As Margaret Thatcher once noted, "The problem with socialism is that you eventually run out of other people's money." — fishfry

The problem with Margaret Thatcher is that she thought that a dumb quip is a substitute for serious thinking. But then, she was a politician. She also believed that there is no such thing as society.

when I say that a lot of people these days are advocating for equality of outcome rather than equality of opportunity — fishfry

I agree that equality of outcome is not a reliable index of equality of opportunity and that people often talk, lazily, as if they were. But if equality of opportunity does not result in changes to outcomes, then it is meaningless. The only question is, how much change is it reasonable to expect? If 50% of the population is female and only eight of UK's top 100 companies are headed by women (Guardian Oct. 2021), don't you think it is reasonable to ask why? I agree that it doesn't follow that unfair discrimination is at work, but it must be at least a possibility. No?

Many issues with long wait times at NIH in Great Britain. — fishfry

There are always issues with the NHS in the UK. But that's not about universal health care or not. It's about what can be afforded, what priority it has. Difficult decisions, indeed, but anyone with sense knows they must be made. That's why we have the national institute of clinical excellence. It is not perfect, but it is an attempt to make rational decisions; other systems do not even attempt to do that.
Of course, when my life, or my child's life, is at stake, I will put the system under as much pressure as I can to try everything. And to repeat, it's not about charity or robbing the rich. It's about insurance.

Given that ad infinitum means "without end" — Michael

Yes, it does. But there is a small but significant mistranslation there. I have no problem with saying that "infinite" means "endless", but "ad" does not mean "without". It means "to".
So there are two different ways of thinking about infinity embedded here. One thinks of infinity as a destination, which, paradoxically, cannot, by definition, be reached. The other doesn't, but rather denies that there is a destination. At first sight, one wants to say that the second is correct.
But how do we know that the operation "+1" generates a sequence without end? In one way, it doesn't seem absurd to think that it might be done. After all, given that "+1" can be defined, the result of every step is determined (fixed) - the whole sequence is always already there, for us to inspect. But that seems a mistake; we can't survey the whole sequence and notice that there is no end.
Well, there is the proof that there can be no largest (natural) number. We can prove lots of other things, as well. We don't have to survey the whole sequence to do any of that. It really is magical, and yet inescapably logical. (Poetry? Perhaps. But this is about how we think about things, so it is also philosophy.)

So it seems that we are locked into two incompatible ways of thinking about infinity. One as if it were a sequence which stretches away for ever. The other as a succession of operations which can be continued for ever. (Two metaphors - one of space, one of time.) I'm not suggesting it needs to be resolved, just that we are subject to confusion and need to think carefully, but also recognize that our normal ways of thinking here will need to be adapted and changed.

Well I can walk a mile, and I first walked the first half mile, and so forth, so it's a matter of everyday observation that supertasks exist. That would be an argument for supertasks. Zeno really is a puzzler. I don't think the riddle's really been solved. — fishfry

Quite so. That's why these puzzles are not simply mathematical and why I can't just walk away from them.

The process carries on, unlimited, despite the fact that the mathematician can determine that lowest total amount of time which it is impossible for the process to surpass. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, quite so. But it follows that applying the calculus to Achilles doesn't demonstrate that Achilles will overtake the tortoise. I think that only ordinary arithmetic can do that.

Then rather than recite the natural numbers I recite the digits 0 - 9 on repeat ad infinitum.
It makes no sense to claim that I can finish repeating the digits ad infinitum, or that when I do I don't finish on one of those digits.
This is an issue of logic and nothing to do with what is physically possible. — Michael

Does it make any sense to claim that you can repeat the digits ad infinitum? All you can do is repeat the digits again and perhaps promise or resolve to repeat them again after that.

The truths of mathematics and logic are timelessly true, aren't they? There is no change in that world. We frame them in the present tense, but it is, grammatically speaking, the timeless present, not the present that is preceded by the past and followed by the future. We speak of logical operations, but what does that mean? Their results are always already fixed - determinate. So when we carry them out - nothing in logic changes.

Thanks for that snippet.

I wish we could know what lies behind it.

I am content being just and moral, and yes, helping those who I think need and want help. — NOS4A2

I seem to have misjudged you. I should not have presented you with a completely inappropriate argument. I can only respect your position. There are some questions, but I don't think they are particularly relevant to this thread.
I'll give you this. It is simply wasteful to try to help people who won't co-operate. All one can do is to minimize harm, so far as that is possible. That's hard to accept, but needs to be recognized.

Not by much. — fishfry

Well, I do agree that there have been a good few incidents that are outrageous, completely inappropriate and arguably counter-productive.

Right wing order-apology or fear-side thinking conflates inequality of function with inequality of intrinsic worthiness. They are wrong to do so. We all are intrinsically equally worthy, and what we do, our function, DOES NOT morally change that value.

Left wing chaos-apology or desire-side thinking conflates equality of intrinsic worthiness with equality of function. They are wrong to do so. We are all capable of only doing differing things well, despite the truth of intrinsic worthiness. So, it's NOT true at all that just anyone can do anything well, like .,.. vote. — Chet Hawkins

Yes, that's a good analysis, though I would have put it rather differently. I hope there are people who are not locked into one or other position, because any resolution must work out what intrinsic worthiness means in practice and how enable each person to play to their respective strengths and/or pursue their various ambitions and desires without oppressing anyone else. However, I also think that basic needs, which we all have in common, (food, shelter, security) are in a different category, just because they are common to everyone.

So, ALL, yes ALL efforts towards equality of outcomes are doomed as ridiculous on the surface of the idea. — Chet Hawkins

I quite agree. But I do think that inequality of outcomes can be a symptom of unjustified discrimination.

However, I was thinking, and I am assuming this here, most of us do not have excess wealth to give away to those who may be in need of help. So it's simply a matter of supply and demand. We don't have the supply to meet their demand. — Rob J Kennedy

I'm sure that is so and certainly it is true of me. But I'm not sure I could look a homeless person in the face and tell them that, and I suspect that most of us would find that difficult.
Whether it is true, is another question. How far it is reasonable to expect people to contribute to charitable causes is yet another. Whether it is reasonable to require people to insure against certain events or provide for them if they are inevitable is yet another. It's incredibly complicated.

We don't have the supply to meet their demand. — Rob J Kennedy

As individuals, certainly not. But when there is enough food to feed everyone and some people are starving to death, it is not a problem of supply and demand, but a question of distribution and that's a complicated problem. Or, to put it the other way round, in times of famine, the rules change and sharing becomes the only moral option - and people seem to accept that, on the whole.

Based upon the majority of replies to this tread, Rawls is right. We have proved his statement to be correct. It seems most are in favour of not redistributing wealth so others can have the basic goods to the extent that others have them. Or am I wrong? — Rob J Kennedy

I'm not sure there is a consensus view here. Is Rawls is putting a proposal to his council (when we're all pretending not to know who we shall be), or simply assuming that we are all already in an equal situation (which, actually, is the situation we are in on this forum). In either case, in such situations, it would be irrational to concede an advantage to others at a cost to myself. Either way, that is quite different from the actual (unequal, or at least varied) situation in our wider society, and I think we have all been talking about that. In a way, that's a problem. But I don't think that the proposal is particularly interesting, so I don't mind much. The debate is interesting and I've learnt from it.

Equality is about power distribution. — frank

There's truth in that.

Welfare is simply the means through which people can absolve themselves of their responsibility to members of their own community, and worse, to delegate that responsibility to a some cold bureaucracy. — NOS4A2

There is a problem around that. But welfare is more than that. "Simply" misses the point.

Charity at least involves some sacrifice and effort. — NOS4A2

... and earing the money to pay the taxes for welfare programmes doesn't involve time and effort? Charity cannot offer more than special treatment for some people - and does not necessarily benefit the most deserving cases. Welfare achieves better results, because everyone has the same rights.

If you mean that some people are demanding compensation for long-entrenched inequities, I don't deny it. Some tipping of the imbalance might be appropriate. — Vera Mont

More or less my opinion. If people can claim compensation for what happened before the birth of anyone now living, where does it stop? Can they really return everything that has been looted even in just the last hundred years? Wikipedia - Supreme Court and Affirmative Action Case gave me pause for thought.

It would be effective to kill them, but effectiveness can often be immoral and unjust. So utility is not any kind of goal for me. — NOS4A2

I very much agree with the first sentence.

So you are content to sit on the side-lines watching what goes on, paying your share of the price for letting it all happen and telling those people how undeserving they are - and, no doubt, generously helping those you consider deserving.

I confess that I get increasingly annoyed at the widespread acceptance of the view that welfare is somehow equivalent to charity. It isn't. It is enlightened self-interest. See Wikipedia - Enlightened self-interest (But I don't think, as Wikipedia seems to think, that this is a complete ethical theory.)

What is at issue is the education of the guardians. — Fooloso4

Why doesn't he worry about the education of everyone else?

They must believe that the good of the city is their own good if they are to protect it even if they die doing so. — Fooloso4

The best way - and the only safe way - to get them to believe that the good of the ciry is their own good is to ensure that the good of the city really is for their own good.

It there reason for believing is not true that is an indication that a lie is needed. — Fooloso4

No. It is an indication that reform of the city is needed. The lie just hides the problem.

A mercenary will only fight if it benefits them. — Fooloso4

That makes them no different from the guardians.

Personally, I wouldn’t put anyone in jail. But I certainly wouldn’t reward their behavior and subsidize their lifestyle by sacrificing my own and other’s. — NOS4A2

You are already paying a price by not preventing them from continuing in their life of crime. Passing laws, buying alarms and locks, and funding the police hasn't worked. Try investing in something else, more effective.

Your feelings and interests sound nice, sure, but I’m curious about your actions, specifically what you are willing to sacrifice and if you would sacrifice for both of them equally. — NOS4A2

The same argument applies.

There are people who deserve prospects and those who do not. Someone who has become impoverished through no fault of his own, for instance, deserves his community’s help, while the one who has impoverished himself and his community through crime and malfeasance does not. — NOS4A2

OK. I doubt I would sympathize with the criminals. It depends how they got in to crime. You would sling them in jail for a long time - at your own cost, not theirs. When they come out, without any prospects or help, what do you think he will do? He needs food and shelter and he craves social connection. As we all do. What will he do?

There are those who find themselves on hard times because of illness or tragedy, and those who find themselves on hard times because they prefer getting high as soon as they wake up. Will you sacrifice your opportunities for both of them equally? — NOS4A2

Yes. I would even sympathize with both. In any case, it is in my interest to get him off his addiction.

It's not faith. I don't care if they were good or bad people, just so they contributed to the body of knowledge and literature, just as I think we should name hospitals after health scientists and airfields after aviators. It just seems appropriate to name things according their function. — Vera Mont

OK. That makes sense.

Let us name our schools for educators, our parks for the place they occupy and our libraries for literary figures, just as priests name churches for their saints. — Vera Mont

You have more faith in educators and literary figures than I do. But it would be best if we could accept that most people - even educators and literary figures - may turn out to be a mixture of good and bad, admirable and despicable.

It depends on how the race is framed. It CAN be described as a supertask, wherein Achilles runs to a series of destinations, each established by where the tortoise is located when he begins each leg of the race. In that case, Achilles never actually reaches the turtle, he just gets increasingly closer. If you frame it in terms of constant speeds by both, then it's not a supertask - it's a different kind of puzzle. — Relativist

I'm not sure it is even a puzzle if it is framed in terms of constant speeds by both. Let's say Achilles gives the tortoise a head start of 100 units of length, that Achilles runs at 11 units per second and the tortoise at 1 unit per second. So, at time t seconds after the tortoise is at 100 units from the start, the tortoise will be at 100 + t units from the start, and Achilles at 11t units. These will be the same - 110 units - at time t = 10 seconds. (This was suggested to me by a friend.) It seems OK to me, but perhaps I'm wrong to think that it will generalize.
But I don't really want to pursue it. I just wanted to point out that a puzzle can be the result of framing the question in the "wrong" way. Everyone seems intent on resolving the staircase problem on its own terms, which seems to me a mistake.

The truth may be that about certain things at certain times sometimes it is better to lie. — Fooloso4

Well, I don't subscribe to Kant's view. I guess it depends on circumstances, with a bias towards telling the truth.

The truth is, all societies have their stories, their myths, their lies. — Fooloso4

"Myth" is complicated. For me, a myth is a story that has acquired so much significance that it no longer matters much whether it is true or false. Yes, every society has those.

Do you mean another part that does not? In that case you both want to do it and not do it. Isn't that a conflict? — Fooloso4

Yes, it is. The idea of separate parts is a way of dissociating and avoiding it. But what is needed is a resolution of the conflict or at least a way of living with it.

In line with the question of noble lies consider allegiance to the fatherland and/or mother earth. Patriots consider their state or country or homeland as more than just an institution. — Fooloso4

Ah, yes, so they do. But it too often means very undesirable things, such as thinking that behaviour that would be immoral between individuals is ok between cities. Or thinking that criticism of one's city is always to be rejected. It isn't necessarily a good thing.

People come to believe that the good of the city is their own good. — Fooloso4

But is it? Anyway, their reason for believing that is not true - i.e. a bad reason.

What I mean by equality of outcome is a reasonable life: satisfying work, physical safety, access to good nutrition, shelter and health care, freedom of movement and personal autonomy.
Why not simply give every citizen the chance to achieve their own ambition and fulfill their own potential, and respect each for his or her contribution? — Vera Mont

That strikes me as simple common sense.

That's because some Westerners still think slavery was a good idea and defending it was heroic. — Vera Mont

I've never met anyone who actually said that. Still, one never knows... But I have encountered people who offer excuses, usually as a way of avoiding responsibility. On the other hand, I gather there are some places in the world that still practice it, though perhaps under another description.

Personally, I'm all for public art, but totally opposed to monuments. Today's hero is almost certain to be tomorrow's villain. — Vera Mont

It would be better if we could recognize people as both. Very few are simply one or the other.

Some people in the public square these days would burn you at the stake for arguing for equality of opportunity versus equality of outcome. And for exactly the reason you mention, that outcomes are highly influenced by the random social circumstances of one's beginnings. — fishfry

I hope you exaggerate.
I agree that insisting on equality of outcomes is more complicated than is usually acknowledged. Where outcomes are influenced by random factors, differences do fall into the category of the unfairness of life. But where they are systematic and not random, they are a problem. So inequality of outcome can be an indicator or symptom of a systematic problem.
There is another problem, which is distinguishing between issues that can be fixed, and those that can't.

A whole lot of quite nasty people have had their statues erected in public squares, at public expense. I guess the public has a right to reject them. There are places elsewhere for the images of great men out of favour special parks for the no-longer-wanted statues. — Vera Mont

Yes, the case of Eastern Europe is instructive. They seem to be developing a sensible approach. They had the advantage of a widespread consensus about what should be done. Clearly, that doesn't hold in the West, and, to be fair, it isn't the same situation.

That's the problem with "equality." If you have a system that allows everyone to thrive at their own level of ability and ambition, you'll get lots of great art, science, and wealth. Lots of excellence among the excellent. You'll also get lots of inequality. And if you hammer down every nail that stands up, you'll get all the equality you want ... good and hard. — fishfry

Your system (or lack of it) sounds great. But you can't justify it just by appealing to the high achievers. An ethical system needs to recognize and have space for the majority - the mediocre. It also needs to ensure that high achievement is at least possible for everybody and that the achievements benefit everybody.
Hammering people for any reason is not something that I could approve of, whatever the reason.

In our current bureaucratic trajectory, though, we do not differentiate between the deserving or undeserving, and do so according to more trivial factors such as class or tax-bracket. — NOS4A2

I'm not sure what you mean about not differentiating between the deserving and the undeserving. Freedom from inappropriate discrimination should not be restricted to the deserving, whoever they may be. "Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" are not to be handed out to only to those who deserve them.

I think it's because they are interesting puzzles, and because they help teach certain concepts. — Relativist

I think they are interesting because they dangle the prospect of completing a task and persuade us to ignore the reality of the impossibility of the task.
It is rather like a lottery. A lottery ticket is sold by dangling the prospect of a big win without any noticeable effort; some people focus on that and ignore the probabilities. The way the proposition is presented makes a difference to the view that people tend to adopt.

Why is the passing of a tortoise necessarily not a supertask, as described by Zeno, and given a presumption of continuous physics? — noAxioms

The allure of supertasks is the illusion of being able to complete an infinite process in a finite amount of time. I'm not sure there's anything comparable. — Relativist

Maybe I've misunderstood what a supertask is. Are there not different kinds of cases?
In the case of Achilles, we know that the task can be completed, but it is presented to us in a form in which it cannot be completed. I mean that we know that Achilles will pass the tortoise and even calculate when with simple arithmetic (no infinities required). But then the same problem, presented in a different way, seems to suggest that it cannot. So it's a question of how you choose to present the problem.
The staircase is different. It gives us a task (going down the infinite stairs) that cannot be completed, but links completion of the task to another process which also cannot be completed, but has a limit.

My point is that the stairs are countably infinite. Consequently, they COULD be counted, if we were traversing them. — Relativist

Am I right to think that you are not saying that all the stairs can be counted, even though any stair could be included in a counting sequence?

I'll add that supertask scenarios actually are NOT coherent- because they entail a contradiction. — Relativist

That's true. What puzzles me is why they are not dismissed out of hand. Someone earlier described them as fairy stories, and the writers seem to be able to wave a hand and create impossibilities, which would be magic, so that description makes sense. But it seems to me more like an illusion and the problem is then to understand how that illusion works.

Supertasks describe a conceptual mapping of the abstract mathematical series into the actual, kinematic world — Relativist

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that descriptions of the supertasks are the source of the illusion that there could be a mapping of that mathematical series into the actual kinematic world?
More than that, surely, there can be a mapping of some mathematical series into the actual kinematic world. Perhaps some similarity between those series is what creates the illusion?

The counter, with it's supertask has one way of counting out time, by dividing seconds into shorter and shorter increments, while the stopwatch is designed to measure an endless procession of seconds. The two are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. How come anyone can't see that? Since the difference is the difference between simple addition and division followed by addition, I think it is then possible to see how people can be misled into thinking they are compatible - even that they must be compatible.

The dialogues are not doctrines surrounded by window dressing. The dramatic setting and action are important, not to be ignored or abstracted from when Plato is discussed in terms of theories and doctrines. — Fooloso4

I'm all in favour of that. I was delighted when that approach began, though I have lost touch somewhat with how it has developed. It was a relief to be relieved of the chronology question. It was never clear enough to be helpful and the arguments for it were always suspiciously circular.

If I understand you correctly the point is that there is no clear divisions. I agree with that, but I think Plato points to that problem rather than maintaining the divisions. A world of Forms is not the world we live in. A world populated by people who are either rational or spirited or appetitive is not the world we live in. Our world is, as Socrates says, messy, things are mixed and blended. — Fooloso4

Well, that goes at least part of the way towards what I'm hammering at.

If noble lie is accepted as the correct translation then the issue is whether and why such a lie is needed. — Fooloso4

No, it's not that simple. We have to re-calibrate our view of Plato's view of the value of truth. You might say it is a welcome element of pragmatism, but that implies quite a change.

I do not see it as "the theory of forms" but as the problem of knowledge of justice, or, rather our lack of such knowledge. Unless what justice is is something known then we are in the realm of opinion. This is our natural starting point. The task then is to try and determine what seems to be the best opinion when it comes to matters of justice and the just life. — Fooloso4

I'm not sure I quite understand that. I think that the criteria for a just society will not be the same as the criteria for a just person. I think that the analogy between society and people is tempting, but radically misleading - just as the analogy of the ship of state is tempting but misleading.

But we are often at odds with ourselves. If I want to be healthy I should not sit on the couch eating cake. I might claim that I am free to do this or not do it, and even though there is a part of me that does not want to do it, I may end sitting on the couch eating cake anyway. — Fooloso4

Tell me about it. But if there is a part of me that wants to do it, and another part that does, I am not in conflict with myself, and the problem is misrepresented. Although the temptation to describe the unwanted behaviour as not really me is almost irresistible.

There are things we owe to the city. — Fooloso4

Sure. But the city as an institution has neither heart nor soul of its own; it is what it is because of the people who live in and by it. People are an end in themselves; the city is not, nor is any other social institution.

As individuals? What stands as the good of the people? What I might regard as good for me might not be what you regard as good for you. — Fooloso4

What stands as the good of the people is a difficult question. I have another - what good is a good of the people that benefits no-one? Can anything that benefits only some of the people count as the good of the people?
It can be better for one of us to die - even unwillingly - if it saves many other lives. But that's not the real problem. The puzzle is why people will sometimes put the good of the city above their own or anyone else's good.
What I admit is a difficult problem that people often identify with an institution, so that they feel that they have benefited if the institution benefits. It's not exactly selfish, but it's not exactly altruistic either. Yet it seems to be an inescapable part of living in a society. The idea that we can have a neat division between individual rights and obligations and the rights and obligations of an institution is quite wrong, because we are inherently social creatures. Plato's argument - and I think the standard argument in ancient Greece - was that we cannot be self-sufficient, but it is more than that.

Right now, we're suffering an eardrum shattering scream from the advocates of mega-wealth at the prospect of 1% rise in taxes on their billion-dollar profits. Nobody likes to give up what they have, no matter how unfairly they got it. — Vera Mont

Yes. It is hard to put right an inequity that has become established but perhaps even harder to prevent one getting established in the first place.

As to the principle, John Rawls had the right idea: design a society that you would be happy to live in. The catch is, when you design it, you don't know where you will fit, what your circumstances will be in that society. — Vera Mont

Yes. If only we had the opportunity to start from scratch with people who did not differ in their negotiation skills.

I would not because it is immoral; such an arraignment is premised on the exploitation of those who accept the principles. The arraignment is also unjust insofar as it does not consider those who are deserving or undeserving of the prospects and opportunities you mention. — NOS4A2

That's all very well. But what if the privileges are themselves the result of exploitation? Or what if the privileges are used to exploit people? Then, right-minded people at least would accept. It does happen, surprisingly often. I think the point is that everyone deserves prospects and opportunities.

Social organization is an on-going negotiation among interested factions. — Vera Mont

Yes. Enabling that process to satisfy all parties is the really important and difficult bit.

Which of the specific kinds of social equality I mentioned is unfair? — Vera Mont

Did I suggest that any of them was? If so, I apologize. Perhaps I was a bit lazy in not giving a list. I hesitated because I'm not sure your list is complete.

these exemptions come with criteria and limitations that can be agreed on by consensus, rather than decreed by a ruler. — Vera Mont

Yes. One has to be careful here. What if people who are excluded protest that they should be included? (Slaves, women, children). There's a particularly awkward question about exclusion of those who are or might be regarded as incompetent, such as very young children.

There is no free market and there never has been. — Vera Mont

I agree. Adam Smith's model was never really more than that - a model. At the very least, a market needs a legal and social structure with power to settle disputes and enforce the rules.

I feared we might end up with a discussion that is more than I can handle right now. I would have to re-read the Republic first in any case. Some comments:-

In case anyone too quickly concludes that my interpretation of Plato is an idiosyncratic distortion of the text, I happened upon this today while reading about Thucydides: — Fooloso4

I hope I never accused you of being idiosyncratic or distorting anything. I thought it was a question of how we interpret the text. But it is true that the line between interpreting the text and what the text actually says is uncomfortably fine. Which is not to say that this interpretation is not of great interest, though I think you will admit it is not the traditional interpretation, or at least not the interpretation I was given when I learnt about all this.

On the question of the translation "noble lie", I knew, of course that it is the standard translation. I was questioning whether it was appropriate. There is a case for it, especially in 382, justifying something useful if it is "serviceable" (in Burnet's translation). Whether, and how far, that argument works is the issue.

But the city Socrates makes as a compromise with its luxuries and relishes is still not a city we would wish to live in. It is, in fact, in some ways a less desirable city then the first city. — Fooloso4

I could agree with that.
I'm not sure about the relationship between justice in the ideal city and in actual cities. But you are right, that Plato's project is not to outline either an ideal or an actual one. It is stated, for example, in 382:-

“I will tell you,” I said: “there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city.” “Assuredly,” said he. “Is not the city larger than the man?” “It is larger,” he said. “Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend.

Part of the project (though not explicitly stated) is to provide a diagnosis of the various deviant forms of the city, which he tracks back to dominance by a faction other than the rational one. What he has got right here is that when things go wrong, it is because the city is dominated by a faction.

But my objections, I would think, go deeper than that. To start with, he posits a parallel (analogy) between the structure of the person and that of the city. Each has an appetitive element &c. But his analysis is presented as if were a dissection. But insofar as it is correct, or not wrong, it is not a dissection. It is not a question of parts parts of the city or parts of the person. Even it were, the relationship between a city and its citizens and a person and their parts (I'm thinking mainly of physical parts here) is not the same. I'm not sure how far the theory of Forms is involved in this, but it seems plausible to suppose that it is.

The business of the city, over and above that of the citizens, is the good of the whole. — Fooloso4

The parts of a person are not people and have no rights of their own. I am obligated to my body, not for its own sake, but for my sake. The parts of a city are people and they do have rights of their own. The city is obligated to its people, for their own sake, not merely for the role they play in society. There is no business of the city over and above the good of its citizens. If it cannot maintain or improve that, it has no business.
Here's the thing. Each person (even, I think, on Plato's own account) is complete, with an element (if a weak one) of reason, "thumos" and appetite. So the city cannot (without injustice) treat anyone as if they were pure appetite or pure anything else.

It is question of who or what rules. In the just city and soul reason rules. In other cities and souls some other part, spirited or appetitive, leads. — Fooloso4

What matters more is the system and how it works - or, better, how the citizens (including the rulers) make it work.

Equality is the mantra of the Marxist. — Hanover

I thought that a free market meant that everyone had equal access to it and equal rights of contract and property.
Marxism isn't bothered by inequality, but by unfair exploitation. The slogan "from each according to their ability and to each according to their needs" is not about equality.

But that's not really the issue. The issue is, do you want to live in a fair society? — Vera Mont

Yes. Sometimes fairness means equality. But sometimes equality is unfair.

Would you be willing to accept a set of principles that increases the prospects of others, even if it means having fewer opportunities yourself? — Rob J Kennedy

It depends on the principles. The right to property bestows rights on everyone. Essentially, it's a deal - I accept restrictions on me because others concede something to me. People accept that because they benefit enough to make the deal worthwhile. The same applies to contracts.

What people do not think about is the fact that the first state welfare was instituted by Bismarck in Germany, not because he was overwhelmed by an altruistic impulse, but because he thought there would be a massive rebellion by the workers unless he did something. See Wikipedia on State Socialism in Germany.

But there is also an argument that a state welfare programme is not altruism, but insurance. (In the UK, those programmes are technically insurance, not hand-outs.) Everyone benefits from insurance against unemployment, sickness and so forth. Even the retirement pension is essentially funded by workers on the basis that they will benefit later on. Only a state policy can offer unlimited cover for these things - and, actually, there are limits to what even states can do.

Is altruism appropriate in this context? Good question. I don't see why a community should not collectively decide on some altruistic actions - but it would be politically undesirable unless there is a consensus at least to accept them.

Make everyone an impoverished slave and feed them all the same bowl of gruel everyday. — fishfry

In one sense, it is true that "equal" means the same, but this is not an absolute. Thus, in a democracy, everyone (i.e. all adult citizens, with some exceptions) gets one vote. Not more, not less. But there are not many contexts in which that sameness is appropriate, or acceptable. The idea that equality means that everyone is the same, or should be treated in the same way in all contexts is little more than political propaganda. No-one believes that.

If there is a parallel staircase where the steps start at 1 and increase as you go up, then there must be a point where the step numbers on both staircases align. What would that step number be? — keystone

Presumable it would be at (the number of steps in the first staircase divided by 2). So? — Ludwig V

Actually, I've bethought myself and realized that the step numbers will only align if the number of steps is odd. If it is even, they won't be such a point. I still don't see that anything of interest follows.

If you'll allow me one more post.

This made me realize that if you can define the staircase down, you have defined the stair-case up. There is an intricacy about defining exactly what a step is, but let's leave that aside. Suppose we define a staircase down with 10 steps (floor level is 0). When I take the first step, there are 9 steps (10 - 1) left 2nd step (10-2)...9th (10-9) and 10th step (0) (floor level). Mutatis mutandis, that is the same in reverse 1st step up leave (10 - 1) and so on. So the staircase down defines the staircase up. No need for two staircases.

I could be wrong here, but I think that for a staircase of N steps, 1st step leaves (N-1) and so on.

If there is a parallel staircase where the steps start at 1 and increase as you go up, then there must be a point where the step numbers on both staircases align. What would that step number be? — keystone

Presumable it would be at (the number of steps in the first staircase divided by 2). So?

Mathematically it has some meaning, but it never has physical meaning, as several have pointed out. — noAxioms

Yes. With a real staircase would exist in both contexts and independently of both of them. Then the first step down is the last step up and the last step down is the first step up. But the last step down is not defined, which means it can't be reached. That's why the game is fascinating and frustrating at the same time, even though it is what I would call, arbitrary.

It is only when the philosophers rule and take on the business of the city that the city stays out of his business. — Fooloso4

Plato was well aware that the politics of the soul and the politics of the city are not the same in all respects. — Fooloso4

But the city has no business of its own, or rather the business of the city is the sum of everybody's business. So when the philosopher takes on the business of the city, he takes on the business of everybody. That's because each person's business is dependent on other people's business and other people's business depends on each person's business. Interdependence, not agglomeration. This applies also to individuals and their parts.
He thinks that analysing something consists entirely of taking it pieces, and doesn't realize that it is necessary to understand the relationship between them. Agglomeration is all he knows.

Had you thought what life would be like for the ordinary people in his city? It's a tyranny. From their point of view, it would be a Machiavellian society run by force and deception. It could count as a benevolent tyranny if only he could think of how things would look from the point of view of the subject citizens. But he can't do that, because he can't recognize most of them as people, because the elements of people are not people and he's stuck in his analogy. The relationship between a citizen and the city is not like the relationship between someone's appetites and them.

He seduces us by telling the story from a stand-point of someone who is not a citizen of his city and focusing on the philosopher, so we imagine his city from the point of view of the philosopher and we follow his point of view. But the people who live in the city have their own points of view and that matters more than Plato's greater good.

A consistent theme throughout the Dialogues is that the best relationship amongst these parts is the source of virtue and true happiness. The pursuit of that relationship is deemed more worthy than the expression of traditional norms. — Paine

The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration.

And does Socrates/Plato know who the best people are? He doesn't even trust his own philosophers, since he expects to foist his "noble lie" (a mistranslation if ever there was one) even on them.

The oracle did not say that Socrates was the wisest, it said that no one was wiser, that is, that others might be as wise as him. — Fooloso4

True There might indeed be others as wise as him, but only if they know that they don't know. But they don't know that, so they are less wise than him. And has he spoken to everyone, to make sure that there is no-one apart from him who knows that they don't know?

The model of the good city is built from the analogy of a person living the best possible life, not the other way around. — Paine

Yes. Arguably, that was Plato's big mistake. The relationship between part and whole is quite different in the two cases. He assumed it was the same.

The resistance to the philosophers as an assault upon traditional values was expressed in many different ways by different authors at the time. — Paine

Well, it was, in many ways. But the assault did not come only from philosophy. Exactly how important other factors (such as the rise of the Persian Empire or the effects of overseas trade &c.) were is hard to determine.

Are you saying that all of those points support any particular conclusion?

What I am saying it that the trail was not
...the result of a long persecution
— Ludwig V — Fooloso4

In a sense, you are right, and Socrates doesn't explicitly say that it is. He does say that his hardest task is not to refute that actual accusations, but hard to remove the effects of what people have been saying about him for a long time. Sorry, I wasn't careful enough in what I said.

Malign or align? — Fooloso4

Both, I would say, depending on your point of view. Of course the real situation - even what little we know about it - is more complicated than that. But Socrates' description is in a specific situation focusing on the effects on the jury and his task defending himself.

I like to imagine that Socrates enjoyed the play. Recognizing it as both a serious challenge and appreciating the playful humor. — Fooloso4

I don't rule out Socrates enjoying it - as a caricature. But a caricature is not necessarily harmless.

I'm flattered that you replied. It was just a bit of fun and I expected to be totally ignored or possibly reprimanded. But since you have replied.....

Focus first step up, not last step down- Unfortunately, the stairs are numbered in ascending order from the top down, so the first step up wouldn't be numbered 1. — keystone

That's a complicated remark, because the numbers assigned are assigned in a specific context. If the staircase existed in the way that a physical staircase exists, the steps can easily be re-numbered in the new context (wanting to go up, rather than down). In that context, the first step up is numbered, even though it would not be numbered 1 in the context of going down. I think I recognized the problem when I said:-

But it would be a bad idea for him to ask whether the stairs up were the same stairs as the stairs down, or whether the staircase exists. — Ludwig V

My conclusion in the light of what you say is that the staircase up is not the same as the staircase down.

What I was wrong about was how the staircase is "created". The person going down does not create the staircase. We (the readers) (or, if you prefer, you, the writer) create the staircase. But if a staircase down can be created by our, or your, say-so, another one, going up, can be created in the same way. So my advice should not be given to the person going down but to you and your readers.

but they have not shown clearly that he had now come to the conclusion that for him death was more to be desired than life; and hence his lofty utterance appears rather ill-considered.

Yes, that's right. Plato's Socrates says that he doesn't fear death because nothing can harm a good person. I understand the argument, but I don't put any stock in it.

If so, then at what age does it become an issue? — Fooloso4

There are two possibilities. It becomes an issue when others use one's age to marginalize one's opinion. It also becomes an issue, but rather later, when one's decline actually sets in. No fixed age.

Socrates is referring to Aristophanes comic play "The Clouds". There is not indication that at the time it amounted to more than a few good laughs. — Fooloso4

Yes, but the laughs are at the expense of the sophists and Socrates is made out to be one. Doctrines which he did not hold are put into his mouth and mocked. Are you saying that Socrates was not maligned?

It seems to me that the acknowledgement of not being able to explain the peculiar alchemy that brings a benefit (both publicly and privately) to children speaks to an awareness counted by Midgley to be a terra incognita for bachelors like Plato. — Paine

Perhaps so. At least it seems that he is acknowledging that such alchemy exists. Though quite a lot of his argument here is prudential rather than principled.

The personal dynamic seen in Phaedrus and Symposium is absent in Laws except as horizons. — Paine

I wouldn't have objected to that difference, since they are clearly focusing on one or the other. I know very little about the details of the Laws. More or less by accident, I do know that his treatment of atheists does not suggest any respect for individuals. Neither does the Republic. I have a feeling that he didn't recognize that society is for the benefit of the individuals comprising it, not the other way about and I mind a great deal about that.

Observing this tension caused me to recommend The Care of the Self to the discussion. As a "history of philosophy", Foucault directly addresses how ideas about marriage changes through different articulations. It is a condition with a history and future challenges. — Paine

Yes, that is important. Arguably, we should never talk about marriage simpliciter, but always marriage in its social context - and even then should generalize cautiously.

It also points to the threshold separating the public and private aspects of marriage addressed by the OP. — Paine

AN interesting quote. It does indeed point to the threshold between public and private aspects, or at least between what should be prescribed and what left up to the parties. (I'm not sure exactly what you mean by the reference to the OP.)

However, Plato also sticks to one of his fundamental principles here:-

And there should be one rule for all marriages: each person is to seek a marriage that is beneficial to the city, not the one that pleases himself. — ibid. 772E

It's one thing to recommend marrying prudently or at least taking prudence into account. But it's quite another to prioritize the "city" in making the decision.

Hmm. I wonder if this is more about Plato than Socrates? — Banno

I'm not sure that you mean by "this". For me, what is most interesting is the difference between two representations of the same event. Assuming that neither side is lying, but that both are selecting, we might expect to get a more balanced view of what actually happened.

This strikes me as cowardly. Elsewhere he talks about Socrates courage. — Fooloso4

This takes us to the heart of the euthanasia issue. I'm with Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations. I hope I will have the courage to recognize when my time is up; I would welcome the opportunity to choose to make a dignified exit. There is something cowardly about clinging desperately on to the last shreds of life, though I admit that from another perspective all we can ever do is postpone death. But this may only be the result of my life experience.

Given that Socrates was actually in good health, you may be right. But what were the real likely outcomes of the trial?

Socrates gives something of an answer in the Crito, but frames it in the context of his violation of his (implicit) contract with the Laws. But I think it was unrealistic to think that this accusation and this trial could possibly be the end of the matter. The trial was the result of a long persecution, as Socrates tells us in the Apology; that would not have ended. Exile would not have resolved the issue, especially when he started practising his philosophy in the place he was exiled from or even when his reputation followed him. (He talks about having to constantly move on from one city to another.)
Socrates frames his questioning process as a collaborative exploration in which each participant helps the other(s). But it is not difficult to see that they might see the process as entirely combative and even dishonest (for goodness sake, we all know what piety or courage is, even if we can't define it!). That's the heart of the problem.

With regard to the scene in Plato's Phaedo, it may be that Socrates no longer wanted her present simply because she had become distraught. — Fooloso4

Perhaps. I think it is more complicated than that. Plato wants to present an inspiring scene (or version of the scene). The philosopher meets his end with calm and courage. Xanthippe disrupts that, but, in the presentation, reminds us that this is the scene of a disaster. By being escorted away, she is prevented from disrupting the project. Whether we see that as a rather brutal exclusion of his wife or a protection of Socrates is another matter.

It may be that her reputation for being difficult is due entirely to Xenophon. — Fooloso4

Yes. It seems to me that there is a great deal to be said for Xanthippe's bad temper. He irritated everyone else, why would he not irritate his wife? All that time spent in futile debate with strangers, when he could be earning a living. For Xanthippe, that would not have been a marginal issue. How did Socrates pay the bills? Though if there were two women in his life (Myrto), perhaps her issue with him was simpler than that. We'll never really know.

Don't get me wrong. Plato succeeded in creating a story which has turned out to be the founding myth of philosophy. It was the first philosophical text I ever read, and still works well with beginning students. It's just that it would not be philosophical to refrain from exploring what a less sympathetic stance would look like.

Both Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates look forward to his death. — Fooloso4

That's perfectly true. What's interesting is the different take on the trial.

I sympathize with him. Seventy was a great age in those days. It is still well over the hill, and for most, in sight of the end. One does get more concerned and pessimistic about one's health as the years tick by.

Plato's Socrates is the founding myth of philosophy. Naturally, Plato smoothed out, - tidied up - the story and, equally naturally, I like anything that gives me a sense of something more real. Xenophon gives me that sense. So does the scene with Xanthippe at the trial.

As I said before, it's perfectly possible - even likely - that Socrates did what he did for both reasons. After all, given that they were very likely to impose impossible conditions on him even if they didn't kill him, it was win/win. It was a great opportunity to send his message to the city, and even to posterity and he wasn't that bothered about staying alive.

PS. As an example of Plato's editing of the story, why don't you read the end of the Phaedo and then look up the symptoms of hemlock poisoning?

I don't understand the rules of this game.

However, I recommend that Icarus stops looking for the last step down and starts looking for the first step up. He should find that as easily as he found the first step down.

But it would be a bad idea for him to ask whether the stairs up were the same stairs as the stairs down, or whether the staircase exists. At best, those questions would scramble his mind, possibly to the point where he might get so distracted as to forget to keep moving. At worst, the staircase might disappear beneath his feet.

He should allow at least twice as long to climb up as he took to get down. But he can expect to complete his climb in the same amount of time as he took to descend.

For what it's worth, I believe you'll find it in Bk 6 of Nichomachean Ethics. A lot of any such argument is a sort of stipulation of intuitive principles, so of course the premises are debatable. I think the general idea is that contemplation produces the most universal, principles of theory, and these are required to ground practical principles, and practical principles are required for moral actions. Therefore contemplation produces the highest principles because these are a requirement for all the other virtues. So contemplation is the highest virtue. Then, he moves to show how contemplation is consistent with "happiness" at the end of Bk 10. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks for the references. I knew it was in the NE but had forgotten which book(s).

My suggestion is he does not answer because he cannot educate her. If they, horses and wives, are not first broken they cannot be educated. — Fooloso4

Well, it is certainly possible that this is a Taming of the Shrew scenario. I don't know the texts well enough to argue with you.

My most recent encounter with him was reading his Apology of Socrates and finding that Socrates, in that text, says that he was feeling his age and preferred to be executed by the Athenians rather than endure the long, horrible process of dying of old age. Very different from the flim-flam that Plato treats us to. Of course, the two explanations are not totally incompatible. But the down-to-earth attitude of Xenophon's account seems to me to fit well with the Anabasis - just as the high-falutin attitude of Plato's is entirely typical of his writing. Not enough to contradict you, but enough to explain why I'm sceptical.

it remains that Xanthippes' presence was undoubted. — Banno

Do you mean that there is no doubt that Xanthippe existed? I don't know what the evidence is, I'm afraid. It is true that no-one questions it. But if it just rests on Xenophon's account, some scepticism is not unjustified.

Foucault, who speaks of the "art of partnership" in his Care of the Self. Foucault traces the changing ideas about marriage from the Classical writers to contemporary thinkers. One theme he develops is how the reciprocal nature of companionship leads to its own recognition of the "solitary" as a matter for care. Respect for the other strengthens the union in the business of the world as well as personally improving the life of the mate. — Paine

I like the idea of an art of partnership. But the themes you mention seem to me to be more about what partnership should be than what it is. Would that be unfair?

In terms of being a bachelor, Foucault depicts them as being less restrained than married men but still living in the fabric of the social reality continued through marital life. — Paine

Yes, if I've understood this right, the life of the unmarried (in the traditional view) does seem to be going on in the context of the family, hence the married life of others; it is also regarded as a stage of life, with the expectation that marriage will supervene at some point in the not-too-distant future. No doubt that was the reality for many, but one wonders whether it was for all. But then, if those who didn't fit the pattern were marginalized and forgotten, it would simply demonstrate how powerful the orthodox pattern was.

Xenophon is making a little joke. — Fooloso4

You could be right. If the name Xanthippe was just dreamed up by Xenophon that the idea that there's something else going on here would have some legs. As it is, I think you are reading too much into this.
What I know of Xenophon doesn't suggest a man likely to make jokes of this kind.

Mankind at large [and not Xanthippe] is what I wish to deal and associate with

I think that this refers to mankind in the sense that Xanthippe is also part of mankind. All he wants to achieve is

I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind.

That doesn't sound like he's thinking of training horses.

Yes. Introduce a little doubt into there their doubtful thinking, that is, into what is doubtful about their doubting. — Fooloso4

Well, Descartes does say that he wants to doubt everything that can be doubted. So I don't doubt that I'm justified in disrupting their doubt.

Perhaps the philosopher can only teach those who have been made ready. — Fooloso4

Ah, now, that's pretty much true. You can take a horse to the water, but you can't make it drink.

While you and I might know better, Cartesian scepticism is unfortunately not uncommon. — Banno

I agree, but it is one battle I usually choose not to fight. — Fooloso4

I also agree, though sometimes my conscience pricks me. Someone should, at least from time to time, try to introduce a little doubt into their thinking.

Now, Aristotle shows how contemplation is the highest virtue. So can we conclude that philosophy provides us with the very best ideas? — Metaphysician Undercover

It looks like a simple question, but it isn't. I wouldn't want to reply without looking up his argument for a start. One reply might start from the argument here, that solitary thinking (which may or may not be what he is talking about) doesn't produce the best ideas on its own. The answer from that stand-point would be, no. But that might mean rejecting his argument about "contemplation". That is thinkable. I'm not a fan of his hierarchical argument for the Supreme Good.

A curiously accurate characterisation of marriage. It acknowledges the difference between a flatmate and a partner. There is a very different commitment, the willingness to work together while accepting those aspects of one's partner that are not within in one's control. More than a recognition of the other, marriage seeks the likes of Joy in the presence of the other. — Banno

I also like it a lot. But commitment is tricky. I don’t think one can do it in advance. No matter what ceremony is supposed to establish the commitment, it needs to be maintained, or perhaps performed from day to day and even from hour to hour. If and when circumstances change, it may need to be renewed – life throws things you did not sign up for at you.

Yes, it is like that in some cases. In others it is transactional or a battlefield. — Fooloso4

Quite so. We should not say that marriage is like this, or like that, only that it can be like this or like that – even swopping from one to another in the course of a day. What it will be turn out to be may not be what you expect. It is very much down to the complicated interaction between the parties.
Anything is possible when it comes to love. I can’t resist quoting what is probably Catullus’ only philosophical observation:- “I hate, yet love. Perhaps you ask why that is so. I do not know, and I’m in torment.”

And then we might consider the various other kinds of partnership that exist in human life - all different and all important. Friendship, for example, can be a swallow in summer and a life-long relationship. In the latter case, the commitment turns out to be the case, rather than being made in advance, but nonetheless can be as deep as marriage can be. There’s a galaxy of others. We form these relationships, we don’t deduce them, or even sign up for them.

From "Rings & Books" --

..an account of human knowledge which women’s whole experience falsifies is inadequate and partial and capricious. Philosophers have generally talked for instance as though it were obvious that one consciousness went to one body, as though each person were a closed system which could only signal to another by external behaviour, and that behaviour had to be interpreted from previous experience. I wonder whether they would have said the same if they had been frequently pregnant and suckling, if they had been constantly faced with questions like, “What have you been eating to make him ill?”, constantly experiencing that strange physical sympathy between child and parent, between husband and wife, which reveals the presence of an ailment and often its nature when experience is silent; constantly lending eyes and hands to the child that requires them, if in a word they had got used to the idea that their bodies were by no means exclusively their own? That, I suggest, is typical human experience.

So her argument is that traditional philosophy privileges one kind of human experience, typified by Descartes' solitary thinker (and, perhaps Rodin's statue, which also suggests the thinking is a solitary occupation) or Virginia Woolf’s desire for a room of her own. But still, she should have concluded with "That, I suggest, is a typical and equally valid human experience." Her attempts to give a balanced view, acknowledging that solitary thinking has achieved some good results, lead me to think that this is what she was aiming for.

The surprising depth of what is going on here is like Stanley Cavell's project of accepting philosophical scepticism as part of human life and trying to look behind Wittgenstein's gestures towards human practices and human life, to understand what it is about human life that gives rise to scepticism. His work shows that one gets into really messy territory if one pursues that. (Where “messy” is not derogatory, but more like Wittgenstein’s rough ground.) So, in a smaller way, does this piece.

Perhaps, but: 1) We are not that audience. We could read it as a quaint period piece, but if we are to evaluate it on its philosophical merits we might ask if it stands the test of time. — Fooloso4

I think that's a false opposition and that the test of time is not so much whether the text is right or wrong, whether on its own terms or ours. It is whether it helps us to understand ideas about philosophical problems that may not take for granted what we take for granted.

2) If her intention was to persuade young men to marry it is revisionist history. — Fooloso4

I don't see any such intention here. Though I agree that the claim that marriage is normal and even mature might lead young men astray (but not, of course, mature people like ourselves).

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.
As I read it she is claiming a concern to avoid contamination by the world of objects. — Fooloso4

Yes, and that is puzzling. It could be a rhetorical gesture towards the detailed argument about dualism. After all, such ideas are present, if only as unacknowledged background. For Plato, for example, it is clearly not an inappropriate description of his story of the ascent of the soul to heaven. For Berkeley, it is very clear, since he says, loudly, that the concept of matter is an excuse for scepticism and atheism and he is motivated by the desire to put paid to it. However, I prefer to think, in this context, that she uses the word to surprise her audience into thinking of a familiar model in a different way. This isn't a scholarly philosophical text.

No. There are various reasons why someone does not marry. It was in response to Midgley's sweeping claims about immaturity and forming attachments. — Fooloso4

Yes, and I agree that those claims are problematic. I just think that there's a baby in the bathwater.

That is something I would judge from the fruits it bears. It would have to go further than just marital status, however. — Fooloso4

I'm very much in favour of judging from the fruits that it bears, though maybe the intentions should also be taken into account - not necessarily as an excuse.

My course is similar. Mankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind.

His course in marrying Xanthippe is similar to that of a horse-trainer breaking a willful horse. — Fooloso4

Socrates doesn't speak of taming Xanthippe, more of getting along with her. Your comment takes us to yet another model - the courtship of Petruchio and Katherina in "The Taming of the Shrew". That is indeed a story of oppression. But it is true that Socrates sounds far too cold-blooded for our expectations. But then, arranged marriages disappoint us Westerners. Yet one can't arbitrarily say that they aren't marriages or even that they exclude the possibility of love.

Well, she does not make the distinction, which is part of the problem with her misrepresentation of the history of philosophy. — Fooloso4

True. But this is short talk for the BBC, not a scholarly disquisition. So the assumption that her audience would assume that she was talking about marriage as popularly conceived in the mid-20th century is not unreasonable.

No distinction was made between philosophy and science. Science is from the Latin word for knowledge. — Fooloso4

Yes, of course that's true. The sciences did not spin off from philosophy until much, much later. But how does that show that Plato and Descartes, in their different ways, did not both regard the human soul as radically distinct from physical objects? Or, as MIdgley summarizes their philosophies and her objection to them:-

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.

Rather than a deliberate and immature choice to not develop attachments, his attachments were severed from him — Fooloso4

Fair point. You seem to be suggesting that this is an alternative explanation for someone having difficulty with interpersonal relations. So the most you can say is that Midgley does not consider that a philosopher might have difficulty with interpersonal relationships for more reasons than one, or even that not being married and liking solitude might not be related as cause and effect, but both have a common cause.
I think it would be reasonable to argue that this is not really a philosophical question, but a psychological question (in our terminology). But that allows that it is, or could be, a question.

Context has more to do with their historical and cultural situatedness than with their marital status. Marriage too must be put in this context, as you point out. — Fooloso4

So we agree on that. But that legitimates asking the question whether they were married or not and considering whether it may have affected their philosophy. It seems likely to me that we would not find a strong correlation between marital status and specific philosophical doctrines, but we need at least to consider the possibility, don't we?

The question stands as to whether solitude and self-sufficiency caters to philosophy. — Leontiskos

Midgley certainly thought it did.

Philosophers need above all to concentrate. They are not like poets (nearly all good poets marry, however madly). What they most need is space for thought.

Virginia Woolf (admittedly not strictly a philosopher) is making a similar point in her famous "A Room of One's Own"
On the other hand, I believe that Sartre and de Beauvoir wrote in a busy café, at least sometimes.