Sorry, the forum did not notify me of the @s.

Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does). — javra


I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with @Bob Ross.

I completely agree: I am not contending that we should praise or blame tornados for what they do, but, rather, to acknowledge that what they do is intrinsically bad (or related directly thereto in a relevant manner) which makes them morally bad.

For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)

Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils. — javra


Thanks - I think it is very relevant to the discussion I am having with @Bob Ross, and this distinction between agent-causes and non-agent-causes is central to the OP, because for the OP morality is bound up with agency.

I completely agree. Again, I think my position is being confused, and it is (perhaps) myself that is to blame because I did not initially convey it with full clarity. I have no problem with the 'natural' vs. 'moral' evil distinction if one is merely denoting what is capable of moral responsibility with the adjective 'moral': HOWEVER, if one is attempting to make 'evil' merely a synonym for badness simpliciter (which is outside of the scope of morality), then they are gravely mistaken. Morality is not itself the study of behavior.

Hopefully that helps clarify my position.

Bob

I added a bit to my last post in an edit and I'm not sure if you saw it:

I saw it, but it didn’t seem to address our issue (between us). Let me address some of it in ways that avoid reiteration to help further the conversation.

The reason we don't call natural evils immoral is because they are appreciably different from moral evils. Both natural evils and moral evils are evil or bad (and this is their common genus: evil or badness). So what makes them different? The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect.

You hold that some ‘evil’ is amorally bad, and is thusly outside of the scope of morality; whereas I think that all ‘evil’ is intrinsically bad, and is thusly within the scope of morality. I cannot tell if your use of this sort of ‘amoral badness’ is equivalent to my ‘intrinsic badness’ (which I call likewise moral badness).

You hold that ‘moral’ refers to only meanings directly related to ‘acts’, whereas I use it in a much broader scope.

Morality, at its core, is about acts for you; intrinsic goodness, for me.

A moral good is the meal cooked by your mother. A non-moral good is the rain that waters your crops

I understand why you would say this, because you are holding a strictly act-centric theory of what ethics is about, but I think both of these are moral goods.

I think you think health, for example, is an amoral good (because it has no direct relation to deliberate acts, nor acts in general); whereas health, because of how it relates to flourishing (which is intrinsically good), is morally good to me.

There is another way one can say health, or rain nourishing plants is good, and it is, in fact, an amoral sense: extrinsic goodness. I can equally say that health is good for keeping a sane mind (or some other goal or [subjective] purpose): this kind of good is relative to a thing fulfilling a subjective purpose, and there is an infinite amount (subjective) purposes that a thing can be evaluated, as good or bad, relative to. This is the only kind of good which I concede is outside of the sphere of moral discourse.

For example, "Grandma does not exist anymore." We talk about things losing and lacking being.

Everything in reality can be attributed the property; and I can make a parody argument for redness: everything in reality is red, but we can say things that makes sense like “a block that doesn’t exist is not red”.

Yes, because if everything happened to be red then we wouldn't be capable of identifying or distinguishing red

Yes we can: just like ‘to exist’. I can say “red is this particular color that everything is a shade of”. Do you think colorblind people that see only grey don’t understand what grey is?

What does the word "moral" in your term, "moral discourse," mean?

It means discourse related to (1) intrinsic goodness and (2) what is intrinsically good.

Does it mean something other than the two senses I already gave?
…
(As in the OP, "acts" is shorthand, and is not meant to exclude other moral or immoral things, such as habits.)

For you, and commonly to people, morality is about behavior; but this is a major mistake: it is really about intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good.

We can talk all day about good trees, or good birds, or good sunsets, and no one will suppose that we are engaged in moral discourse.

It depends: when we discuss those things, are we supposing we are talking about actually good trees, actually good birds, etc.? If so, then we are definitely talking about ethics.

If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts. — Bob Ross

Earlier in our conversation I already told you that I don't think this.

You never explained why; and I think it is a consequence of your view. From my perspective, you can’t have cake and eat it too (;

Either morality is only about what is related to behavior and there is no morality in a world incapable of agents (i.e., things which have behaviors, can act, in the manner you describe) OR morality is not fundamentally about behavior (although it can include that in itself, even as a primary sub-subject).

Bob

It looks like you may be new here: welcome to the forum, Jasonm!

Unfortunately, you did not eliminate what you sought to: it is entirely coherent for someone to posit that this "human taste" (viz., "range of possibilities") for morality is a reflection of the range of "human emotion" towards morality.

All you succeeded, at best, at adding is that the subjective dispositions (whether that be an emotions, preferences, beliefs, etc.) which make moral judgments true or false should be evaluated in terms of the vast majority collective of humans.

This doesn't negate moral cognitivism, nor does it provide a "logical basis" for your version of moral anti-realism.

<The tornado is a "moral" "agent" "acting" "immorally">

Let me put it more precisely, then: “the events which transpire directly due to a tornado are intrinsically bad”. Do you disagree with that statement, or find it likewise idiosyncratic? If not, then I think we are just disagreeing on semantics: I identify intrinsic goodness with moral goodness, and by ‘moral’ I am referring to the sense of “within the sphere of moral discourse” and NOT your #1 or #2 (that you explicated in your response, quoted at the end of this response).

"Being" involves analogical predication and degrees. For example, propositions exist in a different way than giraffes or colors. "Brk" is a univocal predication, as is your predication of "moral (agent)."

The predication of generic “being” (i.e., generic ‘to exist’) is univocal predication, just like “Brk”.

Either way, I don’t see how univocally predicating a property to everything, would make it vacuous. If it is clearly outlined what “Brk” actually is, then it is not vacuous. For example, imagine that everything happens to be red: does that make ‘redness’ vacuous?

Oh, but you are saying it is a property. You think the tornado has the property of "moral agent," and this property applies to all things without exception.

I am no longer claiming that a tornado is a moral agent; I was referring to the adjective, which I guess in a sense is a property, of ‘moral’ (perhaps ‘moralness’).

For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral

I highly doubt this. Would you not agree, that “moral” also signifies “that which is within the sphere of moral discourse”? You left that out in your analysis here.

If you deny this, then I must admit your theory of ethics is entirely too act-centric for me. The study is fundamentally about what is “good”, and this in a “moral” sense, and only as a biproduct does one discuss moral or immoral acts.

Again, if you think there is a morally ideal possible world IF there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that “moral” can be used in this third sense.

EDIT:

If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts.

By #2, are also referring to moral and immoral acts, or what is morally bad or good simpliciter? I read it as acts, but if it is about just moral badness and goodness (in general); then I would say that my use of "moral agent" falls within this category, because #2 makes no reference to any sort of capacity for responsibility (of anything). 'moral' in #2's sense, assuming you aren't referring to only acts, would include uses like "this agent is doing moral things, even though they cannot be held responsible for their actions, because their actions align with what is morally good".

Bob

Firstly, you are absolutely right to point out that a tornado is not an agent, as an agent is self-caused, and that it isn’t acting (in the strict sense of the word that relates to agents) either; and I apologize if I suggested otherwise. However, this doesn’t takeaway from my main point, which is is that what the tornado is “doing” is immoral. Likewise, I think there are still examples of agents which are not capable of being held responsible for their actions; like ants.

Besides that clarification, I think we are only disagreeing now about semantics. Even if ‘moral’ does signifies—with respect to one of its meanings—traditionally ~“something related to an agent that is capable of being culpable for their actions” (and, in this regard, agents constitute “moral realities”), I clearly doesn’t fit my theory on ethics at all.

I would also point out, to my favor, that ‘evil’ is traditionally a morally-loaded term; and so, technically, it doesn’t make sense to say “moral evil”: it’s redundant. I know you disagree, but I think you are heavily overlooking the fact that it is counter-intuitive to posit a sort of ‘evil’ which is not only natural (in the sense of being indeliberate) but also unrelated to what is morally bad; that means you are speaking about pragmatic goodness when discussing it, which isn’t what people are usually talking about with ‘natural evil’: evil is still always about something morally bad, in the sense that the “bad” being discussed is of moral constitution.

. The fact that you have a hard time communicating your thoughts with idiosyncratic language is no coincidence, for idiosyncratic language undermines the purpose of language itself.

It’s just because I have my own ethical theory, which we haven’t discussed in depth. This does not mean that I am wrong; and surely doesn’t entail that I should stick to all the traditional terms IF there are better ones (for formative purposes).

It is moot insofar as it does not impact the formal soundness of your arguments. It is not moot insofar as it will prevent you from easily talking with other people and engaging in dialogical philosophy.

Semantics, assuming it is syntactical and grammatical, doesn’t affect formal soundness; and, although you are right that unique theories are harder to convey to people, I don’t think it would be that hard to clarify my position with respect to the terminology. I say all agents are “moral agents” insofar as they are capable of moral analysis, but some are not held capably blameworthy for their actions; and if one wants to use “moral agent” in the sense of an agent which can be held responsible for their actions, then I have no problem using it that way if it helps them wrap their head around things. Anyone can understand this easily. The difficulty in our discussion was that I didn’t formulate it very well, initially.

Only because "evil" in that sentence will be interpreted as, "evil (human) acts." If you ask the same person whether a devastating tornado is evil, and whether it is immoral, they will probably say yes/no.

I already explained why they would say yes/no; and I also would bet that the common person would find it nonsensical to say there is an evil which isn’t relevant to morality, as opposed to merely being natural. This is what you are committed to if you are saying that not all evil is a matter of moral discourse.

And they are right, for immorality implies culpability. I showed you that SEP affirms this. We could also go to IEP and Wikipedia, but if you distrust SEP then I doubt these other sources will avail.

I’ve never had a problem with the SEP article, as, like I said, I have interpreted it as making a distinction between two types of evil; and that ‘evil’ still was completely in the sphere of moral discourse.

It makes absolutely no sense to claim that some amoral bad is evil. Something that is amorally bad is just pragmatically bad.

Are we perhaps at the end of our conversation? SEP says that we call something morally evil, morally bad, or immoral insofar as it "results from the intentions or negligence of moral agents." I agree with SEP; you disagree. You think entities incapable of intention can truly be called immoral, such as tornadoes. For me, this is the key takeaway.

Fair enough! As always, great conversation Leontiskos! Feel free to stop the conversation whenever you wish...I will let you have the last word.

Edit: I suppose I should raise the customary toast to the argument from vacuity. That if everything is "moral" then nothing at all is "moral."
• Jake: That tree is brk.
• Sue: What does 'brk' mean?
• Jake: Brk is a property of everything whatsoever.
• Sue: So nothing is non-brk?
• Jake: Nope, nothing.
• Sue: Well if there is nothing which is non-brk then it would seem that 'brk' means nothing at all.

That everything is capable of moral analysis does not in any way entail that nothing is capable of moral analysis; and just because a property can be applied to everything, it does not follow it is vacuous (e.g., beingness).

EDIT:

I would also like to note that by saying everything is capable of moral analysis, I am not claiming there is a property of "moralness" that can be predicated to everything. "moral" was being used as an adjective, not a property.

The true word 'moral' has meaning because there are realities which are truly non-moral (or amoral)

I feel like you keep forgetting that, by your own lights, ‘moral’ has multiple meanings; and you then proceed to conflate them.

Bob

Excellent, and it is the corollary that you seem to transgress at various points throughout the thread, "Amoral agents can only produce amoral acts." Or similarly, "Amoral agents cannot produce acts which are moral or immoral." Do you accede to this corollary?

I see what you mean, and now recognize that I need to be more clear with my terminology.

To answer your question outright: I accept the corollary as valid, but this leaves me no choice but to deny the existence of amoral agents and acts (in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is within its sphere [of discourse]) because I do think we can analyze acts and agents which are not responsible for their actions within [the study of] morality.

However, it is important (for me) to note that there are amoral agents and acts in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is morally wrong/right.

In other words, all agents/acts are within the sphere of moral talk, but not all agents/acts are necessarily being immoral/moral or doing immoral/moral things.

Moreover, there are two subtypes of immoral agents (in both senses of the term I expounded above): those capable of culpability and those that are not.

A tornado is a moral agent in the sense of being an agent subject to moral analysis; and it is, in fact, doing things and that are morally wrong and is being something that is inherently immoral—it is not just being or doing things that are amorally bad.

Evil, then, is always moral. There is no such thing as ‘natural evil’ in the sense that you outlined; instead, what I mean by ‘natural evil’ is evil which is does indeliberately (viz., in a way of which no one can be held responsible for it)—that’s it.

But someone who holds that the suffering and death of 100 people are bad would just say that death and suffering are intrinsically bad (or evil)

The problem with this, is that under my theory moral goodness is identical to intrinsic goodness; so the obvious antithesis to this is intrinsic badness. Thusly, if what the tornado is doing is intrinsically bad, then it is morally bad. See what I mean?

I would presume that a person with your response (here), would deny that moral goodness is intrinsic goodness; otherwise their position is incoherent.

You think it is immoral because you have idiosyncratically defined "immoral" to include natural evil, as I noted above (
↪Leontiskos
). You agree with SEP that it is a "bad state of affairs which did not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents," but instead of using the common philosophical parlance of "natural evil" you call it "immoral." According to moral philosophy that which does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents is in no way moral or immoral.

I agree, except that (1) I don’t think it is idiosyncratic (but that’s a mute point) and (2) a very much am fine with the phrase ‘natural evil’...its ‘moral evil’ I have a problem with.

You will never hear newscasters or other people speak about the immorality or wickedness of tornadoes

To your point, if I were to say to the common man “that tornado is immoral”, they will find it nonsense because they would interpret it the way you are.

To my point, if you said “evil is not always immoral”, they would also find this to be nonsense.

Likewise, to my point, if I clarified my statement about the tornado, such as “the tornado is immoral insofar as its acts (or the events it brings about) are immoral”, the common man would find no problem with it.

The only reason they would find it initially nonsensical, is because within the context of the use of ‘immoral’ in that particular sentence makes it sound like I am saying the tornado is culpable for its evil actions.

Arthritis is bad, but it's not immoral

I disagree. Cancer is immoral, because I think it is intrinsically bad; and intrinsic badness is the antithesis to intrinsic goodness; and intrinsic goodness is moral goodness.

Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); — Bob Ross

If SEP is making a distinction between natural evil and moral evil, then it makes no sense for you to say, "Okay that distinction makes sense to me so long as natural evil is moral evil." To say such a thing is to fail to understand that any distinction is being made at all!

No, so what I was pointing out is that the ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil distinction makes sense if (1) ‘evil’ is interpreted as immoral AND (2) ‘moral’, in ‘moral evil’, is interpreted as signifier the capability of being responsible (as opposed to being an assertion about it being within the sphere of moral discourse). Again, you have to admit (at least) that the adjective ‘moral’ is used in many senses.

Morality is restricted to the realm of deliberate acts. As SEP demonstrates, this is not controversial.

I deny this. Anything that is intrinsically good, is morally good; anything that is intrinsically bad, is morally bad. Period. Morality is not just the study of what one ought to do: it is about what ought to be. What ought to be, is not itself necessarily dependent on what one ought to be doing.

For example, imagine agents could not exist in reality: it is, let’s say, metaphysically or logically impossible. Does that mean that there isn’t a state of supreme and ultimate (moral) good that would be applicable to that reality? I don’t think so. Do you?

Bob

The way I see it, either 'natural evil' is a matter of amoral consideration and is, thusly, not evil (viz., it is really 'natural badness'); or 'natural evil' is a matter of moral consideration and is, thusly, evil.

If the latter is true, then it may be, for intents and purposes hereon, better to portray it as 'natural vs deliberate evil' instead of 'natural vs. moral evil'; and if the former is true, then morality is restricted to essentially the sphere of deliberate acts and what relates thereto.

I reject the former, and accept the latter; whereas it seems like you accept the former and reject the latter.

But I still need to know what you mean by "amoral," as you continue to use this term. In the thread you have spoken about amoral agents and amoral acts. What are amoral agents and amoral acts?

By ‘amoral agent’, I was referring to an agent that is not capable of moral decision making (viz., not capable of being culpable for their actions); and by ‘amoral act’, I would be referring to an action which is not itself immoral or moral.

I am use ‘amoral’ here in the sense of denoting something about the sphere of moral discourse.

"A natural evil is a bad state of affairs that does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents."

Is this “bad” state, morally bad? Or is it a sort of badness which is outside of the sphere of moral discourse—it is neither morally good nor bad?

Suppose a tornado kills 100 people. The suffering and death of 100 people is evil; it is a bad state of affairs.

Again, what do you mean by ‘bad’?

I would say that the suffering and death of 100 people is morally bad, because it is a morally bad state of affairs. If this is true, then ‘natural evil’ is not an amoral consideration.

Would you agree that, although the tornado is not a moral agent, the tornado is doing something “bad” when in the event of destroying those 100 people’s lives? If so, then what kind of “bad”? Is it just amoral badness (viz., “bad” that refers to something which is neither morally good or bad)?

Therefore this evil is natural.

Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); and not that some evil is amoral.

Bob

If we continue you may need to begin to shoulder more of the burden of proof, for your posts are becoming increasingly opaque to me.

Fair enough: I will make my response more abrupt to make it less strainful (on the both of us).

With respect to your use of ‘moral agent’, the issue was really due to my accidental conveyance of ‘an moral agent is one which is capable of being held culpable for their actions’ with ‘an moral agent is one which is culpable for their actions’: I apologize, that was my mistake. The whole time I was thinking the former, but conveyed the latter. Your definition, in light of that, is fine and perfectly consistent.

"What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality?"

I honestly don’t know what a ‘moral reality’ is, at all (other than what I understand you to be meaning). I have never used that phrase, and don’t see any need to use it. Perhaps this is an indication of my ignorance...I don’t know.

Let’s talk about, as per your request, a tornado. To do that, I think we need to talk first about the concept of ‘evil’; because I think this is really the crux of our disagreement. I understand now better what you and the SEP article was conveying: it was conveying a concept of ‘evil’ which does not preclude amoral evil—this is a foreign and wholly implausible view to me.

‘Evil’, by my lights, is a morally-loaded term: there cannot be such a thing as amoral evil; and perhaps if you could elaborate on why you think that, then I may be able to account better for your position.

There is such a thing as amoral badness, by my lights, but not ‘evil’: the word itself implies moral relevance.

Bob

Hello Chet and Kizzy,

Although your intentions may be good, your responses are elongated, disrespectful, sporadic, intellectually lazy, and unsubstantive; and I say this with all due respect, as a person that wants to see you both grow and develop into better philosophers :kiss: . Please try to see it from your reader's perspective: they are reading an essay which conveys a plethora of different ideas (all of which are unrelated to each other) in incredibly confusing, convoluted, and incoherent ways...all while hurling insulting comments at them. How do you expect them to react?

This forum is all about a congregation of people willing to learn from each other with genuineness, respectfulness, and intellectual rigor. It is completely fine and understandable to have different views than other people on this forum, but I would strongly suggest that you try to make your future comments more concise, respectful, and intellectually rigorous.

By 'intellectually rigorous', I do not mean that you need to have extensive knowledge of the topic-at-hand; but, rather, demonstrate in your responses that you took the time to reflect on the topic and the person's post you are responding to (as opposed to just ranting). It goes a long way, when the reader of your response can see that you took the time to genuinely reflect, dissect, and contend with their ideas.

I say none of this with any ill-will intentions nor disrespect in mind: as I said before, I want to see you both become great philosophers (:

Bob

We may be at an impasse, so please feel free, if you see nothing new or noteworthy to add to my response here, to just have us agree to disagree. That is not to say that I don’t want to continue discussing, and I will, but I just don’t want you feel that you have to keep circling back and reiterating (if that starts to happen, as I suspect it might).

They are not. Someone who does something right is someone who is capable of moral acts. Similarly, someone who does something wrong (or immoral) is someone who is capable of moral acts.

I understand, but the problem is you said:

At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
…
Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable

Which implied that by ‘moral agent’, you are referring to not merely an agent capable of moral action but, rather, one that does right action. See what I mean?

If it is that you just mean the former, then I was right in thinking that ‘moral agent’, for you, is an agent capable of moral action and, thusly, one which can be held responsible for their actions (which, for you, is one which has deliberate actions). OR, if you mean that a ‘moral agent’ is the latter, then it is not true, and patently incoherent, to posit that anyone capable of moral action is a ‘moral agent’ (because they also, in order to meet the definition, must be doing the right acts, not just acts of which they are capable of being held responsible).

The interesting thing, is that I think you are using the adjective ‘moral’ in multiple senses, which is normal and fine, without realizing it. This would explain the seeming incongruence here.

There are two broad, traditional senses of the adjective ‘moral’, which you even expounded in your OP, which are a signification of (1) what is within moral discourse and (2) what is actually good. If this is the case, then it is perfectly coherent for you to posit the phrase ‘moral agent’ in both senses you noted, because one sense would be a ‘moral agent’ merely in the sense that the agent, qua agent, is within the sphere of moral discourse (viz., they are capable of being held, in action, accountable, as per the dictates of morality, for what they do) and the other sense would be a ‘moral agent’ in the more strict sense that the agent is not only ‘moral’ in the former sense but also doing the right actions (viz., doing what, as per the dictates of morality, is right). See what I mean?

I would like you to know, although I am not quoting it (for the sake of brevity), that I did read the SEP article and am familiar with it. Although I prefer using adjectives uniformly, I have, upon further reflection, no problem with the distinction of ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil, as incoherent as that may sound to you (relative to my view), because I know that the adjective ‘moral’ is being used yet in another sense (than the other two I already expounded). Here’s a rundown of all three:

1. ‘moral’ in the sense of within moral discourse (e.g., whether or not to rape someone is a moral matter [which is not to make a comment on if it is immoral or not]).

2. ‘moral’ in the sense of morally right (e.g., being kind is moral, being mean is immoral).

3. ‘moral’ in the sense of moral responsibility (e.g., you have a moral duty to not rape people, tornadoes are not moral agents, etc.).

These are all senses, I would argue, you are using; and they are divergent in meaning (and I see nothing wrong with this): I just need you to acknowledge and see these senses at work in your own theory.

By ‘moral evil’ in ‘natural vs. moral evil’, one is denoting with the adjective ‘moral’ what is evil in a deliberate sense: it is to use ‘moral’ in all three senses. The first because ‘moral evil’ is within the sphere of moral discourse; the second because ‘moral evil’ is NOT JUST what is in the sphere of moral discourse (such a statement like “whether or not to rape someone is a moral matter”) but also that it IS morally wrong; and the third because it is not just that it is morally wrong but also that it was deliberate (intentional).

So, let me break down what I mean by way of my dog example:

1. Dogs are not moral agents. ‘Moral’ is being used in the first (and consequently also in the third) sense. This is NOT to say that they are immoral agents, because ‘immoral’ here is being used in the second sense.

2. The act of rape is immoral. ‘Immoral’ is being used in the second sense.

3. A dog raping another dog is immoral. ‘Immoral’ is being used in the second sense, and is not referencing whether or not the dog is itself a ‘moral agent’ in the first (and consequently third) sense.

I guess, I view the adjective ‘moral’ as, for intents and purposes hereon, plural in meaning; and I see clearly that you are using it the same way (and correct me if I am wrong).

If the dog is not a moral agent then it is not capable of committing immoral acts, such as rape.

Correct, because by ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ you are referring here to the first and third sense and not the second: you are mentioning that the agent is not capable of being held responsible, and, in this sense, their actions are not within the sphere of moral talk which pertains to talk about moral responsibility.

This doesn’t negate the fact that rape, being committed by the dog, is ‘immoral’ in the second sense—i.e., that it is morally wrong/bad.

Then it's high time you defined what you mean by an immoral act.

I was meaning ‘morally bad’, which to me is ‘to be intrinsically bad or relate to something intrinsically bad such that it bad relative to it’, and this is in the second sense (I mentioned above). I am not commenting on whether or not, by saying it is an ‘immoral’ act in this manner, this act is within the ‘moral reality’ of moral responsibility talk—I just mean that it is morally bad.

Think of it this way, for my view, you can just, in this sense of ‘immoral’ (i.e., the second), just substitute ‘immoral’ for ‘evil’ (although I do think that ‘evil’ is specifically moral badness to an extreme, but that doesn’t matter for now).

If you think evil just means immoral then you didn't read or understand the SEP articles, because they clearly distinguish moral evil from natural evil.

Correct me if I am wrong, but all I got out of the SEP was that they are making a distinction between two general types of moral badness: those which are natural, and those which are done purposefully. The latter they use the adjective ‘moral’ to describe, and I don’t see how this negates the other traditional meanings of it. Do you think that the adjective ‘moral’ has one meaning?--and specifically that it refers only to the sense it is used in the SEP?

If so, then you have issues with your usages in the OP of the adjective. Just as some examples:

What is the breadth of the moral sphere? The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk.1 You should immediately notice that by “moral” I do not mean morally good; by “moral” I am not talking about the opposite of immoral. Instead, when I use the term “moral act” I am referring to an act that belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts; or an act that belongs to the species of good-and-bad-acts. More simply, I am referring to an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment. A moral act is an act that can be legitimately (and, thus, morally) judged good or bad; a non-moral act is an act that cannot.

The underlined portion admits at least two of the senses I described.

In order to understand why all human acts are moral acts we must understand the difference between applying scrutiny to an act and applying moral scrutiny to an act

“moral scrutiny” is being used in the first and third sense, and not the second; which is completely different from how it is used in the natural vs. moral evil distinction. By your own admission, “moral” in “moral scrutiny” is not referring to something morally right nor wrong: “moral” in “moral evil” is referring to something morally wrong, deliberate, and in the sphere of moral discourse.

What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality? You may as well say that non-colored realities can be red.

By ‘moral reality’, I am assuming you mean ~”a society (or perhaps framework) comprised of beings capable of moral responsibility”. Is that not what you mean?

Given the way you use words like "culpable" and "immoral," I think what you are in need of is a dictionary.

I apologize, by ‘moral agents’ that are culpable for their actions; I meant capable of being culpable for their actions. I see now how that was confusing. But I don’t see anything wrong with my use (so far) of ‘immoral’.

Hopefully my expounding of the terms helps.

Bob

Another way of thinking about it, that just crossed my mind, is that:

If natural evil is not moral evil, then some evil is not immoral.

My interpretation of your view, and correct me if I am still misunderstanding, is that you mean to denote a subtype of immorality (i.e., of evil) which is the realm of these 'moral realities' that you refer to; and in that sense I have no problem with it. The semantics just seem weird to me.

At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
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Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable.

That's basically the definition of a moral agent: something that is capable of moral acts

Which one is that you mean to convey? These are incoherent taken together. Either a ‘moral agent’ is an agent capable of moral scrutiny (of moral acts) or an agent which does the right thing. I have been understanding you to mean the former, but now it seems like you may mean the latter.

This is incoherent. If the dog is not a moral agent that can be held responsible then it cannot commit immoral acts. You can't say that the dog is simultaneously non-moral and immoral. You are committing contradictions.

I need a bit of clarification on this one: do you NOT think rape is wrong, if it is committed by a dog? I seriously doubt that is what you are trying to convey, but that seems (to me) to be the implication of the above quote.

All I think you mean to convey, is that the dog isn’t a moral agent; which wasn’t ever in contention in the first place. I am saying that the act of rape that the dog committed is wrong, and the dog is not a moral agent (in the sense that the dog is not capable of being held responsible for their acts).

1. Non-moral (or "amoral") realities do not engage in moral or immoral acts.
2. A tornado is a non-moral reality
3. Therefore, a tornado does not engage in immoral acts.

What do you mean by “engage” here? I would say that a tornado does not “engage” in immoral or moral acts insofar as it is not culpable for the acts its commits but NOT that the tornado cannot perform what is an immoral or moral act (although it isn’t deliberate).

We may be at an impasse though, because I suspect you are going to find all of this unsatisfactory. You seem to distinguish between moral badness (like evil) and moral ‘moralness’ (like intentionally raping someone) that I don’t accept: evil is a description of something which is being emphasized as morally bad, and immoral acts refers, to me, to any action which itself is morally bad.

I am interested to hear if you do consider rape amoral IF a dog commits it—that will be a very interesting take. I see your point to a certain extent, that you distinguish natural and moral evil; but this use of ‘evil’ just seems circular: isn’t that just a reference to something that is immoral?

Just so we can find common ground, let’s forget semantics for a second. I agree with you that there is a difference between ‘evil’ (i.e., moral badness) which is done by indeliberate (i.e., natural) vs. deliberate (i.e., what you call “moral”) actions/events. I would merely add that the action/event is still ‘evil’ (i.e., morally bad: what I call ‘immoral’) if it is natural. I think, stripping the semantics out, you can agree with that.

I hate semantics just as much as the next guy (;

Bob

I would like to disclaim that, as always, I appreciate your feedback and critiques! It is rare on this forum to find a person that is willingly think about an idea in depth, and give thoughtful responses; and you are one them (:

I think that your use of the more colloquial meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ is causing you to fall into a muddied trap; which is why you are incapable of understanding why an analysis of these sort of states (which only alive beings can have) is an objective analysis. I say that with all due respect, and assuming fully that you completely disagree (; , and hopefully I can help expound my thoughts on this.

I greatly appreciate your elaboration on your idea of “incompleteness” with respect to arguments, because it allowed me to understand better where your head is it. There’s some things worth noting.

1. You must remember that by “argument” we are discussing a formal argument in the strictest sense of the word: a syllogism. We are not talking about informal arguments (or at least I wasn’t).

2. Formal arguments (i.e., syllogisms) are not subjective because they are “incomplete” (in the sense that you mean: that they are not a full account of exactly why a conclusion is true): they are subjective if a premise’s truthity is relative to subjective dispositions. I outlined this in my examples before, so please bring them up if you need clarification on what I mean here.

3. A formal argument (i.e., a syllogism) is not itself incomplete because it is “incomplete” (in the sense that you mean). This is a common mistake outside of philosophy that people make: it is not valid to claim a syllogism—which is logically sound, consists of a major and minor premise and a conclusion, and has its conclusion necessitated if the premises are true—is invalid because the reader, or recipient, requires further elaboration on a premise to understand it. A complete syllogism is comprised of a major premise, minor premise, and a conclusion that is necessitated therefrom.

4. There are good reasons philosophers stick to syllogisms, or pseudo-syllogism, and do not attempt an elaborate expounding of the position they are arguing for. Firstly, what you are noting is a deficiency in the understanding of the reader and not the syllogism itself; and, thusly, it is impractical to provide the exact amount of elaboration needed to expound the view because the knowledge a person comes in with, as a reader, varies. Secondly, to have a “complete” argument, in the sense you described, is impossible; and I can demonstrate it. For every premise I give, a person can validly ask for clarification; thusly, there is no end to the length of an argument that is fully “complete”. To take your math example, even if you added the implicit step of “2x + 1 – 1 = 3 – 1”, they can still ask for a proof of that as well (and are perfectly within their rights to)(but more on that example later, because I don’t think that is what you are trying to convey with that example).

Solve for X: 2X + 1 = 3
2x = 2
2x/2 = 2/2
Conclusion x = 1

I think what you are trying to convey is that there are implicit steps in this proof: but there aren’t any in my syllogism I gave you. Asking “what is intrinsic value?” in the proof that pain has intrinsic value is not an demonstration of an implicit step being skipped. If there were an implicit step in the syllogism, then you would be able to demonstrate that the syllogism is not logically valid; that’s how you know.

So, in short, I think you are confusing the need for further clarification (for a particular learner) with having implicit steps in an argument. An implicit step is in the logic, not the content, of the argument.

1. An evil demon exists.
2. Evil demons always compel people to do wrong.
3. Therefore if people do wrong, it might be an evil demon.

As I noted with your argument earlier, this argument is incomplete. The first thing I would ask is, "What's an evil demon?"

Some things worth noting:

1. That argument, unlike mine, is not a valid syllogism; so I surprised you used it. What you said is:

P1: p.
P2: q.
C: z → t

The logic is incredibly unsound. Here’s an example of your example that is a valid syllogism:

P1: If an evil demon exists and evil demons always compel people to do wrong, then “if a person does something wrong, then it could be an evil demon that compelled them to do it”. [p → q]

P2: An evil demon exists and evil demons always compel people to do wrong. [p]

C: Therefore, if a person does something wrong, it could be an evil demon that compelled them to do it. [q]{ Modus Ponens }

2. What makes your example argument incomplete, is not that you don’t understand what an evil demon is: that’s just a limitation you happen to have in terms of your knowledge. It is not the arguers job, when explicating a general argument, to write out a book on everything that a person may not understand: there job is to provide a quick and dirty argument, that is logically sound, for a particular conclusion. Syllogisms are entry-arguments into discussions. That you don’t understand what an evil demon is, has no bearing on if the argument provided was objective nor complete itself.

The last thing I would like to note for now, is that an analysis of emotions is not subjective when one is analyzing their natures. The nature of an emotion is objective, because it is not dependent on what a subject desires or believes about it. For example, I can strongly hate the idea of what hate is, but that doesn’t change what hate actually is. I don’t get to say: “I hate it, so now hate is really joy because I like joy”. Nope. So I hope you can see how the study of emotions is not subjective.

Secondly, not all states are emotions—not even the one’s I have given you up to this point. For example, the state of flourishing is clearly not an emotion.

I know you have a philosophical background, so I would like to say that if you are familiar with Aristotelian ethics, then it is worth mentioning that my view has many similarities to it (and of course many differences). If you are familiar with it, then it may make sense to you when I say that a state of eudamonia (1) is not a state of emotion and (2) is not subjective. If you aren’t familiar with Aristotle, then no worries...just thought you may be since you have such a background.

Bob

For example, cars and fuel go hand in hand. All cars run on fuel, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to fuel is not to talk about a car. Nevertheless, not all car talk is fuel talk. We can talk about things like steering, brakes, or tires without talking about fuel.

Agreed. So:

For example, morality and culpability go hand in hand. All things relevant to culpability rely on morality, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to morality is not to talk about culpability. Nevertheless, not all culpability talk is moral talk. We can talk about things like good/bad effects, natures, and intentions without talking about culpability.

All our disagreement boils down to, is that by ‘moral’ you are referring to moral talk that is culpability talk—you are discussing a subsector of moral talk—whereas I am referring to moral talk in general. A tornado is not culpable for its actions, and thusly is not ‘moral’ in the sense of being a moral agent, but is still the embodiment of something immoral (hence why it is called natural evil).

Note that the things I am stating are not in any way controversial, so you may need to brush up on moral philosophy.

Neither is mine. I am NOT denying that only agents which can be held responsible for their actions are moral but, rather, that the actions, effects, and intentions of agents that CAN’T are still capable of moral evaluation insofar as one can determine whether or not the act is moral or immoral (irregardless of the fact the agent is not culpable for their actions). Please read that again, because you missed it in my response.

When a dog rapes another dog, we don’t say the dog can be held morally responsible and thusly, to your point, is not a moral agent; HOWEVER, we do still admit that the act of rape the dog committed is immoral.

No, I have never said such a thing. In fact the word "culpable" appears only once in my OP. I'm not sure how you are drawing all these conclusions from that one sentence. They certainly don't follow.

I say this, based off of your responses and not the OP. By ‘moral agent’, you clearly mean an agent which is culpable for their actions (to the extent that their actions are deliberate); and by ‘moral talk’ you clearly don’t mean just culpability talk.

I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things. — Bob Ross

Read the bolded part of that sentence back to yourself. You are positing that amoral agents can be moral

Your interpretation, being false, is the source of this contradiction. All you found, as far as contradictions go, is that amoral agents != moral agents—I was never denying this. Take the dog rape example: the dog is not moral agent, but the dog’s action was immoral. This is not controversial; so I am surprised you deny this, but perhaps I am missing something.

Are you saying that whatever type of premises we stick inside of a syllogism, are now objective because the structure of a syllogism is objective?

No.

By “structure of a syllogism is [being] objective”, you are referring to the form of the syllogism being valid (i.e., that it is logically consistent, has a minor and major premise, and the conclusion is necessitated by the premises) but that the premise itself is expressing something objective is to say that its truthity is NOT relative to subjective dispositions (e.g., “this is green” as opposed to “I think this is green”).

An argument is objective if all of its premises express something objective.

1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.

1. No objects have intrinsic value that I am aware of, although they may exist (I guess, since I cannot technically eliminate their possibility).

2. Not all states that have intrinsic value are constituted of emotions—e.g., a state of indifference.

2. You claim your value morality is objective. As you've noted, I've been giving both subjective and objective examples of arguments. Now its your turn. Write me an argument for your value morality that is subjective under your view. This will help me to see how you view subjectivity and objectivity beyond the abstract. There should be no barrier to this.

An example of an argument that contains two premises that express something objective (and thusly is objective itself):

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it).

C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.


An example of an argument that contains two premises that express something subjective (and thusly is subjective itself):

P1: A thing that I desire to have intrinsic value has it.

P2: I desire that the state of pain has intrinsic value.

C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.


An example of an argument that contains one premise that expresses something objective and one that expresses something subjective (and thusly is a subjective argument):

P1: If I believe that a unicorn exists, then it exists. [Expresses something objective]

P2: I believe that a unicorn exists. [Expresses something subjective]

C: Therefore, a unicorn exists.

Yes, it is objectively true that the old man has never gotten cancer, but it is his conclusion that is subjective because it relies on the old mans' personal experience, or anecdote. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument, not an objective one

That’s fine, as long as it is noted that the claim itself was objective (that he had not gotten cancer from smoking).

How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints?

One would evaluate whether or not the thing is a source of motivation and is not itself a subject; and this can be done by analyzing other people than oneself OR oneself through an unbiased lens.

How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?

This would not be specifically a psychologist’s job, as this endeavor would require knowledge from multiple different sciences—such as sociology, biology, etc.

One would need to understand people’s general psychologies, sociology, and biology to better distinguish something which one is motivated towards due to their disposition vs. what is externally motivating. E.g., one person may have an extreme dispositional towards a thing, a society may view a thing as extremely important, etc.

Bob

Culpability talk is only one kind of moral talk.

So the claim is that if culpability does not, even in principle, pertain to tornadoes or reflex-kicks, then these are not moral realities.

How is this not incoherent? You first say there exists a moral talk that is not culpability talk, and then say that all moral realities are culpability realities. Unless ‘reality’, as opposed to ‘talk’, is doing some heavy-lifting here that I am not following, this is incoherent.

I think what you are trying to note, which I agree with, is merely that only actions, out of all possible actions, which are deliberate or derivable back to an action that is deliberate are within the sphere of culpability talk—but this does not mean that actions which do not meet those requirements are outside of the sphere of moral talk.

You seem to use ‘moral’ as synonymous with ‘culpable’ in some sentences, and then use them as distinct in others.

If it is impossible to ever hold X responsible or culpable, then X is not a moral agent. Because of this "wrong" cannot be applied to tornadoes, for "wrong" is a moral predicate.
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That's basically it, but don't you think this also accounts for why a tornado is not a moral agent?

That something is a moral agent, is not relevant to if something can be predicated as doing something wrong or right. By being a moral agent, you are referring to the agent being culpable for their actions, which is clearly not the case for a tornado, but by ‘moral predicate’ you are referring to anything within the sphere of moral discourse—not discourse about culpability.

I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things.

In moral philosophy a tornado is a natural evil, not a moral evil. Not all evil (i.e. bad things that happen) is moral

This is interesting, because I would say that natural evil is immoral, which is why it is called ‘evil’. I think, though, this is just a disagreement in semantics; because, here, you are referring by ‘moral’ to ‘culpable’ and not what you refer to as ‘moral’ before (when saying ‘moral’ in “Culpability talk is only one kind of moral talk”).

When I say that moral realities are not limited to acts, I am thinking about things like habits, intentions, societies, etc. I am not thinking about tornadoes. I hold the uncontroversial view that tornadoes are not moral realities.

I understand and agree with you, if I strip out the misuse of the adjectives, but it is worth mentioning that you should be saying “realities of culpability” (or something like that) and not “moral realities”. The adjective ‘moral’ refers to anything which can be validly denoted within the sphere of moral discourse, or something which agrees with what is (morally) good—not just what contains some degree of responsibility or duty.

Bob

I would also like to mention that even with the idea of 'objectivity' requiring publicity of the empirical content, it is still possible to analyze what mind-independent 'things' motivate subjects---by study of the brain, psychology, sociology, the nature of the mind-independent thing, etc. ... none of this is dependent on subjective experience, although it is entirely possible to acquire the same knowledge from the "subjective side" as you put it.

I think your use of the terms is incoherent with your definitions.

If:

OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).

Then ‘objectivity’ is fundamentally about anything which is not relative to subjective dispositions—that’s the difference between reason, logic, “the real outside world”, etc. and desires, beliefs, etc.

Making this sort of distinction, is inevitably to distinguish between two different dependency relations: one being a dependency on subjective dispositions, and the other not—objectivity, in your sense, is defined negatively in relation to subjectivity.

I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments.

An argument is about truth: you can’t separate them in any way that would be meaningful for this discussion. The premises, which are propositions, are expressing something objective if they can be evaluated (as true or false) independently of what any person feels or believes about it—and this is what your definition entails (quoted above).

This is no way implies that objectivity or truth are platonic forms.

You actually (sort of) recognized this in your own counter-point:

Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument

If this is true, then a premise is objective (or expressing something objective) IFF whether or not it is true or false is NOT dependent on any given subjective disposition.

“Food tastes delicious” is a proposition which does NOT express something objective, because one has to evaluate the truth of this sentence relative to the given subject at hand (since how a thing tastes is directly dependent on who is tasting it).

“I've smoked every day until 90 years old and never gotten cancer" IS expressing something objective, because the evaluation of its truth (or falsity) IS NOT dependent on any subjective disposition: either “I” really did smoke every day for 90 years and didn’t get cancer, or “I” didn’t—this is not dependent on how anyone feels or believes about it.


What you are trying to explicate with your example of smoking, is NOT that the proposition is subjective but, rather, that it is anecdotal and thusly cannot be used to demonstrate a statistic on the effects of smoking on the human body. That is cannot be used validly to prove anything related to a proposition like "Smokers have a X% higher chance of getting lung cancer is objective" has no relation to whether it is subjective or objective...by your own definitions. “I’ve smoked every day...” is a proposition based on reason, valid logic, and is independent of desires/beliefs which obviously meets the definition you gave (quoted above previously). That’s what it means to evaluate something “outside of oneself” (to take from your definition): on the contrary, “I’ve smoked every day and didn’t get cancer” is true because “I want it to be true” is subjective, by your definitions.

Do we have evidence of rays that emit from objects, interact with brains, and compel them to do things? Or do we have some people who really WANT that thing over there, therefore believe its not their fault, it must be compelling them? Do you see which argument is objective vs subjective?

That you asked for some sort of measurable entity in reality, as opposed to a phenomenal quality, demonstrates sufficiently to me that you are using your definitions incoherently; and that you think that an argument is only objective if it references some scientifically measurable ‘entity’...which is nonsense, even by your own definitions. If the argument’s premises expound propositions which can be evaluated “outside of oneself”, independently of desire/belief, with reason, with logic, etc. then it is ‘objective’. It isn’t valid to tack on “and it has to be about some sort of instrumentally measurable concrete entity”...nah.

An example I would give is, "The Grand Canyon". Such a feeling is usually described as 'awe'

I am glad you gave this example, so I can clarify how it is not analogous to my examples and is not an example of something which has intrinsic value.

If one removes the beliefs and desires they have about the Grand Canyon and views it, they will no longer feel any awe about it; thusly, the Grand Canyon itself is not innately motivating them. This is just extrinsic value, like when a person is motivated to workout or play basketball, because the thing itself is not, per its nature, a source of motivation.

Now, in colloquial speech, we may say things like “I was motivated to workout because of the documentary I saw about body-building”, but this is mistaken if taken literally: if the desires and beliefs that the person has about everything relevant to the documentary on body-building and then they watched it, then they would certainly not be motivated to workout (because of it). It is their interpretation of the documentary, of the Grand Canyon, that is the source of motivation; and so this is a form of extrinsic value, because the value one assigns the Grand Canyon is relative to some subjective purpose that the person has for it (e.g., one is motivated to value to the grand canyon because, for example, they like the feeling of being in awe).

Now, to provide ample clarification, the feeling of awe does have intrinsic value, although the Grand Canyon does not, because if one removes all the desires and beliefs a person has about the feeling of awe while they are having it, the feeling of awe, as per its nature, will motivate them, to some degree, to value it.

Bob

:up:

I said, "Morality is therefore not only about what someone does or considers. It is also about what they fail to do or fail to take into consideration."
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If someone neglects to do something with invincible ignorance, then they are not culpable for their "negligence" because their omission is not in any way deliberate.

Fair enough. I think your idea of “invincible negligence” clarified quite a bit of my contentions; and I am inclined to agree with you.

I agree that morality involves a study of goodness, but in the OP I am focusing on the question of the breadth of the moral sphere. The idea is that we determine how far the moral sphere extends by comparing the set of all acts to the set of moral acts.

I think I understand what you are going for, but it doesn’t seem correct to depict it as about “the breadth of the moral sphere”: that would imply that you are discussing and analyzing what can be constituted as ‘moral’ whatsoever, and not about particularly what set of [human] acts can be constituted as ‘moral’ (which is what I believe you are trying to discuss).

As long as it is acknowledged that the breadth of the moral sphere is not limited to acts; then I am content.

Now, I did add Objection 5, and perhaps this is what you are concerned with?

I don’t buy objection 5, because it conflates “importance” with a high degree thereof. All human acts can be said, to some degree, to be important.

• K1: If something is not a human act, then it is not a moral act
• K2: Only moral acts are moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K3: Therefore, if something is not a human act, then it is not moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K4: A reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not a human act
• K5: Therefore, a reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not moral or immoral, right or wrong

I see what Aquinas means here, although I must admit I am not well-versed in Thomism (so I can’t substantively discuss about it), and partially agree. It seems likely moral discourse is being conflated with discourse about culpability (although perhaps I am reading too much in between the lines): for example, I think it is perfectly valid to analyze whether or not a tornado is inherently immoral or not, and I see that, although a reflex-kick would not render a person culpable, a reflex-kick that is to the detriment of an innocent person is still wrong—it seems like, and correct me if I am wrong, Acquinas is trying to limit the sphere of moral discourse to just "human acts".

If all that is being conveyed here is that only acts which a person performs that is deliberate, or traced back to some deliberation prior, can be validly called a ‘human act’ in the sense of an act that would bind the person with responsibility for it, then I agree.

The effects of human acts are moral insofar as they touch on volition

This is the conflation I am talking about (between moral discourse and discourse about culpability): morality is not just the study of culpability and responsibility. We can say, just like when analyzing a tornado, that a foot + leg kicking another (innocent) person is bad, without conceding that the person that performed the action is culpable for it; which is an eliminated possibility if I take the above quote seriously. A tornado is inherently (morally) bad, but we wouldn't say it is culpable for its effects (or 'actions' in a loose sense of the word).

Bob

I commend you for the thoughtfulness which is exemplified in your OP, as it is well-written, succinct, and substantive. By-at-large, I agree with your assessments and agree with your two theses; and I also share in the suspicion that separating human acts into amoral vs. moral categories either (1) is confused (at best) or (2) downright manipulative (at worst). The classical example, in my mind, is the common idea in modern society that 'morality' is personal, and that one should not mix their morals with what they vote into law: it is all a load of nonsense that, at worst, is deployed as a moral deception to silence moral views.

There only two areas that I would disagree with you, and that is (1) the credence that you give to the idea that "morality is nothing more than justice" (which also implies, to me, that you are giving credence to the idea that ~"morality is nothing more than the study of good vs. bad human acts") and (2) what you qualify as within moral scrutiny.

With respect to #1, Morality is the study of intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good: both components are necessary to capture what ethics is about. If one simply analyzes what can be predicated as good, then they miss the important metaethical step of analyzing what the property of goodness even is; and if they only analyze the property (and things which relate thereto, such judgments), then they completely miss what actually can be said to be good.

This definition, that I have given here, of morality is broader than just acts (let alone deliberate human acts). Firstly, it includes metaethical questions that don't solely relate to actions---e.g., the nature of moral properties, judgments, etc. I don't think metaethics as a whole fits well into an ethical theory that defines ethics as solely about actions. Secondly, an analysis of what can be predicated as good, does not solely pertain to actions: it pertains to essences, effects, and intentions.

Before explaining that further, I must segue quickly into #2: an action is the synthesis, at least, of an intention, an effect, and an essence. One can validly scrutinize an effect independently of the intention of an action; and this is missing from your kind of viewpoint. I can say that a person is not morally culpable for a consequence of their action while simultaneously recognizing that the consequence (i.e., the effect) is immoral (i.e., morally bad). To take your "kicking the doctor" example, just because I am not morally culpable for kicking the doctor (because it was not deliberate) does not take away from the fact that we can moral scrutinize the effect, which in this case is wrong. We can say that kicking people is generally wrong, for example, because it produces consequences which violate our morals (whatever they may be); and so the act of kicking the doctor was still wrong, although we wouldn't hold the person, in this case, responsible for it. Moreover, an action can be analyzed not solely in terms of the intention (behind it) nor its effects, but, rather, its nature. The intention to rape someone is immoral, because the nature of rape is immoral; and the nature of rape is immoral not because of its particular effects in any given instance but, rather, because the very essence of the act is morally bad.

Likewise, sometimes we understand that the intention behind an act was good, but the effect was bad; and this demonstrates that both deliberate and accidental effects are within the sphere of moral discourse. A great example is the one you gave: negligence. I think that if you really hold that only deliberate, human acts are within moral scrutiny, then human negligence cannot be within the sphere of moral scrutiny. Your position, being that you hold sometimes negligence is wrong (and thusly within the sphere of moral scrutiny), seems internally incoherent on this point. I think that negligence (1) is within moral discourse (even if the instance of it does not contain any culpability on the person) and (2) some instances do legitimately contain culpability on the person; but this can only be so if not just deliberate acts are within the sphere of moral scrutiny.

Ok, back to #1. Actions which are not deliberate, can still be analyzed, to some extent, in terms of their effects and essences, being that it is a synthesis of intention and effect. For example, other species cannot, for the most part, be meaningfully considered deliberately acting (like humans) so we don't really consider their intentions within moral scrutiny, but we do still analyze the effects and natures of the acts that they perform. If morality is just about justice or, more generally, human acts, then we lose this valid aspect of the study.

Likewise, analyzing essences does not pertain solely to acts; for example, is the essence of a human (morally) good or bad? This is not something we merely look at the actions of humans to determine: we analyze their whole nature.

Bob

:roll:

"I" references "self", which makes no sense if there isn't "not self". You cannot identify what is you and what is not, if there isn't anything besides you. It can't be done. Distinctions can only be made with space and time.

I think I have identified one of the subtle issues with my theory, that may be causing you trouble (understanding it). That a thing demands or insists on being valued, does not mean it has value independently of a subject's determination or analysis of it (i.e., that it has value in-itself as I was referring). Either a thing has value in-itself, which I would have to explain how it is constituted into the being of the thing, or it is assigned value (by a subject).

Ok, let me break down more clearly what I do and do not mean. To your credit, value is always assigned but, to my credit, it is not always extrinsic value. Intrinsic value is value assigned to a thing because, and to the degree that, it innately insists (or demands) on being valued. Extrinsic value is value a thing has been assigned relative to how well it fulfills a (subjective) purpose.

Intrinsic value, unlike extrinsic value, is objective because, although we assign it, it is being assigned because the thing actually (mind-independently) motivates people to value it for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: a person is motivated, even if they overcome it, to value a thing with intrinsic value despite what they believe or desire to value it at. It is external motivation (for the subject) which they can not think or desire away.

Another way to put it, is that intrinsic value is value a thing has (1) for its own sake and (2) is attributable to the thing (which exists mind-independently) from its natural ability to motivate people of #1.

The intrinsic value a thing has, then, would be proportional to how motivational the thing is at demanding people to value it for its own sake (whether that be positively or negatively); and this is how we could compare them.

Obtaining pleasures, for example, would be less intrinsically valuable then a state of eudaimonia because the latter, when in that state, is more innately motivational towards valuing it for its own sake than the former (although it is not clear to a person who has not reached the latter state and is stuck in the former one).

Does that help?

That's fine and fair. An idiom, through repetition, can be ascertained by what it conveys and not the origin of how it came about to mean it. However, this does not negate that "it is beyond me", if understood properly in how it was developed as a phrase, has spatial references.

Also, "I don't understand it" also references space...just not as directly. There is no "I" without "other" in space, for example. The sentence still wouldn't make sense without the concept of space, but I get and agree with your point.

I cannot imagine anyone relating the idea of space with the word or concept "beyond". It is just an idiom of the linguistic expression which we use habitually to mean over the boundary of something.

You just unknowingly contradicted yourself. "Over the boundary" is the idea that there are two things in space (at least conceptually) and one is beyond the "boundary" of the other.

I always appreciate your thoughts!

Aristotle says that eudaimonia is the highest end because of its nature, not because subjects happen to value it.

Here's where I get a bit confused with Aristotle, because I agree that eudaimonia is the highest good because of its nature BUT I don't see how Aristotle is really arguing that; since his definition of intrinsic value is ~"that which is done for its own sake". It seems like something can be done for its own sake and be a matter of subjective disposition, no?

I think he would need to define intrinsic value not in terms of what is done for its own sake, but, rather, what can be assigned value in virtue of its innate (natural) insistence of being valued (e.g., pain is a great example, although not the ultimate good).

What am I missing?

I guess I am not fully fathoming what you mean by subjective vs. objective definitions and arguments. I thought you were saying that 'subjective' refers to something which has its truth relative to mind-dependent dispositions (e.g., feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc.) and that 'objective' refers to something which has its truth NOT relative to mind-dependent dispositions. Am I misunderstanding?

It seems obvious to me that the premises are not appealing to being true relative to mind-dependent dispositions, what would make you think otherwise?

Is intrinsic value objective or subjective?

The definition or the underlying meaning?

The definition is subjective, because all definitions are subjective. I don't know what it would mean to define something objectively. We choose what sets of symbols (i.e., words) to associate with what underlying meanings (i.e., ideas/concepts): I don't see how it could be otherwise.

The underlying meaning is objective, because it is the idea/concept of having value in-itself. If this is not understood, then one doesn't understand what 'in-itself' means. Again, just to sidestep your Kantian ties, what I mean by 'in-itself' is the nature, the essence, of the thing and not what it exists as independently of all experience of it.

Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective?

How could it possibly be subjective? I don't understand where you are coming from here, unfortunately. Either a thing motivates a mind or it doesn't: this isn't relative to what anyone believes or feels about it.

Bob

Yes, a word is a set of symbols which signifies a concept; and a concept is an idea.

:kiss:

No, an idea/concept is non-spatial--even if they are derived from processes of the brain. We are not analyzing the phenomenology or ontology of concepts but, rather, their meaning: the concept of space, which is non-spatial, is the idea of space itself.

The idiom "it is beyond me" cannot be made sense of, conceptually, without the idea of space. Think about it: to conceptualize it, one must represent to themselves, whether that be implicitly or explicitly, a 'something' which is outside of what is marked as 'themselves'. It is 'beyond' me, because it is cannot be placed within me...it is separate, which is another spatially-loaded term, from me. It is beyond me, in the sense that I do not understand it...it extends past my understanding. Although my understanding doesn't exist in space, I can represent something being outside of it by using space conceptually...hence 'it is beyond me'. These are all ideas expressing something which is not actually in space by means of using the idea of space.

It is easy enough to understand this, when one tries to describe "it is beyond me" without using spatially-loaded terms like "beyond": they can't. It loses meaning.

It absolutely does. You are literally saying that "it", whatever that is, cannot be placed within the sphere of "the imagination". You absolutely cannot make any sense of that without the concept of space, because you need to be able to conceptually mark out an area of space which represents "the imagination" to denote that something is outside of it.

That is all fair. I can see concepts which are primitive (in the sense I mean it) being explicable in the sense of being capable of physical or gestural expression; I was referring to a grasping of the concept via verbalization or explicated thinking (if that makes sense). I don't think we are in disagreement afterall.

That a word is spatially referent, DOES NOT mean that it refers to something in phenomenal or cosmic space. "Beyond" refers to a thing and another thing, the former of which is outside, at some distance, of the other.

When I say "imagine a red ball and another blue ball, and the blue ball is beyond the red ball by 3 meters north": "beyond" here is still spatially referent, even though neither the red nor blue ball exist.

"It is beyond me", "that is above my pay grade", "that went over my head", etc. are spatially referent idioms that mean that they didn't understand something: the idiom conveys it through spatial representation (e.g., "beyond", "above", "over", etc.). Without the concept of space, none of these idioms make any sense; so they are not separate senses of the words.

You have to provide an argument yourself instead of lazily linking a long article: I am not going to take the time to debate a Dialetheist's perspective from stanford. I reject the view, is all I will say for now until you provide your own view on it.

As written, the argument is incomplete.

It is not valid to argue that a syllogism is incomplete because each premise needs to be questioned and expounded—that is the nature of all syllogisms.

A valid and complete syllogism (i.e., formal argument) is one which has:

1. A major premise.
2. A minor premise.
3. A conclusion.
4. A logically sound form.

My syllogism meets these demands, and is thusly complete and valid.

What you move on to note, is exactly what I was asking you to refrain from noting: various issues you have with accepting the premises. A person not accepting the premises of a syllogism does not make the syllogism invalid.

On a similar note, your definition of an ‘objective’ argument was:

OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).

My premises fit this description: they are not themselves appeals to subjective dispositions. So:

If the answer is, "
I believe in external motivation — Bob Ross
, then this is a subjective answer to the question because belief alone is entirely subjective.

This, even if it were true (which it is not), does not make the argument subjective, by your definition, because the premises I expounded are claims which are not dependent on beliefs.

You are questioning the justification for the premise itself, which would require another, separate syllogism. I am asking if this syllogism itself is objective—not whether some subsequent one is or not. P1 is a claim which is expressing something objective: it is not saying ~”Something has intrinsic value if I want it to”.

You asking for justification for external motivation theory, which is not provided in the syllogism itself; and wasn’t intended to. Even if a syllogism produced for such justification were based solely on beliefs, and thusly is subjective, it wouldn’t negate the fact that P1 is expressing something objective.

How do we determine that it is a thing which motivates a mind? Can it rationally compete with and invalidate the idea that a mind that is motivated towards goals simply uses things to obtain its goals? Is it that the food in front of me has an internal compulsion that expels outward towards my mind demanding that I eat it? Or is it that my mind desires food, and seeing the food triggers my mind to want it for what it wants/needs?
…
My second question would be, "How have you proven that a state of pain is not a mind?" I'll give you a faux example that seems reasonable. "The mind is defined as the aspect of consciousness which analyzes its own states and make decisions based on those states. Pain is a state that the mind decides to act on or react to, therefore it is not the mind itself, just a state that the mind considers."

I am going to disregard all of these parts, because I am asking you a specific question: do you think that the premises + conclusion constitute an ‘objective argument’. I am not asking for an analysis of how plausibly true you find the premises.

The question is whether the syllogism is (1) valid (as per explicated above) and (2) meets your definition of ‘objective argument’ (which is to say it’s premises and conclusion can be said to be rationally constituted, logically sound, and independent of subjective dispositions).

Because you have a subjective answer as part of a major foundation of your argument, any part of your argument that relies on this foundation is now a subjective argument.

If, by this, you are claiming that an argument is subjective if the fully expounded list of syllogisms (required to prove it)(which would be infinite, by the way) anywhere contains a subjective element; then, my friend, there are not objective arguments. You can’t prove ‘1+1=2’ with an ‘objective argument’ if you are that absurdly strict with your definition of ‘objective argument’.

As a quick aside, I like that this is a much more straight forward definition of intrinsic value.

P1 is not a definition of intrinsic value: it is a claim about what has it.

"A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind

Do you mean to say that, in this hypothetical, the term ‘mind’ is defined as something of which its meaning is relative to the given subject-at-hand? The fact it is inexplicable, in this scenario, has nothing to do with it being subjective.

In short, you are confusing an analysis of why the premises are true/false, with whether they are purporting something objective; and by your definition of an ‘objective argument’, this syllogism would suffice to meet that standard.

Bob

I appreciate your response! Since we have no common ground, I would like to take things step-by-step. First, I want to address your idea that my argument is not 'objective', in your sense of the word.

For now, I am going to use 'objective' and 'subjective' in your sense of the terms.

Consider the below argument:

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it).

C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.

Now, I don't want you, right now, to contend with the premises in the sense of what you merely disagree with; but, rather, I want you to tell me if this syllogism meets your requirements for being an 'objective argument'.

I think it does, because the premises and conclusion are formatted rationally and logically consistently; and none of it is true in virtue of my or someone else's subjective disposition towards the subject. Do you agree?

I don’t see any way for our conversation to progress, because we keep dead-ending at the same spots, so I will just respond to the parts where I think I am adding to the conversation (instead of reiterating).

You use the term ‘objective’ in really nonsensical ways—e.g., ‘objective knowledge’, ‘objective definition’, ‘objective wavelength’, ‘objective argument’, etc. Sometimes its use is straight up incoherent, and other times it adds nothing to what you are saying.

I have already explicated clearly what objectivity is, and I think your position on it is wrong and confused.

Again, this is all based on subjective experience then. An objective argument wouldn't need my understanding of the intuition

An argument is an evidence-based proof; and can absolutely include intuitions in it. Arguments are not objective; but are hopefully rational. Likewise, experience is always used in arguments: there’s no such thing as an argument that is devoid of a posteriori content.

No, that's not proven objective knowledge.

“objective knowledge” is something you can say, but that doesn’t make it coherent. Knowledge is about information minds have, and has three main components: justification, belief, and truth. Refactor and create whatever epistemological theory you want (to accommodate for gettier cases and what not), but it will include these three (including yours that I remember from before). Truth is objective, the other two aren’t.

You are saying “mind-independently existent (or stance-independently true) [viz., objective] information that a mind has [viz., knowledge]”.

Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green.

You completely missed the point of the example, and failed to explicate what green looks like.

No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?

You rejected it many times in our older conversations about epistemology; and it was relevant to what you said, because by saying a concept is simple (and indefinable) is NOT to say that they cannot be known.

Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain.

This doesn’t completely define pain, because it does not define how it feels (phenomenologically). You can’t completely strip out the subject, Philosophim: it doesn’t work.

A Masochist might actually value pain in itself, and purposefully injure themselves for it.

Sure. We can talk about that, but it doesn’t negate the idea that pain has intrinsic value. There are fine lines between pleasure and pain for sure.

Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob

I believe in external motivation; so I deny this. I think we can have reason which motivate us without us having any desire towards it. You are clearly a Humean, and there’s no easy way to find common ground on that.

And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?

With respect to #1, it is obvious that valuableness is not identical to ‘to ought to be’ by way of examples (of its valid use). For example, when one says “that diamond is worth $1500”, they are not commenting on whether it should exist per se but, rather, that it has a specific, quantitative worth. In short, it is impossible to convert quantitative values to the property of ‘to ought to be’. Only after a comparison of value, can one determine which things out of the things which have value should exist and, thusly, the two properties are not identical. — Bob Ross

You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'.

???

Cancer-independent is not identical to being independent of cancer?

No, it means that there is a rationality that holds true despite what other minds may feel.

Your “rationality” presupposes my use of objectivity; and that it is independent of desires is not enough: just because one believes something is the case, does not make it so.

Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more

No, it is based off of what seems more correct—which one is more convincing. Just because you are not convinced, does not make this endeavor subjective: you have a tendency to do that.

Bob

@fdrake

I think I just figured out what we are seemingly in disagreement about, and that, upon clarification, we are not really in any disagreement at all.

My OP, I see now, is a bit ambiguous: I did not make any distinction between the meaning of a concept and its definition. I don't think that simple concepts are themselves circular and unknowable in meaning but, rather, what I was referring to by 'definable' is the explication of meaning.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you read the OP and thought that I was referring to 'meaning' by 'definition'; and therefrom arises the disagreement. Am I on the right track?