I agree that makes sense but it's inconsistent with Thomism. How can God be perfectly simple yet have thoughts that are not him?

It makes no sense under any theory to say that a being is identical to its thoughts. That’s like saying you are identical to your thoughts: no, you think.

Secondly, that God is perfectly simple is not to say that God is conceptually simple: it is that God has no parts. God still has a will, intellect, etc. without having parts; and God is not ‘simple’ in the sense that God is like one singular atom.

:roll:

But how is it properly reconciled with the 'macro' world?

So I personally do not like the idea of an infinite regress, and view it as a 'god of the gaps' argument

A god of the gaps argument is an argument for God’s existence by appeal to ignorance. Nothing about the OP’s argument does that; so it can’t be a god of the gaps argument.

But for this argument in particular how is this any less 'impossible' then something that has no prior cause having the energy to start and power everything else that comes after it?

This ‘energetic and powerful’ entity which has no prior cause that keeps things existent would be the absolutely simple being. As the OP demonstrates, the existence of composed objects necessitates an absolutely simple being at the bottom.

In other words, whatever being you are positing here as having the energy to power everything would have to be absolutely simple; and then you end up looping back around to the idea God exists (:

2. Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause. Yet it somehow has all the energy to power infinity to A which powers B which powers C.

This is absurd, and not actually possible. Again, go back to the gear example: you are saying that an infinite series of gears moving each subsequent gear is possible because “somehow the infinite series is such that each can do that”; but if you understand what a gear is, then you no that no member of this infinite series would be capable of initiating the change. Something outside of that infinite series would, at the least, have to initiate the movement.

Likewise, if you have an infinite regress of members which do not have the power to keep the next member existing and yet each depends on the other, then something outside of that series is powering it.

Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause.

An infinite series itself cannot be treated like an object: it would not have any ability to do anything, because it is just itself a series.

If something can appear without prior cause that powers everything,

I do not hold that a thing can appear and then actualize everything: I hold that there is an eternal and immutable being which is absolutely simple and purely actual.

why is it not possible for an infinite series of 'gears' for example that has infinite power spread all over itself to power it all at once?

Because what I think you are missing is that the gears don’t have the ability to move themselves; so this “infinite power” would have to come from something outside of that series which affects the series. Right now, you are positing that an infinite series of powerless things have infinite power coming from nothing. Something does not come from nothing.

Its good to chat with you again!

You too!

I don't know, a lot of this quantum physics stuff I think gets misinterpreted into voodoo; or, worse, tries to force us to disband from the truths about macros things that I am certainly not willing to give up. We still have no reconciliation of QP with newtonian nor einsteinien physics; and this indicates that we are getting some stuff wrong here.

Like real numbers series (i.e. continuum), like unbounded surfaces, like fractals ...

What is an unbound surface? Can you give a concrete example of that?

What is a fractal? Ditto.

Real number series are not concrete entities, so they are not a valid rejoinder to the argument from the composition of concrete entities.

"Exist" is not a predicate of any subject but instead is merely a property (indicative) of existence like wet is a property (indicative) of water (such that whatever is in contact with water is also wet).

I don’t understand your point here: could you elaborate?

The compositional beings exist for sure, but they are contingent; and an infinite regress of contingent beings is actually impossible.

conflates his abstract map(making) with concrete terrains.

I don’t know what this means.

Okay, and yet another anachronistic metaphysical generalization abstracted from pseudo-physics – of no bearing on contemporary (philosophical) usage of "causality" ...

How would you define change? How would you define causality?

If he is his thoughts he cannot move his mind but if he doesn't move his mind than he cannot move. To have thoughts mean movement.

Like I said in that quote, God is not his thoughts and God doesn't move himself; so nothing you said here has any bearing to my response that you, ironically, quoted.

Also, as a side note, to have thoughts does not imply movement: movement is physical, thoughts are mental.

It means that a being which is complex, which has composition, has parts which comprise it.

In time it could be eternal. In space it is infinitely divisible. See Kant's antimonies

Even if that were true, it doesn’t negate what I said:

Even if there was a thing which was uncreated, if it is composed of parts then that composition cannot be an infinite regress

I was noting that it would have parts; and this is true if you are thinking about ‘eternity’ in the improper sense of persistence through time. Temporality itself provides parts to something, as can be divvied from each temporal succession.

A part is not actualized by the whole. That would mean it actualized *itself* with the rest of the whole

Not at all. The parts which make up the whole actualize the potential for the whole to exist; and, yes, I understand that is a controversial take on change. Irregardless, when we think of it in terms of composition, the parts make up the whole; which must bottom out at an absolutely simple thing at its base.

Yes it does since you say God is existence itself and the world exists

You aren’t understanding Thomism properly. By God’s essence entailing esse, Aquinas is noting that nothing else is pure actuality; and this pure actuality is not the only thing that exists but, rather, the bases for why it exists. They are obviously separate and this is internally coherent within Thomism; although, of course, one can have cogent reasons for disagreeing with it.

The premise here is a purely actual being cannot have parts. Why is the premise the conclusion? This is what Aquinas does. All the 5 ways have the conclusion in the premise

Nothing about what I said was begging the question: you keep randomly misquoting me.

So now the parts instantiate the whole. You can't keep your story straight

:roll: :lol:

You need to take things slower and actually read what I am saying: nothing I have said is incoherent nor logically inconsistent even if you disagree with it.

. Imagine a slide that flows water down infinitely from infinite height downwards. The gravity is the prine mover, not some person you invent who has no parts lol. If you don't prove a mind you don't prove a God

First of all, gravity is the displacement of space-time fabric which is relative to a relationship between the two objects effected; so this example is nonsensical.

Second of all, to be charitable, let’s assume that there is some sort of natural law that causes the water to flow down infinitely. This wouldn’t negate this argument from composition, which would, unlike an argument from motion, dictate that the water and the slide cannot be composed of an infinite per se series of parts and, thusly, God must exist. Either way, you end up with God’s existence (:

Now, natural laws and other real substances (if you are a realist about them)(like space and time) are immanently immune to the argument of composition and motion because they aren’t proper objects; however, crucially, the proper objects are what those arguments begin with and from them it can be derived that there is a purely actual and simple being; and then one can deduce that those laws and real substances must also be dependent (for reasons I see you have already read from my comment to someone else, so I do not feel the need to reiterate).

if God is his thoughts and he knows he moved his mind to create the world, this brings new knowledge to God and since he is his thoughts he has therefore changed. Therefore to create is to change for God. Simple

God is not his thoughts.

God doesn’t move his mind: that makes no sense.

God acquiring knowledge from His own creation is an interesting thought; but even if it is true it would not negate that God is omniscient in the sense described in the OP nor would it entail that God has changed. Change is the actualization of passive potential, and God would still lack any ability to be changed in that manner.

Lastly, God doesn’t create things in the sense like we do in time; and so it doesn’t seem incoherent to posit that a God knows everything that is going to happen and has happened and what is and what will be all the while creating and keeping it going. I admit, this is a bit confusing though.

Hello again Bob! My busy end of 2024 schedule has relented, so I have time again to properly engage with your posts

No worries and glad to have you back, my friend!

What is a part?

A part is something which contributes to the composition of the whole. I keep it purposefully that vague, because I don’t think a more robust definition is necessary for intents of the OP.

Is there any part that is not also composed?

That would NOT be a part of the definition; for a part is a word which refers to a thing’s relation to another thing and not what some other thing may be in relation to it. Viz., whether a part is composed is just to regress into whether or not a part has its own parts, and this certainly is (and should) not (be) included in the definition.

To answer your question directly: in principle, there could be a part which is composed or uncomposed—those are the two logical options; and there is nothing, thusly, about a part per se which entails one or the other.

For example, lets say I find an Aristotle atom, or a thing that is 'indivisible'. Could we not look at a part of that and say, "That's the front, back, and sides of the atom?'

No, that is a contradiction. Nothing which is spatiotemporal can be absolutely simple (i.e., an ‘aristotelian atom’); for everything in space and time is divisible.

In addition, can it be proven that we cannot have an infinite series of parts composing other parts?
Number 5 seems to assume this cannot the case

That’s fair and a good question. I would say that the idea is that there is a form instantiated in matter by way of particular things arranged in particular ways—and so, as a side note, this argument presupposes realism about forms—and complex being has its form contingently on the parts which make it up (in some particular arrangement). This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms <…> ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). If each is dependent on the smaller comprised thing—which exists with a form and matter alike in the same contingency patter—then there could not be anything at all there (without something that they subsist in); just as much as if each gear does not have the power to move itself then there can’t be any of them moving (without some outside mover).

You note that something which is not composed of parts must exist on its own. But if it exists on its own, then there is no reason for it to, or to not exist besides the fact that it does. If this is the case, can it not also logically be that there is an infinite regression of parts, and there is no reason for it to, or not to exist besides the fact that it does?

If I understand your question correctly as asking why an infinite per se series of a composed being’s parts cannot just be explained as necessary, then I would say that that is because it is absurd (as noted above). To say there is an infinite regress of things which lack the power to exist but somehow do exist makes no sense. The infinite regress being necessary would not make any member in that series necessary, which is what needs to be the case for the whole series to exist in the first place; just as much as an infinite regress of moving gears, to take my previous example, needs some member which itself can actualize (innately) and such an infinite regress itself being changeless would not provide any of its members with this ability to purely actualize anything.

So the argument I saw in the Summa Theologica is:

I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist,
are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it
possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q[19], A[4]) that God's will is the cause of all
things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only
inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence,
since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God
loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the
goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to
anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of
God infuses and creates goodness

This is the same argument I put forward in the OP; but it weirds me out: is it really a demonstration of being all-loving to will the good of everything by merely keeping it in existence? Also, what about the clearly conflicting so-called love of each being (such as organisms tearing each other apart and eating each other alive)?

If I only desire to will that you stay alive, or that you should exist to begin with, than do I really love you?

When I first read the argument I thought of what David Oderberg calls "Reverse mereological essentialism," and you've here confirmed that this is an issue

Interesting, I am not that familiar with that position. Is it essentially the idea that the esse (viz., the parts) depend also on the essence (viz., the whole)?

It's not quite right to say that substantial wholes depend on their parts, because in a more primary sense the parts depend on the whole

I agree with this insofar as living beings aren’t just composed like non-living beings: they have a form that has to do with a process of maintaining and developing as an organism. Is that what you are referring to by “substantial form”?

For Aquinas existence is granted to the parts and to the whole, but it is not granted to the whole mediately through the parts.

I guess I am not seeing the issue. I would say that a form is instantiated by way of the parts arrangement in such-and-such manners; and so the essence is not strictly reducible to the parts which comprise the being which has it; but this doesn’t seem to negate the fact that the essence itself is contingent for its existence on the parts.

The second is more difficult, and it is Aristotle's belief that prime matter is uncreated and the universe is eternal. Aquinas is very conscientious of Aristotle's position on this.

Now perhaps you are not positing a finite universe, but I think a subtle difference on the nature of prime matter (between Aristotle and Aquinas) may come into your argument. This is because if prime matter is necessarily eternal, then in some sense it is not a composition of essence and existence.

That’s fair, and I hadn’t thought of that. I think this OP, if true, would necessitate that the universe is finite and that matter is not eternal; or at least that matter is eternal only insofar as it subsists in being (from God).

We can also, I would say, object in a similar manner to time, space, and natural laws. None of these have parts themselves, and so they would be immune to the OP; but my point would be that the OP establishes the requirement for God, and establishes the nature of God sufficiently to know that these kinds of things which have no parts themselves must be only in existence through God as well. I would say this because nothing can affect a purely actual being (since it lacks passive potency), granted such a being exists, and given natural laws (or time or space itself—if you are a realist about those) would be a medium which does affect such a being’s ability to actualize, it follows that no such purely transcendent natural laws (or time or space) can exist; for God must be more fundamental than them, as their own actualization. They equally have a potential to exist or not, and God actualizes that potentiality.

Why doesn't Aquinas appeal to the essence/existence distinction very often in his simpler works? I think it is because it is difficult to understand and know

That is fair, but my thing would be that Aristotelian idea of ‘motion’ is misleading for modern people; and makes them be too dismissive of the argument.

If God is pure act he would be everything

Absolutely not. Pantheism would be false under this view, because the composed part is separate from the thing which ultimately provides the ability to actualize it; whereas if it were true, then the composed part just would be a part of God.

A thing being purely actual means that it lacks passive potency: it does not entail that everything actualized by a purely actual being is a part of that being. On the contrary, we can prove this is impossible; for a purely actual being cannot have parts and for everything to be a part of God entails that God has at least everything in the universe as His parts, therefore God must be separate from the universe.

It looks like you disagree with every premise; so I am going to ask you to pick one that you would like us to discuss, and I will respond to that. Responding immediately to every rejoinder to every premise at the same time is an unattainable and unproductive task (I would say). So, which one do you want me to address first?

The original text probably would have had ‘created’ where this text has ‘composed’, would it not?

No, as far as I understand, Aquinas didn’t forward this exact argument; but his version is of essence vs. esse.

Using the word ‘created’ shifts the focus towards per accidens causal series; which Aquinas believes could—in principle—go on for infinity. Using this word would essential focus the argument into a kalam cosmological-style argument (like William Lain Craig’s).

1. Created beings are made up of parts.

The problem I have is that a created being does not entail that they are necessarily made up of parts; at least not when beginning the argument. Composed beings are made up of parts (obviously); but we only learn that there is an uncreated being from a deduction from the originally inferred absolutely simple being—not the other way around. Even if there was a thing which was uncreated, if it is composed of parts then that composition cannot be an infinite regress.

Ancient and medieval philosophy recognised the ‘creator-created’ distinction which is fundamental to this form of argument.

I don’t remember Aristotle’s argument for God (as the Unmoved Mover) talking in terms of created vs. uncreated things…

As we see ;-)

That is true :smile:

No 'mind' or 'will', for that would be a composite system that has memory, foresees, plans, designs, implements forms, etc.

I don’t see why that is the case at all. The OP clearly demonstrates that an absolutely simple being—with no parts—has active potencies; and one of which is willing. One would have to reason from some other starting point than the OP to derive (perhaps) what you are saying. My question would be: from which are you starting your reasoning?

Rather, it is energetic, and so stillness is impossible, and higher and higher forms come forth from the elementary 'particles', unto our complex minds that have doing - this at the opposite end of the spectrum, but not as the simplest. Higher being lies in the future.

The Ground-Of-Determination', G.O.D., underlies all, but it isn't a God Being.

I don’t know what this means; and I am not following how it relates to the OP.

Arcane, with all due respect, everything you say is just superfluous and superficial. I am advancing this Thomistic style argument, as mentioned in the OP, because I think it is true.

Why not?

Because it would be an infinite series of beings which lack the power to exist (i.e., are contingent).

This statement does not follow (e.g. numbers are infinite and each is an infinite composite).

Numbers are not composed beings—at least not in the concrete sense I am discussing in the OP.

Besides, classical atomists argue otherwise.

Good point. Here’s my response:

Here an Atomist will say that atoms (or whatever fundamental building block they choose) is purely simple and yet distinguishable via its "spatiotemporal properties." That is, the spatial location of something is an accident of that thing, but why think it is a compositional "part" of that thing?

That’s a good question. I would say, if the thing is spatial, then it must have parts; because anything that is spatiotemporal can be broken up into smaller parts. Anything, e.g., with extension must be capable of being broken up into the succession of some unit—e.g., a succession of dots form a line. Something is space is necessarily the succession of some some smaller things; and something in time is the succession of a thing temporally, which is also a form of being dissimilation.

"Cause" here is undefined

By cause, I mean it in the standard Aristotelian sense of that which actualized the potentiality.

but even so, this idea corresponds in conception to atoms in void.

What do you mean?

even if both "lack parts" they do not occupy the same positions simultaneously in space and time – necessarily "exist separately".

They cannot lack parts if they are in space and time: spatiotemporality implies divisibility.

This statement does not make sense since there are "two" which implies differentiation by more than just internal composition. "Parts" (i.e. internal compositions) are a necessary but not sufficient condition either for describing or of existing (see my reply to #9 above).

The point of #10 is exactly what you just noted (I believe); as two purely simple things could not exist since that implies differentiation.

On the other hand, if by this you mean to imply that two uncomposed beings could be differentiated by some sort of relation (which is non-spatiotemporal since the contrary would imply parts) then I would need more elaboration on that.

Sorry, I thought you were just copying and pasting something you found elsewhere. I will look at it more closely given that you wrote it yourself. :blush:

Thank you, I appreciate that :smile:

I know you know more about Thomism and Aristotelianism than I do; so your input is much appreciated.

It's actually pretty creative, and I can see some of the things you are drawing from. I have never seen an argument phrased in quite this way. Interesting thread. I will respond again to the OP eventually.

Yeah, I wanted to write it in a way that made the most sense to me and was less entrenched in Aristotelian and Thomistic concepts. For example, change, as far as I understand, for Aristotle is any actualization of a potential and everything around us has passive potency; so a thing persisting as it were through time is considered change for him, which to the modern mind sounds bizarre.

Ed Feser still keeps in line with this tradition, and talks about the need for a cause for the, e.g., apple persisting as it were on the table (without being affected by other things); and from which he draws essentially from Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover argument.

The closest to it I found, and which inspired the argument from composition over motion, was Aquinas’ argument that if all essences do not in-themselves necessitate esse than none of them could exist; and so there must be an essence which is identical to its existence—God. It makes more sense to me to formulate it in terms of ‘composed being’ than forms and matter.

I am reading "infinite series of composed beings" as individual composed beings ordered in a series. That is, we can't just be referring to the composition of a being because we are talking about the way that multiple beings are related to one another in a series.

I am not sure I followed this. The infinite series of composed beings I was referring to is an infinite regress of composition for any given, single, composed being. Sorry, I see how that might be confusing in the OP: I will rewrite that part.

Going back to my suggestion that the premise requires defense, why should we accept it? What is the rationale?

The idea is that there is a form instantiated in matter by way of particular things arranged in particular ways—and so, as a side note, this argument presupposes realism about forms—and complex being has its form contingently on the parts which make it up (in some particular arrangement). This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms <…> ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). If each is dependent on the smaller comprised thing—which exists with a form and matter alike in the same contingency patter—then there could not be anything at all there (without something that they subsist in); just as much as if each gear does not have the power to move itself then there can’t be any of them moving (without some outside mover).

For Aquinas’ essence version, it is the idea that the essence of a thing normally does not imply its existence, and so the essence of a thing is distinct from its existence. If there were an infinite per se series of composition of things sorts of essences, then none of them could exist; for they are all contingent. There would have to be some essence—which he argues is only one of this kind—where it just is identical to its existence (i.e., is a necessary being).

Here an Atomist will say that atoms (or whatever fundamental building block they choose) is purely simple and yet distinguishable via its "spatiotemporal properties." That is, the spatial location of something is an accident of that thing, but why think it is a compositional "part" of that thing?

That’s a good question. I would say, if the thing is spatial, then it must have parts; because anything that is spatiotemporal can be broken up into smaller parts. Anything, e.g., with extension must be capable of being broken up into the succession of some unit—e.g., a succession of dots form a line. Something is space is necessarily the succession of some some smaller things; and something in time is the succession of a thing temporally, which is also a form of being dissimilation.

Well, if your argument had only two premises and a conclusion, like a syllogism, then it would be easier for people to read, and more difficult for people to attack.

If it were a proper syllogism, then it would be utterly superficial and meaningless for an OP.

A simple syllogism that aims to prove that God exists is much, much more difficult to formulate than an argument that has around 40 premises, give or take

No it isn’t. It is much easier to formulate two premises that necessitate a conclusion than to provide a substantive argument for something. A proper syllogism is vague and usually frail.

I could see your point if you wanted it trimmed down to like 10 or something; but 2 is over-simplification. In this case, I went with just enough premises for a laymen to follow the argument.

do you really need 40 odd premises to begin with?

Yes.

It's not possible to simplify this argument of yours?

If you don’t think some of the premises are necessary, then I am all ears to hearing which ones and why. So far you are just saying “well, it seems like 41 is a lot”. Again, keep in mind that this OP is meant to outline robustly each step to getting to God’s existence.

Thomas Aquinas famously stated five arguments, also known as five ways, for one to be able to arrive at the conclusion that God exists. He did not resort to 40 or so premises in any of the five proofs that he gave.

First of all, none of the five ways in their common form try to prove all of God’s attributes: this one is supposed to and given that Thomas needs about 10 premises for each of the five ways just to prove one aspect of God, I think 41 is pretty short for proving all of them.

what is it about your argument that can be characterized as "Thomistic"?

It is literally his argument from essence vs. esse and his conclusions about God’s attributes that can be deduced from Him being absolutely simple. Aquina's didn't just argue for God's existence with the five ways: those were more of a cheat sheet for laymen.

Arcane, it is not helpful to say that there are 41 ways someone could object to a 41-premised argument.

But this is not a real argument.

:up:

The argument is reminiscent of classical theism, but to prove 12 predicates [of God] in a single proof is excessive. Where did you find this?

So it is an argument for classical theism—as opposed to theistic personalism—and I created it myself based off of various neo-Aristotelian arguments for a pure, unactualized actualizer. The three main one’s I read were Aristotle’s argument from motion, Acquinas’ argument from essences, and Ed Feser’s “Aristotelian Argument”.

With respect to the first and third, I think the way Aristotle uses ‘motion’ is counter-intuitive now; so I didn’t want to word it that way.

With respect to the second, the essence vs. esse distinction works but I think it harder to explain to people.

This probably requires defense. It looks like the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which Aristotle and Aquinas disagreed with (but others, such as Bonaventure or now William Lane Craig, uphold). I forget the common scholarly name, but it is the question of an infinite series of contingent beings ordered per accidens.

So, in the OP, I am referring to the composition of a being and not a temporal succession of causes; so it would be a per se series according to Aquinas because without the part you cannot have the whole: this is not like begetting children, where without the father the son can still beget children.

I can add in the concept of per se causal ordering into the OP if that helps clarify it.

The conclusion is too ambitious in my opinion:
…
but to prove 12 predicates [of God] in a single proof is excessive

But doesn’t it succeed in doing so? I get it is an informal pseudo-syllogism; but each point follows logically from the previous.

Two things might be indistinguishable in their parts, and yet be numerically distinct. We don't distinguish two identical marbles by their parts, but by their distinct bodies occupying distinct spatial locations.

The spatiotemporal properties are properties of the part; so it does hold that we distinguish them based off of the parts even if they are identical notwithstanding their occupation of space or place in time.

For one, there are just too many steps for them all to have any hope of withstanding scrutiny.

I second this observation. Think of it like this, Bob: your argument has 41 potential targets.

This is the most controversial part of the argument, IMHO.

None of these are arguments, rejoinders, nor valid criticism.

What do you get out of the aphorism you provided? I guess, I am just not understanding it yet. Is it the idea that we should strive towards being with those who think differently than those who think the same?

Ah, I see. But what does it mean? An aphorism has an underlying principle of (practical) wisdom.

The idea that western values are superior to eastern values in no way implies nor entails that the white "race" is superior to any other "race".

Like "whiteness", "the west" is a myth

Firstly, my OP is not arguing for white supremacy; and I don't know why you went there.

How is the west a myth? Historically, the democratic values we all tend to love originated out of the west and the east has been playing catch-up.

That is pungent, short, and puzzling....but I have no clue what the moral of the story is. Could you elaborate?

Is it that we should strive to push ourselves beyond our limits (viz., to avoid the comforts of joining a club which we already qualify for the hard work required to join one we don't)?

Good questions.

First, I want to note that an aphorism is meant to be pungent, short, and puzzling. The point is to simplify a proverb down into a thought-provoking sentence, which will cause one to think about it more deeply exactly the way you are. (:

Second, let’s dive into its meaning.

Drinking salt water is ok, assuming the concentration is low, but maybe we are intended to think of someone who is drinking only sea water as opposed to broth, which is a death sentence. Drinking salt water is ok if you have the means to dilute with fresh water in alternation.

The immediate point is that salt water doesn’t quench one’s thirst—not that it may kill you. Hope is the same way: when you are really thirsty—perhaps when stranded on a boat—it is really tempting to see the salty water as a viable solution, but the more you drink it the more it slowly causes more of the issue needing to be solved. Hope, schopenhauer famously stated, is the confusion of the possibility of something with its probability: it to latch onto something in a manner where it is despite its probability being disproportionate thereto.

When we are in despair, we tend to see hope as a viable antidote—a solution to the problem—just like using salt water to quench one’s thirst; but, in reality, it is contributing to the problem. How so? The problem, the Stoic would say, is that the person is discontent with what is outside of their control; and the attachment thereto is causing their mind a disturbance—viz., from which the ‘problem’ arises in the first place needing to be solved—and procuring hope only temporarily alleviates the problem by consoling the person swiftly but making them, so to speak, thirstier. Hope just makes a person more attached to what is not in their control, which adds fuel to that fire of discontent. The Stoic is going to say that it would be better—and a real solution—to detach from what is outside of one’s control and to work towards whatever one wishes with respect to what is within their control.

The important thing to note here is that the Stoics are talking about ‘hope’ as an irrational passion because it only arises when one is irrationally attached. They are not claiming that one cannot be wishful of the future—just that one needs to equally detached from what is outside of their control and they must be able to size up the probability of it occurring properly. Most instances of hope are not like this: they are, instead, irrational fits of emotion.

I think in some of what you mentioned, you are just using the term ‘hope’ in the sense of merely wishing or desiring; and that is not what is meant by ‘hope’ here. Hope, traditionally, is more than a mere wish—it is more than a mere desire—: it is much stronger than that.

I think about this all the time. There's a news article I read (probably 20 years ago) about some military official watching a bomb-clearing robot work it's way through a practice field. After watching the robot get blown up repeatedly and then crawling pathetically toward the next bomb, he said to stop the test. He couldn't stand to watch it anymore. Fast forward ten years from now and we have lifelike robots as intelligent as we are. What are we going to think when someone uploads a video of themself torturing/raping some childlike robot while it begs him to stop? I think we'll have laws protecting them.

Yeah, I agree. People don't tend to be good: they are only as "good" as they have been conditioned to be and their environment allows. Most people think that human beings have rights just because they are humans and they only believe it because their conscience---the conscience of their ancestors---screams out for it.

We are already seeing immoral acts with robots, and it is only going to get worse. I saw a video of someone who bought a tesla robot and had it watch the part of the iRobots movie where one of the robots gets executed: the tesla robot was visibly haunted.

The worst part of it is that AI is being development for the purpose of slavery; and is being advertised exactly for that (although there are other purposes too). Eventually, e.g., we are going to have prominent adds of buying a robot for household chores.

No I didn't: your OP denies the existence of consciousness. I quoted it...unless by "subjective experience" you didn't mean consciousness. Is that what you are saying?

I really don't mind if you want to keep discussing them in here: I just was pointing out that they are not aphorisms: they were quotes that you like, which is fine.

It is a tall order for sure; but that doesn't mean people shouldn't strive towards it. Everyone can do it: it just takes hard work and practice. I still struggle with this, and that is why it is one of my aphorisms I rehearse.

@frank

A super-duper slave.

I am predicting that we are going to reinvent slavery with AI; since it is feasible that, although they are not conscious, these sophisticated AIs will be sufficiently rational and free in their willing to constitute persons, and I don't think humanity is going to accept that they thereby have rights.

People don't have subjective experiences.

This is patently false; and confused consciousness with sentience and (perhaps) awareness. An AI does not have conscious experience even if they are sentient in the sense that they have awareness.

The solution here, apparently, in this OP to the hard problem of consciousness is to radically deny the existence of consciousness in the first place; which, I for one, cannot muster up the faith to accept when it is readily available to me introspectively that it does exist.

While there is plenty of suffering that might be avoidable if one could muster the courage/will to act rationally, there is plenty of suffering that is not avoidable.

The aphorism doesn’t say all suffering is avoidable: it says all suffering is a choice. Suffering is not reducible to the pain or torment of the body: it is, rather, attachment to something by the mind in such a manner where the mind wants it to be other than it is (or is going to be).

Ironically, I’ve found that most people don’t understand this until they end up with relentless and persistent suffering from some sort of trauma (and still many don’t realize it then too). Usually when I explain to someone that I have experienced being in extreme pain and physical unwellness for long periods of time in absolutely relentless manners while being completely at peace in my mind; it sounds absurd and almost unimaginable to them—nevertheless, that state can be achieved.

If you think about it, suffering can only coherently be posited in this way—unlike pain; for two people with the same exact injury can suffer different amounts, and one person with a lesser injury can suffering tremendously more than a person with a greater injury. The mind’s attachment to what is happening—of not properly sizing up the situation and remaining irrationally attached to that which is outside of its control or outside of what will happen—is what generates the mental torment.

The point of the aphorism to make a person aware that suffering—unlike pain—is always in their control; and that they can choose to properly shape their mind to be unaffected by (or only affected in a healthy manner towards) problems of the body.

It is also worth mentioning that suffering can be chosen in a manner where it is a good thing; which relates to the other aphorism about the tree striving towards heaven. We must volunteer to suffer to become great; and this is the other aspect of the aphorism that is powerful.

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Those are good: keep them coming. I like the "there are no antirealists in foxholes" :lol: :ok: