What conflicts could you resolve by explaining what would be useful for us? We're already doing that anyway and usefulness depends on your position, you can't explain what's most useful for everyone, right? — Judaka

Consider some cross-culturally common moral norms:
Do to others as you would have them do to you.
Do not lie, steal, or kill.

Contrary to your claim, people do not commonly try to compute the behavior that would be most useful to them when making moral judgments. Rather, people experience motivation to follow the moral norms they grow up with such as those above. This motivation comes from the biology underlying our moral sense and from the potential punishment of at least reputation damage if they are seen to violate their culture’s moral norms.

People commonly have serious conflicts over when it is moral to follow the above norms and when it is not. The mystical origins of religious and cultural moral norms tend to make rational discussion difficult and these conflicts virtually unresolvable.

The empirical observation that all cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies punctures that mysticism and provides an objective basis for agreeing on when it is and is not moral to follow the above moral norms.

From the OP,
[quote="Mark S;d13929"
]This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:
1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ.
2) Revealing the exploitative component of domination moral norms and the arbitrary origins of marker strategies.
3) Piercing the mysticism of religion and cultural heritage that protects moral norms from rational discussion by revealing that cultural moral norms have natural, not mystical, origins.
4) Refining cultural moral norms to be more harmonious with our moral sense (because our moral sense also tracks cooperation strategies).[/quote]

We profoundly disagree. I'll post a response in a day or two.

Janus
13.2k
The more important moral norms are, in my view, pretty much universal for merely pragmatic reasons and this ties in with Kant's deontology (which is a kind of non-particular consequentialism writ large). Any society that condoned lying, theft, rape and murder could not survive, let alone thrive — Janus

I agree. As I said in the OP regarding why this is true:

the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS’ feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. — Mark S

I don't think MACS achieves what you claim it achieves. MACS is just as susceptible to the problem you outline. MACS would show human coorporation often has an out group that is excluded. It does not rule out causing massive harm to a few in order for the many to coorporate - this has been pointed out to you in the previous thread I think. — PhilosophyRunner

MACS begins as an observation about all past and present cultural moral norms (including the nasty exploitation of outgroups you mention) being parts of cooperation strategies. I agree, we cannot include the exploitation component of these norms that create cooperation problems as objectively moral means. (The morality of simple exclusion without exploitation is a more complex issue I want to do more work on.)

MACS as I envision it in the above consequentialist/cooperation moral principle defines 1) moral means as solving cooperation problems and 2) immoral means as creating cooperation problems. This evolved form rejects as immoral the exploitation component of domination moral norms.

I can see I need to do a better job of explaining how that evolution happens. Thanks for pointing that out.

I don't think this holds. In fact my observations of "what is" recently, suggests that MACS would motivate those already motivated, and not motivate those already not motivated. Try to motivate an anti-vaccine person by bringing out more scientific studies. I think you will fail more often than succeed. And that failure would be because the motivation is values driven rather than technocratic. — PhilosophyRunner

Science can tell us about the motivating emotions produced by the biology underlying our moral sense.

These motivating emotions can be taken to be empathy, gratitude, anger (at moral violations), shame, guilt, and elevation (a mix of pride, satisfaction, and optimism in the cooperative company of friends and family). All of these motivate either components of cooperation strategies or, in the case of elevation, are pleasurable biological rewards for cooperation.

Since these motivating emotions, like past and present cultural moral norms, were selected for based on their ability to solve cooperation problems, moral norms that solve cooperation problems can be innately motivating by our moral sense. A norm to initiate or maintain indirect reciprocity can be motivated by empathy and gratitude. A norm about punishing moral norm violators can be motivity by righteous anger (regarding others) and by shame and guilt (regarding ourselves). Elevation can motivate cooperation as a way of life.

Thus, I am confident that MACS components are innately motivated for everyone with a normal moral sense. Obviously, it would not be innately motivating for a rational psychopath.

To wit: reducing 'suffering' by any means which does not increase or exacerbate 'suffering'; increasing 'well-being' by any means which does not descrease or impair 'well-being'. "MACS" is possibly one such "means" in either case depending on, I think, how it is practiced. — 180 Proof

To reduce suffering (or increase well-being) for all as an end, I have been thinking that moral means will sometimes include a cost to be paid by those who are suffering less, or who have higher well-being. That is, a cost to those who can afford it that benefits the worst off.

I am not comfortable agreeing that a means can be found that “does not decrease or impair 'well-being'” or “increase or exacerbate 'suffering'” for anyone, ever.

That said, I like MACS for this task of regulating the means to morally achieve consequentialist goals for two reasons.

First, it advocates cooperation strategies which are positive-sum games. These strategies offer the possibility that no reduction in well-being or increase in suffering will be required of anyone – the best result.

Second, coercion is ruled out since the means are cooperation strategies. Ruling out coercion implies any reduction in well-being or increase in suffering is accepted willingly to help other people who are worse off – an intuitively morally acceptable means.

Such a thread should include not just the implications for philosophy , but the metaphysical pre-suppositions of the biologically-based science of human cooperation that researchers like Nowak have contributed to and Curry and Haidt build on. — Joshs

I am happy to address all of those. But I can't talk about everything at once, particularly as I aim for 600 to 1000 words per post.

Nowak's theology is a curiosity, but I am unaware it has influenced either the data he presents, his highly respected work in game theory, or his broad conclusions. And Curry and Haidt have some poorly supported ideas about cross-cultural commonality somehow implying normativity that they mention in passing, but the data they have gathered is high quality and untainted.

Please let me know immediately if you see any data or conclusions I present that appear tainted by theology.

Imperative ought are really just conditional oughts. ...
And even then I'm not even sure instrumental oughts are oughts. — PhilosophyRunner

I prefer “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” after Bernard Gert's definition in the SEP as my basis for what is morally normative, an imperative ought.

I did not realize "instrumental oughts" is a controversial idea.

You might have a look my most recent comments above to ↪SophistiCat. I address at least some of your points.

Science can only "dubunk" the mysticism of moral norms when it is opposed to mystical narratives concerning their origins and operation, such as those offered by some religious traditions. But we are not talking about that. There is no mysticism involved in accepting moral norms without or independently of an awareness of history and mechanism. (The "queerness" of which Mackie wrote is something else - it concerns moral "properties" when viewed alongside items in a naturalistic ontology of properties.) — SophistiCat

I should not have mentioned the explanatory power for Mackie’s “queer” properties of bindingness and obligation. I am trying to limit this thread to how this science reveals useful instrumental oughts relevant to refining cultural moral norms. Please ignore my mention of Mackie.

What it (science) cannot do is advance the discussion of norms as such - that is, whether one ought to accept them - except indirectly and arationally, similarly to how learning and life experience can over time affect one's moral outlook. — SophistiCat

Right, there is nothing in the science (or in what I have said here) that addresses normativity. Justifying normativity is outside science’s domain.

I want to limit this thread to only 1) introducing the science and 2) arguing for this science’s instrumental usefulness (the same kind of instrumental usefulness provided by the rest of science – “If you want to achieve that, do this”).

But perhaps you are wondering how these instrumental oughts for refining moral norms can be useful without an argument that people somehow ought to follow their moral norms?

People already follow their culture’s moral norms such as Golden Rule and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” and will continue to do so. No philosophical reasoning about normativity is required. So I don’t see the lack of imperative oughts from science as affecting this science’s usefulness for refining cultural moral norms.

On the other hand, this science does reveal the exploitative origins of domination moral norms and can debunk their mystical origins. Again, I don’t see the lack of imperative oughts against exploiting others as a serious hindrance to using the science to refine moral norms.

What about any implications this science might have for normativity, the metaphysics of morality, and so forth? I look forward to exploring these topics but prefer to have that discussion to the next thread where I can start with a fresh OP focusing only on that.

Morality is a social institution, and just about anything having to do with sociality involves cooperation strategies - even conflict above individual level. "Solving cooperation problems" can describe everything that goes on in society, from family life to wars. — SophistiCat

Exactly right. As Martin Nowak likes to say, we are SuperCooperators. Our ability to cooperate is what has made us the incredibly successful social species we are.

We are near time to start a new thread on philosophical implications. That may be more interesting for this audience.

Science is about how things are, ethics is about what to do; these are very different questions.
At the core, that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate. — Banno

Of course, science and ethics answer different questions.

“How should I live?” – this is a question for moral philosophy about what to do.

“Why do cultural moral norms exist?” - this is a scientific question about what things are.

“That we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate.” Right. To think otherwise would be a category error confusing what is with what ought to be.

Where do you think my OP or the rest of my comments contradict either of your two points?

We all have different goals and values they are not all compatible. — Andrew4Handel

You are correct that people have different moral goals that they feel everyone should conform to. How does that contradict what the science of morality reveals - the subject of this thread?

As I said in the OP about the science of morality:

It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. And except regarding cooperation with other people, the observation is silent concerning:

1) How should I live?
2) What is good?
3) What are my obligations? — Mark S

When the science of morality explains that "past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies", it explains what moral ‘means’ are, not what moral ‘ends’ (goals) are.

And there is nothing “imposed” on people by this science except a better understanding of reality. Like the rest of science, this science is useful when it reveals instrumental oughts.

Here, that instrumental ought can be expressed as “If you want to increase the benefits of cooperation in ways that will better achieve your goals, then you ought to follow your cultural moral norms when they will predictably solve cooperation problems and abandon them when they will create cooperation problems”.

↪Mark S Sorry Mark, I am unconvinced and the arguments seem nebulous.

Women who are being exploited and are questioning the morality of that exploitation should be easily convinced.
— Mark S — Tom Storm

It is Ok with me that you are not convinced. We can simply disagree.

Science has empirically shown it is a powerful means for understanding what ‘is’ and how it works.
— Mark S

This is taking the view that reality can be understood - a metaphysical position. — Tom Storm

The idea that reality can be understood is a metaphysical position.

I took your implication to be that I was improperly basing the empirical observation "past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies" on an unjustified metaphysical premise. I am not.

Science has empirically shown it is a powerful means for understanding what ‘is’ and how it works. That means the idea that important aspects of what is in our reality and how it works can be understood is a provisionally true, highly robust, scientific hypothesis - not a premise.

Again, if you want to disagree, that is fine with me.

But I must ask. Do you then conclude that there is no point in doing science at all? And if some science is worthwhile, how do you distinguish what is worthwhile from what is not? Perhaps just how you feel about the answers provided?

Curry believes his approach bypasses philosophy by using Popperian science to treat moral questions. However , rival views of the role of science (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rouse, Rorty) reveal Popperian science (as Curry calls his approach) as stuffed with philosophical presuppositions — Joshs

I understand Curry’s two main claims for Morality as Cooperation to be that cross-culturally universal moral judgments 1) solve cooperation problems (an empirical claim about what ‘is’ that I agree with) and 2) cross-cultural moral judgments solving cooperation problems are also somehow(?) normatively moral (a position about normative moral oughts that Curry does not adequately defend IMHO).

I try to be careful to only rely on Curry’s empirical observations which appear to be good scientific data. I have not been able to follow Curry’s arguments for Morality as Cooperation’s normativity and in no way rely on it.

Which do you think communicates better, “marker norms” or “signaling norms”?
— Mark S

"signalling" sounds more appropriate and it may fit well with analogous notions used in animal ethology (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_theory) — neomac

I am moving to agreement that, in part because of its increasing usage in the science of morality literature, "signaling norms" may be preferrable to "marker norms".

I'm very much interested in this topic and I'm sympathetic to your views so I hope we can discuss it further but I would like to finish to read Oliver Curry’s Morality as Cooperation — neomac

I'm glad to hear of your interest! Proposing the potential relevance of the science of morality to questions in moral philosophy and practical ethics can be a lonely business on philosophy websites.

How do you get buy in for this when many people think morality comes from - gods/s, higher consciousness, a Platonic realm, etc? — Tom Storm

Consider getting buy-in for understanding domination moral norms such as “women must be submissive to men” as cooperation to exploit an outgroup.

Women who are being exploited and are questioning the morality of that exploitation should be easily convinced. The scientific explanation of the shameful reasons such norms exist should be attractive to them. I don’t see a problem with getting them to buy in.

Men who enjoy the benefits of this exploitation and are not concerned with the morality of it will be resistant if not impossible to convince. But at least those being exploited have some objective reasons for arguing against the normal mysticism of religious and cultural domination norms.

You begin with a metaphysical position - that reality can be understood by humans and that science is the chief tool in this enterprise. — Tom Storm

No. The metaphysical position I take is not a premise. It is an empirical provisional truth from science. Science has empirically shown it is a powerful means for understanding what ‘is’ and how it works. Science has not shown it is a suitable means for understanding what ought to be or what we imperatively ought to do. They are different categories of things.

No one has discovered a truth value to moral claims or moral instructions. — Andrew4Handel

So you find no truth value in the OP? Humm…

I think there is an equally, if not more, important affective dimension; the moral sense. The moral sense is based on love, for those closest to one, and general compassion for others. — Janus

But our moral sense can also judge domination moral norms as right and even obligatory, such as extreme cases in the middle east of killing one’s daughter to “protect family honor” because she eloped with a neighbor boy the family judged unsuitable.

The thing to remember is that the selection force for the biology underlying our moral sense is the reproductive fitness benefits of the cooperation it motivates. That reproductive fitness benefit is what encodes the same partnership and domination cooperation strategies in our moral sense as is encoded in cultural moral norms.

Where did you get this classification? Is it yours? — neomac

I was hoping someone would ask about the nomenclature.

The sociologist Riane Eisler coined the names of the basic patterns of cooperation in societies as partnership and domination morality in her 1987 book The Chalice and the Blade.

I’ve not seen her nomenclature (or any good alternatives) used in the science of morality literature. But her’s seems wonderfully appropriate, so I thought I would try it out here. Previously, I have referred to these categories as “ingroup” and “exploitation” (cooperation to exploit an outgroup) moral norms but now prefer Eisler’s names. What do you think?

Nomenclature in the science of morality field is still in flux. Perhaps by having a better name, the domination subset of human morality will get more of the attention it deserves. The present science of morality field’s focus (such as Oliver Curry’s Morality as Cooperation and Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundations work) is on partnership moral judgments, with unfortunate neglect of domination moral judgments and norms.

“Marker moral norms” has been used in the field for some time (and the strategy in game theory they implement has been called the “green beard” strategy). More recently, these norms have been called signaling norms (signaling membership and commitment to a more reliably cooperative ingroup) as in this 2021 paper:
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rstb.2020.0294

Which do you think communicates better, “marker norms” or “signaling norms”?

Yes, but you are making an ought - that there is a way to approach this using empirical observation (and the norm model) which are values which need to be justified to those who believe in moral truths which come from theism or a Platonic realm, or similar.

Seems to me that your model only works if everyone who comes to a study of ethics shares your initial axiom - which requires a commitment to a particular worldview. — Tom Storm

Yes, understanding the function of past and present cultural moral norms as solving cooperation problems does require a worldview – one that accepts, rather than rejects, science as a powerful way to understand what ‘is’ in our universe and how it works. But don’t we agree about that?

If that scientific understanding of past and present cultural moral norms is, like the rest of science, instrumentally useful for achieving our relevant goals (here achieving the benefits of cooperation in our societies), then is not that useful science?

Note that I am not proceeding to say “This is the benefit of cooperation (flourishing or reduction in suffering) you ought to pursue.” This would be claiming an ought which would have to be justified.

Identifying an instrumental ought (you ought to do X if you want to achieve Y) from science does not imply any oughts that must be justified. Are you still thinking it does?

There is something very specific about the continued stigmatisation of homosexuality in various cultures. Why did the writers of the bible care about it?

It really seems very arbitrary. I don't see the creation in groups and out groups as a moral system as opposed to a hierarchy.
But I don't see what the benefit in this case is of condemning homosexuals (to the point of neuroticism) If a morality evolved from such irrationality it seems unreliable. — Andrew4Handel

What kind of threat are homosexuals to society? An imaginary one.

Being imaginary does not prevent right-wingers in the United States and other places from advocating against the threat of the “gay agenda” to families and children to demonize homosexuality. Why would people do that?

Demonizing homosexuality can be beneficial for the people doing it. First, among Christian fundamentalists, it marks them as ‘moral’ people worthy of respect at little cost to themselves. It even marks them as leaders fighting to defend innocent families and children.

Do they know the threats are imaginary? I don’t know. I do know that when it is in someone’s self-interest not to understand something, they are unlikely to ever be able to understand it.

Why do Christian fundamentalists who are not trying to be leaders believe it, often against the evidence of their own experience? Beyond the religious teachings calling for the execution of male homosexuals (Leviticus 20:13), they can believe it because it feels good. Due to our evolutionary history, cooperating to defend our groups (here families and children) triggers pleasurable emotions of pride, elation, and righteous indignation. There is an emotional feedback system in biology underlying our moral sense that can be hijacked to resist the threat of even imaginary threats.

Marker strategies are often random. If they don’t make any sense, then people who follow them must be sincere and committed to the ingroup and therefore likely to be good people to cooperate with.

For example:
The many food and sex taboos including the execution of male homosexuals (Leviticus 20:13);
Stoning of those who curse (Leviticus 24:10–16),
Stoning of those who work on the Sabbath (Exodus 31:15)
Do not wear clothing woven of two kinds of material (Leviticus 19:19)

What about moral norms such as the prohibition of homosexuality, the acceptance of slavery, the inequality of the sexes, the application of the death penalty and so on. — Andrew4Handel

From the OP:

...the coherence, diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of past and present moral norms people typically argue about are products of three major norm categories: (There may be other categories of moral norms specific to cooperation by kin-altruism and hierarchies that are less often debated.)

Partnership moral norms – Parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems between people with equal moral standing. These include heuristics “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, “Do not steal, lie, or kill”, and “Be loyal to your group” which advocate initiating indirect reciprocity. (Cross-culturally moral norms are partnership moral norms.)

Domination moral norms – Parts of strategies to cooperatively exploit an outgroup to benefit an ingroup. These include “Slaves must obey their masters” and “Women must be submissive to men”.

Marker moral norms – Markers of membership in and commitment to a more cooperative ingroup. Preferentially cooperating with members of an ingroup can reduce the chances of being exploited and thereby increase the benefits of cooperation. These markers include “eating shrimp is an abomination”, “masturbation is immoral”, and other food and sex taboos. — Mark S

1) prohibition of homosexuality – The simple prohibition is a sex taboo marker norm of membership and commitment to a more reliably cooperative ingroup. But the effect of this moral norm on ingroup cooperation can be enhanced by claiming that homosexuals are somehow a threat to the ingroup that all must unite against. Due to our evolutionary history in small groups, we are strongly inclined to increase cooperation when our ingroup is threatened. So claiming that homosexuals are both evil and somehow a threat to society is an example of a domination moral norm which exploits an outgroup, homosexuals, as an imaginary threat to the ingroup (the society).

2) Moral norms condoning slavery and the inequality of the sexes – Both are examples of domination moral norms.

3) Acceptance of the death penalty – Moral norms are cultural norms whose violation is commonly felt to deserve punishment. Laws about the death penalty are in a different category. But a relevant moral norm could be “Do not kill people for fun; that merits execution”. Executing people who kill for fun is a punishment component of cooperation strategies. For cooperation strategies (composed of moral norms) to be stable in the face of free-riders and other exploiters, there must be punishment of violations. The relevant insight science provides is that execution can be parts of cooperation strategies encoded in a society’s moral norms. Whether or not to advocate for such norms can be an instrumental choice based on which option will most likely increase the benefits of future cooperation. Of course, this is only an insight into what the moral norm ‘is’, not what the moral norm ‘ought’ to be. We both might advocate that moral norms whose violation merits death also be judged based on a Rawlsian view of justice and minimizing suffering. Remember, science is silent about what moral norms ought to be. Science can only tell us what moral norms ‘are’.

Is does not debunk ought. A naturalistic theory of morality does not have it as a consequence that moral imperatives are false, invalid or obsolete. — SophistiCat

Moral norms are just a different kind of norm, and they are not derivable from anything non-moral, though many things can influence them. — SophistiCat

I am an admirer of Hume and, perhaps like you, have yet to find any convincing argument for how to derive an imperative ought from what ‘is’ – they are different categories of thing.

The “mysticism” of cultural moral norms that science debunks is the mystery of their origins and why they have the strange intuitive properties (that John Mackie described as queerness) of bindingness and violations deserving punishment.

By explaining the “queerness” of our intuitions about cultural moral norms as subcomponents of cooperation strategies, science debunks the mysticism that shields cultural moral norms from rational discussion.

This mysticism is not in the category of imperative oughts.

Science reveals an objective basis for evaluating cultural moral norms as instrumental oughts. If you want the benefits of cooperation, you ought not follow cultural moral norms when they predictably will create rather than solve cooperation problems. That seems simple to me.

On the other hand, consider a stoic, a consequentialist (perhaps for flourishing or reducing suffering), and a religious divine command theorist. What implications, if any, does this science have for their answers to “What is good?” and “How should I live?”? There are no necessary implications at all. They are about different categories of thing.

Past and present cultural moral norms are subcomponents of cooperation strategies. We know this is true in the normal provisional scientific sense based on the hypothesis’ incredible explanatory power for known past and present cultural moral norms, plus meeting other relevant criteria for scientific truth such as simplicity and integration with the rest of science.

I am not making an ethical proposal of the form “You imperatively ought to do such and so” which would require an explanation of where the ought comes from.

Rather, I am first reporting an empirical observation that virtually all past and present cultural moral norms can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies. It is the nature of empirical observations that is not necessary to explain why they are what they are and not something different (in this case different from cooperation).

Second, I am arguing that this empirical finding is useful for resolving many disputes about cultural moral norms since:

With this empirical knowledge:
• Any perceived imperative oughts are debunked. (Despite our intuitions, the Golden Rule, do not lie, steal, or kill, and other cultural moral norms do not have any innate, mystical, imperative oughtness. They are only heuristics for parts of cooperation strategies.)
• Agreement on if or when moral norms will be advocated becomes an instrumental choice. If people want the material and psychological benefits of cooperation in their society, they should (instrumental ought):

o Advocate following cultural moral norms when they will predictably solve cooperation problems and
o Advocate not following those moral norms when they predictably will create cooperation problems. (Not following the moral norms when, as fallible heuristics, they act opposite to their function.)

The scientific study of cultural moral norms reveals that, as heuristics for cooperation strategies, advocating or not advocating cultural moral norms can be justified as an instrumental ought. — Mark S

In biology two kinds of relationships exist:

1. Parasitic: in a relationship, one gains and the other loses
2. Symbiotic: in a relationship, both register a gain

Morality is, by the looks of it, all about symbiosis and reducing parasitism. — Agent Smith

Right. You are talking about what is, at bottom, a cooperation problem that symbiotic relationships have solved by gene-motivated behaviors selected for by the reproductive fitness gains both partners obtain. My subject is about how cultural moral norms solve the same cooperation problems. Nice parallel. Thanks.

In other words how do you justify cooperation to those who aren't interested? — Tom Storm

I can't. What I can do is have nothing to do with them. If they exploit other people, I can, at minimum, warn other people these are poor cooperators and they should have nothing to do with them also.

If they just want to be left alone, we can leave them alone.

This is how our ancestors have been handling the problem for perhaps hundreds of thousands of years.

it is possible to determine one moral position as being objectively better than another on the basis of non-moral meta-empirical values such as consistency, universalizability and effects on well-being — Joshs

I agree, but the subject of moral positions in terms of answers to “How should I Live”, “What is good?”, and “What are my obligations?” is beyond what I would like this thread to be about. I’d like this thread to focus on what science can tell us about cultural moral norms as heuristics for cooperation strategies. Perhaps we can return to this in a future thread?

the supposed neutrality of objective scientific inquiry is itself grounded in pre-suppositions ( consistency, parsimony) that amount to ethical valuations Thus, science is as much in the business of determining ‘oughts’ as any other ethical stance. — Joshs

I understand this is a position some have defended. I see science as not based on premises (pre-suppositions) but as a coherent web of knowledge (as per W. V. Quine) from which the specific pre-suppositions you refer to emerge. Again, this is a topic I would like to put off for another thread.

Thanks for pointing out that my explanations need more details to clarify how I am handling is/ought issues.

Assume there is a dispute about when, or even if, following a cultural moral norm will be advocated.

Lacking the empirical knowledge that cultural moral norms are heuristics for parts of cooperation strategies:
• The mysticism of religious and cultural heritage and moral norms’ intuitive imperative oughtness can protect cultural moral norms from rational discussion.

With this empirical knowledge:
• Any perceived imperative oughts are debunked. (Despite our intuitions, the Golden Rule, do not lie, steal, or kill, and other cultural moral norms do not have any innate, mystical, imperative oughtness. They are only heuristics for parts of cooperation strategies.)
• Agreement on if or when moral norms will be advocated becomes an instrumental choice. If people want the material and psychological benefits of cooperation in their society, they should (instrumental ought):

o Advocate following cultural moral norms when they will predictably solve cooperation problems and
o Advocate not following those moral norms when they predictably will create cooperation problems. (Not following the moral norms when, as fallible heuristics, they act opposite to their function.)

The scientific study of cultural moral norms reveals that, as heuristics for cooperation strategies, advocating or not advocating cultural moral norms can be justified as an instrumental ought.

As I said - that's where the contest of ideas comes in. Which is already in place and morality (in the West) is an active part of public discourse and subject to incremental tweaks, mods, and set backs over time. As a secularist, I might argue for preventing suffering as the primary goal. No doubt others have their goals, from pleasing gods to rule utilitarianism. Which to choose? All we can do is argue a case based on our convictions. — Tom Storm

I agree, except our convictions can be naive or informed by the accumulated moral wisdom of the ages from moral philosophy.

What I am proposing (that is newish in the modern age) is the usefulness of understanding cultural moral norms’ underlying principles. Cultural moral norms are a topic almost ignored by traditional moral philosophy as just a chaotic mess. Fortunately, science’s tools can sort through such messes to reveal underlying principles. And I am happy to say that these conclusions about what moral means ‘are’ are complimentary, not contradictory, to traditional moral philosophy’s investigations into moral ‘ends’.

Oliver Curry is a prominent advocate of “Morality as Cooperation” and I have sometimes used his phrase. However, the responses here have emphasized that such nomenclature is misleading because it reads as an ought claim not justified by science.

What I propose as culturally useful is that “cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies”, an ‘is’ claim. My claim is silent regarding the broader scope of ethics.

If I just had a more memorable name for the idea…

You and I are standing on the edge of a cliff. I say that my moral values lead to the concussion that I should throw you off. You say "hold on a moment, let me talk to you about what is." I listen patiently, thank you for the interesting insight into what is, but since you have given me nothing about what I should do, my should from earlier remains and I throw you off. — PhilosophyRunner

The ‘is’ claim about cultural moral norms being cooperation strategies could help me if you were going to throw me off the cliff because one of your cultural moral norms advocated killing me and you are trying to act as a moral person.

By explaining that the moral norm, perhaps something like “People who work on the Sabbath should be killed”, is a marker strategy for increasing cooperation in your ingroup, you might be convinced, as a moral person trying to act coherently, to not cause that harm (if causing harm would contradict other moral norms or values you try to follow).

But what if your moral values lead you to believe that you ought to throw me off the cliff because it would be fun and you have no more important moral values that tell you that you should not do so? There is nothing about what we ought to do in the ‘is’ claim about cultural moral norms, so I expect I should be ready to resist being thrown off the cliff.

For me morality seems to be an open conversation and contest of ideas conducted between groups holding a multiplicity of values and beliefs. — Tom Storm

Right. But ethics is a much broader subject than cultural moral norms which advocate parts of cooperation strategies. What goals ought we have for our cooperation? How ought we live, apart from living cooperatively with other people?

The ”open contest of ideas” is more about these important ultimate goals and values, a subject that moral norms as cooperation strategies is silent on.

If morality is all about cooperation strategies then why do you need to use the term morality at all. Why not just say what are the best cooperation strategies? No problems with that goal. — Andrew4Handel

Cooperation is a rapidly expanding field, a wonderful topic all on its own, and people can certainly talk about it without mentioning moral norms.

But assume you are arguing with someone about cultural moral norms. If you said “We could enjoy more benefits of cooperation in our society if you abandoned this or that cultural moral norm either permanently or in these special cases and rather followed this or that moral norm”, I expect all you would get is a puzzled expression.

Most people would be thinking “Why is he talking about cooperation when the dispute is about following moral norms? My religion or culture provides my moral norms and my intuitions are that they apply to everyone. There is nothing in them about cooperation.”

Using the insights from cooperation studies to solve disputes about moral norms requires an extra bit of empirical information - cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies. This hypothesis can be shown to be correct based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange. That such as simple hypothesis has the ability to explain such a huge, superficially chaotic data set supports its robustness as scientific truth.

That cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies must be presented if we are to use what we have learned from cooperation studies to resolve disputes about cultural moral norms.

I am not a fan of Dawkins’ selfish genes perspective. While perhaps technically correct, it is highly misleading and other technically correct perspectives provide useful insights much more readily.

... as an ultimate goal for moral behavior.
— Mark S
Well, for proximate beings like us, "an ultimate goal" is about as useful for flourishing as tits on a bull. — 180 Proof

When I said "ultimate goal" I was thinking of standard moral goals such as increasing flourishing or reducing suffering.

Thanks for asking! If you did not understand my key point, I expect there are also many others here who did not. I’ll try to clarify "Cultural moral norms are arguably heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for subcomponents of strategies that solve cooperation problems,"

This is not a theoretical approach to understanding morality - what we somehow ought and ought not do. And specifically,

It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. And except regarding cooperation with other people, the observation is silent concerning:

1) How should I live?
2) What is good?
3) What are my obligations? — Mark S

It is an empirical approach to understanding the function of past and present cultural moral norms, a subject of little interest in traditional moral philosophy.

This approach takes moral norms to be cultural norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment, though the violator may not actually be punished.

Its scientific truth claim is based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange plus other relevant criteria for scientific truth. Virtually all past and present cultural moral norms can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies. (Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.)

For example, “Do to others as you would have them do to you” is a heuristic (a usually reliable, but fallible rule of thumb) for initiating the powerful cooperation strategy, indirect reciprocity. But the Golden Rule only initiates indirect reciprocity; it is only a subcomponent of the strategy. Indirect reciprocity typically includes other subcomponents such as punishment of people who do not reciprocate (free-riders) and criteria for who you choose to cooperate with and who you choose to ignore.

So we have:
“Cultural moral norms such as the Golden Rule are arguably heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for subcomponents of strategies such as indirect reciprocity that solve cooperation problems."

This is a scientific claim about what ‘is’. It is a different category of knowledge than claims about what we ought to do.

Does this help at all?

"Cultural moral norms as parts of cooperation strategies" is consistent with cultural moralities being seen as dialects (specific applications) of those strategies.

The dialects can be oppositional though. Contradictions are common. Homosexuality is worthy of death in some cultures and morally irrelevant in others.

Plurality (available variations), particularly in a rapidly changing environment, is beneficial for either biological or cultural reproductive fitness but I expect we would agree that reproductive fitness is not interesting as an ultimate goal for moral behavior.

Thanks for the welcome! I am glad to be here.

My post is a proposal for an approach to establish if a scientific observation about past and present cultural moral norms could have implications for ethics. If that scientific observation is useful for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms, then we have reasons for believing science can have some limited implications for ethics.

As you point out, there are differences of opinion, but I am happy to defend that past and present cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies. Note that this is a claim about what ‘is’ (science’s domain), not what ought to be (moral philosophy’s domain).

For this thread, can’t we take it as a hypothetical that past and present cultural moral track cooperation strategies and then explore the implications?

The implications:

This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:

1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ. — Mark S

Without this knowledge, a few people might think of the Golden Rule and “Do not steal, lie, or kill” as mystical moral absolutes and follow them blindly. Most people would intuitively abandon them in such cases (as cultures typically do) but lack an objective criterion for doing so. I can imagine huge arguments about if and when such norms ought to be abandoned. Knowing that these norms track cooperation strategies seems to me useful for resolving such disputes when these heuristics can be expected to fail at that function.

Key question for you: Why do you think this knowledge would not be useful as I have described?

I want to emphasize the “limited” implications of science for moral philosophy:

What about its limits? This observation’s usefulness in resolving moral disputes is limited by its silence on important ethical questions. It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. And except regarding cooperation with other people, the observation is silent concerning:

1) How should I live?
2) What is good?
3) What are my obligations? — Mark S

I like your other questions and look forward to exploring some interesting possibilities with you. But, for now, can we focus on why you think this knowledge would not be useful as I have described?