Yup yup, true. Even the example sonnet 108 I gave doesn't follow what I said, too. (does it really surprise you that a person whose fine without form would forget forms? :D But they're still useful to think through) -- and there are other forms of the sonnet, like you mention.

But surely you see what I mean by form now, though? The rhythm-rhyme scheme, at a minimum, defines a poetic form.

So again, a clear-cut example of what your first sentence means would be helpful.
Clarity is necessary for understanding. How will unclear abstract theories provide this? — Amity

Ah! I'm lifting the term from computer science.

So, as the wiki shows, "This is a string!" is a string.

And if it is a sequence then, to make things more abstract, any set of characters with members greater than 1 would count as a string, I think. <-- Keeping it here cuz I started here, but re-reading I think this is a tangeant.

So in positing the question "How many phrases are in a string?" I'm asking is for a rule that would allow a computer to compute some number given any string -- so it couldn't be infinite, but it could be any combination of characters, including spaces and indentations and dashes and every bit that we'd consider in reading a string (as these themselves were added later).

Also, I added the information about direction of reading because we're dealing with poetry which is itself not necessarily digital. It's written on an open page, and the notions of space aren't as easy to define when we have a whole page to write on vs. some line that might include "paragraph break" as a character in its alphabet, which means "new plank of meaning", or something like that -- time to consider something else.

So one rule I could propose in counting phrases would be "every time there is a paragraph break, add one" -- and with the sonnet we'd get a definite number of "10" this way. However, in looking at the content, we'd probably contend this derivation in some poems. Thinking here of lines that invoke two contrasting ideas or feelings or meanings within the same line -- we'd likely, as humans, count those as two phrases instead of 1. Actually I should highlight here just how odd my line of questioning is, because as humans reading a poem we wouldn't usually ask "How many phrases are in this poem?" -- such a question seems to entirely miss the point!

So yes, of course, there is always a combination of subjectivity and objectivity in any text; poem or art.
The 'subjective' is not 'left over'. — Amity

Yes, very true. This is by way of trying to delineate what I'm attempting to get at. I agree that it's not actually left over -- hence why I could see how someone would call into question my little thought experiment, claiming that it is not as innocent as I'm proposing.

But I'm not sure how else to get at what I mean other than by contrasting...

I appreciate all the time and energy spent in responding to my queries. — Amity

Heh, I'm just glad there's enough interest here that I'm able to think through my wacky thoughts. :)

Heh. Sorry. I may have even lost myself. Feel free to skip the philosophy-bits, as they may well just be nonsense anyways :D

What kind of a phrase?
https://natureofwriting.com/courses/sentence-structure/lessons/phrases/topic/phrases/ — Amity

Hopefully any of those, and more, given that poems tend to invent their own phrase kinds.

What kind of a string? Examples?

Well, for now, I just mean a set of characters with some kind of single-dimensional direction that has a place where it begins and a place where it ends -- speaking more formally, basically. When I'm speaking as abstractly at the level of "strings" I'm kind of coming at the question "from the other side" of feeling -- attempting to put down abstract theories that provide clarity.

What is left where... in a poem? What is a 'truth-condition'? Why would a poem need one? — Amity

A poem would certainly not need one -- that's why I thought it a good topic! :D I'll try to explain responding to this:

I struggle to understand what is at issue. Even after I read the following: — Amity

I suppose I'd say that truth-conditions do not exhaust the meaning of even sentences in the form of a statement. The meaning of a statement may include truth-conditions, but my impression is that something is left out, that there is some remainder of meaning not included in such a definition of meaning. I don't think I'm even at a point where anything is quite at issue -- I'm still forming nascent thoughts.

But one of the things I'm trying to do is focus on the bits of language that truth-conditional semantics doesn't. So poetry, and its evaluation, as @SrapTasmaner pointed out earlier, is a concrete topic under which we might come up with distinctions to figure out what this "left over" is -- if we think there's more to meaning that the truth of statements at least. While I don't think that (EDIT, for clarity: I don't think that the meaning of a statement can be reduced to truth-conditions), if someone does then they'd likely see this endeavor as "following from" truth-conditional theories of meaning, where poetry is parasitic upon the truth embedded withing language.

Or the opposite, if someone is more given over to this notion of sentences simply meaning (like myself) and not needing a theory of meaning, though I'm obviously not satisfied else I wouldn't be creating threads like this -- then it would seem all the logical constructions are extraneous, superflous, unhelpful. (but they are interesting!)

Another kind of logic question, grammatical: — Amity

Perfect! That's exactly the sort of question I'm asking after. What does "do" do? Here we're asking about the meaning of the word within a sentence rather than the conditions under which it would be true. What is up with that?

Nothing is obvious to me, perhaps I missed it. If you could explain again, I'd be grateful. — Amity

heh, fair.

I think that the approach which prefers to talk about meaning in terms of a Language "L", such that we're speaking about language in the abstract rather than a particular natural language (like German or English or..), would say that the actual sound of a given unit of meaning is not important. But the phonic structure of a poem is part and parcell to poetry, even when it's not one of the forms.

A linguist would say that you could say--

"Snow is white" is true iff Schnee ist weiß

Has the same meaning because the conditions under which either sentence is spoken are the same. So the phonic structure is "accidental", or could be any other phonic structure insofar that the truth-conditions are somehow "attached" to this phonic bit or plank.

A poet wouldn't. Poets frequently complain about the impossibility of translating poetry. And one of the main complaints in translating poetry is exactly the phonic structure of the poem, and the relations that invokes within the spoken language.

That is -- it's not just the truth conditions that brings about the total meaning of a phrase, it's also all the relationships it holds with the other meaning-bits or meaning-planks (mostly making a distinction here based upon whether one might prefer analytic or holistic "units" of meaning -- the "unit" being undefined at this point because poems don't define things in terms of a sentence, for instance)

What do you mean by 'reasonable delimitation on generality'? — Amity

I mean the domain under consideration. So rather than all languages, I'd at least limit myself to a particular, natural language. But I wouldn't make a theory so specific such that it could only interpret the 108's sonnet of Shakespeare.

What are the 'rules for interpreting a sonnet'?

Iambic pentameter, 3 stanzas. Rhymes as follows: ABAB, CDCD, EE
And then with respect to the question "how many phrases are in a sonnet?" I think we could propose something like 10 phrases. Though there are constructions which would require us to look at the content, as opposed to the form -- so that's not quite a steadfast rule either, only the closest thing to a formal answer to the question. (also itself not necessary for providing an actual interpretation of a poem, which I've agreed is more about feeling and sharing and connecting than this attempt at making something formal)

What is the importance of this question, in any case, when it comes to understanding meaning?
Wouldn't looking at the content be just as helpful? — Amity

Heh, I'm sort of looking at meaning from two sides -- but with respect to poetry I think you're right to say that looking at the content is even more helpful than these questions I'm asking. I guess I'm starting to dip into the philosophy side of the question here, more than the poetic feeling side (though I also want to keep the poetic feeling side going -- rule 1 holds for me still)

Again, do you have a source for your claim about 'modern poets' - who are they and where do they assert that 'formalities are not necessary to convey meaning? — Amity

Mostly just using T.S. Elliot's The Wasteland as a standin for the category, since the essay I read pretty much treated it as a sort of revolutionary moment in poetry, where I thought it was clear he was inventing his own form and following it -- and certainly I felt the meaning that was there, the mood, the imagery... assertion isn't the right word, but I'm claiming that T.S. Elliot shows with this poem that we don't need the classical forms to convey meaning, (though maybe that's controversial! Others might say that it's clearly meaningless because it doesn't follow the forms....)

(EDIT: Just to be clear, the essay wasn't anything fancy -- literally just the introduction to a collected works I own, written by someone who works in the academy in New York at the time in the 80's, from the sound of it. It was a good essay on poetry in general, I thought, though... might type it up to share. Doubt I could find the exact one online)

A poem might initially be 'felt' by a simple read; not fully engaging the mental faculties.
However, to reach any obscure or symbolic meaning requires us to go beyond.
To read again. With care. To connect with our own 'truths'. — Amity

True. So we can't just say, what Davidson calls a "first reading", is the true reading -- the real meaning. And I completely agree that this is part of the interpretive process for poems. We connect to it with our own 'truths', as you say.

Do you see why, then, poetry serves as a good contrast case for truth-conditions to explore the nature of meaning?

A thought on demarcation between poetic and truth-conditional meaning --

Would it be possible to develop a logic of phrases? (heh, probably anathema to the two camps who'd usually ponder one side or the other of that question)

I dont think this would help in interpreting a poem. Mostly still just looking at that "what's left, if we are able to conceptually "take away" truth-conditions?" question.

In particular, it'd be interesting to simply answer the question "what constitutes a phrase?" when we take a string -- is it possible to devise a relationship between a string and how many phrases are in a string?

One thing that should be obvious from my approach is that I don't think there'd be a general answer for all languages, given that poetic meaning -- as I've been rendering it thus far at least -- includes phonic structure. So the question would be about, first, what is a reasonable delimitation on generality such that it's still interesting, and not just a set of rules for interpreting a sonnet?

That's what form does for us, in a way -- it tells us exactly how many phrases a poem will have, and some of its internal structure. In a way poetic form is a logic for answering the question "What constitutes a phrase?" -- and the modern poets basically assert that such formalities are not necessary to convey meaning (thus making it much harder to answer the original question, but taking us back to the original impetus -- the feeling of poetry)

EDIT: Just as an example using the first four indentations of The Wasteland -- you could count 4 phrases, based on indentation, or any number of phrases based upon how you interpret them (like I noted how April itself was also breeding, adding another phrase). But this procedure, right now, isn't even as robust as "guess and check", since there's no necessary answer to the question. Hence, not quite a logic with respect to modern poetry, but possibly a very weak and un-interesting one in the case of defined forms -- still, the focus on counting phrases is interesting for compare/contrast, i think -- perhaps this could count as showing a difference in approaches to meaning.

I can recommend the same recommendation that was given me -- don't worry too much about the scholarly side, just feel it like you would any other poem. I looked up a couple of things along the way, but not much, and enjoyed reading it at that level.

Having added some modern poetry to our list of poems, I automatically feel the need to invoke something classical -- so browsing Shakespeare's sonnets I decided upon --

108

What’s in the brain that ink may character
Which hath not figured to thee my true spirit?
What’s new to speak, what now to register,
That may express my love or thy dear merit?
Nothing, sweet boy; but yet, like prayers divine,
I must each day say o’er the very same,
Counting no old thing old, thou mine, I thine,
Even as when first I hallowed thy fair name.
So that eternal love in love’s fresh case
Weighs not the dust and injury of age,
Nor gives to necessary wrinkles place,
But makes antiquity for aye his page,
Finding the first conceit of love there bred,
Where time and outward form would show it dead.

In Elliot we get something personal, something purposefully undefined -- but a definite mood, I'd say. The essay I read wanted me to read The Wasteland like it would change me, even -- like it was a spiritual experience. With Shakespeare we get a classic form, well executed, on a classic subject -- love and aging. Something familiar re-addressed, re-spoken, and re-assessed.

One of the parts of the sonnet that is like The Psalms is the relationship between the first and second stanza -- it can be put to multiple uses, but usually the 2nd stanza either repeats the first stanza, or it states something which develops the first stanza, or it states something which is in some kind of opposition or contrasting stance to the first stanza. The Psalms use this method to develop meaning -- repetition, development, or opposition.

Something that's different about the sonnet is the couplet which puts a bow on it -- though sometimes that's put to the opposite effect too.

While browsing for poems -- I have never before ventured down the path of The Wasteland until now. And I really did love it. I read an essay beforehand, knowing that the poem is notoriously difficult, and she suggested to sit at home with the sound of the poem rather than starting out with the analytic approach of trying to understand all the references, or even all the images! I can feel the cohesive mood in the poem, but the ending mystifies me.

However, one technique Elliot uses I want to highlight in this thread, because it's a good example of poetic meaning - and it's from the first lines of the first stanza! :D

April is the cruellest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.

Here the line-breaks give the lines a double meaning, a really common poetic technique. Whereas truth-condition type meaning attempts to set out a meaning, poetic meaning frequently attempts to employ multiple meanings to give a kind of resonance or mood or theme, or to compare ideas and moods and feelings at the same time with the exact same set of words as they are spoken or read.

So as I read it the first line "April is the cruellest month, breeding" -- clearly "breeding" forms a phrase with "Lilicas out of the dead land", but also April itself is breeding (what is it breeding? Well, the rest of the poem fills that out, somewhat, but only through images and sounds and feelings)

Funny - "that which has no distinction" is what Lao Tzu would probably call "non-being." — T Clark

well, they are sort of similar -- since being applies to everything that is, it's not like we can say it's like this or that thing. It's everything. And when I look at everything -- what on earth is in common? Nothing.

Or maybe it is the aspect of being we can notice, even if we don't right now. — T Clark

I'm fine with this way of talking too.

"Aspect" is probably the wrong word, now that I'm thinking on it. Sounds like "property", and it's probably better to say "mode": A kind of way which we encounter being. Ways? What is a way? (Dasein's comportant...)

Agreed. I guess that's the point of this discussion - if you're going to use the words, make sure you let us all know what you mean. — T Clark

Heh. It'd be nice, but I think that usually we just assume we know what we mean with "real" -- and that's not too weird, either. We don't go about proving reality, more often than not. Maybe whether a statement is true, but not reality. Reality doesn't admit of proof or disproof. And if that's so, is it even amenable to reason?

It's almost more weird to set out the term in the first place :D -- which is why such talk gets so confusing, I think. Too many possibilities at this level of abstraction, and without some kind of text or tradition or something -- it's just not definable. It requires some philosophic tools to define. But in so doing we are already sort of begging the question in defining it by defining it by such-and-such as being real.

To bring this back to quantum weirdness -- It's fascinating unto itself, but yeah, I take it that most QM-weird discussions are -- perhaps unknowingly -- begging the question, and pointing at this weird thing to say "Look, if this weird thing exists, then my weird thing exists"

I don't understand this — T Clark

Oh, I may not either -- but I think I got a gist at least. And I'm just stretching, really -- attempting to make use of concepts more widely than in their interpretive home (while mid-reading no less -- so there be danger here!)

I'll try to un-jargonize the above here --

Reality is that aspect of being we notice. I'm cool with just drawing a distinction between being and reality -- good enough for me.

Being is that which has no distinction. If it were distinct then it'd be individuated then it wouldn't apply to some existence. There are no predicates, but the very basis upon which predicates can be stated. Reality, then, is that which is cared about.

And, more generally, we are free to set out what we mean by reality. It changes depending upon the philosopher.

The idea of “real” or “reality” comes up frequently on the forum, often in relation to quantum mechanics. It has struck me the concept is not usually defined explicitly or carefully. — T Clark

I used to think of reality as having a relationship to existence as having a relationship to being, where "the real" refers to lived experience, existence refers to judgments of statements, and being does not refer but is the most fundamental -- one might be tempted to say there's a Hegelian relationship between being and the other two. Something rougly along those lines.


Recently having been revisiting Levinas I came across a term he uses: the there is. The opening paragraph of chapter 2 in the Levinas reader, a pdf which I found through the graces of google:

Let us imagine all beings, things and persons , reverting to nothingness.
One cannot put this return to nothingness outside of all events. But what of
this nothingness itself? Something would happen, if only night and the
silence of nothingness. The indeterminateness of this 'something is happening'
is not the indeterminateness of a subject and does not refer to a
substantive . Like the third person pronoun in the impersonal form of a
verb , it designates not the uncertainly known author of the action, but the
characteristic of this action itself which somehow has no author . This
impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable 'consummation' of being,
which murmurs in the depths of nothingness itself we shall designate by the
term there is. The there is, inasmuch as it resists a personal form, is 'being in
general' — Levinas

To stretch my mind a bit -- I might say reality is related to the self in the selfs projects or pictures, or more fundamentally, in the selfs enjoyment of grasping the world for itself -- and being able to do so without falling into the usual traps by use of the there is. But here, reality isn't playing the linguistic role that @Banno sets out (which I'm also drawn to -- honestly those were my first thoughts. OLP has had its way with me! :D ) -- and here's where I'd say I think we get along, because as he says reality plays many roles, and it depends upon the philosopher. It's just a matter of setting it out.

Cool, much thanks -- I was focusing on pong being played, for sure, and you've helped in pointing out that's not the point, but rather to demonstrate a model's prediction of neuron-network behavior.

heh, yeah, glad I just asked :D.

So no instant-karate-brain-chips in the next year or so, I suppose, but one step closer to the cyberpunk future.

This is super cool. So many neat intersections. It'd be interesting to look at the original paper, but it'd probably read funny to me -- i.e. the pop-version is probably just as good.

One thing the pop article made me wonder about was the notion of coherent/white-noise in relation to a dishbrain. The technical side going on in this set of sentences:

To allow the brain cells to play the game, the computer sent signals to them indicating where the bouncing ball was. At the same time, it began monitoring information coming from the cells in the form of electrical pulses.

"We took that information and we allowed it to influence this Pong game that they were playing," Kagan says. "So they could move the paddle around."

At first, the cells didn't understand the signals coming from the computer, or know what signals to send the other direction. They also had no reason to play the game.

So the scientists tried to motivate the cells using electrical stimulation: a nicely organized burst of electrical activity if they got it right. When they got it wrong, the result was a chaotic stream of white noise.

is where the meat of the argument would be. "That information and we allowed it to...", "sent signals indicating", and "chaotic/organized electrical activity" -- in some way I wonder if it'd been any different if the dishpan was hooked up to a series of lights and if the experimenter had just shocked the cells or anytime it guessed the wrong light -- but there's a lot of intentional conduct being implemented by the experimenters, and I wouldn't know how to tell if it's the cells in the dish-brain or the cells in the bone-pan that's making the inferences.

So let's just say I agree with all this. What now? We wait until we die, persuade others not to reproduce, and thats it. Do I have that right?

Eh, all I can claim is sincerity on my part. I'm making attempts, but sometimes those are mis-fires, mistakes, confusions -- probably about where we're at at the moment.

Both, if I think about it. But I'm ok with just saying metaphysics, since I suspect that's what you'd object to.

I think emphasis is what's at stake, or at least recognition of emphasis. Rather than philosophy being thought of as only speculation on the nature of reality or the logic of being, it could also be something else.

I'm including speculative physics. I'm saying there's more to metaphysics, not that it's not included.

The examples would be from around here abouts. I've indluged too, and even still do so.

No, that sounds like a definition. I was answering what is at stake. Speculative physcis isn't. RIght?

That's not helping my confusion as much as adding to it.

Start over with this question?

Is metaphysics a method of inquiry aimed at some goal, or is it merely a history of intellectual accidents? — apokrisis

Is that the issue at stake? Am I not answering the question in saying it is neither of these things, but something else? Couldn't that be civics?

That ellipsis is the important stuff. It is what can only be shown, and also what cannot be shared at all. — Banno

The bug still bites, at times, and I try. Tempted to call the philosophy bug a beetle...

I've been known to make mistakes, and tend to prefer to own them and learn from them. I'm not sure I follow your meaning, though.

Looking back, I've moved from seeing philosophy as serious play towards seeing it as plumbing. They're not mutually exclusive, though. — Banno

I think I'm in that position I get to where I feel like anything I say on the matter looks wrong a moment after saying it -- at least in terms of looking at philosophy. Serious play, plumbing -- yes! and.... :D

For me I think the whole "way of life" rendition of philosophy will always have appeal, even though I recognize that the institutional philosophy isn't really pursuing that. I think my interest in this subject comes from trying to understanding philosophy in these two terms -- because in spite of my relationship to philosophy being different from that, I clearly still benefit from, or at least owe a debt to, institutional philosophy.

:) Thanks! -- I'm not done with it yet, either. I just get to things when I get to them....

Training them how to think, not in metaphysics. Is it really that hard to see how today's leaders went to Ivy League schools a whole lot? I know I say philosophy is useless, but I would contend that it does help people to think, at least.

Maybe you're not pursuing this line of thinking, though. It seemed right to me, but you're acting like it's wrong -- so it must be wrong in some way. But I feel like I'm not being given a fair shake, either.

Aristotle was the metaphysician, and Alexander was the politician. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes it pretty clear that abstract pictures of himself as a character and Alexander as a character are the pinnacle of human achievement, and thereby, goodness. (though he sneaks in a quick one to say that the life of the philosopher is actually the best one, which always makes me laugh). Further, the whole idea of the university can be traced back to Plato's academy and Aristotle's Lyceum -- there are definite differences as we live in wholly different economies, have different values, and all that. But that power structure, and the material reason for philosophers, is still there: the institutions of knowledge-production and preservation are given leeway to pursue their studies as a valid economic activity on the basis that they at least teach and train people to think.

So I think you're asking after the wrong evidence -- it's not like Alexander the Great used the four causes to create his empire. But it's not a stretch to think he was tutored in them, too. So it goes for the modern university, though the various principles and foci have changed. (considering we've produced more knowledge since then, I'd hope so!) -- and they'll change again. As they change I'm sure that philosophers will be able to put together a coherent picture of knowledge, at that moment. They've managed to do so many times throughout history, why not again? But it'll be a snapshot of reality at a moment in time -- and sometime down the line it'll seem quaint. And so the project will begin again, to re-assemble another snapshot of reality.


Note how this doesn't even make this kind of speculative physics false. I'm merely noting that there's more to metaphysics than it, that philosophy can be done other ways. Does that seem wrong to you?

OK. I thought you were replying to my point that metaphysics speaks to a particular logic of being rather than being some kind of unmoored, pluralistic, history of free speculation — apokrisis

Heh. I'd say that I'm not being that bad :D -- but I'm also not explaining myself well. I am directly answering your question, though, because I thought that'd be the most fruitful way to develop a discussion.

So in response to whether metaphysics is a method of inquiry, or a series of historical accidents, I think neither still fits the bill -- it's so much that it's honestly hard to define, in general. What metaphysics is depends upon the philosopher. And that's why I was focusing on Aristotle (which, in turn, invokes Kant, and that in turn invokes Heidegger, at least in developing these ideas and engaging with them)

On the whole I take the Aristotelian meta-philosophy, as I understand you to be pursuing, to be indicative of modern institutional philosophy: the quest for the ultimate answers about existence is a question for those informed of the sciences, trained by the institutions of knowledge -- themselves politically aligned to the elite of the world, training the future leaders of tomorrow. It very much fits along the lines of the Ivy League model of philosophy. And, internationally, a state college provides opportunities (hence why people travel internationally to attend them).

And I think that such a story could likely be assembled again. While it's hard to see how it fits together when we poke it, I think we get a sense that Aristotle's way of looking at the world did fit together, and so philosophy is just that practice by which we continue to refine the categories, the ways of knowing, the logics, and all the speculative questions while paying the bills by teaching tomorrow's leaders to be smarter than the the average bear.

The phase you are calling “metaphysics as ethics” is just the application of this style of transcending inquiry to the practical job of forging a new technology of self. Ideas about justice, virtue, balance, etc, were the new universals by which society could start to organise itself and so scale a rational view of being. — apokrisis

Is it a phase? Or is it just another way to do philosophy?

Eh, I should say by post-Aristotle, I'm specifically referring to late antiquity -- so before our modern world. I think modern philosophy is pretty much enraptured in the notion of metaphysics as first philosophy -- Descartes, after all, wrote The World, and he's the traditional starting point for modern philosophy.

Is metaphysics a method of inquiry aimed at some goal, or is it merely a history of intellectual accidents? — apokrisis

I think I'd say neither.

In relation to Aristotle it's hard to say, in my opinion. Was it as literal as an uncreative and tired copy-editor smugly naming it "After physics, cuz it's after the physics"? Is Aristotle's work actually literary, or given his demonstrated understanding of artistic writing, would it not be better to think of these as lecture notes which are as direct as possible so as not to confuse the poor students? Or does it really mean the summation of all things, as we've come to understand it? And did that really drive Aristotle, or is that more what we have come to see value in Aristotle, being obsessed with metaphysics ourselves? Wasn't it Heidegger that began this obsession with metaphysical foundations?

I'm not entirely sure that's all that's there... but for me, anymore, I have fewer opinions on metaphysics now than I have questions. At the most basic metaphysics is just that philosophy which addresses the question "What exists?" -- but even that says too much, because metaphysics is also considered the most general kind of philosophy at times, so that more than what exists is at stake, but rather, the whole kit-and-caboodle: ethics, ontology, aesthetics. . . a sort of Totality that encompasses everything. (and, indeed, I'd say that metaphysics -- especially post-Aristotle -- is more about justifying ethics than it is about truth, though of course truth is still important to both ethical stances so they argue about what is true too. Mostly taking Nussbaum's reading of late antiquity as read here)

And I think that sort of metaphysics is what I'd say Kant does a good number on: speak away, but I don't think it'll become scientific knowledge. So, at that point, what else could metaphysics be other than ethics?

I think this puts too much causal emphasis on philosophy. That is, anti-social persons will be attracted to absurdism, but it's not the expression of absurdism that makes them anti-social. In another time and place the anti-social person will be a moral realist, a Catholic Cardinal demanding the King submit to the Church, insofar that it allows them to take advantage of people to fulfill their own personal desires. The anti-social person does not care for moral realism or anti-realism -- these are the questions of nerds -- the anti-social person, however, recognizes that the nerds, at times, influence people: and that influence is what the anti-socialite wants.

I've pretty much remained consistent in saying that existentialism can justify bad things, but also saying that this isn't the whole story -- in a way I think that this reduction comes from a perspective that is still too rule-bound in their moral thinking. The nihilist is fine with changing rules, but the moral realist is not, and so thinks that the possibility of justifying selfish behavior with moral language is enough to defeat a particular way of talking -- I'd say the absurdist is just pointing out that this is what people often do, that it's absurd, at bottom, and frequently is a guise for selfish, rather than selfless, motives.

Talking of poems about poems--and apologies to Moliere if this is off-topic. . . — Jamal

As @Amity already said, but just in case anyone else is holding back out of a sense of topicality, the more poems and interpretations of poems the better.



Ahhh!

This was lovely to read. It's the exact sort of thing I'm looking for. Meiner Deutsch ist Kerput ;) -- but I remembered enough to get the phonic structure out of it, and it was nice to be able to read two renditions of lines for the purpose of preserving the meaning found in the original language -- the adjectives you use, I get exactly what you mean when you say them, though they are often physical metaphors: a line being "heavy", or debating between two translations on the basis of the way they "feel" in each language. That's exactly what I'm after.

First I should say I'm no expert on Aristotle either, just an enthusiast who in another life would have dived deeper. Just to keep things honest.

I'd say that's a good interpretation, but I'm not confident enough to say that it's the purpose. It's very much my interpretation, if you get what I mean. The best way I can make sense of Aristotle's corpus is through understanding it politickly -- in the sense of the life of the human animal (the ethics), and the life of the human species (the politics).

I think it'd be better to say that from our perspective, first philosophy is most important, and hence why Levinas picks up on that in relation to Heidegger and posits ethics. (as a Marxist I'd say, yes, Aristotle's purpose of the metaphysics is politics, but I think that might be too many steps to just say yup, ya'know?)

Again, it really all boils down to a definition of metaphysics. — Pantagruel

I'd disagree here. @Banno is taking the right approach by putting metaphysics in a lower position, IMO. You can define it how you like, but the history of metaphysics will still be there -- and this is what I'd say I'm talking about in talking metaphysics. It's not what we define it as, but rather what has been done thus far.

This is exciting: I have a copy of William Blake's Songs of Innocence and Experience that includes printings of the original artwork that he drew into the book -- and it turns out they've got a multitude of the works archived digitally. Here's a link to several of the copies of Songs of Innocence -- and it's easy enough to scooch around the website to see the other illustrations. (Thinking about more poems to add to the mix, but thought I should share this good find)

Without agreeing or disagreeing, if not that way, then in what way must we read the essay? — god must be atheist

We must imagine ourselves agreeing with Camus.... :D

I don't think there's any one way to read a text, so there's no way you have to read it. I'm more inclined to say there are things which are obviously wrong: Camus is not writing a math textbook, and other of the multiple -- possibly infinite -- obviously wrong readings that are available to us.

Accepting more than one interpretations, that are non-congruent with each other, then obviously many of them are wrong, and only one or zero are right.

So what's the point of accepting more than one explanations, interpretations, etc? — god must be atheist

Heh, I'll note I disagree with your first assertion, that only one interpretation is the right one. What would it even mean to have a right interpretation? The closest I can imagine is that we have the same interpretation as the writer when they published the text -- the intent of the author is usually the way about making a "right" reading. But the problem with that is we don't have access to Camus' intent -- all we have are his words and the various facts of his life that we might use to bring sense to the words he wrote. We can't check up with him and ask "Did you mean this, or that? Or both?" -- and the "both" could very well be the answer an author gives, disappointing any interpreter hoping to demonstrate that their reading is the correct one.

But to answer your question -- even supposing there's a right interpretation, we wouldn't know if we had the right one. We'd only know if we had a coherent one. It's only by reading a multitude of interpretations and judging their relative merits that you'd be able to select the right one at all. So, at a bare minimum, even presuming there is a correct reading, the point would be to make sure the explanation or interpretation you have on hand is the right one or not.

I should have thought that philosophy was about finding the truth, which is necessarily singular, and not about pussy-footing around a set of acceptable interpretations. — god must be atheist

Is it possible for truth to turn out non-singular, in this process of finding it?

However, realistically in comparison to the norm, these are a type of suicidal and self-destructive behavior. I can't help but to think the whole philosophy is erroneous as a type of slave mentality wherein the slave self-destructs without his master. This differs from an atheism wherein believing in God is the point of departure for a life of absurdity, and the adherent goes on to live unaffected without religion. — introbert

I think that it'd be easy to justify self-destructive behavior from the point of view of an absurdist. However, I think I'd say that the reason Camus chooses these eccentric personalities is to highlight in what way his ethical stance isn't traditional. But also, there's just something not as gripping as the heroic accountant embracing the absurd task of never-ending calculation. So, yes, I think there's a bit of entertainment in his choices, and that's where you'd get the impression of self-destructive behavior as a sort of substitute for suicidal desire in light of the absurd.

But I don't think that we must read the essay in that way. And, obviously, I think this would count as a kind of reductio ad absurdum of absurdism. It was, after all, meant to overcome the absurd. And isn't self-destructive behavior just suicide, but more exciting?

Heh.

I'm often surprised by what others say of a poem. I think it's part of the pleasure: in some way we enrich our understanding or experience or reading by hearing what others have to say. I think the more we do it the less silly different thoughts sound. And, after all, it's just a poem -- so it's ok to have a bit of fun with it.

Naw, not at all. Maybe not the most natural reading, but I think that's part of what I really enjoy about reading and sharing readings of poetry -- what seems most natural at first isn't always the best reading, and sometimes our creative readings aren't quite natural, but all that meaning -- at least insofar as I understand poetic reading -- can still be found there.

I think the old religious man is completely ironic and intended to be funny and silly. It makes me smile whenever I read it. — T Clark

OK, that helps me. I was thinking how depending upon the old man the poem could be read as affirming the speaker, but that makes more sense for the rest of the poem which, I agree, feels lighthearted. So the speaker can be read as giving some warm advice to a filial woman much younger than the author -- so the speaker actually is Yeats.

That makes me pull back from any broader ideas about it being a reflection on humanities inability to see beyond appearances. I never had any inclination to see it from a modern perspective as an example of the objectivization of women. — T Clark

Ahh, I didn't see the more universal reading at all, on first glance. So the appearances are just what we humans see, and only God himself could possibly love that person.

I liked the use of "Ramparts" as a metaphor for her beauty.

I'm not sure I can follow what you're saying.

No, I didn't buy a cat today, and it follows that none of the other lines are true either. Is that what you mean by "'P' is false"? If so, yes "P" is false. If not, what are you saying isntead? — Dawnstorm

Yup, that's exactly what I was saying. So literal meaning is whether or not a statement is true or false. (note how this won't work for interrogatives or imperatives, so perhaps "literal" isn't the right word either -- since questions have a literal meaning, but I'm talking about statements here)

Poetic meaning is . . . what's being asked after. But one method we've been using is the notion of sharing our experience of a poem. It has the virtue of being open-ended, and for thems of us who just like poems too it's pleasurable :D I've gone so far as to call this sharing an "interpretation", but others have noted discomfort with that term, instead opting to say it's really just our experience of the poem that we're talking about.

I'm not sure why a paragraph of contextual meaning is sandwhiched between two references to truth. As you probably guessed, I didn't buy cat today. I don't quite see why this important. If I did, you might arrive at a different poetic meaning, or you might not, depending on your approach. Does the literal meaning change at all? I'd say no. — Dawnstorm

The meaning of the poem would change from false to true, in that case. So I'd say it does change. Or, at least, this is what I'm setting out as literal meaning, for now, given what I said above. I can see what you mean that "literal" isn't right -- let's just say truth-conditional meaning?

What's "P"? The words of the poem? P for proposition? — Dawnstorm

There I was using P for "Poem" :D -- so the whole string, including indentations.

So I think it's a bit obvious that no one would be interested -- except we curious ones philosophizing about poetry -- in the truth-conditional meaning of a poem. In a way what I'm asking is "OK, so let's just allow truth-conditional semantics to do its thing. Poetry can even be interpreted like that, but no one would do so. So what is left of meaning when we're not applying truth-conditional semantics?"

As for metaphor, I find it interesting that you provide a hierarchy of complicated that goes from basic to more complicated like this: synonymy -> metaphor -> substitution. A similar hierarchy I would have thought of is: simily -> metaphor -> conceit.

I'll probably have to read you more carefully before I understand what you're saying. — Dawnstorm

I'm not sure what the pathway to substitution is, but I think that's what I'd have to maintain, at least. Something along those lines. I'm uncertain if this is true, but for now I'm just going for consistency.

That's a wonderful one. In part it shows polarity really well since the words are the same, just being read in a different order. But also I like the parenthetical reminder to "read thoughts backwards", not necessarily as a dialectic but at a more personal, "inner monologue" level it's often good to reverse negative mind-worms.

"For Anne Gregory" by W.B Yeats.

Never shall a young man,
Thrown into despair
By those great honey-coloured
Ramparts at your ear,
Love you for yourself alone
And not your yellow hair.'
"But I can get a hair-dye
And set such colour there,
Brown, or black, or carrot,
That young men in despair
May love me for myself alone
And not my yellow hair."
I heard an old religious man
But yesternight declare
That he had found a text to prove
That only God, my dear,
Could love you for yourself alone
And not your yellow hair — T Clark

Part of me wonders who the speaker of the poem is. Not a young man, I imagine -- because a young man would be thrown into despair swearing their love, rather than informing the listener that their beauty draws in more people than actually loves them.

The old religious man is something I keep returning to, though. Is that meant to give credibility or undermine the view? Looking at Yeats' wiki page, I have a hard time deciding. Is the old religious man a speaker of truth, or attached to old texts that wouldn't likely matter for a young couple?