but then, i'm coming to think phil. is garbage & not a real discipline. — The Great Whatever

i assume u r refer/g 2 anal-style phil, & not phil-as-luv-of-wisdom?

Hmmm. I think that we're not talking about the same thing when saying "worldview". I would say that you demanded that your interlocutor justify his dismissal of Fitch's proof by more than just 'a feeling'. I mean, a feeling alone is not adequate justificatory ground for dismissing a widely accepted argument.

The point is that the external world has nothing to do with the meaning of the phrase "it is raining", and so nothing to do with the truth of the claim that it is raining. Only the things that play a role in how we use the phrase are relevant, which in my analogy is the simulation. — Michael

I see no distinction between the simulation and the external world. The simulation is the shared reality, making it external to to each person sharing that reality. An indirect realist would hold that the truth of a statement is dependent upon the way it's perceived and talk of an objective (i.e. non-simulated reality) is incoherent.

So, "the cat is on the mat" is true if we all agree it's true, but we're agreeing on something external to us, whether it be the contents of God's reality or Michael's simulator. You've just distinguished phenomena from noumena.

I mean, a feeling alone is not adequate justificatory ground for dismissing a widely accepted argument. — creativesoul

i don't think it is easier, but i think professional philosophy as practiced allows this kind of move. all i ask is that ppl avoid it

truth conditions have nothing to do with representation or 'viewpoints.' they have to do with whether sentences are true, i.e. whether certain things are so. — The Great Whatever

Unless you're an antirealist, as per the OP.

also, of course language games get outside of language games! — The Great Whatever

I don't know what this means.

[Language games] make reference to all sorts of things totally indifferent to language. — The Great Whatever

Language has no feelings or desires, so everything is indifferent to language..?

oh, no, that something might be outside our recognition! boy, that's just a reductio, isn't it? — The Great Whatever

Yes, "something". Quite absurd.

I see no distinction between the simulation and the external world. The simulation is the shared reality, making it external to to each person sharing that reality. An indirect realist would hold that the truth of a statement is dependent upon the way it's perceived and talk of an objective (i.e. non-simulated reality) is incoherent. — Hanover

By "external world" I meant the world outside the simulation. It has no bearing on the meaning of the words said inside the simulation. Dummett's argument, using Wittgenstein's account of meaning, is that recognition-transcendent things have no bearing on the meaning of our words, given that the meaning of our words just consists of our practical ability to use them; i.e. the actual acts of speaking, the recognition-immanent things that influence our speech-acts, the recognition-immanent things that result from our speech-acts, and so on.

So, "the cat is on the mat" is true if we all agree it's true, but we're agreeing on something external to us, whether it be the contents of God's reality or Michael's simulator. You've just distinguished phenomena from noumena.

The point isn't that things are true if we all agree that they're true, but that some propositions are neither true nor false. If the inside of the cupboard isn't being simulated then "the cat is in the cupboard" is neither true nor false, because for it to be true requires that a cat be simulated inside the cupboard and for it to be false requires something else (or nothing) be simulated inside the cupboard.

By "external world" I meant the world outside the simulation. — Michael

I understand your distictions, but I'm saying they're irrelevant. What you're saying is P is true if P corresponds to X, where X is some event independent of the speaker. It's obvious to everyone other than naive realists that X is undefinable without resort to the subjective interpretation of the observor, and it's assumed that all or most observors impose similar subjective interpretations on the object.

You're just now using the term "simulator" to describe the collective subjective interpretation of the community. This makes the simulator the "meta" reality, which is that which exists outside the observer. P is therefore true if it corresponds to that metaphysical reality, thus begging the question of what the simulator is composed of and why it causes sensations in people.

I'd define the simulator as you have: That which causes sensations. What it "really" is without subjective interpretation is incoherent, or noumenal.

If the inside of the cupboard isn't being simulated then "the cat is in the cupboard" is neither true nor false, because for it to be true requires that a cat be simulated inside the cupboard and for it to be false requires something else (or nothing) be simulated inside the cupboard. — Michael

P has a truth value at all times, you're just misapplying the rules of the direct realist on the indirect realist. If you ask an indirect realist if there's a tree in the woods when no one is looking at it, he'd say there is, but he's also be saying a description of a tree without reference to the way it is seen is meaningless. That is, all the conditions for the tree being present exist when unseen, so P is true if those conditions are present when unseen.

And now back to your simulator. If I say "the cat is in the cupboard," such is true now if I look later and he's there. That is, even when he isn't presently simulated and observed, all the conditions for his appearance exist even while not simulated. Those conditions, all which exist independent of the observor, and which are part of the mysterious composition of the simulator, are the metaphysical reality which must be true for P to be true. If they are not, P is false.

And now back to your simulator. If I say "the cat is in the cupboard," such is true now if I look later and he's there. That is, even when he isn't presently simulated and observed, all the conditions for his appearance exist even while not simulated. Those conditions, all which exist independent of the observor, and which are part of the mysterious composition of the simulator, is the metaphysical reality which must be true for P to be true. If it's not, P is false. — Hanover

This seems to misunderstand the argument. In the example, the simulation might be nothing like the external world. The external world might just consist of a brain in a vat. The only cupboard is the simulated cupboard. Given that the contents of the simulated cupboard aren't being simulated, and given that the external world has nothing to do with the contents of the simulated cupboard, there are no relevant conditions which determine whether or not there's a cat in the cupboard.

This has nothing to do with direct or indirect realism. It's about recognition-transcendent conditions having nothing to do with the meaning, and so truth, of a proposition.

You're refusing to define the simulator. In our community of observors, we take note we see things. We must therefore ask ourselves why. Instead of agreeing with most and saying we see the cat because there's a cat, you say we see the cat because there's a simulator showing us a cat. I say fine, the simulator is the cat. I had no idea what an unobserved cat was anyway, and if you want to say the cat is simply that which makes us see the cat image, we're in agreement.

When we don't see the cat in the cupboard we don't presently see the cat, but we note that everytime we look in the cupboard, there's that cat. We therefore conclude that even when we see no cat, something continues to exist that will cause the cat to appear when we open the cupboard. The laws of the simulator exist outside us. That is the cat.

Instead of agreeing with most and saying we see the cat because there's a cat, you say we see the cat because there's a simulator showing us a cat — Hanover

I'm not saying that at all. I'm saying that to explain what we mean by "because there's a cat", we have to look to our practical ability to use the phrase "because there's a cat". And that practical ability can only be explained by looking at the simulation. So "we see the cat because there's a cat" is true. But this has nothing to do with the world outside the simulation.

Perhaps it's clearer if I use the example of Mario jumping on a Goomba. I see Mario jumping on a Goomba because Mario is jumping on a Goomba. To understand what I mean by the proposition "Mario is jumping on a Goomba" you have to look to the use that such a proposition is put. And that use is concerned with the video game I'm playing. It would be a category error to look outside the video game to determine what is meant by the proposition and to determine whether or not it's true.

When we don't see the cat in the cupboard we don't presently see the cay, but we note that everytime we look in the cupboard, there's that cat. We therefore conclude that even when we see no cat, something continues to exist that will cause the cat to appear when we open the cupboard. — Hanover

In my example we've never looked inside the cupboard.

But this has nothing to do with the world outside the simulation. — Michael

The world is the simulation, composed of the simulated facts transmitted by the simulator and the simulator itself, which is the independent metaphysical reality that determines truth values.

In my example we've never looked inside the cupboard — Michael

That's irrelevant. The cat is in the cupboard if all conditions presently exist which would cause an observor to see the cat if the cupboard is opened. You try to say nothing exists when things aren't observed, but then you offer no explanation for why things pop into existence consistently. But then you do admit that something exists independent of you, and you call it the simulator. I call it a cat when it simulates a cat.

Perhaps it's clearer if I use the example of Mario jumping on a Goomba. I see Mario jumping on a Goomba because Mario is jumping on a Goomba. To understand what I mean by the proposition "Mario is jumping on a Goomba" you have to look to the use that such a proposition is put. And that use is concerned with the video game I'm playing. It would be a category error to look outside the video game to determine what is meant by the proposition and to determine whether or not it's true. — Michael

But who made the simulator? The programmer would refer to this particular code that makes up the simulator program as "Michael playing a video game called Mario causing Mario to jump on a Goomba".

When I write a computer program I'm thinking about what I want to happen in the game (a simulator), and I need to write code, which isn't the image of what is going to happen on the screen, in order to make that happen in the game. In the outside world the happenings in the simulator is computer language and my idea and intent to make that happen in the simulator. A programmer can't even imagine, much less program, something that he/she has never experienced before. So their simulation will always include aspects and notions of the world outside the simulator.

You try to say nothing exists when things aren't observed, but then you offer no explanation for why things pop into existence consistently. — Hanover

That's not what I'm saying at all.

But then you do admit that something exists independent of you, and you call it the simulator.

We, as impartial observers, can talk about the simulation and the world external to the simulation, but my point is that given Wittgenstein's account of language, the world external to the simulation has nothing to do with the meaning of the things said inside the simulation.

The cat is in the cupboard if all conditions presently exist which would cause an observor to see the cat if the cupboard is opened.

This strikes me being comparable to saying that the cupboard is open if all conditions presently exist which would cause an observer to see an open cupboard if the cupboard is opened.

But who made the simulator? The programmer would refer to this code makes up the simulator "program as "Michael playing a video game called Mario and jumping on a Goomba".

When I write a computer program I'm thinking about what I want to happen in the game (a simulator), and what happens in the game is a reflection of what has happened in the outside world. A programmer can't even imagine, much less program, something that he/she has never experienced before. So their simulation will always include aspects and notions of the world outside the simulator. — Harry Hindu

What does that have to do with anything? To understand what is meant by the phrase "Mario is jumping on a Goomba" and to determine whether or not it is true you have to look at what is happening in the game. Whether or not there is some comparable event happening outside the game is irrelevant.

the world external to the simulation has nothing to do with the meaning of the things said inside the simulation.

Well, it may or may not. We just don't know. In fact, we can't even comprehend the world outside the simulator. It's the noumena.

This strikes me being comparable to saying that the cupboard is open if all conditions presently exist which would cause an observer to see an open cupboard if the cupboard is opened.

No. The cupboard is closed, but if all conditions exist such that I'd see a cat if it were opened, I can say there's a cat in the cupboard. The metaphysical cat is whatever it is that makes us see the cat. You're saying that metaphysical stuff is a simulator.

Do you have dyslexia, or something? I said that there has to be a programmer that made the simulator with the plan of what he/she wants the simulator to do (and his plan exists prior to the simulator and anything that happens in it), and part of what they want the simulator to do is "have Michael play Mario and use the Mario character to jump on a Goomba." That is what the programmer would say if someone asked him what that particular code means.

That is also what the programmer would have you say in this internet forum as an example of your position. The programmer would speak the same language as you. In other words, they'd be using language to refer to the happenings and things inside the simulator, the same way you'd be using inside the simulator.

Both you inside the simulator, and the programmer outside the simulator, would be using language to refer to what is happening inside the simulator, you both would be referring to the code AND what the code makes happen in the simulator. This is similar to how we refer to things in the world. By talking about the color red on an apple, we are talking about the color (which only exists in our minds (the simulator)) and a particular wavelength of EM energy that only exists in the outside world.

Do you have dyslexia, or something? I said that there has to be a programmer that made the simulator with the plan of what he/she wants the simulator to do (and his plan exists prior to the simulator and anything that happens in it), and part of what they want the simulator to do is "have Michael play Mario and use the Mario character to jump on a Goomba." That is what the programmer would say if someone asked him what that particular code means. That is also what the programmer would have you say in this internet forum as an example of your position. The programmer would speak the same language as you. In other words, they'd be using language to refer to the happenings and things inside the simulator, the same way you'd be using inside the simulator. In other words, both you inside the simulator, and the programmer outside the simulator, would be using language to refer to what is happening inside the simulator. — Harry Hindu

No, I'm not dyslexic. And I know what you said. What I don't understand is what it has to do with the claim that the meaning and truth of the claim "Mario is jumping on a Goomba" is to be explained by looking at what happens in the game. I'm pointing out that it would be wrong to look to some "corresponding" event outside the game, and so it would be wrong to say that the phrase "there's a cat in a cupboard" (when spoken in the simulation) is true if there's a cat in a cupboard outside the simulation.

I'm pointing out that it would be wrong to look to some "corresponding" event outside the game, and so it would be wrong to say that the phrase "there's a cat in a cupboard" is true if there's a cat in a cupboard outside the simulation. — Michael

But there is a corresponding event in regards to your other example of playing Mario. The corresponding event would be the computer code. The same can be said about the "cat in the cupboard" There would be corresponding code for looking in a cupboard and seeing a cat. Not only that but there is also code for your use of language. How would you speak, and what language would you speak in, in the simulator? You'd talk about whatever the programmer wishes and in whatever language he wishes, when he wishes.

There is the experience of seeing red, and the corresponding event of a particular wavelength of light entering your eye. Natural selection is the process of improving our knowledge of the world by selecting organisms that see more truly than their competitors.

Well, it may or may not. We just don't know. — Hanover

Given Wittgenstein's account of language (or Dummett's interpretation at least) it doesn't. To understand the meaning of the sentence "there's a cat in the cupboard" is just to have the practical ability to use it. Given that there's some use to it inside the simulation, it doesn't matter what's happening (or isn't happening) outside the simulation. The external world "drops out of consideration as irrelevant", as the author of the article in the OP says.

The metaphysical cat is whatever it is that makes us see the cat. You're saying that metaphysical stuff is a simulator. — Hanover

I don't think that this is right either. Light is what makes me see a cat, but the metaphysical cat isn't light. Or if we're using the example of a computer game, the hard drive and monitor is what makes me see Mario, but Mario isn't the hard drive or the monitor.

But there is a corresponding event in regards to your other example of playing Mario. The corresponding event would be the computer code. The same can be said about the "cat in the cupboard" There would be corresponding code for looking in a cupboard and seeing a cat. Not only that but there is also code for your use of language. How would you speak, and what language would you speak in, in the simulator? You'd talk about whatever the programmer wishes and in whatever language he wishes, when he wishes.

There is the experience of seeing red, and the corresponding event of a particular wavelength of light entering your eye. Natural selection is the process of improving our knowledge of the world by selecting organisms that see more truly than their competitors. — Harry Hindu

By "corresponding" you appear to just mean "causally responsible". That's not the kind of correspondence I'm talking about. Obviously things have a cause. Consider the correspondence theory of truth. It claims that a statement is true if it corresponds to some obtaining state of affairs. If "correspondence" just meant "causally responsible" then every statement would be true as every utterance is caused by something.

f all conditions exist such that I'd see a cat if it were opened, I can say there's a cat in the cupboard — Hanover

I should add though this cat-in-a-cupboard example wasn't a good one. Recognition-transcendent truth conditions are truth conditions that we cannot determine. Opening the cupboard and seeing a cat counts as a recognition immanent truth condition, as we have a means of verifying or falsifying the claim.

There's a good summary of it here:

For the realist there is a large class of statements whose truth-value is strictly undecidable since it lies beyond our utmost powers of verification or falsification yet concerning which we can rightfully assert that they must be either true or false – objectively so – despite our lack of knowledge concerning them. What decides that value is the way things stand in reality, that is, the existence of certain truth-makers (facts, circumstances, real-world [including historical] events, mathematical or other such abstract verities) to which those statements correspond in their role as truth-bearers. Truth is conceived as recognition-transcendent in the sense that it depends not at all on the scope and limits of our cognitive or epistemic powers. For the anti-realist, conversely, any truth-apt statement has to meet the condition that its truth-value can be specified in terms of some available proof-procedure or method of verification [my emphasis]. To suppose otherwise is to believe – nonsensically – that we could somehow acquire or manifest a grasp of what it takes for that statement to be true (or false) while lacking just the kind of knowledge required to decide the issue either way. In which case we should think of truth as 'epistemically constrained', or of statements as possessing a truth-value only in so far as we can (or at any rate could in principle) find it out by some investigative means. The realist must therefore be deluded – metaphysically out on a limb – if he or she asserts the existence of truths that would lie beyond our utmost cognitive, epistemic, or probative reach.

I appreciate that last post Michael... Cleared some stuff up for me... semantics.

To suppose otherwise is to believe – nonsensically – that we could somehow acquire or manifest a grasp of what it takes for that statement to be true (or false) while lacking just the kind of knowledge required to decide the issue either way.

how hard to u have to get hit on the head to read shit like this and nod

what kind of dumb premise is it, 'oh yeah, obviously everything must be something we can epistemically decide – to think otherwise is nonsense' like holy christ, not everything revolves around humans and their knowledge

Unless you're an antirealist, as per the OP. — Luke

actually sweetie, the way the world works doesn't depend on yr. hot philosophical 'opinions'

I have always worked under the assumption that when one enters into a philosophical debate, particularly a retired or working professional, that s/he voluntarily enters into an obligation to justify the position they're arguing for. I take that to include providing warrant for rejecting common historical arguments and/or positions which contradict and/or negate one's own.

philosophy has no method. have u read phil. books or seen prof. philosophers argue? they don't 'justify' shit. same with this thread, michael now seems content to just repeat himself. maybe if he says the same thing again ppl will start to believe him?

Academically speaking, I would think that the rules for formal debate apply... or should at least. I wrote that regarding your exchange with Srap, and his/her flippant dismissal of Fitch.

Michael's last post helped me by virtue of sharpening up some of the key notions. That is, it helped me to better understand Dummett's criticism.

I think the conflict here is inevitable, because there are intensional and extensional aspects to language.

If you approach things from the intensional side, you get a clear view of how a population uses words. If you approach things from the extensional side, you get a clear view of what it means for a statement to be true.

The intensional, use-oriented approach has trouble accounting for truth. I take this to be @The Great Whatever's point, and it is well taken.

From the other side, we have Dummett's argument that truth alone does not explain how a population uses language.

Mostly the two camps talk past each other. Dummett is attempting to extend the reach of the intensional account into the extensional camp's home territory: whatever goes on beyond our recognition won't affect how we use our language. Even TGW essentially admits this by allowing that we may have the practical ability to use a word, say "gold", without knowing everything about gold. It's also not clear if the extensional camp can provide any account for that practical ability.

But the intensional camp still has no plausible account of truth, and has trouble explaining how the meaning of the word "gold" can be extended beyond the sort of situations in which it has heretofore been used.

It's clear that the battleground is truth, and that ideally we'd be able to combine the two approaches. David Lewis tries in Convention, but I haven't made much sense of the last chapter. :-(

Yeah, seems to me that there's quite a bit of historical bewitchment going on in academia. Self-imposed none-the-less...


Here's a simple consideration that cuts the heart out of the matter...

Statements do not suddenly become true/false upon inspection.