Hrm, what is substance then? — DifferentiatingEgg

My question also.

What do you mean by the subject here? — MoK

Subject of experience. Not simply human subjects, but sentient beings, generally.

the subject and object are two different things. — MoK

P1 is not about subject and object. It predicates coherence to experience.

There's no helping some folk. I'll leave you to it. Cheers.

I wonder how often you say this in the mirror... :chin:

#1 C1 follows since the experience does not have the capacity to be coherent, given its definition — MoK

I think you refer to experience as a tabula rasa. But haven't you read Kant? the subject structures that which provides us with the senses. In that sense "coherence" is not given by the object, but in the interaction between the subject and the object. The subject is also active in the shaping of experience.

On what basis do you say that experience cannot be "coherent"? That requires a demonstration. For it makes much more sense to see experience as composed of forms of sensibility (space and time) and categories of the understanding. Otherwise experience would be chaos of stimuli.

The object can indirectly perceive its content, and that requires another substance to perceive the information and change accordingly, such that the object can then perceive the content of another substance. — MoK

The so-called qualia for example are the ways in which the subject interprets the stimuli given by the relationship with the object. We cannot say that objects have qualia, but that qualia are active interpretations of the subject.

This does not rule out that the reaction of a mind to the environment is just that - an energetic reaction which can be described entirely in physical terms. — Banno

The Taj Mahal cannot be described entirely in physical terms. Its coming into existence over a span of 22 years cannot be accounted for without love, pride, art, and various other things that are not arrangements of matter/energy. The idea of it existing in the future, knowing it would take a very long time, knowing that tools, people, and material would have to be gathered from far and wide, knowing that many different construction techniques would need to be used and combined... None of that happens without meaning and intentions that do not exist in purely physical explanations.

I don't disagree.

From a few years ago:
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1. Painted using a matte house paint with the least possible gloss, on stretched canvas, 3.5 meters tall and 7.8 meters wide, in the Museo Reina Sofia in Madrid.

2. An anti-war statement displaying the terror and suffering of people and animals.

Two very different ways of talking about the very same thing.

Do we need to reduce one to the other?

There is indeed a discussion to be had about how the selection of paint leads to the impact that Guernica has on the viewer. In the end you might be able to show the effect, but not to say it; there is nothing to say, when what is left is to look a the painting. A complete description of the tones and materials will not have the same impact.
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None of which rules out the fact that the painting Guernica and the Taj Mahal are physical objects. It's the "just that" that is problematic. Note that wrote those words - I was quoting him. It might have been clearer if I had edited that or added (sic.).

So yes, the two differing descriptions do quite different things - which is why we have more than one description, and why we should look to the use of the utterance.

I maintain that the proposed dualism remains unsubstantiated... (see what I did there?)

The suggestion is, roughly, anomalous monism:

psychology cannot be reduced to physics, but must nonetheless share a physical ontology. — SEP

These two character strings all comprise identical elements. As far as physics is concerned, there's no discernable difference between them as they both comprise the exact same elements.

"The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog"

"quc hye vko jum tfb lrx dog wna zie ped ohr"

The difference is, obviously, that the first is a meaningful sentence, and the second is the same set of characters in random order.

Question: is that a physical difference? If so, what physical law describes it?

Physically, the two strings may be identical in terms of material composition — same number of letters, same frequency of each character, even the same total length. To a physicist concerned only with particles and energy, there may be no measurable distinction.

But semantically — from the perspective of meaning, structure, or information — they are worlds apart. The first is an intelligible sentence with syntactic and semantic coherence. The second is a jumble, with no meaning (unless you're trying to hide a code in there!).

So: is that a physical difference?

In the narrow sense — mass, charge, spin, energy — no. Physics doesn’t (yet) have a law that accounts for the meaningfulness of symbolic forms. Shannon's information theory quantifies information capacity, but it doesn't (and doesn't try to) account for meaning as such.

Yet obviously, for minds — for us — there's a difference that matters. A big one.

And this gets to the heart of the issue:

There is a kind of order — semantic, functional, interpretative — that is not captured by the physical description.

Nice post.

So: is that a physical difference? — Wayfarer

Yep. Describable, as you hint, in thermodynamic terms or as Shannon entropy, or Kolmogorov Complexity.

And yes, there is also a difference in their intent.

psychology cannot be reduced to physics, but must nonetheless share a physical ontology. — SEP

I'm curious, what is the difference between physics and a physical ontology?

Yep. Describable, as you hint, in thermodynamic terms — Banno

And also, doesn't thermodynamics work with the heat produced by a system?

Where do you see the measurable heat (Motion of atoms and molecules) in a sentence like:

"The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog".

psychology cannot be reduced to physics, but must nonetheless share a physical ontology.
— SEP

I'm curious, what is the difference between physics and a physical ontology? — JuanZu

The trick there is what they mean by "reduce". I think there's perhaps, and this is arguable, but a difference between abstract explanatory reduction, and ontological reduction.

So when he says it can't be reduced to physics, he's saying you'll never be able to understand the abstract principles and general patterns of human psychology by speaking in terms of quantum fields, basically. But that can (arguably) be true, even if it's still true ontologically that every instance of a psychological event in our universe is the direct consequence of quantum fields doing what they do.

I'm curious, what is the difference between physics and a physical ontology? — JuanZu

You can pursue physics without any commitment to physicalism. You can be an instrumentalist, for example, and hold no view as to whether the objects of physics are ontologically fundamental. ‘Whatever works’.

But Then this ontology is not an explanatory ontology. So if this ontology does not explain, I don't know what is the point of maintaining it.

this ontology does not explain — JuanZu

Too general. I said something specific. I didn't say "does not explain".

The fundamental (foundationalism) is precisely what should be criticized if it is not an explanatory ontology. It would be better to maintain a pluralistic ontology from my point of view.

I didn't say you said that. Rather, I inferred it

ok, you inferred incorrectly. you overgeneralized. That generalization isn't the case, it's not applicable.

I doubt it. You have said: "you'll never be able to understand the abstract principles and general patterns of human psychology by speaking in terms of quantum fields, basically".

mhm. notice how specific it is. i didn't say "does not explain", i said "does not explain this specific set of abstract principles." See where you went wrong?

Well, then it does not explain this specific set of abstract principles. But don't you think that a fundamental and general ontology should explain them?

i don't know what a "fundamental and general ontology" is. What I do know is that, when you have a turing-complete system, other emergent systems can come about which are best understood at a different level of abstraction than trying to understand them through the fundamental constituents of the system.

Conway's game of life is turing complete. That means you can implement the Haskell programming langauge inside conway's game of life. But trying to understand the abstract concepts of Haskell, by understanding them in terms of conways game of life, is a failure. Even if it's ontologically true that some specific instance of an implementation of haskell is implemented in conway's game of life.

Pyschology is like that. Psychology is best understood at a layer of abstraction that makes no (or very little, at least) reference to quantum physics. Even if it's ontologically true that every psychological being is composed of quantum objects.

Even if it's ontologically true that every psychological being is composed of quantum objects. — flannel jesus

But that is really the question. How can you talk about constituents without that being more than a naive intuition that cannot be carried out in scientific or philosophical practice, and above all that you cannot prove.

i said "if it's ontologically true". I didn't say "it's ontologically true". This is a conditional statement.

It does not make sense to say, your seeing a cup with a set of properties in a location is  the ground for the experience being coherent. — Corvus

It makes perfect sense.

You are bound to have plenty of other experiences that are incoherent such as what other people feel, believe and think in their minds, and how they will act, decide or behave in the future etc etc. — Corvus

I am not talking about people's beliefs and thoughts.

You won't quite be sure why you dreamt what you dreamt in your sleep, and you won't know what you will see in your dreams in the future etc etc. — Corvus

I am not talking about dreams here but our experiences when awake. Dreams are an example of incoherent experiences though so it should make sense to you when I speak about coherence in our experiences when we are awake.

Another problem is just saying, your seeing a cup in front of you, cannot be the object ground for your experience being coherent, because no one knows what you are seeing or perceiving in your mind just by listening to your statement or claim on what you were seeing. — Corvus

Then consider your computer. Is your experience of your computer coherent?

There is also possibility that what you were seeing was an illusion, not real perception too. — Corvus

I am talking about my experience to be coherent only.

It makes perfect sense. — MoK

When something is coherent, it is meaningful. demonstrable, provable and verifiable. Can you prove your seeing a cup is coherent?

I am not talking about people's beliefs and thoughts. — MoK

Beliefs and thoughts of people are part of the world which you experience in daily life.

I am not talking about dreams here but our experiences when awake. Dreams are an example of incoherent experiences though so it should make sense to you when I speak about coherence in our experiences when we are awake. — MoK

Dreams are experience. Dreams don't exist outside of your experience.

Then consider your computer. Is your experience of your computer coherent? — MoK

Computers are tools for information storage, retrieval and searches for information. They are also communication tools. They are not coherent or incoherent.

I am talking about my experience to be coherent only. — MoK

The argument is too limited and unclear, but most of all misleading in its content and points. You need to clarify all the above points before progressing into P2 and C2.

"I feel happy." (subject verb object) — PoeticUniverse

By the object, I don't mean a mental thing but something physical that exists and has a set of properties.

So, awareness experiences the qualia-form information given from the neural-form information. note that the information has two forms. — PoeticUniverse

There are indeed two substances (apart from the mind), namely the brain and the object, and each has its own properties. The properties of the brain are the location and motion of its parts whereas the properties of the object are Qualia. The mind does not experience the brain but the object.

1. Painted using a matte house paint with the least possible gloss, on stretched canvas, 3.5 meters tall and 7.8 meters wide, in the Museo Reina Sofia in Madrid.

2. An anti-war statement displaying the terror and suffering of people and animals.
Two very different ways of talking about the very same thing.

Do we need to reduce one to the other? — Banno

I do not believe it's possible. But if someone says #2 can be described entirely in terms of #1, then that is what they are saying, and I would like to hear how it works.

My question also. — Wayfarer

A substance is something that exists and has a set of properties or abilities. We have at least three substances in the case of the person, namely the mind, the object, and the body/brain. The mind is a substance with the ability to perceive and cause the object. The object is another substance that is perceived and caused by the mind and has its own properties, namely Qualia for example. The last substance is the brain which is a physical substance with properties that everybody knows. I have to say that the object is also a physical substance that interacts with the brain. It is however a very light substance so it cannot affect the brain significantly while it can be affected by the brain.

Subject of experience. Not simply human subjects, but sentient beings, generally. — Wayfarer

Ok, I see, I changed the argument slightly to avoid confusion between the subject that I used as a synonym as experience, and the subject as experiencer.

P1 is not about subject and object. It predicates coherence to experience. — Banno

Correct. I however wonder how through existential generalization one can conclude the existence of the object from the experience. This is the first time that I become familiar with existential generalization so I need your help to understand this. Would you mind elaborating?

I think you refer to experience as a tabula rasa. — JuanZu

I didn't say that the experience is tabula rasa. The experience has a texture and is the result of the mind perceiving the object. The object has a set of properties one of them being Qualia, namely the property that appears to the mind. The object has other properties allowing it to interact with the brain as well.

But haven't you read Kant? — JuanZu

I haven't read Kant.

The subject structures that which provides us with the senses. — JuanZu

That is the duty of the brain to structure what the mind perceives, namely the object.

In that sense "coherence" is not given by the object, but in the interaction between the subject and the object. The subject is also active in the shaping of experience. — JuanZu

Well, excluding thought processes, all the mind perceives is unconditionally coherent and this is the result of the object being coherent. Of course, the object is coherent because it is shaped by brain activity.

On what basis do you say that experience cannot be "coherent"? That requires a demonstration. For it makes much more sense to see experience as composed of forms of sensibility (space and time) and categories of the understanding. Otherwise experience would be chaos of stimuli. — JuanZu

I didn't say that the experience cannot be coherent. I said that it does not have the capacity to be coherent. I think I should have said that the experience does not have the capacity to be coherent on its own (I changed the OP accordingly). That follows from the definition of experience as a conscious event that is informative and coherent. An event is something that happens or takes place so its coherence cannot be due to itself but something else namely the object.

When something is coherent, it is meaningful. demonstrable, provable and verifiable. — Corvus

None of these. Something is coherent when it is consistent.

Can you prove your seeing a cup is coherent? — Corvus

I don't need to prove it. It is a brute fact.

Beliefs and thoughts of people are part of the world which you experience in daily life. — Corvus

But beliefs and thoughts could be incoherent. That is why I want to exclude them from the discussion. That does not mean that the ultimate understanding of reality is incoherent. The ultimate understanding of reality has to be coherent but we don't have it yet so we have wait for it.

Computers are tools for information storage, retrieval and searches for information. They are also communication tools. They are not coherent or incoherent. — Corvus

Of course, your computer is coherent. Yet get on the screen what you type on the keyboard for example.