Really? Why do you say that?

Because we're the tallest hog in the trough. — BC

I don't think you're supposed to get in the trough. You just eat out of it.

So, the simplest hypothesis is not guaranteed to be true, but it is more likely to be true — Xanatos

Why?

Consciousness is meaningful experience. — creativesoul

Meaning is neither physical nor non physical, internal nor external, etc. — creativesoul

Consciousness is neither physical nor nonphysical? Are you saying ontology doesn't apply to consciousness?

Are you asking me to present possible candidates for an argument I am not making? I was not asking a rhetorical question of Ludwig V. I don't know the answer. I am genuinely interested in any reply. — Paine

Oh, sorry. I misunderstood.

I am not the one who expressed dissatisfaction with the dialogue. Do you have an opinion on the matter? — Paine

Cryptic. :chin:

Do you think Socrates playing a mid-wife is withholding something from us? — Paine

Like what?

Which reinforces the view that I'm developing, that many of these problems are created by the bad habit of saying more than we need to. If I say I know where it is, I'm making assumptions that I'm not making if I say I know where I parked it. — Ludwig V

Right. There's a thing where a news broadcaster asks if you know where your children are. The point is to suggest you might not. So if the issue of knowledge is spoken of, it's likely that said knowledge is in question, right?

My intent in using the metabolism example is to say, hey, yes, we can already map the chemical pathways of these things. But that chemical map doesn't explain why the animal eats. Why does an animal make decisions at all? In what way are even single-celled organism's decisions to respond to sugar gradients predicated upon any physical law? (or is the observation that they respond to sugar gradients a physical law? are all observations observations of physical laws?) — Moliere

I don't think it's that we observe physical laws. We use physics to explain what we observe. Do we really observe acts of volition? Or is volition a theory to explain observations? In other words, is there a clash of explanations when we try to reconcile decision making with physics? I would be one who says there's no bridge between the two.

Physics, especially when viewed as an all-encompassing body of explanations, is essentially a deterministic domain, right? The area of decision making is about identity (who makes the ATP? who shot down the balloon?) Decision making marks off the natural from the supernatural (per the literal meaning of that word.) And ultimately, it's the engine of emotion we call morality. I suspect that reduction is never going to happen here. Any attempt to reduce is going to give way to eliminativism. Do you agree with that?

One of the things I want to mention, though it could throw us too far off course so I'm separating it off -- something that threw me off of thinking reductionism could take place is the fact that we cannot analytically solve any Schrödinger equation other than the one which represents the system of one proton and one electron -- the hydrogen system.

But the physical systems which comprise life are much more complicated than that system. We don't have analytic, logical access to that at this point in time in terms of scientific knowledge. So I think this thought is also causing some of my doubts. — Moliere

Yes. It's a bad time in history to be reductive because the foundation of physics is unfinished. We could make bridge laws to what we've got, only to find out tomorrow that it's all completely different from what we thought.

Mitochondria have a number of functions, including producing ATP.
— frank

Right! So this is a statement which seems to link a name and two biological concepts (Name,concept,concept: Mitochondria,functions,producing) with one chemical name (which, sure, I'll count that as a concept).

Is this now a bridge law? Is it enough to find a harmonious example between two disciplines? — Moliere

We would start with chemistry and bridge up to the biological function as a category of processes required for the endurance of the system. All chemistry has to do is explain cell respiration, digestion, metabolism, etc. We enter the bridge when we collect those explanations and serve them up as to how the organism endures?

I would say the sciences are independent of one another, and their harmony is something sought after by us because we like it. And sometimes we find it, which is nice! But that's not the same thing as to say everything will, or could be, reduced to physics. — Moliere

Gotcha.

I think it can go too far. For instance the amount of time spent peering into dust, and smashing bits of it together to see what falls from them, has been time wasted, in my opinion. — NOS4A2

If you're talking about the Hadron collider, I kind of lean in that direction as well. That was a lot of money spent, for what exactly?

But what I do not see is a reduction of the functions of the cell to the physical level. The functions of the cell are still an important part of understanding the phenomena of life, even if understanding the molecular interpretation of life further elucidates and deepens our understanding of why life is behaving in accord with such and such a function.

But the way biologists use "function" -- you won't find an extension for that in the physics textbook, nor will you find anything but metaphoric talk in the chemistry textbooks about function. So on page 109 of the above pdf biology book: "Organelles are cell structures with specialized functions that will be discussed in section 4.4" -- this is my intended meaning of "function" — Moliere

Mitochondria have a number of functions, including producing ATP. Obviously this is a cherrypicked example because we know mitochondria were originally independent critters which were eaten by bigger cells who then started using them as metabolic regulators. It's not too hard to see functionality in this case as the result of a happy accident (happy for us, since we're the result of those ancient events).

It's true that once we start explaining function in this way (that it's stuff that happens accidently), the line between life and non-life fades. But I think that's the point of reduction?

This is the problem. A complete justification would consider every possibility (except, perhaps, the purely imaginary ones), including the possibility that it might be struck by a meteorite. Theoretically doubtful, practically impossible. So the question is, what possibilities can he not cover and still count as knowing? — Ludwig V

I think we can just rely on cultural norms here. If common sense says I was justified, I was.

I'm justified in believing there are satellites orbiting the earth, even though I have no way of checking on that. My justification is that experts tell me so and I have no good reason to doubt it.

Do I have good reasons to doubt the location of my car? I do, but maybe others don't?

I mean, if you parked your car somewhere, would you say you know where it is? Or just that you know where you parked it?

It seems clear enough to me that meaningful thought and belief(experience or consciousness, if you like) are reducible to neither physical events nor physics, similar to Davidson's anomalous monism(without 'mental' events).

How does one reduce meaningful correlations drawn between different things to physics? — creativesoul

I don't know the answer to your question. Could it be it's as if you're asking a person from 50 CE: "how does one get to the moon?"

"One day" is the answer I think a reductionist would give.

Would you argue that it isn't possible to reduce our theories of consciousness to physics?

In the assorted incidents category, if you're curious how much it would cost to get Obamacare, there are numerous scams that head the Google search which are just fishing to sell people insurance. That's annoying.

He's lacking conclusive justification, that's true. But I'm not sure that justification must be conclusive. If that is the case, the J clause and the T clause will have exactly the same content and it's clearly a presupposition of the JTB account that they will be different.

I'm still puzzled about this. — Ludwig V

If he lived in a universe where cars never move once you park them, he'd be justified in his belief.

In this universe, a person would be a fool to imagine their car couldn't be towed or stolen or molested by small, mutant drug addicts.

He's not justified in believing he knows where his car is unless he has access to a surveillance cam? Or he has small, mutant, drug addicted minions who check on it for him?

However, you can crib from other sciences for your purposes (hence the kinetic theory of heat). If it works for your question, for your experiment, go ahead. And I'd say that treating the sciences as if they cohere is a very common, regulative belief that is fruitful. (But notice that's not the same thing as to say that it's a true belief). — Moliere

True. Carnap says that all sciences have these in common: the same kind of observer, the same kinds of observation, and the same world being observed (that's loosely paraphrasing). It's a phenomenological approach that implies that science (and maybe all knowledge) is a unity.

I guess it would be looking at, what constitutes a bridge law? What counts as a reduction to physics? — Moliere

"Nagel describes his model as follows:

"A reduction is effected when the experimental laws of the secondary science (and if it has an adequate theory, its theory as well) are shown to be the logical consequences of the theoretical assumptions (inclusive of the coordinating definitions) of the primary science. (Nagel 1961: 352)

"The basic idea is simple: a theory TR reduces to a theory TB if and only if TR is derivable from TB with the possible help of the relevant bridge laws (here labeled ‘coordinating definitions’), often with an emphasis of the derivation of the laws of the reduced theory. If we add the remarks Nagel opened his discussion on reduction with—namely, that reduction has to be understood as a certain kind of explanation (1961: 338)—the core idea of the Nagel model is fully characterized. Adding Nagel’s idea of reduction as a kind of explanation, the so called “Nagel model of reduction” can be fully specified as follows: Reduction is (i) a kind of explanation relation, which (ii) holds between two theories iff (iii) one of these theories is derivable from the other, (iv) with the help of bridge laws under some conditions. The basic model covers two sorts of reduction, one in which bridge laws are not required (homogeneous cases) and one in which they are (nonhomogeneous cases; for a presentation of homogeneous cases of reductions and the question of whether or not alleged cases of reductions really should count as reductions in the Nagelian sense, see the entry on intertheory relations in physics). Nagel conceives of sciences or theories as developing entities that undergo changes, across which their vocabulary remains unchanged (though it is, presumably, sometimes extended). These successive states of theories are covered by the notion of homogeneous reductions—deduction of an early stage from a later stage of a theory is possible without bridge laws since they share a common vocabulary. Nonhomogeneous cases of reduction hold between pairs of different theories, employing different vocabularies. Whereas the former variant of reduction did not attract much attention (by Nagel and others), the latter has been a subject of intense discussion since Nagel introduced it in 1949." SEP article on scientific reduction

The downside:

"Many criticisms have been raised against both the original Nagel model and its variants. The original Nagel model was faulted as too narrow because it allows only for theory reduction (Wimsatt 1972; Hull 1976; Darden & Maull 1977: 43; Sarkar 1992), whereas an appropriate model would cover cases of reduction of mere models and the like—sciences like biology and neuroscience should be regarded as being possible candidates for reduction, although they do not contain full-fledged theories (see also the entry on reductionism in biology; for a discussion of this and the following criticisms, see van Riel 2011).

"In a more general sense,the Nagel model has been criticized as exemplifying all the shortcomings of the orthodox view on science. For example, it conceives of theories as syntactic entities, and it views reduction as explanation cashed out in terms of the DN model (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948), which has itself been challenged on many grounds, especially those regarding the asymmetry of explanation (for an overview that focuses on problems arising from reduction as explanation, see Craver (2007: chap. 2), and for problems concerning the DN model, see Salmon 1989)."

Would you agree that a scientific theory is a syntactic entity? If so, the bridge laws are just a matter of translation.

Look, in the people's scientific resistance to the romans... — Moliere

:razz:

is because we live within the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie! — Moliere

Very true. You read Marx. I'm reading The Sensible Guide to Forex by Cliff Wachtel. If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. :grin:

What's your assessment of the book? — Moliere

I haven't read anything by Shrodinger :razz: Even trying to understand the debate about chemistry reducing to physics goes straight over my head pretty quickly. I'd need a philosopher/scientist to give me the synopsis, and I don't know who that would be (yet).

I suppose, given the diversity of all the sciences, I still feel skeptical about a reduction to physics. — Moliere

Most broadly speaking, reduction is not about ontology. You could be an idealist reductionist (like Berkeley).

Nagel's approach is about the reduction of one theory to another. This leaves both theories intact. When we say biology should reduce to physics, we don't mean biology should disappear and be replaced by physics. That's eliminativism.

They assume that the cars are still there and that they will be there when they return. I'm waiting to see how the story turns out before I decide whether they know or not. — Ludwig V

If I ask Allen if he knows where his car is, he might say yes. If I nod menacingly at him, he may realize he doesn't.

He's lacking justification, so JTB doesn't work here.

That's the move I think I'd guard against. I think it better to let history trump our ratio-centric re-statements of what we believe might be going on, in accord with a certain rationality we choose (because how else would you judge it rationally than be first choosing your rationality?) — Moliere

I'd agree that the argument from rationality has this weakness: that rationality pretty much just comes down to fashion. In the 18th Century it was rational to believe that exsanguination (draining blood) cures pneumonia. Medical experts said it did, and that's all it takes to get the rationality badge. In order for science to flourish and grow we'll have to allow scientists to develop tomorrow's fashion statements.

So yes, I agree with you.

I was thinking how given that Darwin's proposal, in his own time, did not reduce to physics, yet it was science, and we continue to believe it and count it as science (though the story gets more complicated along the way), then that shows how science does not always reduce to physics. — Moliere

But as a theory, I think evolution is amenable to reduction to physics. Darwin just didn't live long enough to read Schrodinger's book on it. I don't think he would have objected. If your point is that Darwin didn't start with Newtonian laws and work his way up to evolution, I don't think that's what reductionists are suggesting scientists should do. Are they?

But, more straightforward for what I believe: I don't really believe it could be reduced, though I'm not firm on that notion. But that's where I stand. — Moliere

Any reasons why?

I think, too, so hey, it's always good to stretch no matter the side we find ourselves on — Moliere

:up:

Anything goes" isn't exactly satisfying either, in the end, even if it guards against a certain kind of transcendentalism that is worse than not having a theory. — Moliere

Could you explain what's meant by "transcendentalism"?

. All you need do is point out the theory of evolution, which is clearly a novel scientific theory which didn't reduce life to physics — Moliere

So let me ask: do you think biology can't be reduced (in the Nagelian sense) to physics? Or are you just saying it hasn't been as of yet?

That's such a good answer, it's challenging me to come up with a response that wouldn't be a soft pitch. :grimace: Thanks!

Scientists haven't stuck to any methodological consideration for thousands of years. What works is dependent upon a community of scientists. And sometimes reductionism is a method which works to resolve problems, and sometimes it doesn't. It's this view of science being that Feyerabend targets when he says "anything goes" -- if science is an immutable, transcendental method of knowledge generation, and the method to understanding said method is to be gleaned by understanding what scientists actually do, and we look to the historical evidence of science the only theory one can propose that unites all historical scientific activity is to say "anything goes" -- whatever the scientists do in a current era, that's what the science is. Else, you'll find counter-examples of a proposed transcendental methodology. — Moliere

I'd emphasize that I said that reductionism is the most rational approach. For instance, it was advised by Augustine in cases of examining miracles. He said we should first look for explanations that are mundane (worldly). It's the less dramatic approach, so it puts mysticism on the shelf. Should we find in the future that we need to resort to ghosts and demons, we have those options available, but as we peek behind the curtain, let's first expect to find gears and levers.

So I would respond to you by saying that reductionism is already what rational scientists are doing. The normativity I'm presenting isn't meant to dictate to scientists some foreign methods. It is what they're already doing.

Even removing the historical scope wouldn't work to make way for the claim that scientists reduce to physics: chemistry nor biology concern themselves with reducing to physics, and yet both will utilize physics for their own purposes and both utilize mathematical expressions in their own domains — Moliere

I would just comment that most biologists are in the business of making medications, so they actually don't need much more than physics. This is to touch on the fact that science doesn't take place in a vacuum. Sages have always been called upon to use their wisdom to help grow crops, cure the sick, etc. Except in the 19th Century when scientists were usually wealthy gentlemen, scientists depend on society for funding and support. Science is grounded in the mundane from the start.

How'd I do?

I don't get why we would say he's justified in saying he knows where the car is. He thinks he knows?

I don't see where there's a paradox. We use the word "know" in various ways? Is that the point?

So I'll argue that scientific reduction is the only rational approach. It works. With regard to consciousness, we only need to explore bridge principles. We don't need to start from a revolutionary paradigm. We only head in that direction as a least resort, and we're not presently at that juncture.

Anyone want to take the opposing view?

A theory is a system of ideas.

A grammatically correct sequence of words may be used to express a system of ideas.

The word "expression" implies a vehicle for conveyance. A vehicle is something other than the thing being conveyed.

An expression is something separate from the thing being expressed.

A theory is something other than the words used to express it.

We just need to Finn Nagel it.

One challenge to Nagel's approach is that it basically reduces scientific theories to arrangements of words. Intuitively, a theory is more than a grammatical entity.

But if they're more, what is this "more"?

I’m sure of it in my own case. — NOS4A2

Do you feel like throwing hand grenades into the Haymarket?

I'm not familiar with Nagel, so I looked him up on Wikipedia. It seems like his position on reductionism relates mostly to it's presentation of consciousness as a physical process. His objection, if I understand it correctly, is that the reductionist approach ignores the experience of qualia. — T Clark

That's Thomas Nagel. The bridge-laws guy is Ernest Nagel.

Reductionism can be simplified even further. Science never asserts that its underlying premises are true, only that they have not been able to be disproven at this time. While scientists must rely on what has been scientifically ascertained up to that point, nothing is sacred.

Thus, in the first case, someone may discover some new information that finally negates an earlier accepted conclusion in science. The only reasonable thing to do at that point is re-evaluate the now questionable underlying theory until that can once again pass scientific rigor. This may then extend out to other theories that rely on this building block. Only then can science continue upward.

With this, we see the second case cannot be a viable reductionism argument for science. To conclude that everything must end in physics is the negation of the scientific ideal that nothing which has been learned can be questioned. Physics has no special place in scientific theories in this regard. — Philosophim

Yes, well said.

The Nagel approach says we will eventually reduce a baseball game to quantum theory by way of bridge laws which connect the dots. This is expected to be a matter of vocabulary.

So we will derive the baseball game from quantum theory with the bridge laws as a crutch.

Is this really true? We don't know. We may at some point discover that Yahweh has actually been pulling the strings the whole time.

It's more just the attitude that what scientists should be aiming for is this Nagel approach. If you agree with that, you're a kind of scientific reductionist.

But hey, look at how many "rights" we have while the government forces me to pay taxes just because I hold a basic ownership. — javi2541997

Death and taxes, man. :smile:

Bentham believed a belief in natural rights would lead to anarchy because they contradict the very idea of government. I think he’s right on that. — NOS4A2

Do you know of any cases of that?

think civil rights would fall under legal rights — NOS4A2

Civil rights require a government that is divided against itself so that one portion of the government can defend citizens from mistreatment by the other part.

Natural rights are believed to transcend any government:

"When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

Declaring their rights to be natural was a strike against the idea that all God given rights flow through a monarch. "God given" and 'natural' mean pretty much the same thing.

believe in natural rights and natural law. I just don’t think we’re born with them. The opposite is the case. They must first be granted and defended. — NOS4A2

You're thinking of civil rights.

Why are you telling me about flushing toilets in Psycho? — BC

Because I figured you'd post a picture of a chair made with human skin. :up: