Do you think Socrates playing a mid-wife is withholding something from us? — Paine

You mean that Socrates is offering a wrong, or at least incomplete, account in order to stimulate Theaetetus to come up with something better. I guess that's a possibility.

But I have the impression that when he made that remark he meant to compare the process of cross-questioning someone with being a midwife. So I would expect Socrates to cross-question Theaetetus to elicit the alternative. That's more like his usual procedure, isn't it?

The awkward thing about Plato is that he never speaks in his own voice (except possibly the Seventh Letter). I think he's only mentioned once - a walk-on part present in Socrates' death-cell. So we never know for sure. It is possible that when I criticize the Theaetetus I'm going beyond what we can be sure of.

So our difference of opinion probably cannot be resolved. The issue at stake was whether I was justified in thinking that citation of that dialogue in the context of our discussion about knowledge was helpful or not. I'm saying that I regard that dialogue as irrelevant because the notion of justification that is considered is obviously inadequate and the dialogue recognizes that. More than that, no-one nowadays is suggesting an account anything like that one.

Right. There's a thing where a news broadcaster asks if you know where your children are. — frank

You're right. Asking the question changes the context, which can change one's attitude to what one thought one knew. That's inherent in the example, which is constructed to exploit it.

So it looks as if we expect knowledge to be proof against changes in context. That's a tall order.

Suppose I asked Al whether he is aware that there is a non-zero probability that his car will be hit by a falling meteorite. Do you think he would change his mind then?

'm trying to point out that the notion of justification is vague and that judgement in particular cases that beliefs are justified is therefore more or less arbitrary, so as a general principle justification fails at its purported task of providing a criterion for differentiating between what is knowledge and what is not. — Janus

I agree that the notion of justification is vague. It follows that judgements about it are not as crisp and clear as they hopefully would be if there were clear criteria. But that's not the same as being arbitrary

The game of giving a formal definition is quite difficult. Fortunately, we manage to function, linguistically speaking, perfectly well with concepts that we have learnt, but never learnt to define. Formal definitions have their place and their usefulness, but they are not an absolute requirement, as they are, for example, in logic and mathematics.

The thought of being wrong in an interesting way has a charming appeal — jgill

It certainly stuck in my mind. It also gives on another target to replace the ever-elusive Truth and helps with destructive anxiety.

So let me offer you another insider remark that I've never forgotten. A professor well known for his contributions to logic once confided in me that he understood Gödel's famous argument, but didn't believe it. (!) Thst's a consolation for people like me who find logic very difficult.

It's the situations when someone holds false belief unbeknownst to themselves that the practice is found lacking, because it is during these times that the person cannot even tell you what they believe. It is impossible to knowingly hold false belief, and/or be mistaken. — creativesoul

Yes, quite so. I think that these cases are one kind of embedded belief, in that we (but not everyone) think that beliefs are also appropriately attributed to animals that don't have language. For the record, my belief (!) is that beliefs are reasons for doing something, and are essential to the language practice of attributing rationale to certain actions. One art of this is that we find that sometimes people act as if p were true when it isn't. So if a rational agent acts as if that piece of cloth were a cow, I believe that agent believes it is a cow. Another part is that sometimes they act without taking into account some p that is clearly relevant, and it can be the best explanation that they do not believe that p. I think that "know" does the same job, with the addition that p is true. This contributes to the language practice of passing on information. It may all sound a bit wacky, but I find it very satisfying.

citing these yet to have been disclosed verbs as what interests you in lieu of whatever aspect was being discussed at the time. — creativesoul

You seem to want an exhaustive list. Is it not enough for me to give examples and then say "and other verbs like those"? It's only a kind of ostensive definition. If you think of a case you are doubtful about, we can consider it and decide. I don't have any reason as things stand to work through such a list, unless I find an interesting problem amongst them. The ones I've thought about seem to be pretty straightforward. I refer to them because I assume that the kind of explanation one gives of "know" and "believe" should apply to the other words mutatis mutandis.

In addition to that, I'm reminded of the blanket theory that you mentioned as a preference to piecemeal answers to Gettier, after saying you weren't interested in a theory. — creativesoul

I can't remember what I meant saying I wasn't interested in a theory. This is philosophy, after all.

I mean, if you parked your car somewhere, would you say you know where it is? Or just that you know where you parked it? — frank

That's really interesting. I don't know which I would say. It might be one in one situation and another in another situation.

But most people would regard it as indifferent which I said, because, they would assume, that one follows from the other.

Which reinforces the view that I'm developing, that many of these problems are created by the bad habit of saying more than we need to. If I say I know where it is, I'm making assumptions that I'm not making if I say I know where I parked it.

That's why I suggest holding off being pushed to decide whether he knows where it is or not until all the evidence is in.

So, it is held that when we say someone believes "X", we are saying that they have an attitude/disposition such that they hold "X" to be true.

That's most certainly an accounting practice at work. — creativesoul

I think I understand what you mean.

There's no doubt, for example, that Gettier writes as if he believes that a belief maps to a proposition which maps to a sentence. He doesn't feel any need to clarify that, no doubt because it is so widely believed.

But I don't see any interesting different between "Smith believed the proposition that p" and "Smith believed that p", so I prefer to cut out the middle man. I feel that there's an ontological idea going on that there must be some object that is believed, just as there's a feeling that there must be some object that is true or false. It seems pure assumption to me and I find it annoying. But I don't pretend that I'm clear about it.

I don't have a list of the interesting words. I seldom get much beyond know, believe, think, say, assert, but I would include suppose, imagine, fear, hope, wonder (both that.. and whether... and why... ). I'm sure you could go on.

I'm hoping you overlooked.... — creativesoul

I don't even remember overlooking anything, so I suppose I must have overlooked it. It certainly wasn't a problem. So no worries.

there is a significant amount of trusting the truthfulness of the source material inherent to our daily lives — creativesoul

That's right. Our problem, I think, is that since the development of mass media, it has become more difficult to trust, because the weaknesses of those we must trust are much more difficult to hide, and yet those who want us to trust them try to build an image of perfection that is very easily shattered. There should be some happy medium of accepting human weaknesses as inevitable without a reaction of disproportionate mistrust.

If he lived in a universe where cars never move once you park them, he'd be justified in his belief. — frank

This is the problem. A complete justification would consider every possibility (except, perhaps, the purely imaginary ones), including the possibility that it might be struck by a meteorite. Theoretically doubtful, practically impossible. So the question is, what possibilities can he not cover and still count as knowing?

What then could be the general criteria to justify thinking there is or could be justification for belief in any particular case? — Janus

I'm sorry, I'm not ready to venture on articulating general criteria. It's a very complex topic and I have never seen anything more helpful than very general remarks.

Do you have something specific in mind?

I've looked at some sources and I agree that I was wrong to be so confident that he believed in reincarnation when he wrote the Theaetetus. I still think it likely that he did when he wrote earlier dialogues. Presenting an idea as a myth, I suggest, is evidence that he could not prove what he was saying, but not necessarily evidence that he does not believe it. As I'm sure you know, mythos in ancient greek just means story, not necessarily false story.

the Greek term logos, is much broader than analysis. — Fooloso4

Yes, I was aware of that and pointed it out in what I wrote. But the example he presents in the Theaetetus is as I describe it. My point is precisely that the model of account is not helpful for the problem he is considering. He was quite capable of presenting a different kind of logos which would have been less obviously unhelpful.

He's lacking justification, so JTB doesn't work here. — frank

He's lacking conclusive justification, that's true. But I'm not sure that justification must be conclusive. If that is the case, the J clause and the T clause will have exactly the same content and it's clearly a presupposition of the JTB account that they will be different.

I'm still puzzled about this.

Note the irony. Elsewhere Socrates tells the myth of recollection, but here in the dialogue about knowledge, where we might think we are most likely to find it, he is silent. Rather than recollection there is the problem of forgetting. — Fooloso4

Yes. I found that puzzling, given that, so far as I know, he never abandoned the doctrine of reincarnation. But perhaps we can see it buried in the discussion of memory, since, for Plato, all knowledge is really memory.

He doesn't mention the theory of recollection in the Gorgias either. But again, perhaps it is buried in his mention of philosophical "understanding".

Plato's idea of an account in the Theaetetus is what we might call an analysis of whatever we are giving an account of in terms of its elements. (I would look up a quotation, but I don't have much more time for philosophy right now.)

That's true, but did I suggest it was a necessary fact.

Certainly, I would happily agree that the location of his car is contingent and that his knowledge of the location of the car is contingent. But that's because they are different facts, as demonstrated by the fact that they are contingent on different circumstances. Yes, it is true that his knowledge is partly but not entirely contingent on the location of the car.

reply="creativesoul;780722"]

You're right. I'm sorry.

What stops you from agreeing with the accounting malpractice charges I've levied against the historical and current conventional practices of belief attribution(including believe that approaches), belief as propositional attitude, and treating naked propositions as if they are equivalent to belief? — creativesoul

Two answers.

First, I don't understand what you mean by "accounting practice" or "malpractice" in this context. You seem to think that philosophy is a kind of accountancy. Perhaps it is, in some ways, but it seems clearly different in other ways.

Second, after our exchange, I decided that it was simpler not to talk about propositions in this context, but simply about beliefs. That way, the amount of confusion in the discussion might be reduced.

This involved accepting that "propositional attitude" was not a helpful way of describing the group of verbs that I was interested in.

I can't resist replying "Yes, it is!"

My perception of the nature of philosophy keeps changing. — jgill

I'm not clear whether you think that's a bad thing or a good thing. I suppose it could be either, depending on why it changes.

It is also possible that philosophy can be seen in more than one way at the same time.

I'm not a philosopher, I'm wondering is there a single philosophical question that has been 'answered' definitively for eternity? — Tom Storm

On the surface, the answer is probably No.

But that depends on how you define the questions. Arguably, what happens is that an answer that works in one cultural and intellectual environment will seem inappropriate or inadequate in another and so the question is re-framed and re-interpreted.

There's an old saying - or possibly a quotation whose source I've forgotten - that it is differences of opinion that make horse races. And when there's a winner, the race is over. My point is that it is differences of opinion that make philosophical dialogue - and reflective dialogue is the heart of philosophy.

I'm opposed to people who think that the questions must have a final answer - especially when they think they have found it. It leads to dogmatism and squashes dialogue. Perhaps I should have distinguishes between answers, which shut down dialogue, and responses, which don't.

There seem to be a lot of people around who worry about the lack of "progress" in philosophy. I'm suggesting that the demand that philosophy makes progress by providing conclusive answers is only one view and that there are alternatives that perhaps should be better developed.

I don't know how philosophy will develop, but I'm sure that it will continue in one way or another - for better or worse.

philosophy must offer answers in order to generate new questions. — Joshs

I agree with that. But then, an answer that is correct, job done, doesn't generate new questions.

Perhaps we should distinguish between answers (2+2=? Answer 4) and responses, which do. Or perhaps we can just rely on disagreement and elaboration to keep the conversating going?

Sorry, I was a bit vague. They know where they parked their car and assume that it's still safe, and where they left their respective cars. They assume that the cars are still there and that they will be there when they return. I'm waiting to see how the story turns out before I decide whether they know or not.

The Theaetetus doesn't point to the inadequacy of the JTB, but only to the inadequacy of Plato's idea of an account or an explanation or a justification. Insofar as it can be taken to suggest that the JTB is inadequate, it doesn't offer any clue as to what the alternative might be.

I've just had a light-bulb moment. I was thinking that the J clause enabled a chain of transmission to form. The J clause provided assurance that the person I got the information from did know and the T clause provided my endorsement for the next person in the chain.

But the T clause means that every link in the chain has to test the information for itself. In other words, we never get away from first hand evidence.

That isn't quite clear, but it means that while second hand knowledge might be knowledge, third hand knowledge isn't.

But we live and third, fourth and fifth hand knowledge! Nobody could establish the truth of all the information we live by in even a long lifetime. That's why knowledge is so important.

I'm missing something.

Pause for thought.

In addition, you seem to place far more importance and justificatory weight than I do upon common speech patterns/practices. — creativesoul

I do place emphasis on common speech practices. That doesn't mean that I rule out all technical or specialized language, just that everything needs to have a basis in the shared language.

I'm not sure that our differences are as radical as you seem to think. You misunderstand me about beliefs and propositions. Perhaps I didn't explain myself clearly enough. First, given the lack of clarity about both beliefs and propositions, it seemed better to talk about beliefs without talking about propositions. Second, I don't think that beliefs that are reasons for believing something are clearly distinct from or identical with the belief that they support. From one point of view they are. From another, they aren't. In other words, their beliefs are similar in that they can both be partly expressed by "John should not marry Jane" but different in that Max's belief is expressed in more detail by "Jane is a horrible person, so John should not..." and Jessica's belief is expressed in more detail by "marriage is a terrible practice, so John should not ...". Perhaps it is clearer to say that their beliefs overlap?

Does that help?

A posteriori, he does, but not as a necessary fact. — Wayfarer

I don't know what this means. The echo of Kripke doesn't help.

No, it hasn't been discussed - so far as I remember.

It's a good point. That's why "I know that p" is a pleonasm, i.e. adds nothing except rhetorical emphasis - or possibly a claim to being in a particularly good position to know.

The definition only really has meaning with "You know that p" or "S/He knows that p", where the speaker is different from the knower. Then, the J clause works to ensure that the knower has access to the basis for the knowledge. It really is pretty vague. Philosophers always concentrate on first hand knowledge, for understandable reasons. But the vagueness of the J clause allows the justifications other than the first hand evidence - for example S may know because he has it on good authority without knowing the first hand evidence. That enables me to report what I have learnt from someone else.

In order to determine if an argument is true, to have the ability to discern a true from a false logos, requires knowledge. But this knowledge is not itself a justified true belief.

Well, there are issues here. It's just that the discussion in Theaetetus is not of much help. — Banno

It's nice that people quote Plato in this context, but the Theaetetus really is no help at all. It doesn't even really represent what Plato would like to say about it.

In the Theaetetus, Plato raises the question how we distinguish knowledge from belief by means of an analogy, supposing an aviary in which various birds of knowledge and of false belief are flying about. How are we to tell the difference? That's a real question, even if the metaphor is flaky. He also raises the problem in the Meno, and resolves it by appeal to reincarnation.

In the Theaetetus the discussion of knowledge moves smoothly through belief and truth. When he reaches the final point, he does use the word logos. This is usually translated "word", but extends more widely than that to include "story" and "account" but can mean "explanation" or even "justification". Socrates suggests that an account explains the elements of which something consists. Theaetetus accepts - (he has more or less given up by this point). Socrates then asks, innocently, how we can give an account of the elements; which sets off an infinite regress. So the Theaetetus is indeed no help.

What might be more help is the Gorgias. Plato there paints a picture of the captain of a ship, who does not have knowledge but a tribe (long "e"), which is usually translated "knack". I take a knack to be what one acquires through experience without training and without necessarily understanding why it works. If he is to have knowledge, he needs episteme, which is usually translated "understanding" and is derived from the same root as one of the Greek words for "know" epistemi. (Yes - epistemology) He has in mind, of course, the understanding of a philosopher and I'm sure this is much closer to something he would accept. It is not much help to philosophers, but is a lot more help than the Theaetetus.

We distinguish between true and false accounts by means of of intellectual skills. Which are not beliefs, so the regress is ended.

Sorry if this is a long way to a short story, but I have been looking at mentions of the Theaetetus and swearing to myself for a long time and I couldn't resist telling the story that is always left out.

Philosophers put themselves in the position of the conjuror revealing where the queen really is after taking the sap's money. — unenlightened

It's perfectly true that examples are, inevitably, constructed or selected - usually to prove a point. Al and Betty are no exception, even though this one presents itself as asking a question. The author of this one is not simply asking a question, however, but taking the reader through a process. As each complication is revealed, the doubt whether Al knows increases, and finally, the comparison with Betty puts Al in a new light because we see an inconsistency between our assessment of Al and our assessment of Betty. So the moral of the story (and presumably of the author) is that we change our assessment of these matters, not only on the basis of facts about Al, but also because of the context we see them in.

As to the question whether Al knows, and indeed, whether Betty knows until the car disappears, I wonder whether we should resist being pressured to make a decision. After all, the situation for both of them is perfectly clear. They have parked their cars and assume that they are safe and will be safe until they return. This is a perfectly rational assumption. Millions of people do the same thing every day and find their cars safe. But the story is not yet finished, so although we could grant that their car is safe while it is safe, we should hold off deciding whether either of them knows their car is safe and certainly whether it will be safe and sound on their return. Then, we make different decisions, because different decisions are appropriate, but their is no inconsistency because we didn't make a decision earlier.

Perhaps in some way this isn't a legitimate move in philosophy. Nevertheless, I think it is rational.

Philosophy is like..... — Banno

:up:

..... supposing themselves to have the answers — Banno

:up: There are two things about philosophy that are not quite polite to mention. But they are important, nonetheless. Answers are not the point, and in fact are the death of philosophy. Similarly, agreement about the answers are welcome as an episode, but disagreement is what keeps us going.

It's just preferable to argue about the meaning of "gavagai" on a full belly. That's pretty much the reason i decided not to pursue academia. — Banno

I agree about the full belly. However, having started another career which would have provided considerable comfort as well as a full belly, I had to put up with feeling like a fish out of water. In the end, I decided that a full belly had too high a price and started postgraduate work to put off making another choice between unappetising options and see how it went. Somewhat to my surprise, in the end, I got a job.

I see from later comments that others had experiences similar to mine. I compromised, because what I was doing was better than any alternative that I could think of and it kept my belly (and my family's belly) full, though holidays tended to be on the cheap. Perhaps I was just hooked on philosophy. But it was all a severe disappointment; I started with idealistic ideas about philosophy being available to everyone and working closely with other subjects. Some of that has happened, but a great deal of it has not. My Department no longer exists, in spite of trying hard to adapt to the changes; the University decided it could not afford any luxuries. We did try arguing that philosophy was not a luxury, but no dice.

Folk think philosophy easy, a topic for dabbling dilettanti. — Banno

Yes. But. I knew some quite annoying professionals. In any case, philosophy, like sport and classical music benefits from a lively fan base and surely should be available to as many people as possible.

The truth is, that although I have some regrets, I don't regret my career. What surprised me most was that when I retired, I had had enough and I turned my back on philosophy for some years. But gradually I found myself drifting back to it, and now here I am - obsessed with it again and much happier for it.

It doesn't matter if "gavagai" is a rabbit or an undetached rabbit leg. What counts is making the stew. — Banno

How very pragmatic of you. :smile:

What this high-lights is that we rely on a whole heap of assumptions in deciding what is true, or may be true, or isn’t true. But when we are reminded of them, we pause and question them and this can change our minds. Gathering evidence for all of them is impractical, so it is hard to see that this can be avoided. One might draw two conclusions from this.

1. There is an element of luck in all our knowledge claims, which makes it more difficult to distinguish lucky guesses, which most people would classify as not knowledge, from knowledge. To be honest, I’m not sure what to say about this.

2. Knowledge can be fallible. Or rather, it is obvious that knowledge claims are fallible. The question is whether a knowledge claim that fails because it is wrong is still to be classified as knowledge or whether it should be re-classified as belief, (until and unless an infallible, conclusive claim is established). It may be that this is just a linguistic question and doesn’t really matter. But if one accepts that knowledge (as opposed to a claim to knowledge) is fallible, I don’t see what distinguishes it from belief, so I’m inclined to the latter option.

This case is is too simple to do more than start considering the problem. We should consider a variety of cases. For example, consider another risk that Al has not taken into account, that his car may be smashed by a falling meteorite. Does that mean he doesn’t know about his car? Again, suppose Al’s car has a sun-roof. Rain is not certain, but has been forecast. Does Al know his car is safe?

Each of these cases is different. Do the differences make any difference? I’m not sure, but we should consider whether the question “Does s/he know?” is appropriate in the sense that it can really be answered.

Vogel seems to think that there's a difference between Al's and Betty's epistemic circumstances. — Agent Smith

The problem is set by the similarity between the two, which suggests that their epistemic classification should be the same, and the difference in their circumstances (i.e. the fact that Betty’s car has been stolen), which strongly suggests that it is different. So the fact that Betty’s car has been stolen makes me classify her as believing and rather than knowing. Conclusion – knowledge is not just about the psychological state of the knower. Hence, for example, how confident they each are is irrelevant.

So, on the ground, as a person in the world of those scenarios, I wouldn't consider having said one or both of them knew where there car was as some big error should it turn out that the car is not there. Because when I say 'know' it doesn't mean 'cannot possibly be revised stuff'. — Bylaw

It is certainly true that philosophers often get very dogmatic, especially about knowledge. I deduce that you would say that both of them know, except that Al’s knowledge is correct (so far) and Betty’s knowledge is not correct and hence should be revised. I think that does reflect how we actually use the word. When she finds out her car has been stolen, she will know that. Would that be a fair summary?

May I ask what would you say to this possible outcome? Her car is stolen but only for a joy ride, and the thief, being cautious, took the trouble to return her car to its place and managed to do so before she came back to retrieve it. So she never knew her car was stolen and believed it had been safely parked all the time.

But knowledge about the world is never infallible. What we hold to as something known can change over time. — Fooloso4

You’re right. The parallel universe is a bit over the top. I based this on Jennifer Nagel’s version of it (I couldn’t find the original). You’re also right that we only know what the example chooses to tell us, and that is usually very limited, which can be frustrating.

Surely, we can sometimes be conclusively right. For example, one could say that Al and Betty both have fallible knowledge. But then, when they get back to the cars and drive back home, they will know conclusively, won’t they?

The situation would change if the crime rate was so high that it was reasonable to expect that one's car would be stolen, in which case one would presumably take extra precautions, or expect trouble. — unenlightened

The situation would change if the crime rate was so high that it was reasonable to expect that one's car would be stolen, in which case one would presumably take extra precautions, or expect trouble.
Your point that Al has no justification for believing that his car has been stolen is a good one. Until she discovers that her car has been stolen, the same is true of Betty, of course. That’s a key problem, of course. Justification can be less than conclusive.

An induction based on logic, reason, and memory, but an induction none-the less. — Philosophim

Quite right. I’m not sure whether you think that induction can never result in knowledge because it is always uncertain or not. Certainly, in this case, it is an induction that can be replaced by certainty – when they get back. Though actually, I would say that unless one embraces full-blown scepticism, induction can also justify certainty. What is less clear is when we reach that point. I suspect that philosophers would be much less optimistic than everyday people.

Pretty soon you'll get to the Gettier problem. — T Clark

That's unlikely. I've been there and done that. But epistemology is perhaps in an impoverished state because all the big questions have been spun off into distinct philosophical fields. If you're not interested, that's fair enough.



I have to say, the only alternative to the JTB that I've come across is the "knowledge first" idea. That might have something so recommend it, but I haven't caught up with it yet.

I've posted a starting-point with the title "Vogel's paradox of knowledge"

It seems that there is something of a consensus here.

In On Certainty Wittgenstein addresses examines claims about such things as knowledge and certainty. — Fooloso4

What I was getting at it that Wittgenstein doesn't say "Here is scepticism. This is my solution." in the way that Descartes, Berkeley, Hume &c. &c. He seldom does that. I think there are reasons, even good reasons for that. It doesn't mean that I think that nothing that he says is relevant to scepticism and intended to be relevant to it.

What I make of the itch and scratch metaphor is that what progress means can be different in different contexts. My point was that the despair about progress in philosophy depends on a particular definition of what progress is and that definition does not apply in a lot of other cases - including, of course, scratching an itch.

Is there a Philosophical Investigations, or are there only un-detached Philosophical Investigationsparts? — Banno

I'm not sure I want to answer that question. I think the point is that the themes in the Investigations are linked and interwoven. That's one of the strengths of his writing.

This does not mean that there is or ever will be an interpretation without problems. — Fooloso4

In addition to the different practices you mention, there is also the point that interpretations will vary to work in different contexts - which will include questions and interest that the author could not have had in mind.

Thanks. I'll check it out.

What Kripke fails to see is that by denying just such a fact Wittgenstein is not agreeing with the skeptic, but rather calling into question the very assumption that there is such a fact. — Fooloso4

My memory may be fallible, but I'm not sure W directly confronts the sceptic. He certainly thinks that many of the philosophical questions that he does address contain mistakes and he certainly does philosophy in a unique way.

Hacker, in his categorial framework, mentions with approval the idea that philosophy is conceptual, or rather grammatical, in an extended sense of the word. That's helpful in some ways, but still gives a purchase to the idea the philosophy should make progress.

My suggestion to understand this is to look more widely at the intellectual and cultural world that we live in. There are many disciplines that can be said to change and develop, but are misunderstood if one supposes that they should or could progress. It seems to me that the Arts, by which I mean music painting dance drama stories etc. are all like this; the obvious explanation is that they have no goal or purpose, because they are done for their own sake. They are done in their cultural and historical traditions, but add to them rather than superseding them. Mathematics, it seems to me, is like them in that respect - it adds to its traditions without superseding them. It is true, of course, that mathematics often turns out to be useful, but I can't accept that that is its point. Science seems more like an outlier in that it seems to have a goal, though I'm not absolutely sure that is the whole story. In this context, our question becomes how philosophy fits in to this collection of activities. It's probably best to think of them as a family united and divided by family resemblances.

I have thought about this. I would like to start a new discussion for it. If we start what I have in mind on this thread, things will get confusing for me and probably anyone else who joins it.

Is that OK with you?

However you want to tackle it, Gettier in his criticism of a base JTB theory of knowledge is unquestionably correct. — Philosophim

So what is your solution?

Although Alien has terrified me, I generally favor bold exploration into new territory, hazards notwithstanding. — ucarr

I've no problem with exploration. But I'm also cautious enough to find about as much as I can about what I'm getting into, and a clear idea of what I'm going to get out of it.

I saw "Alien" and one of the sequels. Not they're talking about "Alien %". It's turned into a franchise. I'm not a fan of horror movies. I just don't enjoy being scared.

We seem to have two quite distinct threads running through this thread. Never mind.

I get quite worried about Wittgenstein's hints that there are things hidden in the Investigations. He does the same thing in the Tractatus in that he says that we cannot speak about the really important things. But at least I understand why. It's less obvious what is going on in these bits of the Investigations.

But then I remember that I'm rarely satisfied with anything I write for longer than about five minutes and if I worry about misinterpretations I get absolutely paralyzed. If Wittgenstein felt the same way, I can understand that.

One has to accept that text (or speech) is never all that we would like it to be. Communication is always subject to noise and distortion - there's no way of escaping from that. One does one's best and that's all there is.

OK. But it will take me a while to get things together.

Thanks for that link. It's nearly as good as Christmas. But I was thinking that perhaps it was time I read it again, so it is well timed.