Even in your simulation example, there can be facts about the simulation that are recognition-transcendent — The Great Whatever
So you say. But Dummett's argument is that meaning-as-use doesn't allow for recognition-transcendent truth conditions. The notion that there's a spoken sound here that has some sort of connection to some other thing there isn't one that seems to work with Wittgenstein's account of meaning. The meaning of the phrase "it is raining" isn't to be understood by positing some metaphysical correspondence between utterance and something else, but by understanding its practical use in recognisable situations. — Michael
So it seems that the real issue here is that you disagree more with Wittgenstein's account of meaning than with Dummett's claim that Wittgenstein's account of meaning entails anti-realism. — Michael
The use of it's raining has to do with whether or not it's raining – one uses it roughly to correctly describe a situation in which water falls from the sky. So the idea that language use has nothing to do with how the world is makes no sense. — The Great Whatever
I'm saying that the part of the world that has something to do with the meaning of a particular phrase is the part of the world that influences and measures its use. Which then means that the part of the world that has something to do with the meaning of a particular phrase can't be recognition-transcendent. — Michael
That's not it at all because it doesn't do sufficient justice to the "mind" with its goals and meanings. — apokrisis
(1) We understand the sentences of D.
Suppose, for reductio, that
(2) The sentences of D have recognition-transcendent truth-conditions.
From (1) and the Fregean thesis that to understand a sentence is to know its truth-conditions, we have:
(3) We know the truth-conditions of the sentences of D.
We then add the following premise, which stems from the Wittgensteinian insight that understanding does not consist in the possession of an inner state, but rather in the possession of some practical ability (see Wittgenstein 1958):
(4) If speakers possess a piece of knowledge which is constitutive of linguistic understanding, then that knowledge should be manifested in speakers' use of the language i.e. in their exercise of the practical abilities which constitute linguistic understanding.
For example, in the case of a simple language consisting of demonstratives and taste predicates (such as "bitter" and "sweet"), applied to foodstuffs within reach of the speaker, a speaker's understanding consists in his ability to determine whether "this is bitter" is true, by putting the relevant foodstuff in his mouth and tasting it (Wright 1993).
It now follows from (1), (2), (3) and (4) that:
(5) Our knowledge of the recognition-transcendent truth-conditions of the sentences of D should be manifested in our use of those sentences, i.e. in our exercise of the practical abilities which constitute our understanding of D.
Since
(6) Such knowledge is never manifested in the exercise of the practical abilities which constitute our understanding of D,
It follows that
(7) We do not possess knowledge of the truth-conditions of D.
(7) and (3) together give us a contradiction, whence, by reductio, we reject (2) to obtain:
(8) The sentences of D do not have recognition-transcendent truth-conditions, so semantic realism about the subject matter of D must be rejected.
The key claim here is (6). So far as an account of speakers' understanding goes, the ascription of knowledge of recognition-transcendent truth-conditions is simply redundant: there is no good reason for ascribing it. Consider one of the sentences introduced earlier as a candidate for possessing recognition-transcendent truth-conditions ‘Every even number greater than two is the sum of two primes’. The semantic realist views our understanding of sentences like this as consisting in our knowledge of a potentially recognition-transcendent truth-condition. But:
How can that account be viewed as a description of any practical ability of use? No doubt someone who understands such a statement can be expected to have many relevant practical abilities. He will be able to appraise evidence for or against it, should any be available, or to recognize that no information in his possession bears on it. He will be able to recognize at least some of its logical consequences, and to identify beliefs from which commitment to it would follow. And he will, presumably, show himself sensitive to conditions under which it is appropriate to ascribe propositional attitudes embedding the statement to himself and to others, and sensitive to the explanatory significance of such ascriptions. In short: in these and perhaps other important respects, he will show himself competent to use the sentence. But the headings under which his practical abilities fall so far involve no mention of evidence-transcendent truth-conditions (Wright 1993: 17).
This establishes (6), and the conclusion follows swiftly.
... now unbeknownst to them, gold has a certain property: it melts at temperatures above 1948 F. now suppose they have no way of figuring this out – they live in a world, say, where such temperatures aren't possible, and so they'll never figure out that gold melts at this temperature. nonetheless, i submit, it's still true that gold melts at that temperature, & if one of their scientists claimed it did, even if he could never prove it in principle, he'd still have said something true (even if people couldn't be sure he had). — The Great Whatever
to address the argument you have up there directly, (6) simply restates your old assumption, which i previously asked you to defend, and as such the post doesn't add anything new. — The Great Whatever
The semantic realist views our understanding of sentences like this as consisting in our knowledge of a potentially recognition-transcendent truth-condition. But:
How can that account be viewed as a description of any practical ability of use? No doubt someone who understands such a statement can be expected to have many relevant practical abilities. He will be able to appraise evidence for or against it, should any be available, or to recognize that no information in his possession bears on it. He will be able to recognize at least some of its logical consequences, and to identify beliefs from which commitment to it would follow. And he will, presumably, show himself sensitive to conditions under which it is appropriate to ascribe propositional attitudes embedding the statement to himself and to others, and sensitive to the explanatory significance of such ascriptions. In short: in these and perhaps other important respects, he will show himself competent to use the sentence. But the headings under which his practical abilities fall so far involve no mention of evidence-transcendent truth-conditions (Wright 1993: 17).
This establishes (6), and the conclusion follows swiftly.
You seem to be forgetting that language itself would be part of the simulation. Language is sounds and visual scribbles - no different from any other sound or visual that we would categorize in the simulation. Language means things because we have established a new category for these particular sounds and scribbles as referring to the other kinds of sounds and visuals we experience. We can even use a sound or scribble to refer to itself when we use quotes around a word.Let's say that we are each put in a shared simulation that may or may not represent the world outside the simulation. We assume that the simulation is an accurate representation of the outside world, and so assume that when we talk about it raining when it rains in the simulation we are talking about it raining outside the simulation, and that our claim is true if it is raining outside the simulation and false if it isn't. — Michael
I'm not sure about this. Your hypothesis does seem to beg the question by presupposing that there's an unrecognisable melting temperature. — Michael
so you think that in such a scenario, gold would have no melting pt., just because no one can show that it has a certain melting pt.?
this seems really bizarre, why accept it? — The Great Whatever
or if you like just say those temperatures are possible & gold actually melts, but for whatever reason, doesn't matter, they can't figure this out. notice that in such a scenario gold still melts, & they can still claim this truly. example doesn't matter. — The Great Whatever
their competence in use of the term has to do w/ those properties, whether they know abt. those properties or can figure them out is simply irrelevant — The Great Whatever
Can we sensibly describe the behavior of characters in Season 3 (and later) in terms of what happens in the books? — Srap Tasmaner
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.