Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe.
— Mark S
This claim seems to me quite an unwarranted (reductive) leap that, so to speak, puts the cart (cultural norms) before the horse (human facticity). Explain how you (we) know that "cooperation strategies are innate to our universe" and therefore that they are also "innate" in all human individuals. — 180 Proof

Cooperation strategies, such as direct and indirect reciprocity, are species-independent and innate to our universe because the simple mathematics they are based on are species-independent and innate to our universe.

That these cooperation strategies are encoded into our biology is evident when we consider the emotional responses triggered by our moral sense: empathy, loyalty, gratitude, righteous indignation, guilt, and shame.

These are not just a hodgepodge of emotions.

Empathy, loyalty, and gratitude motivate helping behaviors that initiate or motivate continuing direct and indirect reciprocity.

Righteous indignation (anger triggered by moral norm violations) motivates punishment of others who violate the group’s moral norms. Guilt and shame are direct punishments of ourselves when we violate moral norms.

This combination of motivation to help others and punishment of moral norm violations are the two necessary components of all reciprocity strategies. These emotional heuristics for parts of reciprocity strategies are what began us on the path to being the incredibly successful social species we are.

Are these emotions innate in all people? Psychopaths have diminished to no ability to experience empathy or conscience (shame and guilt) and an inability to learn how to do so. An old term for psychopaths is moral idiots. In them, these heuristic emotions for reciprocity are greatly reduced or even absent.

Your conclusion that cooperation that does not exploit other people is moral does not come from descriptive morality — Philosophim

‘Morality as Cooperation” as a hypothesis that explains past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense has two parts (which I was not intending to be a part of this thread, but here we are).

Those two parts are:
1) Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems within an ingroup but may exploit others. (“Homosexuality is evil!” and “Women must be submissive to men!”)
2) Universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting others (“Do to others as you would have them do to you”) Such norms are universal to all descriptively moral behaviors because cooperating in an ingroup without exploiting others is necessary to enforce moral norms that exploit outgroups.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins.— Mark S

Can we show definitively through science a morality that doesn't result in basic contradictions, handles edge cases, and is rationally consistent? — Philosophim

Like the rest of science, Morality as Cooperation will generally not have contradictions and is rationally consistent. (Any contradictions and irrationality in science indicate that the science needs more work.) However, our application of science could be irrational and inconsistent, just like people. Edge cases such as abortion, how much moral regard to give conscious creatures and ecosystems, and ethical concerns beyond interactions with other people are not necessarily handled at all. We might like for them to be, but that is not the case.

Remember that the science of morality describes what the function of human morality (cultural moral norms and our moral sense) 'is', not some intellectual construct that claims to handle edge cases.

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”.— Mark S

No. Cultural norms and biology based intuitions alone cannot be called moral. If I have a biological impetus to be a pedophile, its still wrong even if I have a group around me that supports and encourages it. Same with killing babies for sport. You have to explain why the biology and culture that is in conflict with this is correct/incorrect. That requires more than descriptive morality. — Philosophim

I assumed it was obvious that “moral” in quotes referred to descriptively moral. See my comment above about what is universally moral to all descriptively moral behaviors. What is universal to all descriptively moral behaviors is the ingroup morality that does not exploit others but is necessary to enforce moral norms that do exploit others.

The law, and morality, are not the same. There are plenty of laws and cultures we would consider immoral. Descriptive morality takes any objective judgement away from morality, and simply equates it to what society encourages or enforces on others. You will find few adherents to that. — Philosophim

I expect most people will prefer to advocate and conform to what is universally moral, not what is merely descriptively moral.

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice).— Mark S

No debate with that, but I'm not seeing that here. — Philosophim

Do you think that past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense are NOT explained as parts of cooperation strategies? Interesting. Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.

So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation. — Philosophim

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity. Our ancestors who did not experience empathy tended to die out. Empathy for a bug is a misfire on its evolutionary function. Could stomping on the bug still be immoral in a culture? Sure. People who kill bugs can be thought of as deserving punishment (being descriptively immoral in that society). In that society, this moral norm would be a marker strategy for a person with empathy and therefore a good person to cooperate with.

Secretly slipping $20 to someone initiates indirect reciprocity, the core of social morality. Having received $20 from an unknown person will make the receiver more likely to help someone else thereby spreading cooperation. Perhaps you are thinking of cooperation only in terms of direct reciprocity? Indirect reciprocity, in which reciprocal help is usually returned to someone other than the initiator, is a far more powerful strategy.

Understanding our moral sense and cultural moral are parts of cooperation strategies explains much about human morality that would otherwise remain puzzling.

AmadeusD
1.4k
The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.
— Mark S

I can't understand how this would be the case. Unless you take "the science of morality" to just be sociology focused on social norms? I would also posit that given the extreme expanses of time that would need to be "number crunched" in regard to their moral outputs, lets say, across history, that this science could never be used. — AmadeusD

From the OP,
"... the science of morality can study why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. There is a growing consensus that “human morality” (here our moral sense and cultural moral norms) exists because it solves cooperation problems in groups. Human morality appears to have been biologically and culturally selected for by the benefits of the cooperation it enabled."

The Morality as Cooperation hypothesis is a candidate for scientific truth based mostly on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense.

You are correct that we can only explain the cultural moral norms we know about and what we know about our moral sense. But we know a lot of diverse, contradictory, and strange cultural moral norms and a lot about our moral sense and its judgments (which also are diverse, contradictory, and strange). If a simple hypothesis can explain that superficially chaotic data set, then we have a robust hypothesis that is strong candidate for scientific truth.

Again from the OP:
"The diversity, contradictions, and, to outsiders, strangeness of past and present cultural moral norms are largely due to 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups or in disfavored or even exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in ingroups and outgroups. "

The insight that the chaos in this data set is only superficial is critical to the great simplification of cultural moral norms into a few categories and high confidence in the hypothesis. "Number crunching" is not an issue here. The number crunching needed to reveal cooperation strategies has already mostly been done (but is still going on) as part of game theory. The cooperation strategies found to date make the simple categories that cultural moral norms and our moral senses' judgments belong to self-evident.

Of course, the data set to be explained as part of sociology. So what?

I'm a "moral naturalist" (i.e. aretaic disutilitarian) and, according to your presentation, Mark, "the science of morality" is, while somewhat informative, philosophically useless to me.
...
I think your "preference" is wholly abstract – "a kind of rule" – and therefore non-natural which is inconsistent with your self-description as a "moral naturalist". What you call "cooperation" (reciprocity), I call "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" (empathy); the latter is grounded in a natural condition (i.e. human facticity) and the former is merely a social convention (i.e. local custom). Of course, both are always at play, but, in terms of moral naturalism, human facticity is, so to speak, the independent variable and convention / custom / culture the dependent, or derivative, variable.

No doubt the relationship of nature-culture is reflexive, even somewhat dialectical, yet culture supervenes on nature (though it defines or demarcates 'natural-artificial', etc). No, you're not "illogical", Mark; however, I find the major premise of your "Morality as Cooperation" to be non-natural (i.e. formalist/calculative/instrumental) and therefore scientistic or, at the very least, non-philosophical vis-à-vis ethics. — 180 Proof

I apologize for my delay in responding.

I understand you to propose, where => is read as “produces”

Empathy and other relevant parts of human nature => cultural moralities
And then,
Empathy and other relevant parts of human nature (as givens) + rational thought => 180 P’s moral naturalism

I propose:

Cooperation strategies innate to our universe + Biological and cultural evolutionary processes => Empathy and the rest of our moral sense + cultural moralities
And,
Cooperation strategies innate to our universe (as givens and the stance independent natural facts) => M’s moral naturalism

Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe. By taking that higher level of causation as given, I avoid potential misinterpretations of the semi-random collection of parts of cooperation strategies that make up our moral sense.

The relevant game theory strategies are innate to our universe and, therefore, fundamentally natural. To be unnatural requires thought and the imagining of unnatural things such as gods and, in my opinion, imperative moral oughts.

Of course, whether one ought to advocate and conform to science's moral naturalism is a philosophical question. I hold that doing so is a matter of preference, and I think I have good reasons for it being my preference.

Am I correct that your moral naturalism goes beyond givens about interactions between people (Morality as Cooperation’s domain in our moral sense) to more fully answer the question “How should I live?”

Yet if we just understand that "how the World is" and "how the World should be" are two totally different questions that aren't easy to answer and that the first question doesn't immediately give us an answer to the second question, that's a good start. — ssu

Right, my intent was that what I have written is consistent with this position.

If moral norms solve cooperation problems in groups, we can obviously understand that moral thinking goes further than a group of humans. What about other groups, what about other living beings, our World and the environment in general? — ssu

Regarding interactions between groups, it seems workable to apply the same definition of what is universally moral as within groups: “behaviors that solve cooperation problems and do not exploit others.” I cringe and feel anger when I hear political leaders talk about how each country, for example, should negotiate what is best for it regardless of the needs of other countries.

Can we apply the same criteria to other conscious beings and environments? Where might we find a good moral philosopher when we need one to sort out such issues?

The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. We need moral philosophy to answer 1) the broader ethical questions you ask as well as the “How should I live?” kind of ought questions and 2) other complex ethical questions about applying such science.

If morality as cooperation becomes generally accepted, I expect the field of moral philosophy would be revitalized, not shut down. We do not face a binary choice in relying on science or moral philosophy for ethical guidance. Instead, we can rely on both disciplines' strengths and areas of expertise.

“Morality” here can be interpreted as [...] a category of strange thing I am not sure exists. — Mark S

My perspective is that 'morality' as "what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences" does not exist.
But 'morality' as "a set of cooperation strategies innate to our universe and necessary to form and maintain civilizations" is as real as the mathematics underlying it.

“Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems in groups” is arguably scientifically true based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense.
— Mark S

This is weirdly worded. A descriptive moral behavior is why someone does something they believe is moral. Meaning that someone could believe that cooperating with another has nothing to do with morality. Descriptive moral behavior is subjective, therefore more a study of sociology on unreliable narrators than objective science. — Philosophim

It has been a common assumption that descriptively moral behavior’s diversity, contradictions, and strangeness showed they were based on no unifying principles that explained them all. Advances in game theory in the last few decades reveals that to be a false assumption as I have described.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins.

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”. That tag is that people feel violators deserve punishment. This tag exists because punishment of violators is required for cooperation strategies to be sustainable. This tag is also the source of morality’s feeling of mysterious bindingness for everyone that has so pre-occupied much of moral philosophy.

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice).

Yes, the ingroup cooperation strategies are universal even when used for purposes that exploit or harm others.
— Mark S

No, this is not universal. Sometimes people cooperate due to threats or personal profit. They might not morally agree with the situation. For example, getting drafted into a war you think is wrong. Cooperating with a killer because they're threatening your life if you don't. Is this cooperation due to a sense of morality? Most would say no. — Philosophim

The ingroup cooperation strategies that do not exploit those in the ingroup are the universal PART of all descriptively moral behaviors. Any exploiting or threatening to exploit others (outgroups) makes the totality of the behavior only descriptively moral.

Hence, by morality as cooperation, “universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting or harming others”.
— Mark S

Considering this could be applied to problems that don't require cooperation, isn't the real claim of morality more along the line of "Taking actions without exploiting or harming others?" — Philosophim

No. There are behaviors that do not exploit or harm others that have nothing to do with morality. To be universally moral, the behaviors must do both, solve cooperation problems and not exploit others.

My chief interest here is in learning how to present it so it will be understood. That is still a work in progress. The responses here have been helpful.
— Mark S

Who is your intended audience? If it's the average person, me, for instance, I struggle to see why it should matter to me. — Tom Storm

Hi Tom,

Though here I address people with backgrounds or at least interest in moral philosophy, my ultimate goal is to make Morality as Cooperation useful to the average person. As you may be referring to, the average person will correctly think “Universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems can do not exploit others” useless, on its own, as moral guidance in normal life.

It is the insights from Morality as Cooperation about standard cultural moral norms that I am hoping can be useful for average people. For example,

1) Food and sex taboos are commonly semi-arbitrary markers of being a good person. If they are found to harm people, they should be abandoned.

2) Versions of the Golden Rule are commonly said to summarize morality because they are usually reliable, but fallible, rules of thumb for initiating a powerful cooperation strategy. Following them would be immoral in cases (such as when tastes differ) when the result would predictably be less cooperation, not more.

3) Shame and guilt over immoral behaviors exists because these emotions, on average, increased cooperation for our ancestors. Shame and guilt to the point one stops doing good things (and thus creates a cooperation problem) is immoral.

4) Punishment, of at least social disapproval, of moral norm violators is necessary for cooperation norms to be sustainable in a culture. The goal of moral punishment is solving cooperation problems.

My understanding of morality is that it's a code of conduct (an agglomeration of historical cultural mores) enforced through a legal system. Morality provides stability and predictability, which helps societies to thrive (within certain parameters, given that the powerful can manipulate most moral systems to suit their interests).

How different is your view to this? — Tom Storm

My view is similar. Legal systems are powerful means of solving cooperation problems and increasing the benefits of cooperation in a society. Punishment of norm violations such as theft, murder, and lying under oath by the group as a whole is much more effective than punishment by individuals at maintaining cooperative societies.

The inherent rightness or wrongness of certain actions (e.g., murder or stealing) is a separate matter, I take it? — Tom Storm

No. Murder and stealing are violations of moral norms that solve cooperation problems. The cooperation problem is “How can I avoid being murdered of stolen from in cases when other people really want to murder or steal from me?”. The solution is moral norms and laws that imply or specify punishment for violators. They are, in effect, reciprocity rules, I won’t murder or steal from anyone else and they will not murder or steal from me, even when they really want to.

as useless to moral philosophers as ornithology (or aerodynamics) is useless to birds — 180 Proof

I was an aeronautical engineer in my working career. I expect a bird who was able to understand aerodynamics would find it quite useful to learn how to take off with more weight and to fly with less energy.

Perhaps understanding what human morality ‘is’ will provide valuable insights for philosophical studies into what morality ought to be.
— Mark S
Given that morality is an aspect of philosophy (i.e. ethics), a scientific "understanding of morality" seems, IMO, as useless to moral philosophers as ornithology (or aerodynamics) is useless to birds. — 180 Proof

To your point that you find the science of morality, at least in its Morality as Cooperation form, useless:

I can see it would be useless if your philosophical position is that a morality exists that is what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences – that imperative moral oughts exist. If someone already knows what is imperative, then what is merely instrumental could be of no interest.

But I remembered you were supportive of a kind of moral naturalism. This is what the science of morality is all about.

Regardless of your personal position, would you argue that a moral naturalist would find the science of morality useless?

Here is how this science is useful to me given my philosophical position:

I do not believe imperative moral oughts exist. My preferred answer to “How should I live?” is simple stoic wisdom except for interactions with other people. I prefer morality for interactions with other people defined by a kind of rule consequentialism with the moral consequence being a version of happiness or flourishing and the moral rule being Morality as Cooperation.

So the science of morality is not just helpful, it is critical to my moral philosophy. Would you claim I am being illogical?

What is hateful [harmful] to you, do not do to anyone. — Hillel the Elder, 1st century BCE

Right. And the New Testament describes the positive form as summarizing morality.

Why? Science can explain that. Forms of the Golden Rule are heuristics for initiating indirect reciprocity, perhaps the most powerful cooperation strategy known. Further, as usually reliable, but fallible, rules of thumb, this same science can identify when it would be immoral to follow them – when doing so will predicably create cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Are science’s explanations of why versions of the Golden Rule exist, are found in all well-functioning cultures, and are commonly described as summarizing morality of no interest to you?

— a[n] exercise entirely in the domain of science.
— Mark S
So then why do you think this "exercise" has any relevance to moral philosophy? — 180 Proof

As I said in the OP,

Perhaps understanding what human morality ‘is’ will provide valuable insights for philosophical studies into what morality ought to be.

Our moral sense and cultural moral norms shape our moral intuitions. Therefore, our moral intuitions are also virtually all parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. To the extent that a moral philosopher relies on guidance from their moral intuitions, this might be an additional helpful insight. — Mark S

There are many perspectives in moral philosophy. Some philosophers may find these results from the science of morality helpful to their area of study, others certainly will not. That is OK with me.

My interest is how to make the science of morality culturally useful. My chief interest here is in learning how to present it so it will be understood. That is still a work in progress. The responses here have been helpful.

You are pretending to use these words in non-normative ways, but it seems clear to me that you are not being consistent in this.

The simpler claim here is, "Cooperation explains morality, says Science." — Leontiskos

To claim "Cooperation explains morality” is a philosophical leap I would not make and science definitely can’t. “Morality” here can be interpreted as “what everyone ought to do” a category of strange thing I am not sure exists.

Cooperation explains our moral sense and cultural moral norms. That is a scientific claim, so yes, “says Science”.

The word “morality” in the theory Morality as Cooperation refers to past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense. Cultural moral norms are norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. Our moral sense is our biology-based facility for making near-instantaneous judgments about right and wrong.

Of course, cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgements are “what everyone ought to do” in that culture or in that individual’s opinion.

But I expect you don’t confuse “cultural moral norms” and our “moral sense” with what a philosopher would describe as “moral” when answering questions such as “How should I live?”, “What are my obligations?”, and “What is good?”.

So why the difficulty with understanding what “Morality as Cooperation” refers to as an explanation of why our cultural moral norms and moral sense exist?

Hello 180 Proof!
Thanks for commenting.

I think the attempt to reduce habits of normative non-reciprocal harm-reduction (i.e. morals) to "strategies for solving cooperation problems" (e.g. game theory, cybernetics) is incoherent and misguided. — 180 Proof

I agree that trying to reduce the philosophical understanding of morality (such as habits of normative non-reciprocal harm-reduction) as what people ought to do to strategies for solving cooperation problems is incoherent. This is not my argument.

I am reducing past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense to morality as cooperation – a exercise entirely in the domain of science.

This proposal is incoherent due to the category mistake of reframing non-reciprocity (altruism) in terms of reciprocity (mutualism), or vice versa. — 180 Proof

Also fully in the domain of science is understanding how the biology underlying empathy and loyalty can exist and motivate true altruism, sometimes even unto the giver's death.

That explanation, first proposed by Darwin, is that empathy and loyalty motivate cooperation that can increase what is called inclusive fitness of groups who experience empathy and loyalty even at the cost of the individual's life.

For example, the so-called "moral sense" in human toddlers and many nonhuman animals is expressed as strong preferences for fairness and empathy towards individuals both of their own species and cross-species ... prior to / independent of formulating or following any "cooperation strategies". — 180 Proof

And of course, people, including babies and myself for most of my life, are utterly oblivious that their moral sense motivates and cultural moral norms advocate parts of cooperation strategies. Biological and cultural evolution stumbled across them by chance and they were selected for by the benefits of cooperation they produced. We just experience the motivation to follow our moral sense and, sometimes, cultural moral norms.

When people are motivated by empathy, loyalty, gratitude, righteous indignation, shame, and guilt or “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, cooperation problems are solved. No intellectual understanding of what is going on is required. How helpful an intellectual understanding might be in daily life is still to be seen.

But what does that have to do with morality? — Leontiskos

What it has to do with "morality" is that morality as cooperation is the underlying principle that explains why past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist.

I expect you are thinking of "morality" as what everyone imperatively ought to do - a topic in moral philosophy. Morality as cooperation is in a different domain of knowledge - what 'is', which I hope we agree may or may not be what we ought to do.

— Leontiskos

to say that morality is for cooperation is a teleological claim — Leontiskos

I did not say morality is for cooperation. Given a standard philosophical understanding of “morality” as what everyone ought to do, I see no justification for such a claim. I said the existence of cultural moral norms and our moral sense are explainable as parts of cooperation strategies.

A moral norm involves valuation, and therefore any field which prescinds from matters of value cannot appraise moral norms, except insofar as it explains them away. But to predicate cooperation of morality is to explain one value term with another value term, and "science," as you have described it, cannot do this. The account is therefore not even logically coherent. — Leontiskos

Consider three cultural moral norms:
Eating pigs is an abomination
Homosexuality is evil
Do to others as you would have them do to you.

All are parts of known cooperation strategies explored in game theory.
The first two are marker strategies as described in the OP.
The Golden Rule is a heuristic for initiating indirect reciprocity, arguably the most powerful known cooperation strategy.
Similarly, virtually all cultural moral norms I am aware of can be explained as parts of known cooperation strategies.

And somehow in your mind this is logically incoherent? How?

Perhaps you are leaping to philosophical conclusions that I have not made and that are incoherent.

— Philosophim

The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like.
— Mark S

That's a fine thing to claim, but where is science in your example describing a universal morality? — Philosophim

I did not include the derivation of what is universally moral by morality as cooperation in the OP to keep it short and because it was unnecessary to my points. I can’t say everything at once.

In outline:

“Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems in groups” is arguably scientifically true based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense. However, solving these cooperation problems has been done for what we see as morally reprehensible goals such as mass murder.

Might there be a part of all these descriptively behaviors that is universally moral – meaning universal to all descriptively moral behaviors?

Yes, the ingroup cooperation strategies are universal even when used for purposes that exploit or harm others. But exploiting or harming others (in outgroups) creates a cooperation problem, which we know is immoral by morality as cooperation.

So all descriptively moral behaviors have a universal ingroup cooperation component and a potentially immoral interaction with exploited or harmed outgroups.

Hence, by morality as cooperation, “universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting or harming others”.

That our moral sense and cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is a robust hypothesis that 1) explains virtually all past and present cultural moral norms (suggested counterexamples would be gratefully received) and 2) everything we know about our moral sense. It is a simple explanation of a huge, superficially chaotic data set. It is a good candidate for the normal, provisional kind of scientific truth.

It also is not new. Protagoras proposed it to Socrates in Plato’s dialog of the same name. Socrates rejected it, perhaps because it was too close to what the common people thought about morality at the time and therefore not intellectually challenging. Protagoras proposed it by reciting a Greek myth about why Zeus gave people a moral sense. If you replace Zeus with evolutionary processes, you get a remarkably coherent story of the evolutionary process.

Finally, your criticism that morality as cooperation redefines morality as expedience is a philosophical claim irrelevant to science.

So we observe a few serial killers working together to mass murder people. "Ah, look at that morality in action!" we would say as scientists. But as philosophers we would take a step back and say, "Huh, cooperation as morality in this situation doesn't make sense. — Philosophim

Yes, it is descriptively moral in human societies to solve cooperation problems that prevent the society from achieving its goals, for instance genocide or mass murder. Descriptively moral behaviors have included a lot of things we would consider despicable – no surprise there.

You seem to be thinking about what is universally moral. It is universally moral (as part of morality as cooperation) to solve cooperation problems while not exploiting or harming others. So, no, the mass murders cooperation does not count as universally moral by morality as cooperation.

The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like.

Moral philosophers tend to focus only on what is universally moral. We have missed a lot by not being able to explain what is descriptively moral.

I expected my examples of “Don’t eat pigs” and “Homosexuality is evil” would have made it clear that the science of morality explains both what is descriptively moral and what is universally moral.

If I had proposed "It is universally moral (as part of morality as cooperation) to solve cooperation problems while not exploiting or harming others." in my OP, I would have been moving over into making a philosophical claim which I was trying to avoid.

I get to the conclusion of obligation by the fact that the processes to create life in the first place exists at all. The opposite of life and existence is death and nothingness. Life doens't have to happen. But the mere fact it does leads me to believe that to proactively force the opposite is a violation. — Kaplan

Living is what life does. Living is not an obligation of life because life has no moral obligation to live regardless of needs and preferences.

I don’t understand your explanation of how you go from the fact that:

“…living is the first 'thing' an organism does and is what makes it an organism” to

“Living is an obligation for life. Therefore one ought to live, as being a being implies this by default.”

Even if you explained how you made that leap, who ought to live? The smallpox virus? (Did we do evil when we exterminated it?) Some individual organism, the individual’s species? Just conscious species? All species?

Also, “Obligation” and “ought” imply doing something regardless of needs and preferences. Coherently using these words here would require you to describe the domain of when and why “one ought to live” would be in conflict with your needs and preferences.

"Objective knowledge" cannot be interpreted as a (physical) object whose attributes are thereby equally applicable to all co-existent minds in impartial manners. Hence, I so far can only interpret it as "impartial knowledge" regarding our shared intuition of about the good. — javra

Objective knowledge from science about our moral intuitions is “impartial” and even mind-independent. Obtaining mind-independent knowledge is the standard goal in science.

For example, is guilt triggered by our moral sense good? Guilt is not physical, but science can objectively tell us why it exists. Guilt exists because it is a punishment strategy – internal self-punishment to motivate not repeating immoral behavior.

Science can tell us the function of guilt is to motivate moral behavior in terms of cooperation with others. That is all.

In sum, it so far seems to me that science and philosophy can only happily, satisfactorily, converge on the issue of morality only if both agree on what the meaning of "good" (regardless of the language in which it is expressed) can and does signify, and what it applies to in all its conceivably instantiations. — javra

Remember that:

Science of morality investigators seek answers to questions about what ‘is’, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” and “How can answers to this question help us achieve our goals?” — Mark S

Science does not address the broad question of the meaning of good, so agreement with moral philosophy on “the meaning of good” is impossible. And I have yet to hear that moral philosophers have agreed on the meaning of good.

But science can provide culturally and philosophically useful information about a subset of what is good. “Good behaviors” regarding interactions with others are science’s playground of objective knowledge. Objective knowledge about what is good (even this limited subcategory of good) could be useful in moral philosophy in broader discussions about what is good.

I’ve talked about objective knowledge in the form of Morality as Cooperation Strategies. But the same approach can also be applied to answering the broader question, “Why do our intuitions about what is good exist?”

Objective knowledge about why our shared intuitions about good are what they are could be similarly useful.

As I've repeated already, I believe there is no reciprocity implied by the Golden Rule, and I think that this represents a gross misinterpretation on your part. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you that the Golden Rule advocates behavior independent of conditions or consequences such as the expectation of reciprocity.

However, following the Golden Rule INITIATES indirect reciprocity, regardless of any lack of awareness of that being the case. People acting in accordance with the Golden Rule without consideration of consequences is the main mechanism for initiating indirect reciprocity in societies, the main strategy for maintaining a well-functioning society.

People can and do act consistently with cooperation strategies (act morally) without awareness that their behavior has anything to do with cooperation (with forms of reciprocity).

Being “friendly” to people we have just met is a marker strategy for being a good cooperator.
— Mark S

That's a very unreliable principle. If I meet someone on the street who is unusually friendly toward me, I am very wary that the person is trying to take advantage of me in some way or another, because that is how the con works. — Metaphysician Undercover

I, and virtually everyone, would be similarly wary of unusual friendliness.

Why? Because we suspect it is preparatory to an attempt to exploit us by asking us to do them a higher cost favor.

Why would we suspect that? For two reasons. First, because friendliness initiates low-cost cooperation with the goal of mutual small psychological rewards directly from the friendliness. Second, friendliness is a marker strategy (a fallible heuristic) for being a reliable cooperator for higher-stakes exchangers.

Our innate interest in, and ability to detect, “cons” is necessary for sustainable cooperation in groups. Otherwise, exploiters and free-riders would destroy the benefits of cooperation and therefore any motivation to cooperate. Our interest in, and ability to detect, “cons” is part of a cooperation strategy.

I explained already why the Golden Rule is very clearly not a cooperation strategy. Cooperation requires a common end. The Golden Rule as commonly stated has no implications of any end. You simply misinterpret it to claim that it states that one should treat others in a particular way, with the end, or goal of getting treated that way back. And I already explained why that particular goal, which is inserted by you in your interpretation, is clearly not a part of the Golden Rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Golden Rule advocates initiating indirect reciprocity, the most powerful cooperation strategy known. Indirect reciprocity has no stated goal - it is a cooperation strategy, not a goal generator. The Golden Rule is inarguably part of a cooperation strategy. If you want to understand morality you must understand at least a little about game theory.

The Golden Rule is a heuristic (a usually reliable, but fallible rule of thumb) for how to achieve shared goals by sustainable cooperation. Burdening the Golden Rule with specific goals would be counter-productive. The lack of goals in no way inhibits, but rather augments, the Golden Rule's cultural usefulness and applicability as a moral reference (as part of a cooperation strategy).

I can make no sense of your claim that "the Golden Rule is very clearly not a cooperation strategy."

If morality is about what goals “we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do” (e.g. when there is a conflict between individual and collective goals), and morality cannot tell us “what our goals somehow ought to be” then there is no science of morality.
If your assumptions leave moral goals to be set and chosen by individuals and not by scientific principles, in what sense we are not ending up in a form of moral relativism? — neomac

Thanks for your reply. Let’s see if I can use it to clarify the science of morality concept of morality as a natural phenomenon. So far as I know, this concept of morality does not exist in traditional moral philosophy.

I am happy to answer all of your questions, but getting the grounding right about what Morality as Cooperation Strategies claims will provide a framework within which those answers can make sense.

Summarizing morality as a natural phenomenon:

• The science of morality has answered the question, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” by explaining them as parts of cooperation strategies. Cultural and biological evolution selected for these norms and our moral sense based on the benefits of cooperation they produced.

• This concept of morality (Morality as Cooperation Strategies) is as innate to our universe and cross-species universal as the mathematics that defines the cooperation/exploitation dilemma and the strategies that solve it.

• However, being innate to our universe does not necessarily imply any innate, imperative bindingness - what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences.

• Rather, Morality as Cooperation Strategies’ bindingness comes from individuals and groups choosing to advocate it. Groups that do not find solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma cannot form highly cooperative societies. Applying solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma has made us the incredibly successful social species we are.

• People already unknowingly advocate applications of Morality as Cooperation Strategies when they advocate their cultural moral norms and act on spontaneous moral judgments.

• The science of morality is then culturally useful when it identifies 1) those norms and judgments as heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma and 2) the cross-cultural and cross-species universally moral subset of those heuristics that do not exploit others. People can use this knowledge to resolve disputes about refining their morality to meet their needs and preferences better.

Do the above claims seem coherent, or do you still see internal contradictions?

Being nice to each other” is cooperation.
— Mark S

It seems we have two very distinct ideas of what constitutes cooperation. I know of no other definition of cooperation other than to work together. And so it follows that people can be friendly toward each other without necessarily cooperating. — Metaphysician Undercover

My understanding of cooperation is based in game theory. That game theory explains why the Golden Rule is such a powerful moral norm and why we often take the trouble to be friendly to people we have just met. Being “friendly” to people we have just met is a marker strategy for being a good cooperator. Being a marker strategy makes being friendly part of a cooperation strategy - part of cooperation.

What evidence do you have that your perspective on cooperation that does not include being friendly is useful?

And seriously, do you think that the Golden Rule is either not a cooperation strategy or does not advocate being friendly to other people? I see no justification for your assertion that cooperation does not include friendliness.

Expressions of thoughts of compassion and advocacy for fairness to all intuitively feel moral because 1) they are markers of being a moral person and 2) they can encourage others to act morally.

But perhaps the speaker is a psychopath who is using a low-cost strategy to convince other people to trust him so that he can exploit them. Then, the psychopath’s expression of compassion and advocacy of fairness as a means to exploit others would be immoral.

We can’t always know. The markers of being a moral person may be false, the goal of expressing moral sentiments may be evil.

Whether a man is evil cannot be determined with certainty based only on what he says.

Can we usefully categorize a thought as moral? If thoughts advocating moral behaviors are sincere, I think we can judge them as "moral thoughts". But that judgment of morality depends on intent.

I will argue the contrary, that fairness and equality moral norms are norms for solving cooperation problems.
— Mark S

You don't seem to be grasping the incompatibility between "cooperation" and "competition". We cooperate, help each other, as the means to an end. So cooperation requires an agreeable end, such that people will work together to achieve that goal. Without the agreeable goal, people can be nice to each other, and behave respectfully, but this cannot be called "cooperation", because they are simply being respectful of each other without cooperating (working together). On the other hand, competition between you and I means that we are both striving for the same goal, but the goal can only be achieved by one of us, exclusively. This rules out the possibility of cooperation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Following the Golden Rule includes “being nice to each other”. The Golden Rule advocates initiating indirect reciprocity, it is a powerful cooperation strategy. “Being nice to each other” is cooperation. Will you argue the Golden Rule is not a moral norm, indirect reciprocity is not a cooperation strategy, or that the Golden Rule does not advocate being nice to each other?

Competition can provide net benefits to society. To sustainably obtain those benefits, all advanced countries cooperatively advocate morally limited competition, which is largely beneficial.

Sure, competition without moral rules can result in exploitation and even extinction of subgroups which is the opposite of morality’s function and, therefore, immoral. But we can compete morally by cooperatively agreeing on rules (as part of cultural moralities) that limit that harm to agreed-on kinds and that prohibit other kinds of harm. For example, the agreed-on permissible harm (as part of a moral system) of economic competition might be limited to loss of investment or employment.

Following the Golden Rule, you would treat others fairly because you would like to be treated fairly.
— Mark S

I think you are misrepresenting the golden rule here. When it says "as you would have them do to you", this is spoken as an example of how you should treat others. In no way does the golden rule imply that you expect an equal, or fair return on the goodness which you give. This is the meaning of Christian/Platonic love, to do good without the expectation of reciprocation. Therefore it is a significant misunderstanding, to represent the golden rule as principle of equality in this way, that one only ought to do good in expectation of reciprocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You and I are describing two perspectives on the same phenomenon. Your perspective “to do good without the expectation of reciprocation” is a standard perspective for people in a well-functioning society.

I describe the same phenomena of moral behavior but point out these unselfish behaviors exist because they provide net benefits. When societies fail and the rewards for acting morally in the larger society stop and become losses, I assure you that people will stop acting morally in the larger society because they no longer benefit from those moral acts. (In failed societies, moral behavior does not stop. It is refocused on a smaller group – such as family – where the benefits of that morality are more reliable. See Peter Singer’s The Expanding Circle)

It is an important insight that “Properly understood, morality is not a burden, it is a means of accessing many benefits.” But I take your point that this insight can be confusing for people who hold the standard perspective you describe for people in well-functioning societies.

I'll also quote the earliest known version of the Golden Rule from Ancient Egypt's Wise Peasant:

"Do for one who may do for you, that you may cause him thus to do."

This version explicitly calls out why we should follow the Golden Rule. I am a bit dubious about the translation since the translator made it rhyme, but I expect he got it mostly right. Several sources suggest this implied understanding of morality as cooperation strategies was a common view at the time. We just got confused about morality for a few thousand years.

If the moral will of human beings, to do good, is dependent on having others do good, then everyone would be looking for bad behaviour from someone else, as an excuse to do something bad, and all of humanity would slip into evil at a very rapid rate, as one bad deed would incite many more. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact is that everyone is always “looking for bad behavior from someone else”. But this vigilance (innate to our moral sense) is not primarily “an excuse to do something bad”, but a reason to do something good – punish the moral norm’s violator. Punishment of moral norms violators is necessary to sustain the related cooperation strategy.

One punishment for moral norm violators is a refusal to cooperate with them in the future. In dysfunctional societies, this can lead to refusal to cooperate with (to act morally toward) anyone who is not a member of your most reliable ingroup – usually your family.

Competition is not the opposite of cooperation. The opposite of cooperation is creating cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Cooperation to limit the harm of competition and increase its benefits is what makes our societies work as well as they do. We can cooperate or compete to achieve the same goals. They are not opposites, but alternates. The difference is that people who agree to compete are agreeing to the potential for harm (limited harm if the competition is to be moral).

Neomac, terminology is an ongoing challenge in presenting results from the science of morality. The philosophically relevant terminology in the science of morality literature remains immature and problematic, at least in my view. I am happy to describe why my using more standard philosophical terminology to describe science of morality results is misleading and inappropriate. Suggestions for how to improve my terminology would be gratefully received.

Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.
— Mark S

To me the meaning of "descriptively" must be contrasted to "prescriptively" (or "normatively") not to "universally". If you use "universality" as a condition for identifying rational moral norms then you are no longer descriptive but prescriptive. Alternatively, you can use "universality" to refer to cross-cultural descriptive moral norms and NOT to a condition of rationality. Conflating these two usages would be fallacious. — neomac

Right. The problem my terminology addresses is that the science of morality (like all science) cannot tell us what our goals somehow ought to be or what we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do.

As you quote above, science can tell us as empirical observations that:

• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies. (“Descriptively moral behaviors” have the normal meaning in moral philosophy.)
  
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.” ("Universally moral behaviors” are universal to all cooperation strategies. There is no corresponding concept in moral philosophy that I know of. Also, the term “universally moral” is not commonly used in moral philosophy, so perhaps I can claim it as needed science of morality terminology.)

I can’t say “Prescriptively moral” in the second claim because there is no innate source of normativity in science and, here, I am only describing scientific results with no prescriptive claims based on rational thought or anything else.

Yes, universally moral here refers to what is cross-culturally moral (and even cross-species moral) but has no innate prescriptive power. This is a simple concept in the science of morality but one that does not exist in moral philosophy.

So where does the normativity come from that makes the science of morality results culturally useful?

Their normativity first comes from groups choosing to advocate these principles as moral references for refining their moral norms based on being most likely to enable achieving shared goals due to increased cooperation. Their normativity comes in the form of hypothetical imperatives in Philippa Foot’s terminology and conditional oughts in mine.

The science of morality result’s second source of normativity is from individuals choosing them as moral references in their personal lives, again as hypothetical imperatives most likely to enable them to achieve individual goals.

In this forum, I have not talked much about why I think these principles could be so compelling for adoption first as moral references in a society and then as a moral reference for individuals. That would be a good topic for a future post.

I should be able to better respond to your other points once I hear your response. What do you think?

Thanks for your considered reply.

"Fairness" based rules for competition are derived from equality norms, rather than cooperation norms. And equality norms are fundamentally different from cooperation norms because there is no requirement for the intent to cooperate for there to be a desire for equality. That is to say, that when people compete, and there are rules established to ensure fairness of competition, that is the only required end, fair competition. And fairness is based in equality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I will argue the contrary, that fairness and equality moral norms are norms for solving cooperation problems.

“Do to others as you would have them do to you” and “Do not steal or kill” are all moral norms which are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible, rules of thumb) that initiate indirect reciprocity. (An example of indirect reciprocity is you help someone else in your group with the expectation that someone in the group will help you when you need help, and that the group will punish people who refuse to help others.)

Following the Golden Rule, you would treat others fairly because you would like to be treated fairly.

Following “do not steal”, you would respect others’ equal rights to their property with the expectation that others will respect your right to your property and that society will punish those who violate that right. Following “do not kill”, you would respect others’ equal rights to their lives for the same kind of reasons.

Equality norms are equal rights norms, not norms that would incoherently somehow claim equal capability. Equal rights norms are reciprocity norms that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

The rules we impose on competitions are cooperation norms.

That is, we must cooperate to establish these limiting rules on competition.

So, what is the one feature distinguishing moral competition from moral cooperation?

Consider two groups. Each cooperatively makes and tries to sell widgets to the same outsiders. As part of this competition, one group figures out how to make better widgets cheaper than their competitor’s widget. The group that makes the worse, more expensive widget loses all their investments and are now unemployed. The losing competitor has been harmed.

Has the winning group necessarily acted immorally in causing that harm? No, so long as they acted fairly in the competition and limited the harm they did to the generally agreed on limits to that harm.

In a foot race, that accepted limit to harm might be that one person would have the disappointment of losing and perhaps loss of scholarships and other rewards.

In business, that accepted limit to harm might be loss of investments and unemployment.

Moral competition requires treating competitors fairly (as defined by general agreement in a society) and limiting harm to what is generally agreed to in a society.

The feature that distinguishes moral competition from moral cooperation is that harm is moral if it is within the general agreement limits for harm between competitors in that society.

The following books explain fairness as the keystone of morality:
Justice as Fairness by John Rawls
The Fairness Instinct: The Robin Hood Mentality and Our Biological Nature by L. Sun
THE ORIGINS OF FAIRNESS How Evolution Explains Our Moral Nature by Nicolas Baumard

How do you define "fair" in a competitive sport? Is it a matter of following the rules? How do we know if the rules are "fair"? Consider Mark S 's thread on the science of morality. There, morality is defined by cooperation. But competition is directly opposed to cooperation. So we have a big problem right off the bat. Competitive sport is fundamentally immoral according to the science of morality. How do you propose that we can make "fairness" a principle in any competitive sport, which by its very nature is immoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hope you don’t mind me entering your conversation, but I disagree that anything in the science of morality would necessarily classify competition as immoral.

The function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense is to solve cooperation problems. The rules and ideas about fairness we establish regarding competition are cooperation norms. Competitors who violate those rules are thought to deserve punishment. Violators deserving punishment is the mark of a moral norm. That is, we have moral norms that enable us to cooperate to sustainability obtain the benefits of competition.

Competition is not inherently immoral. What is immoral is violating the rules people established to sustainability obtain the benefits of competition, whether that competition is in sports or in economies.

For example, it would be immoral for one competitor to trip another in a foot race, and (I assume) there are rules against that. Or it would be immoral for one business to steal the intellectual property of another business.

That said, I'd think something like, "evolved in automated biasing of neocortex by the limbic system", might be along the right lines, though it's fairly unwieldy. — wonderer1

The top-down and the bottom-up/game theory perspectives I describe are about our moral sense's outputs (moral judgments and motivating emotion) rather than how our brains work.

Perhaps someday we will figure out how cooperation strategies were encoded into the biology that underlies our moral sense. But I do not expect that to happen soon.

Banno
20.9k
↪Mark S
Morality as Cooperation Strategies explains fast moral thinking, not slow moral thinking.
— Mark S

So you posit ad hoc distinctions in order to circumvent criticisms of your hypothesis. Until now your theory has been about the whole of morality, but of a sudden it is restricted to gut reactions rather than considered decisions...
...
What I have maintained is the obvious point, that anthropological descriptions, in themselves, do not tell us what we ought to do. — Banno

I would happily set fire to each one of your straw man versions of my proposals.

Over and over, I have explained where your straw man versions are in error, but oblivious, you raise them again like zombies from the dead.

One more time (Please God, make it be the last time! I’m an atheist, so this is only an emotional plea for supernatural intervention.) you restate the basis for the naturalistic fallacy. This time as “anthropological descriptions, in themselves, do not tell us what we ought to do”, thereby falsely, and insultingly implying that I am somehow, somewhere relying on that fallacy.

And on who knows what basis, your strawman version of my proposal now includes your wackiest claim yet, that I argue the science of morality can explain slow moral thinking which potentially includes all of moral philosophy!

You present a new low in rational discussions, straw man zombie arguments – fake representations of a position that, regardless of all attempts at correcting the misrepresentations, rise, over and over, like zombies.

You can put “Inventor of the straw man zombie argument” on your tombstone.

I once thought straw man arguments required ill intent. I now see straw man arguments as an unconscious defense mechanism against ideas contrary to existing beliefs. All of us are susceptible to making them. But when someone tells us we have misunderstood their argument, most of us listen.

Your comments have not been entirely counterproductive.

You correctly pointed out that “the questions they (philosophers) are asking are not the questions you are answering”. Quite right.

And I now understand why moral philosophy, like physics as described by Max Planck, will be progressing one funeral at a time.

The good news is that we appear to have a resolution to our disputes. You wish to no longer engage with me and I wish you to never again comment on my posts.

That was easy. I regret we did not figure out this simple solution at my third post rather than my ninth post.

Oh yeah, I’m a super-duper moral relativist. Which doesn’t mean I don’t believe that there isnt some sort of progress in moral behavior. What it means is that I don’t think that moral progress should be thought of in terms of the yardstick of conformity to any universal norms, whether religious, social or biological in origin. “ Women must be submissive to men” and “Homosexuality is evil” are immoral to the same extent as Newtonian physics, Lamarckism biology or Skinnerian psychology are considered inadequate explanations of the empirical phenomena they attempt to organize in comparison with more recent theories. — Joshs

We use scientific methods as a measuring stick for progress in physics. If cultural moral norms are just parts of cooperation strategies, I don't see why we can't use science as a measuring stick for progress in cultural moral norms.

The best measuring stick for moral progress from a philosopher I am aware of is described in Singer, Peter (1981) The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. Princeton University Press. Singer describes moral progress as expanding the circle of moral concern - or expanding the circle of people who are not exploited (in Morality as Cooperation Strategies terminology). Singer's book might be revealing for you. It and Morality as Cooperation Strategies are mutually supportive regarding the definition of moral progress.

The problem with using "strategy" in this context is that it suggests that moralistic fast thinking on the part of humans is part of someone's conscious plan, when it is actually a result of unthinking evolutionary processes. — wonderer1

First, the strategies in fast moral thinking (such as reciprocity strategies and kin altruism) are encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense and in cultural moral norms which shape our moral sense.
Once more, they are encoded by evolutionary processes; evolutionary processes are not cooperation strategies. Don't make the same mistake Sharon Street does.

Offhand, I can't think of a better word than strategies. Suggestions are welcome.

You don’t see the link between your wrapping this narrative in the cloak of science and religious norms of conduct?

Failing to understand why people’s attempts to get along with others fall short of your standards can lead you in one of two directions. You can either experiment with your construction of the puzzling and seemingly ‘immoral’ behavior of a group or individual until you come up with a more effective way to understand why it represented the best moral thinking for therm at the time, or you can blame them for your inability to make sense of their actions , slap a label of immorality on it and try and knock some sense into them. — Joshs

Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

Human morality is composed of strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

Behaviors that exploit others contradict the function of human morality and create cooperation problems.

Concluding that "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are immoral because they exploit others and create cooperation problems and thus contradict the function of morality has nothing to do with my background, the social environment these 'moral' norms were enforced in, or any other extraneous circumstances.

My claim of immorality for "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" is based only on their innate exploitation contradicting the function of morality.

Are you arguing for some kind of moral relativism? Do you hold that "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are norms some societies can morally advocate and enforce or what?

I can make sense of why men would selfishly cooperate to impose moral norms such as "women must be submissive to men". That is easy to understand. But making sense of it in terms of why they did it has nothing to do with its morality.

Whose strategy is it? — wonderer1

I didn't see an answer to my question in there. — wonderer1

You could be more specific. But what I said summarizes all there is.

I guess I have a problem with your use of "strategy".

Whose strategy is it? — wonderer1

Game theory shows that strategies such as direct and indirect reciprocity and kin altruism are as innate to our universe as the game theory mathematics they are based on.

However, long before the discoveries of game theory, people chanced across the parts of reciprocity strategies and kin altruism. These strategies solved the cooperation problems they faced and the benefits of cooperation they produced were the selection forces that encoded them in our moral sense and in our cultures. It was only after the discoveries of game theory that it became obvious that moral norms like the Golden Rule and "Do not lie, steal, or kill" were important moral norms because they advocated initiating reciprocity strategies.

Inasmuch as evolution might be said to have a 'purpose' that purpose is to produce individuals with a high probability of success in passing on their genes. When evolution is occuring in a species which gets a lot of benefit from social cooperation we can expect evolutionary changes that take advantage of that environmental niche of living as a member of a social species. However, it isn't realistic to think cooperation is the 'purpose' of that evolution. A relatively high level of cooperation is just a side effect of evolution in such an environmental niche. — wonderer1

First, none of my claims rely in any way on a supposed 'purpose' of evolution.

The science of morality shows 1) that cultural moral norms and the judgments made by our moral sense are best explained as parts of cooperation strategies and 2) that these strategies solve a cooperation/exploitation dilemma that is innate to our universe. This science is silent about purpose.

Also, remember that evolution is merely the process by which behaviors are encoded in our biology and cultural moral norms. Morality is consistent with what is encoded, cooperation strategies, not with the process that did the encoding - evolution. Evolution encodes immoral behavior just as readily as it encodes moral behavior. Evolution encodes whatever increases reproductive fitness in given circumstances.

Your error of confusing the process that is doing the encoding (evolution) with what is being encoded (cooperation strategies) is a common one, even among otherwise well-informed, careful philosophers such as Sharon Street in her moral debunking papers. Due to this error, she does not actually debunk morality's objective foundations (moral realism).

Morality as Cooperation Strategies explains fast moral thinking, not slow moral thinking.
— Mark S

I think your sense of what is an explanation of what is a bit unrealistic. I think the adaptiveness of fast moral thinking (considered within an evolutionary framework) is more accurate as an explanation for human moral thinking. — wonderer1

Yes, fast moral thinking (our spontaneous moral judgments) is an evolutionary adaptation. What morality as cooperation explains is what is encoded (cooperation strategies) in that evolutionary adaption.

So I am not understanding what you mean by "the adaptiveness of fast moral thinking (considered within an evolutionary framework) is more accurate as an explanation". Morality as Cooperation Strategies describes that adaptation. They are not separate things.

Do you have a different explanation of the content of the fast moral thinking adaptation?