That may be what you do here, but philosophical argument is a means not an end. — Fooloso4

I never said that it was an end. It is obviously what we both do here - it's what we're doing now - and that's all that I said, capiche? Our exchanges would be much more productive if you restricted yourself to addressing what I say, rather than what you imagine me to be saying, as you've done a few times now.

The confusion is all yours. — Fooloso4

Incorrect. I am not confused. The problem was that you appeared to be, because you unexpectedly and irrationally changed the subject without good reason.

Political correctness is a type of correctness. — Fooloso4

Yes, but that's irrelevant. A type of correctness is still not the same thing as correctness, so you're still wrong. It is merely correct according to a particular standard which is itself open to criticism. That is indeed correctness of a type, but it is trivial.

Or at least it was until it became code for incorrectness. — Fooloso4

Using it as code is still missing the main topic, which is about political correctness proper. Myself and others are criticising political correctness proper. We are not doing what you accuse Trump and conservatives of doing.

Which is to say incorrect by virtue of their politics. — Fooloso4

Well, yes, obviously political correctness will only ever be correct or incorrect in accordance with a particular politics. It doesn't fully accord with my politics. So, from my point of view, it is a bit of a misnomer to call it political correctness.

In either case, it is about being correct in matters political. — Fooloso4

But it's not as simple as that. I'm not incorrect about something just because I'm "politically incorrect" about something, which is what some people seem to be suggesting. That's basically just saying that I don't accord with standards of "political correctness" and I'm perhaps incorrect in a broader sense, as a result, in someone else's opinion. The cheerleaders for "political correctness" are not correct in a broader and more meaningful sense by default, and making that assumption is to not think about the topic philosophically.

Reason can change one's passions. Therefore, it is not a slave to one's passions. — creativesoul

Okay, go ahead and reason me out of my passionate belief that murder is wrong.

You have your tag-line, "reason the slave of the passions." Beyond that, not so much. Why don't you put your sling-shot away and take a little time and make all this clear, including what your tag-line means.

In my view, reason is the slave of reason, nothing else, and not a slave either, but a partner. — tim wood

If you know why Hume said that, then you'll know why I said that. You are unfamiliar with Hume, I take it? There are some good online resources to help you understand what his point was. Otherwise, why do we need to start from scratch as if you have no background knowledge, or as though you can't get yourself up to speed?

As for your view, good for you, but what are your arguments against Hume?

Why are you continuing to argue? — Fooloso4

That's what we do here. It's a philosophy forum.

Yes, there are distinctions between correctness and political correctness. — Fooloso4

I'm glad you acknowledge that. My concern was that you were confusing the two, given that the subject was the latter, and you switched to the former for no apparent reason.

Certainly you would not deny that there is a relationship between what is correct and what is right. — Fooloso4

Oh my goodness. Political correctness is very different from correctness.

Not at all. I am suggesting that a relativist had better not be, though, because he defines his view as absent reason and entirely subjective. — tim wood

No, I'm a moral relativist and I don't define my view as absent reason. I for one have explicitly spoken of the role that reason plays.

After all, one man's horror is just another man's just stretching out, yes?
— tim wood

Yes, obviously. Hitler clearly was not horrified by what he did, so it's pretty irrefutable that one man's horror is just another man's stretching out. Are you suggesting that Hitler was horrified by what he did? — Isaac

You got him good there.

Does not anyone in this thread consider reason? — tim wood

Yes, it's a slave to the passions.

Just a question. If, in a future world, some evil genius had arranged things such that torturing an innocent child brought about a harmonious society, would that make torturing the child morally right?
— Isaac

Zero. Not even a little bit. — tim wood

I feel exactly the same way. Good thing this stuff about a harmonious society is a load of codswallop, so we don't ever have to worry about that. Phew!

But if your morality were based only on your personal preferences, and you were satisfied with that then nothing anyone raises could be a problem for you, then no argument could be against your position and hence would not be worth arguing against. It would be like arguing that your preference for beef over lamb was somehow mistaken. — Janus

Oh god, not another bad analogy relating to foodstuffs. It's not impossible that I can be convinced otherwise. My morality isn't absolutely rigid, it can change. And one technique of convincing me otherwise about something would be to appeal to my moral feelings. Maybe I initially feel that I'm in the right, but you get me to change how I feel about it. That's not unheard of. It happens. And my meta-ethical relativism has no bearing on that. It would be exactly the same if I had almost any other meta-ethical position. It is a fallacy of the moral objectivist to think that an objective morality would make it easier to convince me otherwise. And this fallacy has already been noted by others in this discussion.

And besides, even preferences about food can change, in part due to emphasising the perceived merits or demerits.

To discuss anything is to seek normative agreement, For anything to be worth arguing over is for it to be potentially subject to normative agreement, but that is impossible in the case of moral relativism. — Janus

No, that isn't impossible, that's just the same gross misunderstanding.

So to answer what might be considered to be the meta-ethical question "What do moral judgements consist in?" with something like "They are nothing more than personal preferences", is to ignore the reality of cultural and normative influences on the individual. — Janus

Oh dear. Mistake after mistake. You're not on top form today, Janus! I've explicitly acknowledged external influences, and rightly dismissed them as having much less of a primary role in determining my morality than other more fundamental factors.

And further to that if they were nothing more than personal preferences based on feeling (and I am not denying that they are that, only that they are not nothing more than that) then they are not properly moral at all, since they would then have no moral significance. In other words you would just be acting, not morally, but as your feelings dictate, just as animals do. (This is not to deny that the instinctive behavior of animals towards their own kind is not normative and cannot be seen as a kind of quasi-morality). — Janus

Well, if you intend to say something relevant about my position rather than someone's else's, then you should note that I talk about moral feelings. Other animals don't have moral feelings, or at least that's controversial to suggest. We are moral agents with moral feelings which are the foundation of our moral judgements. You can't rightly say that about chickens or budgies, or at least not without much controversy.

What "other (moral) priorities" could one who wishes to live in society have? The whole idea of morality consists in thinking of others. — Janus

That's a load of rubbish. Morality is not necessarily social or altruistic. They are merely positions in ethics. They contrast with individualism and egoism, which are equally positions in ethics. You are once again confusing your personal moral values for morality itself.

So if you had. for example, an "other priority" that consisted in exploiting others without consideration for their feelings or welfare, then that would amount to thinking only about yourself and your own feelings, and hence would not count as moral at all, but rather amoral. — Janus

The same comment I made above applies here also.

If someone acts against their own moral principles, then they are acting immorally. — Janus

The antecedent suggests an unwarranted assumption. I wouldn't be acting against my own moral principles. So why are you talking about that?

If someone has no moral principles, which would be the case if someone were to kill people without remorse, then they would be acting amorally. — Janus

Again, why are you talking about this? This says more about your own unwarranted assumptions than anything that I've said.

I may have been pointed out, but it is not compelling; it just doesn't stand up to scrutiny. If moral relativism consists in saying that it is OK to believe whatever is in accordance with your feelings about how to act towards others, then that just is an amoral, morally nihilistic, anarchic view. In that sense the very idea of moral relativism is a contradiction in terms. — Janus

Obviously it won't be compelling to anyone who is stuck in their own misunderstandings about it.

I don't believe that individuals are morally independent in any significant sense. — Janus

Well, good for you, but they demonstrably are.

I made this point before to Terrapin; an artist is not isolated from influence, but they may be creatively independent in the sense that they can produce an original synthesis. — Janus

Their work is unique, and so is my morality, because it is uniquely mine, and founded on that which is unique to me, like my thoughts and feelings. An artist and an individual moral agent have this in common. Thanks for giving me a good analogy.

This is not the case with moral stances; there are no original stances when it comes to questions about the rightness of murder, rape, theft, deception and so on. There is really very little variation on those generic question other than for or against, and actually there is even less variation than that since almost everyone is against murder, rape, theft and deception. — Janus

Doesn't matter. Just because I have things in common with others, that obviously doesn't mean that I'm not unique, and uniqueness makes my point rather than your point about originality. I don't really care about your point about originality, and I needn't. That's the good thing about individualism. I forge my own path. I do not require your approval. Your judgement has no authority over me.

It is not merely that they are "equal in kind", but that they are equal insofar as on the presumption of moral relativism there is no rational reason to prefer one over the other. — Janus

It's not a matter of being rational. Feelings aren't rational.

The fact that moral relativists do prefer one over the other does not indicate that there are any rational justifications for any of those preferences, because they are preferences based only on self-interest or feeling. — Janus

If that's supposed to be a criticism, it is ineffectual. It is a category error to seek rational justification in something that isn't a matter of rationality.

There is no need for rational justification if you are a moral relativist, because you are simply following your feelings. — Janus

There can be rational justification on a level, but not at the core. It would be naive to seek one from the core.

If those feelings happen to be kind, then good, but that does not make them moral. — Janus

You have no authority to make that announcement. But if you're just expressing your own personal opinion, then that's fine.

Animals have kind feelings towards their own; does that make them moral beings? — Janus

Other animals aren't moral agents.

Something more is needed, and that something more consists in thinking that it is important to care about your fellows, even if you don't naturally feel that way. — Janus

Yes, something more is needed: moral agency. The rest is just more personal opinion stemming from personal values, but stated as though it is something more than that.

Isn't what? Isn't — Janus

What isn't isn't what? Isn't it? Or is it?

Wait, what?

...if you are a consistent moral relativist you won't expect anyone to be interested in your reasons for your moral judgements since they are merely based on your feelings and not on any normative considerations. — Janus

I'm just going to dismiss this. At this stage, I'm tired of trying to get sense out of it, when there probably isn't any sense to be found anyway.

In fact it isn't possible for you, as a consistent moral relativist, to 'explain the truth in (your) claim that (your) moral judgement is better than someone else's" because any such explanation will necessarily appeal to normative values that you have no business appealing to. All you could consistently say is "I feel my moral judgement is better than yours, so there!" to which the other will likely retort "So what?". — Janus

This is where psychology is handy, I think. Neitzche recognised the importance of psychology in relation to morality. It is handy as a tool, because although you're talking, I think that what you're actually doing and your reasons for doing it matter more. Your talking is actually kind of meaningless. It isn't about consistency at all, it is about you making a judgement about me on the basis that I am a moral relativist. You do not judge that I am deserving of "the right" to make moral evaluations, just because I am a moral relativist, and you disapprove of moral relativists for whatever reason. It doesn't have to be logical, and it probably isn't. You've basically already admitted to a guilt by association fallacy. Yours is a prejudiced and authoritarian judgement. Note the language: "You have no business!". The great irony is that you seem to think that you're being more rational than emotive, when in reality it is the opposite. "Boo moral relativism!".

No, I don't treat it like that at all. As I said a few times moral philosophy is more an art than a science, and similarly as with aesthetics there are qualities which determine the value of works that are more than merely a matter of personal preference, even though, since art has no strict utility, it is even harder than it is with ethics to say precisely what those qualities are. — Janus

Art isn't best made sense of by taking a rationalist approach either.

Morality isn't anything other than what's it's good for. You seem to be confusing yourself by looking for a substantive nature of morality, instead of realizing it's nature is pragmatic. — Janus

I conclude from that that you don't know what morality is, or you deliberately conflate two different things, which is illogical. The error is clear to see with an analogy. What you're doing is like answering the question of what a drill is by saying that a drill is good for making holes. That's absurd, as it clearly doesn't answer the question, it treats it as though it was a different question. A drill is not a "good for making holes": that's its purpose or design or a benefit of it. It is an object made of materials like plastic and metal.

This is nonsense, since ethics is essentially a normative discipline, and so-called meta-ethics is nothing if it not a part of that. Don't be relying on your incoherent distinction to avoid trying to argue cogently for a position which cannot be argued cogently (since all arguments are normatively motivated and assessed according to normative principles). — Janus

No, that's nonsense, and is the cause of much of your confusion. It is about ethics. It has a different aim to normative ethics. It aims to explain what morality is, not what it is good for, which is that same mistake someone else made earlier. Saying that a particular meta-ethical framework is better or valuable or does more good than another because it leads to more beneficial consequences, given your personal value about a harmonious society, will continue to be fallacious, given the context, which is not what is good, or most good, but rather what is the case.

You obviously care enough to argue with others about it. — Janus

Boy, this is very "meta" now. Yes, I care enough to at least analyse whether or not what you're raising is genuinely a problem and respond with the results of my analysis, and then argue in support of my conclusion and so on.

I mean, we can take this to a meta-meta-meta-meta... level if you really want to. You keep ironically reinforcing the distinction you've explicitly denied.

I agree that moral feelings are the foundation of moral stances; or at least that feelings are. If someone cares about others and about living harmoniously with them, then they will not promote moral thoughts such as that murder, or rape, or theft, or deception is good. If someone cares nothing for others; they probably still will not promote such moral thoughts since to do so could jeopardize their security. — Janus

Okay. On that we agree at least.

So, if one wants to have genuine loving relationships with others, then one would be better served by moral thoughts that are based on that love. That is an objective observation. — Janus

And if one has other priorities, then it will be different. But either way, this doesn't get to the heart of the issue. This is not the objectivity that I am rejecting. I do not see that as meta-ethically relevant, though it is relevant in some other context.

It is functional because people by and large are not moral relativists; most people I know think that it is not merely a matter of opinion as to whether some acts are right or wrong. — Janus

But this is where meta-ethical beliefs are irrelevant. The distinction between what is the case meta-ethically, what people meta-ethically believe, and what people normatively believe in ethics, is very important and very useful. The key point is that morality functions in spite of the meta-ethics.

And besides, as has been pointed out before multiple times, it is not correct to associate moral relativism with amoralism, moral nihilism, or anarchy in the sense of chaos and disorder, indifference, everything being equal, and so on. Again, this is a common misperception. It is just as functional as simplistic notions of morality per moral absolutism. Moral judgement doesn't lose any force, it doesn't mean that there's no right or wrong or better or worse. It actually interprets those terms in a way that makes them meaningful and true, unlike the nonsense and falsehood of moral absolutism and moral objectivism.

You are treating individuals as if they are isolated islands of feeling; this is wrongheaded; people are not like that at all. Most people are heavily influenced by the mores around them, and almost no one is immune to normativity. So the romantic isolated individual model that underlies moral relativism is not true to the actual conditions under which people make moral judgements. — Janus

No, you misunderstand and are not representing my position well. It is more about independence than isolation. I rectified these errors in understanding earlier on in my exchange with T Clark. I acknowledge external influential factors. They are not primary. Demonstrably so in many cases. T Clark weakly appealed to factors like the government and religion. He couldn't have been any more wrong if he tried in my case! I am strongly anti- the current government, and anti- much of the prevalent religion in my society, namely Christianity. These are not the primary determining factors in my morality. I know that better than you. You are on the outside trying to glimpse inside. That is pretty naive.

If all you're saying is that they're all equal in kind, like how we're all equally human, then that is obvious and trivial.
— S

You can try to dismiss this point, which is so uncomfortable for what you want to believe, by calling it "trivial", but it remains a salient point. — Janus

Then go ahead and explain it. It is salient, but it is trivial in the sense that you're preaching to the choir with no clear point beyond that.

If reason is not normatively motivated then it really is a mere slave to the passions, and as such, irrelevant. Rationality suggests 'ratio' which is basically referring to weighing or measurement, and in moral relativism there is nothing to weigh or measure reasons against. — Janus

But of course there is. There are our feelings and values and suchlike. That is what we're weighing up moral considerations against. It is our compass. Reason is just a handy tool to connect things and to rationalise. But it's all fundamentally about feelings.

No it isn't; not if you are merely arguing that it is better because you prefer it. And under the presumption of moral relativism you are not justified in arguing from any other criteria. — Janus

Isn't what? I'm not sure what you're referring to there.

Anyway, when I say that it is better, obviously I mean that it is better in accordance with my standard. That's what everyone effectively means, whether they realise it or not.

And what is my standard upon analysis? It is subjective. It is feelings.

Moral objectivism doesn't have a leg to stand on.

All this asserts is what your preferences and beliefs are; why should I care? — Janus

You don't have to, but that's simply what morality is. We express our thoughts and feelings about the stuff of ethics, stuff we tend to care about a lot. Your error is to treat it as though it is like mathematics or science or something. It isn't. It is more like psychology. Rationalist interpretations of morality are categorically mistaken, and have been dead in the water since Hume.

No, it's all just talk about ethics, which is part of the domain of ethics; there is no coherent separation. In any case it doesn't matter what you call it, the point is that within the context of moral relativism there can be no normatively compelling reason to think that morally relativistic arguments and opinions are anything other than merely arbitrary. If this were actually true of moral thought then this whole argument is irrelevant and pointless. — Janus

What is or isn't normatively compelling is completely irrelevant in meta-ethics.

The simplest way to introduce a normative significance to moral arguments is to acknowledge that the purpose of mores is to bring about social harmony. It is then easy to see that moral positions that support actions that are engendered by fear, hatred, envy, and so on are not up to the task which is the foundational purpose of moral thought. — Janus

Lol. The normative is of significance in normative ethics, not meta-ethics.

You are making a very good example of why the distinction matters.

You can make judgements, but your judgements can carry no normative weight at all, and hence they are merely arbitrary, just as the judgements of all the other moral relativists are. — Janus

But they can and do. Just look around. That's how morality works. That's what it is. It is just people making judgements, approving and disapproving, expressing emotions and sometimes using reason to explain themselves, but often that isn't even part of it. The average person isn't much like a philosopher when it comes to ethics, and especially not a rationalist philosopher. And especially not like Kant! It is laughable to think of the average person reasoning in accordance with the categorical imperative!

Typically, you could probably get enough just from body language alone on things like cruelty to animals or child abuse. The foundation in moral feelings is very evident.

Whether it poses any problem for moral relativists doesn't matter to me, it's irrelavnat to what I am arguing. Their criterion for a particular moral standpoint should only be what they prefer and nothing more. — Janus

Firstly, if it's not a problem for me, as a moral relativist, then why should I care?

Secondly, it all boils down to "preference", or rather, moral feelings. Reason is but the slave of the passions, remember? That is one of the most important lessons to learn in moral philosophy, if not the most important.

The point is that since that is also equally, and equally validly (within the assumptions and context of moral relativism) the sole criterion for any morally relativist argument; there can be no reason whatsoever (apart from individual preferences) to prefer one argument over another, and therefore they are all in the same boat, that is they are all equal. — Janus

That every single individual moral agent, irrespective of their meta-ethical or normative stance, fundamentally appeals to their moral feelings or subjective evaluation in reaching moral judgements or conclusions about what's better or worse does not imply that all of these judgements and evaluations are all treated as equal in any sense which poses any problem for moral relativism. That "we're all in the same boat" and that "we're all equal" in the sense that we're all confined to subjectivity is precisely my point. I don't know why you'd be preaching to the choir or suggesting that that's somehow a big problem. It is not problem at all. It is the way things are, and morality is no less functional. It is functional so long as we are moral agents capable of moral judgement. Morality isn't functional based on misguided romantic notions about a "harmonious society".

Sure there are subjective standards, but as such they are all equal. — Janus

If all you're saying is that they're all equal in kind, like how we're all equally human, then that is obvious and trivial.

If an individual moral relativist's subjective standards of better and worse are merely based on personal preference, then all individual moral relativist's moral opinions are arbitrary beyond the fact that they are preferred. — Janus

Merely? Arbitrary? I'm not suggesting that reason has no role, I'm suggesting that it is subservient. I am a Humean.

"'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger".

This means that there is no need to appeal to standards of better and worse in order to make sense, on the presumption of moral relativism, of morality. — Janus

Of course there is. It is necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's. That truth relies on relativism and subjectivity. It is made sense of as an evaluation.

And standards of better and worse cannot consistently be appealed to in order to judge morally relativistic arguments or standpoints. — Janus

I can and do make consistent judgements. That's all that matters. Any opinion from outside which overlooks things like that are missing something important as far as I'm concerned. I don't care about your assumptions about a dispassionate observer. Morality is of the passions.

There is no meta-ethics; there is only ethics. — Janus

Oh come on. You can't be serious.

Ethics talking about itself is part of ethics, just as philosophy talking about itself is part of philosophy. Try not to be hoodwinked by the fashionable notions of 'meta" disciplines and your thinking should improve. — Janus

Interestingly, despite appearances, that says nothing at all. You implicitly acknowledge meta-ethics, you just don't want to call it that because amusingly you think of calling it that as some sort of fad.

I could care less if you do or do not make an argument. Suit yourself. — Rank Amateur

You've been exposed as evasive, manipulative, and intellectually dishonest. I want nothing more to do with you. But I hope you see the error in your ways.

Really? And on what basis would the disinterested observer "observe" (don't you mean 'judge'?) that "there is a right and wrong in a relative sense" or a 'better or worse in a relative sense"? Relative to what? — Janus

Yes, really. Descriptive moral relativism is pretty damn obvious, even to disinterested observers. Even Noah Te Stroete, who is strongly against meta-ethical moral relativism, accepted descriptive moral relativism.

Relative to a subjective standard. I don't appeal outside of myself to make value judgements about whose moral judgement is better or worse. That makes zero sense. It is in fact absurd.

And yes, it isn't really a matter of observation. It is necessarily a matter of evaluation.

This wrong for two reasons. Firstly there is no reason why moral relativism cannot be considered dispassionately, from outside it and 'apart from" individual preferences; that is it has no justifiable claim to be sacrosanct. — Janus

That's fine, but then you have to explain the supposed logical relevance. It doesn't pose a problem internally for any moral relativist, and if you are trying to criticise moral relativism externally, then you must support your external premises, whatever they might be.

Secondly all moral arguments are, apart from their being individually preferred, all equal, simply because there can be, under the assumption of moral relativism, no normative criteria by which one can be assessed to be better than another. — Janus

To the best of my knowledge, there is no "apart from" any subjective standard that makes any sense of morality. But there are evidently subjective standards of better and worse which can be appealed to in order to make sense of morality.

The fact that individuals prefer one argument to another is irrelevant because that cannot be used to establish that one is in fact better than another... — Janus

There is no "in fact better than another" beyond facts relating to subjective judgement. You need to justify that assumption.

I say I have no interest in making such an argument to you. I have no need to change your view.

You ask again

I still say no

You say come on argue your point.

I say no, but if you want to argue I am wrong go ahead.

You call me names, and demand my unconditional surrender

It is always a special time dealing with you. — Rank Amateur

Jesus Christ. I just want you to be intellectually honest for once. You do not have to try to support your view. I am not demanding that. I am demanding that you be intellectually honest about why that is instead of constantly running away like a coward. You are not an honourable debater, and this is something I find deeply offensive.

It's very simple really; a society in which murder was considered virtuous could never be a harmonious one and would not even survive for long. — Janus

The problem is that that's not logically relevant in the appropriate context of meta-ethics, except by connecting the dots as a fallacious appeal to the consequences. It doesn't validly lead to any logically relevant conclusion in the meta-ethical debate going on between meta-ethical moral relativism and other meta-ethical positions.

Whether what you say is true or false, given the context, it is either a fallacy of irrelevance or a non sequitur.

Not at all; it says that the essence of moral relativism as Terrapin frames it (and I'm not saying that is the only possible framing) is that all moral arguments are equal apart from individual preferences; and it doesn't say that is a "problem" for moral relativism, but on the contrary that that is its nature, for better or for worse. — Janus

It is simply not true that under moral relativism, all moral arguments are equal, nor that that is "its nature". And under moral relativism, there is no "apart from" individual preferences, if that's what morality is necessarily relative to. You can't break that connection from within moral relativism, and you can't do so from outside of it without begging the question.

Wrong again. The very purpose of mores is to engender social harmony. Whether or not there is social harmony has nothing to do with what how I view things. — Janus

That's not a relevant meta-ethical point. The question is which meta-ethical framework is true: moral relativism, moral absolutism, error theory, emotivism, etc.

That doesn't even address that, except as a fallacious appeal to the consequences.

i have no idea at all what you are talking about. — Rank Amateur

Then you are pretty clueless. You tried to manipulate me into making an argument against something you haven't bothered to attempt to support. I rejected that and exposed it for what it is. The burden of proof is on you if you make that claim. And if you don't make that claim because you can't support it, then be honest enough to admit that. Do you know how the burden of proof works? Do you understand what intellectual honesty is, and why it is important? Or do I have to educate you about all of the basics in philosophy?

And secondly if a moral stance promotes harmonious human community (which is the whole reason behind morals) then it is a more valid, that is a more appropriate and effective response than a moral stance that promotes disharmony. — Janus

Your consequentialist views are only appropriate in normative ethics, which is not what this is. In meta-ethics, it is a fallacious appeal to the consequences.

But yeah, from a perspective that's completely irrelevant to morality, and completely irrelevant to any person's view, all moral stances are equal. — Terrapin Station

Yes. And that's the problem. It's like saying all of that, or like saying, "If I beg the question, then there's a problem with moral relativism".

In any case moral relativism (at least in the way you frame it) carried to its logical conclusion means that no moral stance is inherently any more valid than any other, which entails that they are all equal from that perspective. — Janus

Bad argument. It basically says that from an assumption outside of moral relativism, there's a problem with moral relativism. But the problem with that is that assumptions from outside of moral relativism are irrelevant to moral relativism. If you can demonstrate that morality works or makes sense without moral relativism, then go ahead. That carries a burden. It can't just be assumed. That'd be begging the question.

On the other hand the overwhelming cross-cultural prevalence of certain moral stances can reasonably be used to justify the claim that some moral stances are indeed more valid than others on account of their greater efficacy for harmonious human community. — Janus

That some moral frameworks lead to consequences you view as beneficial is not that those moral frameworks are logically sound. That's a fallacious appeal to the consequences.

And that's the question: which moral framework is logically sound. This is meta-ethics, not normative ethics.

If moral relativism were true, then from the point of view of the disinterested observer all moral positions on any issue would be equally valid. — Janus

Oh no, not you too. No, the disinterested observer would observe that on any given moral issue, there is a right or wrong in a relative sense, and also that with regard to moral standards, there is a better or worse in a relative sense. Your inference is not rational.

If you want to do some of the heavy lifting, feel free to make an argument against my position that:

Slavery is morally wrong in all circumstances, in every time, and no matter the individual that is evaluating it.

I would be interested in hearing your argument. If you feel no compulsion to change my mind, I am fine with that as well. — Rank Amateur

No, your burden of proof is not mine. It is a fallacy to try to shift the burden of proof. Either concede or present your argument. Stop wasting time and be honest.

You have already said that all truth is relative to your view of it. Again unless I feel some need to change your views on the nature of morality, why would I argue truth with someone who says relative to him. There is no point — Rank Amateur

Also, you don't seem to recognise or appreciate how sophisticated my ethical position is. It is pragmatic and flexible, not rigid. If you want to talk about truth-values in relation to moral statements in an absolutist or objective sense, then we can do so. That leads to nonsense or falsity. I would be an error theorist, rather than a moral relativist, in that situation.

You have already said that all truth is relative to your view of it. Again unless I feel some need to change your views on the nature of morality, why would I argue truth with someone who says relative to him. There is no point — Rank Amateur

I have explained the problem here already. You just aren't getting it and you're sending us around in circles.

You said that you believe that there is a "real truth" in relation to moral statements, did you not? By that, were you not suggesting that you believe that there is a truth in relation to moral statements which is absolute? If so, and if you can demonstrate that, then by doing so, you will have refuted moral relativism and a number of other ethical positions. I could not reply that it is relative without contradiction.

What part of that do you not understand? Do you claim that you can demonstrate that or not? Yes or no?

This isn't about me, it is about you.

If there is some philosophical rule that says we have to agree - it has been widely ignored for a very long time. Understanding is important - agreement - not so much. — Rank Amateur

We don't have to agree on the issue. Just admit that you're not being philosophical about it, and we can move on. Being philosophical about it does not consist in, "I just disagree, and I offer no explanation or attempt to support my position or anything of that nature".

what would be the motivation for me to argue a truth statement to an individual moral relativist. No matter what I say, you can just always say - "not relative to me"

So unless i find some compulsion to change you relative view - why would i bother? — Rank Amateur

No, we were talking about what you called "real truth" (in relation to moral statements), remember? What you call "real truth" can't be relative if it is absolute, and it can't be subjective if it is objective. Don't revert back to truth, as though they are one and the same. You seem to forget that there is truth and true statements under moral relativism, just of a different kind.

If you were to demonstrate such a moral "real" truth, then you would have refuted moral antirealism, which covers a whole range of ethical positions, including moral relativism, moral subjectivism, moral nihilism, emotivism, and error theory. So please, go ahead and try. I would love to see you give that a go.

Ok - then we just disagree. Which is fine - I think there is a truth statement we can make about slavery. — Rank Amateur

No, it's not fine, because this is philosophy, and that's not being philosophical. That's more of a religious mindset. Urgh. Kill it with fire.

And to be clear, I assumed a translation of the above quote which maintains logical relevance. Meaning that you're talking about "real truth", i.e. objective or absolute truth, and in relation to moral statements. If you won't be clear about that, then I guess I'll have to be clear about it for you, although that's a bit of a pain.

Thanks and thanks - that is fine, we just disagree then. — Rank Amateur

But again, you haven't shown that your disagreement is reasonable. Can you demonstrate a "real truth"?

ok - agree

now if I say relative to my judgement there is nothing wrong with slavery. Other than saying you disagree, and use whatever you can muster to attempt to change my mind. If I don't change my mind, and according to your moral view - I am just wrong relative to you, and right relative to me. And if that is the case than there is no real truth statement we can make about slavery. — Rank Amateur

It looks like you're finally getting it! If by no "real truth" you mean no objective or absolute truth to be found in moral statements, then yes! So it is either error theory, where all moral statements are false, or moral relativism, where truth and falsity is recovered.

It is my individual moral judgement, and it requires no support at all. — Rank Amateur

Moral judgement relates to right and wrong, not to correct and incorrect. You can judge correct and incorrect, but that's not a moral category of judgement. And if you're just saying that slavery has always been wrong relative to your moral judgement, then that's fine. It has always been wrong relative to my moral judgement also.

Still want to get back to this. Your view is there is no truth statement we can make about the rightness of slavery without a cultural reference. Is this correct? — Rank Amateur

Agree completely , the issue is, do you think that means, as S does, that there is no truth statement we can make about slavery without cultural context.

Turning this around, and using ↪S word. Cultural norms are always right, the subject of their judgments are variable.

And does that mean that it is objectively true, that the prevalent cultural norms, whatever they are, are by definition right? — Rank Amateur

If you want to boil things down, then no. The cultural is not the foundation of morality. This is what I was arguing about with T Clark earlier. The cultural is just a reference point. Ultimately morality is my morality, my moral judgement, my moral feelings. I can consider your morality, but mine is king.

No, i will not admit my use of correct vs your use of right makes my position unreasonable. Especially since i didn't take any position in the options. And gave you an non or the above option to describe it yourself. — Rank Amateur

Empty words. You are a dogmatist, and you aren't being reasonable, whether you like it or not, unless you attempt to support the following:

My view is slavery was always wrong, and the culture that allowed it was incorrect. — Rank Amateur

did i understand you right - would you agree this is your position?

Your view is that there is no truth statement that we can make about the rightness or wrongness of slavery without the appropriate cultural reference.
— Rank Amateur
(note just added "cultural")

you didn't get back to me on this one yet. — Rank Amateur

No, because I'm ultimately an individualistic moral relativist. I only accept cultural relativism as just another way of pointing out moral relations. It is useful, and it reflects a sort of truth. But I don't actually depend on any cultural reference, because I can just say, for example, that murder is wrong relative to my judgement. That's about me and my judgement. No culture is referenced there.