Comments

  • The science of morality from the bottom-up and the top-down
    ↪Banno
    Interesting that you mention Philippa Foot, a philosopher who perhaps above all others showed us the intractable nature of moral questions. — Banno

    I assume Foot’s discussions of “the intractable nature of moral questions” you refer to were about imperative ought’s (what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences). If so, Foot and I are in strong agreement. I have proposed no imperative oughts. I have argued that imperatives oughts are illusions “foisted on us by our genes” (as Michael Ruse delights in saying).

    It would be a category error to think that scientific facts could alone imply imperative oughts. This is an error I have not made, though I strangely keep being accused of it.

    I expect Foot would find it interesting to understand, for instance, 1) the source of our illusion that imperative oughts are real and 2) the principles underlying cultural moral norms and our moral judgments and intuitions. Such knowledge about cultural moral norms could be directly useful for resolving disputes about which moral norms to advocate and enforce. Such knowledge about our intuitions could be useful for understanding aspects of moral philosophy that rely on our “well considered intuitions” – which I see as most schools of thought in moral philosophy.


    You say you "post here to understand better how to present conclusions from the science of morality to people familiar with moral philosophy but perhaps not with this science". You seem to think you are providing "answers from science", and are puzzled by their reception. Perhaps what you propose is not as novel to those old fuddy duddies as you supposed, and perhaps the questions they are asking are not the questions you are answering. — Banno

    Not new? If identifying the ultimate source of cultural moral norms and our moral sense in a cooperation/exploitation dilemma is not novel, could you give a reference that describes that?

    Or how about just a reference describing the philosophical implications of cultural moral norms and our moral sense advocating and motivating cooperation strategies?

    I do not expect you to be able to do either, but I would be happy to learn I was wrong.

    But yes, I’ve always fully appreciated that “the questions they are asking are not the questions you are answering” (good observation!). That is obvious. That difference also has had unfortunate effects on the relevance of moral philosophy to public life.

    It's not so much that what you have provided is wrong, as that it is so very incomplete. — Banno

    Incomplete? What more is needed for this knowledge from science to be culturally useful for resolving disputes about which moral norms to advocate and enforce? I am sincerely interested in what else is needed. I really want to know.

    But please don’t respond with more nonsense about (as I understand your vague hints) the importance of searching for imaginary imperative oughts.

    My goal is to find objective, mind-independent knowledge that is useful for resolving disputes about which moral norms to advocate and enforce in a culture.

    What is your goal regarding moral philosophy?


    Indeed, in so far as what you offer encourages the development of the virtues, we are in agreement. But it should be of concern to you that what you espouse might be used to explain away acts of collective, perfunctory evil, as easily as it does acts of virtue. — Banno

    There is no justification of “acts of collective, perfunctory evil” in anything I have said. There is only explanation of 1) why people can do such evil and think it moral and 2) the underlying source of immorality in the exploitation of others. I see this as culturally useful knowledge.

    Do you realize that your accusation only makes sense if you are thinking that what morality ‘is’ implies what we imperatively ought to do? That is the error you bizarrely accuse me of.


    Perhaps you might begin to see that there is more going on here than you might previously have supposed. — Banno

    I would be delighted to learn there is more going on relevant to the implications of understanding the underlying principles of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.

    Perhaps you could describe what "is going on here" that you think I am not aware of?
  • The science of morality from the bottom-up and the top-down
    All,

    Some of the comments received prompt me to repeat previously made points.

    As described in the OP, Morality as Cooperation Strategies describes objective claims supported by the modern science of morality that:

    • Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
    • Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

    Do these moral principles define imperative oughts – what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences? Of course not. You will not find a source of magic oughts in science.

    Is this lack of imperative bindingness a fatal flaw? Again, no.

    For example, the science supporting these principles provides an objective understanding of:

    • A part of “natural goodness” (see Philippa Foot’s work on moral goodness as an aspect of what makes us good as human beings and how this knowledge can supply us with useful “hypothetical imperatives” - no imperative oughts required, 180 Proof).
    • Why we share a strong intuition that imperative oughts exist and why that intuition is an illusion encoded in our genes.
    • Moral ‘means’ for accomplishing what we understand to be moral ‘ends’.

    Readers should also understand that Morality as Cooperation Strategies is only about a subcategory of answers to the big ethical questions: “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?”.

    Morality as Cooperation Strategies illuminates (but does not define) my understanding of my preferred answers to these questions: Utilitarianism tempered by Negative Utilitarianism, Modern Stoicism, and obligations based on Rawlsian Justice.

    How I see Morality as Cooperation Strategies integrating with and even illuminating traditional moral philosophy sounds like a good topic for another post.

    All in all, though, your comments to date are much appreciated and have been helpful. I post here to understand better how to present conclusions from the science of morality to people familiar with moral philosophy but perhaps not with this science.
  • The science of morality from the bottom-up and the top-down
    ↪apokrisis
    ↪Mark S You substantiate my point. :up: — apokrisis
    Good to hear. Thanks for commenting.
  • The science of morality from the bottom-up and the top-down
    Do you run your marathon in green shorts or blue? Who could even find a reason to care? — apokrisis
    In individual sports, the color of your shorts is irrelevant. In team sports, the color matters - a lot. The color of people's shorts (or uniform) is a quick way to recognize your teammates and an example of a marker strategy.
  • The science of morality from the bottom-up and the top-down
    ↪Banno
    Why do you imagine that is a problem...
    — Mark S

    Just checking the pretence that science tells us what we ought to do, highlighting a point you yourself made, that "...the science of morality cannot tell us what our goals somehow ought to be".

    There is extensive literature on this other, much more difficult puzzle, unaddressed by your approach.
    3 hours ago     — Banno

    There is extensive literature on the subject of imperative oughts? Perhaps you are trying to make a joke again.

    That seemingly bottomless ocean of literature underlies traditional moral philosophy with no resolution to date, no resolution in sight, and no reason to believe there ever will be any resolution. This is not surprising since our strong intuition that imperative oughts exist is an illusion created by our evolutionary history.

    What reason do you have, beyond your intuition, for believing that these 'magic' imperative oughts exist?
  • The science of morality from the bottom-up and the top-down
    At the core, that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate.
    — Banno

    We ought to cooperate to socially and personally acceptable degrees if we want to live harmoniously in a community.     — Janus
    Right, People commonly desire the benefits of cooperation, are willing to follow moral norms that preserve that cooperation, and can agree on benefits of cooperation to pursue. Understanding morality as cooperation strategies opens a new perspective for refining cultural moral norms to meet human needs better. The illusion of the reality of imperative oughts is an aspect of our evolutionary past. It is not necessary, and is arguably a hindrance, to refining cultural moral norms to increase human flourishing.
  • The science of morality from the bottom-up and the top-down
    ↪Banno
    ↪Mark S Ninth thread on the same topic; same problem as the first thread:
    At the core, that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate.
    — Banno     — Banno

    Why do you imagine that is a problem or, even more bizarrely, that I and others here don't already understand and fully take into account this obvious and elementary fact?

    Are you lost in the illusion that morality can only be understood as what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences? As Michael Ruse seems to delight in pointing out, and as I reference in the post, that illusion is one foisted on us by our genes and encoded in our moral sense because it increased the reproductive fitness benefits of cooperation for our ancestors.

    It is far more culturally useful to understand what morality (referring to cultural moral norms and our moral sense) objectively 'is' as cooperation strategies than to entertain unending speculations about what morality imperatively ought to be.
  • The science of morality from the bottom-up and the top-down
    ↪apokrisis
    Exploitation is speaking to the competitive element of the dynamic, but painting it as something more negative - an issue that needs to be addressed by adding constraints against cheaters. — apokrisis

    Thanks for your comments.

    The science of morality focuses on cultural moral norms and our moral judgments, which, I have argued above, are parts of cooperation strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

    Moral norms about competition arguably fit well into this perspective. Consider people competing in a marathon foot race. If they do not violate the moral norms about fairness (exploitation is essentially unfairness), they can morally compete without exploiting others. Exploitation might be tripping another runner, taking a taxi for part of the run, or poisoning a competitor. So competition is not necessarily exploitative. We can agree as a reciprocity strategy on moral rules for fair competition.

    Competition becomes immoral when it is exploitative. More work is needed to clarify when that is.

    Global warming poses a classic cooperation/exploitation dilemma. It is in everyone’s short-term interest to use the cheapest energy source they have – usually fossil fuels – and advocate for whatever energy source they own, such as fossil fuels. But following that short-term interest will create a disaster for all.

    I am unsure how much good pointing out the fossil fuel company’s moral failings will do. But it is one tool in the toolbox.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪neomac
    Such comment keeps evading my actual points:
    - You didn’t offer any such proof that your empirical theory of morality has greater explanatory/predictive power than other competing empirical theories. You just keep claiming that’s the case, that’s all. At least you could point at the literature where this comparison is provided.     — neomac

    Thanks for your detailed comments.

    I’d like this thread to focus on the value of conditional moral oughts.

    However, how I am using findings from the science of morality to justify Morality (referring to cultural moral norms and our moral sense) as Cooperation Strategies is a good topic. I have composed something I am reasonably happy with: “The science of morality from the bottom-up and the top-down” at https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14402/the-science-of-morality-from-the-bottom-up-and-the-top-down

    Perhaps we can continue this conversation there.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    The lack of interest in moral concepts based on conditional norms of oughtness can be explained by the fact that it represents a relatively simple problem. When the goal is known, it is relatively easy to reach a consensus on how it can be achieved. — Jacques

    I don’t see moral systems chosen based on conditional oughts as necessarily a simple problem.

    1) There is no commonly accepted ultimate goal for advocating and enforcing moral systems

    2) Even if a commonly accepted goal were found, there is no commonly accepted understanding of moral means to accomplish that goal (except within the science of morality)

    3) There is no commonly accepted definition of who is which circle of moral concern – Peter Singer claims our obligation to children we will never meet is morally the same as our obligation to our own children (and people will predictably fail to meet this high moral standard).

    So even if choosing what moral system we ought to advocate and enforce is merely a matter of a conditional ought, there are lots of remaining unknowns here. The science of morality gives us a big leg up on the problem, but lots of interesting philosophical problems remain.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    Meanwhile, I believe I understand what you're getting at. I will do my best to compose a satisfactory answer to it, but it will take a few more days, I'm sorry to say. — Jacques

    No rush.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪Tom Storm

    People aren't much interested in morality as a subject, but they're happy to hold unexamined 'oughts' which can be used to judge others. Morality functions as a series of prejudices and biases. — Tom Storm

    The biology underlying our moral sense supplies the motivation to act just the way you describe. No surprise there concerning average people.

    My surprise and puzzlement is about the continued interest in the illusion of imperative oughts among people who spend their lives studying morality - moral philosophers.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪Jacques
    Are there goals shared by all well-informed, rational people?
    — Mark S

    Even if that were the case (which I do not doubt), it would have no significance for moral duties because, as Hume already stated, one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is."     — Jacques

    My point in the OP is the unfortunately common ambiguity of the term “moral oughts” in philosophical discussions.

    Are these “moral oughts”

    1) what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences (what I understand Hume and Mackie were referring to)? – I’ll call these imperative oughts.

    2) a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people (Gert in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/)?

    Gert’s definition encompasses conditional oughts of the form “If your goal for morality is X, then you ought (conditional) to do Y”. If all well-informed, rational people share some goals for morality, then:

    1) All rational, well-informed people have a universal moral code they can advocate to best achieve those goals.

    2) And we can derive a universal moral code based on conditional oughts and shared goals.

    3) A universal moral code that is objective in the sense of being what all rational, ell-informed people would advocate.

    When the topic is "moral oughts", I do not understand the combination of

    1) the continued philosophical interest in, and too common assumption of, “imperative oughts” that do not seem to exist and

    2) the apparent lack of philosophical interest in universal moralities based on conditional oughts such as Morality as Cooperation Strategies.

    Can anyone explain it?
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    I am keenly interested in why you say:
    The first claim doesn't make sense to me: it sounds as if you are claiming that evidences are based on an empirical theory.... — neomac

    Your interpretation is, strangely, the opposite of what I am arguing.

    My first claim was: “Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.”

    Perhaps we need a review of how science, including the science of morality, proceeds to conclusions:

    1. Assemble an interesting category of phenomena such as “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” - This is the data set to be explained.
    2. Look for hypotheses that explain why this entire data set of phenomena exist – perhaps cooperation strategies, or acting for the good of everyone (utilitarianism), or a means of social control imposed by the powerful, or ?
    3. If one hypothesis is far better than any competing one at explaining this huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set, we have a potential theory.
    4. If the potential theory meets other relevant criteria for scientific truth such as simplicity and integration with the rest of science, then we have a theory explaining that data set. That theory may become generally accepted as provisionally true (the normal kind of truth in science) or rejected, with rejection usually in favor a new theory that better explains the data set.

    Hence:
    “Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.”

    Then you say:

    "confirms my suspects: taking "solving cooperation problems" as a rational condition (à la Gert) to establish what "morality" is, it's a NORMATIVE criterion,

    "it's external to actual historical cultural moral norms, not descriptive of them (against what you seemed to be claiming in past posts). And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms.     — neomac

    Do you see why they don’t make any sense?

    The theory is empirical, not “external” because it is based on its explanatory power for the huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set of “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” (plus meeting other relevant criteria for scientific truth).

    Are you arguing that “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” is external to what morality ‘is’?

    Finally, you say:

    “And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms.”

    I have already done this in this thread and will repeat it here for convenience and emphasis.

    “In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.
    All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal dilemma. This includes people and our ancestors.”

    The above describes why the cooperation problems morality solves are innate to our universe. The solutions relevant to morality are primarily cooperation strategies such as indirect reciprocity.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    And your claim is that a culture and mind-independent understanding of the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will NOT provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes? I can’t make any sense of that.
    — Mark S

    My claim is simply that you didn’t provide evidence, so neither that there are not such evidences nor that there won’t be. Try to have a rational discussion with muslims while claiming that putting a head-scarf is a way for men to exploit women, so this cultural moral norm is wrong because cultural moral norms are there to solve cooperation problems.     — neomac

    Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. It is irrelevant to my arguments that there are people who will reject them for irrational reasons such as "God told them something different".
  • Implications for Morality as Cooperation Strategies of Nazis cooperating to do evil
    The challenge of living a moral life today is aligning one's actions to be cooperative on a local and global scale, or if such cannot be done, to resist cooperating on a local level with a globally uncooperative enterprise. — hypericin
    :up:
  • Implications for Morality as Cooperation Strategies of Nazis cooperating to do evil
    Are you suggesting that cooperative murder would be moral if it enhanced future cooperative efforts, or do you refuse to entertain that hypothetical because you think it logically impossible that murder could enhance future cooperation? If so, why? — Hanover

    Your subject sounds like what we somehow ought to do .

    My subject is 1) what science can tell us about the primary reason that cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist - they advocate and motivate parts of strategies that solve the cooperation/exploit dilemma and 2) how this science can be culturally useful.

    There are no innate moral oughts connected to this science. What we morally ought to do is still up to us. The science of morality only tells us past and present cultural moral norms are about cooperating to solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

    Could murder be a part of a strategy to solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma?

    Killing could be, and has been, part of punishment strategies. Perhaps some definitions of murder would make it impossible for it to be part of a strategy to solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.
  • Implications for Morality as Cooperation Strategies of Nazis cooperating to do evil
    That the hypothesis Morality as Cooperation Strategies is able to explain virtually all the commonalities and differences of such a huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set robustly supports this hypothesis' scientific truth.
    — Mark S

    It doesn't explain my moral values and also my moral skepticism.     — Andrew4Handel

    Morality as Cooperation Strategies explains the primary reason why past and present cultural moral norms exist. There is no claim it explains your moral values. Your moral values are not part of the data set it explains.
  • Implications for Morality as Cooperation Strategies of Nazis cooperating to do evil
    Means and ends must be adjusted to one another so that the latter is not undermined or invalidated by the former while the former is calibrated to enact the latter. A version of reflective equilibrium. — 180 Proof

    You are making an ought claim (about means and ends) of the normal kind in moral philosophy. Perhaps it is either a conditional ought based on a worthy shared goal or perhaps based on a coherence argument? I am not ready to argue it is incorrect. Also, I am a fan of John Rawl’s reflective equilibrium as perhaps the best guidance we have for defining just societies.

    But my Opening Post here and my other threads are about a different category of thing. I keep thinking that category difference is clear, but our discussions continue to show it is not. That is my fault.

    My OP and other threads are essentially about the category of what ‘is’ regarding the origins and function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense (the science of morality), and how that science can be useful.

    What are the implications of this science for moral philosophy?

    I am still explaining 1) what science can tell us about why cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist and 2) how these scientific truth claims can be culturally useful.

    However, explaining how this science can be culturally useful based only on its scientific truth claims has not been successful here. Perhaps it is time to focus on this science’s implications for moral philosophy. Perhaps the implications for moral philosophy and how this science is culturally useful are best explained together.
  • Implications for Morality as Cooperation Strategies of Nazis cooperating to do evil
    ↪noAxioms
    There you go. Like almost every country, they put out false propaganda against a subset of their society. That's probably evil by most codes. I can't think of a country that doesn't do it. Certainly not my own (USA), especially since open-hate of <those that aren't exactly you> was legitimized by the far right.
    Who supports that movement? The 'moral' church crowd of course.     — noAxioms

    I am familiar with moral relativism. It had not occurred to me that the explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for why cultural moral norms differ could be of interest to moral relativists.

    Do you see any hope that moral relativists might be open to the idea of moral universals?
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    Such discussions would be much more likely to be resolved than if the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms remained mysterious.
    — Mark S

    That is more likely expresses your confidence (or hope?), it doesn't constitute evidence that your theory can actually contribute to solve moral clashes.     — neomac


    My claim is that Morality as Cooperation Strategies can contribute to rational discussions about which moral norms to enforce. Specifically, understanding the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes.

    And your claim is that a culture and mind-independent understanding of the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will NOT provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes? I can’t make any sense of that.

    The present chief barrier to resolving moral disputes by rational discussion is the existing murky, mysterious origins and power of cultural moral norms. Morality as Cooperation Strategies removes that barrier.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    The irony is that you keep pointing at an issue of your definition of morality as solving cooperation problems which then you refuse to acknowledge. If cultural moral norms define "who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups" and related "markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups" which are at the origin of moral differences and clashes then cultural moral norms can solve AS MUCH AS can generate cooperation problems ! — neomac

    I don’t see the irony.

    Yes, “1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups" are the two primary sources of moral disputes between cultural groups.

    And yes, understanding 1) the origins of morally favored ingroups and morally disfavored outgroups and 2) the arbitrary origins of marker strategy moral norms can be useful for resolving those disputes.

    For example, 1) understanding that “homosexuality is immoral” is a strategy for creating and exploiting an outgroup and 2) “eating shrimp is an abomination” is a marker of membership in a morally favored ingroup can support rational resolutions of disputes about enforcing such norms. Such discussions would be much more likely to be resolved than if the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms remained mysterious.

    Where is the irony?
  • Implications for Morality as Cooperation Strategies of Nazis cooperating to do evil
    It is not clear what "morality" refers to and it seems that it refers to whatever you want it to quite arbitrarily.

    I don't think that moral language can refer to anything concrete unless it refers to some kind of metaphysical moral domain or transcendent god given or quasi religious laws. That is why it seems that what you attach the term to usually is an arbitrary preference but with no inherent metaphysical moral properties.     — Andrew4Handel

    I like the scientific approach to understanding what morality ‘is’ because it avoids the ambiguity problem about moral language you mention.

    We can use the normal methods of science to understand the data set of known past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense's judgments. That the hypothesis Morality as Cooperation Strategies is able to explain virtually all the commonalities and differences of such a huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set robustly supports this hypothesis' scientific truth.

    Of course, science is still essentially silent about what we imperatively ought to do (ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences). But simply understanding what human morality 'is' can be culturally and philosophically useful.
  • Implications for Morality as Cooperation Strategies of Nazis cooperating to do evil
    ↪noAxioms
    noAxioms — noAxioms
    I am not familiar with moral relationalism (moral relationism?).

    But yes, descriptively moral behaviors (behaviors advocated by cultural moralities) are diverse, contradictory, and strange to outsiders. What is (descriptively) evil is culturally dependent.

    I can agree with your comment “acts to attain that goal are not 'evil' by that standard” if the subject is what is descriptively moral, but not if the subject is what is universally moral and immoral. Here, universally moral refers to being moral in the sense of fulfilling the function of human morality, solving cooperation/exploitation dilemmas, and immoral if creating those cooperation problems within the group.

    So what did the Nazis do that was objectively evil and not simply evil in virtually every other culture’s judgment?

    Nazis lies within the group (German society) about the imaginary threat Jews posed to the ingroup and the moral superiority of that “Aryan” ingroup were evil in an objective sense. Those lies were objectively evil because they created cooperation problems (the opposite of the function of human morality) within the group rather than solving them. (“Human morality” refers to past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgments and does not include lies and coercion that advocate and enforce those cultural moral norms.)

    Your comment pointed out I needed to clarify that it is the creation and enforcement of moral norms within a group that creates an exploited outgroup that is universally evil.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ….the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought.
    — Mark S

    To be moral belongs to the agent in possession of the means for being so. It follows that “what makes it moral” is not quite the correct iteration, when it is much closer to the case that it should be, “what makes me moral?”.     — Mww
    ]
    The word "it" is too vague, though I have often heard the question phrased this way. "What makes the behavior or moral principle moral?" would be more precise. I see "What makes me moral?" is a different question.

    I resist using Kant's vocabulary because it comes with too much baggage. All it takes is mentioning "categorical imperative," and people erroneously leap to the idea that the topic is Kantianism or deontology.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪Tom Storm

    Focusing on the strategies rather than the ends (which have long been unclear). So essentially, in getting the 'how' right, you believe you can ensure a consistent and progressive morality. — Tom Storm
    Right.
  • Ad Populum Indicator of a Moral Intuition
    ↪Tom Storm

    Tom,
    While perhaps interesting to us, we have gone off-topic for schopenhauer1's thread Ad Populum Indicator of a Moral Intuition. Let's belay this conversation here. I'll consider the questions you have asked and create a fresh thread to address them.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪Mww
    There are imperatives. Imperatives are of two kinds, hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative carries the weight of an “ought” and is conditioned by desire, a categorical carries the weight of a “shall” and is conditioned by moral law, desire be what it may.

    There is no Kantian categorically imperative “ought”, and traditional moral philosophy other than deontology treats conditional oughts as hypothetical imperatives, while deontologically grounded moral philosophy merely grants conditional oughts, but assigns no proper moral quality to them.

    Your wording is confusing I think.     — Mww

    This agrees with the Encyclopedia Britannica “a hypothetical imperative, in the ethics of the 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, a rule of conduct that is understood to apply to an individual only if he or she desires a certain end and has chosen (willed) to act on that desire. Hypothetical imperatives are contrasted with “categorical” imperatives, which are rules of conduct that, by their form— “Do (or do not do) Y”—are understood to apply to all individuals, no matter what their desires.”

    I have been thinking of the two concepts as

    Conditional oughts (instrumental oughts) “If you desire x, then you ought to do Y” = (or close to) Kant’s hypothetical imperatives and

    Imperative oughts (what everyone ought to do regardless of needs and preferences) = (or close to) Kant’s categorical imperatives

    I do not want to rely on Kant’s ethics for definitions, but rather to take a broader view of how moral oughts and moral bindingness are commonly used in moral philosophy. For example, the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought.

    If I use the term imperative ought in the future, I will include what it refers to and point out its similarity to Kant’s categorical imperative. Thanks for pointing out the possible source of confusion.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪neomac

    traffic rules can be explained in terms of cooperation strategies, yet they are not commonly understood as moral rules. So something more specific about morality seems to be left out in your functional analysis. — neomac

    Traffic rules are laws; as you suggest, rule of law is an invention to solve cooperation problems. But laws coincide with what is moral only to the extent they are cooperation strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma – how to sustainably obtain the benefits of cooperation without exploitation limiting future benefits.

    I claim that the function of human morality is solving the cooperation/exploitation dilemma. I have not said that all cooperation strategies, such as laws, are necessarily moral.

    If that's true, then how come that societies in the past and present do not have the same cultural moral norms? As I said there are also cultural clashes because societies do not share the same moral cultural norms, so maybe there are limits to the possibility of cooperation which morality must account for. But if cooperation is not possible, then what's left to do with societies with non-shared cultural moral norms? Exploitation? — neomac

    Cultural moral norms are diverse, contradictory, and strange mainly because of 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups.

    Understanding the origins of these differences provides an objective basis for groups to resolve them. Groups may not always be able to resolve their differences (different goals for moral behavior may be intractable), but at least they can focus on the right issues.

    ... so it seems you are suggesting that there are cultural moral norms which might fail to meet the function you are attributing to them. And failing to meet a certain function may also mean that there is no such intrinsic function, the function is an external criterion. — neomac

    Cultural moral norms, such as versions of the Golden Rule, are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible) rules of thumb for parts of cooperation strategies. Their failure to solve cooperation problems in times of war, when dealing with criminals, and when tastes differ is due to them being heuristics, not due to their function being misunderstood.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪Tom Storm
    To me the most interesting aspect of morality is whether anyone can demonstrate objective goals. — Tom Storm

    Moral philosophy has focused largely on goals. Given the lack of progress in convincingly defining an objective goal for moral behavior, we must face the possibility of no such goal existing. I am not concerned about this.

    Choosing as a moral reference the function of human morality - moral 'means' as cooperation strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma - gives us two constraints on moral behavior:

    • Acting morally requires acting consistently with cooperation strategies
    • The goals of morality cannot be achieved by exploitation

    Then people are otherwise free to set whatever goal for moral behavior they can agree on. That looks like a pretty good moral system even if no objective goal of that moral system (aside from the constraint about no exploitation) is ever found.
  • Ad Populum Indicator of a Moral Intuition
    Sorry Mark, I still haven't followed how we locate or arrive at corporation strategies that do not exploit others. Surely there are many potential cooperation strategies that can or do exploit others? — Tom Storm

    Tom,

    Right, too often ingroups have cooperated to exploit outgroups.

    What if I described the function of human morality as solving a cooperation/exploitation dilemma that is innate to our universe? Would this help clarify that exploitation is opposite the function of human morality and therefore objectively immoral if we choose the function of human morality as a moral reference? (Here, “human morality” refers to cultural moral norms and our moral sense and “function” refers to the principle reason human morality exists.)

    As I said above to neomac,

    Adapted from an old essay of mine about why this dilemma is innate to our universe:

    “In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.
    All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal cooperation/exploitation dilemma. This includes our ancestors.”

    Which is the more revealing description of the function of human morality?

    • “Human morality solves cooperation problems” (what I have been typically using) or
    • “Human morality solves the cooperation/exploitation dilemma”
  • Ad Populum Indicator of a Moral Intuition
    But couldn't enslaving 20% of the planet produce 1) the greatest happiness for most amount and minimize total suffering along with maximizing happiness? Such an approach could even be well considered. — Tom Storm


    You point out the biggest flaw in simple Utilitarianism, that it does not prohibit immoral means of achieving that end. Utilitarianism's end, the goal, is moral by well-considered intuitions. Simple Utilitarianism is unfortunately silent on the morality of the 'means' to achieve this goal. Morality as Cooperation Strategies can come to Utilitarianism's rescue by limiting moral means to cooperation strategies that do not exploit others. This eliminates at least most traditional objections to Utilitarianism.

    I'd also argue that Morality as Cooperation Strategies is also moral by well-considered moral intuitions. This would be true if, as I argue, our moral intuitions were shaped by morality as cooperation strategies.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    Cooperation being a stepping stone to a goal (wellbeing or flourishing), not the goal itself.
    — Tom Storm
    :up:     — 180 Proof

    180 Proof and Tom,
    I'd phrase it as "Cooperation being a 'means' to a goal (wellbeing or flourishing), not the goal itself", but that is essentially the same.

    What I am arguing is the mind-independent core of morality is its 'means' - cooperation strategies. The objectively moral goals (end) of moral behavior require other arguments that I am not prepared to make.

    People I respect say there are such arguments for objectively moral goals for moral behavior. My interest is not in arguing against the objectivity of moral goals, but rather to point out the direct utility of understanding what moral 'means' are, independent of what people are cooperating to do.

    Also, when morality as cooperation is teamed with an objective goal, coherence seems to be increased. For example, most of simple Utilitarianism's "problems" vanish if the moral means of accomplishing that goal is limited to cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

    I have not yet worked through the implications of accomplishing Negative-Utilitarianism's goals only by cooperation strategies that do not exploit others, but I expect those means and ends to be complimentary and reinforcing.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail.
    — Mark S

    How do you know that?     — neomac

    Because it is empirically true.

    From a bottom-up perspective, all past and present cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment) can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies.

    From a top-down perspective, we can understand that cooperation problems in our universe must be solved by all beings that form sustainably cooperative societies. Further, game theory shows that for these strategies for intelligent, independent agents to be successful, violators must be punished. Hence, just as predicted, cultural moral norms exist and can be identified as norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment.

    Proposed counterexamples of moral norms that are not parts of cooperation strategies are always welcome.
  • Ad Populum Indicator of a Moral Intuition
    “X is a moral intuition because most people believe X. — schopenhauer1

    Aren’t moral intuitions simply our intuitions about what is moral? Moral intuitions are personal; their existence does not depend on what other people believe. And moral intuitions are as diverse and contradictory as the cultural moral norms that shape them. So no, “X is a moral intuition because most people believe X” is false.

    It seems clear that popularity doesn't make a moral choice right. — Tom Storm

    That is correct of course.

    But how can we judge moral systems (such as philosophical moral systems) other than by their coherence and our moral intuitions about the premises and the conclusions?

    How about “well-considered moral intuitions” as a moral reference for judging moral premises or conclusions?

    Well-considered moral intuitions are coherent with intuitions from all perspectives. Given the diversity and contradictions of cultural moral norms and the diversity of perspectives we can individually take on an action, finding such moral intuitions is not easy.

    Past candidates for such well-considered moral intuitions include the ideas that the most ethical choice is the one that will:

    • produce the greatest good (or happiness) for the greatest number – Utilitarianism or
    • minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or minimize suffering and, secondarily, maximize the total happiness. - Negative-Utilitarianism

    Different people will claim different intuitions are coherent with either their own or everyone’s perspectives.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪neomac

    Thanks for the non-snarky reply.

    Heuristics

    Heuristics are usually reliable, but fallible, rules of thumb for doing something based on practical experience, not theory.

    Cultural moral norms existed before moral theories. Moral norms exist because they have been selected for based on experience, specifically their ability to 1) produce the benefits of cooperation and 2) harmony with our moral sentiments (which, in turn, are heuristics for cooperation strategies encoded in our genes).

    For example, versions of the Golden Rule advocate initiating indirect reciprocity, perhaps the most powerful known cooperation strategy. Versions of the Golden Rule are heuristics for initiating reciprocity. They are not moral absolutes. They are common around the world because they are highly effective at sustainably attaining the benefits of cooperation.

    The ultimate source of cooperation problems

    From an old essay of mine:

    “In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.

    All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal dilemma. This includes people and our ancestors.”

    Human morality is our flawed set of heuristics for solving this cooperation/exploitation dilemma. This cooperation/exploitation problem is independent of culture or biology. The cooperation problems of a particular culture or biology do not change the primary function of their moral systems, just the implementation details.

    The opposite of cooperation is exploitation, not competition. Competition is common between cooperative groups and, for individuals, within cooperative groups.

    A moral norm against cheating in competition is fully in the domain of morality as cooperation strategies. There is nothing inherently immoral in competition.

    Descriptive or Normative?

    Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail. We ought (conditional) not follow the Golden Rule when “tastes differ” and in certain times of war and when dealing with criminals in order to not decrease the benefits of cooperation.

    And we perhaps ought not (conditional) follow marker moral norms such as eating shrimp and masturbation are abominations once we understand their arbitrariness as markers of membership and commitment to ingroups. And understanding “women must be submissive to men” and “homosexuality is immoral” are norms about cooperating to exploit outgroups gives us reasons we ought not (conditional) follow them in order to achieve the goal of moral coherence.

    Look! Still no normative claims. We only have conditional oughts, which, as the OP suggests, appears sufficient for a culture and even mind-independent moral system.

    Enter Bernard Gert’s claim from the SEP: “’Morality’ can be used…normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions (such as being well-informed), would be put forward by all rational people.”

    In hindsight, normativity was a stinking red herring complexity I should have left out of the discussion in this forum.

    I can make my case for the cultural utility of Morality as Cooperation Strategies based purely on conditional oughts – no spooky imperative oughts or even the normative power of agreement among rational people required.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪Tom Storm

    • I'm not sure I endorse this thinking for reasons others have written, but best of luck hashing something out. I wonder if you need to drill down and examine more closely your presuppositions of well informed and rational. Perhaps you haven't appreciated the extent to which this is perspectival?”

    I may take the opposite approach and avoid mentioning Gert’s definition of normativity again. That might be possible and still convey the culturally useful essence of the relevant science.


    • Have you read Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape, I forget if you have or not.

    I have read Sam Harris and was disappointed.

    Here is something I wrote several years ago for an evolutionary perspective online magazine:

    https://thisviewoflife.com/mainstream-science-of-morality-contradicts-sam-harris-central-claim/

    And another response by Scott Atran who works mostly in the evolutionary psychology of religion is also critical.

    https://thisviewoflife.com/here-he-goes-again-sam-harriss-falsehoods/
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪Tom Storm

    ↪Mark S I'd be interested briefly to understand why you are exploring this subject? Are you hoping to change how humans understand morality, or is this an academic exercise, a hobby?

    In other words, what's your end game?     — Tom Storm

    Thanks for the question.

    Understanding morality started as a retirement hobby. I wanted to understand why morality existed.

    Traditional moral philosophy was little help. Then I chanced across explanations of moral behaviors (behaviors advocated by cultural moral norms and motivated by our moral sense) as parts of cooperation strategies. I was surprised at how easy the relevant science is. However, explaining it can be devilishly difficult, as we see here.

    What’s the dream?

    That I can make a small contribution to making moral philosophy more culturally useful based on understanding human morality’s function is solving cooperation problems.

    I don’t expect any big success. In any event, the many and varied ways that something so simple can be misunderstood keeps me entertained. And even if I decide to abandon my efforts, I expect that acceptance in mainstream moral philosophy of the science of morality as cooperation is inevitable. It will provide insights helpful in refining cultural moral norms that will better meet human needs and reduce suffering.

    I post here looking for insights into how to present the science better and talk about its applications and implications.
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪180 Proof

    180Proof, Thanks for assembling salient issues. From my side, it is not always clear which are the most important points to respond to. I appreciate the help.

    I have responded to banno’s points but not yet seen his response. I doubt that means he is now in agreement.

    Responding to the non-banno points in your list:

    • "... how the idea that morality is about solving cooperative problems can actually help in addressing the moral case for supporting or denying support to the Ukrainians against the Russians.— neomac"

    Understanding morality as cooperation cannot magically answer all our moral dilemmas. It may be of limited help in resolving the moral case for supporting or denying support to the Ukrainians against the Russians.

    Morality as cooperation only tells us the function of human morality (to solve cooperation problems). Its applicability is limited since it is 1) largely silent about what the goals of this cooperation ought to be (which will be important in the Ukraine situation) and 2) has no innate imperative bindingness.

    That said, if nations wish to interact with each other morally, there is an objective reference defining that moral interaction as solving cooperation problems. I have often heard the contrary view that interactions between nations can ‘morally’ be based on each nation looking out only for its own interests. That is incorrect.

    Modest but still culturally useful examples of where morality as cooperation is useful include: 1) understanding that the Golden Rule initiates reciprocity strategies, 2) masturbation and eating shrimp being immoral are marker strategies of membership and commitment to an ingroup, and 3) women must be submissive to men is a descriptively moral norm that exploits an outgroup to benefit an ingroup. Understanding this is a fact of the matter sheds new light, enabling people to make more coherent moral decisions and resolve more arguments.

    • Your ideal of well-informed, rational people with shared goals and ideas is nowhere to be found.— Fooloso4

    Well-informed, rational people are a hypothetical idealization that Bernard Gert created as part of his definition of normative. The fact that no such idealized beings exist is irrelevant to the definition.

    Due to our evolutionary origins, we share some needs and preferences that are generated by our genes. To the extent we share genes, we share at least some needs and preferences. Assumed shared needs and preferences are the basis of the ideas that the goals of moral behavior should be increasing "well-being" or flourishing.

    • What is the relationship between morality and cooperative strategies? They are not, as you assume, one and the same. Cooperative strategies to achieve immoral goals are immoral cooperative strategies.

    Cooperation strategies define moral ‘means’. Moral ‘means’ and moral ‘ends’ are different categories of thing. They are not necessarily connected.

    Assume a soldier falls on a grenade to save his fellow soldiers. By morality as cooperation, the soldier has acted morally since he acted to solve a cooperation problem. Why would you think which side he was on in a war would change the morality of that act?

    • Deontology is not "the traditional perspective" but one traditional perspective. There are others.— Fooloso4

    First, I agree. Second, deontology was not mentioned.

    I was talking about imperative oughts being the traditional perspective. By imperative ought I mean “what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences”. It has been my reading of traditional moral philosophy that imperative oughts, not conditional ones, are what are being assumed in most proposed moral systems, not just Kant's categorical imperatives. Is that incorrect?

    If not, how would you describe the kind of oughts commonly assumed in moral philosophy?
  • The value of conditional oughts in defining moral systems
    ↪Fooloso4

    Your ideal of well-informed, rational people with shared goals and ideas is nowhere to be found. The standards that might apply to science and technology do not apply to ethics and politics because there is nothing resembling an objective standpoint. — Fooloso4

    The idea that what is normative is what all rational people would advocate is Bernard Gert’s (see SEP’s morality entry of the last 20 years or so), not mine. I leave it to Gert to defend. I find it a helpful perspective within mainstream moral philosophy.

    My main point has been that there is an objective standpoint about the function of human morality. The evidence is that past and present cultural moral norms and the judgments of our moral sense are all parts of cooperation strategies. If this is true, then how would you argue there is not an objective standpoint about the function of human morality?

    When you answer, remember this function (solving cooperation problems) has no innate, imperative oughtness connected to it. I am happy to agree there is no objective standpoint regarding imperative oughts - the main focus of traditional moral philosophy.

    Regarding your counter-examples:

    Well-informed rational people agree that an embryo is a fertilized egg, but there is no information, no evidence, and no reason that leads to general agreement as to the moral status of an embryo. — Fooloso4

    Right. The moral status of an embryo is a function of the goals of a society (preserve life at all cost?), a subject that morality as cooperation is silent on. Just because human morality has a function does not mean that understanding that function can answer all our moral questions.

    The "cooperative strategy" more often than not has always been and continues to be that those in power make the rules and those who are not "cooperate" by submitting to their power or suffer the consequences. — Fooloso4

    Again, right. You describe an ingroup cooperating (using moral ‘means’) to gain the benefits of exploiting an outgroup (an immoral end). So what?

    Neither of your counterexamples contradicts the function of human morality being to solve cooperation problems. Both are more about the morality of 'ends', a subject the function of human morality is largely silent on.

    I understand why thinking of human morality in terms of its function (the principal reason it exists) rather than in terms of its imperative oughts (the traditional perspective) can be initially confusing.
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