The use of the word 'consciousness' as it's used here and the study of neurons are not 'in the same world' they don't overlap in their activities. There's no need for one to explain the other, it wouldn't even make sense it'd be like expecting physics to explain what a googly is in cricket. — Isaac

I think you're broadly in agreement with Chalmers here.

Every event must have a cause. If consciousness isn't supernatural, and the physical state of the brain remains constant, then the inversion would be left without any possible cause. — hypericin

Yes. This is metaphysical possibility. We can have a god do whatever we want as long as it's not a contradiction. The test is for conceivability, that's all.

Assuming you reject dualism then I don't see how that is conceivable. — hypericin

How so?

What you're saying is experience causes neural activity. — Moliere

There's no doubt that experience and neural activity go hand in hand. It could be that neural and other CNS materials give rise to experience. We don't know that, though, and we can't assume it.

The inverted spectrum argument is one of the many reasons we can't assume it.

That argument doesn't require two people. It goes:

One day you wake up and your spectrum is inverted, but no physical changes happened to your brain. Is that conceivable? Sure.

Therefore, brain function and experience are not logically identical. In order to claim that one explains the other, we'll need evidence of that.

have an understanding of the hard problem. — Moliere

This was your understanding:

So, whatever that is -- why my red is my red -- that's what the hard problem of consciousness is about. It's the feeliness of the world. And the thought, so my memory of what I was lead to believe at least, is that there is as yet no scientific explanation for why my red is my red (or, perhaps another way to put it, there's no scientific way to tell what my red is -- whether it is your blue or not -- yet I certainly see red) — Moliere

I see where these speculations are coming from, but the hard problem is more basic. It's: why do you experience orgasms? Why doesn't that neural activity happen without any associated experience of it?

It's not about why your orgasms are your own and not someone else's. See the difference?

I think? I'm fine with being quizzed, but I don't have a firm answer to your first question. — Moliere

So if you aren't sure what the hard problem is, why would you vouch for someone else's understanding? I don't understand.

So, would you believe me? I'm certain Banno understands — Moliere

From what you've said so far, I don't think you do. It's just a call a theory of consciousness that includes an explanation for phenomenal consciousness. Is that your understanding?

Actually, this gets to why I'm somewhat suspicious now... notice how close that looks to ye olde ontological argument?) — Moliere

I don't think it's an ontological argument. It's just that functionalists will have to prove that there's nothing more to phenomenal consciousness than function. We can't just assume that.

They just don't share the same worlds at all, — Isaac

What things don't share the same world? I don't know what you mean.

I was just saying this same thing. Worldview comes into play in the assumptions people make about it.
— frank

Which renders the 'hard problem' meaningless. — Isaac

Does it? Remember that when gravity was first introduced into physics as a thing to be explained, no one imagined that it's a matter of curved space. The worldview of the time wouldn't allow that.

So as we go to explain phenomenal consciousness, couldn't the same problem exist? That we don't have a worldview that allows the explanation to appear yet? Why not?

we're not 'discovering' facts about it, were determining them. — Isaac

I was just saying this same thing. Worldview comes into play in the assumptions people make about it.

This is my theory: we have a worldview that says individual humans possess qualities like creativity, initiative, depression, joy, etc. This developed out of an ancient worldview which populated the universe with living, conscious beings who expressed themselves through human action, as in the Homeric myths. It was like the psyche turned inside out

Some people have a double dose of our present worldview in which all the elements of the psyche are squashed into individual humans heads.

The fact that this worldview doesn't work in the extreme version of hyperindividualism, was pointed out by various philosophers including Wittgenstein.

Yet some people, like Dennett and Frankish, think that everyone looks at the world this way. I'm guessing that's because they look at themselves that way. They don't realize that some people don't really understand what it means to say that phenomenal consciousness is internal. It's not an object that has a location, so how could it be internal to something?

See what I mean?

And then it's interesting to compare Frankish's thinking to that of Penrose:

In case anybody's interested in illusionism:

Oh, shut up.

I seriously doubt the Portuguese were worse than the British or later the Americans in terms of how they treated slaves. — Olivier5

It was worse. I've gotta good book recommendation if you're interested.

He can be a toad sometimes. He does know a lot about hazardous waste, tho.

You’re just lucky they don’t ban for self-righteous
twat-ness. — DingoJones

I can't believe you said that about Tclark! :fire:

Chalmers has said that if there is a dissolution of the hard problem, the meta-problem of explaining why we think there's a hard problem has to first be addressed. — Marchesk

Yep.

I just don't know whether it seems like I'm phenomenally conscious is different than actually being conscious in the hard sense. — Marchesk

So he's saying there is a magic show or illusion, but it's missing something that would make it qualify as phenomenal consciousness.

I think Dennett does something similar, where he says there is experience, but it doesn't meet certain criteria often assigned to experience.

I'll check out Frankish, thanks.

If you tested pupillary response in a fully blind person you'd be doing it wrong. — Isaac

Depends on what kind of blindness they have. The GCS is a quick way to communicate clinical signs. It's not a definition of anything. There might be recommendations, like intubate if the GCS is 8 or lower, but that's not a hard rule.

In a Neuro ICU, you'll see cool attempts to rouse people. There's lots of screaming and physical assaults. For instance, I do sternal rubs to see if I can rouse people, but neuro intensivists cause bruising. They dig their thumbs into pinky nail beds and all sorts of other things in order to assess if there's withdrawal to pain.

But after that, they still don't know if the patient is conscious or not because they could be locked in.

You're pretty well versed on the topic, what would you say is the best argument against the hard problem?

It's obviously not the case if you've aware of savants or various neurological abnormalities, which you would hope educated people like philosophers and scientists would be aware of when making claims about the mind. — Marchesk

Well, yes.

Of course in all this I'm reminded of the certain scientific and philosophical skeptics who mistake their lack of visualization or lucid dreaming for those abilities not existing in other people. That's a kind of logical error whose name escapes me — Marchesk

I don't know if that would be a logical error. I'm guessing the strong bias towards believing that we're all the same has to do with communication.

Aphantasiacs report that they always thought that when people talked about visualizing things, they didn't mean it literally. It's that charity thing?

. I will not say that I have gnosis of them but only intuition and the extent of my current understanding. — TheMadMan

I see. :smile:

Never said I was. — TheMadMan

Right, but it takes one to know one.

I'm not into organized religion at all. For me there is a big difference between those who awakened and the religions created around them. — TheMadMan

I see. How did you come to be awakened?

Im not sure what that means. — TheMadMan

Interfaith is a progressive form of religion where the differences between Christianity (including all it's sects), Judaism, and Islam are downplayed to focus instead in their similarities. I guess in principle it would extend to other religions. Those are just the ones that show up most significantly for Americans.

When you actually learn what they said, you understand they were saying the same thing. — TheMadMan

Are you into interfaith?

And what would it be like as an octopus, where the nervous system is as much distributed in the tentacles, which act semi-independently, as it is in the head — Marchesk

Plus they don't have hemoglobin. They have hemocyanin.

Uh huh.

Dennett is the source of several well known thought experiments that show that phenomenal consciousness and functionality are identical, — Isaac

Really? Care to justify that statement?

The idea of the "hard problem" is that in order to make a thorough theory of consciousness, we need to explain phenomenal consciousness, otherwise known as experience.

In answer to the assertion that explaining functions of consciousness also explains experience, Chalmers is the source of several well known thought experiments that show that phenomenal consciousness and functionality are not identical, so proponents of aforementioned "function equals phenomenal" carry a burden of justifying that.

Chalmers doesn't believe that's possible and asserts that science needs to expand it's conceptual framework to include experience. His focus is on inviting creativity. He doesn't propose to offer a final answer

don't think that materialist folks are wired much differently than idealistic types — Olivier5

I didn't suggest that idealists and materialists experience the world differently. Idealism vs materialism is a mischaracterization of the issue.

This is an excellent point. Not only is it different, but everyone presumes that their own cognitive makeup is universal. Which leads to some incredibly frustrating discussions on consciousness. — hypericin

Exactly. People flat out won't believe it until they see proof. Note that some of the posters in this thread thought they were being insulted.

Still, as ever, working on this. Derrida is a very interesting way to consummate this Hegel-Heidegger evolvement of thought. — Constance

That a concept is a package of opposites goes back to Plato. It shows up in a lot of philosophy including Schopenhauer and Kant. Good stuff.

It's rude to refer to the police as pigs — Banno

Burn!!!

She is one of the smartest people I know. — T Clark

Sounds right. Ask her about how she found out she has aphantasia and her surprise at discovering that anybody has a "mind's eye."

This is an obstacle to creating a theory of consciousness: we're not all the same. Cognition can vary radically from one human to the next.

I think it's a real possibility that people who favor Dennett's view really are different somehow.

Goats are not subservient in the way pigs are. — Banno

What kind of pigs do you guys have? American pigs are dangerous, as in they kill people.

I said "kin to." That means similar to, but not the same as.

By the way, people with aphantasia have a statistically significant higher IQ. Weird, huh?