Broadly speaking, an argument from underdetermination is one that attempts to show that available evidence is insufficient to determine which of several competing theories is true. That is, many different theories might be able to explain the same evidence, hence any move to choose between theories must be “underdetermined,” i.e., not determined by the evidence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have some questions about this. I hope it is not too disruptive to raise them.

1. What happened to falsification, which is based on the argument that there can never be enough evidence to establish a theory? Falsification is much easier and can be conclusive when positive proof is not available.

2. There are several criteria, I understand, that are applied in order to choose between two competing theories - Occam's razor, elegance, simplicity etc. Kuhn suggests that the wider context - sociological, technological, practical considerations - all have influence here.

3. If an alternative theory explains more data than the existing theory, it is preferable. If it explains less data, the existing theory is preferable. If both explain exactly the same data, how are they (relevantly) different?

4. Is there really anything special about our making decisions based on less than conclusive data? (We even have a special word for this - "judgement" - admittedly it is not always used in this way.)

But this doesn’t square with framing it as distinctly not foundational (“loose”, “conventional”, “only co-ordinates… with”, being “unable to answer” what is the defining criteria), despite the desire to know (for sure); and so the (philosophical) point is about the (inappropriate, out-of-context, ad hoc) desire, “particular purpose” (next, for strict rules). — Antony Nickles

OK. I see what you are saying. The discussion of the toothache is set in the context of practical use, and Wittgenstein's point is that the doubt is created by shifting (silently, unconsciously) to the context of strict use. It is not that either is wrong, but that the silent change is inappropriate. It looks as if the decision which context to adopt is pragmatic.
So we have another philosophical tactic to set alongside the discussion of the "meaning object".
As you say - on to strict rules.

I thought it was interesting (clever?) because philosophers see “always coinciding” and think either: here is a “form of life” that justifies the knowledge! or think: it is uncertain because the “always” could have until now been a coincidence! — Antony Nickles

I thought it was interesting and clever because, with a dictionary and a flick of the wrist, you turn the conventional trope (conventions as arbitrary) upside-down.

My point perhaps not being “validity” but just to shed light on the unrelenting nature of the desire for this to be a matter of knowledge (that mere accord wouldn’t stop anyway). — Antony Nickles

Yes. It is still floating about - and likely always will be. I thought when I read "You will be at a loss to answer this question, and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is we have come down to conventions." that Wittgenstein turns this conventional rock bottom into something real, almost foundational.

if we wanted a bottom of “rock”-like justification, we are only left with “this is how things are usually done” (a sense of convention). — Antony Nickles

There is a sense of being abandoned.

But, as you say, my main concern here is just to follow the process of his thought. — Antony Nickles

There is a good deal to be learnt from doing that.

Thanks for this. I can see the difficulty. You adopt a possible interpretation of "coincide", but I'm not convinced that it is valid in this context.

Now one may go on and ask: "How do you know that he has got toothache when he holds his cheek?" The answer to this might be, "I say, he has toothache when he holds his cheek because I hold my cheek when I have toothache". But what if we went on asking:--"And why do you suppose that toothache corresponds to his holding his cheek just because your toothache corresponds to your holding your cheek?" You will be at a loss to answer this question, and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is we have come down to conventions. (If you suggest as an answer to the last question that, whenever we've seen people holding their cheeks and asked them what's the matter, they have answered, "I have toothache",-remember that this experience only co-ordinates holding your cheek with saying certain words.) — pp. 24/25

I don't see how anyone who has not undergone even an introductory course in philosophy could not see this as a rehearsal of the sceptical attack on, in this case, other minds.
There is an opportunity, I would have said, for Wittgenstein to respond by saying that the conventions he refers to are definitions of meaning. But, for many people, this is a behaviourist/verificationist solution, which arbitrarily changes the meaning of a term that refers to inner experience. So he does well to avoid it. But the problem remains. With our knowledge of the future, we can see that this is where the private language argument is required. But I can see no hint of it. He seems to be offering only his discussion of criteria and symptoms in response. I don't think this really resolves the problem.

Wittgenstein seldom or never directly addresses orthodox philosophy, so it may be that he is simply thinking outside the box. But that won't help us here now. The only "solution" I have is to say that this is a work in progress and we need to swallow our doubts and allow Wittgenstein to pursue the argument further, as he does in the Phil. Inv.

PS. As and when you continue your reading, I would welcome the opportunity to see your thoughts and discuss them. Naturally, I shall base that on reading the text.

But the specter of skepticism remains, because a referential relation is implied between judgement and criteria. And this implication is deliberate on Wittgenstein’s part. As he elaborates later, what grounds the meaning of a phrase, its use, is not determined by a comparison between judgment and criteria. — Joshs

I don't understand your diagnosis here. I thought that criteria are what guides judgement in the application of linguistic rules. The "criteria vs symptoms" argument complicates that, but I can't see that it negates it. There is also the argument about rules, and this is what is recalled by the reference to "rock bottom", but I don't see any reference here to the discussion of rules that we find in the Phil. Inv.. Could you elaborate a bit?

That's a splendid example.

Can opacity vis-á-vis belief wholly semantic and logical? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Formal logic depends on treating language as a structure - unless someone has begin devising a logic that includes speakers - who would be an abstraction anyway.

But, if we want to keep to a view where opacity is purely a function of language/contexts itself, what of ambiguous statements in the context of something like an anonymous text, a p-zombie, random text generator, or AI? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think we would treat such texts as if there were a speaker. The text itself posits an author. The author of the text is not necessarily the same as any specific person. It's a trope in literary studies.
BTW I don't believe in p-zombies.

The writer's intention is irrelevant. The book says "Superman can fly" not "Clark Kent can fly", and any one who says otherwise would be misquoting. Substitution of co-referents is not licensed inside quotation or belief reports. — Banno

I have a feeling that what you meant to say was that the writer's intention is irrelevant for the purposes of logic. That's true. But if you know that Dostoevsky was a devout Christian, you will be licensed to interpret his texts in the light of that knowledge. Surely?

So the book example illustrates why opaque contexts may not be exhausted by local quotation rules — a single quote can’t capture the interpretive force of a whole body of text. That’s where holism starts to look more natural. — Banno

That's why we can't take "believes that.." as something like a quotation.

Davidson's account of "said that" starts from a quotation and analyzes it on that model. But quotation and reporting are not the same language games (contexts). The rules and criteria are different. Neither is the same as a recording, but a quotation is expected to be more like a recording than a report. The exact same words are key in a quotation, though pronunciation and tone are not relevant. This attracts philosophers, because it is (reasonably) clear and emphasizes accuracy But reports are more complex. On the other hand, "X reported the fire in the kitchen" is a rotten quotation but a perfectly acceptable report. In some contexts, we are not much bothered about the difference between "The President", "Trump". In others, we are.

In particular, we are not allowed to replace referring expressions inside a quotation. If someone said "Rickard Starkey was a drummer", we have to stick to "Richard Starkey" if we are quoting. But if we are reporting, depending on the audience, we may well substitute "Ringo Starr was a drummer", because that is more relevant in the context of the report or because it is more effective if the audience for the report cannot be expected to know that Richard Starkey was Ringo Starr.

"Water" can mean the liquid only, or it can mean any of liquid, solid, and gas. If we assert that water = H₂O, we are asserting the latter, since we are also by symmetry asserting that H₂O = water. I don't see an issue, provided we are clear here. Tim's post seems tangential. — Banno

That's right. The problem with the ice/bridge argument, IMO, is although one could argue that the first premiss tells us that the wider sense applies, the conclusion is misleading, because the substitution of "water" for "ice" suggests that the narrow sense applies. Does that work?

Referential opacity is a different issue to referential equivocation. — Banno

Yes. I'm a bit slow sometimes. I finally realize that referential opacity is the result of cross-contextual confusion, but old-fashioned equivocation, which is what @Count Timothy von Icarus is talking about takes place within a single context. Is that right?

Both the organisms and the world as they found it were necessary for this lineage to happen. — Punshhh

Absolutely.

Although, when it comes to the devastation of the planet, that turn of events happened when we had used intellect to subvert natural selection. — Punshhh

It seems to be true. Though one could also argue that the ability to do that was conferred by evolution and it looks as if the planet is taking action to restore balance.

The task of the philosopher is not to extract a common conceptual scheme from these myriad domains and to determine its faithfulness to some uncorrupted reality; it is, rather, to learn to navigate among the domains, and so to clarify their concerns in relation to each other. — Evan Thompson

I can sign up for that project. It makes sense to me.

We end up with worldview that literally uses universals constantly (in mathematics, definitions, logical inferences) while denying their ontological standing. — Wayfarer

I conclude that your position is somewhere in platonist territory, and that you think that nominalism amounts to denying their existence. I don't agree with either conjunct. In my book, there is no doubt that universals exist. The argument is about their mode of existence or (what comes to the same thing) what kind of object they are.

The fact that the theoretical constructs are an essential constituent of what is considered real, while they're not themselves existent in the way that the objects of the theory are. — Wayfarer

I don't get that. I thought you believed that our concepts and perceptions were all constructs.

That would be the mainstream understanding. The point of philosophical analysis is to see through it. — Wayfarer

No. The point of philosophy is to weigh up mainstream and fringe opinions and decide which are satisfactory and which are not.

Where did these extra relations come from? — RussellA

This is getting boring. There are no extra relations. They are spatial relations, so they must be in space, if anywhere.

There is very little to be learned from an endless series of the same puzzle. It's your puzzle, you answer it.

If we had progressed to some sort of intelligent discussion, it would have been worth it.

I'm here for the fun, not for exercises.

I've seen your other posts. You can do better than this.

Tell you what - you tell me where the end of the rainbow is and why I can never get to the horizon and why the only direction away from the north pole is southwards.

And in turn that begs the question as to what we might mean by "mind-independent'―a term that seems to be much more slippery than 'real'. — Janus

Yes. I keep getting myself into arguments that leave me wondering what definition of independence is in play. A lot of people seem to think that anything in one's mind must be mind-dependent. I think that only things that are created and maintained in existence by the mind are mind-dependent. That makes for quite a short list.

We end up with worldview that literally uses universals constantly (in mathematics, definitions, logical inferences) while denying their ontological standing. — Wayfarer

Sorry. What, exactly, is their ontological standing? Are we talking platonism here?

A science teacher teaching the water cycle or phases of matter would say just this sort of thing. There isn't a correct context for "cats are dogs." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't understand you. All I'm saying is that "water" is ambiguous and this makes it easy to fall into error. To be sure, we usually manage the ambiguity. BTW. "Cat" is ambiguous between the species and the genus. So there is a similar ambiguity there. I'm sure there are others.

Sometimes people hold money for other people, and they expect them not to mess around with it. Money is fungible though, so exchanging it isn't generally meaningful. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure I know what "fungible" means, but I think I get the point. Exchanging money for money would indeed be pointless. Borrowing and lending money is not a straightforward exchange so it is different.

Compare this with something with a strong principle of unity like a tree. Break a tree in half and you have a dead tree, you have timber, not a tree at all arguably. Break it up more and you have lumber that is clearly not a tree. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. That was my point.

This suggests that the mind, which depends on a brain, which has a physical size, should be able to cognise spatial relations. — RussellA

I won't argue with that.

The observer perceives that one person appears taller than the other. — RussellA

... or, alternatively, that one of them is further away than the other.

The mind has created the perception of a height difference, even though a height difference does not exist in the world. — RussellA

The mind does make mistakes, but it is a lot cleverer than that. It judges the size of distant objects by comparing their height with other objects in the field of vision. It knows the actual height of the other objects, so it can work out the height of the unknown object.
So, yes, it creates a perception, but not necessarily a false one.

Where does the relation between their heights exist in the world? — RussellA

Wherever they are.

If the relation between their heights existed in the world, then it wouldn't change dependent on how far the observer was standing away form them. — RussellA

The relation between their heights doesn't change depending how far away a given observer is.

The fact that the relation between their heights is relative to the observer suggests that the relation between their height exists in the observer not the world. — RussellA

No, it suggests that the observer exists in the world.

Where in an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm can the colour red be discovered? — RussellA

Nowhere. Neither can it be discovered in my brain or my mind. Where do your eyes tell you it is?

(PS Actually, I've been told, the colours do not directly respond to actual wavelengths. Apparently, it is to do with the proportion of a given wavelength in the overall impacting wavelengths. The take-away is - it's complicated.)

Not minds in the usual sense of the word. But an agency, — Punshhh

Would that, perhaps, be the sort of agency that has enabled us to warm the climate and devastate much of the world?

The fact that I perceive the colour red does not mean the colour red exists in the world. — RussellA

Very good. What's your criterion for something to exist in the world? Colours, for example, occupy space - admittedly in two dimensions - and have definite locations.

Perhaps that is what I am trying to say. A relation is a concept in the mind rather than an object in the world. Relations exist in the mind, not the world. — RussellA

But then, how can the relationship "next to" be between between the ship and the quay? It is true that we can see that the ship is next to the quay, and you might choose to describe that as having the ship and the quay and the relationship between them in your mind in some sense. But that doesn't mean that your mind has created any of them. In any case, it can't be literally true. Your mind is not a spatial object - it occupies no space whatever. The physical substrate of your mind is in your brain (though I prefer to say that it is your entire body). Whichever it is, there is no room for the ship or the bollard and consequently not for the relationship between them.
I'm happy to say that a concept is in my mind, though neither mind nor concepts occupy any space at all - it's a metaphor. A relationship is indeed not an object in the world; it is something that holds between objects in the world. That mean it doesn't exist only in your mind. If it existed only in your mind, it would not be between the ship and the bollard. The thing is, a concept is always of something else, and the something else may well not be in your mind.

An intelligent and strategic response to the environment of these single cell organisms, which led to the T Rex and Sartre. — Punshhh

That's certainly true. The real genius of Darwin was that he managed to create or identify a purely causal, unthinking system which achieved the results of an intelligent system. There's no need to posit any minds - unless you want to include them for other reasons than explaining the phenomena.

The ship is not secured because of the relationship between the ship and the bollard, otherwise no rope would be needed. — RussellA

I see that you have decided that the relationship is between the ship and the bollard. Good choice. Now, can we agree that the relationship between Glasgow and Edinburgh is between Glasgow and Edinburgh and vice versa?
It depends on what you mean by "secured". But I would say that the rope secures the relationship and not the other way round. But the question that matters to us is whether we have secured that infinite regress.

Referential opacity is to do with individuals, not natural kinds. — Banno

I would have thought so, too. But what do we make of Kripke?

In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that proper names and certain natural kind terms—including biological taxa and types of natural substances (most famously, "water" and "H2O") designate rigidly. — Wikipedia - Rigid designator

I realize encyclopedias get things wrong, but this coincides with my memory.

Steam is H2O
Ice is H2O
Therefore, steam is ice
This is obviously incorrect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's true. But you don't diagnose the problem.

It's the same as "All cats are mammals, all dogs are mammals, therefore all cats are dogs". — Banno

Banno is right. Undistributed middle.

Ice is water.
Ice makes for a good bridge.
Therefore water makes for a good bridge. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have doubts about this. It is not wrong. But it doesn't mean that any old chunk of ice will make a good bridge. Ice only makes for a good bridge if it is handled properly. One could argue that the conclusion is true, provided we specify that it needs to be handled properly (i.e. turned into ice). There's a complication here because the same could be said of water.

The problem here is an equivocation on "water" as chemical identity versus as a particular phase of that substance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Mostly, this does not bother us, but in this kind of discussion, it matters.

it seems clear that my cup of water is the same water when it has frozen, ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that this is where the example is clearly in a different category from our referential examples. "Water" is a mass term - it doesn't do individuals. The only ways you can identify "the same water" is indirectly, via, for example, a cup. When you borrow a cup of sugar from your neighbour, you will, of course, return it. But you don't have to return the same grains of sugar, do you? The same goes for borrowing money. You repay the money you borrowed, but not the same individual money - the very idea is meaningless.

Referential opacity is not about ambiguity. — Banno

Well, we agreed, I think, that the problems occur between contexts, which may be one kind of ambiguity. But it is true that there are ambiguities that are not about reference. Nonetheless, I'm beginning to think that there are issues about the "description under which" we think about things that I have not seen discussed.

The schema says that if we have a true formula containing an individual variable a, and if we have a=b, then we can replace a in with b, and the formula will remain true. — Banno

There is something I don't understand here. Presumably, the implication goes the other way, so that if we can replace a with b in a formula, then we have a=b. So we need an independent way of establishing one or the other.

That's a nice and thought-provoking collection of examples.
— Ludwig V
I don't agree. — Banno

Fair enough.

That's good stuff. Thank you. :smile:

Well, if the personas have different properties then you have solved the "puzzle." — Leontiskos

I don't know I would go that far. That "if" tells me that you have reservations. I suspect there will still be issues to discuss, but it might be a change from going through that argument over and over again.

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80). Rather the relation must somehow share the divided locations of Glasgow and Edinburgh without itself being divided.

This won't do. Bradley had what he considered a general argument about this - as I'm sure you know. If aRb, then there must be two other relations that relate a to R and R to b. I shall write this down as a(r1)R(r2)b. What is the relationship between a and r1 and R and r2 and b? You see how it goes - a nice infinite regress that proves the impossibility (not merely non-existence) of any relation whatever. Great fun!

Suppose I want my ship next to a quay. I can sail it up until the ship is at location x, where the quay is at location y and x and y are next to each other. If you are thinking like Bradley, you will be thinking that something more needs to be said. So I shall add something to physically represent the relationship - a rope. I shall fix the rope to a bollard on the quay, and fix the other end to the ship. I shall fix the rope by wrapping it round the bollard in a clove hitch, and similarly on the ship. So I can represent all of a, r1, R, r2, and b. So you can be reassured that the ship is securely next to the quay and physics will prevent it from moving. You can decide where the relationship is. I say it is between the ship and the quay. How could it be anywhere else? It certainly isn't in my head.

Bradley wouldn't be happy with this, because he's a theoretician, playing with symbols, of which he has an infinite supply. That's the province of a logician, which I am not, so I'll leave you to read up on that. But for me Bradley's mistake is thinking of the relation as if it were an entity in its own right - an object corresponding to R. You are getting sucked in to his misleading metaphor because you are asking whether relations really exist, with (presumably) tables and chairs as your models. But symbols do not always represent entities that correspond to them. You can see from this example that there is no need for an infinite supply of entities linking the ship and the quay. To put the point another way, in 2+3=5, "2", "3", and "5" represent numbers, but "+" and "=" do not. It isn't a problem.

The relationship "west of" holds between Glasgow and Edinburgh, so I shall say that it is between Glasgow and Edinburgh. Similarly for the relationship "east of" between Edinburgh and Glasgow.

Oh, I see. I would have expressed that by saying that the number is the same in all possible worlds, so the numeral "9" designates the same number in all possible worlds. I should have worked that out. Sorry.

I get the point about "the number of planets".

Sorry, but I don't really get the relevance of being an abstract object to rigid designation.

Let's just share the blame.

The planet case is a misapplication because the number of planets isn't a proper noun. Both t1 and t2 have to be rigid designators. — frank

Do you mean something like a blank space to be filled in with a number - hopefully the correct number?
Or perhaps more like a question "How many planets are there?" I get that. Thanks.

BTW. What is "9" the rigid designator of?

Are you familiar with de re vs de dicto? — frank

Yes, but don't see how it applies in the planets case.

I rejected that this is a good way to determine real, but that it is clearly showing us that there is no universal acceptance of how to categorise things as real or unreal. — AmadeusD

I have a bit of a bee in my bonnet about "real" at the moment. So I hope you won't mind if I suggest that statement needs to be modified. I agree that there is no established way of categorising Heaven as real or not. But there is pretty much universal acceptance about how to categorise some other things as real. Unicorns, for example, forged paintings, dramatic performances. There is no single way of categorizing things as real or not. It depends on what kind of thing you are talking about. The same applies to questions of existence (which is what the issue of Heaven comes to). Numbers don't exist in the same way that tables and chairs do.

Read the exchange with I just had with Banno. You do need to understand the issue of Supervenience though in relation to Mental States/Identity. — I like sushi

I'm afraid I'm not competent to express an opinion about what you are trying to say. I don't understand it.

That's a nice and thought-provoking collection of examples.

You aren't using the identity elimination schema there. — frank

I'm afraid I don't know or can't recall exactly what the identity elimination schema. Do you mind just outlining what it is?

That relations don't really exist in the physical world. — RussellA

I see. It's clearly not real issue. I would like to pursue it a bit, but I'm afraid I don't have the time and energy to think it through. But thank you for drawing my attention to it.

Relations certainly exist in the mind, in that I know the apple is to the left of the orange, but in what sense does the apple "know" it is to the left of the orange.

That's a silly question. It is presumably an attempt to explain what Bradley meant, but it is very unhelpful, amounting to mystification. It can't be what Bradley was saying.

physics is understood as amounting to finding useful indexical relations for the purpose of defining protocols for intersubjective communication — sime

I'm not sure I follow you exactly. But the intention to interpret Locke's distinction as semantic seems like a good way to go. I think of it as a methodological decision. I don't know how far that coincides with your view.
When you talk of "indexical relations" are you thinking of the equation, for example, between photons and colours? If so, I wouldn't equate finding them with the whole purpose of physics, nor think that it amounts to enabling inter-subjective communication. Or do I misunderstand you?

But that is exactly what was implied by the Galilean division. The distinction between what was measurably the case, and how objects appear, was central. I quote this passage about once a week: — Wayfarer

It's a good passage. Something to put on a wall in a frame.
But I think you misunderstand my point.
The "external reality" is always external, even when, for example, it is measured. Referring to "absence of an observer" allows people to conclude that when an observer is present, what is observed is not reality. But reality is still reality even when it is observed, or, for example, measured.
The new idea seems to define a new world of real objects, distinct from the world we perceive which contains appearances that don't really exist. But that is an illusion. The new idea defines a new way of looking at, thinking about, the same objects that we perceive and think about every day.

Yes, I'm aware that it is a side-issue, and I've no intention of pursuing it. I don't have the bandwidth to do that, so, although it could be part of another thread, I wouldn't be contributing to it.

Quine's contribution was to put the problem in terms of substitution, and hence in terms of extensionality, and so presenting it as a puzzle of logical form as opposed to a physiological issue. — Banno

"Physiological" is an odd term to use here. Did you mean something more like "Psychological"? But I take the point. But it seems to have turned out that the logic used to state the problem can't resolve it.

In this last we can see the whole in a single context. The problem - so far as there is one - only arises when the contexts are muddled together. That's what Quine pointed out. — Banno

I believe that "Lois believes that Superman is Clark Kent and Superman can fly, so Clark Kent can fly" represents things better. Whether, post Davidson, "Superman is Clark Kent and Superman can fly, so Clark Kent can fly. Lois believes that." is better, I wouldn't care to say. What I'm after is that it's not enough that she believe three separate sentences. She has to put them together, and that's what it is hard to represent in language. Perhaps what I'm trying to say is that there something like a Gestalt at work here, which it is hard to represent with atomic sentences/propositions. I'm thinking of something like Quine's web of belief.

I suspect that you, Ludwig V, are familiar with all this. — Banno

There are many things that I ought to know and do not know. I did not know that Quine has an actual diagnosis and a solution.
Like all good philosophy, it is obvious when you see it. So thanks for that.
I was not asking in the spirit that some philosophers ask questions to which they believe they know the answer in order to lodge an objection - though I have to admit that I have been known to do that.

However, there are many cases when a form of language is misleading, such as reification. But there are others where it is not, such as a categorial distinction. I'm not sure which kind the intensional/extensional distinction is.

When Macbeth sees Macduff's sword when Macduff comes to kill him, we are all clear the Macbeth sees Macduff's sword. There is a real sword, so it's an extensional context. When Macbeth sees a dagger before him, does Macbeth see an intensional dagger - i.e. a hallucination? What kind of object is that? I want to say that he does not see a dagger and that a hallucination is not an object. You can, I assume, see the implications.

You covered it pretty well. — Wayfarer

Thanks.

It was the novel iteration of the appearance-reality divide in the context of early modern science. That's what I'm saying that Berkeley (and, later, Kant) was reacting against. — Wayfarer

It was certainly important. I suppose the schoolmen must have some concept of appearance and of reality - though it is also possible that they just didn't think about them in the way that we do. One would have to read the texts carefully to know.

It was the belief that was coming into view in Berkeley's time, and is fully entrenched nowadays, that what is real, is real in the absence of any observer or mind whatever. — Wayfarer

I treat "in the absence of any observer or mind" as an extreme example of mind-independent existence. That's the key point for me. If only Berkeley had proposed "To be is to be perceivable" instead of "To be is to be perceived (or to be able to perceive)". That still leaves the possibility of inference to unobserved realities in question, though he has to admit that it is possible (as in the case of other minds and God.)

It's worth noting, though, that he cannot, on his own terms, go back to Aristotelianism, which also has realities that cannot be observed, but only inferred. That's what makes him an empiricist.

Yes, sure. LLMs don't encounter information in the same way we do, they cannot choose how they encounter information in the way we do, they don't have aversion or reward afaik. — Apustimelogist

Yes - aversion and reward are a key part of this. Which generates an interesting question - what would one have to provide a machine with to get a) an analogue of aversion and reward (which perhaps one could already see in existing machines) and b) actual aversion and reward.

They are capable of intelligibly talking about experiences even though they don't even have the faculties for those experiences. An LLM has a faculty for talking, it doesn't have a faculty for seeing. The structure of language itself is sufficient for its intelligible use. — Apustimelogist

Yes. But there's a limitation. If language has its roots in, and acquires its meaning from, human practices and forn of life, LLM cannot use (or abuse) language in the many of the ways that we do.

"Superman = Clark Kent" is logically presupposing both that there are two things being related, and that there are not two things but only one thing. It's that inherent contradiction that is the problem, and which is so bound up in your own thought. — Leontiskos

I'm sympathetic to most of what you have been saying. But this contradiction can easily be resolved. "Superman" and "Clark Kent" are both names for the same person - but each name is assigned to a different persona. This is not particularly strange - pen names, professional names, character names (Barry Humphries, for example), regal names, baptismal names, adoptive names, married names, aliases of all sorts.

Quine showed that Frege's solution didn't work, and told us not to try to substitute in such circumstances. Not really an answer so much as a statement of the problem. — Banno

It seems that people are quite unwilling just to accept the restriction. It needs a rationale - apart from Frege's solution not working.

The answer to this, From Kripke, is to drop Leibniz’s Law but keep extensional substitution - that is, to use rigid designation. — Banno

I'm afraid that I don't see this as any kind of answer.

a. Superman is Clark Kent. Major
b. Lois believes that Superman can fly. Minor
c. ∴ Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly. a, b =E
— IEP
From two true statements, we get an untrue conclusion. — frank

This is too simple It is certainly true that Lois does not believe that Clark Kent can fly.
I don't suppose anyone thinks that we can be expected to automatically believe all the logical consequences of what we believe. We have to work them out for ourselves. But we need to believe some of them if our beliefs are to have any meaning. Yet there seems no way of drawing a line between logical consequences that we can be expected to believe and the rest.
At least, I would be reluctant to generalize this example, as the standard account of extension and intention does. There needs to be some room for paying attention to each case. They may not all fit the same mould.


I can't resist commenting on your quotation from Davidson.

But then it does not seem possible to distinguish between quite different things the dog might be said to believe. — Donald Davidson, Rational Animals

Of course not - not in a thumbnail sketch. But if we live with the dog, we can work out a fuller picture. There's nothing special here. All beliefs are surrounded by a penumbra of ancillary beliefs - many of them logical consequences, many others mere associations. Deciding which of them a believer has and which they do not have needs a wider view than two lines.

In a popular if misleading idiom, the dog must believe, under some description of the tree, that the cat went up that tree. But what kind of description would suit the dog? — Donald Davidson, Rational Animals

In one sense, there cannot be a description of the tree that suits the dog. The dog doesn't describe things. On the other hand, there seems no bar to our deciding what description suits the dog and applying it to the dog. We do that to other human beings as well and when we do that, we take their behaviour into account as well as what they say. What people say about their beliefs is important evidence, but it is not especially authoritative; sometimes behaviour over-rules it.

I don't think either of these philosophers claim that what you experience doesn't exist in some sense though. — Apustimelogist

Perhaps I should have explained properly. You are right, of course. Neither of them claims that what we experience doesn't exist. But the PLA is often treated as enormously paradoxical, as I'm sure you are aware. But Wittgenstein is only trying to demolish a philosophical myth, not deny that we can talk to ourselves. Again, Dennett is arguing that our perceptions are not what they seem to be, not that we don't have any.

LLMs are demonstrating his beetle-in-box argument. — Apustimelogist

Do you mean that they are capable of engaging in rational discourse without the benefit of human consciousness?

FH Bradley made a regress argument against the ontological existence of relations in the world — RussellA

Was he saying that relations don't really exist? Or just that they don't really exist in the physical world?

Only insofar as all were empiricists - 'all knowledge from experience'. IN other respects, chalk and cheese. Ayer and Carnap would have found Berkeley's talk of spirit otiose, to use one of their preferred words. — Wayfarer

Quite so. I just wanted to suggest that even though Hegelian idealism was widely rejected, Berkeley was still remembered with approval in some positivist quarters.

Note again that 'substance' here is from the Latin 'substantia', originating with the Greek 'ousia'. So it could equally be said 'there is not any other kind of being than spirit', which sounds to me less odd than 'substance' in the context. — Wayfarer

I understand Berkeley as adopting a rather literal interpretation of substance and assigns it the role of "supporting (standing under) the existence of things". That was precisely what God was supposed to do - not only creating things, but maintaining them in existence. I'm sure you know about Malebranche and Occasionalism. Philosophers mostly seem to skate over Berkeley's project and its roots in the theology of the time. But, in a sense, it makes a nonsense of Berkeley's project to leave God out of it - not that he wasn't interested in science, as you point out.

What Berkeley denies is the existence of corporeal substance, where 'substance' is used in the philosophical, rather than day-to-day, sense: the bearer of predicates, that which underlies appearances. He claims that is an abstraction - which is a point I hope I made sufficiently clear in the OP. — Wayfarer

Oh, you certainly did make it clear. I'll take you word for it that he sees it as an abstracting. I rather think, though, that "bearer of predicates" is a translation into modern terminology. My point is only that, whatever exactly he is denying, he is clear that its conceptual role will be fill by the spiritual substance which is God.

So he's saying objects of perception exist in perception - if not yours or mine, then the Divine Intellect, which holds them in existence. — Wayfarer

That's trivially true. His problem is that once he has got people to grasp that he does believe that things do not exist unless they are perceived, they find wheeling in God to save himself from absurdity to be too little, too late.
BTW I read somewhere - so it may not be true - that the second limerick was written by Berkeley himself. It was certainly published anonymously.

Indeed, I did also mention that, to dispel the idea that Berkeley dismissed sensible objects as mere phantasms. — Wayfarer

You were quite right to do so. I'm not sure what you are referring to. I wanted to stay near the heart of the matter, so had to be very selective, so it is not impossible that I failed to acknowledge what you actually said properly.