Red is a property of a thing and redness is a property of red?

Red is a concept; redness is a property. Red is the concept, phenomenally, of that specific color which one has to see to intuit (what it is); and redness is the property of being red.

Property relates to the identity the thing has, whereas quality is an estimation of the property itself

This seems backwards: the object has qualities; and the properties we assign it are the estimations of those qualities.

when analyzing redness we are analyzing red, not redness
…
By extension, then, when analyzing goodness we are analyzing good, not goodnes

Agreed, we are analyzing ‘being good’, ‘to be good’, and what ‘good’ means.

.good in and of itself, not good for this or that, but just plain ol’ good. Period. Full stop. Bare-bones, pure conception representing a fundamental condition upon which a proper moral philosophy follows.

If I followed that correctly, then yes: we mean to investigate, metaethically, what the nature of the concept of ‘good’ is—viz., what it means for something, in principle, to be good.

We’re already in possession of the tools for “ethicizing”. They are codes of conduct, administrative rules, edicts and assorted jurisprudence generally, in the pursuit of what is right. None of which has anything to do with what is good.

Not necessarily. I was talking about how to think about ethics, to build up a theory. It could be that one is a, e.g., moral particularist and denies the legitimacy of rules whatsoever; or they could go to the other extreme and be a deontologist (like Kant); or be neither.

Likewise, they have to do with good, as a concept, insofar as they are considered good principles.

It is good to “ethicize” in accordance with assorted jurisprudence, which reflects one’s treatment of his fellow man, which one can accomplish for no other reason than that’s what everyone else is doing.

Goodness doesn’t refer, in-itself, to human conduct—let alone conduct: that’s morality; and just because other people are doing something, does not make it right nor good to do it.

we may come closer to what makes us tick as subjects rather than what makes us tick as herds

That’s impossible: the concept of ‘good’ is absolute; like any other concept. Just like Truth.

This is not to say that moral absolutism is correct, because that family of theories holds that what can be predicated to be good for one thing, is good for all things; and all we are admitted here is that what it means for something to be good, irregardless of what is good for a thing, has to be the same concept applied to all things. E.g., when I attribute 'healthiness' to the human hand and the ant leg, I must be referring to the same property (otherwise, I should be using a different word to refer to each since they share nothing in common) although by saying the ant's leg is healthy and the human hand is healthy I am not implying that what is being attributed as healthy are the same things for each nor that they could cross-apply to each other.

What happened to tools for “ethicizing”?

I was talking about analyzing ethics.

Are ants being ethical for not crowding each other out of the way when entering the hole to the lair?

There are objective goods and “bads” for ants, yes, but ants are not moral agents; because they do not have the sufficient rational capacities to rationally deliberate. I think you might to conflating metaethics with ethics proper: the former is more of a prerequisite for ethics, although we still count it as a part of the latter. Just because it is good for an ant to be such-and-such a way does not entail that there is anything ethical/moral going on; because morality refers to right and wrong behavior (and not what is good or bad). An analysis of goodness is more broad than an analysis of morality.

Only certain forms of living beings are conditioned by happiness on the one hand

It depends on what you mean by ‘happiness’: I just mean the deep sense of fulfillment that comes with the organism functioning properly and within its proper (natural) roles and practices. Ants have happiness in that sense, because there is such a thing as a bad or good ant relative to what ants are supposed to be doing (which is relative to their nature as a species). A bad ant isn’t going to live as well of a life as a good ant.

The chief good is worthiness for being happy

This seems like the same thing as saying happiness is the chief good in the sense I am using it because one is worthy of happiness, in my view, only when they are fulfilling their Telos; which means worthiness of happiness and being happy are interlinked to the point where one cannot come without the other. By ‘happiness’ here, I mean the eudaimonic sense; which precludes shallow happiness like hedonic happiness.

which reduces to a principle

Why? I don’t understand. Happiness is not reducible to a principle: it is about living a virtuous life; which is about excellences (habits) of character.

there is no other good, as such, in and of itself….hence undefinable….as a good will.

Why? Likewise, I would like to point out that this is not an analysis of goodness itself: you are predicating the will as being good. So this cannot be identical to whatever goodness refers to; instead, you are importing some understanding of what, in principle, it would mean ‘to be good’ and are attributing that to the will.

Sure, one does not need a single, canonical univocal definition of "health" to do medicine or "life" to do biology. But surely biology starts from observing and thinking about living organisms and works backwards to "life," just as the doctor starts with instances of health and illness and works backwards to "health."

This goes back to my point, which I think you may have misunderstood: the identity of a concept and its predication are two wholly separate things. To take your examples, you are absolutely right that we start, e.g., with the particulars of biology and induce/abduce what is healthy from it; but it is not true, to my point, that one can induce/abduce from biology in this manner what the concept of healthiness simpliciter is identical to. I must, in order to determine that such-and-such is healthy, import an understanding of what it means, simpliciter, for something to be healthy (viz., to be biologically functioning properly [according to the Telos {or functions} of the organism]). To your point, I cannot determine that this or that is healthy by purely analyzing the core concept of ‘healthy’ and the property of ‘healthiness’ (for I must analyze the particulars in question to do so—e.g., this is a healthy human hand, a healthy bubonic plague, etc.); but it is necessary to have a concept of it before beginning that inductive/abductive process. Don’t you agree?

Otherwise, it would be blind metaphysics. Viz., imagine you had to determine if a body was ‘goobloobookoop’ without knowing whatsoever the concept referred to. That’s what I take you to do be saying, by saying that we ‘works backwards to [e.g.,] “life”’.

IMHO, this is the classic conflation between asking ‘what can be said to be good?’ and ‘what is goodness?’; e.g., between ‘what can be said to be healthy?’ and ‘what is healthiness?’.

I am not just advocating for the basic analysis of ‘goodness’ though (in the sense of what I just described above); because that is not enough: it is also necessary to determine other meta-ethical concerns (like moral realism vs. anti-realism).

Most people have no trouble identifying all sorts of abhorrent acts as wrong, be they individual acts like running down a toddler for picking one of your crops, or policies like like health insurers "deny, delay, defend" strategy.

That’s because they already have an intuition about what is (morally) good which they are importing for their own apperception; and my point is that if they have never pondered what goodness is, then they are liable to having baseless intuitions. E.g., a Nazi child that were to grow up in Nazi Germany may very well intuit that turning in that jew knowing full well they will be slaughtered is the right thing to do; and, e.g., most post-modernists (these days) don’t even think, when pushed on the subject, that torturing a baby for fun is actually wrong (because they are moral anti-realists)—so are they really intuiting properly morally the situation or are the shadows and remnants of different moral realist theory rippling through their psyche?

Viz., although I may not press someone to give an account of what the concept of good is identical with; I will certainly have them answer the question of moral objectivism before having them ponder any normative ethical thought experiments. That is the biggest one (to me), because who cares if you think pulling the lever, e.g., is wrong if you only believe it is wrong because, e.g., you desire it to be the case?!?

We might think the general principle can be known better in itself than the particulars

I agree that people tend to do better working with the shadows, as Plato would put it, than the Ideas; but they are also equally liable to blind investigations if they skip steps in their analysis of things. E.g., going straight to applied ethics before normative ethics is no different than trying to shoot a cat in a pitch-dark room that might not even be there….

I am going to break it down explicitly clear for you, and if you cannot muster the strength to respond adequately then we are going to have to agree to disagree.

I gave an elaborate and painfully obvious critique of your position:

This was my main point that you keep dismissing without any response: happiness is good is not a description whatsoever of what goodness is. It is not an analysis of the metaphysics of goodness. When you say it “was [a] good enough definition”, that is patently false; because it was not a “definition” in any of the two senses of the term that I used before (or anyone uses).

This is analogous to if there was an OP asking where to begin studying what is red, and your response is to say “analyze red trucks”. One should not begin with an analysis of what can be predicated to be red (like a red truck)—viz., happiness—but rather what does it mean for something, in principle, to be red at all? That’s where begin. — Bob Ross

Your response was to say:

You are still missing the point. I never said happiness is Good. I said, actions which brings happiness is Good. — Corvus

Thereby trying to evade my critique by providing the rejoinder that it was a mischaracterization of your view (because you do not believe happiness is good). I, then, responded with:

So, under your view, it is good to do things that make you happy; but not good to be happy? — Bob Ross

And:

My critique did not presuppose that there is an abstract object of The Good. Predicating happiness as being good is analogous to predicating actions (that produce happiness) as being good. You can just swap the parts where I said “happiness is good” for “actions which bring about happiness are good” in my critique, and it all still stands. — Bob Ross

You, then, responded with:

You seem to be trying to make things more complicated than necessary here. — Corvus

And:

Where did you get the idea? :D Who on earth would deny happiness is good? Happiness is the purpose of life, according to Aristotle. — Corvus

You are impossible to converse with, because you concede nothing (but instead try to ad hoc refactor your position as if it was your original point) and act like the recipient is the one completely misunderstanding the conversation. You tried to circumvent my critique by first challenging the idea that happiness is good and then when that didn’t work completely contradicted yourself and acted like I just completely fabricated the idea that you thought happiness was not good; and your response became ~”your over complicating this”.

There’s no discussion to be had if you are going to continue to stand ten toes down in this kind of way. Either address the critique or don’t; and stop acting like you didn’t originally counter my critique with the denial that happiness is good. It’s on the tapes, as I showed above: anyone can see for themselves.

EDIT:

I don't care if you think happiness is good or not per se: I am just pointing out that you refuse to accept the obvious contradiction that you landing yourself in. It would be very easy for you to just concede this and reword or refactor what you were saying to make it coherent: I am guilty of it too, and many people on this forum know that I refactor my positions all the time. I am not interested in holding you to previous things you have said as if you must stand by them forever: I just can't stand it when people try to act like what obviously just happened didn't happen. E.g., "where did you get that idea?": I don't know, maybe when you literally said it?

It could be the case that you might be injecting too much emotions into the interactions on what supposed to be objective and rational discussions.

Your comments speak for themselves:

You are still missing the point. I never said happiness is Good. I said, actions which brings happiness is Good. — Corvus

That implies happiness is a good thing; which you denied above. — Bob Ross

Where did you get the idea? :D Who on earth would deny happiness is good? Happiness is the purpose of life, according to Aristotle. — Corvus

I apologize Mww, I forgot to respond to this one.

Redness isn’t so much a property as the relative quality of being red.

But that’s what ‘redness’ means: it’s the property of being red. Sure, a property is attributed to things by subjects; and so it is an estimation, to your point, of the quality which the thing has (or has for us in the case of the phenomenal property of redness). However, what use is it to this conversation to note that? I am not following the relevance. When analyzing redness, we would analyze redness (:

You might say attribution requires reason, but you can’t say reason attributes.

I would would say thinking attributes.

Moral judgements being a priori doesn’t make them transcendental. Reason isn’t necessarily transcendental, is only so in the consideration of those ideas the objects of which arising as schema of understanding, contain no possibility of experience.

Can you elaborate more on this part? I didn’t quite follow it. When would a judgment be a prior but not transcendental?

Wouldn’t “given to Nature” indicate something objective?

No, because that which the subject bestows onto Nature is not from nature itself; and bestowing properties to things which are not estimations of whatever qualities those things have themselves is purely subjective. Hence why moral anti-realism is considered the doctrine of projection; and moral realism the doctrine of discovery.

In truth, reality merely presents itself, dictating nothing of its own or of itself

The point, I think, a moral realist would be mentioning is that there are features or qualities of Nature herself, or perhaps reality itself (for non-naturalists), which are of moral relevance and are the truth-bearers for moral propositions. So far, it sounds like in your view reality has no moral properties or qualities itself: we are just projecting what we want or think to be the case, with no objective basis, onto it.

Wonderful. In a place where the main contributing dialectical factor….is metaphysical?

What do you mean?

we know how reason gives us metaphysics but we don’t know how metaphysics gives us brains

Well, I think science tends to engage, secretly but necessarily, in metaphysics. Biology includes some metaphysics, don’t you think? It is the study of the nature of the body afterall….

I do that on purpose, for the simple reason the moral philosophy I favor has it as a condition.

Fair enough; but that’s my point. Shouldn’t we be nudging the OP in the direction of how to build their own theory—to think for themselves ethically—instead of nudging them in the direction of our own positions when the question asked is “how do I determine what is good?”? I would rather see us giving them the tools to ‘ethicize’ then tell them our own ethical theories.

It may not necessarily be true humanity in general gravitates towards instances of personal happiness, but it is certainly persuasive that it does

I don’t disagree that eudaimonic happiness is the chief good for any living being; and it is necessarily so because it is merely the biproduct of the being’s physical constitution working in harmony and unison to do what it was “designed” to. That’s what it means to live well.

If it is good to do things that make you happy, then you are good to be happy
…
Where did you get the idea? :D Who on earth would deny happiness is good?

You did: are you trying to troll me? That’s literally what I responded to, when you said:

I never said happiness is Good. I said, actions which brings happiness is Good

I am growing impatient with how lazy and ridiculous you are being. You say one thing, and then deny it in the very next post.

You seem to be trying to make things more complicated than necessary here.

This explains exactly why your position is so muddied and convoluted. Instead of providing a substantive response, you just noted that you have absolutely no clue what I am saying.

Beginning with the concept of Good seems to be a not good idea in studying Ethics.

This is just a blanket assertion: I already explained that this is exactly what one should do, because analyzing what can be said to be good cannot be done properly without knowing what one means by ‘good’ in the first place. That’s like determining what is red without knowing what ‘red’ is itself. To negate this, you would have to explain how one can, e.g., reliably know what objects are red without knowing what ‘being red’ refers to.

I never said happiness is Good. I said, actions which brings happiness is Good

So, under your view, it is good to do things that make you happy; but not good to be happy?

I thought my point in my previous posts were clear. Good is not an entity. It is property or quality.

My critique did not presuppose that there is an abstract object of The Good. Predicating happiness as being good is analogous to predicating actions (that produce happiness) as being good. You can just swap the parts where I said “happiness is good” for “actions which bring about happiness are good” in my critique, and it all still stands.

Good is not an entity. It is property or quality. There is no such a thing called Good. So Moore was right, it is undefinable.

That is a non-sequiture. Moore is talking about the property of goodness, just like you. Moore is not saying that goodness is undefinable because there is no abstract object for it.

Only human actions are good or not good based on the fact that whether the actions brought happiness to the society

That implies happiness is a good thing; which you denied above.

Until actions are performed, and analysied based on the above criteria, there is no such thing as Good. Good is the quality of some human actions.

“Good” is the concept of, roughly speaking, what ought to be: what you just described is the concept of ‘moral good’.

If you went out for a walk or dropped off by the shop, that is not moral action category

You don’t think that it may be, under certain circumstances, immoral to go out for a walk?

Just was trying to clarify the murky points you raised in this thread.

What murky points?

It is not the main focus of this OP either.

It is, because the OP is asking where to begin in understanding what is good. It is putting the cart before the horse to begin with what can be predicated to be good, when one hasn’t analyzed what goodness is itself. Do you disagree?

I feel that my explanation for Good as the actions which brings happiness to all involved parties meeting at the mid point was good enough definition, if you really insist that one must start from a concept of Good.

This was my main point that you keep dismissing without any response: happiness is good is not a description whatsoever of what goodness is. It is not an analysis of the metaphysics of goodness. When you say it “was [a] good enough definition”, that is patently false; because it was not a “definition” in any of the two senses of the term that I used before (or anyone uses).

This is analogous to if there was an OP asking where to begin studying what is red, and your response is to say “analyze red trucks”. One should not begin with an analysis of what can be predicated to be red (like a red truck)—viz., happiness—but rather what does it mean for something, in principle, to be red at all? That’s where begin.

I am assuming you mean Mark Twain didn't study metaethics, normative ethics, nor applied ethics: in fact, I don't believe they existed as defined areas of ethics back then (given that it came along with Analytic Philosophy). More importantly, I am noting what is necessary to provide a treaties, an analytic proper, in ethics and not what is best for works of (american) literature. What is most convincing to people (politically), is certainly not a robust and rigid analysis of ethics.

You seem to think Moore had started with a concept of Good in PE, which is a misunderstanding of the original text in PE.

No. Moore starts with an analysis of the concept of good: that was my point. You started with an analysis of what can be predicated to be good. That happiness is good does not say anything about what goodness is. That is an issue that you have: saying that goodness is undefinable (because it is absolutely simple) does not exempt you from this problem—you have to still analyze the properties of goodness (which includes analyzing, first and foremost, what the concept of ‘good’ refers to).

Your writing above seems to suggest Good is definable from what Moore had said about Good
…
He was just telling about the nature of Good.

What Moore means by “undefinable” is not that we can’t analyze its properties; afterall, he was a non-naturalist. What he meant is that what exactly ‘good’ simpliciter means cannot be defined properly because it is an absolutely simple concept. We are not in disagreement here; and I am not sure what about what I am saying is leading you to believe that I think we can define the concept of good in this sense of ‘definability’. In a looser sense of ‘definability’, we can: we can analyze the property of goodness and other moral properties themselves, beyond trying to properly define the concept of ‘good’ simpliciter, such as moral realism vs. anti-realism, cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, naturalism vs. non-naturalism, etc.

How can you define good when it is not definable? It seems to suggest you don't understand what you have been maintaining, and are self negating yourself.

Show me where I ever said that we can “define” good in this sense. Never once. I even referred you to an earlier post I made where I explicitly stated that the concept of good is absolutely simple and cannot be properly defined.

The metaphysics of morality doesn't enhance the journey too much, does it?

I think it does. Normative ethics without metaethics is blind.

CC: @Mww, @Corvus

I didn't do that.

Just picture who you want to be and what kind of environment you want to be in 5 years from now. You're like an arrow shooting through time. Good is whatever is conducive to the arrow's path toward your vision. Evil is whatever makes the arrow deviate down some other path. — frank

I don't have a problem with the fact that you have your own ethical theory (in fact, I would be interested to hear about it), but the problem is that you just nudged them immediately towards your own view instead of explaining to them how to build up their own like this.

That was my only original point with everyone.

To be fair, I sympathize with starting a novice with analyzing existing ethical theories to begin; but that is putting the cart before the horse. It is a real problem that many people have, as exemplified by the fact that everyone so far (that I have noticed) in this thread has immediately bypassed metaethics to suggest their own whole-sale theories. The order of analysis in ethics is metaethics, normative ethics, then applied ethics.

No one, as far as I noticed, stopped to question what goodness is, what it would mean for it to be objective, what it would mean for judgments about it to be cognitive, etc.; No one thought to nudge the OP in the direction of asking what the nature of moral properties are; No one thought to ask them whether or not goodness would be a natural property; etc.

How is it not putting the cart before the horse to talk about this being good, or thinking about if this would be good and how it would be, before the metaphysics of goodness?

I wasn't: I was advocating that everyone is giving the OP an incorrect starting position, which was whatever the responder thought is chiefly good (or good). It is first vital to segregate what the property is from what can be assigned it, what can be said to be good from what goodness even is itself, and that this is the first proper step of getting into (meta)ethics.

This is a classical mistake, and the most common of which (in this thread) was nudging the OP in the direction of happiness.

Likewise, just because one cannot define something, it does not follow that one cannot describe that something to the point of understanding it sufficiently. Just because the concept of good is purely intuition, it does not follow that everyone automatically has a good grasp of what it is.

I reject that good has properties

I was referring to the property of goodness, and not properties of goodness. It is one property, just like redness is the one property of ‘being red’.

Good is an ideal of pure practical reason

This seems to contradict your previous point though: if practical reason is attributing to things ‘good’ or ‘bad’, then it is assigning things the property of goodness and badness. No?

that principle which serves as the ground of determinations of will which satisfy the worthiness of being happy.

Am I understanding correctly, that you, then, view what is good as whatever makes one happy? Again, wouldn’t that entail that, contrary to your first point, happiness is good (which entails it has the property of goodness)?

I agree with Moore, insofar as to define an ideal principle does little justice to it, while at the same time, all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.
…
Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.

Then, what do you mean by moral judgments being a priori?

…..Real things, re: reality writ large, belong to Nature, insofar as Nature is their causality, and are given to us for the use of pure theoretical reason in determining how they are to be known;
…..Moral things, re: morality writ large, belong to us, insofar as we are their causality from the use of pure practical reason in determining what they will be, and are given to Nature.

This sounds like you are saying that moral judgments do not express something objective, correct?

Given this obvious and universal dualism, the dual aspect of pure reason itself is justified.

I reject this as a false dichotomy. How reality is can dictate how it ought to be (for me).

That’s the question: what is it that just is this sense and from whence does it arise

I would say biology.

I have maintained from the beginning of this discussion thread that I think Moore was right that good is an absolutely primitive and simple concept. E.g., (although this wasn't addressed to you) this post. I am not saying you need to be aware of all my posts to other people in the thread, but I never suggested to the contrary in my discussion with you. My point was:

That bringing happiness is good is a predication of goodness; and not a definition of what is good. You are putting the cart before the horse: the OP person needs to start at the basics.

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter).

Begin at looking what brings happiness.


Why would they do that? They need to first understanding what it means for something to be good, then explore what is good. You are having them skip vital steps here.

(PS: the Nichomachean and Eudemian Ethics are good reads indeed: no disagreement there).

Where the conversation turned into a quest into Moorean ethics, was:

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter). — Bob Ross


Where did Moore say that?

I never suggested that the concept of good was definable in the sense that can be adequately defined.

So, going back to the actual point I was making, do you think the OP should start analyzing what is good by looking at what makes them happy (like you originally suggested) or what they think goodness even is in the first place? Do you still want them to put the cart before the horse?

EDIT:

I think what happened is you took my (consistent) approval of Moorean thought on the concept of 'good' as an admission that one shouldn't start out by analyzing what they think goodness is. I don't think that the person in the OP should start out with my idea of goodness, which is very Moorean, but, instead, should begin with their own understanding of it. A person just getting into ethics shouldn't start with other peoples' ethical theories: they should start by building their way up. What you, and most people on this thread did, is nudge the OP in the direction of your own ethical theory; instead of nudging in the direction of how to think about ethics for themselves.

This response makes absolutely zero sense in the face of what I have said.

I already outlined in this post; and of which you didn’t respond at all.

IF you were being charitable, it would be painfully obvious (and, i've checked this by running the set of exchanges by a third party who has no skin in the exchange) that what I have said there is exactly what it says - an example that ab objective Good would need to be circular.

The euthyphro dilemma refers to whether or not God is determines what is good or if what God determines is good because it is good: this has nothing to do with my position, nor anything I have said.

You seem to think that the euthyphro dilemma refers to objective goodness being circular (or needing to be circularly defined): it doesn’t.

I will say it one last time: my definition is not circular, and I agree with Moore that it cannot be defined properly.

The problem with our conversation is that you birthed it out of half-assedly wedging yourself into my conversation with someone else. Again, your first quote in this exchange was an abysmal attempt at engaging in conversation.

It seems to be the case, that your reading the original text was not very through or accurate.

How do you know? You've never read it lmao.

I thought it was not a waste of time at all, because it helped someone to correct his misunderstanding on Moore. :D

Nothing was corrected about what I said: I refer you back to my response. I have maintained the same position throughout this discussion, and you are merely confused about Moore and my claims (as they relate thereto) because you haven't read him.

EDIT: I also refer you to your original post that I was responding to <here>.

Warnock was a professor of Philosophy, and the book is a good introduction to modern Ethics. I don't think you need to read The PE, in order to understand Moore, unless you are specializing in his Ethics.

:lol:

It is good that you admit your misunderstanding Moore, and your claim was wrong. :cool:

:roll: I find it interesting that the person who has never read Moore, who doesn't see a need to, thinks they are understand Moore better than someone who actually has.

This conversation is a waste of my time.

I didn’t ask about goodness, and I’m not interested in meta-ethics.

Perhaps I misread, then: I thought you asked about what is good—no? Goodness is just the property of being good.

It seems to me you’re advocating somewhat of what you claim Moore is refuting

I am just advocating that a person who wants to begin understanding what is good must start with analyzing what they think the concept of good is; then what can be said to be good. That’s it. I don’t think the person in the OP should start with our understanding of what we think goodness refers to.

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates.
…
Clock’s ticking, Bob.
(Grin)

Well, this just opened up a can of worms (;

Now we inevitably begin discussing transcendental idealism again haha. The question you raise, is an interesting, Kantian one—viz., if we cannot know how the things-in-themselves are, then how can we know what is in-itself good?

In short, I think this falls prey the same issue that transcendental idealism has with its in-itself vs. “for-us” distinction: by ‘in-itself’, I take Kant to really be meaning (whether he likes it or not) how a thing exists independently of any experience of it; and there’s another common meaning for ‘in-itself’, which is just the nature of a thing (and this can be based off of conditional knowledge of it). I find no reason to believe that I cannot have indirect knowledge of reality as it were in-itself in the second sense of that term.

So, for me, I would say that we have a sense of what it beautiful just as much as what is good (and just as much as what is a car) by our conditional knowledge of the world around us. All we need in order to grasp what is good (conditionally), is the intellect. That is, I guess, the “a priori sense of good itself”—although I am certainly not referring to exactly what you meant here (since you probably meant a faculty of some sort that is special for grasping morality). Or are you thinking that by concept of good, I am referring to an a priori concept of good?

EDIT:

It is also worth mentioning that moral non-naturalists will nod their approval your way on this one; and say that we do have some sort of extra sense for morality that allows us to sense the supersensible or that God gives us divine revelation.

I have responded to this as presented in several of your posts in this thread. Not the bare quote which I used to represent it. That bare quote would, one would think, cast you back to your entire position

No, one would not think that AmadeusD; because for anyone who actually read my posts, I took a Moorean position on the nature of goodness which is not circular. Again, you just quoted me out of context when I was talking about how goodness is objective.

Your notion of 'objective good' is circular. I have made that much clear about my position, whether you agree with it or not.

All you said was this:

This is tautological. This is unhelpful. This is not an answer to any of the questions. What's good is *insert definition* is the correct form of this statement. Everyone has their own. And that's absolutely fine. — AmadeusD

All you did is address that, when taken literally, “what is good is good” is tautological and doesn’t give a real definition. You absolutely did not address anything about my idea that goodness is objective. Now you are just trying to ad hoc rationalize your laziness.

AmadeusD, I try to be charitable; but on this one I can’t...it’s too painfully obvious what you did. You read a tiny snippet, which had nothing substantial to do with the post in which it was, that said “what is good is good” and assumed I was trying to define goodness as goodness.

It could be objective and circular, as Euthyphro shows is almost certainly the case, if an objective good were to obtain.

The Euthyphro Dilemma is about God and God’s relation to any objective goodness to demonstrate that God can’t really be the standard for it; and does not provide any reason to believe that an objective morality cannot exist.

Where did Moore say that? From my memory, Moore said it is impossible to define what good is, and one must start from what one ought to do from the knowledge of what morally good actions are, rather than asking what good is. (Ethics since 1900, by M. Warnock)

My understanding of the Principia Ethica, when I read it a while ago, was that his whole critique was, first and foremost, that ethics hitherto had not even thought to question what the concept of good even is and, instead, skipped over it to a discussion of what can be predicated to have it. This is not to say that Moore, upon conducting (what he considered to be) the necessary investigation into the nature of goodness (as opposed to what The Good is—what can be said to be chiefly good), concluded that we can define it accurately. In fact, you are absolutely right that he considered it an absolutely simple and primitive concept; and I am inclined to agree with him on that point.

If it is from the actual reference from the original texts and academic commentaries on these points, you should indicate the source of the reference with your claims.

“Ethics since 1900” was not written by Moore. If you want to understand Moore, then you need to read The Principia Ethica:

But our question ‘What is good?’ may have still another meaning. We may, in the third place, mean to ask, not what thing or things are good, but how ‘good’ is to be defined. This is an enquiry which belongs only to Ethics, not to Casuistry; and this is the enquiry which will occupy us first.

-- (Principia Ethica, Ch. 1, Section 5)

I said what brings happiness to all parties involved is good. So it was an inferred definition of Good.

Even if I grant your point, my point still stands:

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics. — Bob Ross

The OP is asking where to start to understand what is good, and I am merely pointing out that you are trying to have them start with Aristotelian ethics (at best); and starting with an already existing, robust theory is not the proper way to start. One needs to start by studying what the nature of goodness is: that is the beginning of metaethics.

It is not possible to define what good is, according to Moore.

That’s all fine: the OP is about where should a person start. Do you think they should just skip over asking themselves “is good definable?”? Do you just want them to skip that step?!?

I don't disagree with that: I think we learn about all concepts through experience; but that doesn't mean that we can skip steps and put the horse before the cart.

My answer of what the concept of good is, is found in this post:

For example, I would say that Moore was right that the concept of good and bad are absolutely primitive and simple—like being, value, time, space, etc.—as opposed to derivative and complex concepts—like a car, a cat, a bat, etc.—and thusly are knowable through only pure intuition. I would say that the concept of good—which can only be described inaccurately through synonyms, analogies, metaphors, etc.—refers to that which should be; that which should be sought after; that which is best (or better); etc. — Bob Ross

That doesn't matter for my point I was making: I was pointing out that the OP is asking where to start, and surely they must start with the concept of 'good' and not what can be said to be good. This is a basic distinction that shockingly no one else in this thread seems to cares about: everyone is just nudging @Matias Isoo in the direction of their metaethical and normative ethical commitments. I am not here to do that, because that's not what the OP is asking about. You don't start with someone else's robust ethical theory when starting ethics: you build your own way up.

Yes...... :brow:

PS: I refer you back to this comment, because you never actually addressed it.

The reason I am being so harsh with you, is because you obviously cherry-picked one sentence from my most recent post to someone else......

When I said that, I said:

I think it does. You're just attached to this little rock going nowhere for a short amount of time. Love and do what you will.


That’s just a red herring. What does that have to do with anything? What is good is good: who cares if you are just on a “little rock”? What about your view would help give some objective form of goodness?

Of which the phrase "what is good is good" clearly refers to the idea it is objective, and not that I am defining 'good' circularly.

It isn't productive to cherry-pick peoples' responses and address something utterly irrelevant to the conversation.

We can talk about what we mean by "good" without worrying about moral realism

:chin:

What meaningfully is there to talk about other than whether goodness is objective; whether judgments about what are good are cognitive and some of them are true; and so forth? Sure, we can venture into metaethics without explicitly dealing with realism vs. anti-realism, but there core tenants of each are going to be addressed irregardless...

Because the what goodness is is presupposed in what can be said to be good, so how can one accurately predicate goodness to something when they have not a clue what goodness is itself? That's blind metaethics, my friend....

The problem I was raising is that the OP is asking:

So I decide to build my own set of rules and values, this is my first attempt and I will need your help, so where should I begin? What question should I make?

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics.

You just randomly misquoted me to try and pick a low hanging fruit (without reading anything I said). Either engage in what I am saying and give a useful (or at least genuinely attempted) response, or don't wedge yourself into other people's conversations.

It's my own view, home grown in my own little brain, but yes, it's echoed by Nietzsche, and it's in keeping with the essential teachings of Jesus. So it has that going for it.

Nietzsche’s thoughts on morality are completely incompatible with Christianity. Moral anti-realism is incompatible with Jesus’ teachings. Beyond good and evil is about creating one’s own values, which are non-objective, and imposing them on themselves and other people: how is that compatible with Christ’s objective morality which is (allegedly) grounded in divine law?

I think it does. You're just attached to this little rock going nowhere for a short amount of time. Love and do what you will.

That’s just a red herring. What does that have to do with anything? What is good is good: who cares if you are just on a “little rock”? What about your view would help give some objective form of goodness?

I would also mention that it is exceedingly difficult to actually justify moral realism with Christianity (although I understand that is a very hot take)….the euthyphro dilemma still holds to me. Also, even if God’s nature does facilitate some sort of (objective) goods, then it seems that it would only relativistically apply to God (teleologically) (no different then how the human good refers to humans—not God).

:up:

If you read my post again, it would be clear what the concept of moral good is from Aristotle. Good is a quality or property of actions which brings happiness to all parties involved.

You misunderstand me: the concept of good refers to whatever 'good' means, not what or how one can predicate something to have it. Viz., the concept of value does not refer to what may be valuable. One must first understand, explicitly, what 'value' even means, not just as a word but as a concept, to determine what has it.

That bringing happiness is good is a predication of goodness; and not a definition of what is good. You are putting the cart before the horse: the OP person needs to start at the basics.

I caught that too.

No worries, and fair enough. You are right that the concept of ‘evil’ does arise out of religious ideologies, being closely connected to ‘sin’, but I don’t think we have to use it that way.

My understanding being: one 'likes' not suffering, suffering is virtually in de facto agreement by everyone to be unethical, ergo, the relationship between human ethics and what the subject of the whole matter's preferences are (what is liked, what is disliked, the fact inflicting suffering is unethical, etc.) is not without noting

I agree that most people would agree that suffering is bad, but this doesn’t provide the necessary connection to show that it is actually bad. E.g., if everyone thinks that red blocks are bad and blue blocks are good, then does that thereby make it so? Of course not: that’s just inter-subjective agreement.

What you would have to do, if you are a moral realist, in order to do proper ethics, is demonstrate how suffering is bad by way of explicating what badness is, how to assess something as bad or good, and apply that to suffering.

For example, I would say that Moore was right that the concept of good and bad are absolutely primitive and simple—like being, value, time, space, etc.—as opposed to derivative and complex concepts—like a car, a cat, a bat, etc.—and thusly are knowable through only pure intuition. I would say that the concept of good—which can only be described inaccurately through synonyms, analogies, metaphors, etc.—refers to that which should be; that which should be sought after; that which is best (or better); etc.

As a neo-aristotelian, I would say that objective goods, which are just ‘goods’ in their proper sense (as opposed to moral anti-realist concepts of it), and “bads” arise out of the teleology of things as relativistic to how the thing was supposed to be (as demonstrated by its Telos). E.g., a good farmer, a good human, a good clock, a good bubonic plague, a good lion, etc. These are not hypothetical goods nor are they non-objective—e.g., a good farmer is not hypothetically good at farming nor are they good at farming only because one wants them to be nor are they good at farming only because one thinks they are: they are, in fact, good at farming.

Suffering is generally bad, then, because it represents a (living) being not living up to their Telos properly (either voluntarily or by force) as suffering is normally the bodies way of telling itself what it is designed to do is not happening (and, on the contrary, what anti-thetical to it is happening). However, I would note that suffering simpliciter is not bad, because suffering is required in order to properly fulfill one’s duties, roles, and (utlimately) Telos.

I am not advocating that you need to agree with me on my analysis of what is good here; but I merely advocate that you do the same with respect to your theory. Otherwise, you are prone to many mistakes by venturing in muddied waters.

You could say it's Beyond Good and Evil, yea.

Then, you are not giving them a starting point for investigating ethics: you are giving them a Nietschien, moral anti-realist, position to explore.

The OP has a starting place. He or she is an atheist.

Sure: I don’t see your point. They were asking where to begin to understand what is good: being an atheist doesn’t preclude moral realism.

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter).

How can one determine what is good without understanding what it would mean for something to be good in the first place? Isn't that putting the cart before the horse?

Agreed. I was just noting that people find this very compelling, hence why (I would argue) most people find libertarianism appealing and are confused what compatibilism even is.

Good is whatever is conducive to the arrow's path toward your vision. Evil is whatever makes the arrow deviate down some other path

That's just another way of saying there is no actual goodness and badness; because you defined it as whatever suits a person's own non-objective dispositions. My biggest complaint is not that you are siding with moral anti-realism, but that the OP wants to know where to start and this makes them think, if they accepted it, that they should collapse ethics into pyschology. They need to explore, first, what goodness even is: not go on a psychological quest.

This is also why, as a side note, I call moral anti-realism only ethics insofar as it is its negation.

Begin at looking what brings happiness.

Why would they do that? They need to first understanding what it means for something to be good, then explore what is good. You are having them skip vital steps here.

(PS: the Nichomachean and Eudemian Ethics are good reads indeed: no disagreement there).

Good doesn’t have a definition, but if you think you can build your own set of rules, you must already have an idea of what good will be.

This sounds like a Moorean intuition of goodness, am I right? (: