Not quite―I disagreed with an assessment (which I was not accusing you of making) that Hume was merely a nitpicker. — Janus
My suspicion is that (the Grand Theory Of All) provides a rhetorical tool for authoritarianism. It's the elite philosopher kings who really understand which flower is beautiful and which plain. — Banno
Since this word "arbitrary" has come up so consistently, I'm wondering if possibly some of us are using it to mean different things. But I'm going to use it to mean "not based on any particular reasons; like a throw of the dice." On that understanding, I would answer the second question this way: "It doesn't, but if the discipline is longstanding and has smart, experienced practitioners, quite quickly the demand for good reasons will channel the discussion away from arbitrary and unfounded practices. Furthermore, just about no one presents their views in this way."
Are you seriously advancing the epistemic position that no one is ever wrong but that the two options would be: "yes I agree," and "I don't know?" — Count Timothy von Icarus
Practices have to be open to external critique by some additional standard or else there is no way to identify pseudoscience. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Hence, it seems that there are general principles here vis-á-vis various sorts of bias that are inappropriate. And these issues are still with us. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It depends on what you're talking about. When you are ignorant of the facts, it certainly does appear that "anything goes", or "anything is possible". That is what probability and randomness are - projections of our ignorance. While probabilities seem to narrow down the list of possible truths, randomness seems to imply that anything goes. A probability is probable, but all probabilities are possible.Again, the point is the logical one, that we can say of a statement that it is true, and we can say that it is false, and thirdly sometimes we can say that we don't know it's truth value, and that doing so does not, as your statement quoted above implies, lead immediately to "anything goes". — Banno
Right, so this is an appeal to a sort of virtue epistemology. Virtues are principles, so I can get behind that. However, I don't think "smart" and "experienced," are necessarily good virtues here. Consider the examples of Aryan physics, socialist genetics, phrenology, etc., which were created by intelligent, experienced scientists. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I like your framing of "arbitrariness," though, because it's really not something we need to worry about, IMO. — J
Seems like “in context” is meant to do the same work as “in truth, or absolutely”, all of these to avoid arbitrariness.
But we can ask of the context type limiter, “by virtue of what did you determine the context”, or “can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)?” Context identification immediately begs these questions. Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, we are still in a world of arbitrariness. (Which I believe is basically what Count, Leon and I are saying). — Fire Ologist
Good point. We could say, "If the contexts are just gerrymandered..." — Leontiskos
Put differently, there are two theses:
1. Every professional philosopher [deserves a hearing].
2. Everyone [deserves a hearing] (including everyone on TPF).
Which thesis is J's? He keeps equivocating and vacillating between (1) and (2). He begins with (2), and then switches over to (1) when he fails to justify (2), and then after justifying (1) he switches back, pretending as if he has succeeded in justifying (2).
Note that [deserves a hearing] could be replaced with any of the other normative concepts under consideration. Whatever the normative concept, @J's equivocal arguments are the same. — Leontiskos
As a lawyer, at work in the real world... — Fire Ologist
Answer the simple question. Whatever the answer is, I’m not seeing it, and neither is Count or Leon.
If the answer is, “there is no truth, we know nothing absolutely, so the context in which every opinion sits can never be certified or ultimately proven certain, and so the value of every opinion is as arbitrary as the next one,” then so be it. Tell me that. That’s what I am paying for. Something that hangs together that we can try to apply and show the value of in the real world. — Fire Ologist
Who is behaving like a tyrant, answering to no one in this debate? — Fire Ologist
I would have an easy time convincing a majority of people that you and Banno are dodging the issues and questions.
I’d be allowed to treat the witness as hostile to the court. — Fire Ologist
Non-arbitrariness should now be the anchor (or unknown “X” we keep in mind). We are all trying to say how non-arbitrariness is a possibility, because we all agree and have said in one way or another, arbitrariness is bad. — Fire Ologist
My solution, still, is in trying to listen to one another and build a relationship of trust. — Moliere
If there is a bad consensus and bad practices, they don't just work themselves out through discourse as a sort of random brownian motion. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So falsifying your data so that you can gain fame and wealth is can sometimes good practice vis-á-vis good inquiry? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I’d be allowed to treat the witness as hostile to the court.
And then the Judge would force you to answer “are all narratives acceptable or not?” The most liberal progressive judge would demand, “in my court, on my record, nothing proceeds until you answer, or the charge that you say ‘all narratives may be true’ stands. You swore to tell the truth in my court and now we see you can still say anything you want, possibly giving no meaning to the ‘truth’ you swore, since you won’t answer the question and think it doesn’t matter.” — Fire Ologist
But I don't think I'm being unreasonable. If you throw J's epistemic position into Chat GPT it identifies all the same issues I did, plus some others (although these seem ancillary to me). I don't think it is biased towards "foundationalism" or "infallibility"... — Count Timothy von Icarus
So falsifying your data so that you can gain fame and wealth is can sometimes good practice vis-á-vis good inquiry? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yup. Only sometimes. — Moliere
The madman's explanation of a thing is always complete, and often in a purely rational sense satisfactory. Or, to speak more strictly, the insane explanation, if not conclusive, is at least unanswerable; this may be observed specially in the two or three commonest kinds of madness. If a man says (for instance) that men have a conspiracy against him, you cannot dispute it except by saying that all the men deny that they are conspirators; which is exactly what conspirators would do. His explanation covers the facts as much as yours. Or if a man says that he is the rightful King of England, it is no complete answer to say that the existing authorities call him mad; for if he were King of England that might be the wisest thing for the existing authorities to do. Or if a man says that he is Jesus Christ, it is no answer to tell him that the world denies his divinity; for the world denied Christ's.
Nevertheless he is wrong. But if we attempt to trace his error in exact terms, we shall not find it quite so easy as we had supposed. Perhaps the nearest we can get to expressing it is to say this: that his mind moves in a perfect but narrow circle. A small circle is quite as infinite as a large circle; but, though it is quite as infinite, it is not so large. In the same way the insane explanation is quite as complete as the sane one, but it is not so large... Now, speaking quite externally and empirically, we may say that the strongest and most unmistakable mark of madness is this combination between a logical completeness and a spiritual contraction.
Here come the tu quoque replies.
They are logically questionable. They attack the person, not the claim. They shift focus from argument to biography. But mostly, tu quoque's a continuation of that very authoritarianism — Banno
I think you're rather missing my point, but this is quite common for you -- if you can't understand why someone would say something then you conclude that they must be incoherent.
But it could be that you just don't understand someone, and they only appear incoherent to you. — Moliere
Does foundationalism and completeness lead to authoritarianism? I've considered that it might be precisely the opposite. Consider that one almost never sees appeals to authority in basic arithmetic. If there is disagreement, it is almost always over ambiguous notation. But one never needs to appeal to one's job title, involvement in practice, virtues, etc. in justifying the answer to 6 × 87 or 112 ÷ 8. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But to suppose that metaphysics, ethics, politics, etc. is not like engineering, medicine, military science, etc., i.e. that it has no proper authority, or that its measure is man and not the subject matter, is extremely consequential. — Count Timothy von Icarus
There is no need for appeals to authority because the answer can be made obvious. You can, if you really want, separate 112 beans into groups of 8. It is clear when the emperor wears no clothes. Whereas appeals to standing practice and consensus open to door to authoritarianism precisely because authority can manufacture both of these. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Whereas appeals to standing practice and consensus open to door to authoritarianism precisely because authority can manufacture both of these. — Count Timothy von Icarus
You put yourselves on a pedestal when in fact you require instruction. — Leontiskos
Does foundationalism and completeness lead to authoritarianism? I've considered that it might be precisely the opposite. Consider that one almost never sees appeals to authority in basic arithmetic. If there is disagreement, it is almost always over ambiguous notation. But one never needs to appeal to one's job title, involvement in practice, virtues, etc. in justifying the answer to 6 × 87 or 112 ÷ 8. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is a broader problem, in that, on TPF, discussions of ethics or politics or metaphysics are usually wholesale irrational. The current state of philosophy is incapable of addressing such topics in a rational manner. That's why the threads on logic or mathematics or reference are so popular: because they represent that small slice of reality where the Western mind can still manage to engage in rational thought. — Leontiskos
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.