There's clearly something in this all-or-nothing position that seems incontrovertible to you.
-J
I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?
If one cannot offer any criteria for making this judgement, then the choice seems arbitrary. In the past you have said some narratives are not "reasonable." But what does "reasonable" mean here? From what I've gathered, it has no strict criteria, but "you know it when you see it." If I'm wrong, feel free to correct me. If I am right, can you not see how such an incredibly amorphous, ill-defined criteria essentially makes inquiry all a matter of taste? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; — J
Indeed.
Hegelian rhetoric can be brilliant, as in the mouth of that salivating Slav, Žižek. And our own Tobias, of course. — Banno
I think a similar example could be made involving hard science, but this is not my field, and one's enough to show what I have in mind.
or at least try to.
Such a narrative will, we hope, be "reasonable." And it has no strict criteria. We may or may not know it when we see it -- there's usually debate among musicologists concerning this kind of thing -- but we aren't utterly in the dark either. We don't want historical mistakes or bad reasoning, but merely avoiding these things will not get us where we want to go. This is, perhaps, the difference between "criteria" understood as rules which can be applied in all cases, and something much more rough-and-ready. But I still have trouble seeing how this makes anything arbitrary.
It's a practice, it is learned and deepened over time, and new consensuses produce new question
It may be the case that some philosophers, doing a certain kind of philosophy, need to find indubitable foundations to be going on with, but most areas of knowledge and interpretation aren't like that.
Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; — J
an area that I would imagine most people think is purely a matter of subjective taste, — Count Timothy von Icarus
If you cannot know if they ever succeed in saying "some things that are acceptable, true, and valid," how is this not an all-encompassing skepticism? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Am I being unfair? Am I being "reasonable" in my rejection? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Is this supposed to be an appeal to democratization and popularity, or just "if you do it a lot 'you just know it when you see it' better?'" — Count Timothy von Icarus
But then the same problem of amorphous standards would plague that debate as well. [i.e., the debate about whether most areas of knowledge and interpretation do or do not depend on indubitable foundations] — Count Timothy von Icarus
Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort;
— J
So is this always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it? — Fire Ologist
Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty might someday be considered a "mature work." It brings in a lot from the prior texts, and starts to work a lot of these ideas into the framework where the defining feature of modernity is the elevation of potency over actuality (matter over form, etc.). It's a study of notions of liberty in Plato and Aristotle as compared with Locke (and a lesser focus on later thinkers like Kant and Spinoza). I think this is perhaps the biggest thesis because it rings very true and the ramifications have obviously been huge. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I assume J has something in mind, like "we" (i.e. people) make the standards for mathematics (although this seems opposed to the idea that mathematical discoveries were "always there" so maybe not?) Otherwise, wouldn't something like medicine be quintessentially authoritarian? For, either the patient lives, or they don't. Either they end up disabled, or they don't. There is a clear arbiter of success. Likewise, for engineering, the bridge either collapses or it doesn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus
"Is it structured to preclude objection?" And by "structured" I don't necessarily mean "by some agency." — J
A person who kills their patients through negligence, designs a bridge that collapses on people, or loses a winnable war is blameworthy. How could they not be? Likewise, academic dishonestly, e.g. falsifying data, is also blameworthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is all spot on. — Fire Ologist
I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc. A narrative about how to interpret and evaluate Beethoven's music, compared, say, to his contemporary, Hummel's, is going to say some things that are acceptable, true, and valid -- or at least try to. It will appeal to knowledge about the High Classical style, its aesthetic standards, the transition to Romanticism, European cultural history, and much more. — J
I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think you're asking whether the truth of the "Some narratives . . ." statement is beyond debate -- whether it represents something we can be certain of. — J
Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort;
—J
“So is the above (narrative) always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it?” — Fire Ologist
There could be reasons not to accept it. — J
I didn't imply anything about a great list. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think we have to make a case for, rather than assume, incommensurability between language games. — Moliere
I am tempted to go a step further, and suggest that we assume commensurability. That, after all, is what the Principle of Charity implies. You and I are talking about the very same world, in which we are both embedded. — Banno
Our points of agreement overwhelm our points of disagreement. But our disagreements make for longer threads. — Banno
Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort;
—J
“So is the above (narrative) always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it?”
— Fire Ologist
There could be reasons not to accept it.
— J
Then, some narratives are acceptable for only one sort of reason. (And you have asserted some sort of absolute criteria exists and a universally non-arbitrary narrative exists and contradicted your own narrative.) — Fire Ologist
Thanks but isn't it just how we talk? — J
A fair point. Yes, we can say more, and yes we just can't say more in rational discourse. What happens when the more said outside of rational discourse is taken back in to that discourse? When Way, for example, claims that all there is, is mind? When Hanover objects to putting oysters in the stew?
they seem to have in mind that there is an endpoint, or at the very least that there could be, but we do not now know what that will look like, nor could we possibly. — J
the more charitable act isn't to always interpret within your bounds, but recognize when there's a genuine difference — Moliere
Hegelian rhetoric can be brilliant, as in the mouth of that salivating Slav, Žižek. And our own Tobias, of course. — Banno
I'm not sure what you mean here. — Banno
Sure.Commanding and asking are conveying information about one's intent. — Harry Hindu
"hello". It doesn't name a greeting, it is a greeting. And I know you will object to this, saying it names an intent to greet or some such. But it doesn't name an intent to greet. It greets.Examples? — Harry Hindu
Marriage? Scratching your nose?I would need an real-world example of a "solution" that was reached without an algorithm. — Harry Hindu
I am so lost here. — J
Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?
If one cannot offer any criteria for making this judgement, then the choice seems arbitrary. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.