I've yet to do V3, but my understanding is that's where he tackles that very question and concludes that transit is a part of SNLT. (not read your posts there yet, definitely going to)

I think, in the most abstract sense, it does. If you think about a firm there are people who really just move things to where they need to be, when you think about it abstractly.

I think it gets really confusing because of the obvious conflict between "I drive things over here and back and don't make things, so what?", but then if they didn't do so the market wouldn't be expanded, and capital must expand.

ooo... nice question. "alienated labor -- alienated capital -- what is it they are alienated from?"

I'll admit that alienation is one of the harder concepts of Marx. "that capacity is alienated from the worker by going under the control of capital" -- perfect answer. The worker is there, and while they have capacity to do things, that capacity is owned by someone else. It was bought. And they don't control the process or product, either.

"Now, capital is alienated" -- interesting!

2 reasons -- the coercive laws of competition force capitalists to do things whether they like it or not. If child laborers are acceptable in a market, the other businesses which employ child labor will out-compete you. "in a market system, abstractions rule"

Heyyy... question for you @fdrake -- question about "workers retain past value" -- that wasn't what I was thinking in the question. But yup, I like this too. In a sense I've looked at the Labor Theory of Value, since it uses an SI unit, as being a possible conservation law.

Heh. posted my notes to respond, because I lost them last time when trying to respond.

But, yup! All that responsibility placed on you making so much sense.

Heh. While the reading material became more interesting, I have to say halfway through that makes the conversation less about the text. But that's not bad. I'm glad to hear the class talking and asking questions they're thinking about. If the book doesn't connect to our lives then it's purely academic. And, honestly, the text became more interesting so I don't need Harvey to connect as much in explaining why something is relevant. I'm just noting feelings.

"If you look at the statistics in Marx's times the largest category of labor was domestic service" -- that's interesting. And I like how Harvey is connecting that to how in Marx's time domestic labor was not organized by a firm, so it didn't seem relevant. But Harvey even mentioned the actor quote I posted, and noted how at the moment it didn't make sense where today it does. (hah! though he doesn't want to spend too much time on productive/unproductive... fair enough. It's kind of an "ad hoc" theory, looked at from a certain view, though I always like to note that it didn't take us long to figure out, in practice, what was productive/unproductive during COVID-19, so maybe that's why it's wise to not spend time on it -- it doesn't matter except as a political decision, rather than as theory)

Harvey has a wonderful mastery of Marx in his reading. He's so comfortable with all the texts and concepts he's fielding questions about difficult concepts with ease. And he's not fudging it: there are times I can tell the students in class (as an aside, the students questions have been great, and I admire the work they're putting in) have questions with some kind of hope, but Harvey is straightforward and doesn't mind dampening hopes in the name of a consistent and honest reading.

Very side note, but "labor is purposive activity" reminds me of Kant's aesthetics. I try to de-emphasize the Kant-Marx connection, now, because I've come around to saying their similarities make sense through the common influence of Rousseau. And I think that the angle of Rousseau has gone underemphasized -- no one wants to admit to Romantic influences, it's all about the Enlightenment! :D

That's awesome.

Now, how to intregrate this into a formalization of Hegelian dialectic, and the beginnings of analytic Marxism will be complete! :D

:D

I agree. There's been a lot of bits like that throughout, for me -- where there's been a slog, but then there's something that finally clicks, and it really does change the way I look at things. Like money.

Though for me, I'd actually not want to de-emphasize the numbers as Harvey did. One of the things that would excite me is if I could utilize these to begin to understand a way of setting up formulas, make measurements, etc. -- that is, I'm interested in Marx, in addition to the many ways he's used, but in his original purpose: as a scientific project of economics. It's one of those questions that's always interested me.

But it's worth noting that Marx is a philosopher first, and has been read in many ways. And I like that Harvey says that too :D.

By the way, for 14MAR23, marxists dot org link and final paragraph:

Finally, the result of the process of production and realization is, above all, the reproduction and new production of the relation of capital and labour itself, of capitalist and worker. This social relation, production relation, appears in fact as an even more important result of the process than its material results. And more particularly, within this process the worker produces himself as labour capacity, as well as the capital confronting him, while at the same time the capitalist produces himself as capital as well as the living labour capacity confronting him. Each reproduces itself, by reproducing its other, its negation. The capitalist produces labour as alien; labour produces the product as alien. The capitalist produces the worker, and the worker the capitalist etc.

Yup! that's what I was thinking. (though it being consistent with V2 is pure luck, since I've yet to get that far!)

Page 350 before class started today. Glad to hear some of the comments up front about how this section is when we hit a turning point, because that's what I was thinking -- that it started get interesting at this point.

I'm looking forward to being caught up next week, since it's a skip week.

That's interesting. M-C-C-M is given a directional connotation though right. A big deal's been made about money going the opposite way around the cycle than commodities. I agree with you that both make sense. Though maybe they should not. — fdrake

I agree there's definitely a direction to M-C-C-M -- I interpret it as the second moment in the process of circulation. The C-M-M-C moment is from the one side of the laborer, and the M-C-C-M moment is from the other side as the capitalist.

And maybe they should not -- I'm definitely still playing around, and only sharing thoughts here. I'm not firm on anything yet.

Are the raw materials interpreted as commodities in your view? Are they there "before" this step of circulation? — fdrake

Nope! I agree that the raw materials are a commodity. The means of production (the factory, the spinner) are a commodity, the raw materials (wool) are, and so is the living labor purchased. In order for raw materials, like gold or iron or what have you, to enter into the economic relation, even though they are there beforehand, they must be worked, so they have labor time invested in them.

Another good Grundrisse quote, p 328/329 -- for thems who believe that workers are strictly factory workers making things:

Actors are productive workers, not in so far as they produce a play, but in so far as they increase their employer's wealth

What counts as a commodity can be, say, a Starbucks coffee. Service.

This breakdown is really good. Especially with the interweaving of the quotes.

I have one but: I thought the first "C" in "M-C-C-M" was the purchase of the labor commodity. Fortunately, I think this doesn't really do much against your breakdown. Flip 'em around and it works. The commodity labor is purchased and then does work on raw materials with the instruments(means) to create a commodity to be sold on the market which then yields money, having been sold.

Page 322 -- there are these quotes and times in Marx which crack me up because the arguments he's responding to are old even then, and I hear them today. One such quote in today's reading:

Thus the economists take refuge in this simple process in order to construct a legitimation, an apology for capital by explaining it with the aid of the very process which makes its existence impossible. In order to demonstrate it, they demonstrate it away. You pay me for my labour, you exchange it for its product and deduct from my pay the value of the raw material and instrument which you have furnished. That means we are partners who bring different elements into the process of production and exchange according to their value

"That means we are partners" is what made me smile. Might as well say we're all a family while we're at it :D

I don't think so. At least, the identification of self with activity, or at least a strict relationship between the two, is a strong part of existential philosophy as I understand it -- and it's not a personality that one is looking for in asking nor a personality that one gives in answering.

Think of the archetypes which Camus gives as examples of existential heroes. Many personalities could fill those archetypes.

And, for myself -- though I am inspired by Camus -- I don't even think the heroic stance towards the absurd is really the best. I prefer a softer approach.

What answers the absurd? I'd say that's pretty close to an existential identity of some kind, and this being existentialism, activity is what I'd put forward as central.

Deliberation occurs before activity, and one can always return to the existential question and deliberate again. (one can choose otherwise again, become someone else)

But we can also just answer the question with the simple declaration: Here I am! Even the fact of choice need not weigh us down. We can choose to refuse the weight of choice, if that fits us.

And what could the existential thinker say to such a person?

So anyways, the point is, this is all recognized and understood by yours truly. I get it. We don't have to parse this understanding out and belabor this point. Rather, I want to re-adjust back to what the OP is really getting at and that is that we are existential animals. So, what I mean is more the self-reflective element. We KNOW we could do otherwise (even if comfort of habit makes us decide one way mostly). This is an exhaustive extra layer. It is a continual judgement that rides on top of things. I don't just survive by learning mechanisms and instincts combining. I DECIDE to do something, sometimes against what I would really like to do (I don't want to tend to the plants, but I don't want to see them die) and JUDGE things (I don't like seeing the plants die). I don't have to do any of that though (I can watch the plants die and live without a garden).This is more what I mean for it to be existential. I am not denying that we can do things by routine, but it is the fact that we know that we can fall into a routine, that it is quite iterative above and beyond simply routine. — schopenhauer1

I can stop working and not work, but then the anxiety of leaving people without saying a word, the anxiety of looking for another thing, of not getting money, etc. You see, I just decided that these things were important, though I could decide otherwise. Perhaps freedom from work is most important to me at all costs to the point I'd rather live under an underpass than work for the Man. You see, we have a large degree of deliberative freedom, and this causes the burden of knowing we can do things which we didn't necessarily "have" to do, but do "anyways" because we decide things continually to do or not do. This, whilst praised in the main, is I see a burden of the human. This is the error loop where nothing is justified. — schopenhauer1

The self-reflective is the evolutionary error (to the individual) even though it was a (emergent over time) solution (for the species). — schopenhauer1

Cool.

At some point, though, one finds themself.

The deliberative moment is prior to finding oneself. The choices are endless, because one doesn't know who one is.

But if you know who you are, the choices slowly dwindle down.

And there isn't a reason, as you note.

There's simply yourself, and the world, and what you need to do.

True!

But as soon as I put words to it I can think of a rebuttal in terms of thinking of which is best :D

Even directly -- I was thinking how phenomenological-existential philosophy is "accessible" because we're all subjects, as opposed to scientific or political leaders (which traditional, even Modern, philosophy addresses itself to). But then the terminology is far from accessible without work put in, and then you get some of the same themes from what at first blush may appear "at odds" with the phenomenological-existential approach with, say, linguistic or empiricist philosophy.

I suppose that while I can pick one in the bunch, as soon as I justify it I can think of a reason to pick another one.

Phenomenological-existential.

Buuut... I think that for my own case, at least, is correct about why I chose it: I like these philosophers.

I wonder, though, if there is a philosophical reason I like them, rather than just a personal reason -- which I'd be more apt to believe the personal reason, it'd be interesting if there was some underlying philosophical aesthetic that makes these choices the choices we're thinking about, too.

I'm not sure if plush forums pings you if I edited your tag, so I'm replying directly here to ping you. (mods feel free to delete this post)

I own this one in English.

I think I found the paragraph you're talking about. Is it from the last paragraph of Chapter X?

Two points can profitably be noted at once. First, if we propose to start with the infinite divine substance, and if the affirmation of the existence of this substance is not to be regarded as an hypothesis, it has to be shown that the definition of the divine essence or substance involves its existence. In other words, Spinoza is committed to using the ontological argument in some form or other. Otherwise God would not be prior in the order of ideas. Secondly, if we propose to start with God and to proceed to finite things, assimilating causal dependence to logical dependence, we must rule out contingency in the universe. It does not follow, of course, that the finite mind is capable of deducing the existence of particular finite things. Nor did Spinoza think that it was. But if the causal dependence of all things on God is akin to logical dependence, there is no place for free creation, nor for contingency in the world of material things, nor for human freedom. Any contingency which there may seem to be is only apparent. And if we think that some of our actions are free, this is only because we are ignorant of their determining causes

If so, maybe that's enough context for your @180 Proof - I don't know Spinoza worth squat. I'd be only guessing based on the meanings of the words there.

Mine just don't fit the cookie cutter alternatives presented when one is taken to exclude the others, that's all — javra

This would account for the difference, too, then. Perhaps many of our fellows here on TPF feel the same? The thought being that each thought should be treated individually, and feeling that our beliefs cannot fit the cookie cutters?

Surely the professional group also engaged in critical thought, though. I'd say, sure, everyone who answered was engaged in critical thought. It's the differences between the communities I was looking for an explanation for.

Or are you making the stronger contention that those who did choose should engage in more critical thought?

Previously I put this down to contrariness. I now wonder if it might be vacillation or trepidation. Or simple failure to commit? — Banno

I'd put another spin on the difference.

Our community is less homogenous than the professional community, and so it's harder to say the three views put on offer are of the sort where one can actually go ahead and make a choice, even knowing all the difficulties.

Or perhaps this is just a way of coming down firm on "trepidation" as an explanation for the difference.

It makes sense to feel trepidation on an online poll, I think.

Oh, yes, I forgot to mention -- that your theory between the Grundrisse/Capital forms works! (ala M-C-C-M/M-C-M, etc.)That makes a lot of sense. Thanks for taking a stab at it.

I'm not holding back "buts" in this conversation either -- I'm just really open-ended on a first reading, even if I'm familiar with a writer. And this being notebook selections, rather than a worked out whole, ups the difficulty in making strong assertions even more.

I came across a good passage today that relates pretty directly. Honestly, this section is proving to be a lot easier than the previous ones. And his splitting up into a alpha and beta "result" when taking the production process as content of capital gets along with your guess along the lines of concrete/formal characters of capital. (And, in this, I'm beginning to glimpse a distinction between material and both of those -- because Marx refers to the exchange value in capital circulation which does not exist circulation as a kind of rarified, formal value that still exists, and in a way is more material because of its alien character than, say, the concrete description of the labor process, which intentionally points out how the worker is a part of that)

I've never seen a passage in Marx that puts together the labor theory of value and how it relates to supply/demand until this one. It's so clear that there certainly must be another passage in Marx that disproves it somehow ;) :

The use value of a thing does not concern its seller as such, but only its buyer. The property of saltpetre, that it can be used to make gunpowder, does not determine the price of saltpetre; rather, this price is determined by the cost of production of saltpetre, by the amount of labour objectified in it. The value of use values which enter circulation as prices is not the product of circulation, although it realizes itself only in circulation; rather, it is presupposed to it, and is realized only through exchange for money. Similarly, the labour which the worker sells as a use value to capital is, for the worker, his exchange value, which he wants to realize, but which is already determined prior to this act of exchange and presupposed to it as a condition, and is determined like the value of every other commodity by supply and demand; or, in general, which is our only concern here, by the cost of production, the amount of objectified labour, by means of which the labouring capacity of the worker has been produced and which he therefore obtains for it, as its equivalent.

So, supply-demand as a more particular force on commodity price, or in the more general form, the cost of production, or the amount of objectified labor, but in this much wider sense where the laboouring capacity is what's being produced along with -- so not an individual firm, the economics of the firm, supply/demand, but rather the total, and therefore political, economy.

At least, it's a quote from the Grundrisse I can now flip out to support my general interpretation of Marx.

Well... to be fair he's more cheerful in the sexy murder poet way. (Liam Kofi Bright's Two Tendencies linked: it answers the question why "we" do philosophy)

There were two "buts" I had while reading (I'm sticking to my no working on weekends commitment.;) )

Thus the total amount of money required to circulate M1, — fdrake

I can't tell if we're supposed to be able to derive how much money should be in circulation at a given time, or if it'd be better to somehow substitute, for M1, some function of the quantity of goods in a market, something like a supply-demand function. At times it seems like he's focused on a single commodity market, almost as literally as the market metaphor would have us think, and then he quickly expands to say "of course the banker pays the grocer pays the clerk pays the gas man and that would influence how much money is needed too".

Also, and this may be nothing I'll say up front -- I'm wondering about the differences between M-C-C-M/C-M-M-C and the latter, as you've broken it out. (EDIT: Just to be clear, "the latter" I mean M-C-M/C-M-C, "latter" as in coming from Capital)

But, with that being said, I think that the mathematization is a nice clean picture, and while I'm still trying to tease out this possible difference in meaning ala the M-C-M-C... formulations, I do tend to think of each one of those parts of exchange as forming a chain as you've laid it out, and you can look at each dayd as a moment, and depending upon which side you start with tells you which moment you're dealing with.

:heart:

Hrmmm...

I think the one thing in your thoughts that makes it difficult for me to connect to is your emphasis on the individual.

Mostly because, this being a lingual way of connecting, who are you talking to? Are you talking to us? Or is it just an expression you feel the need to express, regardless of who is reading?

Cool.

I agree the familiarity of patterns is a factor. I think that's a large part of why I wanted to push against this notion of deliberation! "familiarity" is a comfort, one which I also go back to: I like what's familiar. I'm sure others do too.

And you're right in saying we can be both. I think that's why I wanted to highlight how existential ethics presupposes freedom. "The unconscious" basically unseats freedom. It stops freedom from being an ethical consideration -- and it's not the only theory which limits freedom either. Including, from the angle I've been talking, material freedom.

I think I'm just trying to point out that condition. There are times...

where we are being deliberate we are actually unconscious of what it is that is informing our choices. We can be deliberate and clueless simultaneously. — Tom Storm

And that's a point to undermine existential ethics. If there ever is a time we are not free, then it's not bad faith -- it's a lack of freedom.

The sentence I had in mind was "Humans are existential animals" and that was the part I had meant to disagree with, especially in regards to deliberation: it just seemed too... false? Most people do not deliberate their every action, after all. I wanted to correct this notion to something more like "people *could* deliberate their actions"

Maybe too fine a distinction, since you're noting you agreed :)

But that's why I asked about habit. Habit, to me, seems like the obvious counter-example that people do things deliberately. We often do things not for a reason, but simply because we did it yesterday (no and! And is post hoc).

I remember liking both of them. I even got to see them give talks through the organizations then.

For me I think I traveled elsewhere after because my political beliefs have been more materially focused, in the sense of who gets to own what according to what rules, rather than personally focused. (probably explains why I still remember people who wanted equal rights) -- for me, there were too many people who just wanted to be accepted in the current regime, and I already knew that was wrong ;)

Ooooo. Some interesting disagreement! :)

What do you make of habit?

This is a constant theme and I am going to continue it as I see it of utmost importance to the human animal. Humans are an existential animal. That is to say, why we start any endeavor or project (or choose to continue with it or end it) is shaped continually by a deliberative act to do so. — schopenhauer1

I think I'd rather say as a condition of existential ethics one presumes a kind of freedom in talking that way. I wouldn't say that all human beings, qua their humanity, are existential. Something I like to highlight in reference to existentialism is how in spite of the existential condition, people by and large do not act in this deliberative manner -- including me!

But that doesn't go against an existential creed -- I'm not a pure being of active deliberation. I have attachments arrived at by means other than making a choice. And I'm comfortable with that. Now, with respect to the existential condition, which I believe to be the case, the one thing I could point out is just because I'm comfortable doesn't mean I'm free of choice. I could choose against my comfort. And, in fact, sometimes it is good to do so.

But there's probably not a good rule for such times. Hence my hesitation on your focusing upon "deliberation"

Heh, well, we certainly disagree on "rights" then. "Rights", like property, arise out of how we interact with one another, and so are subject to change insofar that we interact differently. And I'd lean more towards the notion that nothing can be taken for granted when it comes to social rules: insofar that the social rules do not lead to dissolution of the social organism, then they are permissible in this wider sense I mean, where the social rules cannot be taken for granted. (and, most broadly, extinction is the final stage of evolution, and there have been the death of social organisms before, so even rules which lead to social death are permissible, if harder to pass on)

I think that with small groups it can be easier to understand the "lay of the land", but that they are as diverse as large groups and will also fight over perceived territory within the group and against other groups: that is, property relations are still a source of conflict, even in small groups. Territory is another way of saying "property" -- that is mine, by right, and I will obtain it. (on the other hand, the "bad" anarchy is run purely by the right of might, so non-legal formulations do not necessarily lead to some kind of golden age either -- and it's important to note this! A lot of the reason people believe the state is preferable is to say it's better to consolidate the use of violence to a bureaucracy which adjudicates its proper use which has some kind of democratic control. But that's only true if the state is actually acting in your benefit!)

So, I think legalism, with all its pitfalls and injustices, arises from a particular kind of relationship with the world, and with other people. Civilization erects artificial social structures: barriers, strata, hierarchies, functions and distinctions; it allocates goods and resources according to an entirely artificial system of divisions. (And it's madly, fatally dysfunctional) — Vera Mont

My intellectual heritage, ala Rousseau, would agree with this notion of artificial social structures removing freedom from people who are born free.

But I'm more inclined to see these social structures as a natural part of our living together. If history is a guide, then we are naturally the sorts of creatures which create hierarchies in order to survive against the other hierarchies which also developed -- in a sense hierarchies are more powerful than non-hierarchies, at least at a certain point of economic development, and so they were the "natural" structures which came out of the process of social selection. The non-hierarchical societies could not organize militarily as efficiently, and so were wiped out -- so this just so anthropological story goes, at least.

So rather than point to some kind of pure state of freedom to which we are born in, I'd say that there are material conditions of freedom.

And insofar that those material conditions of freedom are satisfied, then and only then could legal property be morally worthwhile. In the language of rights people would call these positive rights.

But that's the intellectual tradition I'd prefer to break from, because as far as I can tell its social products just aren't working too well -- we can at least agree on that! :D

I'm not sure that applies to war - excerpt class war, of course. But I think this is a useful way to look at the situation, and I generally agree. — Vera Mont

Cool. I don't mean to say this is all there is to the matter, either, so "a useful way to look" is good enough for me.

I would, however, want to define 'property' more exactly, because whenever the topic arises, we always get the quibblers who consider a cobbler's last 'capital assets' and demand to move a dozen idle squatters into some poor fisherman's hut. So we need to distinguish real estate and land and water rights (the property which is theft) from the clothes on ones back and the tools of one's trade. — Vera Mont

I would have said there's a difference between private and personal property at one point, and attempted a definition game of sorts.

Now, I think I am uncertain about such distinctions. I think I want to say that the distinctions aren't as important up front, because that is the legalistic way of looking at property, in a nutshell: there are rules about our material world which are enforced by some social organ.

So we have the OP's scenario of equal damages by value (though not be consequence), but varying the numbers of people who are stealing, and the numbers of people who they are stealing from.

In our present way of looking at property then I think @Banno's got it right -- scenario 1 is worse than scenario 2 because it points to a much more pervasive problem of half a million people stealing, clearly indicating that the "rules" aren't really working, whereas in the second scenario you just have the usual case of a person trying to break the rules.

Consequentially I think 1 is at least worse because it results in one person losing their livelihood, which I'm guessing the scenario is meant to highlight.

The scenario I meant to highlight how value isn't always financial, that squatters steal in accord with the rules, by our rules of property, and the only consequences are utilitarian good -- a greater number of people have comfort than before. But I don't want to justify this ethically. Rather, I want to get under the notion of property as a legal right, somehow. I'm thinking it's the "real" culprit, more or less. In this other notion of property that I'm uncertain how to define, but could point to the practices of anarchists at least as exemplifying it, scenario 1 would take care of the guy who lost his business, and scenario 2 is effectively borrowing a cup of sugar from your neighbor, just spread out over a million people, and that level of property drift, as far as I can tell, already exists. We don't demand an exchange every time we trade property, after all. (EDIT: though if one person accumulates all the drift, then ala anarchy that'd be a problem -- another difference in these theories of property)

An even bigger ethical problem is presented by money. It's the substance of corruption and the easiest means of injustice. When law is based on property rights - held above human rights, if only because property rights are easy to spell out precisely in law and human rights are hard to define, hard to agree about, hard to set down in black and white and to administer - we have an ethical dislocation. When property is expressed in terms of $ value, which itself is arbitrary and mutable, we have another level of ethical dislocation. If degree of criminality is evaluated in absolute monetary terms - $XX.XX, rather than property taken as % of property owned - we have no ethical standard left on which to base judgment. The legal issue is wholly separate from the moral one. — Vera Mont

This part about it being hard to agree and set down in black and white and administer human rights -- that's a lot of where my suspicions to such approaches comes from. It's an intellectual approach which seems to make arbitrary what really probably shouldn't be arbitrary.

So part of my thinking, here, is to attempt to move outside the framework of "rights", conceptually. And property is a good topic for working through that.

For myself, though I certainly agree that circumstances being what they are justify taking back what's already owed, I tend to think that our property relations cause conflict: in a cold and bizarre way, it's our accounting practices which lead us to war.

One way to put property relations is to say that person's have legal rights within states, and one of those rights is the right to property.

It's this foundation of rights, or at least property rendered as legal rights, that I'd push against. It's not just the circumstances which justify theft, nor is it the circumstances of re-interpreting property as belonging to those below (since they are the genesis of wealth) -- rather, the whole idea of property as a right is what I'd push against.

In the abstract I think it's hard to say something definite. But, as a for instance, squatters taking over unused buildings is a case of theft by property rights. But in this other way of looking at property, it's actually a more efficient redistribution mechanism than the legal one.

Hrm.

I hope not. I was hoping to point to something bigger.

Thinking more along the lines of it's no longer theft because we're all OK.

Rather than the legal definition of property/theft, which I'm pushing against, I'm saying theft is from some other's needs, rather than some other's property.

You know. Good old Marxist schlock ;)

Contrarian-wise, I might say that we already live in both these communities.

Overall, however, I prefer a community which doesn't care about small "theft". I think we are a social species, in spite of our attempts to make us otherwise.

Property is theft? No! We own it all. And we've yet to figure out how "we" owning things works.

Oh, and as it happens, it's a command, not a proposition. — unenlightened

Ooooo.... that's pretty good.

Meaning-as-command: of course you can lie about it, but there it is!

heh. Yeah. I go back and forth :D