But notice how your reading of Hegel contrasts with my reading of Kant?

With Kant we cannot know anything about God. So we could not make the inference that we are baby-gods or anything of that sort. — Moliere

I'll readily say there's a big tonal gap between them. It should be stressed that all of Hegel's godstuff is (for me anyway) best understood figuratively. Rationalized theology just uses the old pictures to channel feeling and maybe to fool the authorities. I take Hegel to be a flaming humanist. Feuerbach offers a mostly demystified version.

Hegel’s philosophy thus represents, for Feuerbach,

the last magnificent attempt to restore Christianity, which was lost and wrecked, through philosophy … by identifying it with the negation of Christianity. (GPZ 297/34)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach

Another Hegel passage from same section on Romantic Art (lots of great stuff in that section, so this is just a sample):

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/part2-section3.htm#s1
Spiritual reconciliation is only to be apprehended and represented as an activity, a movement of the spirit, as a process in the course of which a struggle and a battle arises, and grief, death, the mournful sense of nullity, the torment of spirit and body enter as an essential feature. For just as God at first cuts himself off from finite reality, so finite man, who begins of himself outside the Kingdom of God, acquires the task of elevating himself to God, detaching himself from the finite, abolishing its nullity, and through this killing of his immediate reality becoming what God in his appearance as man has made objective as true reality. The infinite grief of this sacrifice of subjectivity’s very heart, as well as suffering and death, which were more or less excluded from the representations of classical art or rather appeared there as mere natural suffering, acquire their real necessity only in romantic art.
....

So, I'll add, can you explain what "truly logical thinking" refers to? — Judaka

Normativity is what matters here.

Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. For there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons [i.e. no person bears more authority than any other—GW]. On this freedom rests the very existence of reason, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back. (A738f/B766f, translation modified)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/

My big point is that putting on the scientist's lab coat or the philosopher's toga is embracing a responsibility. Unlike mystics pontificating or thugs throwing dissenters in cells, we work together to synthesize better beliefs in a tradition of criticism and fallibility that does not hold any belief sacred --- except for the 'belief' in this rationality itself.

One of Kant’s revolutionary, revolutionizing ideas is that what distinguishes judgements and intentional actions from the responses of merely natural creatures is that they are things knowers-and-agents are in a distinctive way responsible for. They are exercises of a distinctive kind of authority: the authority to make oneself responsible, to commit oneself. Responsibility, authority, commitment — these are all normative notions. Unlike Cartesian subjectivity, Kantian subjectivity is not distinguished from physical objectivity ontologically, but deontologically. The overarching distinction is not between minds and bodies, but between facts and norms. Discursivity is the capacity autonomously to bind ourselves by norms in the form of concepts, rules that determine what we have committed ourselves to by applying them in judgement and the endorsement of 0practical maxims.
https://sites.pitt.edu/~rbrandom/Texts/Some_Hegelian_Ideas_of_Note_for_Contempo.pdf

There is nothing to explain about a priori synthetic knowledge because there is no a priori -- rather there is the dialectic which the phenomenologist is able to see and explicate through training in philosophy. — Moliere

This can only be taken so far without performative contradiction. In fact, Braver's A Thing of This World largely inspired my contemplation of exactly how far such relativisms could be taken.

The matrix itself must be atemporal. The denial of an aprior knowledge/structure is given as an apriori knowledge/structure. The earnest 'skeptic' is always (tacitly at least) an ontologist describing the unchanging 'Matrix' of our experience. Or so I claim (well, I strongly suspect it....)

if even Logic and its categories are not forever-and-always concepts that become baptized in space and time through the Transcendental Subject -- but instead are time-bound then the categories are also subject to change just as the world and its objects are — Moliere

:up:
Braver features Hegel as just this kind of liquifier of Kant's transcendental subject. He then has Heidegger push it even farther, leaving out any kind of goal for history.

I wouldn't go that far. I think the reason Hegel's philosophy is a mess is because it's hard to say what a misreading of him even is. I've read fascists, anti-colonial communists, and liberals who all claim Hegel as their philosophical base. So clearly there's something inspirational in there for people -- but where you can go with the ideas is a very wide range of possibilities. — Moliere

Hey now. That doesn't sound like disagreement. At least I meant to make clear that the real Hegel's authorial intention is even a fiction perhaps (Derrida, Foucault,...). I think we both grant the massive suggestiveness of his work. Let me share a passage full of organ music.

The true content of romantic art is absolute inwardness, and its corresponding form is spiritual subjectivity with its grasp of its independence and freedom. This inherently infinite and absolutely universal content is the absolute negation of everything particular, the simple unity with itself which has dissipated all external relations, all processes of nature and their periodicity of birth, passing away, and rebirth, all the restrictedness in spiritual existence, and dissolved all particular gods into a pure and infinite self-identity. In this Pantheon all the gods are dethroned, the flame of subjectivity has destroyed them, and instead of plastic polytheism art knows now only one God, one spirit, one absolute independence which, as the absolute knowing and willing of itself, remains in free unity with itself and no longer falls apart into those particular characters and functions whose one and only cohesion was due to the compulsion of a dark necessity.

Yet absolute subjectivity as such would elude art and be accessible to thinking alone if, in order to be actual subjectivity in correspondence with its essence, it did not also proceed into external existence ... the Absolute does not turn out to be the one jealous God who merely cancels nature and finite human existence without shaping himself there in appearance as actual divine subjectivity; on the contrary, the true Absolute reveals itself and thereby gains an aspect in virtue of which it can be apprehended and represented by art.

But the determinate being of God is not the natural and sensuous as such but the sensuous elevated to non-sensuousness, to spiritual subjectivity which instead of losing in its external appearance the certainty of itself as the Absolute, only acquires precisely through its embodiment a present actual certainty of itself. God in his truth is therefore no bare ideal generated by imagination; on the contrary, he puts himself into the very heart of the finitude and external contingency of existence, and yet knows himself there as a divine subject who remains infinite in himself and makes this infinity explicit to himself. — Hegel

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/part2-section3.htm#s1

In my view, he's saying that we are fucking God.Or we are baby potential God waking up and remembering we are God, overcoming our dizzy alienation/projection as emphasized by Feuerbach. Crucially we are flesh, and in that sense more Jesus than God -- but Jesus is a humanist superman, and God is maybe the software riding our bones, our timebinding conceptuality independent of any particular host but never of all of them.

Brandom also interprets Hegel as grasping our escape from (loss of) nonhuman authority and trying to address how such autonomous creatures could generate their own norms which are nevertheless binding. Neurath's boat, I think : reason is a self-challenging self-editing authority.

Let me add that I know such ontological niceties aren't primarily what flesh needs. But I'm reluctant to join the pragmatists in their collapse of truth and science into worldly utility. So think ontology is (or can be) 'scientific' in its intention. Like some of Cantor's work maybe, coherent and beautiful and what's for again ?

And that which only exists dependent on what we think, I shall call a dream, a myth, an idea, or an image. — unenlightened

:up:

Yes. So we have to avoid both typical mistakes --- magical independent object and magical independent subject. The world is not our dream, for we are flesh in the world, or 'subjectivity' could have no sense in our talk. But we only know our world, strangely, through this same flesh.

What do you reject about scientific realism? — Judaka

It's a vague term, so let me specify what I reject.

Metaphysically, realism is committed to the mind-independent existence of the world investigated by the sciences.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

Note that I am still a phenomenological direct realist. The world is real, but I anthropomorphically insist that we pretty much tautologically can only talk meaningfully about the world as it is entangled with the human nervous system.

Has anyone ever seen the world without eyes and a brain ? The world is given, so far as we know, perspectively, through this or that pair of eyes. Consciousness is just the being of the world from a perspective.

Note that this nervous system is part of the world, so it's a bit like the world looking at itself, but that looking can't be removed except within a potentially useful fiction.

That was my first response, self-censored; Dinner realism, I eat therefore I am, and try not to eat the menu.

Am I eating the menu here? — unenlightened

I don't know, but I like the phrase. I think we can at least strongly agree that it ain't all concepts out there. Though we need concepts to say so.

I don't understand how this is so at all. Yes I am asking you to justify your claims, yes I do believe I am being rational, I just don't see how autonomy figures into it. — goremand

Why don't you just take my word for my claims ? Why don't you just believe what I tell you to believe ?


Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. For there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons [i.e. no person bears more authority than any other—GW]. On this freedom rests the very existence of reason, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back. (A738f/B766f, translation modified)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/

Alternately, if we do talk about this "base reality", then it's not the case that we can say nothing about it. — Banno

Once the solid common sense of direct realism is paradoxically violated and we are cast headlong into a world of representation, we end up being forced to admit that more and more of everyday reality, including the scientific image and even time and space itself (!?!), must be 'just representation,' till the represented shrinks to a point without extension, a sign without meaning.

Then, hopefully, we see that representation has vanished with the represented.

By being oracular, or poetic. — unenlightened

:up:

Sure, but I'd say metaphysics has always been oracular and poetic, as discussed in Derrida's White Mythology. As I put Popper putting it, science is a second order oracular tradition that critically synthesizes a better and better Tale.

Therefore there is no problem in the first place of 'ontology'. It's all 'engine idling'. — unenlightened

On some 'existential level,' I probably agree with you. But this is very close to a pragmatism that just identifies with truth with coping.

You say that :

a philosopher is one who has become lost in language, and is trying to argue his way back to reality. — unenlightened

This seems to assume that Reality exists independently of what we think about it, but surely we largely live in a web of our own historically generated conceptuality. I'd say that we actually enrich this web with metacognition (talking about talking about talking) that potentially helps us overcome a sense of alienation --- getting back to Reality in the sense of escaping the fear that Reality is hidden from us.

[deleted]

Don't get me wrong. I appreciate having a sense of humor about these things. But chess is more fun when one is trying to win, so ontology/metaphysics might be silly in a larger context, but let's play if we're going to play, right ?

That's all the intellect can deal with: partial truths. — frank

That being too a partial truth?

Critical discussion is all performative contradiction. Or to put it contrariwise, a philosopher is one who has become lost in language, and is trying to argue his way back to reality. — unenlightened

As much as I enjoy agreeing with you, I can only make sense of this by understanding 'philosopher' as 'failed philosopher.' And with you speaking as 'successful [anti-]philosopher.'

I reckon I'm a semantic structuralist, so to me it's not so much the magic word 'philosopher' as the role of the 'fundamental' truth teller. For instance, a philosopher is one who has become lost in language, and is trying to argue his way back to reality is very much a 'fundamental' claim.

How does it avoid being the same kind of lostness in language it points out ?

I suggest that such avoidance is partially achieved by presenting/grasping it ironically --as a kind of playful speech act that calls the theorist home for supper. The concept of bread is not as good with soup as actual bread. Conceptuality is merely one 'aspect' or 'dimension' of the world.

This is my point: that regardless of intentionality, language or other human exceptionalism, there is no referring to an inherent, fixed property of abstract, independently existing objects, except under Newtonian assumptions that have since been scientifically disproven, over and over. It is more accurate that the past, the future, whatever matters “is substance in its intra-active becoming - not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency... phenomena in their ongoing materialisation.” — Possibility

:up:
I relate to this. People tend to forget the crucial 'contribution' of the 'subject.' This subject is
the 'ontological community' or 'the Conversation,' which is not outside of the reality it articulates but arguably its necessary center.

Ah, I see, so I guess I was right when I thought your OP was talking about something I'd consider common sense — Judaka

I think it is a defense of common sense against the rampant indirect realism found among philosophers.

But I do reject scientific realism ('mind-independent objects'), and that part probably goes against commonsense.

You aren't ruling it out, you're just saying you don't want to talk about it.

Meanwhile you are talking about it. — frank

If I can jump in, to me the big Hegelian insight against postulating a hidden Base Reality is that anything that's meaningful for us is caught up in our inferences --- the game of justifying our claims and explaining our deeds. If the Base Reality is given no inferentially significant relationship whatsoever to other entities, it's also given no meaning. If, on the other hand, it is caught up in such reason-giving, it's on 'this' side of 'appearance.' [ So we get a continuous immanent flat ontology with no disconnected quasi-mystical disconnected points.]

talking about the perceiving of apples. — Judaka

I'd say we all see actual worldly real apples when we see, even if we see them from different angles, and even if I'm colorblind and you are nearsighted. We look at and talk about the same apple that is out there in the world. We aren't trapped in a dreambubble.

Ah, I see. I was trying to explain how some ordinary situations inspired some philosophers to think that we don't see real objects at all but only representations of them.

Basically they went from us seeing the same actual world differently to us each seeing our own private 'internal' world and not seeing the common real world at all.

The latter mostly, why does it matter? — goremand

My point is that norms of autonomous rationality are also just mostly absorbed by members of freeish societies. We learn to take responsibility for our promises. We learn to justify claims and not expect others to simply take our word for it. We learn to think for ourselves and not just believe whatever we're told.

Why? Why can't a non-autonomous being reject unjustified claims? — goremand

I'd say they couldn't do so rationally. Recall what I actually claim.

Autonomy means [ approximately ] self-rule. Rejecting the unjustified claims of others is part of that. Rejecting the justified claims of others is irrationality. — plaque flag

The bolded part is where things get interesting. Despite our attachment to our current beliefs, our attachment to our conceptions of ourselves as rational dictates that we change those beliefs when they are shown inferior to or less justified than others.

Note that you are asking me to justify my claims (which also involves their clarification) as an expression of your autonomy. You are not bound to agree with me unless I make a sufficiently strong case. And you are only committed to agreeing with me, if I do make a strong enough case, to the degree that you identify with the project of determining your beliefs rationally.

I take myself to be explicating the concept of rationality here.

To me it seems that we often literally forget ourselves and our own 'space of reasons' as we do philosophy. The transparency of our own subjectivity, often a great thing in other contexts, is disastrous ontologically.

What is the difference between a parrot who is disposed reliably to respond differentially to the presence of red things by saying "Raawk, that's red," and a human reporter who makes the same noise under the same circumstances? Or between a thermometer that responds to the temperature's dropping below 70 degrees by reporting that fact by moving the needle on its output dial and a human reporter who makes a suitable noise under the same conditions?

By hypothesis both reliably respond to the same stimuli, but we want to say that humans do, and the parrots and thermometers do not, respond by applying the concepts red or 70 degrees. The parrot and the thermometer do not grasp those concepts, and so do not understand what they are 'saying'. That is why we ought not to consider their responses as expressing beliefs: the belief condition on knowledge implicitly contains an understanding condition. The Sellarsian idea with which McDowell begins is that this difference ought to be understood in terms of the space of reasons. The difference that makes a difference in these cases is that for the human reporters, the claims "That's red," or "It's 70 degrees out," occupy positions in the space of reasons---the genuine reporters can tell what follows from them and what would be evidence for them.

This practical know-how --- being able to tell what they would be reasons for and what would be reasons for them--- is as much a part of their understanding of 'red' and '70 degrees' as are their reliable differential responsive dispositions. And it is this inferential articulation of those responses, the role they play in reasoning, that makes those responsive dispositions dispositions to apply concepts. If this idea is right, then nothing that can't move in the space of reasons --- nothing that can't distinguish some claims or beliefs as justifying or being reasons for others --- can even count as a concept user or believer, never mind a knower: it would be in another line of work altogether. — Brandom

https://sites.pitt.edu/~rbrandom/Texts/Knowledge%20and%20the%20Social%20Articulation%20of%20the%20Space%20of%20Reasons.pdf

A flat ontology is largely a response to the recognition of the huge role that inferential relationships play in meaning. Granted our autonomy-fired mission to articulate the conceptual aspect of reality critically, which includes justifying our claims by showing them as conclusions of sound arguments, the inferential role of concepts can hardly be some secondary afterthought.

And we have the aesthetic values of parsimony, elegance, and simplicity which can serve as a judgment of a home. — Moliere

:up:
This touches on the marriage of art and science or the art that's already in science.

I think I've lost track of what we're talking about, I'm just responding to comments at this point, sorry. I don't have a clear picture of what I'm currently arguing against or what I'm arguing for. — Judaka

I respect the honesty, and I'm sorry that I wasn't more careful with my words. If you feel like it, what do you make of the OP ? I think we moved from that quickly of right away. But I'd like to hear your opinion on it.

What still attracts me to the Kantian limit on reason is Hegel's philosophy, which I think is a mess -- it's an interesting mess! But a mess. — Moliere

Hegel is a beast. I think I've always had to settle for misreadings of him that make him more coherent by throwing some of him away. At the moment, I suggest interpreting him as intensifying Kant's project. We can interpret him as a direct realist who grasped the meaninglessness of talk about entities which are completely disconnected from other entities and the necessary centrality of the storytelling detective in the detective story and all this implies. 'Absolute knowledge' is (from this POV) just a collapse of indirect realism at a certain level of inquiry's self-explication. The key theme is us realizing what we are already doing. What we have and live in is 'just' our autonomous-rational-critical sensemaking in this world together. The 'other side' of this sensemaking (postulated untouchable-always-filtered Reality. ---with an Official (?) conceptual articulation) is a token within that adventurous self-unfolding sensemaking --- eventually seen as a kind of phlogiston. But this doesn't close off a return to 'alienated' mysticism and other flights from autonomy.

I did not understand your answer to this question: could you elaborate? I am not asking about language nor concepts (in the sense of our faculty of reason taking in our perceptions as input and derive ideas/concepts of them in our native language)—I am talking about representations (i.e., our faculty of understanding producing a filtered representation of the world). — Bob Ross

I'm trying to say that normative linguistic rationality and the inferential relationships between entities are, for us, the 'deepest' level. Whether or not the representational framework is meaningful and appropriate depends on logical and semantic norms that transcend any particular ontologist on the 'stage' of the public ontological inquiry.

What does it mean for a person to be rational ? What does it mean to feel the responsibility to justify claims ? And the duty to change a set of beliefs when they are not coherent? Our rational inquiry is not outside of Being peeping in.

The necessary being for ontology is a community of ontologists articulating reality together. This implies a shared world and a shared language.

What do you mean by ‘public stage’? Rational conversation is of our representations. What else would it be? — Bob Ross

Rational conversation is, I insist, about the worldly object, the public object. Occasionally we might talk about your 'take' on Hegel instead of Hegel. But both are worldly objects accessed differently.

No we are not gremlins in a pineal gland. No I do not sit behind my eyes. I am a collective organism that represents the world to itself via sensibility, receptivity, and the understanding. — Bob Ross

I agree: an organism. But... as a scientist / ontologist, you are not just goo or even just self-modelling goo. You are at this table with me talking about reality, living into and toward an ideal of rationality. Dramaturgical ontology. The biological details that make this possible are secondary to the dramaturgical possibility of establishing such details rationally.

Pain, as the qualitative sensation, is not in the world like, for mathematically realists, the square root of two is; so I don’t understand how it is ‘flat’ in that sense. — Bob Ross

The main idea in my flat ontology is that the 'fundamental' aspect of entities is their inferential relationships to one another. That they exist otherwise in very different ways is something like a distraction. It's fine that nickels and protons and octonions exist and are accessed very differently. They are all connected by the role they play in our giving and asking for reasons for claims about them. We rational ontologists are not outside looking in. Our normative discourse establishes the conceptual structure of the only reality we can talk about sensibly.

as this demonstrates that ‘he’ is representing the world, and that is in the form of his conscious experience; for giving him morphine has inhibited his sensory receptors and cognitive functions and thusly he has lost his ability to represent pain (i.e., and lost his ability to have the sense of touch in general). How would you explain it if his body is not responsible for representing unpleasurable and unwanted damage to his body in the form of pain? — Bob Ross

I embrace the existence of pain. The meaning of pain is (roughly) its inferential relationships with other entities, like morphine and the spinal cord and spiritual training perhaps. Both 'mental' and 'physical' entities exist on the same inferential plane. All entities are interdependent. The pain is not and cannot be part of some absolutely disconnected 'interior.' The concept could have no meaning, no use.

Your pain exists in my world, even if I access it differently than you. Otherwise we could never talk about it. Pain plays a role in inferences like umbrellas and sardines.

The pain need not be understood as a representation of something else, even if we do indeed articulate a causal relationship of the pain or its absence with rusty nails and doses of morphine.

So, under your view, the brain is not representing anything? ‘Seeing’ and ‘smelling’, by my lights, are senses: are you saying we have senses without perceptions (i.e., formulations of those sensations)? — Bob Ross

I'm tempted to say we should talk as simply as possible to get at my point. I see this lamp on my desk. I perceive it. It's right there in front of me. I put my hand on it, and the metal is cool to the touch.

All the background biological stuff that enables this is not being denied. But the discursive subject only makes senes as a worldly 'public' entity. We now are on a 'stage' together or at a table enacting the norms of a scientific inquiry. Anything talk that calls that into question is necessarily unjustifiable.

Could you be more specific about how denying my autonomy results in self-contradiction? — goremand

Autonomy means [ approximately ] self-rule. Rejecting the unjustified claims of others is part of that. Rejecting the justified claims of others is irrationality. Note that such a framework can remain fairly blurry. The details can be debated endlessly.

Well as far as I can remember I never such a contract, but in your view I did so implicitly when I joined the rational community? — goremand

Did you the sign the 'member of the English speaking community' contract ? Or did you absorb its semantic norms mostly without trying ?

To be rational is just to act in accordance with the norms of reason, which have nothing to do with being "autonomous" or any other strange fantasy. — goremand

Hush now, child. Let me tell you how things are.

Nicolai Hartmann, contests this fundamental dyad of object and subject, saying it is a hypostatization of the relational nature of consciousness (i.e. an unfounded metaphysical assumption) and that there is an avenue to pure being through some kind of pre-reflective 'natural attitude.' — Pantagruel

Sounds interesting. I found this paraphrase:

According to his new ontology, epistemology depends on ontology, not the opposite.
Thus, the “being” of objects is a necessary prerequisite for thought or knowledge about them. The knowledge that people have of reality is itself a part of reality, as an event among other events.

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nicolai-Hartmann

One way to get at this is to consider that no epistemology can be installed without appeals to the nature of the subject. We might talk of the entanglement of epistemology and ontology, because the ontologist has to make a case for claims, and the form of such a case will presumably imply or manifest an epistemology.

The thing that makes science science are the activities of a community of self-identified members who are recognised as such by other members of the community who share a particular set of approaches, values and standards, that shifts as their perspectives change. Primary values of this community are a belief in the provisional nature of our knowledge and, as Whitehead puts it, 'a vehement and passionate interest in the relationship of general principles to irreducible and stubborn facts'. These values also currently include quantification, objectivity and replicability, but these are only included as they are seen as furthering this relationship between principles and facts. — Richard Goldstein

:up:

The reason why P is true isn't because I "assert it", it's true because the necessary prerequisites to be true have been met, whatever they may be. — Judaka

Of course. That's so obvious that I'm surprised you'd misunderstand me like that. The point I was making is that calling P true is different than calling P useful.

it's about a correct reference, and the intention is in that. — Judaka

I agree that the world is intended. There's all kinds of philosophy written about the relationship of true statements (linguistic and/or conceptual) and the world. I think Husserl's idea of a fulfilling intuition is pretty good on this matter. I can claim there are plums in the icebox from the back yard. That's an 'empty' intention. But I can go look in the icebox and have my intention fulfilled by seeing the plums. 'Categorial intuition' might be a necessary posit here, but I'm OK with that as a phenomenological direct realist.

The very idea of rationality is a useful fiction, and the idea of logic is a useful fiction. — Judaka

I think I've made a case already that that's just confused unjustifiable irrationalism. How could you begin to make a case for the unreality or impossibility of making a case ? Are we back to utility being truth ? Because I'll grant that philosophy is foolish in worldly terms.

In fact I believe we ought explore multiple rationalities, because we don't know what the future holds and so we do not know what thoughts will help us most as things change. — Moliere

To me that's already in the framework. What we are doing right now is in that framework. It's cooperatively adversarial and the reverse, as if the community was somehow shrewd enough to run a different 'logic' in every individual on its existential-discursive stage.