I think so . . . Let me try it from the idea of qualia. I suppose you agree that, if I ask you to close your eyes and imagine "red," and then "green," the two color patches or whatever you come up with will look different in your imagination. That is because (I would say) "red" and "green" have different meanings, at least as far as "meaning" is commonly understood. Are we on the same page so far?

Ok. SO you are looking to divorce "red" and "green" from individuals that are red or green... Good move. Keep going.


(Note that I am not a fan of qualia... https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9509/nothing-to-do-with-dennetts-quining-qualia )

(It is like a chess problem, isn't it? :wink: ). So, turning to the colored beads:

{1,2,3} may be extensionally equivalent to "is red", but would you really want to say that "{1,2,3}" means the same thing as "red"? — J

We agree that we know what "is red" and "is green" mean, sufficiently well to imagine them ourselves, and to pick them out in the visual field. (And I'm not trying to beg the question by employing "mean" as if we both understand it the same way. Please feel free to translate as you see fit.). If I understand you, you're saying that extensional equivalence explains this. Or at least that's how I interpret your:

If everything that applies to {1,2,3} applies to "...is red", then what more is there to "meaning"? — Banno

The "more" would be the quale "red." In pointing to the beads, I happen also to be pointing to beads 1,2,3, but if you and I are discussing redness, that would be beside the point.

Perhaps another good place to pause -- do you see something awry yet?

Yep - The meanings of words are learned by using them... — Banno

The inference of the meanings are not the meanings themselves, are they?

So now you are making use of a private rule... this (indicating the qual) is red...

And how can we say that what you pick out by "this" is the same as what I pick out?

I don't see that question as having any significance. That is, we can't talk about the hidden stuff, only the things around us that are red. When we think we are talking about the hidden stuff, we are mistaken.

It's not wrong to say that this (indicating the qual) is red; rather it's senseless.

( I do like the line of reasoning you are adopting.)

The inference of the meanings are not the meanings themselves, are they? — Corvus

What is the difference between learning the meaning of a word and learning to use the word?

(, you might consider this, too. )