Actually the competing interests are the woman's bodily autonomy (not importance) vs the fetus' right to exist. Autonomy exists equally as a concept regardless of the type of relationship between the woman and her sexual partner.

I disagree with pinning bodily autonomy (i.e., consent) vs. right to life principles against each other as absolute principles; as they are not, and in one instance it could be that consent matters more than the right to life and in another it could be vice-versa. It is not productive nor correct to use either of these principles in an absolute manner.

For me, culpability is a principle which, when applied, determines the woman's right to consent as outweighed by the woman's obligation to amend the condition she has put this life in (albeit a new life). She, when consensually having sex, gives up, in the event that she gets pregnant, any relevant consideration of consent.

However, when she is not culpable, it becomes a question of consent vs. the de facto duty to rescue, which is going to revolve around the potential risk/severity of unwanted bodily modifications of the rescuer.

Hello Philosophim,

It seems as though we use the term ‘truth’ differently, as you appear to use it in the sense of ‘being’ and I use it in the sense of the correspondence of thought and ‘being’. You say:

Truth as defined is what "is" despite what one knows.

For me, I hold that truth is a relationship between subject and object, such that the asserted being (i.e., thoughts about reality) correspond to (i.e., agree with) actual being (i.e., reality). Truth, for me, is thusly not subjective nor objective, but emergent from both. For the full story, see my discussion board on truth.

So, within my terms, truth serves the same role as knowledge; since wanting to ‘know the world’ is to try to correspond, to orientate, one’s thoughts to what reality is.

I think, semantics aside, this is mostly what you are claiming as well, and my term ‘truth’ would just be the ideal function of epistemological theories for you and your term ‘truth’ is simply reality for me (i.e., being).

Which leads me to:

If however you feel that what is known is true, then there is one question which must be answered: "How do I know that what I know is true?"

I agree with you that the ideal of epistemology is to try to get at, as best as possible, reality (i.e., to ‘know reality’) and that it can’t ever absolutely obtain it. So I can, generically speaking, only “know” that what I “know” is “true” iff I have sufficient reasons (i.e., it passes epistemic verification) that what I am thinking corresponds with reality. Of course, I can only be certain of this correspondence on limited examples (such as ‘a = a’ as a logical principle), and the rest I only can be more or less confident in their truth.

My point knowledge always equating to truth is that it makes no sense to me, within my terminology, to claim something is ‘true’ (that is, it corresponds to reality with respect to whatever it is alleging of reality) but that I don’t ‘know’ it; nor that I ‘know’ it but that I don’t affirm it as ‘true’. Sure, even if I affirm it as ‘true’, that doesn’t mean I am certain of it—but, by my lights, I am taking it up as ‘true’ by saying I know or, otherwise, I am saying that ‘I don’t believe this corresponds to reality, but I somehow know it anyways’.

If we are stating something is contextually true, is it contextually true, or contextually known?

By contexts in propositions, I was merely trying to note that if one affirms a proposition, then they are thereby claiming it is ‘true’ (i.e., that it corresponds to reality); and that proposition, whatever it is claiming, has a scope—so one is claiming it is ‘true’ insofar as it is within that scope. If I affirm that “cats are green”, then the scope I am affirming is “every cat is green” which is the totality of whatever I classify as a “cat”.

To say it is “contextually true” (or ‘known’) was, for me, just to say that the claim corresponds to reality and that claim is limited in some scope (i.e., everything, totality of a class of objects, etc.). Perhaps I made it more confusing than it needed to be by invoking “contexts”.
To clarify, I am not claiming that truth (or knowledge) is contextual (in the sense of what I believe you are asking), as I would say it is absolute (in that sense); and this is why claims can be propositionalized. Either the proposition, when inquired, passes the tests to be considered corresponding to reality (with respect to what it claims about reality) or it doesn’t: it isn’t relative.

Epistemology's attempt is to find a consistent method to examine beliefs and claim without inconsistency or indeterminacy whether someone's belief is knowledge.

I mainly agree, but I would add there is more to it than being merely logically consistent and providing clarity (determinacy). Logical consistency, in itself, does not promise any sort of correspondence to reality (which I think you agree with me on that).

Since I separate truth and knowledge, then yes, it would necessarily follow that rationality is a precursor to epistemology. First comes the desire to make claims that are not contradicted by reality, then comes the establishment of norms and theories that help us refine and become successful at this.

Interesting, I think we largely agree here (just not about where to finally place rationality). I would say, epistemologically, that the desire to “know the world” (i.e., ‘know reality) is the prerequisite to epistemology and stemming from that desire is to want to not contradict reality. The desire itself to want to not contradict reality can be taken on without wanting to know reality; however, I don’t think one needs to the desire, as a prerequisite, to desire to know reality.

The big issues I would have here is that it makes (1) the desire to know the world not the sole imperative of epistemology and (2) it places rationality as moral tenants, which I would argue are inevitably going to bottom out at subjective moral judgments. When placed in epistemology, it becomes objectively based.

Again, I largely agree with your approach here besides a few conceptual and semantic differences!

Wonderful! I figured we would agree on quite a bit, but that there are some places we won’t (as of yet).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

From my study of Spinoza, by "dual-aspect" I understand there to be (at least) two complementary ways to attribute predicates – physical & mental – to any entity which exhaustively describes its functioning.

How is this not property dualism?

This is my shorthand for Spinoza's description of substance (i.e. natura naturans) that, among other things, consists in necessary causal relations and is unbounded (i.e. not an effect of or affected by any external causes – other substances – because it is infinite in extent).

Oh, I see. Are you, then, a necessitarian?

Hello 180 Proof,

Well, your quote cherry-picks its emphasis (indicative of uncharitably reading me out of context again) by missing / ignoring the following...

Since I seem to be misrepresenting you, let me just ask for clarification: are you claiming that these promises are moral facts because (1) they are mind-independent (as biologically embedded into us as organisms) and (2) also obligations? Is that the idea?

Hello Apustimelogist,

Yes, because at the end of the day, aslong as you are receptive to evidence and change your views based on that then it should lead to the same result.

I don’t think this works, as you are saying that if it strikes you as the case that the counter-evidence (which would change your mind) was true, then you should do the opposite and thusly not change your mind. I don’t see how one would be receptive to evidence if they always have to negate their intuitive reaction to the situation, as they would be obligated to never accept counter-evidence that they would normally accept.

Yes, but why should one have to use parsimony if a non-parsimonious explanation is just as good? If the non-parsimonious one gets the job done, is there really a requirement to use a more parsimonious one?

If they both explain the same data, then it is extraneous to accept the more complicated theory: it is just superfluous and, thusly, there is no legitimate reason to accept it.

I will grant that it doesn't actually make sense to go against this principle but at the same time this principle is not guaranteed to give you knowledge.

That is absolutely fair enough! Yes, I am not saying that this principle, in itself, provides any understanding of how accurate one’s beliefs are in relation to the world, but I do think that it is a factor for ‘knowing the world’ better, if that makes any sense.

Hello Philosophim!

I have wanted to dive into your posts but I have not had the time to give them the thought they deserve. I am impressed by this particular post. I wanted to go over why.

It is great to hear from you again! I always enjoy our conversations, and I look forward to hearing your thoughts on my posts!

Firstly, your reservation that I did not justify the epistemic norms themselves nor “rationality” adequately in the OP is completely warranted: my main purpose was to just demonstrate the objectivity of epistemic norms, and then to very briefly enumerate some of the principles I find to be such norms (and to define rationality). In terms of giving an elaboration justification for them, I can absolutely provide those. Although, I will disclaim that I am still thinking through my own epistemological theory, but I am looking forward to hearing your critiques of what I am thinking so far!

To elaborate a bit, my justification for those four principles as epistemic norms is based off of intuitions; so I will need to start us off with the first principle (namely, intuitions as a principle itself), which leads me to:

This is not circularly justified. In fact, you made no justification for it at all

Correct, I merely alluded to the circularity of, well, the first principle; so here’s my thinking on why it is actually circular.

If one is to say that one ought to take what strikes them as the case as “true” until counter evidence is provided that demonstrates its unreliability (p.s., I know you don’t like that word in this usage, so I quoted it to defer that conversation for now), then what justification is there for that claim other than that it strikes them as the case that one ought to take what strikes them as the case as “true” <...>? I submit to you that there isn’t. I can only justify my belief that intuitions should be taken as “true” <...> based off of my intuition that it has been my best means of navigating life. But if someone were to ask “why are intuitions reliable?”, then I have nothing but an intuition to give them—hence the circularity.

You alluded to a solution that you have in your epistemological theory:

If you recall, that's what I did in my paper. It is justified by the fact that logically, it is our best way of assessing reality within our limitations

But I think your solution is plagued just the same by this issue, as I could ask “what justification do you have for intuitions being the best way of assessing reality within our limitations?”...is that not an intuition you have based off of your experience which strikes you as the case that your intuitions, which have not been invalidated as unreliable by counter-evidence, are the best way of assessing reality?

Intuitions, by my lights, seems to be an epistemic primitive: I cannot even invalidate intuitions (by claiming them all as unreliable) without thereby trusting intuition that they are all unreliable, which thusly leads to a paradox.

Next up, is your alluding of ‘true’ being improper within epistemology, as, if I remember correctly, you believe that epistemology is devoid of consideration of truth and, rather, is about cogency. You express this here (I think):

A minor quibble with the word "true". I would replace "true" with "known".

To me, to claim something is ‘known’ is to take it up as true, even if it is not certain as to whether it is true. I don’t see (anymore) how a person could claim to “know” something and simultaneously not take it as true (even if they are not certain about it). Perhaps, as I suspect you disagree here, you could briefly give me a refresher on how this would work in your epistemological theory?

To me, whatever the proposition may be, it has prepackaged within it a context (i.e., a scope), and to claim to know it (about the world) is to take it up as true within that context. We may not be able to know the absolute truth of things, but we are, by my lights, still getting at truth in this contextual manner. For example, if I claim “Bob Ross exists”, then it is pretty ambiguous—as I could be saying many things with that statement, such as “Bob Ross exists in the world-in-itself” or “Bob Ross exists in the world-for-us”. However, once the ambiguity is resolved, it becomes clear (to me) that if I were to agree that “Bob Ross exists in the world-in-itself”, then I am taking that proposition as true—it is not somehow not true and I know it.

Another thing you noted was the role of ‘beliefs’ in ‘knowledge’, which I would like to briefly address:

Beliefs are of course part of the discussion of knowledge, but beliefs are steps towards knowledge, not knowledge itself.

Although it has indeed been awhile since I read your papers (so correct me if I am misremembering here), I remember your use of ‘belief’ as something like an initial attitude towards a proposition (i.e., a conjecture/hypothesis about reality which hasn’t been verified yet). To me, it seems as though ‘beliefs’ are knowledge (i.e., the verified claim) and the conjectures (i.e., the preliminary attitudes towards something), and the difference is only whether the claim has passed the rules of verification (within the epistemological theory). My conjecture “that I exist” is a belief, and even after it has been verified it is still a belief I have: it is just now a verified belief (viz., I stamp it with the approval of it passing my epistemic validation, like a value returning a 1 when inputted into a function).

I would say that within you clay analogy the beliefs are indeed the clay, and so is the pot that is made out of it—and the difference is merely in the clay passing the validation of being whatever it was intended to be made into by the potter (in this case, a pot).

Another thing you mentioned is coherence not being a consideration of epistemology, for

Good epistemology does not seek coherence by forcing our rational outcomes into a belief system, but an already established knowledge system...it is not that we change or alter knowledge to keep coherence, it is that a system of knowledge should be coherent naturally

.

I agree that the epistemological theory should itself, be coherent; but I also add that within the theory a consideration of coherence of current knowledge with the candidate knowledge is important. For we assimilate the world around us via what we already claim to know about it, and we attempt not to incessantly force the candidate knowledge to bend and appropriate to our current knowledge but, rather, to assess the hierarchy ‘web’ of our knowledge with the inclusion of the candidate knowledge to see how well it fits in contrast to our higher-prioritized knowledge (within that hierarchy web). For example, I reject that I can fly by flapping my arms in the air because it is, among other things, incoherent with my current knowledge (beliefs, as I would call them) of the world. There is absolutely no logical contradiction in such a claim, but nevertheless it is incoherent with all the knowledge I have that I prioritize higher than that claim (as potential knowledge).

Lastly, you mentioned that:

At a basic level, wouldn't it make more sense that rationality is what the epistemic norms are grounded in, and not the other way around?

I would say no, for then “rationality” would be defined outside of epistemology, which, in turn, only leaves it room to be crafted within morality, which, to me, doesn’t quite fit what ‘rationality’ tends to mean. We don’t mean that you are rational or irrational in relation to whatever ethical theory one has (e.g., you are acting irrationally because I take ethical theory A to be true and in A your action is immoral) but, rather, we take rationality to be epistemic (and, thusly, psychopaths can even act very rational when committing egregious crimes). If it is to be placed in epistemology, then it would have to be derived from the epistemic norms, whatever primitive ones exist, which are objectively better for “knowing the world”--and thusly rationality is not the prerequisite for the epistemic norms themselves.

For the sake of brevity, I shall stop here and give you a chance to respond.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Apustimelogist,

Obviously your intuitions may be wrong but it also seems to be that I could apply the opposite rule and it wouldn't necessarily have an effect on how well I gather knowledge.

Are you saying that taking what doesn’t strike you to be the case as the case would be equally legitimate as doing the contrary?

I just don't see why this needs to be the case. I can imagine someone applying this and it turning out that the correct option had more entities than they woukd have deemed necessary.

With parsimony, it is not a principle that determines what is necessary to explain but, rather, to restrict one’s explanation thereto; so, a person not explaining the entire phenomena (which would thusly require more entities to explain) would not be more parsimonious than a person would utilized more entities to explain it but they were all necessary for explanatory purposes. Parsimony is not ‘the simplest answer wins’, it is ‘entities should not be multiplied without necessity’. Of course, what one thinks is necessary could be different than what another thinks, but that is not of concern for this principle itself.

Your higher-prioritized beliefs may be wrong.

True. But if you believe something with higher confidence than something else, then why would it ever make sense to, when in conflict, take the less confident belief as true over the more confident one? This seems irrational to me and clearly not a good way of ‘knowing the world’.

This one I agree with most and is most intuitive of what we want to do but at same time maybe sometimes we do hold inconsistent models about the world which nonetheless are useful.

Of course! However, utility is not knowledge. For utility, as opposed to knowledge (truth), the goal is only to provide whatever is the most useful towards another goal, which could entail any sort of explanation so long as it achieves just that. Thusly, you are absolutely right that it may be the case that a inconsistent, paraconsistent, illogical, incoherent, paracoherent, etc. theory may be a more useful than one which is perfectly consistent—but its usefulness, to me, says nothing about its truth (other than, of course, that it is true that it is useful).

Hello Mww,

Long ways from moral realism, aren’t we?

Lol: yes. But I am intrigued by this conversation, and as long as you are as well then I think we should continue.

It isn’t a fabric, it’s a mathematical model of a gravitational field under specific conditions. The Universe, reality in general, in and of itself….whatever there is that isn’t us…..doesn’t need space or time. We as calculating intelligences, do.

That makes sense! I’ve just only ever heard of Einstein’s space/time as a fabric, but that must just be physicalists and substance dualists that advocate for it and not Einstein himself (potentially).

The interesting part of this part of your response it that it almost seems like you are granting science metaphysically legitimacy, which I reckoned you wouldn’t as a transcendental idealist, but just that we don’t need, scientifically, to posit space and time but, rather, only mathematical models of things: is that correct?

Otherwise, wouldn’t you be compelled to say that “the universe is completely unknown” instead of “the universe...in and of itself...doesn’t need space or time”: the latter seems like a knowledge claim about the things-in-themselves—but I could be just getting in the weeds here.

But then, the Universe doesn’t need mathematical models or gravitational fields either, so……

I also lean towards mathematical anti-realism, if that is what you are alluding to here. I just wonder what is actually going on in reality then, and how would we ever know?

Thing is, we’re investigating objects a posteriori, in order to understand them better, not space or time.

But that is exactly what Einstein did: he made predictions about objects that would prove the differing behaviors of space and time—so it was an indirect empirical inquiry of space and time themselves (e.g., predicting the orbit of mercury with space curvature).

Space and time don’t behave, don’t possess behavior.

So, under your view, space curving and time dilating are not classified as behaviors? Then what are they classified as?

Hello Apustimelogist,

Well the way I stated it in the OP was meant to just be a counterargument against irreducibility so that a physicalist could use it. But I think my view here is mostly just an argument against dualism. I don't think I am truly a physicalist

Oh I see! Yes, I agree that dualism is not a coherent way to go, for sure.

Oh heck no. The science is good.
...
He stated for the record mathematics is discovered, but in fact I rather think the proofs of mathematical relations are discovered, but math, in and of itself, is a purely rational construction by, and manifestation of, human intelligence.

I see! I am just a bit confused then what you think of space/time fabric? Einstein's notion of space/time is something which would exist beyond the possibility of all experience, which I thought, as a kantian, you would deny knowledge of any such things.

For example, do you amend Kant's original formulation and say that space and time are a posteriori (since we only understand them better via empirical investigation)? Are they still a priori insofar as they are forms of our experience, but their behaviors are a posteriori? Do you know what I mean?

You take my use of promise out of context and then object rather than engaging with what I've actually written. For example, there's nothing about saying "I promise", which you quarrel with tendentiously

I apologize if I misunderstood (and thusly misrepresented your view), but I can assure you it is not on purpose. Here's why I thought you were speaking of promises as moral facts:

Suffering signals the need for help; other sufferers either keep the promise implicit in their own need for help or they break the promise. A promise is an IS that entails an OUGHT, no? A moral fact that warrants a moral claim? So it seems reasonable to say the "furniture of the (our) world" does contain moral facts: suffering sapients.

You are absolutely talking about 'promises', which you seem to have denied in your current response, and you definitely claimed that a 'promise' is an IS that entails an OUGHT. So I am failing to see how I misrepresented you; but please feel free to clarify as I do not wish to misrepresent you.

I would like to hear more about your irreductivist approach to explanation.

I've no idea to what you are referring or how the above is relevant to anything I've stated.

Dual-aspect monism is just property dualism--isn't it? If so, then it is a irreductionist account, which is a theory of explanation. Perhaps I am misunderstanding what 'dual-aspect' means in your use of 'monism'.

I do not see how Spinozism (i.e. dual-aspect monism + modal-ontological determinism) is consistent with panpsychism / idealism.

This is more of a side-note, but when I read Spinoza's Ethics, I thought he was an idealist; but I could be wrong.

What is modal-ontological determinism? Could you please elaborate?

I still don't know what his idea of culpability means in this context. People aren't to blame for getting pregnant, they are responsible for their actions and their consequences.

The woman (and man) are to blame for the condition of this new life, which is fragile and needing of nourishment and care; because they decided to engage in an act which reasonably can be inferred to result in a pregnancy. How are they, under your view, not to blame for getting pregnant?

Clearly you and I aren't going to come to any agreement on this when you don't even recognize that you are making a judgment that the fetus' interests are more important than the woman's.

I have clarified that the fetus' life is more important than the woman's life in the case that she is culpable for their condition (i.e., consensually had sex). I do not think that the fetus' life is always more important than the woman's life. Within the context of consensual sex, it seems as though you also disagree with me here--as you envision the woman's health as always more important than the fetus': even in the case that the woman is to blame for that fetus' condition. We could start there if you would like.

I see! You are right that they would have to absolutely apply to epistemology, so if you have examples where they fail then I would love to hear them!

Although I am not sure I am fully understanding your connection of dualism to your original OP, an argument against dualism does not count in favor of physicalism (if that is what you are suggesting here).

Also, I likewise find dualism to be quite implausible, but I am not a physicalist.

Hello Judaka,

Our discussion was regrettable, despite everything I've said, I know your intentions were genuine, and I wish you the best.

I agree that our conversation, regrettably, has not been fruitful; but, likewise, I recognize that you are also being genuine and I respect you for that! Sometimes when two people converse the words which they use to express their positions are being used in such foreign manners to the other person that it becomes hard to convey anything; and that seems to be the case here.

I appreciate you taking the time to discuss the topic with me, and I wish you nothing but the best as well!

I am unfamiliar with a 'meta-problem' of consciousness; but I don't find it plausible that 'learning architecture' will ever be conscious.

It seems to take more than merely quantitatively generating a 'experiential concept' (whatever that may be) to have qualitative experience. There is something it is like in and of itself to have qualia, which is not something mere algorithms can produce (at least there's no foreseeable conceptual explanation of how it would work at all). A very easy way of seeing the incredibly difficulty in giving a conceptual account of the reduction of mental properties to physical properties is mary's room.

What AI will end up being is a philosophical zombie--a really convincing mimick of proper minds.

If I make a commitment to be someplace but then get sick, it is reasonable for me to cancel the commitment based on the judgment that my health is more important than being where I am expected to be. The situation you describe is analogous.

Not in the case that you are culpable for the condition of another life. For example, if you are not feeling well, you are driving, and you accidentally hit someone with your car (of no fault of their own); then you cannot continue driving in order to go to your appointment at the doctor’s office: you are obligated to stop and attend to that person that you caused injury to.

In the case that you are not at risk of any significant, unwanted bodily modifications and it wasn’t your fault when you hit that person with your car, I would say you still need to stop and help them. But, since you are not culpable for their condition, you could speed off if your health it at severe risk if you were to wait (to get to that doctor’s appointment). — Bob Ross

If I am responsible for a pregnancy and you decide I have to go through with it even if it risks my health, you are deciding that the fetus' life is more important than my health.

in the case of (1) consensual sex which (2) makes the woman (and man) culpable for the condition of that new life: yes. Not in other circumstances. — Bob Ross

Hello Apustimelogist,

Just a some things I would like to clarify about the hard problem of consciousness:

1. It is technically, at best, only a problem for reductive physicalism. One could be a irreductive or elimativistic physicalist (although I personally find other problems with them).

2. There is no such thing as refutation in metaphysics (and thusly not in philosophy of mind): no one can claim that physicalism is refuted by anything but, rather, they can describe reasons that they think count against the theory.

3. Due to the nature of metaphysics, one can reconcile even reductive physicalism with the hard problem, even when granted it as true, because one can metaphysically justify virtually anything. Thusly, a person could say that it is expected that consciousness would not be reducible to the brain states since they are, after all, the representations. However, the idea in using the hard problem as an epistemic token against reductive physicalism is that it makes it significantly less coherent or at least less plausible: all we directly know is mental (and not physical) and if one is conceding that they cannot explain reductively mentality, then it appears as though nothing one directly knows can be sufficiently explained. The trade off, allegedly, is that the theory fits with the rest of our knowledge; but why would we posit this extraneous physicality when we can reductively explain it in the reverse direction? Anyways, the idea here (that I am trying to convey) is that metaphysics is all about tradeoffs: what counts in favor and against the theory?

4. If mentality is not explanatorily reduced to physicality, then what reasons does one have to believe it is reducible to it (in theory)? That’s like me saying this property A is reducible to B but that I can never prove it: so why think that is actually the case?

Hello T Clark,

In my first post I made it clear that your "absolute moral principle" is not relevant as far as I'm concerned. What is relevant is your willingness to apply that principle as the basis of laws to restrict women's ability to have abortions.

I already noted that I am saying that it should be translated into law. So simply substitute “absolute legal principle” for “absolute moral principle”.

In the OP, you wrote:

In what you quoted of me, I never said nor does it imply that the life and well-being of the fetus is more important than the pregnant woman. What I said in that quote is that culpability, as a principle, by my lights, implies that in the situation of consensual sex the woman’s health now is less priority than the fetus (because she is cuplable for that person’s condition): this is not the same thing as claiming that the fetus’ life is more important than the woman—for one is an absolute judgment about one trumping the other, and the other is constrained to a particular context.

Where does this "culpability" idea come from.

Morally and legally it is found everywhere in society. If I am culpable for the condition of another life, then I am obligated to remediate the situation (and cannot simply unconsent) (e.g., car crash, battery, etc.).

The right word is "responsibility."

I don’t think that quite captures it, because one could have responsibilities that they are not technically culpable for. For example, someone could argue that a rape victim is responsible for taking care of the fetus, but is not culpable for its condition.

If I am responsible for fulfilling some obligation but can't because of risk to my health, I am making the decision that my health is more important than the obligation

Not in the case that you are culpable for the condition of another life. For example, if you are not feeling well, you are driving, and you accidentally hit someone with your car (of no fault of their own); then you cannot continue driving in order to go to your appointment at the doctor’s office: you are obligated to stop and attend to that person that you caused injury to.

In the case that you are not at risk of any significant, unwanted bodily modifications and it wasn’t your fault when you hit that person with your car, I would say you still need to stop and help them. But, since you are not culpable for their condition, you could speed off if your health it at severe risk if you were to wait (to get to that doctor’s appointment).

Your position that women whose lives are at risk from their pregnancy should not be able to have abortion is a claim that the health of the women is less important than the life of the fetus.

in the case of (1) consensual sex which (2) makes the woman (and man) culpable for the condition of that new life: yes. Not in other circumstances.

This is why you are straw manning my argument when you say:

Your whole argument rests on the claim that the life of the fetus is more important than the women's life, health, and personal autonomy.

You are making claims that I never made by expanding the context to every pregnancy situation; which I never made.

Hello Apustimelogist,

In what sense would you say your norms are objective?

I would say that there are objective (i.e., mind-independent) epistemic norms insofar as there are objectively better ways to “know the world” which, in turn, is the precondition for epistemology in the first place. In other words, epistemology, as a practice, is predicated on the acceptance of the hypothetical norm that “one ought to acquire how to come to know the world” and this, as a precondition of this practice, has objective consequences (e.g., that since I am committed to knowing the world, I should use whatever principles/norms are the best at acquiring knowledge).

Hello Mww,

So, yes, interest is devoid of will insofar as having an interest is not to will anything, nor is it the structure of will, which is reducible to pure practical reason. Accordingly, before anything is to be willed there must be an interest in the manner in which it is to be done, hence, interest in a principle which grounds the will’s determined volition.

I see now! I was not understanding that ‘interest’ was distinct from ‘willing’, which I agree they are different—as I can have an interest in something without deploying my will to engage in it. However, I am skeptical that ‘interest’ is completely devoid of willing, as when I am interested in something, I am thereby willing attention towards it (even if it be very brief and only cognitive).

Perhaps ‘interest’ is the initial, weakest form of willing?

However, desire takes no account of good in the attainment of its objects other than the satisfaction of the agent, but mere ‘feel good’ satisfaction can never be deemed truly moral behavior, which is ‘good’ in and of itself regardless of the feeling derived from it.

This is where I think your ‘feeling’ vs ‘willing’ distinction unfairly favors one abitrary camp of tastes over another, as there absolutely no way for a person to willfully obey a moral principle in and of itself without having a taste to do it. There is no such thing as performing an action devoid of ‘feelings’ but, rather, only devoid of (or more like in opposition to) one’s initial (or superficial or less-prioritized) emotional responses to something.

Yes, that’s true, and further instance of space/time conceptual irreconcilability of the two geniuses

If einsteinien space/time is irreconcible with Kantian space and time, then, as a transcendental idealist, do you deny Einstein’s general/special relativity?

Hello T Clark,

Sure, but I think those can be boiled down to two major issues 1) People should be allowed to have control over their own bodies 2) Based on @Bob Ross's judgment, which I don't share, the life and well-being of the fetus are more important than the pregnant woman's.

#1 is false as an absolute moral principle, and true if relative to various factors in the circumstance.

#2 is an incorrect formulation of my position: I never said that the well-being of the fetus is more important than the pregnant woman’s. In fact, I sided with pro-choice in the matter of rape (for reasons already expounded in the OP).

Hello 180 Proof,

Yes, it seems you believe that minds are dis-embodied (i.e. dis-encephalized), Bob, whereas we know that minds are embodied (i.e. encephalized).

They are “dis-embodied”, for me, insofar as the body is an extrinsic representation, a product of the thing-in-itself conforming to my representative faculties which produce it synthetically as tangible, of a mixture of reality + myself (i.e., my mind).

Also, “we know that minds are embodied” just begs the question, as that is the whole debate in philosophy of mind and you are thereby presupposing physicalism as true.

Also, as a dual-aspect monist (i.e. Spinozist) who therefore discounts panpsychism, I do not 'equate life with mind' (e.g. bacteria, etc are mindless).

By ‘panpsychism’, are you referring to idealism? If so, then I think Spinoza can very easily be interpreted as an idealist.

Secondly, I would like to hear more about your irreductivist approach to explanation; for, to me, it seems like you are wanting the cake and wanting to eat it too. I genuinly don’t understand how an entity can be derived or composed of a set of entities and its relations but there are somehow properities it has which are irreducible to those set of entities and relations between those entities. Of course, I may be just completely misunderstanding: could you elaborate on your theory of explanation here?

Hello 180 Proof,

I don't understand your objection.

In your post you shared with me (where you outlined your justification for their being ‘moral facts’) I understood the crux of your argument to be that promises are some sort of ‘is’ that is an ‘ought’ and thusly are moral facts (as that is what you said in that post). My point was that they are not an ought that is an ‘is’: I am claiming that I ought to do X because I promised X, but that isn’t a valid argument (but, rather, a colloquial shorthand). The real argument is:

P1: I ought to fulfill my promises.
P2: I promised X.
C: Therefore, I ought to do X.

Notice that the promise is not an ‘is’ that is also an ‘ought’ but, rather, a mere description: a fact, but not a ‘moral’ fact. Thusly, as far as I understood your post, you didn’t prove nor suggest any sort of moral facts.

Hello Apustimelogist,

I think maybe there is still a kind of something like an is-ought problem in epistemology

There are, indeed, those who argue for the non-existence of categorical epistemic norms based off of Hume’s is-ought gap; but, to me, since epistemology is predicated off of the hypothetical imperative of “one ought to know the world” and that impertive is outside of epistemology itself (as a precondition for it), then there are objective norms which are derived from the hypothetical imperative which, within the context of epistemology, are categorical.

Hello Judaka,

Nope, goals must be rational as well, if your ethical position is invalid, inconsistent or illogical, then you aren't being rational by merely being consistent.

Saying one’s ethical position is irrationalif they are inconsistent or illogical, is to agree with me. Saying it is “invalid” is ambiguous: what you do mean by “invalid”?

Besides your criteria of validity, you just agreed with the sentence you quoted of me while attempting to disagree with it:

But, as I said before, rationality does not consider anything ethical except for being consistent in one’s ethics; and I thought you agreed with me on that? – Bob Ross

Perhaps the confusion lied in me not explicitly saying ethics must adhere to one’s logical theory?

give me an example like "the serial killer has this goal and this opinion and these values", that's remarkably distinct from reality.

It isn’t. There have been, historically speaking, very rational serial killers. In fact, there were some who did it in such a rational and ingenious way that it took the authorities a really long time to catch them.

I have no basis by which I can question the traits or opinions of a hypothetical serial killer, and so your word is law here.

That’s why it is called a “hypothetical”: you evaluate it based off of the stipulations. This is not a problem whatsoever.

You can give your serial killer all the traits, values and beliefs (and you have done that) to make him rational, and thus, I can't reasonably call him irrational. That's true for the hypothetical serial killer, but not in any real-life case.

Firstly, you admitting in the hypothetical that the serial killer is rational refutes your position that ethics is a criteria for rationality—that’s why I used that example. Hypotheticals are really good ways of teasing out incoherencies and inconsistencies in peoples views.

Secondly, there are many real life cases of serial killers that were quite rational: they just didn’t value other human beings’ well-being.

In real life, I'll be using my interpretations, my beliefs, my characterisations, my knowledge and my understanding of the serial killer, not yours.

This is completely irrelevant and misses the point of hypothetical thought experiments: they test whether you are being coherent and consistent in your beliefs, by giving you stipulations and seeing if the necessary conclusion is made that aligns consistently and coherently with your claims.

I already tried to, but you just found ways of dismissing everything I said, as though that meant something. Whatever traits or beliefs your serial killer needed to be rational, you gave him, however, it was required to interpret his actions to be rational, you argued for. As someone who considers rationality highly subjective, none of this is compelling. Mostly you're just proving that he who acts the judge can conclude how they deem fit.

You have not given a counter-example nor an example of how my definition leads to nonsensical and true propositions: you have continued to beat around the bush, and if you aren’t willing to give them then just say so!

If you really think you are provided counter-examples, then please quote them from a past discussion response you made, and I will happily concede if I am wrong here.

Just rationality's importance in ethics.

I am starting to think we may need to just agree to disagree here, because we seem to be getting no where: I already stated that this is a non-issue for us and is not the claim I am contending with but, rather, your claim that ethics pertains to rationality.

Can you explain how two unthinking concepts can be "in agreement"? Explain how that works.

I don’t quite understand what you are asking. Two concepts could be in agreement in the sense that they cohere well with each other, are equivalent to each other, are analogous to each other, etc. But the concept is in agreement with reality iff that concept corresponds to something in reality.

So a concept which is of another concept (like the concept of concepts) would be true (and in agreement with reality) if, in reality, that really is the concept of that other concept (e.g., my concept of concepts corresponds to what the concept of concepts is in reality). Is that what you are asking about?

Perhaps a better definition is “an act that attempts to agree with reality” — Bob Ross

That would be a significant improvement for sure.

On second thought, I actually don’t think intentions matter for rationality, because one could be intending to be rational while actually being incredibly irrational; so I think the definition stands as “to act in a manner that agrees with reality”.

surely, you can think of examples without my help.

I honestly am starting to believe you don’t any examples of what you are claiming, as you never provide them and constantly beat around the bush about them. So long as you provide none, I am going to assume you have none.

Your understanding is a mess as expected.

If you want to discuss theories of truth, then please post it in that discussion board (I linked): this one is for this OP.

Hello Mww,

The interest isn’t of the will, which is the autonomous faculty of volitions. The interest residing in the agent, is in a principle, with which the will determines a volition.

Oh, so are you saying that there is an ‘interest’ devoid of ‘will’ which is a part of the structure of being a will? Is that the idea?

subjective moral fact equates to moral commitment; objective moral facts equates to rational commitment

If there is really an ‘interest’ (i.e., a desire) which pertains to the structure of being a will and not to a will itself, then I think that would be, by definition, a moral fact (in its own right).

I do not know of any such moral facts though, and I would only find them useful insofar as I do have a desire to commit myself to them. Perhaps, then, the moral fact and my taste would run full circle, and the latter would be an illusion of the former.

They can’t be reconciled, because Einstein invoked a geometry Kant didn’t use in his construction of the conceptions of space and time

But under Einsteinien space/time fabric, they are not synthetic judgments—they are not isolated ‘pure’ forms of one’s experience (like Kant thought): they do pertain as properties to the things-in-themselves. I am curious how a Kantian would reconcile that: would you say space and time are analytic judgments but do not exist fundamentally as extension and temporality?

Kant derived true propositions in order to prove their possibility, and because the proof of their possibility stands, they can be employed as ground for something else relative to them. Einstein disputed the propositions as being true in any condition, but they were never intended for any condition, but only for one.

What true propositions are you referring to here? A priori judgments? A priori categories, conceptions?

Einstein didn’t like Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori propositions….the ground of all mathematical proofs…

Isn’t the idea that mathematics is proven true in virtue of the structure of our representative faculties? And math is always synthetic, as the numbers and mathematical operations on those numbers do not contain in themselves the result of them?

Another question I have: if one’s conscious experience is a representation (of the world) and extension & temporality are only the forms of one’s experience, then is Kant referring to atemporal representation? For isn’t “representation” itself imply temporality—but these operations which produce within a pure form of time these representations would have to be outside of that pure form, which is either in a noumenal time or no time at all. That’s my logic, at least.

Hello T Clark,

Do you think your moral judgments should be used as the basis for laws restricting access to abortion?

Yes, I do.

Anyone who wants to restrict abortion and birth control should be sent to live in Alabama.

(: I agree.

Hello 180 Proof,

A seed is not a tree. A sapling is a potential tree. A pre-26th week old unviable fetus is not a person. A viable fetus aka "baby" is a potential person.

A person is a qualitatively experiencing being (or if one would like, a being with a mind), which, as an idealist, I would say is always true of anyone alive. Life does not begin at 24 weeks, the brains formulation does (for the most part). This is our disagreement, as I would assume you believe that one is not qualitatively experiencing whatsoever until they have the proper brain parts. Correct?

Hello 180 Proof,

I appreciate you referring me to your exposition of moral facts (in another thread), but, unfortunately, I am not seeing how they are really such. A promise is not an ‘is that entails an ought’, for it is the obligation to fulfill one’s promises that furnishes one with a valid deductive argument for any obligation contained in the promise itself. Just my two cents.

Hello RogueAI,

1), I'm not sure you should be forced to save a drowning kid. It would be nice if you did, but do we want government compelling charitable acts?

I think that duty to rescue should exist insofar as one should be legally obligated to save someone, when they are in the vicinity of an incident, if it would not produce any significant unwanted bodily harm to them to do so.

If there was a baby that got dropped off at your porch and there was no service you could call to get this child help (and thusly it will die if you do nothing), then I don’t think you have the right to not consent and let that child starve to death. You have a de facto obligation to save them. What do you think?

2) Forcing a woman to give birth is not even close to risking an ear infection. It entails months of pregnancy and birth has all sorts of complications and a non-trivial mortality rate.

I was never intending to make that comparison. In fact, I am pro-choice in the case of rape exactly for this reason (and because there is no culpability).

A woman's bodily autonomy right trumps the fetus's rights at every stage, even if it's a person at the moment of conception. Bodily autonomy rights are that important.

I agree that bodily autonomy rights are important, but they are not absolute. If they were (as you are suggesting), then I can unconsent from saving the kid who is drowning in the pool (given there is no one else around to do it) because there is risk to my body getting an ear infection. Forcing me to do it would, indeed, violate my right to bodily autonomy. I find this to be blatantly wrong, as I am de facto obligated to save the kid in this situation: no one should care if I consent or not. No one has an absolute right to life, nor to bodily autonomy.

Here's the problems I have with personhood arguments:

1. I disagree with the stereotypical physicalist notion that the brain must be present, fully or adequately, for one to consciously experience. An embryo is consciously experiencing, just more rudimentary then ourselves (as fully developed adults). I thusly would extend personhood to the developing human being (in the womb) so long as it has any sort of autonomous movements (e.g., a heartbeat), which is significantly sooner than your 24 week mark.

2. Personhood does not absolutely matter. Just because the developing human being is a person, it does not have the right to use a rape victim's body to develop without consent because it posing a reasonable risk of potentially significant unwanted bodily modifications (and she is not culpable for its condition).

3. If we were to grant persons absolute rights to their lives, then that would lead to unwanted consequences. For example, a person who is walking passed a burning building and hears someone scream would be obligated to protect and save that life, even if they do not consent to that level of risk of bodily danger. The only way to refute this is to concede that personhood is relative principle and consent does matter in some cases. Even arguing that the person has a right to their own life (and thusly doesn't need to put it in danger to save the other person) is contingent on consent/bodily-autonomy arguments.

Nahhhh….oil and water. She’s a retired Fed in the intelligence services with U-Dub Masters in history and library science, for her, it’s facts and nothing but the facts.

Lol. I was just curious, as two transcendental idealists, as a couple, is quite a rare feat!

Still, in proper philosophy, I submit it is not so much the directed towards, but rather, the arising from
…
Simply put, it follows that interest in a principle it that by which a moral act is given and its negation impossible regardless of circumstance, but mere desire for a good feeling is just as likely to invoke an immoral act as a moral one

I sort of understand: all interest is of a will, but the desire to do something irregardless of whatever surface-level pleasure/pain is better, correct?

I’ve been thinking about “moral realism”.

I agree and am also suspicious of the existence of moral facts; however, I also, nowadays, find the moral facts, if they do exist, to be irrelevant as long as the person has committed themselves to being rational.

This is a bit off-topic, but I am curious: how do you reconcile Einstein’s general/special relativity with Kantian notions of space and time?

Hello Judaka,

I don't think rationality "relies" on ethics, but ethics play an important role in rationality, in so far as one's goals, values and beliefs naturally take ethical considerations into account

But, as I said before, rationality does not consider anything ethical except for being consistent in one’s ethics; and I thought you agreed with me on that? Now it sounds like you are claiming that what is rational is contingent on what one thinks is ethical or unethical beyond merely being consistent.

Your thinking is binary. As far as you're concerned, seemingly, if you can prove a single exception, then you've proven rationality is disentangled from ethics.

Sort of. If I can provide an example of a person that you would consider rational, under the definition thereof, which does not exhibit a property of which you are claiming is essential to rationality, then I thereby have demonstrated a contradiction in your view. Thusly, either, in that case, you have to refurbish your definition of rationality or reject that the person is being rational. You can’t have the cake and eat it too (;

In the case of the psychopath, you can’t claim that (1) there is such a thing as a rational and egregiously immoral psychopath and (2) that rationality, by definition, entails moral goodness.

I'm focusing on the 99.99% of cases where ethics matter, you're focusing on the 0.01% of cases where it mightn't.

I am just using a radical example to tease out the contradiction in your view. I don’t think morality is relevant 100% of the time to whether or not a person is being rational. Perhaps, if you would like, then you could offer a counter-example, similar to mine, that demonstrates the need of moral consideration to determine a person as being rational? I would be more than happy to entertain any such examples.

Why are you so concerned with this technical, trivial truth that rationality doesn't necessarily include ethics?

I am not. Again, the OP is about there being objective epistemic norms: it isn’t even focused on rationality. You brought up rationality, and somewhere along the lines we started conversing about whether ethics plays a role in its the definition.

If rationality doesn't technically mandate including ethics, should we ignore the relationship between the two?

What relationship?!? You are just begging the question here, as I am saying there is no relationship between rationality and ethics (in that direction), but there is vice-versa. If you think that there is, then please elaborate; or, at this point, just provide a counter-example (like my psychopath one).

Welcome to the real world, where people don't always speak honestly.

There is absolutely no relevance to the OP whether people are dishonest or not.

Where we advocate for rationality, full well knowing and intending the implications the concept would have on morality and ethics.

Like I said before, ethics is tied to rationality, but rationality is not tied to ethics. I don’t disagree that what is rational will impact ethics, but you are saying that ethics impacts rationality.

The importance of rationality in morality and ethics is the moral consideration

In that case, then you aren’t saying that ethics impacts rationality but, rather, vice-versa; which I have no problem with.

nothing that mentions anything that falls outside the area of thought

Thinking is an action, and actions which are in agreement with reality are rational. Sure, one could say that one is not intentionally being rational if they act in agreement with reality (to the best of our knowledge) but more lucked their way into it—but they would still be acting in a rational manner.

Despite that, its definition, as well as yours, primarily focuses on acts as being rational or irrational.

That is all the definition should ever portray: what is rational, and, in light of that, what is not. There is absolutely nothing else the any definition should do other than define the word.

If I was studying but got distracted by a conversation with a friend, since what I'm studying for is action to accomplish my higher priority goal, then by definition, that's irrational.

Firstly, this just depends on what your goals are: if you are just casually studying, then it would not be irrational to step into a side conversation.

Secondly, if the goal is the maximize comprehension (of what one is studying) then it is actually better to take breaks.

If I know it would be beneficial to put my keys in the same spot each time, but I forget to do it, by definition, that's irrational.

I don’t think this is irrational because you were still being consistent, to your best ability, with your goals: you just forgot. I don’t see how the act of genuinely forgetting is irrational.

Yet, by definition, actions are rational or irrational even in cases where there's nothing wrong with the quality of my thinking.

I think this is a good point: I think that defining it as merely an act precludes intentions, which I think matters. Perhaps a better definition is “an act that attempts to agree with reality”. If you had the intention of doing something quite rational, but for some reason your body fails to actualize that intention in a rational manner, then I wouldn’t say you are being irrational; because the irrational behavior was outside of our control (in any meaningful sense of the term).

Describing actions that don't align with long-term goals or higher-priority beliefs as a flaw of one's thinking is a riot, but that's exactly what the term does.

I don’t see how this is a flaw: if one has a goal and has prioritized it above all the others, then it makes no sense do something prioritized lower—either de-prioritize the goal or do it.

The implication that such actions are necessarily thinking or knowledge problems is absurd and antiscientific

How is it absurd and antiscientific?

One's actions may not be of "a manner that agrees with reality" for many reasons outside of knowledge. You can insist that the term is purely epistemic, but you're wrong

Give me some examples of when someone would be justified in acting in a manner that disagrees with reality.

You're asking me to give an example of sensible behaviour being nonsensical, why don't you see that as a problem? The definition is vague, that's the issue, and what I consider sensible may seem nonsensical to you and vice versa.

I am starting to suspect you don’t have any examples of my definition implying something nonsensical; as I already stated that you don’t have to use the term “nonsensical” in whatever way you are assuming I use it. You are the one who said it implies “nonsensical” claims, so what are they?

I am interpreting, on my end, the term in its colloquial usage (unless you specify otherwise): having no meaning; making no sense or ridiculously impractical or ill-advised.

You keep assuming I define “nonsensical” in terms of “rationality”, but even if I do it has no bearing on whatever you claiming, as you used the term in whatever sense you mean it.

Explain how "There is a truth to the matter" is not the same as saying there's an objective truth.

You can see my thread on truth here .

It's part of the discussion in 99.99% of cases, and arguably in 100% of cases, but there's some subjectivity there

Then give me an example!

As I said, if I want to interpret the serial killer's actions as irrational, and his thinking and goals as foolish, nothing stops me.

You would be violating my definition and most (if not all) colloquial definitions.

It's a symbolic practice heuristically (or algorithmically) effective for controlling behavior and / or the environment despite insufficient time and/or information – IIRC, Peirce-Dewey's conception of 'rationality': practice.

Thank you for the definition! So, is “rationality”, then, for you, a pragmatic tool for achieving our desires? If so, then wouldn’t that tool be separate from the desires and wouldn’t it have a set of principles which stem from it that are “rational”? If so, then wouldn’t those “rational” principles, which you say are used for pragmatic purposes of control, devoid of moral content themselves (irregardless of whether someone is deploying them with morally motivated reasons)?

I ground ethics in rationality (i.e. inferential rules/heuristic-making) because I conceive of ethics as the study of 'the how of well-being', that is, how to reduce negations of well-being. (NB: Thus, I analogize well-being (how to reduce its negation) in ethics with e.g. sustainability (how to reduce its negation) in ecology and optimal health-fitness (how to reduce its negation) in medicine.)

Upon further contemplation, I actually don’t see anything wrong with this (without importing my own normative ethical theory in the mix); but I am saying that vice-versa is false: rationality is not defined with any moral considerations. Someone can be utterly rational and immoral.

To me, you using rational principles to infer your ethical obligations is fine, as rationality, then, would be a prerequisite to your ethical discussions; but rationality itself would not be presupposing any ethical considerations.

Are you saying that the moral facts obliges us to posit hypothetical imperatives?
Yes; just as medical facts and ecological facts also oblige us to ask 'how to reduce' their adverse impacts as noted above.

I see.

Species (e.g. h. sapiens) specific functional defects – natural vulnerabilities – which cause dysfunction or worse – increase suffering – in living individuals when such defects are neglected and/or exacerbated (via e.g. deprivation). In other words, whatever harms – is bad for – our kind.

I understand that these are facts, but how are they moral facts? They do not inherently have any obligations contained therein, nor do they inherently have moral worth, nor are they categorical imperatives...someone has to decide, as a matter of taste (no matter how deep within their psyche), that they have any moral worth.

And how are they facts (as opposed to hypothetical imperatives themselves)?
At minimum, they (e.g. hunger, bereavement, isolation, injury) are constitutive constraints on – limits to – (our) biological functioning.

A limit to our biological functioning is not, by my lights, a moral fact; it is an amoral or non-moral fact. There is nothing about a limitation on our biological functioning that itself categorically obligates someone to strive to reduce impairments or injury to their physiology.

Yes, I am. In other words, I am saying an aspect of rationality is for one to act in accordance with one's values regardless of whether I think one should act in accordance with their values

I agree and don’t see how this contends with my definition. Also, this entails that the psychopath is being rational as long as, all else being equal, they are acting in accordance with their values.

I'd argue the entire idea of acting in a way that is consistent with one's values is a moral one. It's about holding people accountable.

Right now, we are just discussing what rationality is, not why one would be motivated to tell someone to act in accordance with their values. With regards to motivation, there are a lot of reasons someone would advocate for a person to be rational.

that's an important role rationality plays in morality and ethics.

I agree that ethics heavily relies on rationality (which is epistemic); but not vice-versa. Usually, what is used to decipher what is wrong or right is epistemic principles (e.g., law of noncontradiction, etc.), but rationality itself does not include any moral considerations (viz., rationality only makes reference to people being consistent which, in turn, implies that one ought to be consistent in their values; and they must abide by their values because they literally can’t act without a value judgment occurring; but neither of these consideration are ethical ones: it doesn’t say what is right or wrong).

The idea of rationality starts to fall apart if we don't include any moral considerations

I don’t see any moral considerations in what you have been saying about rationality. Saying that one should be consistent in their moral considerations is more like a prerequisite to ethics, not ethics itself.

It's not possible from your understanding, because you've defined rationality as the opposite of nonsense.

I don’t care if you abide by my semantics, if you think that my definition leads to implied nonsensical propositions (that are posited as true), then I need you to be able to demonstrate at least one. Otherwise, I don’t think you can claim that.

It can never be true that "a manner of acting that agrees with reality" was nonsensical

What action that is a manner of acting in agreement with reality is nonsensical to you? Give me one example.

is that sensible has no baggage,

Like “common sense” and “reasonable”, it has a ton of baggage.

Right, but I didn't say that. I'm saying they'd find the serial killer to be inconsistent and incoherent because the serial killer's ethical stance was nonsensical or unjustifiable.

But if all you are claiming is that a part of rationality is that one should “act in accordance with one's values”, then they would be factually wrong to claim that the serial killer is irrational because their ethical position is so-called “unjustifiable” or “nonsensical”. As long as they are being consistent and coherent (with their own views), then a person would be wrong to call them irrational; hence, rationality does not have any meaningful connection to ethics.

Most serial killers believe that what they're doing is immoral, they just either don't care or can't help themselves

You have to be careful here: usually they mean “immoral” merely in the sense that they are doing something that most people would consider wrong, but they themselves don’t think it is.

You consistently misunderstand language, as though there's an objective truth to whether the serial killer is consistent and coherent, rather than thinking of these as words people use to convey opinion.

Firstly, I don’t think truth is objective nor subjective, but that’s for a separate discussion.

Secondly, I do think there is a truth to the matter of whether the psychopath or serial killer is being internally coherent and logically consistent: that absolutely not a matter of mere semantics.

Obviously, nobody who thought the serial killer was coherent and consistent would simultaneously say he was irrational because he was incoherent and inconsistent, as that would be contradictory.

Then you agree with me that ethics is not a part of the discussion about if a person is being rational; for that serial killer could be violating every common moral law and still be considered rational.

Hello Mww,

Sure, but at the risk of detouring the thread topic? Up to you, of course; it’s you that called the meeting.

Fine by me!

Moral obligation relative to interest, indicates the employment of practical reason in determining a willed volition. That obligation relative to an interest in a principle, then, indicates practical reason determine a willed volition in accordance with the subjective disposition of the moral agent himself. A principle in a moral agent that accords with his subjective disposition, is called a maxim. The point being, to eliminate outside influence with respect to moral considerations in general.

Taste, on the other hand, represented by aesthetic judgement, indicates merely a desire, which is always relative to sensation, re: attainment of that which corresponds to, and thereby satisfies, a desire, which in turn is always influenced from outside. Influenced from outside eliminates employment of practical reason, without which there is no proper moral consideration.

Morally speaking, acts willed according to good principles are more powerful than acts willed by mere good feelings.

I see what mean and agree that “obligations” are more powerful than “desires” within your semantics; however, where I could never get on board with this kind of terminology is the that both a “interest” in a “principle” and a “desire” in a “’good’ feeling” are both mere acts of “taste”, just separated semantically by what it is directed towards.

To me, any act of one’s will is a “taste”, irregardless of whether one has a euphoric or emotional feeling with it, as it is a subjective “desire” that one has. Yes, desiring more rigid, long-term oriented, principles tends to be a better bet in life (and are more powerful, as you put it) but it is still just a taste. Thusly, I fear that your terminology makes an unwarranted implicit favoritism towards one arbitrary class of desires over another. I mean, who’s to say my short-term desire is not geared towards a “principle”? Or that my “good feeling” is not towards a “principle”?

Dunno about semantically. I positively detest, and refuse to engage in, so-called “language games”.

I agree, but what I mean is that we are using two different schemas, so we need to hash out terms first—not to debate them but to see where eachothers heads are at.

Shall indicates a command of reason offering no alternatives; should desire indicates a conditional want which implies a plethora of alternative inclinations.

So is “shall”, for you, a command with literally no alternatives (e.g., a person being forced to do something, etc.)? If so, then that doesn’t seem like the word is too often applicable.

Personally, I think as soon as society enters the conversation, morality becomes group morality writ large, which is ethics. So maybe there is a form of realism in society, but it isn’t moral as much as ethical, realism

I don’t make a distinction between “ethics” and “morality”, but I do agree that we have laws, which are morally motivated, which do become considerations that supersedes the individual’s wants.

Anyway….obviously I survived 6 days in the bush. She with the whistle and spray, me with the .44. No need for either and good times for all.

I’m glad! I am just curious: is she a transcendental idealist too?

Hello Judaka,

I think I may have identified our confusion with each other: are you trying to convey that "rationality" includes the consideration of one's morals and values, as opposed to 'rationality' entailing any sort of particular ethical theory? — Bob Ross

Yep.

I see! Let me try to interpret your response through this lens then.

I am not saying one needs to be consistent with their own values, I'm saying that's part of rationality.

I am confused here: aren’t you saying that it is a part of rationality to be consistent with their own values? If not, then please elaborate on what exactly you are referring to here is a part of rationality (so I can assess).

Or are you making a distinction between acting in accordance with vs. consistent to one’s values? Because you say:

No, rationality by definition references the importance of acting in accordance with one's values, that's what rationality is.

Yet, your definition is so vague, that I have no doubt your definition can be used to justify anything bar utter nonsense, so I'm not convinced by what you're doing whatsoever.

So I can understand your counter here better, please provide me with one example of something which you can derive from my definition which is “utter nonsense” (or even just nonsensical).

If I'm judging the rationality of your choice of ethical theory, I may arrive at a different conclusion than you, and the serial killer is a good example of that

I agree, and this is why rationality is not contingent on one’s ethics. It is not irrational or rational, in-itself, for a psychopath to murder people simply because they are doing something immoral. However, it is irrational for one to be inconsistent in their ethical commitments.

Most wouldn't find the serial killer's goals and values to be rationally justifiable, and so even though his actions align with their own goals,

Why? If that psychopath is being consistent, coherent, etc. then I don’t see why anyone would be justified in saying they are irrational on the grounds of them performing an act which violates that person’s ethical theory (of what is the right thing to do).

Rationality is a bloated concept, so full of aspects that I think one can arrive at whatever conclusion one likes.

Well, now “rationality” is just being treated as a trivial notion! My definition is the core of the concept of what it means to be rational; the term, for me, is not just a whimsical term.