There's clearly something in this all-or-nothing position that seems incontrovertible to you.
-J

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?

If one cannot offer any criteria for making this judgement, then the choice seems arbitrary. In the past you have said some narratives are not "reasonable." But what does "reasonable" mean here? From what I've gathered, it has no strict criteria, but "you know it when you see it." If I'm wrong, feel free to correct me. If I am right, can you not see how such an incredibly amorphous, ill-defined criteria essentially makes inquiry all a matter of taste? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is all spot on.

Maybe all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/good enough.

If we want to say no to that, what Count says above has to be true.

Added: where I differ maybe from Count is that I haven’t discovered the thing that forces one to say no.

As I said, I think @Banno has said most of what I would want to say about that, but perhaps an example will help:

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc. A narrative about how to interpret and evaluate Beethoven's music, compared, say, to his contemporary, Hummel's, is going to say some things that are acceptable, true, and valid -- or at least try to. It will appeal to knowledge about the High Classical style, its aesthetic standards, the transition to Romanticism, European cultural history, and much more.

Such a narrative will, we hope, be "reasonable." And it has no strict criteria. We may or may not know it when we see it -- there's usually debate among musicologists concerning this kind of thing -- but we aren't utterly in the dark either. We don't want historical mistakes or bad reasoning, but merely avoiding these things will not get us where we want to go. This is, perhaps, the difference between "criteria" understood as rules which can be applied in all cases, and something much more rough-and-ready. But I still have trouble seeing how this makes anything arbitrary.

Anyway, this is the middle-ground position that I'd recommend as frequently more accurate than having to choose between "recognizing some authority" and "anything goes." It's a practice, it is learned and deepened over time, and new consensuses produce new questions. It may be the case that some philosophers, doing a certain kind of philosophy, need to find indubitable foundations to be going on with, but most areas of knowledge and interpretation aren't like that. To insist on such criteria, under the specter of "anything goes," is to misunderstand. Or I suppose you could try to convict all the musicologists of not knowing what they're doing, but surely that would be silly? :wink:

I think a similar example could be made involving hard science, but this is not my field, and one's enough to show what I have in mind.

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; — J

This is a narrative.

Is there a reason the above is acceptable or not?

Indeed.

Hegelian rhetoric can be brilliant, as in the mouth of that salivating Slav, Žižek. And our own Tobias, of course. — Banno

I go so far as to say the ideas are brilliant. I mean, someone had to try to build the complete system of German Idealism, right?

In a way his is the philosophy to pick up if you think you can have a ToE -- if you can definitively translate Hegel into your system as a worthy inference, somehow, then you might have a philosophical basis for at least claiming a ToE.

But not necessarily, as @Count Timothy von Icarus noted about Hegel being pluralistic in a way. And my general impression of Hegelian interpretation is pro-pluralist: all interpretations are valid. And I cherish any input @Tobias decides to give us.

But you see... there's that quicksand feel of being sucked back into the universality of Hegel's mind, as if a human in the 1800's could see all of time and know it.

Sorry -- by "this" do you mean the quoted statement beginning "Some narratives . . ."?

I think a similar example could be made involving hard science, but this is not my field, and one's enough to show what I have in mind.

I find it funny that your example comes from an area that I would imagine most people think is purely a matter of subjective taste, akin to "which food tastes better." I would disagree with that of course, but it seems like a particularly fraught example for this reason.

or at least try to.

Do they ever succeed, in musicology, ethics, physics, metaphysics? If they did succeed, how would you know? If you cannot know if they ever succeed in saying "some things that are acceptable, true, and valid," how is this not an all-encompassing skepticism?

Such a narrative will, we hope, be "reasonable." And it has no strict criteria. We may or may not know it when we see it -- there's usually debate among musicologists concerning this kind of thing -- but we aren't utterly in the dark either. We don't want historical mistakes or bad reasoning, but merely avoiding these things will not get us where we want to go. This is, perhaps, the difference between "criteria" understood as rules which can be applied in all cases, and something much more rough-and-ready. But I still have trouble seeing how this makes anything arbitrary.

Well, suppose I was uncharitable and was to say that this is "invalid and not reasonable epistemology." And I "know good epistemology when I see it," having practiced it. And indeed, I could probably draw on an appeal to consensus, or at least majority opinion on this point. However, I cannot offer you much by way of what does make for good epistemology, or what is wrong with your approach. What is the response then? Am I being unfair? Am I being "reasonable" in my rejection?

It's a practice, it is learned and deepened over time, and new consensuses produce new question

Is this supposed to be an appeal to democratization and popularity, or just "if you do it a lot 'you just know it when you see it' better?'"

It may be the case that some philosophers, doing a certain kind of philosophy, need to find indubitable foundations to be going on with, but most areas of knowledge and interpretation aren't like that.

How could it ever be demonstrated that this is the case? This would surely be debated. But then the same problem of amorphous standards would plague that debate as well.

Yes sorry. The story of narration goes:

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; — J

So is this always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it?

an area that I would imagine most people think is purely a matter of subjective taste, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Oh, no, sorry if I wasn't clear. Musicology does much more than try to make aesthetic judgments -- in fact, it rather rarely does that. It's a "human science" as much as any other.

If you cannot know if they ever succeed in saying "some things that are acceptable, true, and valid," how is this not an all-encompassing skepticism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because I don't require this kind of certainty in order to participate in a practice that produces narratives that may be true; that offers ideas about what would be reasonable that fit my own understanding; that seem to the best of my belief to be true; but that are open to debate and revision. I don't have to know. I don't think skepticism represents such a position. A skeptic thinks all this talk of truth and reasonableness is malarkey. (Did I really just use the word "malarkey?" :smile: )

Am I being unfair? Am I being "reasonable" in my rejection? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It doesn't sound unfair or unreasonable to me, but as always, context is everything. If this is a philosopher and scholar whose work I respected, and whom I knew was part of an ongoing conversation on these subjects, I hope I'd take their views seriously, and invite them to explain, though I'd probably be surprised at their initial unwillingness to make their case.

Is this supposed to be an appeal to democratization and popularity, or just "if you do it a lot 'you just know it when you see it' better?'" — Count Timothy von Icarus

The latter, though I'd "fair it up" a little to read, "If you engage in a practice consistently and thoughtfully, you know reasonableness in that practice when you see it, usually."

But then the same problem of amorphous standards would plague that debate as well. [i.e., the debate about whether most areas of knowledge and interpretation do or do not depend on indubitable foundations] — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is important. It calls into question the entire project of Foundational standards -- I'm using the capital F so as to represent the idea of a standard that can be used to set and judge other standards. And this takes us back to the -- by now perhaps a little tired? -- debate about what may stand outside interpretation.

by now perhaps a little tired? — J

Only if we've stopped caring about doing philosophy and found our answers, I think.

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort;
— J

So is this always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it? — Fire Ologist

I think I understand your question, but tell me if I've got it wrong. I think you're asking whether the truth of the "Some narratives . . ." statement is beyond debate -- whether it represents something we can be certain of. If that's the question, my answer would be no. There could be reasons not to accept it.

Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty might someday be considered a "mature work." It brings in a lot from the prior texts, and starts to work a lot of these ideas into the framework where the defining feature of modernity is the elevation of potency over actuality (matter over form, etc.). It's a study of notions of liberty in Plato and Aristotle as compared with Locke (and a lesser focus on later thinkers like Kant and Spinoza). I think this is perhaps the biggest thesis because it rings very true and the ramifications have obviously been huge. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for the overview of his works! I think this is the one I will read first, since it looks interesting and may dovetail with Simpson's book on Illiberalism.

I assume J has something in mind, like "we" (i.e. people) make the standards for mathematics (although this seems opposed to the idea that mathematical discoveries were "always there" so maybe not?) Otherwise, wouldn't something like medicine be quintessentially authoritarian? For, either the patient lives, or they don't. Either they end up disabled, or they don't. There is a clear arbiter of success. Likewise, for engineering, the bridge either collapses or it doesn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think his idea was that for mathematics a high quality answer is true and a low quality answer is false, so it's cut and dried. I don't disagree that these other things are "authoritarian." I think everything (worthwhile) is "authoritarian" in that strange sense, i.e. involving quality discrimination and also the notion of merit.

But the reasoning isn't very tight. For example:

"Is it structured to preclude objection?" And by "structured" I don't necessarily mean "by some agency." — J

"X is structured to preclude objection, and it is not structured to preclude objection by any agency." That's just a contradiction. I think the "systemic" avenue would be more fruitful.

A person who kills their patients through negligence, designs a bridge that collapses on people, or loses a winnable war is blameworthy. How could they not be? Likewise, academic dishonestly, e.g. falsifying data, is also blameworthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, and this is a huge problem for @J, namely the fact that there are blameworthy acts, and people do carry them out. Thus avoiding all systems that provide the tools to identify blameworthy acts looks like a flight from reality.

But note that, at face value, "A person who designs a bridge that collapses on people is blameworthy," is not true. All bridges will eventually collapse, and therefore this cannot be a sufficient condition for blame (and I think this is also why engineering is not as clear as mathematics). This relates to <this post>, where I similarly pushed back on a point where you imputed blame.

Of course we could read you charitably as saying, "A person who [negligently] designs...," but the broader point is that the phenomenon of fault is pretty tricky to nail down. It requires philosophical skill to nail down, and that skill presupposes a mind that is not prejudiced with respect to blame, either pro or con. I think Aquinas' treatment is excellent, but I also don't think there are four people on TPF who could follow it. My Beyond the Pale thread is a rough introduction to that whole question, and it was intended to generate interest in the fact that we all impute blame even though few of us have an understanding of fault.

-

This is all spot on. — Fire Ologist

I agree. :up:

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc. A narrative about how to interpret and evaluate Beethoven's music, compared, say, to his contemporary, Hummel's, is going to say some things that are acceptable, true, and valid -- or at least try to. It will appeal to knowledge about the High Classical style, its aesthetic standards, the transition to Romanticism, European cultural history, and much more. — J

As @Fire Ologist aptly points out, what you are doing here is providing a "narrative." Your narrative involves the claim that there are many different criteria for what is to be considered acceptable/true/valid, and each criterion will generate a disparate set of acceptable/true/valid things. Call this, "J's narrative."

Now consider a second narrative, namely the narrative that although there are many different criteria for what is to be considered acceptable/true/valid, nevertheless each criterion will generate the exact same set of acceptable/true/valid things. Call this, "K's narrative."

Now go back to what Count has pointed out:

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected? — Count Timothy von Icarus

• Either:
  
  • 1) All narratives are acceptable/true/valid
    
    • ...and therefore J's narrative and K's narrative are both equally acceptable/true/valid.
• Or else:
  
  • 2) Not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid
    
    • ...and therefore either J or K's narrative may be less acceptable/true/valid than the other. It may even be the case that both J and K's narrative are unacceptable/false/invalid.

So do you choose (1) or (2)? Must we avoid (2) to avoid "authoritarianism"?

I think you're asking whether the truth of the "Some narratives . . ." statement is beyond debate -- whether it represents something we can be certain of. — J

But this is surely a strawman, given that acceptable/true/valid is not the same as "beyond debate."

Note too that you and @Banno can say that nothing is beyond debate / beyond the pale, but it is obvious that you don't believe that nothing is beyond debate / beyond the pale. When someone such as yourself judges something beyond the pale, you are obviously involved in quality discrimination. When you deem something to be beyond the pale (and beyond debate) you have deemed it to be of excessively low quality. It's more than a little bit ironic that those who are in the very process of carrying out a campaign against that which they deem to be beyond the pale also profess that nothing is beyond debate, and that anyone who thinks things are beyond debate is "authoritarian." "Authoritarianism is beyond debate, and by 'authoritarianism' I mean that which deems things to be beyond debate."

Touché. Maybe I'm tired! :grin:

Heh, me too -- but I keep coming back :D

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort;
—J

“So is the above (narrative) always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it?” — Fire Ologist

There could be reasons not to accept it. — J

Then, some narratives are acceptable for only one sort of reason. (And you have asserted some sort of absolute criteria exists and a universally non-arbitrary narrative exists and contradicted your own narrative.)

OR

Then, what is the criteria we use to tell when it is not acceptable to say: “Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort”
AND
does that criteria set up a narrative that is sometimes valid and sometimes not? Leading to infinite regress…

Bottom line on this second optional outcome - you still haven’t avoided arbitrariness.

I didn't imply anything about a great list. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So you don't think that god knows everything? Or that every statement is either true, or it is false, and hence there is a set of truths, and all other statements are false? Ok.

I think we have to make a case for, rather than assume, incommensurability between language games. — Moliere

I am tempted to go a step further, and suggest that we assume commensurability. That, after all, is what the Principle of Charity implies. You and I are talking about the very same world, in which we are both embedded. Our points of agreement overwhelm our points of disagreement. But our disagreements make for longer threads.

Nice.

Do dolphins have a language that is so different to ours that we cannot recognise it as such? Good question. I do not know the answer.

But you are not a dolphin.

And when you are not looking up to the heavens, when you get hungry or cold, and look instead to what is going on around you now, then we may find agreement, and maybe work together to build a fire and cook some food.

And then your metaphysics will not be nonsense, but only relevant in how it influences what you put in the stew.

Kosher, I presume? I'll go with that, if you keep it gluten free.

I am tempted to go a step further, and suggest that we assume commensurability. That, after all, is what the Principle of Charity implies. You and I are talking about the very same world, in which we are both embedded. — Banno

I think I can go that far. Not sure how to disagree, but I split your reply for a reason... :D

Our points of agreement overwhelm our points of disagreement. But our disagreements make for longer threads. — Banno

Assuming commensurability makes sense to me, at least as a philosophical norm. Else we'll likely talk past one another.

But I wouldn't want to rely upon the justification "our points of agreement overwhelm our points of disagreement" -- because it may lead to the same thing. This is the first time I've tried to express this, but there's this "other" side of charity whereupon the maximal charity doesn't hear the expression of difference. Or, perhaps, the more charitable act isn't to always interpret within your bounds, but recognize when there's a genuine difference -- that'd be the more charitable interpretation.

I like charity as a principle, a lot. Just there could be this other weird way of "swallowing" another's thoughts.

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort;
—J

“So is the above (narrative) always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it?”
— Fire Ologist

There could be reasons not to accept it.
— J

Then, some narratives are acceptable for only one sort of reason. (And you have asserted some sort of absolute criteria exists and a universally non-arbitrary narrative exists and contradicted your own narrative.) — Fire Ologist

I am so lost here. Where did I assert an absolute criterion? Is that following from the fact that some narratives are acceptable for only one sort of reason? How does that make the reason absolute? I'm sorry, would you mind trying again to explain?

Thanks but isn't it just how we talk? — J

Well, yes. That's why it's brilliant. The simple observation that we can do more than one thing with the words we use.

@Wayfarer and others are right that philosophy as a practice has meant many things over the centuries. — J

A fair point. Yes, we can say more, and yes we just can't say more in rational discourse. What happens when the more said outside of rational discourse is taken back in to that discourse? When Way, for example, claims that all there is, is mind? When Hanover objects to putting oysters in the stew?

they seem to have in mind that there is an endpoint, or at the very least that there could be, but we do not now know what that will look like, nor could we possibly. — J

I'm not sure what you mean here. That there could be an end to philosophy, a point where we have finished the Great List of Facts?

Perhaps, but I don't see why. Could there be a point where there was nothing more to say about mathematics? Could there be a point at which there could be no new songs?

Is philosophy so different?

the more charitable act isn't to always interpret within your bounds, but recognize when there's a genuine difference — Moliere

Nice. I think I see where you would go.

And I guess all I can do here is point to the basic liberal principles of accepting the differences that make no difference. If someone wants to be referred to as "they", why not just oblige? And were it makes a difference, to seek accomodation before violence.

And of course there is much, much more to say here.

Hegelian rhetoric can be brilliant, as in the mouth of that salivating Slav, Žižek. And our own Tobias, of course. — Banno

Thank you for the compliment Banno, *tips hat*. As for Hegelian rhetoric... might it not be that both ways of philosophizing as you sketch them are incomplete? Nitpicking, plumbing, dissecting etc. is also always done from a background of assumptions, even if it would simply be reducible to the laws of logic, it still assumes that logic is the proper pickaxe to perform philosophy with. Usually much more is assumed, though I think. Also, the Socratic or the Cynic erects a world, albeit not very explicitly. The system builder and discursivist tries to make these intuitions explicit. This renders them visible and therefore also more easily picked apart.

The nitpicker and the builder are sides of the same coin. One may prefer this style, the other that one, but both are in the business or clarity, and in the process between the two, inadvertently display all those things that are still unclear... Just my two cents during a late evening...

Oddly accurate.

I'm not sure what you mean here. — Banno

Nor am I, because this is a point of debate about Habermas, at least (not sure about Peirce and his convergence theory of truth). The question is, Is the "endpoint" a final consensus for human society (perhaps similar to the Marxian idea), or could there be, as you're wondering, an end of philosophy? The distinction I would want to make, in any case, has to do with a process of dialectic that may reach some end, but cannot be predicted to do so, versus a process where the end is already known, because the principles entail it.

Fairly sure that an "end of philosophy," were such possible, wouldn't look like a sorting of true from false.

Thanks for chiming in, with a very Hegelian response, no less. And being Hegelian, of course it's right.

I do hope my account is incomplete. Otherwise this might be too short a thread. Onward...

Commanding and asking are conveying information about one's intent. — Harry Hindu

Sure.


But that's not all there is going on here. A command also creates of an obligation, a question seeks a reply. That's more than just a transfer of data.

Examples? — Harry Hindu

"hello". It doesn't name a greeting, it is a greeting. And I know you will object to this, saying it names an intent to greet or some such. But it doesn't name an intent to greet. It greets.

I would need an real-world example of a "solution" that was reached without an algorithm. — Harry Hindu

Marriage? Scratching your nose?

the poster who shows up with a project is giving us something to test. — frank

Yep.

I am so lost here. — J

Yeah.

You are trying to avoid arbitrariness, while avoiding authoritarianism.

Let’s go back.

Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?

If one cannot offer any criteria for making this judgement, then the choice seems arbitrary. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You answered this to avoid arbitrariness saying that narratives are acceptable/valid based on “one sort of reason.” But this is a narrative too, a meta narrative about narratives, but just another narrative. So Count’s question could again be asked and becomes whether this new level’s “one sort of reason” is arbitrary. So I asked again, is this new narrative absolute or not?
You said no. This “no” is either an absolute (at a third layer we haven’t gone there but it would be me asking you how you came to say “no”), or you are just contradicting of the initial statement that all narratives can be validated by one sort of reason or another.

You either:
1. answer my question “yes” and contradict your statement about narratives, or
2. answer “no” and keep punting the question to a meta, meta-level, avoiding the question making everything continue to seem arbitrary, or
3. something becomes the absolute authority on narratives, ending the infinite regress but also contradicting the original intent of the argument with Count.

It’s still confusing but maybe Leon’s post clarifies it.

You can’t say there is nothing absolute if you want to avoid saying the validity of any narrative is arbitrary. Some goal post must become fixed before the arbitrary is avoided.