It's a cycle. Monarchy becomes corrupt and gives way to oligarchy (statesmen or clergymen), which become a burden on the people and gives way to democracy, which fails and gives way to monarchy. Over and over...

t is the opinion of the men of Athens that Socrates is doing harm to the young people. His disobedience suggests that he thinks that whatever harm and injustice to the city and its laws his disobedience may cause, the suppression of philosophy is a greater harm. — Fooloso4

But he wasn't disobedient. He stayed and drank the hemlock.

Not for me. I often think in terms of opposing viewpoints, or a triangle, or a square.

If you think of your own ideas about Being, notice that they make sense relative to the opposing view. What is that opposing view? What are its strengths and weaknesses? Are there other views that lie at an angle to this opposition, so they partake in some ways from each pole of the original opposition?

If you can't do this, it's probably because your intellect is being controlled by emotions on this one issue. If you let emotions go (or put them on a shelf), your mind will be able to move freely, recognizing that the question is beyond the limits of language anyway.

A dictatorship is an autocratic form of government which is characterized by a leader, or a group of leaders, who hold governmental powers with few to no limitations. Politics in a dictatorship are controlled by a dictator, and they are facilitated through an inner circle of elites that includes advisers, generals, and other high-ranking officials.
— Wikipedia

Is that really what you want? — Agree-to-Disagree

If it accomplishes our goals whereas democracy, or in the case of the global political scene, anarchy, doesn't, then why not?

Anyone have solid/reliable numbers for

• amount of fossil fuel deposits (let's say oil and coal) — jorndoe

I think it's classified. Just kidding. It would need to be a pretty recent assessment because of fracking. Pre-fracking numbers would be way too low.

Think we can burn all this accumulated stuff (geological timeframe) in a century or two without noticeable effects...? — jorndoe

It would take a few centuries to burn it all. There will definitely be a noticeable effect. :grin:

The incentive would be that we wouldn't need to inevitably fubar the grid and effectively cripple the economy by disintegrating coal plants. . . We either create that technology, or prepare for drastically diminished standards of living (excepting China of course). — Merkwurdichliebe

That sounds awfully rational.

Well, you have to survive in order to act justly.
— frank

Yes, but can a city survive and not be just? Is it sometimes necessary to act unjustly in order to survive? — Fooloso4

I don't know :grimace:

The laws ask:

Or do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?”
(50b)

Would it be that there would be no city or would it become a different city, one with laws without their just enactment, or a city without law? — Fooloso4

The laws say:

“Socrates, don’t be surprised at the question, just answer it, since you make such a habit of asking and answering questions. Come on,you are attempting to destroy ourselves and the city. On what grounds?" — 50C

This is stated in the context of the claim that Socrates wouldn't have been born without the law. He was raised and flourished in the stability provided by the city. I'd add that city was an integral part of identities of Athenian citizens. In a number of ways, the citizens and the city are inextricable. You can't really have an Athenian without an Athens and vice versa. Since it was a democracy, rule of law was also inseparable from the city.

So the point was that by breaking the city's law, Socrates would be undermining the foundation of his own existence.

Put differently, is it a question of justice or survival? If, as the laws claim, the citizens are its servants or slaves, then what part does justice serve? Isn't justice replaced by obedience? Would it still the same city, still a democratic regime? — Fooloso4

Well, you have to survive in order to act justly. This represents a challenge to any ideology, for instance if I'm a conservative and I stand against change, it would behoove me to recognize that sometimes societies need to evolve and standing against that is to oppose life itself. If my choice is between my beautiful conservative values and the very life of my society, which do I choose?

But the challenge is even more acute for an ideology that aims to destroy the existing social order without any plan for an alternative, which I think fairly describes the average leftist perspective.

But on a more materialistic note, historians claim that the very idea of living alone beyond the safety of a city was unthinkable for the average Greek. So if Socrates leaves, it certainly wouldn't be to wander. It would be to find another home in a city.

Philosophy poses a threat to the city. Socrates is silenced by force. The law proclaims that he does not stand on an equal footing with the law. To convince them would require doing the very thing they want to prevent him from doing, that is, philosophizing. — Fooloso4

Socrates was blamed for Athens' defeat at the hands of the Spartans. He had previously publicly lauded the Spartan way of life, which probably wasn't the smartest thing to do. He irritated the crap out of the Athenians, so he became a target. More philosophizing probably wouldn't have helped. Our own local Socrates is @Banno. Imagine that he's now being tried for corrupting the minds of the youth. It's that kind of thing.

China produces about 70% of the world's coal output, although they only have about 13% of the world's coal reserves within their borders. But two of the biggest reservoirs are in countries that orbit China: Australia and Russia. So there is no incentive for them to reduce coal burning. Coal will continue to be a cheap option as their economic development continues.

The fact that they're now building new coal power plants instead of nuclear means that humanity's chances of reining in CO2 emissions is fading. One possibility would be that scrubbing technology could be developed to make coal plants carbon neutral. But what incentive would make that economical?

At 50B Socrates presents a Kantian perspective. If everyone ignored the laws of the city, there would essentially be no city.

China is permitting the construction of about 2 coal power plants per week. — frank

Two odd things about this: 1) they decided to drastically increase their use of coal because it was so hot last year that the air conditioners were too big a load on their grid. And 2) that this is not particularly big news. Trump's latest circus is huge, but this, arguably a decisive fork in the road, is just miscellaneous news.

if I didn't know any better, I'd be inclined to think China rejects the science of climate change — Merkwurdichliebe

Either that or they just don't give a flying fuck

In so far as I understand Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein, the rule following aspect of language games is seen as troubling the view that such games involve the description of facts. — Paine

Not to put too fine a point on it, but Kripke's point is that it ends up being an empty claim that communication involves rule following. This idea that we follow rules when we speak is an interesting hypothesis. It's not something supported by any facts (of the kind Kripke specifies).

From 48-50 Socrates addresses Crito's argument that it's right to flee because so many aspects of public opinion support it. Socrates points out that we usually only pay attention to worthy opinions, which are those which aim to improve our lives (little bit of consequentialism). He asks a couple of times if adults suddenly change their values when the shit hits the fan and execution awaits.

One of the threads running through 48-50 is the question of whether the ends justify the means. Per Socrates, only children live that way.

Unfortunately, I need to leave the discussion for about 5dys.
You guys are providing food for thought. It's all good! Will see if I can add anything later... — Amity

Cool.

There's quite a lot to be getting on with, isn't there? Crito is a piece of work! — Amity

There is. I've read this dialog a couple of times. I'm rereading it thinking about what it says about normativity: Crito is giving all sorts of das Man type reasons to ignore the court's judgement and sentence. If the crowd gives us ethical normativity, then Crito is right. But the court is part of the foundation of the lives of the members of the crowd. The court is ordained, so to speak, remember the law court is a gift of Athena. The court helps us avoid mob action, so it's about stopping to think things through. The court means our judgments at least have a change to be tempered by reason. So Crito is advising Socrates to forget about rationality.

Except the whole situation shows that the court can be subverted by passions of the day, like with McCarthy. So where does that leave us? It's not the crowd, it's not reason. Then where is normativity really coming from? And since I'm applying all of this to normativity as it related to meaning, Crito suggests that meaning doesn't arise from the whims of the crowd, it doesn't arise from rationality. So from where? With the last two points, Kripke would agree. Meaning is not conventional if we define that as rule following. There is nothing in the world, all the way down to the intimacies of mental states that constitutes rule following in our communication, which is wild.

So if you haven't read Crito before, feel free to read further along. We'll catch up.

Crito is not able to give a better argument for why Socrates should not comply with the court's decision. Can we? — Fooloso4

Sure. The court in this case is the judicial arm of a democracy. A democracy is like a ship whose owner has been tricked and manipulated into giving the helm over to sailors who know nothing about navigation. This ship of fools is more likely to end up at the bottom of the Aegean than any where close to where the owner wanted it to go. Where did I hear that argument? :razz:

Since democracies are poorly run, there's no obligation to adhere to their judgments.

erhaps we can see here one way in which Plato's views differ from Socrates'. Since Socrates did not write his influence was more limited than Plato's. Plato did not simply write, he wrote in a way that heeded Crito's warning to care about the opinion of the many. He did this in two connected ways. He presents a salutary teaching that even though it did not make one wise it helped shape the opinions of the many. He also left some things unsaid that

The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration
(44c)

might discern through careful reading and interpretation.

In this way Plato mitigates against Socrates concern that the written word does not take into consideration who it is addressing and so cannot say what is most appropriate for different readers to hear.

Socrates sought to benefit his friends without harming others. Plato wrote for posterity. — Fooloso4

Yes, I can see that.

Just another note before moving on, it's good to remember the circumstances in which Socrates was accused of impiety and misguiding the youth of the city. Athens has just lost a war. With hindsight, we know Athens will never fully recover from this loss. The citizens became demoralized and turned to scapegoating.

They've always been irritated by Socrates, but now their feelings have turned to intolerance. There is a sort of blind madness to their desire to punish Socrates.

one in which the real Socrates is allowed to speak.
— frank

For much of the dialogue he speaks on behalf of the city and its laws — Fooloso4

I meant that this has traditionally been thought to be about Socrates' real views as opposed to Plato's. The Republic, Phaedo, and Phaedrus are commonly thought to be expressions of Plato's views rather than Socrates'. Of course there isn't anything about Plato that's pinned down. At one time or another the authenticity of every work attributed to him has been questioned by some historian.

For much of the dialogue he speaks on behalf of the city and its laws. — Fooloso4

Right, as the dialog emerges, we'll find that Socrates is a strong advocate of the rule of law (although we could ponder whether that's the right way to put it.) We can compare and contrast other prominent views, like the Stoic view. It comes down to how one thinks about one's place in society.

We can see from the beginning of the dialog that the concept of individuality is in clear view, since it seems perfectly reasonable to Crito and his friends that Socrates should reject the judgement and run. That concept of individuality probably won't be eclipsed again until the middle ages.

Athens was a democratic regime. Socrates was convicted by a majority decision. His low opinion of public opinion, raises questions about how wise he thought the city and its laws actually were. And yet Socrates defends the city and its laws and abides by them. — Fooloso4

So we'll look into his reasons for abiding by the law and discuss whether this is a proto-form of social contract theory.

Crito has arrived to visit Socrates and they discuss his coming execution. This passage is packed with ideas for me:

Crito: It seems all too clear but, dearest Socrates, even at this stage heed me, and save yourself. For if you die it is not just a single misfortune for me. No, quite apart from being deprived of a friend, the like of whom I shall never find again, many people who do not know you and me at all well will think that I did 44C not care enough to spend some money to save you. And what reputation could be more disgraceful than this, a reputation for setting higher value on money than on friends? For most people will not believe that you yourself were unwilling to leave this place, although we were willing to help.

Soc: But bless you, Crito, why does popular opinion concern us so much? The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration, will believe that we acted exactly as we should have acted.

Crito: 44D But, Socrates, surely you can see that it is indeed necessary to care about popular opinion? The very situation we are now in demonstrates that, if someone is discredited in their eyes, the multitude can do harm, not only on the smallest of scales, but well-nigh the greatest harm of all.

Soc: I really wish the multitude were able to do the greatest harm, Crito, so that they might also be able to do the greatest good, and all would be well. As it is, they are not able to do either, for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish, and they do whatever occurs to them. — Horan translation

There's a tug-of-war going on about popular opinion. Crito says we have to "care" what others think, and I'd fill out his thought with: conform to what others want you to be, because the crowd is dangerous, and at worst, they'll kill you for failing to satisfy their expectations.

Socrates denies that the crowd has the greatest power, which in his view is the power to render others either wise or foolish.

I see. Thank you!

I'm not sure how to quote from the Horan translation. I just get a little envelope when I try. Do you know how that works?

A little introduction: Crito is a Platonic dialog that's about how the individual relates to society in terms of law and justice. If you receive an unjust verdict from your society, what should you do? Run away? Or face it?

This dialog is traditionally accepted as a legitimate work of Plato, but one in which the real Socrates is allowed to speak. The first time I read it, I found it to be kind of heartbreaking.

I think the Horan translation might be a better choice for the discussion, but you might find West's translation and notes worth reading and having. I will keep a copy beside me and compare it to Horan.

Another advantage of Horan is that quoting the text by copy and paste is much easier. — Fooloso4

Ok. I'll go ahead and order the West translation, but we can stick to the Horan for the convenience. Cool!

I prefer the West translation from Four Texts on Socrates, but I cannot vouch for the security of any PDF copies of this translation. — Fooloso4

I don't have that translation, but I can get it from Amazon. Up to you.

I don't know what you have in mind in terms of moderating, but I look forward to participating. — Fooloso4

Like pick a translation you like and set pace?

Definitions are a post hoc invention. — Banno

On the one hand, the OP is saying: "give me the primary use for this word," but then everybody can specify their own. There's a little bit of a contradiction there.

Am I describing what you are saying correctly? — Agree to Disagree

I thought about it too and I think he's right. If we dumped a dose of methane into the atmosphere now, wouldn't the energy it captures accumulate year after year? I think it would. After a decade, the accumulated heat would be higher than it was after the first year.

I think the conclusion is that if we dose the atmosphere with methane every year, it would contribute to global warming until equilibrium is reached, but I don't know how long that takes with a constant amount of methane.

A word of caution Frank. Be careful what you wish for. — Agree to Disagree

What do you mean?

Please stop talking common sense. Somebody might believe you — Agree to Disagree

:grin:

If we could get fusion working that would help.

Marriage Counselor: "So Micky, I hear you saying you think Minnie is mentally... unstable?"

Micky. "I didn't say she was mentally unstable. I said she was fucking Goofy."

"You try any preversions I'll blow your head off."

-- Colonel Bat Guano

Okey dokey.

So once you've put your coat on, you don't get any warmer unless you keep putting more coats on? — unenlightened

Your body is a heat generator. The earth isn't.

If anyone was really afraid of him, he'd be dead already.

What he had to say was really interesting. He comes from a part of the world where cattle and lamb farming is ultra efficient, but his government is struggling to adhere to Paris climate accords, so they're going to try to reduce meat production.

Meanwhile on the other side of the world, there's no interest at all in the meager Paris accords and meat production is crazy inefficient and floods the Gulf of Mexico with fertilizer.

So he feels like idiots are running the world, which is true.

Fine, but heat is heat and you can't identify which degree of heat is from water vapor, CO2, CH4, N20 (nitrous oxide), Perfluorocarbons, hydroflurocarbons, or sulfur hexafluoride. My point was that it it practically doesn't matter a lot whether the effect of a GH gas kicks in 10 years from today or 200 year from now. — BC

True. It's just a point that climate nerds who read a lot about it would be interested in: "hey! they changed that!"

What I want to say to agree to disagree is that we are on the hook, and we won't be getting off the hook through reinterpretation. Only by altogether stopping greenhouse gas production can we avoid getting cooked. — BC

He hasn't suggested that we aren't on the hook. People hungry to pile on have shown their disregard for him by continuously trying to pin that on him. It's probably a psychological problem on their parts.

Just as philosophers suddenly get really accessible when they write about aesthetics, the SEP article on supervenience in ethics is much easier to understand than the main article. Some excerpts:

Supervenience relations are covariance relations that have three logical features: they are reflexive, transitive, and non-symmetric. The claim that supervenience is reflexive means that every set of properties supervenes on itself: for any class of properties A, there can be no difference in the A-properties without a difference in the A-properties. The claim that supervenience is transitive means that: if the A-properties supervene on the B-properties, and the B-properties supervene on the C-properties, then the A-properties supervene on the C-properties. The claim that supervenience is non-symmetric means that supervenience is compatible with either symmetry (A supervenes on B and B supervenes on A; as in the case of the ethical and itself) or asymmetry (A supervenes on B but B does not supervene on A; as may be the case between the biological and the microphysical). — SEP article on supervenience in ethics

These claims reflect how use of the word ‘supervenience’ has come to be usefully regimented in contemporary metaphysics. It is worth emphasizing this point, because there is a significant history of the word being used in ways that depart from this contemporary orthodoxy. For example, for a time it was quite common both in metaphysics and in ethics for ‘supervenience’ to be used to mark an asymmetrical dependence relation. Such uses are, however, inconsistent with the contemporary regimentation. This is a point about terminological clarity, not a substantive barrier to discussing such asymmetric relations. For example, one could name the asymmetric relation that holds when A supervenes on B but B does not supervene on A. Or one could name the relation that holds when the supervenience of A on B is accompanied by an adequate explanation. One influential variant of the latter sort of explanatory relation has been dubbed ‘superdupervenience’ (Horgan 1993, 566). More recently, many philosophers have suggested that a certain asymmetric dependence relation—grounding—is of central importance to our metaphysical theorizing. (For discussion, see the entry on metaphysical grounding.)

Given the standard contemporary regimentation, however, supervenience claims state a certain pattern of covariation between classes of properties, they do not purport to explain that pattern, as a grounding or superdupervenience thesis would (compare DePaul 1987). This point is crucial to several arguments from ethical supervenience, as we will see below.

These clarifying remarks put us in a position to introduce four central questions that can be used to develop alternative supervenience theses:

How can we best characterize which properties the ethical properties supervene on?
Should we characterize the supervenience of the ethical in terms of facts about individuals, or about whole possible worlds?
What is the modal strength of the supervenience relation? Does it hold only across worlds with the same laws of nature as ours, or across all metaphysically, conceptually, or “normatively” possible worlds?
Thus far I have introduced ethical supervenience as a thesis about what there is; is it better stated as a commitment concerning combinations of our ethical attitudes? — SEP article on ethical supervenience

We might have to do some superdupervenience here shortly.