Russia doesn't claim any such rights. — Tzeentch

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_annexation_of_Donetsk,_Kherson,_Luhansk_and_Zaporizhzhia_oblasts
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation

Russians have less claim to it as Turks, and they have less claim to it than Tatars. You basically claim that Catherine's conquest somehow made it Russian forever, while all the other changes are irrelevant. — Jabberwock

The argument that Crimea has always been Russian is often grounded also on the idea that Crimea is ethnically Russian. What that remark seems to forget is that Russians turned out to be
- The ethnic relative majority wrt to the Crimean Tatars only after 1897 (so practically at the beginning of XX century) thanks to massive deportation of Crimean Tatars (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deportation_of_the_Crimean_Tatars#/media/File:Demographics_of_Crimea.png) and parallel re-population of Crimea by Russians (Russification).
- And the absolute ethnic majority only after 1939.

This is how "since forever" Crimea was Russian.

Indeed I claimed/argued that BOTH the following arguments of yours are non sequiturs — neomac


Because you don’t know what it means. If you do, then you’ve failed to understand what was said. I’m not interested in holding your hand in explanation. You’re worth the minimal amount of time.

But to disregard what a country has been saying for years is stupid, assuming we’re against war. Likewise, continuing the war instead of pushing for negotiations or at least a ceasefire is also morally bankrupt.
— Mikie

Some more dogmatic claims. — neomac


No, just pure logic. But it does presume I’m dealing with a non-pathological adult, so I can see why you’ve struggled with it. — Mikie

Some more shameless self-serving delirium.

it would still be a non sequitur, because propositional logic has nothing to do with interpreting claims literally or non-literally, but with FORMAL logic links between propositions. — neomac

That wasn’t the numbered statement, which you used to show us all your poor understanding of freshman logic. That was the statement you incorrectly claimed was a non sequitur.

At least try to get that right. — Mikie

Indeed I claimed/argued that BOTH the following arguments of yours are non sequiturs:
1 - “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was
considered a red line. There was no reason to do so”
2 -(1) If it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a "red line"), then
(2) The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake .
Because from atomic propositions one can not infer other atomic propositions in propositional logic.

You keep repeating that I have a poor understanding of freshman logic yet without ever clarifying what is the correct understanding. For the fourth time, tell me what “non sequitur” is supposed to mean in freshman logic (feel free to quote textbooks about logic) and prove from that definition that your 2 arguments, as they are formulated, are NOT “non sequiturs” but correct inferences according to propositional logic. I bet you can't.
And there is no way you can recover from that. So suck it up and move on. And never ever dare to come back to this again. Ever.

But to disregard what a country has been saying for years is stupid, assuming we’re against war. Likewise, continuing the war instead of pushing for negotiations or at least a ceasefire is also morally bankrupt. — Mikie

Some more dogmatic claims.

By conveniently chopping my quotation you overlooked 2 points: 1. — neomac

Yeah, because I stop reading after you show you have no clue what you’re talking about — Mikie

.

Some more convenient chopping.

I see in there 4 main claims and no argument in their support — neomac

Yeah, I’m really not interested in what you consider an argument or not an argument. You’ve shown so far to have the understanding and conversational style of a high schooler who thinks he’s in a debate, and “winning.” The reality is that you’re just embarrassing. — Mikie

Some more dismissive or offensive remarks.

- I need however a (plausible enough) argument for “assuming the USSR didn’t want to cause nuclear war, — neomac

Then go read a book. I couldn’t care less about what you “need.” I’m certainly not going to explain it to a child who thinks he’s in debate class. — Mikie

Some more pointless advice.

And conveniently so because you are unable to properly argue and counter-argue. — neomac


Says the guy doing nothing except making random claims and bickering over statements he doesn’t understand. — Mikie

Some more delusional accusations.

You’re a waste of time. Do me a favor: read a book about logic and Ukraine. You can use it. Then grow up a little.

Maybe repeat “your guru Mearsheimer” for the thousandth time. Solidify your place in the running for goofiest forum members. — Mikie

Some more petulant whining.

Yawn.

"There was no reason to do so" is a general statement, which I believe true. Clearly I don't mean "any reason whatsoever," as there can always be reasons given about anything. But no (good) reason, no. It's obvious that is implied. — Mikie

I already countered such pointless remarks:
1 - “I’m not here to make a survey about your beliefs, I’m here to hear your challenging arguments to support your beliefs, if you have any. If you do not have any, I welcome you to totally ignore me. Now, arguments need premises and conclusions, and it’s on you to clarify your arguments to support your own beliefs, especially those I and you do not share”.
2 -“At most you can argue that there was a ‘very strong’ reason NOT to do so (Russia’s strong opposition). Not that there was NO reason to do so. And reasons are more or less strong compared to other reasons. So the US, NATO, Ukraine may have had THEIR strong reasons to counter such Russian strong opposition (among them, all the concessions they made to Russia)”.
“This objection is particularly pertinent in geopolitics because, as explained, in a domain where there are strong competing interests and mistrust (like during great powers’ struggles), defensive measures (like military alliances) can be perceived as aggressive and can likely escalate tensions.”

Replace “very strong” with “good” or “very good” or “very very very very very good” and still ALL my objections hold (the logic and the geopolitical).
As the logic objections goes, even if you replace “There was no reason to do so" with "There was no (good) reason to do so" (BTW if that’s what you call “English nuance” then it’s evidently false, there is nothing specifically “English” in this nuance, if it’s not what English nuance were you referring to?), it would still be a non sequitur, because propositional logic has nothing to do with interpreting claims literally or non-literally, but with FORMAL logic links between propositions.
Aren’t we done yet?!

But I understand that if you're reading everything literally — Mikie

I already countered such pointless claim: “My point wasn’t meant to be pedantic though, but to solicit you to EXPLICIT the IMPLICIT premise”. And that I was able of a charitable reading like you are suggesting is evident since the first time I made that objection: “At most you can argue that there was a ‘very strong’ reason NOT to do so”. Even in this case, that doesn’t make your argument strong enough because, as I wrote, “reasons are more or less strong compared to other reasons. So the US, NATO, Ukraine may have had THEIR strong reasons to counter such Russian strong opposition”.
Replace ‘very strong’ with ‘good’ or ‘very very very very real good’ and my logic and geopolitical objections still hold.

it wasn’t a syllogism — Mikie

It wasn’t a VALID syllogism. And not even an evidently SOUND syllogism, after making explicit the implicit premise, which I did for you (“This premise should sound something like “If Russia feels provoked by NATO expansion, then there is NO reason for NATO expansion” for you to draw that conclusion”).
The fact that you are hopelessly trying to escape from is that you were trying to make an argument. But your clumsy argument is evidently objectionable from a logic and geopolitical point of view. And even grounding one’s arguments on implicit assumptions over what one claims to be “good” for him or the world, doesn’t make the explicit argument more logic or geopolitically conclusive.
On the other side, even if we pretend you were not trying hard to make an argument, just a general claim expressing what you believe to be true, then I’ll repeat it once again: “I’m not here to make a survey about your beliefs, I’m here to hear your challenging arguments to support your beliefs, if you have any. If you do not have any, I welcome you to totally ignore me”.

You wrote: “I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it”, the question is why on earth China or Russia should hear your advise “however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington”?! — neomac

First, I’m not literally saying I would “give advice” to China or Russia. So that’s ridiculous. — Mikie

By conveniently chopping my quotation you overlooked 2 points: 1. That I was in fact giving a charitable reading of your still questionable claim 2. That you are still overlooking the “English nuance” I was sarcastically referring to. Here is the part you candidly dropped:
“Dude, you have to give arguments to even try to score points, not just make emotional appeals in disguise like “But it's still very real”. What on earth is the expression “it’s very real” supposed to mean for great powers in a hegemonic race? What does it imply? What is the specific nature of the threat? The likely retaliatory consequences if red lines are crossed? The affordable measures to counter them?
You look exactly like a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet advising a young heavy weight boxer who, in his professional carrier, reached the point to challenge the world champion for the first time with something like: “Hey Mike Tyson, I wouldn’t try to test the World Champion , you know, because the risk that he is going to kick your ass badly is very real, so very very very real that one can’t imagine more very very very very very very very very real in the universe of the actual, possible and impossible worlds -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of a World Champion (which obviously means I’m so very very very real objectively reliable)”.
The problem I was pointing out IS NOT the possibility for you to literally “give advice” to China or Russia as much as it IS NOT the possibility for you to literally “give advice” to Mike Tyson, the problem is the questionable confidence you put in having worthy advice given YOUR understanding of what “it's still very real” in a challenging foreign policy (or sport competition) versus China or Russia’s (Mike Tyson’s) understanding of it.
Besides I made this last point very clearly here: “be also careful to not conflate your reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine” with their reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine”. The nuance here is that without proper arguments grounded on shared assumptions about geopolitical scenarios and implications, your “But it's still very real” remains an emotional appeal behind the appearance of a factual claim over an existing policy like “the Monroe Doctrine”.

Second, the statement about reasoning behind the fears refers to the Monroe Doctrine, and how it doesn’t matter if one thinks it is irrational or rational. Why? Because it is, in fact, a policy. — Mikie

From a geopolitical perspective, OF COURSE it does matter if, in a hegemonic competition against the US, competitors like Russia and China want to assess “What is the specific nature of the threat? The likely retaliatory consequences if red lines are crossed? The affordable measures to counter them?”. And OF COURSE it matters if you want to explain and/or justify the economic/military clash between competitors as function of respective security dilemmas, threat perception and containment strategies.
If you do not care about the geopolitical perspective, then we have another non-shared assumption and we need arguments in support or against geopolitics as a domain of research and analysis. I gave you one argument (but it’s not the only one): The problem is that “it'd be nice” is expressing your best wishes, your preferences. As I anticipated the reality may very well differ from what we prefer. So what if geopolitical reality doesn’t work based on people’s preferences? We can’t dogmatically assume it does or it should do. Right? I myself wish the same as much as I wish an incurable cancer of anybody I care to be curable, but I don’t find rational to use my wishes to establish what can be cured or can’t. What is yours?

Depends on the goals. I assume starting conflicts and wars isn’t the objective, and if it is it’s wrong. But assuming the USSR didn’t want to cause nuclear war, then putting missiles in Cuba was a mistake — and was extremely risky and foolish if done for other reasons (like getting weapons out of Turkey, which I also think was a mistake on the US’s part) — Mikie

.

I see in there 4 main claims and no argument in their support:
- I don’t need an argument for the first one, since I find it plausible enough from a geopolitical point of view: namely states do not pursue war for the sake of it. Ever heard the quote “War is merely the continuation of politics with other means” from Carl von Clausewitz? In other words, war is more a means to achieve objectives than an objective per se. And this might be very well true for Putin, Khomeini or Hitler too. I find such assumption so plausible that I didn’t even see the point in making it explicit, given that I didn’t make any claim nor argument questioning it.
- I need however a (plausible enough) argument for “assuming the USSR didn’t want to cause nuclear war, then putting missiles in Cuba was a mistake” because, from a geopolitical point of view, this was a proportional (and non-escalatory) countermove against the move made by the US, even under the assumptions that it could be very risky (“game theory” was born to model such kind of risks).
- I need a (plausible enough) argument for “was extremely risky and foolish if done for other reasons” and “which I also think was a mistake on the US’s part”, because from a geopolitical point of view, nuclear weapons can be (and mostly are) used as deterrent to prevent wars resulting from conventional military aggression by state enemies against homeland. And they seem quite effective in doing this.

USSR’s move was indeed effective to counter the military nuclear threat coming from the US — neomac

That it turned out OK doesn’t make it a good decision. This is a common mistake in decision-making.
That I even have to point this out further shows I’m dealing with an intellectual child — Mikie

.

Again just statements and zero arguments. Here two objections:
- If wars are bad and especially nuclear wars, why on earth deciding to do something that prevents a nuclear war or de-escalate the threat of a nuclear war is a bad decision?
- It doesn’t matter how confidently you apply two distinct labels like “OK decision” and “good decision” to qualify decisions, which any intellectual senile can do despite suffering from a severe dementia. What matters to me is if you are able to make explicit the criteria to discriminate between the two types of decisions, and to provide the arguments in their support to properly frame GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES. That’s all intellectual children like me care about.

The problem is that “it'd be nice” is expressing your best wishes, your preferences. As I anticipated the reality may very well differ from what we prefer. — neomac

Once again you have no clue what you’re talking about. Mine wasn’t a statement about reality. It was expressing a basic value, and assuming other non-pathological people also share that value. Not wanting the world to be engulfed in nuclear Holocaust is a pretty minimal and non-controversial expectation — Mikie

.

Again you have a hard time not only to understand what I write but also to understand what you yourself write. That “it'd be nice”-statements of yours are not about reality is something I clearly acknowledged when I wrote “The problem is that ‘it'd be nice’ is expressing your best wishes, your preferences". Also expressions of wishes and preferences are not statements about reality of wars and states, right? Pointing out that your “it'd be nice”-statements are expression of “basic value” or “minimal and non-controversial expectation” as if you are making a deep remark, doesn’t change the fact that your “it'd be nice”-statements can still express nothing more than wishes, desires or preferences as “it'd be nice”-statements normally do, it doesn’t matter how widely shared and strongly felt they are (yet another English nuance I have to teach you about). Indeed, I too expressly acknowledged that I share them, as much as I can share the wish for anybody I care about to survive a cancer (isn't life a basic value?). Yet the fact that there are shared expectations, basic values, shared preferences, desires and wishes, doesn’t make more evident that what we collectively expect, prefer, wish, desire, hold as a basic value can be achieved as much as the human wish to survive a cancer, no matter how intensely felt or shared by the entire humanity, doesn’t make it more evident that cancer is curable.

I skip everything you write — Mikie

.

And conveniently so because you are unable to properly argue and counter-argue.

Now if you don’t mind, I’d like to get back to a better conversation with Jabberwock — Mikie

Hallelujah!

Why someone would refer to Brzezinski to deny Washington's culpability remains a mystery. — Tzeentch

Why someone would refer to Mearsheimer to deny Russia' hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine, even prior to any NATO expansion further east, remains a mystery.

“Non sequitur” is a Latin expression not English — neomac


I know what non sequitur means. You apparently don't. You've also proven my point about misunderstanding English nuance. — Mikie

OK since you know, for the second time, tell me what “non sequitur” is supposed to mean and prove from that definition that “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so” is not a non sequitur.

everyone with a functioning brain, including Russia, are aware that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO” is about Ukraine and Georgia’s perceived historical threats coming from Russia. — neomac


I'm not talking about Ukraine or Georgia's perceptions. I'm sure they have their reasons, which I respect. To argue it was mostly about "historical threats" is at best haIf-truth. But try to stay on topic.
I'm talking about Russia's perception, right or wrong. Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat. — Mikie

Dude, I’m not here to make a survey about your beliefs, I’m here to hear your challenging arguments to support your beliefs, if you have any. If you do not have any, I welcome you to totally ignore me. Now, arguments need premises and conclusions, and it’s on you to clarify your arguments to support your own beliefs, at least those I and you do not share.
“Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” is a belief that you and me share in the sense that we find it plausible enough, what I’m questioning is how you get from that claim to “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake”. More precisely, “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake” can not be logically deduced from “Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” if you understand propositional logic. You need more premises, all of them have to be true (or at least plausible enough), and logically linked to the conclusion. That’s the only game I’m interested in playing in a philosophy forum, including in this thread.
The topic of this thread is “Ukraine Crisis” and I’m talking about the "historical threats" coming from Russia at the expense of Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity, which the Ukraine Crisis exemplifies, how is my comment not on topic exactly?

but because Brzenzinski was an actual prominent national security advisor of American administrations, — neomac

And this is a reason to take him more seriously? — Mikie

As far as I’m concerned, if one wants to rationally investigate the security dilemmas shaping post Cold-War American foreign policies, one must have a look into how American national security advisors who contributed to shape post Cold-War American foreign policies, actually understood security dilemmas from the American perspective. Unless you are suggesting that consulting a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet is a more reliable method to do that, of course.

By analogy, if YOU want to sensibly claim it’s US/West/NATO’s fault to provoke Putin because he perceives Ukraine joining NATO as a security threat, then YOU (not the Russians) have to provide strong reasons to support such threat perception. — neomac

I already did. China making the exact same moves in Mexico that the US/NATO has done in Ukraine, and you bet your ass the US would react. — Mikie

.

And I made my objections to it, so if you do not address the points I brought up then you still have no strong enough reasons to support your claims, as far as I’m concerned.

And I don't have to give reasons for the threat perception, any more than I have to give reasons for Georgian threat perceptions of Russia. I simply look at what they say, and if it makes some sense, I take it seriously. In this case, it seems to me Russia has some reason for concern. But in any case, it's not what I think -- it's what THEY think. Which I've repeated several times. — Mikie

First of all, nobody is forcing you to give reasons for others’ threat perception, I’m just challenging you to give YOUR reasons for YOUR conclusions. But unfortunately so far you gave only one premise that doesn’t suffice to get to your targeted conclusion, for logic reasons and not only. In any case that’s the game I’m playing , and if you didn’t get it yet, it’s your problem not mine.
Secondly, now I also deeply doubt you understand what you yourself write. If you explicitly specify "and if it makes some sense" that means it’s not enough that what Russian politicians say about Russia’s threat perception is fine whatever they say. It must also make some sense. And I guess that by “makes some sense” you are not referring to grammar rules, but to your own understanding of State’s security concerns, am I right? Namely, such an understanding that could deny for example “Putin’s repeatedly said that Mikie’s picking his nose with his tongue is the highest security threat in Russian history, so Mikie’s picking his nose with his tongue is clearly a mistake” as making some sense, am I right? If so, then your own understanding of the Russian threat perception is not exclusively based on what they say, but it is based on additional assumptions about State’s security concerns which allow you to discriminate which claims about Russia’s threat perceptions make some sense and which don’t.
As far as I’m concerned, to better discriminate which claims about Russia’s threat perceptions make some sense and which ones don’t, it’s better to start with looking into what geopolitical experts say because it’s their profession to study this stuff, and especially if such experts actually contributed to shaping some State’s foreign policies, like Brzezinski. And this is one Brzezinski's quote for you to ponder: Dr. Brzezinski, some critics of NATO enlargement are alarmed by the negative reaction of Russia to this policy. If, as we are led to believe by those critics, Russia has no designs on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, how does the membership of those countries in NATO impact Russian interests?

Dr. Brzezinski: Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it impacts on Russian interests adversely at all unless Russia is of the view that NATO is an enemy and that the United States is an enemy. If that is the Russian view, then we have a very serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that reason as well.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/html/CHRG-105shrg46832.htm
In other words, Brezinski is an example of “Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” as much as an example of the fact that acknowledging “Everyone knew they considered NATO expansion a threat” is not enough to believe “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake”. Indeed from the same premise (but not only, of course!) Brzezinski draws exactly the opposite conclusion: “If that is the Russian view, then we have a very serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that reason as well”. However, the most important reason why I cited Brezinski is not because I take him to be evidently right and you evidently wrong, or simply because he is a prominent geopolitical expert and you are just a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet parroting his guru Mearsheimer’s cherry-picked claims, but because he was actually contributing to shape American foreign policies also in the case of NATO enlargement. That allows me to say that my objections to your arguments are not only plausible for logical reasons but also for geopolitical reasons.

What would the threat be if China offered a military pact to Canada, trained Canadian troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the US border? Why would the US consider this pact a threat? Can you guess? Or would you dismiss that claim as well? If so, I applaud your consistency. If not, what's the difference? — Mikie

I noticed you couldn't answer this. Too bad. — Mikie

Of course I couldn’t, indeed I also argued why, from a geopolitical point of view, YOU TOO NOR ANYBODY ELSE (including your guru Mearsheimer) can give a conclusive answer to your own questions based on a hypothetical analogy, which we are pretending it is not biased. And I’ll repeat it: “you parroted your guru Mearsheimer’s hypothetical analogy which is ONCE AGAIN vague about nature of the threat and consequences in case declared red lines are crossed. Besides the problem with a hypothetical analogy, is that it is constrained only by the explicit AND IMPLICIT assumptions one thinks are relevant to construe the analogy. This approach can more inadvertently bias the hypothetical analogy. The shared assumption between me and you here is that a defensive military alliance with a hegemonic archenemy in the US backyard would be likely perceived as a worrisome security threat that would need to be prevented or contained as it is the case with Russia and NATO expansion in Ukraine. What I further argue however is that the choice for best prevention and containment strategies depend on the specific perceived threats. A security threat unspecified with respect to its nature and affordable countermeasures in case red lines are crossed is hard to assess in the case of Russia as much as in it is in the hypothetical case of the US. On the other side there are AT LEAST two strong and very concrete reasons why Russian perceived security threat from NATO expansion in Ukraine is HIGHLY questionable: A) Russia is a heavy-weight military nuclear power nobody wants to mess up with for the fun of it (who in Europe would easily agree on Ukraine’s call for art.5 after aggressing Russia proper when they could be nuclear bombed by Russia, exactly?) B) the US de facto and consciously HELPED boost Russia military capabilities through concessions (see Budapest memorandum) and financing military ramp-up (through a good decade of abundant business with the West), among others. IF US administrations were definitely hostile against Russia, they couldn’t possibly help Russia the way they actually did during post Cold-War time, and didn’t do during the Cold-War for the USSR. Besides this is true INDEPENDENTLY from Putin’s whining over generic security threats from NATO/US/West meddling in Ukraine.

Perhaps the rationale for the Monroe Doctrine is indeed "dirty propaganda." That's worth exploring, sure. But it's still very real, and I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington
— Mikie

To assess if your fears are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct the reasons of your fears. — neomac


Good god, can you read?

I'll repeat: Regardless of what *I* myself believe about the Monroe Doctrine, it is in fact a foreign policy of the US. So the question isn't about "rationalizing" fears, especially not my own. If you had taken a few extra seconds to read what was written, you'd quickly see your response was irrelevant[/b]. — Mikie

I still doubt you fully understand what you yourself write. So let me teach you some English nuances. You wrote: “I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it”, the question is why on earth China or Russia should hear your advise “however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington”?!
Dude, you have to give arguments to even try to score points, not just make emotional appeals in disguise like “But it's still very real”. What on earth is the expression “it’s very real” supposed to mean for great powers in a hegemonic race? What does it imply? What is the specific nature of the threat? The likely retaliatory consequences if red lines are crossed? The affordable measures to counter them? Besides I've already anticipated this pointless objection: To assess if China or Russia’s reactions to “the Monroe Doctrine” are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct their reasons for their reaction. And be also careful to not conflate your reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine” with their reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine."
You look exactly like a random self-entitled anonymous nobody from the internet with less than amateurish understanding of boxing or interest in this sport advising a young heavy weight boxer who, in his professional carrier, reached the point to challenge the world champion for the first time with something like: “Hey Mike Tyson, I wouldn’t try to test the World Champion , you know, because the risk that he is going to kick your ass badly is very real, so very very very real that one can’t imagine more very very very very very very very very real risk in the universe of the actual, possible and impossible worlds -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of a World Champion (which obviously means I’m so very very very real objectively reliable)”.

If the US considers nuclear weapons in CUBA a threat, then the USSR doing so anyway, despite these warnings, is a mistake[/b]. — Mikie

Why mistaken?! From a geopolitical point of view, USSR’s move was indeed effective to counter the military nuclear threat coming from the US. And besides, this didn’t require the US:
1 - to start a war in Cuba
2 - to annex Cuba
3 - to nuclear bomb Cuba
4 - to force a regime change in Cuba
5 - to force a change in Cuba’s security alliance
6 - to force a demilitarised Cuba
7 - to force a neutral Cuba
So what’s the geopolitical lesson one could get from this historical example?
If placing nuclear weapons in Ukraine was the specific security threat perceived by Putin, a balanced agreement could be found as it happened during the Cuban Crisis. If it’s not that, what else?
The threat from neonazi against Russian minorities? The threat for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea? The training of the Ukraine troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the Russian border? Depending on how these specific threats are actually formulated, individually or collectively, one might see if negotiable solutions were possible to avoid this war. On the other side, talking generically of Russian security threats without specifying the nature of such threats and then demand satisfaction for very specific desired solutions (i.e. Ukraine out of NATO, demilitarised, neutral) ain't gonna work smoothly on those who are particularly sensitive about Russian hegemonic ambitions in Ukraine: like Ukraine and the US, to name a few.
Surely the pro-Russian narrative of NATO as a security threat against Russia turned out to be particularly effective in easy-to-impression minds infesting this thread.

If you're struggling with WHY it's a mistake, I'll tell you: because it'd be nice not having World War III. In the case of Russia, it'd be nice not having Russians and Ukrainians killed and billions of dollars spent on weapons — Mikie

.

At last you have made another premise of your reasoning explicit. The problem is that “it'd be nice” is expressing your best wishes, your preferences. As I anticipated the reality may very well differ from what we prefer. So what if geopolitical reality doesn’t work based on people’s preferences? We can’t dogmatically assume it does or it should do. Right? I myself wish the same as much as I wish an incurable cancer of anybody I care to be curable, but I don’t find rational to use my wishes to establish what can be cured or can’t. So the best I can do, is to try to understand better where we are with the medical research on cancer and for example give my support to scientific programmes that look more promising, given my understanding of the status of the medical research on cancer.
The same goes with geopolitics, the best nobodies like me can do (at least in best effort mode) is to place their political support on the current or rising hegemon that is likely the least oppressive to them, depending on our understanding of geopolitical hegemonic races, if they occur. That’s why in my arguments I rely more on geopolitical analysts than on my own wishes.

too ignorant about logic to understand how logically confused your claim is. — neomac

Intellectualizing something rather straightforward doesn't have the affect you think it does. — Mikie

“Intellectualizing”? Dude, maybe you are not familiar with the nuances of propositional logic 101, but that’s pretty embarrassing to read in a philosophy forum by one of its moderators (?!).

So are you denying that “non sequitur” means “it doesn’t follow” or that it is used as a label for a “logic fallacy”, prof? — neomac


I'm sorry that your reading comprehension is poor. But that's not my fault. I assume you're not a native English speaker, and in that case I'm not making fun -- I certainly wouldn't be good at understanding the nuances of Russian or Spanish. — Mikie

“Non sequitur” is a Latin expression not English, Russian or Spanish.
In logic, “non sequitur” refers to a deductive fallacy.
Understanding if this claim of yours “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so” is or not a non sequitur has nothing to do with native English speakers’ nuances you’re raving about, and all to do with understanding what constitutes a logically valid deduction. So in any language you would translate your argument, your argument as it is formulated is an obvious “non sequitur”.
My point wasn’t meant to be pedantic though, but to solicit you to EXPLICIT the IMPLICIT premise. This premise should sound something like “If Russia feels provoked by NATO expansion, then there is NO reason for NATO expansion” for you to draw that conclusion. This premise is not self-evidently true AT ALL, so you have to argue to support it, that is why I objected: “At most you can argue that there was a ‘very strong’ reason NOT to do so (Russia’s strong opposition). Not that there was NO reason to do so.” This objection is particularly pertinent in geopolitics because, as explained, in a domain where there are strong competing interests and mistrust (like during great powers’ struggles), defensive measures (like military alliances) can be perceived as aggressive and can likely escalate tensions. That’s why you can take “President Putin felt provoked by NATO expansion” at best as ONE relevant premise of your reasoning for concluding “there was NO valid reason to do it”. But unless you make explicit the other relevant implicit premises enabling you to draw your conclusion, your argument has no force. As it is, it sounds dogmatic and very myopic about geopolitical reasons.

So it’s false your claim that NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat” . — neomac


What was the threat in 2008, and why was it never mentioned? If kept quiet about, where is the evidence that Russian invasion or aggression was imminent at that time?
I won't hold my breath -- because there was none. Just vague appeals to old tensions, most of them within Ukraine itself (which was deeply split, as is seen from election results/language distribution comparisons).
So if there was no imminent threat from Russia, why did NATO expand? Well, they told us why at the Bucharest Summit. No mystery. — Mikie

1 - I never said that “Russian invasion or aggression” was “imminent” (and notice that even “imminent” doesn’t equate to a timestamp like “4 April 2008 at 13:45:12 UTC”). Indeed geopolitical security dilemmas are not primarily focused on IMMINENT threats (that’s why I repeatedly asked you what you mean by “such a threat”, remember?). AND OBVIOUSLY SO, because when the military threat is IMMINENT, it may be already TOO LATE to counter it. BTW even Ukraine joining NATO wasn’t about IMMINENT threats against Russia either but on prospective/historical threats any ex-KGB spy Russian president from the Cold War, worried about NATO-encirclement, Russian hegemonic status and broken promises by the West to Soviet Union leaders, can VERY WELL perceive!. Besides perceived IMMINENT threats like Islamic Terrorism in years 2000-2008 may indeed cloud politicians’ perception of not IMMINENT but way more DESTABILIZING prospective/historical threats. Again, geopolitical security dilemmas are primarily shaped by historical trends, geographic/demographic constraints and actual military and non-military resources to effectively engage in power struggles, NOT by declared intentions from President X at a given time Y. BTW even the hegemonic competition between China and the US is not an imminent military threat either but a prospective/historical threat, which for the US might be more decisive than the threat from Russia. That is why the US is establishing and strengthening military alliances in the Pacific. And China is vocally opposing them and it feels “provoked”.

2 - The Bucharest Summit doesn’t mention the Russian threat as much as the "Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS " doesn’t mention the Chinese threat (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/), yet everyone with a functioning brain, including China, are aware that is about the perceived Chinese threat as much as
everyone with a functioning brain, including Russia, are aware that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO” is about Ukraine and Georgia’s perceived historical threats coming from Russia.

3 - The Bucharest summit brings the distinctive signature of the Bush administration committed to the free world and to counter the imminent threats (like Islamist terrorism) but it hides under the carpet of free-world rhetoric and promises or the concern from the imminent threat from Islamic terrorism or the infamous Bush-Putin bromance and assurances (remember Putin’s words “And we cannot be satisfied with statements that this process is not aimed against Russia”?) the notorious motivations for those who joined or wanted to join NATO, the reiterated vocal Russian concerns and the reiterated American national interest advisors vocally warning about it. But, as I argued, this move didn’t come without MASSIVE BENEFITS instrumental to Russia hegemonic ambitions as well as to the invasion/aggression of Ukraine: like good business with the West, free-pass for military projection in Middle East, free pass for political/media channels/allies in the West for spinning anti-NATO narrative.

4 - It doesn’t suffice to say Putin got motives (he got provoked in 2008!) to explain this war, one has also to explain how he got the means and the confidence to invade Ukraine only 14 years later in 2022 snd despite the fact that Ukraine still didn’t join NATO. It doesn’t suffice to acknowledge that Putin got motives (provocation from the West) to morally justify why he used his accumulated power to hit back at Ukraine and the West, one has to morally justify why Putin shouldn’t have had STRONGER motives to use his accumulated power to improve welfare, freedoms, industries, public services in Russia like Germany did after the end of WW2. It doesn’t suffice to acknowledge that Putin got motives (provocation from the West) to geopolitically justify this war, one must also be able to explain how the Western threat against Russian hegemonic ambitions could be BEST contained by annexing Crimea in 2014 and invading Ukraine in 2022.

Brzeziński — neomac

Shouldn't that be "your guru Brzenzinski"? — Mikie

Not really. First, I read both Brzenzinski’s AND Mearsheimer’s (among others) geopolitical analysis primarily to understand geopolitics, I do not cherrypick only the analysis of the one that best supports my preconceived popular condemnation of the American foreign policies no matter how poor my understanding of the American geopolitics is. Second, I’m putting a different weight on the two not because the former promoted NATO-expansion for Russian threat containment (however critical about how Clinton and Bush administrations dealt with it!) while the second was against it (yet certainly not because the Russian hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine or the Russian historical/prospective threat didn’t exist!), but because Brzenzinski was an actual prominent national security advisor of American administrations, heavily involved in the debate about NATO or NATO expansion within political administrations, Mearsheimer no.

why NATO’s Article 5 [1] (which is clearly defensive) is a security threat aimed against Russia? — neomac

Ask the Russians. They’ll tell you. And it’s they who get to determine what’s threatening to them and what isn’t— not you and me.
— Mikie

No no I’m asking you, because you take Putin’s alleged rationale to actually have not only explanatory but also justificatory power for the origin of this war, not as a convenient lie just to persuade “useful Idiots” in the West, right? — neomac


So you ask me, not the Russians, because you assume I'm going to repeat what the Russian's have said about this?

Your logic is baffling. — Mikie

I’m asking you because “you take Putin’s alleged rationale to actually have not only explanatory but also justificatory power for the origin of this war, not as a convenient lie just to persuade ‘useful Idiots’ in the West, right?”.
Imagine this: an angry dude comes at you asking a refund because you hit his car while driving. Now, you can see he is angry from his body language, but you honestly believe you did not hit his car (e.g. you noticed that there is no dent nor scratch in your car nor his, nor you can recall your car trajectory being near enough to the angry’s dude or noise of an accident), so you want to know why he thinks you hit his car, wouldn’t you? Now imagine your wife by your side telling you: “But don’t you see how angry he is?! He is repeatedly telling you hit his car, not only once, but repeatedly, it is your fault if he is so angry! And now you have to refund him”. You protest: “he might be angry, but I don’t think I’ve hit his car so I want to know why he believes this, maybe he is mistaken. Do you know why he thinks I hit his car by any chance?”. And your wife shocked by your obtusity replies: “What?! Why are you asking me?! You should ask him, not me. I’m just saying it’s your fault if he is angry at you because he repeatedly said you repeatedly hit his car, so you shouldn’t have hit his car even once, it was your mistake, and now he’s justified to ask for a refund. Stop hitting his car and making him angry!”.
Unless there is a huge trust issue (like your wife has strong reasons to believe you are a systematic liar and the stranger is honest beyond any reasonable doubt), wouldn’t you think your wife is definitely a nut case to divorce from as soon as possible? I most certainly would.
By analogy, if YOU want to sensibly claim it’s US/West/NATO’s fault to provoke Putin because he perceives Ukraine joining NATO as a security threat, then YOU (not the Russians) have to provide strong reasons to support such threat perception.

What would the threat be if China offered a military pact to Canada, trained Canadian troops, supplied weapons, and conducted military drills along the US border? Why would the US consider this pact a threat? Can you guess? Or would you dismiss that claim as well? If so, I applaud your consistency. If not, what's the difference? — Mikie

1 - I expressly asked you to give Putin’s most unequivocal quotes specifying nature of the threat and its consequences if red lines were crossed, you didn’t provide any yet. And I also explained why I needed them: “there are some evident rhetoric benefits in making vague threats for alleged defensive reasons: playing the victim and therefore justify self-indulging behaviour (even the Nazis played the victim to justify their preventive aggressions), scare easy-to-impress people (but political leaders of a hawkish hegemonic country are not the first people that would come to mind right?) and discourage minimalist solutions (I’ll give you an example: the Cuban crisis. What was the security threat to the US? The deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. What was the solution? Not put nuclear missiles in Cuba. This didn’t require to have the US annexing or invading Cuba, changing regime in Cuba, changing the Cuban system of alliance, nuclear bomb Cuba, etc. It sufficed to find an agreement on nuclear missiles deployment)”.

2 - If not Putin’s quotes, you could still use concrete historical analogies to illustrate your point, as I did (i.e. the military cooperation between Cuba and Soviet Union that led to the Cuban missile crisis). Instead you parroted your guru Mearsheimer’s hypothetical analogy which is ONCE AGAIN vague about nature of the threat and consequences in case declared red lines are crossed. Besides the problem with a hypothetical analogy, is that it is constrained only by the explicit AND IMPLICIT assumptions one thinks are relevant to construe the analogy. This approach can more inadvertently bias the hypothetical analogy. The shared assumption between me and you here is that a defensive military alliance with a hegemonic archenemy in the US backyard would be likely perceived as a worrisome security threat that would need to be prevented or contained as it is the case with Russia and NATO expansion in Ukraine. What I further argue however is that the choice for best prevention and containment strategies depend on the specific perceived threats. A security threat unspecified with respect to its nature and affordable countermeasures in case red lines are crossed is hard to assess in the case of Russia as much as in it is in the hypothetical case of the US. On the other side there are AT LEAST two strong and very concrete reasons why Russian perceived security threat from NATO expansion in Ukraine is HIGHLY questionable: A) Russia is a heavy-weight military nuclear power nobody wants to mess up with for the fun of it (who in Europe would easily agree on Ukraine’s call for art.5 after aggressing Russia proper when they could be nuclear bombed by Russia, exactly?) B) the US de facto and consciously HELPED boost Russia military capabilities through concessions (see Budapest memorandum) and financing military ramp-up (through a good decade of abundant business with the West), among others. IF US administrations were definitely hostile against Russia, they couldn’t possibly help Russia the way they actually did, and didn’t do during the Cold War for the USSR. Besides this is true INDEPENDENTLY from Putin’s whining over generic security threats from NATO/US/West meddling in Ukraine.

In this case, how could you even complain about Western dirty propaganda, if you fall so candidly to foreign dirty propaganda? — neomac

Perhaps the rationale for the Monroe Doctrine is indeed "dirty propaganda." That's worth exploring, sure. But it's still very real, and I wouldn't advise China or Russia to go testing the United States on it -- however flimsy the reasoning behind it is, however much I think it to be based on unfounded fears, or whether or not I feel I have a direct look into the soul of Washington — Mikie

.

To assess if your fears are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct the reasons of your fears. To assess if China or Russia’s reactions to “the Monroe Doctrine” are rational, you have to be at least able to reconstruct their reasons for their reaction. And be also careful to not conflate your reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine” with their reasons to fear “the Monroe Doctrine”.

As I argued I’m TOTALLY convinced that Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be “threatening” to Russian security — neomac

Okay…so what’s the issue?
In that case, 2008 was a mistake. The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years. Period.
— Mikie

Another non sequitur. — neomac


And again you don't know what that means, or you fail to see the connection. I'll assume the latter, so I'll make it clearer:

(1) If it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a "red line"), then
(2) The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake. — Mikie

And again you don't know what “non sequitur” means, or you fail to see why your argument is a “non sequitur”. I’ll assume both. I'll make it clearer how embarrassingly poor your reasoning is from a logic point of view, step by step. Ready?
As a starter, either we understand that boldened “If… then…” as a logic propositional operator or we understand it as a logic deduction.
In the first case, the propositional logic form of your comment is something like: “p -> q” or “if p then q” (where p = “it is true that Russia considered NATO expansion to be a threat (and a ‘red line’)” and q = “The United States pushing NATO expansion anyway, despite these warnings, was clearly a mistake.”). In this case you are not offering an argument, but just a conditional proposition which could either serve as a premise for some argument or result as a conclusion from some argument. If it’s a premise for some argument, that argument won’t be proven to be sound until the premise is proven to be true along with other premises. On the other side, if it’s a conclusion drawn from some argument, where is the argument? It’s missing. Not to mention that this conditional proposition is evidently not analytically true (its truth doesn’t depend on the meaning of the words of p and q), and I questioned its empirical truth as well. In other words, you would just be offering a statement you happen to believe in, without a solid argument to support it. But I do not care about your beliefs as such, I care about the arguments that are supposed to support them. So where are the arguments?
In the second case, the propositional logic form of your comment is something like: “p ⊢ q” or “q (syntactically) derives from p”. In other words, from the premise p one can syntactically derive q by applying transformation rules governing logic propositional operators. This is not a conditional proposition, but a formal deductive argument between atomic propositions (indeed neither p nor q contain propositional logic operators). Unfortunately, in propositional logic, the rule is that atomic propositions can not be derived from atomic propositions. So, in propositional logic, your argument would be definitely false (q doesn’t follow from p, non sequitur).
Furthermore, the casual combination of “if.., then…” that could be easily taken as a propositional logic operator (by those familiar with propositional logic) to talk about the truth of certain propositions, as if you were performing some truth-functional calculus over propositions (like a deduction), with the declared intention to “make it clearer” to me because I don’t get the nuances of English as I’m not a native English speaker, strongly suggests that you are catastrophically conflating conditional propositions with deductive arguments, likely because you are too ignorant about logic to understand how logically confused your claim is.

Apparently you're arguing it wasn't a mistake, that somehow pushing for NATO expansion, despite Russian warnings, was a good move. — Mikie

Not really. So far I was arguing that Russian warnings are not a strong reason to believe that NATO expansion was the most relevant factor to explain the current war or to justify blame-attribution for the war (as your guru Mearsheimer claims “the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault").

I suppose you believe it was wise for the USSR to put nuclear weapons in Cuba, right? That wasn't a mistake either, by your logic. — Mikie

As far as I’m concerned, it was a nightmarish risky move, but not escalatory in the sense that it was proportional to the nuclear threat the US was exposing USSR to. However Soviet Union’s bold move turned out to be effective in the end: “On Saturday, October 27, after much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles set in Turkey and possibly southern Italy, the former on the border of the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis).

As I said one can take “Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be ‘threatening’ to Russian security” as a premise to support NATO expansion as well. — neomac


So when a war finally breaks out because of this expansion, we still think it's just fine?

You'd fit right in with the Washington crowd. — Mikie

As far as I’m concerned, it is understandable to feel anguished by wars and threats of wars, whose horrible consequences one perceives to be likely or unavoidably exposed to. And uncertainties about it can feel as an intolerable psychological torture.
Unfortunately reality may differ from our preferences in all sorts of nightmarish ways like e.g. an incurable cancer. So instead of whining over it, go in denial, blame the convenient scapegoat or
look for help from holy gurus and snake-handlers, I find it more helpful to cope with my anguishes and uncertainties to try to understand the reality I’m facing, especially concerning events much bigger than me (as an incurable cancer or a escalatory competition for hegemony), and then to see what I can afford in that scenario to serve my preferences (for example, I prefer for me and people I care to live like an avg American, European, Japanese, South Korean, Canadian or Australian, than to live like an avg Russian, Chinese, Iranian or North Korean, you?).

Until you raise the quality of your arguments, I'll leave you at that.

Anything else you feel like wanting to embarrass yourself with? — neomac

It wasn’t close to a non sequitur. Try learning what words mean before trying to sound smart.
The only one embarrassing themselves is you. — Mikie

So are you denying that “non sequitur” means “it doesn’t follow” or that it is used as a label for a “logic fallacy”, prof?
What else do you think it means, prof? Teach me, I’m eager to learn from your superior knowledge.
And then apply your own definition to your own argument:
“Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so”.
In what sense this crystal clear textbook example of non sequitur according to the definition I provided, is not a non sequitur?

Because to me it’s a textbook example of dismissive comment about the relevance of historical evidences behind NATO expansion against the Russian threat. — neomac


NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat,” which is the point — Mikie

.

Dude, should we or shouldn’t we dismiss accounts based on historical rationales? I accused you of being dismissive, you protested that it was my projection. Who is right? If we should dismiss them, then your comment was indeed dismissive, not my projection, if we shouldn’t dismiss them in explaining NATO expansion, then they hold. So it’s false your claim that NATO didn’t expand because of the “Russian threat” .
Besides you keep repeating claims without providing much to supporting them, not to mention your reluctance to clarify your grounding assumptions, despite all my questions.
NATO has an "open door policy" for candidate members, right? Did candidate members from East Europe express concern for perceived “Russian threat” (from Visegrad, Vilnius group, Ukraine, or Georgia) given past history while seeking NATO protection and triggering explicit opposition from Russia? Yes or no? If yes, this is a relevant and persistent driving factor of NATO expansion. Otherwise it isn’t. Which is it?
I don’t need to state that’s the only driving factor, indeed one should take into consideration also the hot debate between national security advisors (among them, experts like Brzeziński), the Congress and President’s administrations in understanding the American national interest in the post-cold war wrt NATO and how it impacted NATO enlargement. Surely those Clinton’s and Bush Jr’s administrations (differently from Bush senior’s administration) may have suffered from excessive overconfidence about their understanding and pursuit of NATO enlargement vis-a-vis of the Russian threat.

why NATO’s Article 5 [1] (which is clearly defensive) is a security threat aimed against Russia? — neomac

Ask the Russians. They’ll tell you. And it’s they who get to determine what’s threatening to them and what isn’t— not you and me. — Mikie

No no I’m asking you, because you take Putin’s alleged rationale to actually have not only explanatory but also justificatory power for the origin of this war, not as a convenient lie just to persuade “useful Idiots” in the West, right? Unless it would be fine with you if Russia (and its emulators: China, Iran, Nord Korea, Islamic regimes) voiced all sorts of made-up security concerns and red lines to make whatever exploitative demands against the West with the complacency and submissiveness of Western “useful idiots”, right? In this case, how could you even complain about Western dirty propaganda, if you fall so candidly to foreign dirty propaganda?
BTW I can’t help but notice yours is another typical dodgy answer that happens to coincide with Mearsheimer’s when challenged on that.

Maybe a Canada joining a “defensive” military alliance with China would be fine in the US— who knows? But I’m guessing the US would consider it a threat— and if I were China, or Canada, I would take that seriously.

declared intentions — neomac

No one is talking about “declared intentions,” only what was considered a provocation and threat — which was clear enough for our own ambassador to understand. — Mikie

And on what geopolitical grounds, is it so decisive to you to talk “only what was considered a provocation and threat” by Putin for explanations or justification of the current war?

As I argued I’m TOTALLY convinced that Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be “threatening” to Russian security — neomac

Okay…so what’s the issue?
In that case, 2008 was a mistake. The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years. Period. — Mikie

Another non sequitur. “Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be ‘threatening’ to Russian security” is a fact (which I’m acknowledging). “The US should not have continued pushing NATO membership for years” is a normative claim (that you are making).
How does the latter claim logically follow from the former claim?
As I said one can take “Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be ‘threatening’ to Russian security” as a premise to support NATO expansion as well.
Again, if you do not explicit your assumptions, your claims look dogmatic and myopic, or worse illogic. Non sequiturs.

This is a non sequitur. — neomac

Learn what these words mean before using them. — Mikie

“Non sequitur” is a Latin expression literally meaning “it doesn’t follow” and that would be already enough, if you understood my charitable objection: "There was no reason to do so" doesn't informally follow from "Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line". But, if one wants to be more pedantic, it’s also a well-known label for the following logic fallacy: “in logic and philosophy, a formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur is a pattern of reasoning rendered invalid by a flaw in its logical structure that can neatly be expressed in a standard logic system, for example propositional logic" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_fallacy), which your argument - as it is formulated, namely “Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so” - SO OBVIOUSLY is.
Anything else you feel like wanting to embarrass yourself with?

your dismissive attitude toward overwhelming historical evidences — neomac

Nope. That was your projection — Mikie

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Oh really?! So pray tell, what else was the point of “Russian history? That’s like arguing that we should surround the nation of Germany because, you know…stuff that happened 80+ years ago” exactly? Because to me it’s a textbook example of dismissive comment about the relevance of historical evidences behind NATO expansion against the Russian threat. Give me an example of how else you would formulate the same content to sound dismissive.

Pls fill in a few of the most unequivocal quotes from Putin 2000-2008 presidency explaining why Ukraine is a “red line” and what that implies, what is going to happen if it is crossed — neomac

I just did above. Plenty more. — Mikie

Well that’s very disappointing wrt what I expressly asked. Indeed, if that’s Putin’s full quote you are referring to is “The appearance on our borders of a powerful military bloc, whose members' actions are regulated, among other [documents], by Article 5 of the Washington [North Atlantic] Treaty, will be taken in Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country. And we cannot be satisfied with statements that this process is not aimed against Russia." (https://www.rferl.org/a/1079735.html) is rather equivocal wrt the nature of the security threat and indeterminate about its consequences.
1 - First of all, why NATO’s Article 5 [1] (which is clearly defensive) is a security threat aimed against Russia? Was Russia implying that they wanted to aggress Ukraine, therefore they didn’t like the idea that Ukraine could invoke article 5, and defend itself with the support of NATO countries? Or that Ukrainians felt that once Ukraine was protected by NATO they were determined to military aggress Russia? But in that case Ukraine couldn’t invoke Article 5 right? Besides Russia is a military nuclear power (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction) that any country fears, how plausible would be to have Ukraine to attack Russia (nuclear missiles in European bases remain under the control of the US, not of the hosting countries)? Not to mention that history clearly tells us that Russia oppressed Ukraine not the other way around. And there are official Russian quotes that are very open about letting Ukraine decide what organisation to join. So which is it? Besides did Russia ever express declared intentions to not invade Ukraine and respect its sovereignty. I’d say yes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum), so did Putin between 2000-2008 ever declare intentions to not invade Ukraine and respect its sovereignty? If not, what did this missing declaration imply? That Putin was committed or not committed to Budapest memorandum? Besides, as the Budapest memorandum suggests, one of the main concern of the US was the fate of the Russian nuclear arsenal after the collapse of Soviet Union, as it still would be if Russia collapses. But then there would be two perceived strong reasons about Russian military nuclear power INDEPENDENTLY from Putin or any other Russian President that would make an aggression of Russia by NATO unlikely, and which are stronger than the threat of Putin’s feeling provoked as such: indeed the US wouldn’t have to be so much worried if Iran feels provoked and sets red lines, because it is not a military nuclear power yet, right?
2 - Putin’s claim doesn’t specify what will happen if lines are crossed AT ALL. Did Putin mean that if Ukraine joins NATO Russia will start a nuclear war with NATO states right away? Or just a conventional war against NATO? But if he ALREADY had no fear to do that, why a defensive art.5 invoked by Ukraine inside NATO would be a security threat to Putin which would have the same effect? And if a full-out war was too risky to him, why not supporting far-right terrorism in Europe/US/Ukraine? Why not provoking civil wars in Europe, inflating national identities, or immigration crisis? Or it means that Putin would start a war just in Ukraine? But then why didn’t Putin declare war to Ukraine much earlier (during Trump, Obama, Bush administrations)?! Ukraine and the West would have been totally unprepared back then, why give them the chance to prepare themselves for a war?! If the Western plan of having Ukraine joining NATO was such a threat, why did he take a good decade to such unbreakable threat which NATO wasn’t prepared for?! Or Putin simply meant that he needed to find a security framework that would include Russian concerns in some satisfactory form with no specifications attached to it? Or else, did he mean he would be ready to annex Crimea in 2014 back then? Or invade Ukraine in 2022? The alleged genocide of Russians in Donbas were an issue back then too?! How about Finland? Also Finland joining NATO matches that claim, will Putin aggress Finland too now?! If not, why not?!

Do you have quotes from 2000-2008 clarifying these points , because if you haven’t and we want to stick to declared intentions then you too could be the one who is trying to interpret retroactively what Putin meant back in 2008 in light of what it happened since 2014, thanks to the fact Putin’s threat could mean and, and in your eyes, even justify literally any hostile reaction against the West at any time, because he felt provoked, right?
BTW if we should care only about declared intentions to assess security threats, why is Putin dispensed with doing the same (“And we cannot be satisfied with statements that this process is not aimed against Russia.")? Maybe it’s because threat assessment by state leaders are not necessarily based on mere declared intentions? Notice also that there are some evident rhetoric benefits in making vague threats for alleged defensive reasons: playing the victim and therefore justify self-indulging behaviour (even the Nazis played the victim to justify their preventive aggressions), scare easy-to-impress people (but political leaders of a hawkish hegemonic country are not the first people that would come to mind right?) and discourage minimalist solutions (I’ll give you an example: the Cuban crisis. What was the security threat to the US? The deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. What was the solution? Not put nuclear missiles in Cuba. This didn’t require to have the US annexing or invading Cuba, changing regime in Cuba, changing the Cuban system of alliance, nuclear bomb Cuba, etc. It sufficed to find an agreement on nuclear missiles deployment).
In any case, economic or military blackmails may not work as one might think or wish on countries with hegemonic ambitions: if that’s true for Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, that should be very much expected to be true also for the hegemonic power too.

The appearance on our borders of a powerful military bloc ... will be considered by Russia as a direct threat to our country's security,

Again what do you mean by “Russia was such a threat”, — neomac

That Russia has imperial ambitions, that they seek to conquer not just Ukraine but other countries, etc. Claims that have been made by the US and others since 2014, and retroactively made as justification for 2008 — which isn’t true.

NATO is a hegemonic security supplier and Ukraine is a non-hegemonic security seeker (from Russian threats), that is how they met each other. Anyone with a working brain would get that knowing the history of Russia and the history of Ukraine. — neomac

I’ve already acknowledged this. — Mikie

You didn’t quote any of such claims nor proved that they are “retroactively” made as justification for 2008. Indeed arguments for NATO expansion came prior 2014 and 2008, and prior to Putin’s presidency, and do not need to rely on Putin’s declared intentions but on the evidences of Russian-Ukrainian history (evidences you acknowledged). So much so that Putin himself is still picking from Russian (also Imperial) history to justify his war and his territorial annexations, go figure. Besides Putin’s politics during 2000-2008 didn’t do anything to contradict Russian imperialist ambitions, on the contrary all he has done is to ENABLE the pursuit of imperial ambitions after necessary power consolidation (so much so that Russia changed its military doctrine already in 2010 which would most certainly come in handy in any possible annexation of territories in neighbouring countries with Russian minorities). And Putin is member of the Cold War mentality Russian elites so trust issues with him shouldn’t come as a surprise AT ALL.
Again you didn’t explain what counts as evidence to support the claim “Russia has imperial ambitions”. For Ukraine, Georgia and Poland, any attempt to question post-Soviet Union countries independent foreign policy was expression of Russian imperial ambitions even during 2000-2008 (https://www.aei.org/articles/love-and-hate-polish-russian-relations-marred-by-russian-unpredictability-and-eu-and-nato-uncertainty/, https://jamestown.org/program/poland-plays-strategic-role-in-ukraines-orange-revolution/, https://euobserver.com/world/22861). Why are they wrong and you right? Notice that one can extend or narrow the semantic of a notion at convenience: example, “Russia has not imperial ambitions, because no Russian president proclaimed himself emperor”. But then why are we talking about American imperialism (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_imperialism)? There are no American emperors either.
What about “hegemonic ambitions” instead of “imperial ambitions”? Do you like that expression better? If so (why so?), do you exclude that Putin’s Russia had hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine in 2008 as well? And that Putin’s “provocation” claims didn’t presuppose it? What would constitute relevant evidence to assess hegemonic ambitions in geopolitics?

Indeed American as any hegemon can commit mistakes and very big ones, but even in this case that doesn’t necessarily mean that NATO involvement was not justified AT ALL. It can simply mean that NATO involvement was poorly planned and/or executed. — neomac


It wasn’t poorly planned, and of course there are reasons and justifications given. The actual reason is that the US wanted to make Eastern Europe like Western Europe, and figured Russia was to weak to do anything about it. So in 2008, despite warnings, they started the process anyway.

You can buy the US rationale if you want to. I don’t. But either way, the outcome was clear: it would provoke Russia. This was known since the early 90s, in fact. — Mikie

“It wasn’t poorly planned” is a claim not an argument, and I don’t need to buy any rationale. Yet. I limit myself to try to understand what it was and get you to do the same exercise to sound more challenging. I acknowledge the fact that Russia was sensitive about it, and vocally so. But these are not all the relevant facts about the relation between the US and Russia: indeed, Putins’ 2000-2008 Russia might have been weaker than it was in 2013, but not as weak as it was Russia under Yeltsin in terms of power consolidation and domestic popularity. However even then, during Yeltsin, Ukraine didn’t join the West despite all reasons in favour of that (it was because the West couldn’t care less to have Ukraine joining NATO or because Russian opposition was diplomatically taken into account?!). Besides in that period the most imminent threat to the US or broadly the West was Islamist terrorism, and Russia was willing to cooperate with the West against a common enemy, so that was likely a strong reason on both sides to not escalate reciprocal hostilities. Besides the US pushed Ukraine to give back nuclear weapons to Russia (benefiting Russia), and then Western countries wanted to do business with Russia (that’s why states like Germany were against Ukraine joining NATO, and yet Finland had no problems, why the difference?). At the same time Russia enjoyed the benefits of globalisation so he kept playing as friendly as he could for its own convenience until he felt the right moment to invaded Ukraine. Russia used its resources capitalized during the globalization not to increase democracy, welfare state in Russia and quell revanchist ideologies against the West, but to project military/political power and anti-American propaganda beyond its borders, in the West (through political corruption, trolling farms, support to far-right movements), in the Middle East, in Africa, build alliances with authoritarian regimes like China and Iran to counterbalance the hegemon. All these are FACTS to be acknowledged. Right? Finally “provoking Russia” should be taken in the geopolitical context of a hegemonic competition. Otherwise it doesn’t make any sense. Right?

but the latter PRESUPPOSES that Russia was interested in preventing NATO expansion in Ukraine — neomac

Are you really not convinced that at least by 2008, Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be threatening to Russian security? They said so explicitly. It’s not about what you or I feel, it’s about how they felt about it. The US knew, and has known for years, and made the decision to go forward with expansion anyway. So Crimea and now the Ukraine War shouldn’t be a mystery. — Mikie

As I argued I’m TOTALLY convinced that Russia considered NATO expansion in Ukraine to be “threatening” to Russian security, but I understand threats in terms of power struggle for hegemony, which have their game rules driven by security dilemmas and their historical background. Not for the puerile reason that “Putin said so” and the universe knew it since ever.
“The US knew, and has known for years, and made the decision to go forward with expansion anyway” is expected also in light of your guru Mearsheimer’s offensive realism which is all about states being security maximisers (ideas that are echoed in American officials like the Wolfowitz Doctrine and “many of its tenets re-emerged in the Bush Doctrine” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfowitz_Doctrine). However your guru Mearsheimer didn’t seem to take much into account Western globalization nor how much it benefited America’s hegemonic competitors (Russia included). Nor take into account that the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO didn’t damage Russia's national security AT ALL because it never materialised and nobody started a military aggression against Russia from Ukraine, on the contrary the narrative of Ukraine joining NATO as a provocation (which your guru Mearsheimer also spins) literally empowered and emboldened Russian anti-American propaganda in the West , revanchist and imperialist views in domestic country, and its business with West Europe, especially with Germany (which means wealth to invest in military ramp-up and projection that MOST CERTAINLY ENABLED the Ukrainian war whatever the fuck Putin’s declared intentions were in 2000). See? Yet another example of self-fulfilling prophecy. Hegemonic competitors need no help to find and voice pretexts about national security and national interest to pursue their power struggles, what they may desperately need is the ENABLING means to effectively pursue their hegemonic goals.
Notice also the difference in our approaches. You are discussing Ukrainian war to assess blame based on whatever naive and implicit understanding of geopolitical conflicts makes you happy, I discuss Ukrainian war to understand geopolitical conflicts as such first, independently from my preferences.

your guru Mearsheimer) — neomac
your guru Mearsheimer — neomac
your guru Mearsheimer — neomac

You seem obsessed with this guy. I haven’t cited him once— except in response to your referencing him.

So, are you just ignorant or what? — Mikie

Oh do you mean that it is pure coincidence that you brought up the same arguments that Mearsheimer abundantly defended (starting with “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault?”), popularised (everywhere he could as other fantastic superheroes like Chomsky and Sachs) and got so viral in the internet (including this thread)? BTW why didn’t you protest earlier if I was so awfully “ignorant or what”?
Don’t waste your time convince me otherwise, because that’s a totally irrelevant issue: indeed, even if we want to pretend that Mearsheimer is not your guru, all the points I made still hold against your as much as Mearsheimer’s pro-Putin views.



[1]
Article 5
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm

Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so. — Mikie


From the official Kremlin press release on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council:

On the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine. But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged. — President of Russia — Jabberwock

02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:

Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?

Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.

https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html

Why stupid provocation? — neomac

Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so. — Mikie

This is a non sequitur. At most you can argue that there was a “very strong” reason NOT to do so (Russia’s strong opposition). Not that there was NO reason to do so. And reasons are more or less strong compared to other reasons. So the US, NATO, Ukraine may have had THEIR strong reasons to counter such Russian strong opposition (among them, all the concessions they made to Russia).
“Red lines” are not necessarily a geopolitical imperative AT ALL. Attacking Crimea was a “red line”, it got attacked. Killing Soleimani was crossing a red line, it got crossed. But most of all, why was Ukraine a “red line”? What does it mean? What does it imply? Pls fill in a few of the most unequivocal quotes from Putin 2000-2008 presidency explaining why Ukraine is a “red line” and what that implies, what is going to happen if it is crossed, since “declared intentions” seem to be so decisive to your argument.

You’re confusing the very real tensions between Ukraine and Russia, which Mearsheimer discusses, and the justification for NATO involvement — Mikie

You wish I made such confusion but I didn’t. Indeed I limited myself to cite Mearsheimer to counter your dismissive attitude toward overwhelming historical evidences concerning “the very real tensions between Ukraine and Russia”, reason why Russia was perceived as a troublemaker by many prominent geopolitical analysts (including your guru Mearsheimer), independently from Russian presidents’ declared intentions. I didn’t argue that suffices to support NATO involvement. Yet.
First let’s get on the same track over the relevant facts.

which today is claimed to be the threat of Russian imperialism — which is incorrect, and which is why the very same person (Mearsheimer) was rightly against it all along, including 1993. — Mikie

That the claimed “threat of Russian imperialism” is incorrect is just a cheap claim. I’m more interested to hear effective arguments to support it. That also presupposes shared understanding of what “threat of Russian imperialism” means and what constitutes evidence for it.
“Mearsheimer said so” may be a strong argument if one takes Mearsheimer as his guru. That’s not my case.

If Russia was such a threat, surely that would have been mentioned in 2008. But even if kept secret for whatever reason, anyone with a working brain would see that NATO involvement would only exacerbate the issue, thus creating a self fulfilling prophecy. — Mikie

Again what do you mean by “Russia was such a threat”, why “surely” that would have been mentioned in 2008?
Your reasoning is all behind these ambiguous expressions. I clarified what is my understanding of “Russia was such a threat” and why “surely” should have NOT been mentioned. NATO is a hegemonic security supplier and Ukraine is a non-hegemonic security seeker (from Russian threats), that is how they met each other. Anyone with a working brain would get that knowing the history of Russia and the history of Ukraine. Even between 2000 and 2008.
The notion of “provocation” presupposes that Russia had interest in having NATO out of Ukraine not to preserve its independence from an oppressive hegemon, because we agree that the perceived historical oppressor of Ukraine was Russia not the US, and Ukraine was seeking security from NATO against Russia. So Russian interest was about taking control over Ukraine. In other words, it was matter of hegemonic competition, about great powers antagonising each others and having the means to act accordingly (let's not forget the Russia is a nuclear power even after the collapse of Soviet Union).
Geopolitical relations can be rife of provocations and self-fulfilling prophecies: Russia was afraid of NATO expansion and wanted to counter it, but then a decaying NATO revived and expanded even more thanks to Putin. This phenomenon is very much EXPECTED because when there are reasons to mistrust one another (as in Russia Ukraine or Russia and the US), any defensive move by a state to contain a potential threat from the other will be perceived as a hostile move. So, calling it “provocation” doesn’t hold as a justification for NOT expanding NATO either (Brzezinski uses this as an argument IN FAVOR of NATO expansion, go figure!). Unless you are conflating facts (Russia’s perceived provocation from NATO expansion) with justification.
What I may concede is a weaker version of “a working brain would see that NATO involvement would only exacerbate the issue”, that is why I talked about overconfidence. Indeed American as any hegemon can commit mistakes and very big ones, but even in this case that doesn’t necessarily mean that NATO involvement in Ukraine was not justified AT ALL. It can simply mean that NATO involvement was poorly planned and/or executed.
Until you take more seriously the task of expliciting your reasoning from your implicit assumptions about geopolitics, your arguments or claims look myopic and dogmatic to me.

But then what was the point of having Ukraine joining NATO? — neomac

US hegemony. To make Ukraine a “Western bulwark on Russian borders.” Russia was believed to be to WEAK to prevent NATO expansion at that point, in 2008.
It certainly wasn’t because of a Russian imperialist threat. Which is why none of that was mentioned, and which is why Putin was himself at the summit. Any talk of Russian threats as justification for NATO wasn’t even mentioned until 2014. — Mikie

Dude, focus, I argued about it already. I agree with “because of US hegemony” and with “Russia was believed to be to WEAK to prevent NATO expansion at that point, in 2008” but the latter PRESUPPOSES that Russia was interested in preventing NATO expansion in Ukraine, the competing hegemonic interest on both sides IS the threat and security dilemma I’m talking about. AND OF COURSE the hegemon (the US) acts at the expense of its competitors (Russia) when the latter ARE PERCEIVED AS WEAK, and postpone it further may be already TOO late to do it. For the same reason Russia aggressed Ukraine NOW and not in 2008, because Putin thinks he is strong enough, and NATO/US/ the West is weak enough that they can’t do much about it. And why would Russia do that? Because NATO is perceived as a threat by Russians! Even though I just said that Putin felt confident (or overconfident?) that NATO was brain dead!
Competing great powers constitute a reciprocal threat, this is the expected core of their security dilemmas. Such power politics dynamics perfectly in line with your guru Mearsheimer’s offensive-realist views on how states assess security threats in the geopolitical arena. However all these facts are not enough to decide how to establish moral or geopolitical justifications of NATO expansion or blame for the ongoing war.
Until you take more seriously the task of expliciting your reasoning from your assumptions about geopolitics, your arguments or claims look not only myopic, dogmatic, but self-defeating.

I’ll skip the rest of your jumbled ramblings. You’ve not shown you even understand what’s being argued. I’m talking about Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008, and about NATO. I’m not talking about historical relations or ancient history or 90s reactions to the dissolution of the USSR. — Mikie

Again, your argument is grounded on a load of implicit assumptions which I’m questioning and you have a hard time to make them explicit and compelling.

1 - On what grounds should we exclusively focus our understanding of Russia vs the US/NATO on “Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008” to understand justifications and place blames? NATO expansion started BEFORE Putin, NATO-Ukraine relationships started BEFORE Putin, relevant reasons by involved parties were based on the historical antagonism between Russia and Ukraine, Russian Soviet Union and NATO and the future of European security, and not based on Russian presidents declared intentions at a given time. Mearshimer’s 1993 prediction of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was based on historical evidences not on President Yeltsin’s declarations of intents, and was concerning the future not just 1993, immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union, the most vulnerable moment of recent Russian history. So much so that for some the concern was not to humiliate them (as it happened with Germany after WW I) and find a way to reintegrate them in the international community, maybe even as an ally of the West. While the idea of Ukraine joining NATO dragged forever.
Additionally, after the collapse of Soviet Union, the elites of the soviet unions didn’t vanish like in Nazi Germany, they survived. Putin is indeed one of them. So why shouldn’t the reasons of the past concern these 8 years of Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008? There would be no perceived provocation and no need of NATO expansion if those reasons weren’t there. Putin himself has plenty of historical claims about his right to land grabbing in Ukraine, which apparently weren’t brought up during the Bucharest Summit, right?

2 - Security dilemmas do not need to be exclusively or primarily grounded on presidents’ declared intentions AT ALL. As also your guru Mearsheimer writes: “states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Specifically, no state can be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability against the first. This is not to say that states necessarily have malign intentions. Another state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty. There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and malign the next. Uncertainty is unavoidable when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go with their offensive military capability
https://www.sv.uio.no/livet-rundt-studiene/studiestart/kollokviefadder/artikler-til-kollokvietreff/the-false-promise-of-international-institutions.pdf (1994-1995)

3 - What was doing Putin in 2000-2008? Consolidating authoritarian power in Russia, crushing independents movements within Russian borders, nurturing far-right ethnic nationalist fan-base, grunting over coloured revolutions in ex-Soviet area, instead of using the Western support, indulgence and partnership to increase democracy, welfare and quell revanchist ideologies. And when it finished with that he started projecting Russian power beyond its boarders. Actually China and Iran did the same : enjoyed the economic and institutional benefits of American promoted globalisation and then used what has been capitalised to grow authoritarian, revanchist against the hegemon, and to project power beyond their borders. So even during 2000-2008 Putin was NOT PERCEIVED as a piece of cake AT ALL (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0151.pdf), and most vocally not by Eastern European countries neighbouring Russia (including Poland and Baltic countries). For them talking about Russian imperialism was not taboo EVEN during 2000-2008.
However the most evident threat of that time, especially for the US and West Europe, was Islamist terrorism which Putin also wanted to fight. And in any case the hegemon preferred “the carrot and stick” strategy to deal with Russia, China and Iran, even though later these countries turned against the US. The point is that the story is not just NATO expanded and provoked Russia, but at the same time globalisation expanded BENEFITING RUSSIA and its resourgence.

Yes it is, indeed this is what was argued to support NATO — neomac

70 years ago.

That’s not what was argued in 2008.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, the US didn’t fear imminent hegemonic competition from Russia OBVIOUSLY. — neomac


Right— which makes the Bucharest Summit an unnecessary and stupid provocation — Mikie

.


Why stupid provocation? If the premise of the Bucharest Summit was “We recall that the NATO-Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on core principles, values and commitments, including democracy, civil liberties and political pluralism.” And “We reaffirm to Russia that NATO’s Open Door policy and current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability.” Then the conclusion “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.  Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations.  We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May.  MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership.  Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP.  Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.  We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting.  Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.” (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm) is consequential. If it isn’t, it means that the premise is wrong.
Your argument is self-defeating: to be a stupid provocation, one must admit a hegemonic ambition from Russia over Ukraine as Mearsheimer does. Which could have been VERY WELL overlooked by an overconfident American administration in light of all concessions made to Russia and partnership with Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union. That doesn’t exclude at all the perception of a potential conflicts in Ukraine. If A and B are likely going to fight (as Mearsheimer suggests Russia and Ukraine would do in 1993, and Russia being the bully one, with or without Putin), a third party could keep them separated.
It’s obvious for the hegemon to play the hegemon, if it isn’t it’s because a competitor intends to challenge the hegemon. But than that’s a threat for the hegemon.

So Russia was considered “such a threat” by many prominent/influential Western analysts and East European countries — neomac


No, it wasn’t.

Nor was Russian imperialism cited as a reason in 2008 — Mikie

.


So what? “Imperialism’ can be easily taken as a derogatory expression, so while one is playing diplomacy with a potential competitor to be tamed and whose declared intentions are not fully trusted, of course this word won’t be used . Unless you are really claiming that NATO declaration should have sounded more like “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO because fucking Russian imperialism has to stop, right little Putin?”. Surely that would be a provocation, wouldn’t it? But then what was the point of having Ukraine joining NATO?
In any case the issue of Russian imperialism was totally evident among American anlysts prior to 2008:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/03/26/the-russia-debate-nixon-vs-brzezinski/31124b6b-f0d3-4449-a0ce-da2b8e55043e/
“Two opposing camps have formed in America's foreign policy establishment over the opportunities and dangers rising from the breakup of the Soviet Union. The one you will want to join depends on how you view the nature and strength of Russian imperialism at the end of the 20th century.”

Indeed I cited it precisely because it talks about Russian threats prior 2008 — neomac


No, it doesn’t. You’re inability to comprehend what you read isn’t my problem. I’ll help:

No one was claiming Putin had imperialist ambitions back then. — Mikie


Which is true. Which your falsely-dated reference outlines very well:

Political will aside, extending NATO’s security umbrella into the heart of the old Soviet Union is not wise. It is sure to engage the Russians and cause them to act belligerently. — The Article You Quoted But Didn’t Understand

It’s laughable you still think this somehow supports all the smoke you blow. — Mikie

I don’t think you understood my argument at all. You keep assessing it from within your frame of implicit assumptions, which I’m questioning. For example I’m questioning Mearsheimer TOO. I just pointed out that Mearsheimer, your guru not mine, in his article of 1993 prior 2008 was expressly talking about the risks of conflict based on historical reasons concerning Russia and Ukraine which you were so ready to discount (“Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast Bolshevism.”) not based on the DECLARED INTENTIONS by Russian President Yeltsin. And that the Russians didn’t tolerate an independent Ukraine “several such disputes are already on the horizon: ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, control of the Crimea, ownership of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, and a host of economic issues stemming from the of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many Russians would breakup change the present border with Ukraine, and some even reject the idea of an independent Ukraine. Senior Russian officials, for example, have recently been describing Ukraine's independence as a ‘transitional’ phenomenon and have been warning other European governments not to open embassies in Kiev because they would soon be downgraded to consular sections subordinate to their embassies in Moscow.” which again is not an assessment based on the DECLARED INTENTIONS by Russian President Yeltsin. And claiming that joining NATO was or was not a good idea is based on this premise about Great Powers like Russia are perceived as a threat by countries like Ukraine.
The general point here is that assessing security dilemmas involving Great Powers doesn’t need to go through declared intentions of presidents AT ALL. And this general point is not contradicted by Mearsheimer’s offensive realism principles:
The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Specifically, no state can be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability against the first. This is not to say that states necessarily have malign intentions. Another state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty.
There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them. Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and malign the next. Uncertainty is unavoidable when assessing intentions, which simply means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go with their offensive military capability
https://www.sv.uio.no/livet-rundt-studiene/studiestart/kollokviefadder/artikler-til-kollokvietreff/the-false-promise-of-international-institutions.pdf (1994-1995)
That is why your belief that evidences of Putin’s declared intentions or American President’s declared intentions in a precise moment are all that counts in assessing responsibilities without understanding deeper geopolitical dynamics is catastrophically misguided. And that’s a problem for latest Mearsheimer’s pro-Putin arguments too (I suspect there are theoretical reasons why he made this argument, but they are irrelavant to the point I’m making).
Besides nobody needs to stick to Mearsheimer’s apparently narrow notion and application of the notion “Russian imperialism” AT ALL. And I certainly don’t. So I can’t care less if Mearsheimer uses the word “imperialism” for his own reason. I can care if he acknowledges or not what to me counts as expression of Russian imperialism. And he does. That’s the evidence I need, not his word choices.
On the other side Mearsheimer’s wording choices are important to you because he is your guru, so if he is critical toward the expression “Russia imperialism” for whatever reason, you feel you kicked my ass so badly. Besides your understanding of geopolitics seems grounded on declared intentions of presidents which is simply outlandish also from the perspective of Mearshaimer’s offensive realism.

mine was just a typo — neomac

It wasn’t a typo. 1993 and 2013 are vastly different. You simply misread the fact that the article was accessed in the 2010s. You just carelessly used it in the hopes it would support your case, failing to notice it supports exactly what I mentioned — and which you can’t seem to follow (or won’t allow yourself to). But your poor reading comprehension isn’t my fault. — Mikie

It was a typo. And once you understand my argument correctly you would understand why it was important for me to report Mearsheimer’s views on Russia before 2008 (and not after), because your challenge was about evidences concerning Russian threat prior to 2008, and that what you mentioned (Mearsheimer’s disagreeing with NATO expansion) supports my argument that Russia was a threat: indeed that’s why Mearsheimer supported leaving a nuclear deterrence in Ukraine. And if Mearsheimer doesn’t call that “Russian imperialism”, who gives a shit?

relevant evidences to fix security dilemmas in geopolitics (have you ever heard of Mearsheimer's offensive realism?). — neomac


The same Mearsheimer who agrees there was no evidence whatsoever of Putin’s imperialism for the NATO provocation in 2008? Sure. — Mikie

Russian history? That’s like arguing that we should surround the nation of Germany because, you know…stuff that happened 80+ years ago.

Yes it is, indeed this is what was argued to support NATO:
By the end of his tenure however, Ismay had become the biggest advocate of the organisation he had famously said earlier on in his political career, was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/declassified_137930.htm

If that’s what you mean, no I don’t consider that evidence for why NATO needed expansion at the Bucharest summit in April of 2008. A meeting in which Putin was invited. (Odd move if he was considered such a threat.) — Mikie

All the rhetoric strength of your argument relies on this mystiphying locution “he was considered such a threat” (again ask your offensive-realist guru Mearsheimer how he thinks States assess threat).
After the collapse of Soviet Union, the US didn’t fear imminent hegemonic competition from Russia OBVIOUSLY.
The liberal views of the American governments were optimistic enough and thought they could play stick and carrot with Russia (economic aids, reintegration in the Western-led international community, energy business with Europe, returning nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia, go figure!). And stick wasn’t meant to be much of a stick, since NATO is a defensive alliance which in the US even East European lobbies supported, fearing a Russian imperialist-nationalist revival.
This was obvious to every prominent geopolitical analyst since immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union: it’s not just the Russo-phobo Brzezinski (whose views were much more influential than your guru Mearsheimer’s on the American administration) but also your guru offensive-realist Mearsheimer who were aware of it and warned pretty vocally on not UNDERESTIMATING the Russian threat.
So the leading Western Europeans didn’t hear the Eastern Europeans warnings about Russia, at the prospect of having cheap oil/gas for their industries, Russia was far away and they felt well protected by the US.
And American administrations didn’t feel pressed by Russian revanchism at the end of the Cold War no matter how American analysts (including your guru Mearsheimer) were vocal about it.
So Russia was considered “such a threat” by many prominent/influential Western analysts and East European countries even though it wasn’t considered “such a threat” by many optimistic Western administrations. They thought they could close en eye while Russia was playing friendly, even two when Russia took Crimea. Until they couldn't when Russia invaded Ukraine.
BTW also the reunification of Germany and now its rearming triggered and triggers security dilemmas in neighbouring countries. The point is that Germany lost the war , they elites completely replaced. That’s not true for Russia, after the collapse of Soviet Union, as President Putin himself is living proof of.

The narrative of Russian imperialism prior to 2008 necessitating the expansion of NATO is revisionism. That’s not what happened. Which is why you and people like you can give no evidence of it, and have to report to vague statements like “Russian history.” — Mikie

It hurts badly when your chosen guru embarrasses you so patently, I know. Do you want a hug?

So much so that you guru Mearsheimer wrote an article about it in Summer 2013 — neomac

No he didn’t. He wrote that in 1993. And he never once advocates for Ukraine becoming a member of NATO— in fact accurately predicts that any tensions between the countries would only escalate if that happened. Which is exactly what happened. He states this clearly in the paper you cite but apparently didn’t read.
Try to get the basic facts right at least. — Mikie

Absolutely, mine was just a typo, whose correction I highly welcome. Indeed I cited it precisely because it talks about Russian threats prior 2008 and it comes from your guru. So thanks! LOL

:up:

Still, after 510 pages, no one has given a shred of evidence for the “Russian threat” prior to 2008, when the NATO provocation began. — Mikie

Well it depends on what you take to be relevant evidences to fix security dilemmas in geopolitics (have you ever heard of Mearsheimer's offensive realism?). Of course if you ignore Russian history [1] and Russian grievances after the fall of Soviet Union. And Putin's political history even prior 2008, sure there is no shred of evidence.


[1]
So much so that you guru Mearsheimer wrote an article about it in Summer 1993
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf (page 54)

WHY RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IS LIKELY
Despite some testy moments, relations between Russia and Ukraine have generally been stable since the Soviet breakup. There are, however, good reasons to fear that these relations might deterio
rate. First, the situation between Ukraine and Russia is ripe for the outbreak of security competition between them. Great powers that share a long and unprotected common border, like that between
Russia and Ukraine, often lapse into competition driven by security fears. Russia and Ukraine might overcome this dynamic and learn to live together in harmony, but it would be unusual if they do.
Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrence there is the danger of hypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly. Expressions of Russian and Ukrainian nationalism have been largely benign since the Soviet col lapse, and there have been few manifestations of communal hatred on either side. Nevertheless, the Russians and the Ukrainians neither like nor trust each other. The grim history that has passed between
these two peoples provides explosive material that could ignite conflict between them.
Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this
relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast
Bolshevism. Against this explosive psychological disputes could trigger an outbreak of hypernationalism suffering under backdrop, small on either side.
several such disputes are already on the horizon: ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, control of the Crimea, ownership of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, and a host of economic issues stemming from the
of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many Russians would breakup change the present border with Ukraine, and some even reject the idea of an independent Ukraine. Senior Russian officials, for exam
ple, have recently been describing Ukraine's independence as a "transitional" phenomenon and have been warning other European governments not to open embassies in Kiev because they would soon
be downgraded to consular sections subordinate to their embassies in Moscow.
Fourth, there is the problem of mixed populations. Roughly 11.5 million Russians live in Ukraine (comprising 22 percent of Ukraine's population) and approximately 4.5 million Ukrainians live in Russia. Abuse of either minority by the local majority could be a flash point for crisis.

Are you aware that the so called "Russian threat" is only in Washington's paranoia? If you were from Finland, Poland, Romania, Moldova, Belarus, etc. I would respect your argument. But, it is obvious that Putin is not that stupid to attack NATO members. — javi2541997

I joined this thread a while back and discussed this too on several occasions.
The Russian threat doesn’t consist in attacking Spain out of the blue yesterday. But in wanting to regain its sphere of influence in Easter Europe which then will have an impact on International power balance. Indeed that also implies likely eroding Western security and economic defences (EU and NATO) with all its means: nuclear threats, economic dependencies, political corruption, troll factories, international alliances (with the worst authoritarian regimes including North Corea), adventurism in Africa and Middle East a REPEATEDLY DECLARED intent to establish a new world order along with his Chinese boyfriend. It’s been more than a decade that he was preparing the Russian come back. And attacking Ukraine was Putin’s way to prove to Russians and the Rest of the World how weak is the decaying West and that the king (the US) is naked.
Besides geopolitics is all about security dilemmas, so if one discounts the arguments behind certain choices, it's always "paranoia", INCLUDING Putin's paranoia of NATO encirclement.

Dude, I was referring to the current war. — neomac


No, you didn't: The Americans fought against the British Imperial power in the past...,
1776 is pretty far from our current year, indeed! — javi2541997

Dude, I was insisting an a historical analogy between the US and Ukraine fighting against oppressive imperialism, to support my view of the present war and the Ukrainian attitude toward it, not giving you lessons about Russian history. Again I joined this thread a while back and discussed Russian history too on several occasions, and with many participants. We discussed repeatedly about the Russian fear of invasion since the Mongols (Russia was invaded by Poliand too!) and how much pro-Russian propaganda (including Mearsheimer’s views) is built on it. So don’t get so excited over nothing.

It’s on the Westerners to decide what to do about it in the face of the Russian threat against the West too, and declaredly so. — neomac

Your arguments are based on the false premise that in the Western world there are no threats, which, of course, is completely wrong. I think that before giving lessons to the East we should have to look ourselves in the mirror, and act humbly. If you think that a Russian commander is more dangerous for your security than some psychopath with the right to purchase weapons, you are not experiencing reality, and it is clear that you are living under the lies of Western propaganda. I see and experience a lot of threats in daily life which do not come from Russia precisely: Inflation, scarcity, unemployment, insecurity, political instability, etc. But, didn't you pretend to defend that the Western world is awesome? — javi2541997

Evidently you didn’t read much of what I wrote in this thread. My arguments do not rely on the premise that “in the Western world there are no threats” or that “the Western world is awesome” AT ALL. In international politics, I think it’s intellectually more honest to reason in terms of lesser evil, than to reason as self-entitled nobodies teaching other nobodies their gospel over an utopian world where all evil is magically gone.

Because Ukraine is not threatening to the West, it wants to join the West. — neomac

They want to be funded by the Western world, which is different. Because speaking plainly and frankly, they are part of the East world. They no longer want to be funded by Russia for reasons that remain unclear to me. — javi2541997

I can’t decide for the Ukrainians which world they want to be part of, nor their motives to do so.
They have chosen the West (and it’s not the first time) and they are ready to pay for it.
It’s on the Westerners to decide what to do about it in the face of the Russian threat against the West too, and declaredly so.

Yet they largely support the war, as far as I can tell: — neomac

I can't take you seriously if you believe in those statistics. — javi2541997

But you should. Surely that’s not the only source of my belief, it was just a sample. As far as I can tell, even concerning those Russians fighting on the front line who may believe that Putin made a big mistake, still Putin managed to convince them that it’s about Russian survival and grievances against the West. So thanks to the pro-Russian propaganda that is even so successful abroad, in the democratic West (and in this thread too), people may genuinely support Putin.

Nobody has invaded Russia proper. — neomac

Operation Barbarossa was the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and many of its Axis allies, starting on Sunday, 22 June 1941, during the Second World War. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa — javi2541997

Dude, I was referring to the current war. Ukraine, the US, NATO didn’t invade Russia proper. Russia invaded Ukraine proper. Period. Besides, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa is about Nazi Germany invading Russia (with which Russia was a very good ally for a good while for expansionist reasons) not Ukrainians invading Russia. Not to mention all the Ukrainians who fought back German Nazis for Soviet Union: According to researchers, during 1943-1945 about 4.5 million Ukrainians became Red Army soldiers. After June 1944, 33% of the Soviet Red Army consisted of Ukrainians . The losses of the Ukrainian people during World War Two account for 19-35% of the total losses of the USSR.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Ukrainian_Front

I'd prefer me, you and our entire families to be bombed, raped and tortured by the Russians — neomac
Ask to yourself: Are the families of the Western world responsible? — javi2541997

If I could see the point of asking myself this, maybe I would.

Secondly, why don't we care about the rest of the world as well as we do about Ukraine? What about Syria? Afghanistan? Niger? Libya and Morocco natural disasters? Do these ring a bell to you? — javi2541997

Because Ukraine is not threatening to the West, it wants to join the West. Not the same with Russia.
What about Syria? Afghanistan? Niger? Libya and Morocco natural disasters? Do you have any news?
Bells are ringing everywhere from everywhere: natural disasters, climate change, pollution, war, famine, inequality, exploitation, inflation, overpopulation, racism, classism, sexism, populism, oligarchs, dictators, criminals, cancer, obesity, pandemics, personal economic, health, mental, relational, professional issues, and aliens… lots of aliens everywhere kept hidden by the pentagon (aliens love to reside only and exclusively inside the pentagon). So… fucking what? What do you want to do about it? What’s your gospel, holy Javi.

Thirdly, what about Russian citizens? They are not guilty of having Putin as President running their country. — javi2541997

Yet they largely support the war, as far as I can tell:
In August 2023, eight out of ten percent of Russians approved of activities of the Russian President Vladimir Putin. The popularity level was three percent higher than in September 2022, when the figure declined following the announcement of a partial mobilization in the country. After Russia invaded Ukraine at the end of February 2022, the approval rating increased. During the COVID-19 lockdown in the spring of 2020, the figure declined.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/

And then compare the Russians under Putin, with the Iranians under the Ayatollah. See any difference?

It was cultural and identitarian too. — neomac

Interesting. You can fight for your American identity and cultural values, but hey! We do not allow Russians to defend their Cyrillic heritage! Russians bad and Putin a dictator! — javi2541997

Nobody has invaded Russia proper. The Americans fought against the British Imperial power in the past, Ukraine is fighting against the Russian Imperial power in the present. While Russia is currently fighting to revive its Imperial power against a seemingly-decaying American Imperial power.

Weren’t you the one claiming that Putin was an imperialist trying to take over the world a while back? Right… — Mikie

Impressive memory. Sarcasm for sarcasm, sure, Putin is an imperialist trying to take over the universe, paradise, hell, dreamland, Barbie World and most importantly be the object of all your most erotic dreams for the rest of your life. And I suspect that so far he overwhelmingly succeeded on the last one.

What I cannot understand is the big efforts of some politicians and neomac to deny Ukraine's Nazi past - or even present - arguing that Putin is just a psychopath. — javi2541997

Two false claims about me.
Never said, implied nor suggested that Putin is “psychopath”. Never denied Ukraine's Nazi past, I’ve discussed about it in more than one occasion in my past posts. And even my rebuttal to you wasn’t meant to deny, but to suggest an explanation. For the Ukrainians Nazism was a powerful way to gain independence from oppressive Russia (read the whole story of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stepan_Bandera). Communism and Islam play/ed that role too against oppressive (neo)colonial empires.
BTW Putin cheerfully supports neonazi movements in his home country and around the world (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Nazism_in_Russia). The great Patriotic Heros from “Wagner” - wink wink - had a well known neonazi as a leader https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Utkin). The problem is when they turn against Russia. BTW for Russians “nazi” is more synonym of anti-Russian than of “anti-Jew” (anti-semitism in Russia has also a very long and glorious history).

True, but both nations agree on the fact that they are in the Western world, and share the same language and interests. The rebellion of the USA against the UK was a taxation or public administration problem rather than a cultural war. — javi2541997

It was cultural and identitarian too. Read Paine: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Sense
And then the US allied with the British archenemy, the French with whom they shared at least republican spirit.

Nah, we all are already busy paying the high costs and inflation, while our public budget is feeding them. :roll: — javi2541997

I hear you, bro. I'd prefer me, you and our entire families to be bombed, raped and tortured by the Russians than paying the high costs of inflation , while our public budget is feeding them. :roll:

: culture, language (Cyrillic) and religion (Orthodox church) — javi2541997

And yet American fought against the British empire for their independence, despite "the same pillars of each nation".

So, the constant efforts of Zelensky to not be compared to the Russian spectrum is, more or less, vane. — javi2541997

Sure, Zelensky has definitely failed with you. So disappointing. Now I'm gonna pick his ears next time I see him.

I agree with the first link on the fact that Ukraine's identity is messy. — javi2541997

And likely the reason why apparently the Ukrainians prefer to be called "Nazis" instead of "Russians", go figure.

Just because Ukraine has a Jewish president and just because it's impossible to take photos of Ukrainian Jews fighting the so nazi Ukrainian government[1] and just because Israel welcomes Azov Battalion's representatives obivously means we're on the side of the Nazis, you infallible Russian propaganda. — WhoTheFuckIsJohnstoneAnyways

[1]
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/jewish-ukraine-fights-nazi-russia-zelensky
https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-zelensky-adviser-40-jewish-heroes-fighting-in-mariupol-steel-plant/

Pro-Russians: "And what about Vietnam war and the Hyper-imperialist Great Satan? And what about Vietnam importing more 70% weapons from Russia?"
Vietnam: "who gives a shit?".
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/10/fact-sheet-president-joseph-r-biden-and-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-announce-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/

↪neomac
I keep giving you chances to prove you can converse like an adult, and you keep disappointing me. — Tzeentch

Meaning? What is bothering you exactly?

Probably I wasn't enough clear. I was referring to the perceived security threat by Russians due to NATO meddling in Ukraine, the Russian backyard, with promises of having it joining NATO, CIA everywhere in Ukraine, American-led coup d'etat Euromaindan, the horror of the Soviet-era Trades Unions building burned in Odessa, neonazi everywhere in Ukraine with the complacency of the West, the genocide of Russians in Donbas under the blessing of NATO, "fuck the EU" by Nuland, the betrayed Minsk agreements, the US brining war everywhere (ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Lybia, Iraq, Syria), the greedy American military industry all excited to shove into Ukraine all sorts of weaponry, the suffocating encirclement of Russia Lebensraum. So Russia was EVIDENTLY forced into a war for its own survival, right? Meanwhile Russia was building up its military arsenal, restoring violently its will against independence movements within its territory, expanding its military activism in the Middle East and Africa, building alliances with China and Iran (with authoritarian regimes with regional and world hegemonic ambitions competing with the US and plenty of grievances against the US), grunting everywhere and unequivocally about the unbearable American threat and broken promises, unplugging from the Internet, financing pro-Russian movements everywhere, annexing Crimea in 2014. The scenario pro-Russians (as you) typically describe is AS IF NATO was really consciously railroading into this war with arrogance despite Russia (a nuclear power led by an authoritarian leader full of grievances against NATO) was preparing for it for a good decade.
And yet "NATO was not and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting and so unable to supply Ukraine to fight said war it's not prepared for”. Moreover until the very last moment no Western country nor the Ukrainian president himself was believing that Russia would invade, except for the US, but it was too late to PREPARE. Not to mention the still ongoing weaponry supply in dribs and drabs when Ukraine is engaged in a full-out war for its own survival, right?
The point being, if NATO meddling in Ukraine was EVIDENTLY a growing unbearable security threat against Russia (as it is claimed by pro-Russians), before and after the occupation of Crimea, why on earth NATO members weren’t preparing for a war in Ukraine?
My answer is that there was NO EVIDENT UNBEARABLE security threat against Russia due to NATO meddling in Ukraine. Indeed it’s totally the opposite: it’s precisely because the threat of NATO meddling in Ukraine was EVIDENTLY WEAK and WEAKENING (the US military presence in Europe declining for decades, “Nato is brain dead”, Trump isolationism and destablization of the US democracy , the delay of Ukrainian membership, embarrassing American withdrawal from Afghanistan, European divisions between European countries, between Germany and the US especially about Russia, between European people and their political elites, the weak response of the West against Crimea grabbing, the growing tension with raising Chinese power, the islamist terrorism) while Putin’s successfully meddling in Western politics, successful crushing the Chechen independentist movements, Russian successful military adventurism in Georgia, in the Middle East , in Africa and in Ukraine, Putin’s domestic popularity AND Russian readiness for a war in Ukraine were EVIDENTLY GROWING that Putin took the Western EVIDENT lowest confidence in NATO, divisions and unreadiness to military confront Russia in Ukraine as a window of opportunity for Russia to boldly invade Ukraine. This is a rational strategy given Russian hegemonic ambitions: it is smarter to take the initiative to attack your enemies while they are weak and less threatening, instead of attacking them while they are strong and threatening (like immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union). But that also means that Russia was not compelled AT ALL to aggress Ukraine by an EVIDENT UNBEARABLE security threat from NATO against Russia, it was Putin’s deliberate choice to pursue hegemonic expansion at the expense of a decaying NATO. On the other side one might question now if the West and NATO are as weak as Putin thought they were. And if at the next round the West will be as unprepared to face the EVIDENT and now UNBEARABLE security threat from Russia against the West.

In other words you agree that NATO was not and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting and so unable to supply Ukraine to fight said war it's not prepared for. — boethius

Which sounds kind of suprising given that NATO has been so rightly perceived as a growing unbearable threat against Russia at least since 2008, right?

neomac, in addition to Sergei Poletaev, Putin, Slutsky, Medvedev, Aksyonov, Zakharova, Gurulyov, Zhuravlyov, Zatulin, and some others, have spoken of demilitarization of Ukraine (not just a fifth thereof). Similarly, whoever has spoken of deNazification of Ukraine, change or control of Ukrainian government / Kyiv, and whoever has gone further. (Kremlin-approved officials.) Also Mordvichev. — jorndoe

Sure. In this case I was also interested in reporting the views of a sober pro-Russian Russian geopolitical analyst on the current situation (others in the same site maintain that nuclear bombing a NATO country like Poland would be the necessary evil to win this war, go figure).

So if Russia will require demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes, to end this war with Ukraine, then Ukraine must make such "uncomfortable but necessary concessions" to end "this senseless waste of human life". Right? — neomac


I get you're really desperate to frame me as being 'pro-Russian', but perhaps you can tone it down a little. — Tzeentch

Not as much desperate as you are to repeatedly frame your opponents as being addicted to "deadly drug" or “hopium” of Western propaganda. Besides there is nothing I’ve said to tone down, even a little. Indeed I still find the expression "pro-Russian" as a non-hyperbolic and most certainly accurate qualification of your views. The problem is not the words chosen it’s their meaning and implications. If I say: "Democracy is the worst form of Government except for all others", this would sound pro-democracy, wouldn’t it? Yes it would and rightly so. That is, it doesn't matter how badly you talk about Russia, but how badly you talk about it relative to their alternatives like NATO or the US, especially if it is matter to decide the political fate of the countries involved in this war and which will impact our present and future lives. You are pro-Russian as far as I’m concerned beyond any reasonable doubt and I don’t need your confirmation to that, I’m just soliciting you (and your sidekicks) to provide arguments to ground your moral and geopolitical positions as applied to this war instead of hiding behind your pointless sarcasm and framing your opponents as NATO cheerleaders. As far as I’ve read, you didn't bring arguments that the actual Russian propaganda supporting the war against Ukraine didn't make (so exactly zero of your arguments proves that you care about Ukrainian lives more than they themselves do), nor brought any arguments to support more likely effective policies of constraining Russian imperial ambitions alternative to what the Westerners are supporting because likely you do not see Russia as a geopolitical threat, certainly not as the US, since the US is the great Satan, right? So let me tone it up a little more: you are even more pro-Russian than certain pro-Russian Russian analysts, as I’ve pointed out earlier.

That often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides. — Tzeentch


Note the keyword. I even underlined it for you. — Tzeentch

And then I'm the disingenuous one?! By underlining this twice pointless keyword which seemingly has a flavor of neutrality, in reality you are underlining how hypocritical and flawed your claims are. So, by all means, thanks a lot for underlining it for me.
As far as I can tell, everybody shared understanding here is that a negotiation “often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides” in order to succeed and that negotiation is a plausible and welcomed way to end this war. So your dodgy answer is apparently nothing more than a platitude which nobody disagrees with. The rhetoric purpose of this platitude however is to hide all what is really controversial about your beliefs and therefore would be more pertinent to bring up in answering my question. What is controversial is under what conditions could and would be desirable this negotiation to happen, in particular concerning the Ukrainian negotiation power toward Russian claimed requirements (which I gave you an example of). This negotiation power could be weaker or stronger depending on a load of evolving circumstances, many of which might be hidden to us. However before, during and after the beginning of the war until now you and your sidekicks were fine with having Ukraine agree on Russian requirements by withdrawing the Western military support (which the Ukrainians have asked for and the Westerners were willing to provide according to Western national interest), without bothering with Ukrainian negotiation power and related circumstances to preserve self-determination, not surprisingly so because you even overlook Ukrainian agency at your convenience. The West should appease the Russians (their sense of security, their geopolitical projections, the Black Sea fleet, not bother them in their “back yard”, repay for the broken promise of “not one inch further East”, thwart the nuclear threat, etc.), so as your guru Mearsheimer suggests Ukraine should accept to remain under the influence of Russia. If this isn’t pro-Russian I don’t know what is.
Second, there are deeper flaws in your and your sidekicks’ views though. You and your sidekicks often accuse [1] your opponents of something like “not only is no theory of victory ever presented (for example how to deal with the lack of air power) but even simple questions such as how many lives lost would be worth the territory back if it was feasible likewise proponents of Ukraine policy can't answer” and something like “No actual sense to the project need be presented by Ukraine nor anyone else. Ukraine wants to fight!”. These arguments are grounded on alleged rational requirements (like a theory of victory or a victory assessment in terms of human life costs) or meant to discredit alleged Western excuses behind Ukrainian’s choices (like “Ukraine wants to fight”) for an exploitative and manipulative behaviour by the West at the expense of the Ukrainians. Both assumptions are not only questionable on their own merits (as I argued in the past on several occasions with little or no feedback) but can very easily be retorted against your own views in the same fashion. Indeed, you too do not have a “theory of peace” and instead pretend to rely on Ukrainian choice (all of a sudden Ukraine has regained its agency back like in “Ukraine found an agreement with Russia in April ’22!”) to determine “the uncomfortable but necessary concessions” the Ukrainians would freely choose ONLY AFTER the Western choice to not support them anyways. And this ALWAYS for exploitative and manipulative reasons, given your US-phobia or aversion to the “Great Satan” (just emulating your penchant for cheap discrediting expressions which you never felt like toning down), this would be a blow in the face of the American imperialism. Besides you too have nowhere presented how much loss of freedom, well being or security would be worth for the Ukrainians not to fight back the Russians.
Third, to me “being neutral” means that either you are indifferent to how the war evolves and to who is right or wrong in this war. Or it means that you place exactly equal responsibility on fighting parties and/or promote policies that maintain good economic/political relationships with both or with neither involved parties (assumed they would allow it). But you are not indifferent to how the war evolves and to who is right or wrong. Nor you and your sidekicks have ever given arguments supporting an equal attitude toward belligerents or involved third parties, indeed you put the greatest blame on the US and advocate opposition to the the current American leadership in this war while keeping totally silent about Russia. Now, given that you and your sidekicks can not claim impartiality by any means, as far as I am concerned what remains to be rationally investigated is your approach in picking sides. One of my core assumptions is that it would be more rational to start with the simple question “what do you prefer for you and people you really care about between living like an avg Westerner or an avg Russian, Chinese, Iranian?” instead of “what can you do to save the entire present and future humanity materially, psychologically and morally from war, starvation, diseases, exploitation, manipulation?”. And you know why “more rational”? Because I have no reasonable doubt that I and you too (or anybody else in this thread for that matter) have a clue on how to answer the first but absolutely no fucking clue about answering the second (I even doubt it makes sense). Whatever answer I give to that core question will guide my siding with the international circumstances (given my very limited but hopefully rational enough understanding of them) which would be more likely benign toward my preferences.



[1]

However, not only is no theory of victory ever presented (for example how to deal with the lack of air power) but even simple questions such as how many lives lost would be worth the territory back if it was feasible likewise proponents of Ukraine policy can't answer.
That it is simply Ukraine's choice is the answer and we must just take it for granted that Zelensky speaks for all Ukrainians. But who doesn't have a choice is Westerners supplying weapons. No actual sense to the project need be presented by Ukraine nor anyone else. Ukraine wants to fight! — boethius

I would worry about ending this senseless waste of human life as soon as possible, and steer towards a stable peace. That often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides. — Tzeentch

So if Russia will require demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes, to end this war with Ukraine, then Ukraine must make such "uncomfortable but necessary concessions" to end "this senseless waste of human life". Right?

it's very disingenuous how our position is repeatedly framed as being 'pro-Russian' — Tzeentch

Earlier I cited a pro-Russian Russian analyst claiming: The conception of our victory is clear: We still need the demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes. (https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/counteroffensive-is-failing/). Now would it be perfectly fine with you for whatever reason to let Russia win according to that definition of Russian victory?

I'll say that by far the most influential book, 'eye-opening' if you will, I've read on the matter is Unrestricted Warfare (1999), written by two Chinese colonels. — Tzeentch

ok thanks, I'll have a look into it.

I also had the opportunity to follow courses on propaganda (euphemistically called 'information warfare') - very eye-opening. — Tzeentch

What are the textbooks in which you studied it?

Right, so there's no plan. Just vacuous rhetoric with no sense of the human cost, which this offensive was a shining example of. This we already knew. — Tzeentch

Yours is just vacuous rhetoric with no sense of human affairs. One can devise a plan and then revise it.
There can be plans A B C D... Z and beyond. If there are plans, effectively made by political or military agents, it will be rational to not divulge them in public and to expect they won't be divulged. One can at best guess and, laymen or uninformed experts, can be wrong.
It's not just the military point that is going to be relevant for our moral siding. Nor the Western propaganda, a good part of which is pro-Russian, like yours. The sense of human cost doesn't need to be assessed in military terms nor in terms of just human lives. You keep reasoning within the bubble of your non-shared assumptions. Even pro-Russian Russian analysts get the stakes MORE OBJECTIVELY than you ever could:
On the home front
Since the military conflict in Ukraine is not an all out war, the loser will not be the side who physically runs out of strength, but rather the one who loses the will to fight sooner. What is important here is a clear vision of victory and a clear strategy for achieving it.
Russia initially had problems with this: The start came as a shock to everyone and just as suddenly turned into a protracted military conflict with a series of humiliating defeats.
Russian society was able to withstand the blow last year and – albeit not immediately, only towards the end of the year – pulled itself together and prepared for a long and hard struggle. The conception of our victory is clear: We still need the demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes. The latter, by the way, will be the most difficult legally; here – for the sake of international legitimacy – Jesuitical forms such as a 99-year lease are possible. But we are getting ahead of ourselves, on this point.
Although this concept of victory has not been articulated, it is intuitively clear; the actions of the authorities at all levels do not contradict it; and society, although not very happy (only people who are not completely healthy enjoy armed conflicts), has rallied and is ready, if not to participate directly, then to support or at least tolerate it. All this will sooner or later produce results at the front – if the enemy does not respond with the same unity.
https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/counteroffensive-is-failing/

Define what 'Ukraine winning' looks like — Tzeentch

At least, not making Russia win according to the Russian definition of "victory".

"Ukraine’s special services ‘likely’ behind strikes on Wagner-backed forces in Sudan, a Ukrainian military source says" :chin:
https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/19/africa/ukraine-military-sudan-wagner-cmd-intl/index.html

Bad news for Ukrainians: A Pole about the tragic situation in Ukraine. "They have no one to fight"
https://wiadomosci-wp-pl.translate.goog/polak-opowiada-o-tragicznej-sytuacji-w-ukrainie-sprzet-pali-sie-jak-zapalki-6934373478947744a?fbclid=IwAR1kBtdnbSMDJYGyVLIESmpNI-gWWULbaswF8mBry2vXIdRP5PA51teQyc8&_x_tr_sl=pl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=fr&_x_tr_pto=wapp

Putin ain't gonna like it:

"Joint US-Armenia military exercise to be held in Armenia on September 11-20 " - https://tass.com/world/1670475

"Armenian PM says depending solely on Russia for security was 'strategic mistake'"
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenian-pm-says-depending-solely-russia-security-was-strategic-mistake-2023-09-03/

More "deadly drug" from pro-Western-hyper-neo-pluto-crypto-capitalist-colonialist-warmonger-satanist-LGBTQ-freemason-nazi-zionist-mic-bigpharma-&-what-about-Vietnam-Iraq-Afghanistan-Syria-?-pizzagaters: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/02/everything-is-ahead-of-us-ukraine-breaks-russias-first-line-of-defence-in-stronghold

Oh it tastes sooo good. I'm sooo badly addicted to it.

I was dipping back into the Routledge handbook of metaphysics and it made me think of something. For folks who don't like thinking of logic in terms of naturalism, or logic as "out there," "in the world, sans mind," do you embrace realism towards propositions, states of affairs, facts, and events? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It seems you are suggesting 3 alternatives: naturalism, platonism, or nominalism. But I don't think these alternatives are the only ones available. I think that Wittgenstein offered a distinctive philosophical approach which is reducible to none of such alternatives.

I suppose a thoroughgoing nominalism that takes logic to be solely a property of mind doesn't have this problem. But to my mind such ontological commitments seem to threaten a fall into radical skepticism and solipsism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Then the link between nominalism and radical skepticism or solipsism should worry naturalists too. Quine was both naturalist and nominalist. Wilfrid Sellars too.

So, on the one hand I see a bridge between all three "types" of logic laid out in the initial definitions that comes from naturalism. Humans are natural systems and our minds formed by nature and our systems are formed by our minds. Thus there seems to be a way in which our minds and representational systems should map to things present in the world and be shaped by any patterns therein. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Take a deduction like Premise1: "If Trump won the 59th presidential elections, the earth is flat", Premise2: "Trump won the 59th presidential elections", Conclusion: "the earth is flat", how do you figure such mapping?

Merkel dared to push back against the Americans, knowing what would happen if they allowed the US to play Risk in the European backyard. — Tzeentch

And yet: In an interview published in Germany's Zeit magazine on Wednesday, former German chancellor Angela Merkel said that the Minsk agreements had been an attempt to "give Ukraine time" to build up its defences.
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-russia-may-have-make-ukraine-deal-one-day-partners-cheated-past-2022-12-09/