In such a sense we’re all religious. — I like sushi

That's only because you've defined religion as a worldview and we all have worldviews. I don't see the terms as synonymous. To say someone is deeply religious doesn't refer to someone who is deeply scientific.

Trust me I don’t. — I like sushi

It's not a trust issue. I was referencing your use in your post.

And religion is not particularly adept at conceptual clarification — Banno

The heart of the religious questioning (in my mind) is that of ontology — I like sushi

You guys use the term "religion" as if describes this single monolithic entity, as if Talmudic analysis is at all like Taoism. The same can be said of "philosophy," as if all it seeks the same thing.


If you're interested, you can find religious texts that endlessly describe distinctions and clarifications and that speak nothing of ontology, but just set forth commandments or that offer moral guidance.

Some theologies accept atheism and some philosophies are schools that offer best manners of living.

What I suspect you mean is that modern Western stereotypical forms of Protestantism don't offer specificity of terms and they treat questions of being as primary, thus making them distinct from modern analytic philosophy.

That I agree with, but there's more to religion and philosophy than just that.

The thought experiment asks whether there are a priori needs, desires, and knowledge. It's a scientific question really. I don't think that human social groups form due to learning, but it's part of being human to be a social animal.

I raise goats. They are herd animals. When in fear, they pack tightly together, and they can't stand to be isolated from each other. That's not learned behavior. I can't see why it's impossible for humans to have social instincts as well.

Wiki defines emotional intelligence as "Emotional intelligence (EI) is most often defined as the ability to perceive, use, understand, manage, and handle emotions." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotional_intelligence

Research has shown that people with a high EQ tend to be more successful than compare to others who have a high IQ. So if a high EQ is the key to success why focus on Epistemology?

It seems to me, it is more useful to know how to navigate the emotional spectrum than understanding the purpose of thought. — TheQuestion

I don't agree with the breakdown of your question because it uses the term "epistemology" as somehow being the study of the purpose of thought or alternatively as having something to do with deciphering IQ. I see it simply as the academic study of how we know things about the world.

If the question is why should we put a premium on IQ when it is EQ that better defines success, the question comes down to what success means. If we want better bridges, I'd prefer the high IQ person even he's prone to temper tantrums. If I want a better neighbor, I'd prefer the high EQ person, even if he can't think his way out of a box. Ideally, we want both, where the person is both smart and civil, but if we're left with a choice of one or the other, I'd probably want a society of smart people. Agreeableness is boring, although maybe a really high EQ person would be quirky and edgy, just for me.

My cat is clever, but her EQ is piss poor. My dog is pretty stupid, but a gentler, kinder creature there's never been. Maybe this comes down to cat/dog people traits. I go with cats, but, you know, having a slap happy tail wagging dog can be a good thing too.

Is studying the history of philosophy the same thing as philosophical thinking? — Srap Tasmaner

You can organize the study of philosophy either by philosopher or by topic, which I assume you mean the former is a study in the history of philosophy and the latter as philosophical thinking.

A historical approach might be that you'll take a course in the pre-Socratics or in Aristotle or in Kant or in Hanover. You can then decipher all their nuances and maybe even learn about their odd quirks and where they lived and who they married. That historical approach would also require philosophical reasoning unless your professor was solely interested in your recitation of the works of those thinkers, but that's a fairly narrow approach to take. In a class on Kant, for example, you might be called upon to explain what some of the criticisms of Kant's ethical theory are, so you're not necessarily going to be protected from critical thinking in a historically based course. It just depends how it's done. Even if, though, you aren't being asked to exercise your own critical reasoning, you will require some philosophical intelligence to understand the arguments submitted by others.

On the other hand, you could do it by topic, and you could learn all about ethics, for example, but that wouldn't protect you from having to learn about Kant and knowing what the criticisms of his ethical theory are. That is, you are not going to be protected from the history of philosophy in a topic focused course either.

I suppose it would be possible to create a topic based course and to offer no attributions to any historical figure, but I'm not sure why you would do that because centering it around a person offers a reference point. It would be odd to teach Utilitarianism and never mention Bentham or Mill, for example, but it could be done if you had a need to rigidly keep history and topic seperated.

Logic is probably one topic that can be taught without reference to a historical figure, assuming the course is purely related to symbolic logic.

But anyway, I see the same sorts of skill sets being needed for either approach because at the end of the day you're being asked to understand and evaluate philosophical positions.

Is this what you mean by history versus doing philosophy?

this is like arguing that the only way to get from your house to the Waffle House is by studying all the routes people have taken from their house when in search of a Waffle House. — Srap Tasmaner

The analogy doesn't hold. There's no debate over how to get to Waffle House and it's not a question that has stumped us for ages. If, however, the question of free will (for example) had an obvious and simple answer it would be unhelpful to spend 1,000s of hours reading about it and hearing other people's theories about it, as it might be to locate your nearest Waffle House.

That makes you an expert on what people have said about it, and that is not the same thing as rigor. — Srap Tasmaner

Assuming that other people offer no meaningful contribution, then sure, but I'm not assuming that. I'm assuming thoughtful responses from them. If other people can't offer thoughtful or helpful responses to your own thoughts, then why engage others or listen to others?

You'll get a response that is more comprehensive, more informed of the current state of the academic study of philosophy, certainly. Whether it will be more "meaningful", whether it will be "better", is unclear. This is just "looking where the light is best", isn't it? — Srap Tasmaner

You're losing me here. This argument of yours is against not just the enterprise of academic philosophy, but of philosophy generally for any purpose. My basic assumption is that philosophical thinking yields meaningful results. If it doesn't, then let's stop here as we're just wasting time.

If we accept that we can arrive at meaningful results, then sharing those with other will also be helpful and having a professional class of those working on those issues will be an even more helpful way of gaining insight into those issues. However, if you're saying that philosophical thinking offers nothing on the individual, group, amateur, or professional level, then I agree there'd be no reason to study anything on the topic at all. Is this what you're saying?

Cornel West does claim that there is benefit to studying the great minds of the past, and makes that claim exactly in the context of a critique of the current state of academia. — Srap Tasmaner

I've not read the West article, but if the gist of it is that the state of academia is in a state of disrepair for whatever reason and needs to be reconsidered, I'll leave that to those who are intimately familiar with it., but that seems like a political and ideological gripe, dealing with poor decision making by those in leadership positions. That is, that doesn't seem to address the OP, which alleges the insignificance of scholarship.

It is perfectly obvious how the professionalization of empirical disciplines advances them, as those require tremendous resources to make progress, halting and uncertain as that progress may be. It is not obvious, not to me anyway, that the same model has been well applied to the arts or to philosophy. — Srap Tasmaner

The question is whether philosophical thought is advanced by increased rigor, which would require one be intimately familiar with the underlying issues, the prior objections raised by prior philosophers, and what those responses have been. If I have the opportunity to speak with Person A who has read the pertinent literature and has taken course work and written papers with regard to Issue X or Person B who has only generally considered Issue X, but has read next to nothing and has taken no coursework and not written on the Issue, I'd choose Person A for the more meaningful response.

That is what professional philosophy is for.

In terms of empirical research, it really depends upon the particular field of philosophy. I would expect someone speaking on the philosophy of science to be knowledgeable of the history of scientific progress, for example. The same would be true of various other fields, often requiring some knowledge of neurology, evolution, or whatever the focus may be.

If we accept the notion that we're all on equal footing just by virtue of our natural intelligence and worldly wisdom such that any of us would do just as well as the other teaching our personal philosophy (as all philosophy is as subjectively valid as the next), then one must wonder why we're even here in this forum. Why listen to me and why listen to you? If we admit we may gain from one another, then we've contradicted our premise of the valuelessness of rigor. That is, if you can gain from listening to me, then it's time to dust off Kant's Critique of Pure Reason because we just might gain from reading that as well.

If rigorous analysis of the topic can be accepted as offering value, then rigor is what we need. I can think of fewer more rigorous approaches than hiring professionals who have committed their lives to their craft if one wishes to advance that craft.

I said that there is no standard of practice for philosophy. That would be a good subject for a discussion, not this one. Is there a standard of practice for philosophy? What is it? What makes good philosophy? — T Clark

Whether I can itemize the criteria, I don't know, but clearly there are journalistic standards that one must adhere to in order to be published.

Your standard, and I don't say this to be snarky, is that you object to rigor. You'll read the posts here and respond to them, but you won't read Kant or Nietzsche. The only difference I can see between what those established philosophers have to say and what we have to say here is the level of complexity and the volume. I don't even see this as an East versus West distinction because I would expect there are countless volumes of rigorous analysis of Taoist thought that you would also decline reading.

Back to my tennis analogy, I see nothing wrong with being a weak tennis player who enjoys being on the court and working up a sweat if that's what you want to do. Where it becomes nonsense is if you'd start arguing that you're just as a good a tennis player as the professionals, but you just play by a different set of rules, and who's to say which rules are the ones we ought to follow.

There really is nothing like a standard of practice for philosophers. No licensing. If a philosopher makes a mistake... well, there's not really any way to tell. — T Clark

Except here you're wrong, which means you've engaged in bad philosophy and you've failed to pay attention. If we can't decipher our mistakes, we have no philosophy as a field and we have no basis for rational debate. If you're correct and I'm wrong here, of course, you can save yourself a reply, as you've explained we have no way to know if what you said made sense. Pay attention: you've just argued argument is a futile waste of time.

Philosophers not being licensed has nothing to do with our inability to distinguish good from bad philosophers. It has to do with politics and attempts to advance some interest, like all laws do. The way one determines the reason legislatures decide as they do is to research why they do as they do, as opposed to giving it a good think and declaring what sounds reasonable.

Is my philosophy half-assed? Take a look at the things I've written here on the forum, not just this thread, and judge for yourself. — T Clark

I've got no shade to throw your way, but I can say that your admission in this thread to your limited exposure to academic philosophy didn't come as a revelation to me. Do you come across as irrational or unreasonable, no, I wouldn't say that, but you're not erudite in terms of knowledge of academic philosophy. Where you do seem to show some interest in text is in Taoism, and you have an affinity toward poetry and inspiring visual art and photography, so as to that, I find your comments more substantive.

My point is that erudition is a positive thing and I do consider my lack thereof in whatever area a negative. Your position here I take to be the sanctification of ignorance (not in its pejorative sense), suggesting that philosophical discussion between the well learned and the unlearned will be on equal footing. Except in the unusual moments when the fraudulent professor encounters the unschooled prodigy, I disagree.

The problem with your tennis analogy is that there is no determinable criteria of excellence in philosophy. Even the so-called experts, the academics, are deeply divided on the values of, for example, on the one hand, Heidegger or Hegel and on the other, analytic philosophy. There is no Nobel Prize for philosophy and that is telling. Philosophy is, paradigmatically, a matter of taste. — Janus

You overstate the subjectivity of academia (which could be alleged in any field except perhaps the hard sciences). I'd suspect that by and large (admitting for some occasional exceptions), there would be fairly consistent grading of examinations from professor to professor. "A" students typically get As across the board, as do C students typically get Cs

That it doesn't work. I only said it hasn't worked for me. — T Clark

I read what you said to be that you made a half assed effort, gathered minimal gains, then quit fully trying, and then declared your approach as valid as any other.

I have a friend who played professional tennis. He refuses to give lessons, claiming no one is really willing to learn. Real lessons, according to him, require grueling hours of practicing a particular stroke before moving to the next.

I think he's right that his method is the true path to excellence, but the truth is I'd quit within minutes of that painful regimen and therefore never improve at all. I'd stay a hack, never even getting mediocre, much less the professional he expects. My method requires that I chip back shots for about an hour while goofing off. Anything else would bore me. I'd improve a little probably.

So, yeah, I get you've found the path to improvement, just be aware your method is ultimately inferior.

I’m interested in hearing other people’s thoughts on this. — T Clark

IWhat you describe is not what most define as philosophy. It's sort of this Zen state of understanding and harmony you're trying to achieve as far as I can see. For example, how do you meaningfully respond to metaphysical, epistemological, or moral questions by just sitting back and absorbing? Do we just wait together all in silence in this Kafkaesque ideal, or do you listen to others and form your own thoughts internally without contribution?

I also don't see these tacks as mutually exclusive. Why can't I spend time in silent contemplation, but also read philosophy? Is reading others' epiphanies corrupting of my own? Wouldn't learning from others advance my own progess?

To the extent you argue that some answers lie within and should be sought by contemplation, I do agree, but to the extent you argue that formal study is unnecessary or even inferior, I don't.

Perhaps, but have you noticed that it depends upon what belief you are doubting? No one is traumatised by the notion that they doubt if the platypus is a mammal. Generally anxiety takes place if you are conditioned into thinking that certainty is possible and specifically that it is possible about 'supernatural' beliefs - for instance life after death and god stuff. The other belief that seems to preoccupy certain people is whether we are living in a simulation or not or if what we call reality is a fancy cover for some heavy duty idealism. — Tom Storm

I think people worry about all sorts of doubts, like whether the surgery will work, whether the job will remain, whether the relationship will continue, whether the team will win, etc.

. My 1940 Family Law book holding family responsible for family, no longer applies. Have we made this social change with much thought? — Athena

This is an absurd re-writing of history, as if there were a time in the past when rigid bright lines divided the family and society, where only through aggressive invasion could the powerful state impose its will on the family and provide for it food, shelter, clothing, education, and other means of social assistance. There never has been this dichotomy, with society properly "out there" while the family worked its magic independently and efficiently, leaving us now to lament a wonderful lost past.

If you wish to argue that society at large is taking too large a role in what could better be handled independently by families, that might be a sustainable argument, but I don't think you have a point when you try to harken back to a time that never was prior to all this societal interference.

In truth, secularized society is a fairly new idea in itself, with prior interventions being made by religious institutions. Regardless, you're talking about a time that never was and are trying to advance the ideal of a rigid family/social distinction. Appreciate at least that your ideal is fraught with all sorts of problems, as it allows the unfortunate offspring of disadvantaged families to remain disadvantaged despite the many resources the greater society could be providing them. You need to ask yourself why you would want to perpetuate such a system that allows inherited disadvantage when it so easily remedied.

This is all to say it's a matter of degree, with how much social assistance each person receives for family matters as opposed to whether there should be any at all.

that be the case i think it's inaccurate to call him a fascist in the same sense that Hitler and Mussolini were fascist. — Wheatley

Yeah, but they were a bit hawkish.

Perhaps with a threat of economic sanctions because Americans care passionately about their economy. It's better than tempting another world war (supposing there is an up-rise of right wing nationalism). — Wheatley

Oh please. The EU fears US sanctions more than the US fears the EU. Trump, despite his many many many flaws is dovish, if for no other reason than he's protectionist.

2) It still seems very intriguing to consider my theory that a single book in an ancient language, containing only consonants, could be many books all at once, each book emerging from the same text by using the correct vowel permutation. Perhaps there's a key in these texts itself. — TheMadFool

If you're looking for a deep religious reason for why no vowels in the OT, see: https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/3087993/jewish/Why-No-Vowels-in-the-Torah.htm

Choose to buy into that as you see fit.

BTW there are other ways of indicating vowel sounds in writing, without using separate letters. I think modern Hebrew does this, though I'm not sure. — jamalrob

Not just modern Hebrew, but the vowel marks have been in existence for over a 1,000 years. For example, the word for dog is (spelled right to left) "כלב", which does not contain vowels. An exact transliteration would be KLV. However, if you added the vowels, it would look like this: כֶּלֶב, with those dots indicating it should be pronounced kelev. The dot on the inside of the backward "c" looking letter indicates it is pronounced like a K as opposed to that throat sound you hear in Hebrew, without which you wouldn't actually know how it is to be pronounced. It's sort of like the C in English, which is sometimes an S and sometimes a K (although the French use the C with the cedilla ç to clarify). Our G and J can be ambiguous as well, but that rarely poses any confusion for the native speaker.

Even consider words like "thought" (and countless others) that are not phonetic, and even some Asian languages that are not phonetic at all, yet are easily read and spoken by native speakers. The point being there is nothing unusual about a written language not directly representing the sounds of the words when spoken.

When Hebrew is written among speakers, they don't use the vowels because it's not necessary to be understood. For example, here is a Hebrew version of a newspaper and it does not contain any of those vowel marks: https://www.haaretz.co.il/ When they choose to insert them and when not, I'm not sure, but I would assume the less sophisticated writings would be more likely to include them, considering it can be generally understood without them.

saw a black dog on the sidewalk, lying down but trying to move get up. It was disturbing. On closer examination it turned out to be a black plastic back being moved by a breeze. It was a strong resemblance until once examined, it was not. — Bitter Crank

I saw a dog beside a child outside a store and asked if his dog would bite. He said he wouldn't.

I pet the dog and he bit me.

"You said your dog wouldn't bite!"

"He's not my dog. "

Sometimes you hear things and they're not what you thought you heard.

The game of life" refers to a cellular automaton created by John Horton Conway. Since you are obviously not talking about the cellular automation, nobody really knows what you are talking about. — Wheatley

That's what you think of when you think of the game of life? We must have had very different childhoods.

Back to the twenty first century, we are seeing more people break away from religion, and from my point of view, there is less religious talk. And instead of talking about souls, many of us are talking about our lives (at school or at work, for example). Which is more in line with twentieth century existential thought rather than traditional concepts of souls. — Wheatley

An atheist can be as or even more concerned about the future of humanity as a theist. Focusing on the here and now can also be the interest of the theist.

The point I'm generally making here (and this goes for Hanover as well) is that no-one assumes all of their models are exact representations of an external reality, and no-one assumes none of them are. The choice over which we behave as if were true and which we approach with uncertainty is a psychological issue, not a philosophical one. — Isaac

You say this as if your responding to something I've said.

More importantly, whether a person will have a fundamentally positive outlook on life or not appears to be beyond a person's immediate control. It appears to be something that one must be born or raised with, but isn't something that can be learned later on in life. — baker

So he must be he and I must be me? Why seek to move the immovable with this thread then?

Anyways, no this isn't about me not cleaning the dishes or wanting to do "my fair share.." The whole point is that it is unjust to be put in a situation where you cannot opt out unless you die of depredation or suicide.. Hence I said (predicting your free rider snark): — schopenhauer1

Your point is that life isn't fair?

As to the OP, being anti-work isn't wrong if all you mean is you gripe about work. Hearing people gripe is annoying and I"d rather see you figure a way to a better job so I don't have to hear it, but being a complainer by itself isn't immoral.

But if you mean you are capable of contributing to your own care and even perhaps contributing some amount to others, but choose to be more a burden than need be, yeah, you suck and are therefore immoral.

If you're the guy who waits for others to clean his dishes, and we all do have dirty dishes, you're not the roommate any of us want, especially if you try to justify your sloth philosophically.

1. people always act in their own interest. — stoicHoneyBadger

Some people are self-sabotaging, suicidal, and are terrible stewards of their lives and all that is important to them. They don't always do this thinking they're doing right, but many probably know that the next drink, the relationship they're about to embark upon, or the punch they're about to throw probably isn't in their best interest. I've made knowingly stupid decisions and would not have wasted anyone's time trying to justify what I did later as being what I thought was going to do me best.

It's both. Vague propositions often don't have a single truth value, precisely because they're vague. — Michael

A vague proposition that is so vague that it doesn't have a truth value isn't a proposition. A propositional statement is defined as a statement with a truth value that is either true or false. https://penandthepad.com/propositional-statement-6943651.html

If no statements, as you've argued, have single truth values, then no statements are propositional. That is the result of removing the truth component from the equation. If I say "The hat is green" and I cannot define what a hat is, what it is to exist, and what green is, then I've said nothing about the world and not asserted a propositional statement.

My token identity is maintained, despite the flux of my physical body, by the way I think and talk about myself (and the way others think and talk about me). I'm the same person that was alive 20 years ago because that's how I think and talk about myself. That's anti-realism — Michael

How do you know that your memories and consciousness aren't also in flux? That you believe you have maintained a constant experience of your consciousness from childhood until today may or may not be objectively true, especially considering the many distractions and sleep states you've been in that have interrupted that consciousness. That is, it is no more a forced delusion for me to claim that I'm the same string of consciousness today than what I was since childhood as it is for me to say that I'm the same physical component today than what I was since childhood.

Whatever undefined thing that lingers in your brain that keeps your consciousness stable throughout life seems no more or less incorruptible and absolute than your DNA that keeps your corporeal composition stable.

It just seems like you've removed objective reality from the equation as the anchor for truth and replaced it with objective consciousness, but I don't see why the latter avoids the problems of the former.

Yes, I would have thought so. Hence my question - is any precedence for the view that one sentence can have two truth values? — Banno

There was the philosopher who came here and argued such a thing. Is this the guy? https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

We don't start by defining "ship" according to some strict criteria and then use it in conversation. Rather we talk about a ship leaving, a ship returning, and then assess whether or not the two are the same (and then possibly derive the meaning of "ship"). — Michael

We do have strict criteria, which is why we can use the term meaningfully. Only when we use the term in a way previously unintended do we run into these challenges.

And what we do for ships isn't what we do for everything. We define "firearms" in a fine tuned sort of way, especially where the law says "no firearms allowed." The specificity demanded is context dependent and not always the same.

We all agree that the material has changed but the function remains. — Michael

If we can't agree as to what is a ship, why can we agree as to what is material and to what is functionality? Are holustic objects the only thing we can't agree upon, but we can agree upon their attributes?

something new, is seems - at least to me: that a statement can be assigned more than one truth value. — Banno

A statement with 2 truth values is 2 statements.

"The ship that left is the ship that returned" is true if we define "ship" in terms of functionality. It is false if "ship" is defined as that which contains all the same boards.

X=X always. As long as we maintain definitions, we don't have this absurd result of X=Y and X<>Y.

doesn't require a narrative description, but your example of a person being both young and old is a good example. "Young" and "old" don't have a clearly defined age-range. Is someone who's 40 young or old? A 10 year old and an 80 year old will likely disagree, and as a young-at-heart 33 year old I'm on the fence. But it doesn't make sense to say that one of them must be wrong, or that I must commit to one side or the other (which would be the case if the principle of bivalence holds). — Michael

This isn't a rejection of bivalence. This is just pointing out certain words are vague. If the law were only old people are allowed to enter and old is defined as over 40, then that's just a clearer form of language.

What you're getting at is much more than this. You're claiming that what a 40 year old is cannot be determined because there is no single truth value to the statement "a 40 year old is X."

doesn't. If you say that it's the same ship and I say that it's not the same ship then it's not that one of us is right and one of us is wrong. — Michael

That means it has no truth value, not that it has a true and false value. Is it a non-propositional statement, like "Hello there!"

The ship that leaves is the ship that returns. — Michael

It has but one truth value unless you've got an equivocation fallacy. "Ship" must vary in meaning in order for "the Ship is X" to be true and false in differing contexts. Or, are you saying "X and not X" is not a contradiction?

Anti-realism argues that truth isn't recognition-transcendent and/or truth isn't bivalent. Realism argues that truth is recognition-transcendent and bivalent. — Michael

Provide an example of a statement that is both true and false. Are you saying within exact contexts and with exact definitions the same statement can be both true and false?

Right. So in what cases does the dubious know-ability of reality come in to play? Is it a model you often use to counter the argument of your fried Bob, that he can fly to the moon? I'd wager no. It's a model used to counter the argument of Bill that he can lift 170kg if he believes he can. "No, your belief doesn't make something real, you either can lift 170kg or you can't" Of course you may already know about the placebo effect and so not counter this way, but this is about the effects you don't know, not the ones you do. — Isaac

If your point is that there is minimal practical import to the questions posed in this thread, I think it's obvious that most navigate the world successfully without philosophical contemplation at all, particularly without ever challenging fundamental assumptions about reality. What this means is that the answer to your specific question is that I would respond to Bob whether he could fly to the moon in the way we all would in the normal world, but if he were posing the question in this thread as it related to challenges to realism, I would point out that we must first establish the correlation between perceptions and reality before discussing the moon and the physical properties he believes he has deciphered from his perceptions.

In any event, your argument is the "appeal to the stone" fallacy which was named after the following event:

"After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus."

— James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_to_the_stone

The ship leaves port. The mast is replaced, then the keel; the various planks of the hull are replaced. At each step something is taken and something replaced. Take out the word "objective" and it's clear that the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" is made true by features of the world. — Banno

This raises an interesting point to @Michael's claim. If we replaced each plank one at a time, but with planks dissimilar enough from the original that the ship returned an airplane, we'd be hard pressed to call it the same boat. The material composition then matters, which means that external reality is critical for identity.

If we commit to the idea that the ship is the same ship even when it's a plane just because we continue to call it a ship, we are left with the odd result of an airplane being a ship.

But, consider the caterpillar. Is it now a butterfly or do the two not share any identity? Why do catterpillars maintain identity through their metamorphosis but not boats that turn into airplanes?

I do take Michael's position to be substance doesn't define an object but only words do, leaving the question of composition irrelevant. I'm still left with the question of what is the composition of this entire enterprise, as in what substance allows us to make these definitions in the first place.