That our moral sense and cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is a robust hypothesis that 1) explains virtually all past and present cultural moral norms (suggested counterexamples would be gratefully received) and 2) everything we know about our moral sense. It is a simple explanation of a huge, superficially chaotic data set. It is a good candidate for the normal, provisional kind of scientific truth.

It also is not new. Protagoras proposed it to Socrates in Plato’s dialog of the same name. Socrates rejected it, perhaps because it was too close to what the common people thought about morality at the time and therefore not intellectually challenging. Protagoras proposed it by reciting a Greek myth about why Zeus gave people a moral sense. If you replace Zeus with evolutionary processes, you get a remarkably coherent story of the evolutionary process.

Finally, your criticism that morality as cooperation redefines morality as expedience is a philosophical claim irrelevant to science.

So we observe a few serial killers working together to mass murder people. "Ah, look at that morality in action!" we would say as scientists. But as philosophers we would take a step back and say, "Huh, cooperation as morality in this situation doesn't make sense. — Philosophim

Yes, it is descriptively moral in human societies to solve cooperation problems that prevent the society from achieving its goals, for instance genocide or mass murder. Descriptively moral behaviors have included a lot of things we would consider despicable – no surprise there.

You seem to be thinking about what is universally moral. It is universally moral (as part of morality as cooperation) to solve cooperation problems while not exploiting or harming others. So, no, the mass murders cooperation does not count as universally moral by morality as cooperation.

The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like.

Moral philosophers tend to focus only on what is universally moral. We have missed a lot by not being able to explain what is descriptively moral.

I expected my examples of “Don’t eat pigs” and “Homosexuality is evil” would have made it clear that the science of morality explains both what is descriptively moral and what is universally moral.

If I had proposed "It is universally moral (as part of morality as cooperation) to solve cooperation problems while not exploiting or harming others." in my OP, I would have been moving over into making a philosophical claim which I was trying to avoid.

I get to the conclusion of obligation by the fact that the processes to create life in the first place exists at all. The opposite of life and existence is death and nothingness. Life doens't have to happen. But the mere fact it does leads me to believe that to proactively force the opposite is a violation. — Kaplan

Living is what life does. Living is not an obligation of life because life has no moral obligation to live regardless of needs and preferences.

I don’t understand your explanation of how you go from the fact that:

“…living is the first 'thing' an organism does and is what makes it an organism” to

“Living is an obligation for life. Therefore one ought to live, as being a being implies this by default.”

Even if you explained how you made that leap, who ought to live? The smallpox virus? (Did we do evil when we exterminated it?) Some individual organism, the individual’s species? Just conscious species? All species?

Also, “Obligation” and “ought” imply doing something regardless of needs and preferences. Coherently using these words here would require you to describe the domain of when and why “one ought to live” would be in conflict with your needs and preferences.

"Objective knowledge" cannot be interpreted as a (physical) object whose attributes are thereby equally applicable to all co-existent minds in impartial manners. Hence, I so far can only interpret it as "impartial knowledge" regarding our shared intuition of about the good. — javra

Objective knowledge from science about our moral intuitions is “impartial” and even mind-independent. Obtaining mind-independent knowledge is the standard goal in science.

For example, is guilt triggered by our moral sense good? Guilt is not physical, but science can objectively tell us why it exists. Guilt exists because it is a punishment strategy – internal self-punishment to motivate not repeating immoral behavior.

Science can tell us the function of guilt is to motivate moral behavior in terms of cooperation with others. That is all.

In sum, it so far seems to me that science and philosophy can only happily, satisfactorily, converge on the issue of morality only if both agree on what the meaning of "good" (regardless of the language in which it is expressed) can and does signify, and what it applies to in all its conceivably instantiations. — javra

Remember that:

Science of morality investigators seek answers to questions about what ‘is’, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” and “How can answers to this question help us achieve our goals?” — Mark S

Science does not address the broad question of the meaning of good, so agreement with moral philosophy on “the meaning of good” is impossible. And I have yet to hear that moral philosophers have agreed on the meaning of good.

But science can provide culturally and philosophically useful information about a subset of what is good. “Good behaviors” regarding interactions with others are science’s playground of objective knowledge. Objective knowledge about what is good (even this limited subcategory of good) could be useful in moral philosophy in broader discussions about what is good.

I’ve talked about objective knowledge in the form of Morality as Cooperation Strategies. But the same approach can also be applied to answering the broader question, “Why do our intuitions about what is good exist?”

Objective knowledge about why our shared intuitions about good are what they are could be similarly useful.

As I've repeated already, I believe there is no reciprocity implied by the Golden Rule, and I think that this represents a gross misinterpretation on your part. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you that the Golden Rule advocates behavior independent of conditions or consequences such as the expectation of reciprocity.

However, following the Golden Rule INITIATES indirect reciprocity, regardless of any lack of awareness of that being the case. People acting in accordance with the Golden Rule without consideration of consequences is the main mechanism for initiating indirect reciprocity in societies, the main strategy for maintaining a well-functioning society.

People can and do act consistently with cooperation strategies (act morally) without awareness that their behavior has anything to do with cooperation (with forms of reciprocity).

Being “friendly” to people we have just met is a marker strategy for being a good cooperator.
— Mark S

That's a very unreliable principle. If I meet someone on the street who is unusually friendly toward me, I am very wary that the person is trying to take advantage of me in some way or another, because that is how the con works. — Metaphysician Undercover

I, and virtually everyone, would be similarly wary of unusual friendliness.

Why? Because we suspect it is preparatory to an attempt to exploit us by asking us to do them a higher cost favor.

Why would we suspect that? For two reasons. First, because friendliness initiates low-cost cooperation with the goal of mutual small psychological rewards directly from the friendliness. Second, friendliness is a marker strategy (a fallible heuristic) for being a reliable cooperator for higher-stakes exchangers.

Our innate interest in, and ability to detect, “cons” is necessary for sustainable cooperation in groups. Otherwise, exploiters and free-riders would destroy the benefits of cooperation and therefore any motivation to cooperate. Our interest in, and ability to detect, “cons” is part of a cooperation strategy.

I explained already why the Golden Rule is very clearly not a cooperation strategy. Cooperation requires a common end. The Golden Rule as commonly stated has no implications of any end. You simply misinterpret it to claim that it states that one should treat others in a particular way, with the end, or goal of getting treated that way back. And I already explained why that particular goal, which is inserted by you in your interpretation, is clearly not a part of the Golden Rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Golden Rule advocates initiating indirect reciprocity, the most powerful cooperation strategy known. Indirect reciprocity has no stated goal - it is a cooperation strategy, not a goal generator. The Golden Rule is inarguably part of a cooperation strategy. If you want to understand morality you must understand at least a little about game theory.

The Golden Rule is a heuristic (a usually reliable, but fallible rule of thumb) for how to achieve shared goals by sustainable cooperation. Burdening the Golden Rule with specific goals would be counter-productive. The lack of goals in no way inhibits, but rather augments, the Golden Rule's cultural usefulness and applicability as a moral reference (as part of a cooperation strategy).

I can make no sense of your claim that "the Golden Rule is very clearly not a cooperation strategy."

If morality is about what goals “we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do” (e.g. when there is a conflict between individual and collective goals), and morality cannot tell us “what our goals somehow ought to be” then there is no science of morality.
If your assumptions leave moral goals to be set and chosen by individuals and not by scientific principles, in what sense we are not ending up in a form of moral relativism? — neomac

Thanks for your reply. Let’s see if I can use it to clarify the science of morality concept of morality as a natural phenomenon. So far as I know, this concept of morality does not exist in traditional moral philosophy.

I am happy to answer all of your questions, but getting the grounding right about what Morality as Cooperation Strategies claims will provide a framework within which those answers can make sense.

Summarizing morality as a natural phenomenon:

• The science of morality has answered the question, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” by explaining them as parts of cooperation strategies. Cultural and biological evolution selected for these norms and our moral sense based on the benefits of cooperation they produced.

• This concept of morality (Morality as Cooperation Strategies) is as innate to our universe and cross-species universal as the mathematics that defines the cooperation/exploitation dilemma and the strategies that solve it.

• However, being innate to our universe does not necessarily imply any innate, imperative bindingness - what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences.

• Rather, Morality as Cooperation Strategies’ bindingness comes from individuals and groups choosing to advocate it. Groups that do not find solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma cannot form highly cooperative societies. Applying solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma has made us the incredibly successful social species we are.

• People already unknowingly advocate applications of Morality as Cooperation Strategies when they advocate their cultural moral norms and act on spontaneous moral judgments.

• The science of morality is then culturally useful when it identifies 1) those norms and judgments as heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma and 2) the cross-cultural and cross-species universally moral subset of those heuristics that do not exploit others. People can use this knowledge to resolve disputes about refining their morality to meet their needs and preferences better.

Do the above claims seem coherent, or do you still see internal contradictions?

Being nice to each other” is cooperation.
— Mark S

It seems we have two very distinct ideas of what constitutes cooperation. I know of no other definition of cooperation other than to work together. And so it follows that people can be friendly toward each other without necessarily cooperating. — Metaphysician Undercover

My understanding of cooperation is based in game theory. That game theory explains why the Golden Rule is such a powerful moral norm and why we often take the trouble to be friendly to people we have just met. Being “friendly” to people we have just met is a marker strategy for being a good cooperator. Being a marker strategy makes being friendly part of a cooperation strategy - part of cooperation.

What evidence do you have that your perspective on cooperation that does not include being friendly is useful?

And seriously, do you think that the Golden Rule is either not a cooperation strategy or does not advocate being friendly to other people? I see no justification for your assertion that cooperation does not include friendliness.

Expressions of thoughts of compassion and advocacy for fairness to all intuitively feel moral because 1) they are markers of being a moral person and 2) they can encourage others to act morally.

But perhaps the speaker is a psychopath who is using a low-cost strategy to convince other people to trust him so that he can exploit them. Then, the psychopath’s expression of compassion and advocacy of fairness as a means to exploit others would be immoral.

We can’t always know. The markers of being a moral person may be false, the goal of expressing moral sentiments may be evil.

Whether a man is evil cannot be determined with certainty based only on what he says.

Can we usefully categorize a thought as moral? If thoughts advocating moral behaviors are sincere, I think we can judge them as "moral thoughts". But that judgment of morality depends on intent.

I will argue the contrary, that fairness and equality moral norms are norms for solving cooperation problems.
— Mark S

You don't seem to be grasping the incompatibility between "cooperation" and "competition". We cooperate, help each other, as the means to an end. So cooperation requires an agreeable end, such that people will work together to achieve that goal. Without the agreeable goal, people can be nice to each other, and behave respectfully, but this cannot be called "cooperation", because they are simply being respectful of each other without cooperating (working together). On the other hand, competition between you and I means that we are both striving for the same goal, but the goal can only be achieved by one of us, exclusively. This rules out the possibility of cooperation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Following the Golden Rule includes “being nice to each other”. The Golden Rule advocates initiating indirect reciprocity, it is a powerful cooperation strategy. “Being nice to each other” is cooperation. Will you argue the Golden Rule is not a moral norm, indirect reciprocity is not a cooperation strategy, or that the Golden Rule does not advocate being nice to each other?

Competition can provide net benefits to society. To sustainably obtain those benefits, all advanced countries cooperatively advocate morally limited competition, which is largely beneficial.

Sure, competition without moral rules can result in exploitation and even extinction of subgroups which is the opposite of morality’s function and, therefore, immoral. But we can compete morally by cooperatively agreeing on rules (as part of cultural moralities) that limit that harm to agreed-on kinds and that prohibit other kinds of harm. For example, the agreed-on permissible harm (as part of a moral system) of economic competition might be limited to loss of investment or employment.

Following the Golden Rule, you would treat others fairly because you would like to be treated fairly.
— Mark S

I think you are misrepresenting the golden rule here. When it says "as you would have them do to you", this is spoken as an example of how you should treat others. In no way does the golden rule imply that you expect an equal, or fair return on the goodness which you give. This is the meaning of Christian/Platonic love, to do good without the expectation of reciprocation. Therefore it is a significant misunderstanding, to represent the golden rule as principle of equality in this way, that one only ought to do good in expectation of reciprocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You and I are describing two perspectives on the same phenomenon. Your perspective “to do good without the expectation of reciprocation” is a standard perspective for people in a well-functioning society.

I describe the same phenomena of moral behavior but point out these unselfish behaviors exist because they provide net benefits. When societies fail and the rewards for acting morally in the larger society stop and become losses, I assure you that people will stop acting morally in the larger society because they no longer benefit from those moral acts. (In failed societies, moral behavior does not stop. It is refocused on a smaller group – such as family – where the benefits of that morality are more reliable. See Peter Singer’s The Expanding Circle)

It is an important insight that “Properly understood, morality is not a burden, it is a means of accessing many benefits.” But I take your point that this insight can be confusing for people who hold the standard perspective you describe for people in well-functioning societies.

I'll also quote the earliest known version of the Golden Rule from Ancient Egypt's Wise Peasant:

"Do for one who may do for you, that you may cause him thus to do."

This version explicitly calls out why we should follow the Golden Rule. I am a bit dubious about the translation since the translator made it rhyme, but I expect he got it mostly right. Several sources suggest this implied understanding of morality as cooperation strategies was a common view at the time. We just got confused about morality for a few thousand years.

If the moral will of human beings, to do good, is dependent on having others do good, then everyone would be looking for bad behaviour from someone else, as an excuse to do something bad, and all of humanity would slip into evil at a very rapid rate, as one bad deed would incite many more. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact is that everyone is always “looking for bad behavior from someone else”. But this vigilance (innate to our moral sense) is not primarily “an excuse to do something bad”, but a reason to do something good – punish the moral norm’s violator. Punishment of moral norms violators is necessary to sustain the related cooperation strategy.

One punishment for moral norm violators is a refusal to cooperate with them in the future. In dysfunctional societies, this can lead to refusal to cooperate with (to act morally toward) anyone who is not a member of your most reliable ingroup – usually your family.

Competition is not the opposite of cooperation. The opposite of cooperation is creating cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Cooperation to limit the harm of competition and increase its benefits is what makes our societies work as well as they do. We can cooperate or compete to achieve the same goals. They are not opposites, but alternates. The difference is that people who agree to compete are agreeing to the potential for harm (limited harm if the competition is to be moral).

Neomac, terminology is an ongoing challenge in presenting results from the science of morality. The philosophically relevant terminology in the science of morality literature remains immature and problematic, at least in my view. I am happy to describe why my using more standard philosophical terminology to describe science of morality results is misleading and inappropriate. Suggestions for how to improve my terminology would be gratefully received.

Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.
— Mark S

To me the meaning of "descriptively" must be contrasted to "prescriptively" (or "normatively") not to "universally". If you use "universality" as a condition for identifying rational moral norms then you are no longer descriptive but prescriptive. Alternatively, you can use "universality" to refer to cross-cultural descriptive moral norms and NOT to a condition of rationality. Conflating these two usages would be fallacious. — neomac

Right. The problem my terminology addresses is that the science of morality (like all science) cannot tell us what our goals somehow ought to be or what we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do.

As you quote above, science can tell us as empirical observations that:

• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies. (“Descriptively moral behaviors” have the normal meaning in moral philosophy.)
  
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.” ("Universally moral behaviors” are universal to all cooperation strategies. There is no corresponding concept in moral philosophy that I know of. Also, the term “universally moral” is not commonly used in moral philosophy, so perhaps I can claim it as needed science of morality terminology.)

I can’t say “Prescriptively moral” in the second claim because there is no innate source of normativity in science and, here, I am only describing scientific results with no prescriptive claims based on rational thought or anything else.

Yes, universally moral here refers to what is cross-culturally moral (and even cross-species moral) but has no innate prescriptive power. This is a simple concept in the science of morality but one that does not exist in moral philosophy.

So where does the normativity come from that makes the science of morality results culturally useful?

Their normativity first comes from groups choosing to advocate these principles as moral references for refining their moral norms based on being most likely to enable achieving shared goals due to increased cooperation. Their normativity comes in the form of hypothetical imperatives in Philippa Foot’s terminology and conditional oughts in mine.

The science of morality result’s second source of normativity is from individuals choosing them as moral references in their personal lives, again as hypothetical imperatives most likely to enable them to achieve individual goals.

In this forum, I have not talked much about why I think these principles could be so compelling for adoption first as moral references in a society and then as a moral reference for individuals. That would be a good topic for a future post.

I should be able to better respond to your other points once I hear your response. What do you think?

Thanks for your considered reply.

"Fairness" based rules for competition are derived from equality norms, rather than cooperation norms. And equality norms are fundamentally different from cooperation norms because there is no requirement for the intent to cooperate for there to be a desire for equality. That is to say, that when people compete, and there are rules established to ensure fairness of competition, that is the only required end, fair competition. And fairness is based in equality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I will argue the contrary, that fairness and equality moral norms are norms for solving cooperation problems.

“Do to others as you would have them do to you” and “Do not steal or kill” are all moral norms which are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible, rules of thumb) that initiate indirect reciprocity. (An example of indirect reciprocity is you help someone else in your group with the expectation that someone in the group will help you when you need help, and that the group will punish people who refuse to help others.)

Following the Golden Rule, you would treat others fairly because you would like to be treated fairly.

Following “do not steal”, you would respect others’ equal rights to their property with the expectation that others will respect your right to your property and that society will punish those who violate that right. Following “do not kill”, you would respect others’ equal rights to their lives for the same kind of reasons.

Equality norms are equal rights norms, not norms that would incoherently somehow claim equal capability. Equal rights norms are reciprocity norms that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

The rules we impose on competitions are cooperation norms.

That is, we must cooperate to establish these limiting rules on competition.

So, what is the one feature distinguishing moral competition from moral cooperation?

Consider two groups. Each cooperatively makes and tries to sell widgets to the same outsiders. As part of this competition, one group figures out how to make better widgets cheaper than their competitor’s widget. The group that makes the worse, more expensive widget loses all their investments and are now unemployed. The losing competitor has been harmed.

Has the winning group necessarily acted immorally in causing that harm? No, so long as they acted fairly in the competition and limited the harm they did to the generally agreed on limits to that harm.

In a foot race, that accepted limit to harm might be that one person would have the disappointment of losing and perhaps loss of scholarships and other rewards.

In business, that accepted limit to harm might be loss of investments and unemployment.

Moral competition requires treating competitors fairly (as defined by general agreement in a society) and limiting harm to what is generally agreed to in a society.

The feature that distinguishes moral competition from moral cooperation is that harm is moral if it is within the general agreement limits for harm between competitors in that society.

The following books explain fairness as the keystone of morality:
Justice as Fairness by John Rawls
The Fairness Instinct: The Robin Hood Mentality and Our Biological Nature by L. Sun
THE ORIGINS OF FAIRNESS How Evolution Explains Our Moral Nature by Nicolas Baumard

How do you define "fair" in a competitive sport? Is it a matter of following the rules? How do we know if the rules are "fair"? Consider Mark S 's thread on the science of morality. There, morality is defined by cooperation. But competition is directly opposed to cooperation. So we have a big problem right off the bat. Competitive sport is fundamentally immoral according to the science of morality. How do you propose that we can make "fairness" a principle in any competitive sport, which by its very nature is immoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hope you don’t mind me entering your conversation, but I disagree that anything in the science of morality would necessarily classify competition as immoral.

The function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense is to solve cooperation problems. The rules and ideas about fairness we establish regarding competition are cooperation norms. Competitors who violate those rules are thought to deserve punishment. Violators deserving punishment is the mark of a moral norm. That is, we have moral norms that enable us to cooperate to sustainability obtain the benefits of competition.

Competition is not inherently immoral. What is immoral is violating the rules people established to sustainability obtain the benefits of competition, whether that competition is in sports or in economies.

For example, it would be immoral for one competitor to trip another in a foot race, and (I assume) there are rules against that. Or it would be immoral for one business to steal the intellectual property of another business.

That said, I'd think something like, "evolved in automated biasing of neocortex by the limbic system", might be along the right lines, though it's fairly unwieldy. — wonderer1

The top-down and the bottom-up/game theory perspectives I describe are about our moral sense's outputs (moral judgments and motivating emotion) rather than how our brains work.

Perhaps someday we will figure out how cooperation strategies were encoded into the biology that underlies our moral sense. But I do not expect that to happen soon.

Banno
20.9k
↪Mark S
Morality as Cooperation Strategies explains fast moral thinking, not slow moral thinking.
— Mark S

So you posit ad hoc distinctions in order to circumvent criticisms of your hypothesis. Until now your theory has been about the whole of morality, but of a sudden it is restricted to gut reactions rather than considered decisions...
...
What I have maintained is the obvious point, that anthropological descriptions, in themselves, do not tell us what we ought to do. — Banno

I would happily set fire to each one of your straw man versions of my proposals.

Over and over, I have explained where your straw man versions are in error, but oblivious, you raise them again like zombies from the dead.

One more time (Please God, make it be the last time! I’m an atheist, so this is only an emotional plea for supernatural intervention.) you restate the basis for the naturalistic fallacy. This time as “anthropological descriptions, in themselves, do not tell us what we ought to do”, thereby falsely, and insultingly implying that I am somehow, somewhere relying on that fallacy.

And on who knows what basis, your strawman version of my proposal now includes your wackiest claim yet, that I argue the science of morality can explain slow moral thinking which potentially includes all of moral philosophy!

You present a new low in rational discussions, straw man zombie arguments – fake representations of a position that, regardless of all attempts at correcting the misrepresentations, rise, over and over, like zombies.

You can put “Inventor of the straw man zombie argument” on your tombstone.

I once thought straw man arguments required ill intent. I now see straw man arguments as an unconscious defense mechanism against ideas contrary to existing beliefs. All of us are susceptible to making them. But when someone tells us we have misunderstood their argument, most of us listen.

Your comments have not been entirely counterproductive.

You correctly pointed out that “the questions they (philosophers) are asking are not the questions you are answering”. Quite right.

And I now understand why moral philosophy, like physics as described by Max Planck, will be progressing one funeral at a time.

The good news is that we appear to have a resolution to our disputes. You wish to no longer engage with me and I wish you to never again comment on my posts.

That was easy. I regret we did not figure out this simple solution at my third post rather than my ninth post.

Oh yeah, I’m a super-duper moral relativist. Which doesn’t mean I don’t believe that there isnt some sort of progress in moral behavior. What it means is that I don’t think that moral progress should be thought of in terms of the yardstick of conformity to any universal norms, whether religious, social or biological in origin. “ Women must be submissive to men” and “Homosexuality is evil” are immoral to the same extent as Newtonian physics, Lamarckism biology or Skinnerian psychology are considered inadequate explanations of the empirical phenomena they attempt to organize in comparison with more recent theories. — Joshs

We use scientific methods as a measuring stick for progress in physics. If cultural moral norms are just parts of cooperation strategies, I don't see why we can't use science as a measuring stick for progress in cultural moral norms.

The best measuring stick for moral progress from a philosopher I am aware of is described in Singer, Peter (1981) The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. Princeton University Press. Singer describes moral progress as expanding the circle of moral concern - or expanding the circle of people who are not exploited (in Morality as Cooperation Strategies terminology). Singer's book might be revealing for you. It and Morality as Cooperation Strategies are mutually supportive regarding the definition of moral progress.

The problem with using "strategy" in this context is that it suggests that moralistic fast thinking on the part of humans is part of someone's conscious plan, when it is actually a result of unthinking evolutionary processes. — wonderer1

First, the strategies in fast moral thinking (such as reciprocity strategies and kin altruism) are encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense and in cultural moral norms which shape our moral sense.
Once more, they are encoded by evolutionary processes; evolutionary processes are not cooperation strategies. Don't make the same mistake Sharon Street does.

Offhand, I can't think of a better word than strategies. Suggestions are welcome.

You don’t see the link between your wrapping this narrative in the cloak of science and religious norms of conduct?

Failing to understand why people’s attempts to get along with others fall short of your standards can lead you in one of two directions. You can either experiment with your construction of the puzzling and seemingly ‘immoral’ behavior of a group or individual until you come up with a more effective way to understand why it represented the best moral thinking for therm at the time, or you can blame them for your inability to make sense of their actions , slap a label of immorality on it and try and knock some sense into them. — Joshs

Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

Human morality is composed of strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

Behaviors that exploit others contradict the function of human morality and create cooperation problems.

Concluding that "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are immoral because they exploit others and create cooperation problems and thus contradict the function of morality has nothing to do with my background, the social environment these 'moral' norms were enforced in, or any other extraneous circumstances.

My claim of immorality for "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" is based only on their innate exploitation contradicting the function of morality.

Are you arguing for some kind of moral relativism? Do you hold that "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are norms some societies can morally advocate and enforce or what?

I can make sense of why men would selfishly cooperate to impose moral norms such as "women must be submissive to men". That is easy to understand. But making sense of it in terms of why they did it has nothing to do with its morality.

Whose strategy is it? — wonderer1

I didn't see an answer to my question in there. — wonderer1

You could be more specific. But what I said summarizes all there is.

I guess I have a problem with your use of "strategy".

Whose strategy is it? — wonderer1

Game theory shows that strategies such as direct and indirect reciprocity and kin altruism are as innate to our universe as the game theory mathematics they are based on.

However, long before the discoveries of game theory, people chanced across the parts of reciprocity strategies and kin altruism. These strategies solved the cooperation problems they faced and the benefits of cooperation they produced were the selection forces that encoded them in our moral sense and in our cultures. It was only after the discoveries of game theory that it became obvious that moral norms like the Golden Rule and "Do not lie, steal, or kill" were important moral norms because they advocated initiating reciprocity strategies.

Inasmuch as evolution might be said to have a 'purpose' that purpose is to produce individuals with a high probability of success in passing on their genes. When evolution is occuring in a species which gets a lot of benefit from social cooperation we can expect evolutionary changes that take advantage of that environmental niche of living as a member of a social species. However, it isn't realistic to think cooperation is the 'purpose' of that evolution. A relatively high level of cooperation is just a side effect of evolution in such an environmental niche. — wonderer1

First, none of my claims rely in any way on a supposed 'purpose' of evolution.

The science of morality shows 1) that cultural moral norms and the judgments made by our moral sense are best explained as parts of cooperation strategies and 2) that these strategies solve a cooperation/exploitation dilemma that is innate to our universe. This science is silent about purpose.

Also, remember that evolution is merely the process by which behaviors are encoded in our biology and cultural moral norms. Morality is consistent with what is encoded, cooperation strategies, not with the process that did the encoding - evolution. Evolution encodes immoral behavior just as readily as it encodes moral behavior. Evolution encodes whatever increases reproductive fitness in given circumstances.

Your error of confusing the process that is doing the encoding (evolution) with what is being encoded (cooperation strategies) is a common one, even among otherwise well-informed, careful philosophers such as Sharon Street in her moral debunking papers. Due to this error, she does not actually debunk morality's objective foundations (moral realism).

Morality as Cooperation Strategies explains fast moral thinking, not slow moral thinking.
— Mark S

I think your sense of what is an explanation of what is a bit unrealistic. I think the adaptiveness of fast moral thinking (considered within an evolutionary framework) is more accurate as an explanation for human moral thinking. — wonderer1

Yes, fast moral thinking (our spontaneous moral judgments) is an evolutionary adaptation. What morality as cooperation explains is what is encoded (cooperation strategies) in that evolutionary adaption.

So I am not understanding what you mean by "the adaptiveness of fast moral thinking (considered within an evolutionary framework) is more accurate as an explanation". Morality as Cooperation Strategies describes that adaptation. They are not separate things.

Do you have a different explanation of the content of the fast moral thinking adaptation?

Claiming science is, therefore, useless would be silly.
— Mark S

Of course, I've done no such thing. What I have done is simply point to the is/ought distinction, and warned against taking what humans have done as evidence for what they ought do. — Banno

If anyone cares to read what I actually said, the next part of my comment points out your incoherence in accepting science to be useful, but rejecting the science of morality as necessarily useless. Is this your way of saying that you now agree that that the science of morality’s explanation of morality as cooperation strategies could be culturally useful if the naturalistic fallacy is avoided (which is the case I have presented)? If so, at last progress.

You have not simply “warned against taking what humans have done as evidence for what they ought do”. In my posts, you have repetitively, insultingly, and, most of all, falsely implied my claims violated the naturalistic fallacy and were therefore nonsense.

Pushing the large man off the bridge will reduce trust between people (if you stand next to someone they may kill you)
— Mark S

Or will it increase trust, in that those who comment on the event after the fact will see pushing the large man off the bridge as showing that you can be relied on to make difficult decisions, and as an exemplar of how one ought act?

Perhaps things are not so clear as you suppose.

Foot's Trolley problem was conceived as a way of showing some of the limitations of consequentialism. The trolley was to be contrasted with the case of killing a healthy person in order to harvest their organs to save five terminally ill patients. Same consequence, differing intuitions. (I see Rogue is aware of this).

Cooperation seems of little use here, in line with ↪RogueAI's strategy of asking for explicit and practical examples of the use of a cooperation approach, in order to test it's utility. — Banno

Empirical data shows that most people consider pushing the large man off the bridge immoral. If you think people are immoral, you will not trust them or want to cooperate with them.

But a minority of people (most being people who have taken philosophy courses) say pushing the large man off the bridge is moral. Any chance you have taken a philosophy course? They and you make unusual moral judgments. Why?

Judging that the act is moral is an example of "slow moral thinking" based on mechanical thought processes from a premise, here a utilitarian one.

Judgments that the act is immoral by most people are spontaneous, near-instantaneous, "fast moral thinking" directly from their moral sense - no rational thought is involved.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies explains fast moral thinking, not slow moral thinking.

Does this lead us into a space that there is nothing intrinsically good or bad and that almost anything might be allowable under the right circumstances? — Tom Storm

Hummn… Quite the opposite. Exploitative moral norms create cooperation problems and therefore violate the function of morality – solving the cooperation/exploitation dilemma. There are a lot of good reasons for groups to decide to advocate and enforce cooperation strategies that do not exploit others – that are universally moral. I can’t imagine groups intentionally deciding to advocate and enforce cooperation strategies that exploit others. So “women must be submissive to men” and ‘homosexuality is evil” are ground ruled out.

Moral norms in general are oughts (what we feel we have an imperative obligation to do). But, as I have explained, that feeling of imperative oughts is an illusion encoded in our moral sense by our evolutionary history because it increased cooperation.— Mark S

Do you think this is a controversial statement? I see where you are coming from but many people who do not share your values could find this problematic. — Tom Storm

The science-based reasoning behind it seems solid – see the OP. I have heard no credible argument for how imperative obligations could exist. It appears at least highly likely that sound arguments for imperative obligations cannot be made.

I've found @Banno helpful on many subjects. He certainly reminds me that philosophy is not easy and to be wary of easy answers. He alerted me to virtue ethics when I first arrive here. Philosophy seems to be about continually refining the questions we are asking, which may matter as much as, if not more so, than the putative answers. — Tom Storm

I don’t doubt that Banno can provide this kind of a description of morality – it is all part of a tradition of endless questioning and uncertainty that began with Socrates. Science now offers an objective foundation for morality (morality as limited to cultural moral norms and our moral sense) that is fixed in objective science – and Banno is having trouble grasping that.

Of course, this science-based objective foundation does not answer all our questions about ethics. We can still have endless arguments about the non-objective parts of ethics. For example, science does not supply the wisdom of stoicism about how to live, or the wisdom of consequentialist thought about what is good. Banno could be an excellent resource on ethical wisdom from both virtue ethics and consequentialism.

I have been impressed with modern stoicism's ethical wisdom, which is way beyond anything science can provide. Massimo Pigliucci’s writings and the book How to be a Stoic are illuminating.

I wrote a paper on that once, many years ago, although the case I was looking at was Trolley Car vs abducting a person to harvest their organs and save five people. I think in the trolley car cases, we see that as a rare one-off, so we sacrifice the one, but in the other trolley-car like cases where we get our hands dirty (pushing a person, abducting a person), we can see how society could head down a scary path where it starts to actively look for ways to kill people for "the greater good". — RogueAI

Right, the case of abducting a person to harvest their organs and save five people is supported as moral by virtually no one even though the body count is the same. I see the Morality as Cooperation explanation as complementary and expanding on your explanation in that it explains why we "don't want to get our hands dirty" - those actions would decrease future trust and cooperation, a big concern for our moral sense.

Relevant to these cases, Morality as Cooperation applied as moral means for utilitarian ends - a kind of rule-utilitarianism - eliminates simple utilitarianism's common gotchas of conflicts with our moral sense. As far as answering the question "What is good?" one attractive answer is a kind of rule utilitarianism with Morality as Cooperation defining moral means (morality as cooperation defining the rule) and, in this case, the utilitarian goal being saving the five lives.

There is no reason to expect them to answer all moral questions that we can think of.
— Mark S

It's going to have to say something about Trolley Car. — RogueAI

There is no a priori reason that morality as cooperation must be able to help resolve the dilemmas posed in Tolleyology.

But Morality as Cooperation Strategies can explain some of its curious experimental results.

People commonly judge throwing a switch to sacrifice one person to save five as moral. But they judge it immoral to push a large man off a bridge (sacrificing one person) to block a trolley, saving five people. Why the difference when the body count is the same?

What triggers our moral sense to make different judgments? Pushing the large man off the bridge will reduce trust between people (if you stand next to someone they may kill you) and thereby reduce future cooperation. Throwing the switch does not reduce trust to the same extent.

The most significant moral issues are regarding exploitation, theft, violence, rape and murder. and those things are almost universally condemned. Other issues such as age of sexual consent, acceptance of homosexuality and so on seem to get worked out sensibly in the absence of dogmatic religious interference.

The question then devolves to 'ought we want to live happy lives" and that question just seems silly since happiness is universally preferred over unhappiness. — Janus

:up:

Would travelling back in time (assume it's possible) to kill baby Hitler be the moral thing to do? What about using data the Nazi's collected experimenting on people? What about diverting a runaway trolley car full of children by pushing one child in front of it? What about aborting a baby one minute for non-health reasons? — RogueAI

Remember the limitations of the primary conclusions about cultural moral norms and our moral sense:

• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

There is no reason to expect them to answer all moral questions that we can think of.
For example, they are largely silent on the goals of acting morally (cooperating). They might or might not be able to answer these particular questions.

Does that satisfy you or does it seem to you that it is just repackaging traditional moralism in new garb, as if there is such a thing as “ universal morality” , or that claiming that evolution wires us to be cooperative doesn’t just push back the question posed by social norms into the lap of biology.
For one thing, it passes the buck on the question of why we desire to cooperate with each other. It’s because “Evolution told us to”. — Joshs

It is highly satisfying.

"Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are common parts of traditional moralism. Now I can explain why people thought they were moral but since they contradict morality's function of solving the cooperation/exploitation dilemma, I know they are immoral.

Our genetic evolution prompts us to desire to cooperate and triggers psychological rewards when we cooperate because our predecessors who did not tended to die out.

Ought we cooperate? I will better achieve my goals by cooperating with people who reciprocate that cooperation. Whether you cooperate or not depends on your goals and your interest, or lack thereof, in achieving your goals by moral means.

This is not complicated. If you want complications and endless arguments, join the search for imperative oughts (categorical imperatives in Kant's terms).

I'll respond to your other points later. But your last one is an easy question.

Final question and forgive me if this seems obtuse - how to do you discern between good and bad cooperation? — Tom Storm

My central point has been that moral norms for bad cooperation are bad because they exploit others such as "women must be submissive to men" and "homosexuality is evil". It is bad cooperation because it acts opposite to the function of morality - solving cooperation/exploitation problems. Bad cooperation creates cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Harming children would usually be included under exploitation as bad behavior. For example, harming children to benefit others.

But if harming children is merely a side effect of having no moral regard for children, we can agree that is evil, but the reasons for being evil might better be found in traditional moral philosophy. Science tells us important things about morality but cannot tell us everything about morality.

For the non-philosopher, what do you recommend as a reasonable foundation for morality? — Tom Storm

The most reasonable foundation for morality is what morality is and always has been - the rules we live by to maintain cooperative societies.

Moral rules such as the “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” make more sense once you understand them as parts of cooperation strategies – they all advocate initiating indirect reciprocity.

For example, “Do not lie” as a cultural moral norm is the reciprocity equivalent of “Don’t steal from anyone else and everyone else will commit to not stealing from you and society will punish anyone who does steal from you.”

Also, as parts of cooperation strategies, all of the above moral norms are understood as heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) not moral absolutes. When the Golden Rule fails, such as when “tastes differ”, and following it would cause cooperation problems rather than solve them, you have good moral reasons for not following the Golden Rule. The same is true for “Do not kill”. If following it causes cooperation problems, as when dealing with criminals and in time of war, there is no moral reason it should be followed.

And applying the above moral foundation in your own life comes with a bonus – increased durable happiness, the feeling of satisfaction and optimism in the cooperative company of family and friends. These durable feelings of pleasure in the cooperative company of family and friends exist because our ancestors who experienced them were more motivated to stay and participate in cooperative groups. Understanding why and when we experience these pleasures encourages the moral behaviors that trigger them. This really works to both increase durable happiness and motivation for moral behavior.

It is intellectually and psychologically rewarding to think "How can I cooperate with this person?" and then feel the durable happiness that cooperation triggers. There will be exceptions when attempts at cooperation are rebuffed, but on average, it works well.

The above describes a useful foundation for morality. Compare it to what Banno could supply.

Not a question that can have a back-of-an-envelope answer. — Banno

For non-philosophers, Banno’s muddled answer is not remotely competitive. Some might describe it as dead useless.

↪Banno ↪Mark S I'm confused by this discussion. And Mark I can't seem to understand what you are arguing for - which may be my fault.

Mark does your approach tell us what we ought to do by identifying universal moral behaviors?

What are universal moral behaviors - are they the same as oughts?

What I have said is that:
• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.
— Mark S

These sentences confuse me - admittedly I am not a philosopher.

What does ' are parts of cooperation strategies' mean? Which parts? What constitutes the rest of these parts?

Is a universally moral behavior an ought?

What qualifies as a cooperation strategy?

So sure, cooperation, games theory, and anthropology might well be a useful part of a moral perspective; but they are not the whole.
— Banno

For the non-philosopher, what do you recommend as a reasonable foundation for morality? — Tom Storm

Tom, here I'll answer the questions you addressed to me.

I'll separately answer your excellent question to Banno, "What do you recommend as a reasonable foundation for morality?" and invite you to compare my and Banno's answers and consider which answer you expect to be the most useful in your life.

Answering the questions you asked me:

Descriptively moral behaviors are described as moral in at least one society but perhaps no other. I could also have expressed this as:

“Past and present cultural moral norms (no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange) are virtually all explained as parts of cooperation strategies.”

Parts of cooperation strategies include moral norms and moral intuitions that advocate or motivate 1) initiating cooperation, 2) punishing moral norm violators, 3) markers of membership in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups, 4) detection of free-riders and other exploiters.

Examples of each include 1) versions of the Golden Rule and advocacy of loyalty and self-sacrifice for the group, 2) moral norms about punishments plus righteous indignation to motivate the punishment of others and guilt and shame to punish our own violations, 3) sex and food taboos plus clothing and behavior rules, and 4) “He who will not work will not eat” and moral gossip about who is and is not a reliable person to cooperate with.

Cooperation strategies are developed in game theory as means to overcome the cooperation/exploitation dilemma. The main ones are reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and kin altruism. You might do a google search. There are a lot of them, with some more relevant to morality than others.

Moral norms in general are oughts (what we feel we have an imperative obligation to do). But, as I have explained, that feeling of imperative oughts is an illusion encoded in our moral sense by our evolutionary history because it increased cooperation.

Is what is universal to morality (cooperation strategies that do not exploit others) an ought? That depends on what you mean by "ought". Is it a “magic ought” (Banno's apparently favorite kind) - what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences? No.

However, that does not prevent it from being a culturally useful, culture and even species-independent, moral reference. All it takes to become a moral ought is for a group to decide to advocate and enforce it as a moral ought.

Groups could decide as a preference that they will advocate and enforce it as what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. This preference could be based on it being most likely to achieve group goals. And experience shows that this advocacy and enforcement should work well. This cultural advocacy and enforcement is the main source of the oughtness (bindingness) of moral norms that enable our civilizations to continue to exist.

Ah, so your account, Mark S, does not tell us what we should do?

...and yet "...science can provide useful instrumental (conditional) oughts for achieving shared goals"? Despite nine threads on the same topic, perhaps your account is not as clearly expressed as you think? — Banno

As a matter of logic, science does not tell us what we imperatively ought to do.

Is science then culturally useless? No, of course not. Claiming science is, therefore, useless would be silly.

Your contempt for the relevance of science of morality for resolving moral disputes and understanding the foundations of moral philosophy is equally silly.

The science of morality is culturally useful because it explains that:

1) Cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies.
2) A subset of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others are universal to all strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma – the same dilemma that must be solved by all highly cooperative specie from the beginning of time to the end of time. To enable highly cooperative societies, all intelligent species must create morality made up of strategies that solve that dilemma. .
3) Morality as cooperation strategies is uniquely harmonious with our moral sense, and therefore has self-motivating components, because these cooperation strategies are what created our moral sense.
4) Our moral intuitions are parts of cooperation strategies.


1), 2), and 3) provide an objective basis for resolving many disputes about moral norms and reveals what is universal for all moral systems – systems that solve the cooperation exploitation dilemma. In summary, 1), 2), and 3) provide an objective basis for a universal moral system.

And before you start going off again about imperative oughts, no it is not a system that comes with innate imperative oughts. However, a group could decide that this is the system they will advocate and enforce based on the expectation it will best achieve their shared goals. Is that a good enough moral system for a well-functioning society? Of course! And as a bonus, it fits our moral sense like a key in a well-oiled lock because this key, morality as cooperation strategies, is what shaped this lock, our moral sense.

Why do you think we should throw out what science tells us about morality just because it does not come with magic oughts? Pursuing a source of imperative oughts is, to me, the intellectual equivalent of spending your life searching for magical unicorns who fart rainbows. Others disagree. That's fine. But please don't spread the falsehood that looking for imperative oughts is the only approach to designing and refining moral systems.

Returning to the list of what science explains, 4) explains the foundations of moral philosophy based on “well-considered moral intuitions”. What foundations does moral philosophy have except our moral intuitions and rational thought?

So sure, cooperation, games theory, and anthropology might well be a useful part of a moral perspective; but they are not the whole. — Banno

I have never claimed there was not more to morality than what science can tell us. I have emphasized there was more to morality than science can tell us multiple times. Again, you make false accusations based on your straw man version of what the science of morality provides.

Max Planck once said, “Science advances one funeral at a time”. Perhaps the same is true for moral philosophy. Some people are incapable of changing old ideas when presented with new evidence.

Here are the two problems with the view espoused by Mark S.

1. Regardless of how sophisticated it might be, no description of what we do can imply what we should do. — Banno

I do not claim anything so silly.

2. That an act is cooperative is not sufficient to ensure that it is moral. Folk can cooperate to act immorally. — Banno

This is, of course, true. If you read what I have written, you will know that nothing I have written contradicts this.

The “Two problems” you describe do not exist.

What I have said is that:
• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

If you could find an example of cooperation that does not exploit others being immoral, then you would have an interesting criticism. As is, you have nothing.

As far as I know, Phillipa Foot was unaware of game theory’s explanatory power for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. So it is no surprise that she didn’t talk about the cultural value of conditional moral oughts based in science.

Peter Singer’s wonderful 1981 book The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress is consistent with the above two moral principles. Singer intuitively recognized that moral progress was made by expanding the circle of moral concern (the circle of people who were not to be exploited). Singer’s moral progress through history is the history of moving from merely descriptively moral behaviors (the first principle) that may exploit others to universally moral behaviors that do not exploit others (the second principle).

John Rawls’ justice as fairness explicitly advocates expanding the circle of moral concern to everyone. This is consistent with the second principle since exploitation is unfair.

By revealing the underlying principles of our moral norms and moral sense, the science of morality reveals the underlying foundations of much of moral philosophy.

↪Mark S So, oddly, you are now saying that it is not the case that we ought cooperate?

I'm not too keen on the term, but that looks rather mote-and-bailly. Somehow this tells us
about right and wrong
— Mark S
without telling us what to do? You commence your argument in the bailey of right and wrong, but when challenged retreat to the motte of supposed "objective science". — Banno

Despite your incoherence here, I will respond that I have made no retreat from bailey to motte - check your spelling.

Where I start from and where I end is that science can provide useful instrumental (conditional) oughts for achieving shared goals. One form is:

"If your goal can be obtained by cooperation and you wish to act consistently with those objective moral values that sustainably maintain cooperation, then you ought (instrumental) to act consistently with those objective moral values."

This is culturally useful moral guidance. No imperative oughts are required, which is a good thing. It is a good thing because we have no evidence they can exist.

Why are you so fixated on imperative oughts when our best evidence is that their pursuit is a waste of time? You must know that your intuitions on the subject are an illusion. In contrast, conditional oughts are quite real and culturally useful for refining cultural moral norms that can encourage human flourishing.

Apparently Hilary Putnam also makes this ‘error’. Putnam makes the argument that if the basis of our valuative, ethical judgements is an evolutionary adaptation shared by other animals then it is as though we are computers programmed by a fool ( selection pressure) operating subject to the constraints imposed by a moron (nature). — Joshs

I have not studied Hilary Putnam, but nothing (with one exception) I have written contradicts his quotes here. The science of morality reveals what the underlying principles of past and present cultural moral norms ‘are’. These principles reveal what is objectively universal to cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgments – which non-philosophers would say summarizes their moral values. That looks like agreement to me that at least these values are objective.

However, there is nothing in the Putnam quote about imperative oughts. The objectivity of moral values does not necessarily imply that everyone somehow ought to follow these values regardless of their needs and preferences.

The objectivity of moral values does imply a conditional ought:

If your goal can be obtained by cooperation and you wish to act consistently with those objective moral values that sustainably maintain cooperation, then you ought (instrumental) to act consistently with those objective moral values.

So, I don’t see the quotes as relevant to Banno’s bizarre belief, despite all evidence to the contrary, that I am somehow naively claiming a source of imperative oughts from science.

Just FYI, where I disagree with Putnam is his reported assumption that the source of our ethical judgments is a fool – referring to selection pressure. This is an obsolete, inaccurate perspective that remains the source of much misunderstanding among moral philosophers, particularly when making evolution-based moral debunking arguments.

Selection pressure is part of the mechanism that encoded cooperation strategies in our moral sense and cultural moral norms and is not the source of what was encoded. The ultimate source of what was encoded – cooperation strategies – (and the source of our moral values) is in a cooperation/exploitation dilemma that is innate to our universe. The encoding mechanism for morality is a fool. What was encoded is not.

I would greatly appreciate it if you could justify or give any explanation of your astonishing claim:

what you call the "bottom-up" is an example of the naturalistic fallacy in which it is presumed that what we ought do is just what we have previously done. — Banno

The bottom-up claims of Curry, Haidt and my extension are objective science. Objective science, on its own, cannot commit the naturalistic fallacy. It takes a person to do that.

The only person presuming that science tells us what we imperatively ought to do (the only person committing the naturalistic fallacy) is you. You alone are making this error.

I do not now and never have presumed something so naive. No conclusion I have described relies on the naturalistic fallacy in any way. The cultural usefulness of my claims is only as the basis of instrumental, not imperative oughts.

I have repeatedly emphasized that this science, like the rest of science, can only supply instrumental oughts and is silent on ultimate goals.

Yet, over and over, you can't get it. You somehow interpret my examples of principles underlying cultural moral norms and our moral sense as imperative oughts. Why?

Any suggestions for clearer language I could use? Here is my present language for my conclusions from the integrated bottom-up and top-down perspectives:

• Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies
• Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

Where in these two claims do you see any presumption of the naturalistic fallacy? Is it the use of the phrase “universally moral behaviors”?

The second claim is a factual claim about what is universal in solutions to the cooperation/exploitation dilemma (and in human morality, the behaviors advocated by cultural moral norms and motivated by our moral sense).

Is there another phrase to describe what is universal about “the behaviors advocated by cultural moral norms and motivated by our moral sense” that would be less confusing for you? I really want suggestions.