Comments

  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    My arguments have been to illuminate Gert’s moral insights rather than contradict them. That illumination starts with understanding the ten rules as advocacy for initiating or maintaining reciprocity strategies which are powerful means for solving cooperation problems. Solving cooperation problems is the default behavior most likely both to lessen harms (Gert’s and negative utilitarianism’s goal) and, as I argue, positive utilitarianism as well. The same 10 moral rules support both positive and negative utilitarianism equally well because the same cooperation problems must be solved.

    Imagine you have 2 parents with 10 kids, they can afford to provide each of them with minimal means of subsistence or kill five of them to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence. Now consider 3 scenarios:
    (A) Both parents agree on providing each kid with just minimal means of subsistence
    (B) Both parents agree on killing 5 kids to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence
    (C) Parents disagree
    In case A and B we do not have a cooperation problem between parents while in C we do, right? — neomac


    As you describe it, the cooperation problem is just between the parents. But alternatives A), B), and C) could each be ‘rational’ (depending on the parents' values) ONLY if the kids have no independent moral worth. If the kids have independent moral worth, then any of the options would be a cooperation problem for the kids plus the parents.
    Mark S

    Talking about Gert’s views, I think that the label of “utilitarianism” is misleading. “Utilitarianism” to me implies a notion of good/harm as measurable parameters, ways to verify their increase/decrease, and the goal of maximise good or minimise harm over a collectivity. I don’t think that is what Gert’s has in mind because he argued against utilitarianism. I think that Gert’s assumption that morality is for biased and non-omniscient beings suggests that good/bad may not be unbiasedly established nor predicted. Yet some default behaviour may exclude the worse for all rational individuals somehow logically. If all rational individuals intentionally act in a certain way by default, harm can not possibly result as intentional outcome by default. What will happen in concrete cases however it depends on the actual circumstances, and certain exceptional circumstances may be such that individuals can not act according to those default ways.
    So wrt the case I suggested, the rationality of the parents’ dispositions shouldn’t be assessed as a function of their actual and inevitably “biased” values nor as a function of future outcomes but as a function of default moral rules. Moral rules should dispense individuals from being guided by default by their biased preferences and predictive skills. This is my understanding of Gert’s argument and 10 rules, although I’m not sure it’s accurate.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    "Lack of suppression" doesn't mean "being fine" — neomac

    So you're not fine with how Sy Hersh's story has been treated. Good. We agree on that.
    Isaac

    I wasn’t talking about not being fine with how Sy Hersh's story has been treated.
    I’m not fine with you talking about "suppression" in reference to Hersh's article.
    It’s a rhetoric exaggeration, a caricature, due to your militant mindset.



    I didn't ask you where one can read about Sy Hersh's story. If you don't want to answer my questions just don't. There's no need to answer a different one.Isaac

    Well, then if you do not want to question my actual claims, just don’t. There is no need to question claims I never made. Mainstream media didn’t suppress Hersh’s article. And mainstream readers can read about that Hersh’s article from mainstream press however corrupted and politically biased you think they are.


    If there is a relevant delta of credibility between BBC and TASS in favor of the former, and Hersh gets mentioned only by the latter, this is not a boost of Hersh's credibility. I guess. Unless one assumes that Hersh is the relevant meter by which one can assess BBC vs TASS credibility. — neomac


    This is either deliberately obtuse or childishly naive. A broadcaster like TASS will give its eye teeth to publish a story which reflects badly on the US. Their doing so, therefore, has no bearing whatsoever on its credibility. Do you think they'd avoid anti-US stories because they're true. I mean its just dumbfoundingly stupid. A non-credible news agency like TASS doesn't actively seek out fake news. They publish news which promotes their agenda, true or not. So a news article appearing in TASS doesn't indicate it's false. It indicates that it's good for Russia. I hate to blow your tiny mind, but some things are both true and good for Russia, and Russian propaganda will publish those thing with no less enthusiasm than they publish flashhoods.
    Isaac

    But that’s irrelevant to counter my argument. I’m not questioning the possibility that TASS is right in supporting Hersh’s story about Nord Stream 2 sabotage, I’m simply questioning the idea that Hersh’s story would earn greater credibility by being sponsored by Russian propaganda outlets like TASS relative to alternatives like the BBC.




    The agencies whose investigations you claim are relevant fall into two camps; governments and journalists. Governments will not report honestly their own collusion so you cannot trust a government to report on its own behaviour. You yourself pointed to the untrustworthiness of TASS.
    So you're left with journalists. But you've said that independent journalists lack sufficient credibility to be taken seriously. So who's left? Mainstream media. You're saying that if the mainstream media don't report it, it doesn't deserve any credibility. So I asked, if the.mainstream media have a problem, how do we hear about it?
    Isaac

    First, to me the main problem with TASS is not that is a state-owned news agency , but that the Russian government is remarkably authoritarian (in the middle of a conventional war which Russia itself started), yet far from being vocally challenged by competitors internal or external to the government as democratic Western governments would be. I just don’t feel pressed to question a Western government’s deeds when there are so many powerful agents readily doing so (even more so if such agents opposing the current government can as well be suspected of equal corruption and political bias, if not more).
    Second, I never claimed “independent journalists lack sufficient credibility to be taken seriously” nor that “if the mainstream media don't report it, it doesn't deserve any credibility”. In Western-like democracies one can find mainstream outlets with different political leanings, also in favour or against any given government. If an independent journalist wants to be read by many, he could sell his articles denouncing a government’s misdeeds to a mainstream outlets. If he doesn’t trust any mainstream outlets, he could still publish in some well reputed independent platform like https://www.icij.org/about/ (this may be also a big promotion for independent journalism if the article turns out to be enough accurate). But if he doesn’t do any of that, and prefers to self-publish, that’s his choice, not necessarily a problem of the mainstream outlets “suppressing” Hersh’s article (indeed many mainstream outlets talked about Hersh’s article anyways and if he couldn’t rely on the American media on this, he could also publish on European news papers) or the credibility of independent journalism in general.
    Third, self-publishing leaves people like me with the doubt that either Hersh requires max freedom because he is fucking Hersh (yet he earned his reputation by actually working in the past for mainstream outlets reviewing/fact-checking/vetting his articles), or Hersh requires some serious reviewing/fact-checking/vetting even if he is fucking Hersh (also because he self-admittedly can lie). So as long as I see one version from the American government (which may sound suspicious independently from Hersh’s article accuracy) and another version from Hersh (which may sound suspicious independently from Hersh’s article accuracy), I can keep my doubts in either case and suspend my judgement. The fact that the Germans are supporting another investigative line could now give more weight on doubts against Hersh’s version, not overwhelmingly so though.
    And that’s basically all I find reasonable to say about Hersh’s article credibility vs mainstream media credibility so far.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    That's a ridiculously low standard for what qualifies as a lack of suppression "if you're not banned of in jail, you're fine"Isaac

    "Lack of suppression" doesn't mean "being fine", it means "lack of suppression". You were talking about "suppression" and that's a caricature.

    If visibility in the mainstream dictates credibility, what happens if the mainstream become corrupt? Who points that out and to whom? Who holds mainstream media to account? Or are they Gods?Isaac

    Hersh made his point in a substack article but anybody in the West could learn of its existence through mainstream outlets, like:
    https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/nord-stream-2-un-journaliste-americain-accuse-washington-du-sabotage-20230213
    https://www.zeit.de/zustimmung?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zeit.de%2Fpolitik%2Fausland%2F2023-02%2Fseymour-hersh-nord-stream-pipeline-anschlag-usa
    https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11760473/As-Pultizer-prize-winning-journalist-points-CIA-DID-blow-Nord-Stream-pipeline.html
    https://www.corriere.it/esteri/23_febbraio_09/nord-stream-hersch-usa-esplosione-gasdotto-fc3f320a-a88b-11ed-b9c4-8c4ac5be6a91.shtml
    https://elpais.com/ideas/2023-02-25/seymour-hersh-el-periodista-legendario-cuestionado-por-su-investigacion-del-sabotaje-del-gasoducto.html



    the Western news platform credibility — neomac

    ...oh, turns out they are gods. Well, that answers that question.
    Isaac

    If there is a relevant delta of credibility between BBC and TASS in favor of the former, and Hersh gets mentioned only by the latter, this is not a boost of Hersh's credibility. I guess. Unless one assumes that Hersh is the relevant meter by which one can assess BBC vs TASS credibility.

    Do you think the mainstream press doesn't have a politics? Over 90% of Washington Post readers are Democrats. You're suggesting that's a coincidence? They're reporting the news unbiasedly and just happen to be liked overwhelmingly by one side?Isaac

    Why do you think I think the mainstream press doesn't have a politics?
    Where did I suggest that is a coincidence that over 90% of Washington Post readers are Democrats?
    Or that they're reporting the news unbiasedly and just happen to be liked overwhelmingly by one side?
    This way of questioning my claims is just random, because they are neither addressing what I actually wrote, nor the assumptions behind it.
    Talking randomly about politics and bias, I guess also Hersh, Mearsheimer, and Chomsky are pretty popular among jacobins like you, aren’t they? And is Hersh’s news report completely unbiased?

    the Nord Stream 2 blasts are object of a wide investigation involving several countries, related governments, intelligence services, news outlets — neomac

    You've given a list which involves only two independant agents - governments and news agencies. You've dismissed results of half of the news agencies, and governments are not going to incriminate themselves, so you're basically saying the mainstream media are inviolable and we need never concern ourselves with the possibility that they may be biased.
    Isaac

    No idea how you can possibly infer such conclusions from the claim of mine you quoted. Anyways I don’t need to take a strong position against Hersh’s version of the Nord Stream 2 story, because I do not have a strong position in favour of what is reported on the mainstream media, either. I’m simply relying on the assumption that the Western media systems give more room to dissenting voices than authoritarian regimes like Russia or China, so one way or the other a truth that is against the government’s narrative has more chances to be shared at some point in Western-like democratic regimes. Indeed, cases like Watergate, Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse, Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction were all covered/investigated by mainstream Western press. What’s more is that in the case of Nord Stream 2 Western interested parties are many, more directly involved and badly impacted so I would expect less complacency from the Europeans (starting with the Germans) toward the Americans, if there were serious evidences about the US being involved in such sabotage with abusive intentions.
    The other point is that I don’t expect Western democracy and media to work during war time with exactly the same transparency and pluralism I would expect during peace time. But I find this predicament physiological and tolerable to the extant there is a non-negligeable threat to the world order from authoritarian regimes like Russia and China, if not a more direct threat to the national integrity and sovereignty. For the simple reason that there might be sensible security information available to decision makers that can’t be readily exposed to the wider public lest national and international enemies exploit it to their benefit. And as you suggested, emergency requires fast and powerful responses that can’t be slowed down by due diligence (having in mind procedures in non-emergency time), even if that might more likely lead to abuses. Once the emergence is over we can review what has been done. BTW Hersh too candidly admits to lie in his profession whenever he thinks he has a good reason to (https://nymag.com/nymetro/news/people/features/11719/).
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Take Seymour Hersh's article for example. It blames the US government for the pipeline sabotage. So the US government will want to suppress that story (note we haven't even got to whether it's true or not yet).

    They will use their enormous power to rapidly put it down. If, therefore, you think you might not want that story put down, you have to amplify it quickly and with force. You have to resist that suppression.
    Isaac


    “Suppressing” is a strong word. As far as I can tell, Hersh’s article is not subject to censorship nor is Hersh prosecuted/jailed because of that.
    Maybe Hersh’s article doesn’t enjoy as much visibility in the mainstream outlets as one could find desirable. Yet this is also part of Hersh’s article credibility problem.
    When I, as an avg dude, read a self-published investigative journalist referring to a single anonymous source, I can not rely on the Western news platform credibility (which implies other people involved in reviewing and vetting the article’s content). On the other side, Rupert Murdoch’s channels, and pro-regime news outlets from China, Russian and India, which can give more visibility to Hersh’s article, don’t improve Hersh’ article credibility since I believe that those sources can be fake news dispenser more likely than the Western outlets for political reasons. Besides the Nord Stream 2 blasts are object of a wide investigation involving several countries, related governments, intelligence services, news outlets, for a case that primarily concerns Germany as a victim (among the Western countries) not Yemen, Vietnam or Djibouti so if they (Germany above all) do not seem much compelled by Hersh’s report, and instead follow another line of investigation, I don’t see why I should feel more compelled to take Hersh’s article as relevant (even if there was some truth to it, mind you).
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    don’t get what you mean by “more epistemic than moral notions”.Mark S

    I didn't think this objection through. The point is that rules of thumbs and heuristics are meant to spare us cognitive load in our decision making. When a problem is too complicated for us to process an optimal solution, then we rely on rules of thumbs and heuristics to approximate that solution. So we have to be able to define the decision problem before talking about heuristics and rules of thumbs. Gert’s rules (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm) may be seen as an answer to the question: what is default behavior that would more likely lessen the harms of all those who commit to them? In this case those rules would be more rule of thumbs. Gert's assumption that "morality is for fallible biased people" could support that reading. My impression however is that Gert's argument is stronger because he wants to talk in terms of rationality and not just make an empirical general claim approximately true.
    Anyways, I think that Gert is having in mind a different problem from yours: he is not formulating his notion of morality as a function of solving cooperation problems, and related heuristics as you suggested (partnership, domination, marker principles).

    I do know, empirically and independently of any of Gert’s claims, that the ten moral norms are fallible heuristics for reciprocity strategies.Mark S

    “Do not kill”, “do not cause pain”, “do not disable” (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm) can be considered fallible in a practical sense if they are seen as instrumental to some further goal. You may want to say that they are instrumental to solve or support the solution of cooperation problems. If that’s the case, there are 4 issues with that:
    1 - maybe you explained that in your past posts and I missed it, but so far you didn’t offer to me a concrete example where a cooperation problem would likely have no (suboptimal if not optimal) solutionunless we adopted Gert’s moral rules.
    2 - most importantly, cooperation is itself instrumental to some goals, which goals? If the answer is: reducing death, pain, disabilities, etc. of some people by some people engaged in the cooperation then we are back to Gert’s rules. The payoff of the cooperative strategies will be defined as a function of death, pain, disabilities, liberties, etc. reducing the evils and/or increase the goods
    3 - Gerts’ “descriptive” definition of morality suggests that also the “normative” definition of morality is focused on reducing evils (“lessening of harms”) and not increasing the goods (indeed “do cause pleasure” is missing among the rules). While the notion of “cooperation” is not focused on lessening the evils.
    4 - I’m not sure that Gert’s 10 moral rules are necessary and sufficient conditions for a “normative” definition of morality. Indeed, Gert concedes that there are reasons for disagreement even if we accepted the 10 rules (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/010.htm). So Gert’s 10 rules may not suffice to support the solution of cooperation problems.


    But if they are not moral absolutes, in what circumstances would following them be immoral? The heuristics for solving cooperation problems perspective provides a simple answer. It would be immoral to follow them when doing so is more likely to create rather than solve cooperation problems.Mark S

    Imagine you have 2 parents with 10 kids, they can afford to provide each of them with minimal means of subsistence or kill five of them to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence. Now consider 3 scenarios:
    (A) Both parents agree on providing each kid with just minimal means of subsistence
    (B) Both parents agree on killing 5 kids to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence
    (C) Parents disagree
    In case A and B we do not have a cooperation problem between parents while in C we do, right? Yet I don’t think A and B would be considered indifferently equally moral by Gert’s standards, because in case B killing 5 kids would breach one of the first moral rules to increase the goods for the other 5. So in case C, those parents would find Gert’s rules helpful in solving the disagreement they had prior to being exposed to Gert’s rules. This kind of examples shows how Gert’s rules contribute to the solution of cooperation games. Yet, if that is the case, Gert’s rules will determine the strategy exposed in B as morally problematic where there is no cooperation problem.
    Besides case C may be the consequence of exposing otherwise agreeing parents to Gert’s rules. So Gert’s rules can also cause cooperation problems like breaking a partnership that was given for granted (in real life compare to the moral implications in cases of religious/political conversion). Maybe we can say that Gert's rules may solve or contribute to solve cooperation problems, if Gert's rules are embraced by all actors involved in the cooperation problem.

    But that is because they are moral norms about behaviors (moral means), not moral ends (goals).Mark S

    I’m not yet sure if the distinction means/ends can really help us here. Can you give examples that illustrate the distinction between moral means and moral ends?

    P.S. I'm giving answers based on a charitable understanding of Gert's position. I don't assume that my understanding is accurate nor I'm committed to Gert's position as I understand it.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    it's mainly about raising, or maintaining, a movement of voters opposed to the abuses of powerIsaac

    Are you talking about being militant in some political movement or party that are against
    one's Western country's involvement in this war? Can you list a couple of such movements/parties that you find definitely trustworthy?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    fight back hard enough and quickly enough to stop itIsaac

    And how would you "fight back hard enough and quickly enough to stop it" in more detail?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    When events are moving powerfully and with speed, responses have to match both or else fail.Isaac

    That sounds enlightening to me. Yet "power" and "speed" (like in "emergency" talks about the Russian threat) are often claimed to be at the root of abusive behavior by political authorities. So I don't understand how much confidence you can put in the idea that you or a mass of individual Isaacs would be able to provide a powerful fast response (as any effective political action would require) against the abuses of the evil people that govern us (like with a revolution? a capitol hill riot? a demonstration where you remove your hijab in defiance of the morality police? a terrorist attack? or chatting over a philosophy forum is enough?), and yet without being as abusive or worse than them.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    You are projecting so hard I could point you at a wall to show off a PowerPoint presentation.Tzeentch

    It's enough to quote me, with or without PowerPoint.

    I don't see need absolute certainty to be sure of something. Absolute certainty doesn't exist, and the pretention that such is necessary to take a strong stance towards something, that is intellectually dishonest, especially when that standard is applied one-sidedly to the narrative you happen to disagree with.Tzeentch

    There is no intellectual dishonesty. I quoted you, and exactly your way of talking about Nord Stream 2 and not mine is expression of a strong stance to me (it doesn't matter if it is not necessary to have one). Talking about "being sure of something" (so sure that you just can go on talking about your stance in terms "hard facts", "painful reality" vs others cheerleading and American bombing Nord Stream 2) is still more than what I could be about the Nord Stream 2 case. Indeed, I never talked in these terms about Nord Stream 2 case and yet I have been accused of “unwavering faith” or “unreserved faith” (despite you claiming that "absolute certainty doesn't exist", go figure).


    Moreover, outside of philosophical debate this type of approach to worldly affairs is, in one word, weak. We're dealing with actors that will take every opportunity to bullshit you, and here we are waiting for that distant moment when we arrive at crystalline certainty (a pipe dream) to call out said bullshit. That's crippling insecurity masquerading as intellectual rigor.Tzeentch

    Well, we are in a philosophy forum, so I'm fine with engaging in "philosophical debates" over world affairs even if they seem "weak" to you. BTW that there is some inherent weakness in such debates is one of my assumptions [1], but that's not enough to make them look boring or useless [2]
    I don't use intellectual rigor to "masquerade" "crippling insecurity" (assumed "crippling insecurity" exists), but at best to cope with uncertainty over divisive facts as an alternative to Isaac's style of tribal fighting. It's also striking that on one side you are dismissing "crystalline certainty" but then you seem as dismissive of "crippling insecurity". You might think you have found the right balance between "security" and "insecurity", also thanks to your "relevant academic background to develop my own general picture..." [3] which maybe others do not have, so they might need to rely on expert source. On my side, as long as I don't know you enough, you can bullshit me as much as Biden, Putin, Scott Ritter, Hersh can do. Also about your "relevant academic background", mind you.


    [1]
    Concerning my “bit of self-awareness”, is the following enough?

    I’m an avg dude (not en expert), we are reasoning under uncertainties of many relevant facts, and exchange in a philosophy forum from our armchair during leisure time. Didn’t we explicitly factor in all that in our claims many times already? Yet I care about the clarity/logic of my arguments and the evidences available to me to assess them (including the input from all sorts of news/stats/reports/experts of course). Since I take such arguments and evidence assessment to be affordable also by other avg dudes in a philosophy forum post format, I expect such avg dudes to reciprocate in intellectually honest and challenging ways — neomac


    as an avg dude, I’m far from assuming to know better or enough how to play the game to “propose” or “recommend” anything to anybody about geopolitical issues, or to have any significant impact on this war directly or indirectly through my posts here — neomac


    nobody and certainly not avg dudes like me and you can figure out a reliable plan to grant an optimal military victory — neomac


    As an avg dude, I would rely more on geopolitical speculation and historical analogies for guidance. — neomac
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/776424


    [2]
    However the fun part to me is mainly to play by argumentative rules that make one’s views rationally compelling to opponents’ views. Besides since this is a philosophy forum and not a science forum, we can more easily end up discussing our conceptual frameworks, our terminology, our beliefs’ inferential or explanatory power, etc. and this in turn can help not fix the world, but fix (clarify/reorder/clean up) one self’s ideas about the world.neomac


    [3]
    I do have the relevant academic background to develop my own general picture based on rudimentary data like troop numbers, movements, etc. That's good enough for me.Tzeentch
    "
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Good job we're avoiding loaded terms and caricatureIsaac

    The US and it's allies are our governments. It is they who we must hold to account and they to whose electorate we are speaking. As such it is their faults and strategies which are our primary concern.Isaac

    I don't feel compelled to refrain from sarcasm, caricature and insults against my opponents if my opponents persist with their intellectually dishonesty as you are. Besides I don't think it was much of a caricature, unless you are a caricature of yourself. Indeed, as long as "primary concern" leads you and your new sidekick to believe that the genesis of this war, the failure of peace talks, and now the bombing of Nord Stream 2 is primarily US responsibility because of some alleged "hard facts" and anti-system expert source, and to insult, caricature, or paint as gaslighted by Western propaganda whoever disagrees with you because you have anger management issues, that objection of mine against your attitude is not much of an exaggeration.

    An odd response, but I appreciate the honesty.Isaac

    There is something to appreciate in its own merits though. To the extent I don't trust the judgement of people like you, you are not part of the solution, but more likely part of the problem. Indeed, all your beliefs and arguments can be instrumental to Russian ambitions, as much as mine can be instrumental to the American ambitions. So if I trust Russia less than America and your judgement on the topic less than mine, then I see you just as a vector of pro-Russian toxic memes.
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    If you assume people are generally rational, then it collapses into historicism, i.e., conventional morality at time X was rational given the information constraints of the era. If you don't allow information constraints to play a central role it becomes deontological morality with less punch.Count Timothy von Icarus

    Gert's assumption is somehow different from what you suggest: "This is where it is important to recognize that morality is for fallible biased people. Failure to realize this is what is responsible for many of the weird views about morality that have been put forward by philosophers. The only weird view that I will mention is what is known as act utilitarianism or act consequentialism. I mention this view because it is a view that initially sounds very plausible and that many people claim to accept because they fail to realize that morality governs behavior between fallible biased beings. Morality is not for impartial omniscient beings". Source: https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    Right, but referring to “normative systems” rather than something like “cultural moralities” could lead to confusion about when a system is normative – “when it would be advocated by all rational people”.Mark S

    This only becomes normative if it is what all rational people would advocate as I understand Gert’s argumentsMark S
    .

    All right, we can distinguish “cultural moralities” from “normative system” in Gert’s sense to avoid terminological confusions. But my point was really about the fact that “cultural moralities” and the “normative system” in Gert’s sense are both “normative” in the sense of being standards for guiding and assessing practical behaviour.


    But Gert is not advocating these 10 rules as moral absolutes. Rather, they are heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for the goal of “lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system”. And “human sacrifice or slavery” would violate that moral behavior goal.Mark S

    Right and I didn’t affirm anywhere that those 10 rules are absolute as opposed to conditional. Indeed, when Gert’s talk about “rationality” in the moral context he’s always specifying a “unless” condition (“Insofar as people are acting rationally, they all avoid the harms unless they have an adequate reason not to avoid them.” https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/003.htm). Here Gert is even more explicit about this “it is important to use these rules as moral guides, it would be disastrous to regard them as absolute, that is, to hold that it is always immoral to break any of these rules no matter what the circumstances were. ” (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm)
    Yet I wouldn’t call them “heuristics” or “fallible rules of thumb” because these are more epistemic than moral notions. I prefer to talk about them in terms of “default” social norms, that may be exceptionally reconsidered depending on some compelling circumstances.


    Am I correct in taking your understanding of
    “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.”
    to be the claimed negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior?
    Mark S

    No, that’s not my understanding. Gert’s made his point against utilitarianism in his slides (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm): This is where it is important to recognize that morality is for fallible biased people. Failure to realize this is what is responsible for many of the weird views about morality that have been put forward by philosophers. The only weird view that I will mention is what is known as act utilitarianism or act consequentialism. I mention this view because it is a view that initially sounds very plausible and that many people claim to accept because they fail to realize that morality governs behavior between fallible biased beings. Morality is not for impartial omniscient beings. Taking act utilitarianism or act consequentialism as a moral guide would require people to do that act which they regard as having the best overall consequences, that is, what they regard the best balance of less harms and more benefits than any other act. (Of course, other people may have a different view of what counts as the best overall consequences.) On this view, moral rules have no significance, people should simply act to achieve the best consequences and pay no attention to whether their actions involve deception, breaking a promise, cheating, disobeying a law or neglecting their duty. Just imagine what life would be like if everyone did what they thought was best and paid no attention to whether they were violating any of the moral rules. It would be a disaster.


    In this case, I agree that adding the phrase “increasing the benefits of cooperation and” does not make sense.
    I have been thinking of Gert’s above claim as a claim about moral ‘’means’ (lessening of harms) not moral ‘ends’ (the negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior). Your interpretation seems more likely.
    Mark S

    Even though I don’t think we can take Gert’s 10 rules as a case of “utilitarianism”, yet I think they are more about “collective” ends than means to achieve them.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    You, SophistiCat, @neomac... What have your governments done recently to deserve such unreserved faith? I just can't fathom it. What, over the last decade, say, has lead you to believe that US intelligence agencies are trustworthy, that government sources tell you the truth, that the official version of events is pretty much how things are... I'd love to know what string of successes has given you all such unwavering faith in the system.Isaac

    As usual “unwavering faith” or “unreserved faith” are ways to caricature my views (and others’, I’d say). The one who is pretty much categorically sure about what happened in the Nord Stream 2 case and related Western propaganda is your new sidekick [1], not me. Indeed, I didn’t dismiss Hersh’s report, nor argued against Hersh’s credibility.
    Where I deeply disagree with you both, is your helpless craving for pinning roughly everything bad is happening primarily on the US. And to me this has to do more with our assumptions about power struggles in politics and geopolitics than on circumstantial “hard facts” (most of which we may be uncertain about). Your and Tzeentch’s frustration to present your reasons in a persuasive way to your opponents leads you both to caricature your opponents’ views. This attitude is intellectually dishonest and repulsive to me.
    Ironically, your attempts to discredit the US is what makes people like me feel like sympathising with the US leadership more than our brains would recommend.


    [1]

    The reality is, when the US bombed Nord Stream 2, a piece of major infrastructure critical to the German economy, all Scholz asked was how many tanks the US wanted him to send. He's an absolute tool.Tzeentch

    As Hersh said himself about his report on Nord Stream: all he did was dissect the obvious. And the only reason obvious things aren't said out loud is because of deafening US propaganda basically gas lighting the entire western world.Tzeentch


    The only reason these things aren't yet part of the western common sense is because of a relentless propaganda campaign.

    For example, the defense on Kiev has been framed as a heroic Ukrainian defense and a huge failure of the Russian armed forces. However, the order of battle on the Ukrainian side was never disclosed which means it's hard to tell what exactly happened.
    Recently, Seymour Hersh gave an interview in which he named the figure of 60,000 Ukrainian defenders at the battle of Kiev. Assuming that's true, and I suspect that it is (and probably the reason why the order of battle remains undisclosed), this means the defense of Kiev was a successful Russian attempt at diverting forces away from the east. The Russians attacked Kiev with ~21,000 troops. This is a small amount for a city as large as Kiev, but against a defending force of 60,000 there's simply no way this force was meant to capture the capital. One would have expected the Russians to aim for a local numerical advantage of at least 3:1, especially for the type of urban fighting the capture would have involved. This would have required roughly 180,000 troops - basically the entire Russian invading force.

    In other words, the western media spin was pure bullshit to influence the public perception of Ukraine's chances in this war.

    Let me end by saying, I find no pleasure in these hard facts.
    "Tzeentch


    All of what I said is supported by hard facts and expert opinions (which I will happily share if you're interested).


    I'm laying out the painful reality of the situation, because cheerleading and sugar coating aren't going to change it, and the price of ignorance is paid every day by the young men dying on the frontline, and civilians suffering under the war.
    Tzeentch
  • Ukraine Crisis
    And Russia is the only player (that I know of) that has actually done this before. Possibly more than once. But those Georgia incidents made a lot more sense at the time. With Nord Stream it's not obvious.SophistiCat

    Russians might have been also behind explosions/sabotage attempts against the Ukrainian gas pipelines: https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/06/17/323011294/pipeline-explosion-in-ukraine-could-be-act-of-terrorism
    https://geostrategy.org.ua/en/media/articles/putins-streams-perpetuum-mobile-of-state-terrorism-how-girkin-and-malofeev-contributed-to-the-nord-stream-2
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Use your brains guts, people.Tzeentch

    I corrected it for you. For people like you and many others here, the US is the right kind of supervillain whom anybody can ultimately blame for anything in this war. And there is no doubt that the US had motives, means, background history of covert operations, and the good amount of hawkishness to directly or indirectly support such operation.
    The point is that this operation didn’t “end” Nord Stream 2 (it can be repaired within months) and most of all we shouldn’t forget other players. Russia too has means, the right amount of hawkishness and a history of false flag operations to directly or indirectly support such operation. Ukraine, Poland, the UK, other nordic states have means and motives to directly or indirectly support such operation.
    Here some Russian predictions (or potential alibi?) since October 2021:
    https://en.topwar.ru/188140-vozmozhna-li-podvodnaja-diversija-na-gazoprovode-severnyj-potok-2.html
  • Ukraine Crisis
    He goes around proclaiming Putin to be a great man and Russia being "on the right side of history", etc. I don't trust such a person's judgement. If you do, good for you.Tzeentch

    Those statements express some personal opinion that go beyond hard facts and what they might imply. Number of land troops and land movements do not falsify the Western narrative of the earliest phases of the war and grounded on the Russian intelligence failures. That's all.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    He also gave the figure of 60,000 Ukrainian defenders, which supports the hypothesis.Tzeentch

    No it doesn't. Indeed, again Scott Ritter in that article gives similar figures: The fact of the matter remains, however, that a force of 40 000 men, no matter how aggressively employed, cannot take, and hold, a city of some three million inhabitants defended by a mix of 60 000 regular, reserve, and territorial soldiers.
    Yet he doesn't think that the number of troops or their movements of Kiev are enough evidence to automatically exclude the possibility that in the earliest phases of the war the Russians were hoping for a quick Ukrainian capitulation due to wrong belief that the Ukrainian military and population would have not resisted.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Couldn't be further from the truth. I don't take Scott Ritter very seriously.Tzeentch

    Then which other expert is explicitly supporting the "diversion hypothesis" as you do?

    Do you?Tzeentch

    Scott Ritter is a controversial commentator but his article is interesting because despite his expertise ("United States Marine Corps intelligence officer, former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspector", https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter), having many times taken issue with the western narrative (at the point of being accused of spreading pro-Russia propaganda https://russiavsworld.org/scott-ritter-how-former-sex-offender-and-us-marine-works-for-russian-propaganda/), and being supporter of the "diversion hypothesis", yet he doesn't find outlandish the idea that there was a Russian intelligence failure about an easy capitulation by Kiev which might explain the weird behavior of the Russian military around Kiev at the beginning of the war. He didn't claim this was a piece of Western fabricated narrative (60K Ukrainian troops do not prove that either!). Yet this is not incompatible with a "diversion" strategy as a plan B.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Assuming that's true, and I suspect that it is (and probably the reason why the order of battle remains undisclosed), this means the defense of Kiev was a successful Russian attempt at diverting forces away from the east.Tzeentch

    Logic jump [1].

    If we are to believe Hersh's sources, it turns out the idea of the advance on Kiev being a binding operation and not an attempt at capturing and occupying Kiev - an idea that I have posited multiple times in this thread - wasn't so far-fetched after all. In fact, it might've been exactly what took place.Tzeentch


    In other words, the western media spin was pure bullshit to influence the public perception of Ukraine's chances in this war.

    Let me end by saying, I find no pleasure in these hard facts.
    Tzeentch

    Rhetoric jump.


    [1]
    BTW Scott Ritter, a "diversion theory" supporter (I suspect it's him your first expert source), also claims:
    Moscow had opted not to employ its forces according to standard doctrine, opting instead to take a light approach, which appeared to be born from a concerted effort to minimise civilian casualties and harm to civilian infrastructure that itself was derived from a fundamental misunderstanding of the reality of the situation on the ground in Ukraine.
    The reported purging of 150 officers from the 5th Department of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), responsible for operations in the so-called ‘near abroad’ (which includes Ukraine), along with the
    arrest of Sergei Beseda, the former head of the department, suggests that Russia had suffered a failure of intelligence the likes of which has not been seen since the Israeli failure to predict the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973
    .
    While the Russian government has remained characteristically tight-lipped about any possible shortcomings regarding the work of the 5th Department prior to the start of the military operation, the statements by Russian leadership suggesting that the Ukrainian military might remain in its barracks and that civilian leadership would not interfere with Russia military operations suggest that these assumptions were made using intelligence provided by the 5th Department.
    That such assumptions, if indeed they were made, proved to be so fundamentally off target, when combined with the preparedness of the Ukrainian military to engage the initial columns of Russian forces, suggests that the work of the 5th Department had been disrupted by Ukrainian security services, who took control of Russian human networks and fed false reports back to the Russian leadership.
    The fact is that columns of Russian troops, advancing boldly into Ukraine without the kind of attention to route security and flank protection that would normally accompany offensive operations, found themselves cut off and annihilated by well-prepared Ukrainian ambushes. It was, to use an American colloquialism, a Turkey shoot, and the Ukrainian government made effective use of combat footage obtained from such encounters to great effect in shaping global public opinion about the effectiveness of Ukraine’s defences. However, the limitations of the Ukrainian armed forces did not allow it to turn its impressive tactical victories into positive operational and strategic outcomes.

    https://www.herald.co.zw/ukraine-winning-battle-on-twitter-on-the-ground-kiev-is-losing-fight/
  • Ukraine Crisis
    ↪neomac
    So you agree that a European security cooperation that does not involve primarily the United States and the United Kingdom would be beneficial to Europe, and it's just the practical aspects that you are worried about?
    Tzeentch

    Yes if it was feasible and sustainable. In the shitty situation we are I simply don't see how we can get there. Even less, safely (or "democratically" for that matter).
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Obviously the practical implementation of this is a whole other story. The European Union is a non-democratic abomination that needs to be replaced with something that is actually functional before this could ever happen, but lets leave that aside for now.Tzeentch

    Yet that's practically the whole point whatever one might think of the EU. It's more easy to agree on what is desirable, than on what is feasible. Outside the EU (or some other form of federation) Europeans might go back to compete one another not only economically but also for security. And outside the US sphere of influence, we might compete not only with Russia, and China and other regional or global competitors, but also with the US. Good luck with that.
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    This is where I see the "no true Scotsman," 20/20 hindsight problem coming in. It's easy to say now that all sorts of prior norms were irrational.Count Timothy von Icarus

    But I'm not denying the possibility of rationally justifying some past practice in certain circumstances, yet such possibility doesn't imply that the rational justification was what led people to adopt that practice. Many behavioral dispositions are acquired by individuals since they were children before any actual pros/cons calculation rationally justifying that behavior could take place. And also in our adult life we may show a significant degree of gregarious behavior that encourages conformity to some common pattern of behavior without there being any conscious calculation of pros/cons at the origin of that collective behavior (which is also what could explain social reluctance to change behavior as soon as circumstances rationally require it). All I'm saying is that we shouldn't confuse rationality with a posteriori rationalizations. Said that, I didn't mean to exclude that certain now morally questionable practices (like the alleged practice of infanticide in ancient Greece) were grounded on plausible reasons and widely accepted for those reasons.

    we can posit and idealized world where agents agree to follow moral principles before they enter the world, perhaps from behind some "viel of ignorance."Count Timothy von Icarus

    I think this would be a more charitable understanding of what Gert's normative definition of morality might assume. However "idealized" Gert's assumptions are, yet they may explain why we might be inclined to consider those 10 moral rules as plausibly universally acceptable by rational individuals. Besides those practices like infanticide or human sacrifices do not necessarily question Gert's normative definition of morality, instead they simply suggest the existence of extreme social or environmental conditions that would allow individual to exceptionally but rationally derogate to default rational moral rules.
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    Do you mean include rules about human sacrifice and slavery?Count Timothy von Icarus

    I was referring to Gert's 10 rules that all moral agents would follow (it looks like the first 5 should be taken to be the most evident to him): https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm
    Plus 5 five ideals (which however are supererogatory): https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/008.htm
    As I understand them, they would exclude slavery and human sacrifice at least by default, because all rational human beings would find unacceptable a moral system where human sacrifice or slavery would be permitted. I guess that this conclusion follows from assuming that rational people want to avoid harm by default (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/002.htm, https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/003.htm) and impartiality (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/007.htm). Rational people wouldn’t find acceptable a moral system that would permit anybody to enslave or sacrifice them by default. However there might be ad hoc social rules that may specify under which exceptional circumstances moral rules would need to be rationally integrated with other rules.


    If you really thought human sacrifice meant the difference between famine and a good harvest, isn't human sacrifice rational? There it is merely an information constraint that changes the nature of such a behavior.
    We might abhor slavery, but military conscription, a form of temporary bondage, is seen as essential to virtually all states.
    Count Timothy von Icarus

    Two comments:
    1. As far as I understand Gert’s normative definition of morality, only a subset of social rules can be considered rationally moral and such rules apply to the default behaviour (which doesn’t exclude exceptions). The acceptability of “human sacrifice” practices can not be dictated by rational moral rules in that sense. Maybe there are religious or pagan social rules that govern human behaviour in exceptional cases but it's not up to morality to determine such cases and their rationality remains to be established depending on the circumstances. On the other side “prostitution” as a free choice is not excluded by default by those 10 moral rules. Other religious or legal rules might however exclude it as an unacceptable behavior.
    2. As far as I’m concerned, I wouldn’t be so quick in calling some behaviour “rational” just because it may look functional to the survival of the individual or the community. I don’t know enough relevant details about human sacrifice practices but I’m not sure that human beings adopted or preserved such practices as the result of some conscious effective calculation that would make look their behaviour rational (e.g. addressing the problem of famines which may be more plausible in case the ritual increased the availability of food by reducing the demand of food within the community and/or by allowing cannibalism) and not just an evolutionary unintended consequence of some traditionalist cultural imprint.
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    What do you understand descriptively moral and normatively moral to refer to?Mark S

    As I understand it, Gert's "descriptive" notion of morality tries to capture what would characterize normative systems as "moral" cross-culturally, independently from the geographic or historical latitude, in short rules/ideals protecting a group from harm is what counts as moral [1].
    Gert's “normative” notion of morality requires that these rules/ideals be acceptable by all rational agents. He identified 10 rules (and 4 ideals, if I remember correctly) that satisfy this normative constraint (they do not seem to include e.g. rules against cannibalism or prostitution but they seem to exclude rules about human sacrifice or slavery).
    Gert’s doesn’t need to talk about cooperation strategies (domination, partnership, marker) because he is not interested in classifying systems that satisfy his descriptive definition of morality. This classificatory task belongs to a lower level of analysis (which I guess would be a preliminary step to morally profile societies of different geographic and historical latitude and correlate such profiles with other social/natural factors).
    The reference to cooperative strategies is not only a further classificatory task wrt the general “descriptive” definition of morality offered by Gert, but it suggests a whole different research program, namely one that tries to connect pre-human pro-social behaviour and human morality. Indeed the cooperative behaviour is present in some “natural” form also in certain non-human animals. So morality would be an upgrade of these pro-social animal dispositions. The problem is again if this is just matter of degrees or there is something emergent in the moral dimension. In both cases one might take morality as an improvement of such pro-social animal dispositions, yet one would need to specify in what sense morality constitutes an improvement (e.g. in what sense circumcision - which animals do not have - is a marker rule that improves the benefits of cooperation?)
    Conclusion, even if I see why you might be interested in integrating Gert’s definition with a reference to cooperative strategies, I don’t think it would be an improvement, because Gert’s definition belongs to a greater level of abstraction (once again compare “rational animal” and “rational animal with genital organs“) and results from a philosophical investigation about the notion of human morality (independently from its continuity wrt animal behaviour).

    [1] notice that the notion of "moral agents" in Gert's descriptive definition of morality risks to make the definition circular.
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    Morality descriptively is NOT simply lessening harm as Gert’s version implies. Morality descriptively is lessening harm by increasing the benefits of cooperation.Mark S

    Yet I didn't see how you can prove that the definition you suggest is an improvement. You are simply making claims not proving a point. For example, is it possible to have an informal public system applicable to human beings that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal, but it decreases the benefits of cooperation? If it's not possible, then you definition is just redundant.
    Besides the more I think of your definition and the less I find it clear. I think cooperative behavior can be found also in animals. The partnership, dominance and marker proto-rules (or patterns of behavior) can be found also in the animal world. Am I wrong? If so and animals showing cooperative behavior are not moral agents, then cooperative behavior must be conceptually decoupled from morality. Now, if morality increases the benefits of cooperation, there must be something in "morality" that can not be reduced to those patterns of behavior constituting cooperation the increases the benefits from such patterns.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    Odd how that whenever it suits your narrative we should trust his word, and whenever it doesn't suit your narrative, he's lying.

    15 years of protest against NATO expansion > Not a genuine expression of worry, but a carefully crafted lie.

    Some war-time rhetoric > Not nonsense narratives meant to influence the public, but a genuine expression of his intentions.


    You have to be pretty deep down the propaganda rabbit hole not to see this.
    Tzeentch

    Do you mean "some war-time rhetoric" is the lie while "15 years of protest against NATO expansion" is expression of Putin's genuine views? And doesn't that suit your narrative too?
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    How does Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral based on “lessening of harms” explain, as you claim:
    (A) “slaves must obey their masters”
    (B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
    (C) “homosexuality is evil”.

    I don’t see that it can. My "Morality As Cooperation Strategies" (MACS) definition of what is descriptively moral does explain them because it includes cooperation strategies. It explains them as marker and domination strategies, strategies for increasing the benefits of cooperation in ingroups at the expense (always for domination norms and sometimes for marker norms) of outgroups.
    Mark S

    My points are 2: one is about explanation, the other about generality.
    1. Gert's descriptive definition of morality is : What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal”
    As I understand it, the definition itself in this formulation doesn't specify any strong rationality requirement nor how wide is the group of the people protected by the moral system. So if A, B, C are forms of lessening the harms of a certain group that is protected by the moral system, then these are moral rules that satisfy the definition offered by Gert. In case A the group would be the masters, in case B the group would be all those who need to rest at least once a week, in case C the group could be e.g. all those (as the politicians) would benefit from a demographic growth through etherosexual mating or by limiting the transmissibility of certain sexual diseases or by limiting naturally repugnant sexual behavior (and religious beliefs might have "irrationally" strengthen this belief)
    2. Gert's descriptive definition of morality can account for all moral rules (like A, B, C) your definition can account for then your definition is redundant wrt Gert's definition, because talking about "cooperative strategies" doesn't add anything valuable to the general definition, other then alluding to something that is more specific than required by a minimal general definition (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    Yes, “slaves must obey their masters” has too often been a cultural moral norm enforced by an ingroup to exploit an outgroup.

    The reason that "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral is that 1) it adds explanatory power, particularly for marker norms such as “working on the sabbath deserves death” and “homosexuality is evil”, and 2) it directly follows from the ultimate source of morality - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

    Without "increasing the benefits of cooperation" you can’t say you have a definition of what is descriptively moral that explains past and present moral norms. And you can’t link cultural moral norms to their ultimate source - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.
    Mark S

    These are just claims, where is the argument to support them?

    Consider:
    (A) “slaves must obey their masters”
    (B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
    (C) “homosexuality is evil”.
    (BGD) Gert's definition: “What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal”
    (MSD) your definition: “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” (which looks like BGD plus "increasing the benefits of cooperation" clause)
    If A, B, C can be explained by both BGD and MSD then how is MSD more accurate than BGD and not just more redundant wrt BGD?
    To support your claims you should be able to provide an example X historically considered as moral that BGD does NOT classifies as moral while MSD classifies as moral, AND/OR an example Y historically considered as non-moral that BGD classifies as moral while MSD does NOT classify as moral.
    If you can't provide any such cases then your general definition is simply redundant, and the allusion to cooperation strategies (partnership, dominance, marker norms) belongs to a deeper level of analysis or empirical investigation (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").


    BTW can you clarify better what "marker norms" means and why it is to be distinguished from dominance and partnership norms?
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    He has not justified stating this as a normative (ought) claim as you (and perhaps others here) are interpreting it.Mark S

    That said, I am frustrated by Gert’s ambiguity in his lecture about whether he means the definition to be descriptive (the only way I can make sense of it) or normative (which he has not justified).Mark S

    To me, Gert’s definition of “morality” is descriptive. What I think Gert takes to be a normative definition of morality is the set of rules and ideals he discussed later in his lecture.


    For example, the definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then this repulsive moral norm would be included under Gert’s definition of what morality ‘is’. This makes no sense to modern sensibilities as a normative claim but is sensible as a claim about what is descriptively moral.Mark S

    Both your descriptive definition of morality and Gert’s descriptive definition of morality can account for the fact that “slaves must obey their masters” can be taken as a moral rule. Can’t they? If so, this example doesn’t show us in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality.


    My suggested revision, “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” more accurately reflects what science tells us of morality’s function – the principal reason what we call descriptively moral behavior exists.Mark S

    In what sense it’s more accurate about the function of morality? Talking about “cooperation” seems to me a way to suggest that there are different ways in which morality can be implemented depending on the cooperation strategy (which must be specified and be correlated to other factors, e.g. material conditions of existence, demographic dynamics, environmental conditions, technological advancement). But the most general notion of “cooperation” itself can be formulated entirely in Gert’s descriptive moral terminology. So adding it to Gert’s general definition doesn’t bring anything to it. In other words, allusions to cooperation strategies should be part of a lower level wrt Gert’s general descriptive definition of morality and a more oriented toward an empirical investigation.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    By the way, I can think of some that would like the US going all isolation and NATO closing up shop. Can't tell if that's what you're suggesting here; is it? — jorndoe

    If European leaders are incapable of serving European interests, NATO is a threat to European security.
    Tzeentch

    If European leaders are incapable of serving European interests, Europeans better be outside NATO. Feeling better now?
  • Bernard Gert’s answer to the question “But what makes it moral?”
    What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.Mark S

    It's not clear in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. Can you give concrete example to clarify that?
  • Ukraine Crisis
    post-Soviet Russian hegemonic ambitions in short:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primakov_doctrine
  • Ukraine Crisis
    The shared rule. — neomac

    If we shared a rule we would have agreed on the first proposition. If there were some rule (which we agree on) that can be used to demonstrate the truth of a rational argument, such that it compels me to believe "you committed fallacy X", then it could have been used in the first place to compel me to believe your original proposition. I don't see why it suddenly becomes more compelling when used to argue for a fallacy.
    Isaac

    Not sure to understand what you are saying. I could explicitly conclude “all cats are animals” from “all cats are mammals” and “all mammals are animals” according to the “Barbara” syllogistic rule. You could argue instead that I inferred that conclusion from “all cats are planets” and “all planets are animals” always according to the “Barbara” syllogistic rule. And since the premises are false, so is the conclusion.
    Your counter-argument would be a strawman, since I didn’t infer that conclusion from the premises you suggested. The strawman fallacy expresses a rule that is different from the “Barbara” syllogistic rule.
    And the shared “Barbara” syllogistic rule might compel you to believe my conclusion if it wasn’t for the fact that you failed to use the right premises either because you overlooked my actual argument by mistake or because you are intellectually dishonest. In the former case you may readily acknowledge the strawman charge, in the latter case you may still want to escape the accusation with some other sophism.


    If we can't converge on such basic level, we remain unintelligible to each other. — neomac


    Nonsense. I can vaguely understand people even talking to me in a foreign language. Most of our words are just fluff. We needn't agree on much. I determine most of my opinion about what you mean from my experience of people and assumptions about what kind of person you are and what you might likely be trying to say. You become a character in my story, playing a role I determine. You'll fit that role all the while it's not overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary because it's easier for me to predict your behaviour that way. It's just basic cognition. We're not powered by words and their meanings, we're powered by predictions, stories, expectations.
    Isaac

    Not sure to understand the contrast between “words and their meanings” and “predictions, stories, expectations”, and how this relates to what I said. As far as I’m concerned your predictions, stories and expectations should still be based on shared rules to make sense to me. It’s also ironic that you are trying to evade my conclusion about nonsensical objections by calling it “nonsense” and still expecting to make sense to me.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    And what prevents anyone from rejecting that 'showing', why are they suddenly compelled by your second judgement when they weren't by your first?Isaac

    The shared rule. If we can't converge on such basic level, we remain unintelligible to each other.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    I should have had you pegged for a 'fallacy-o-phile.

    A couple of questions...
    Do you think those with whom you're arguing would agree that their propositions succumb to these fallacies?
    Isaac

    To the extant I and my opponent share the same argumentative rules, we must converge about how we apply them too. So if I claim he failed or my opponent rejects the charge, it must be shown through the shared argumentative rule who is right.
    For example you recently accused me of strawmanning you, but I argued that I wasn't strawmanning you: if you make a general claim X but intend to refer specifically to Y, and I don't get what you are referring to (I even told you so), so I can just argue against X, you can not accuse me of strawmanning you, because I'm still arguing against your actual claims, not something different.

    If not, to what do you then appeal when arguing that they, in fact, do? More fallacies? Fallacy fallacies? And then, when we disagree about the fallacy fallacies? Fallacy fallacy fallacies, perhaps?Isaac

    Shared rules are necessary to work out differences intelligibly. So if we disagree on some argumentative rule application, at best we can try to work it out through more basic rules (like our conceptual framework). At worst we remain unintelligible.
    For example, as far as I've understood, you accused me of "hypocrisy" based on the idea that I'm advocating for "dispassionate" contributions, while I myself am not contributing "dispassionately". But I'm not claiming to offer dispassionate contributions nor advocating for dispassionate contributions nor implying or suggesting in favor of "dispassionate" contributions. So either that's settled and you must agree, or you must offer a compelling argument against my objection: e.g. quote where I solicited people to offer dispassionate arguments or claimed I'm offering dispassionate arguments or implied or arguably suggested in favor of "dispassionate" contributions, and see if it is compelling enough to accuse me of hypocrisy.
  • Ukraine Crisis
    What are these rules? Can you enumerate a few?Isaac
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies