Yes. I'd say that one can be a cognitivist without thinking that ethics is a cognitive science. I don't think ethics is a science. — Moliere

Okay, interesting.

Not with those words, no -- to be fair to you I'm trying to make a position mostly to understand the idea, so I'm changing my position as I go along; I'm engaged in a creative endeavor. I don't have some firmly worked out idea here, though through the game we have managed to touch upon some possible interesting avenues of conversation. — Moliere

Okay.

at least in the sense of using "wants to be". In the scenario where he acts on anger "X wants to be alpha", or perhaps something more personal like the person insulted his wife: "X wants to be defender"

Where he backs down "X wants to be friend" -- he's promised, and friends keep promises.

Where he's guilty "X wants to be accepted" — Moliere

Okay, in my last I set out different senses of such desires. Are you saying they are a sort of retrospective motive for an action that has already occurred?

Why not? — Moliere

It's just how reality works. If your mother gives birth to you, then you don't give birth to your mother.

Gravitation works that way. The earth pulls on the apple, and the apple pulls on the earth -- it's just the earth is bigger so it's a more noticeable pull, but they simultaneously cause each other to meet. — Moliere

Yes, but the motion is caused by the body, not by the motion of the body. There is no circular causality here, no more than if, sitting across from each other foot to foot, we grasp hands and pull each other up.

I'm appealing to his anger. It's the right kind of anger. The words we make up after the fact notice the distinction between the right kind and the wrong kind, but the words aren't the appeal. — Moliere

An appeal to the right kind of anger is not an appeal to anger itself. Else, if you think there is an emotion called good-anger and a different emotion called bad-anger, and these are two different things with no essential relation to one another, then you would still need to say what you mean by good-anger, and I say this description will always appeal to a rational justification for the appropriateness of good-anger.

But this might be back to philosophy of emotions. — Moliere

If you are interested, one of Aquinas' central writings on the passions occurs in questions 22-48 of the Prima Secundae.

Edit: Some old threads on emotion:

• Are emotions rational or irrational?
• How voluntary are emotions?
• Difference between thoughts and emotions?
• Does the West educate about emotions?
• How May the Nature and Experience of Emotions Be Considered Philosophically?

's thread is perhaps par for the course in that it conceives of emotions as separate from the self. I'm starting to wonder if this is just how modern people think.

I'm claiming that MS is consistent, at least, and making a steel-man attempt at making it plausible to its detractors. My pet theory is error theory just to put my cards out there, but I'm trying to think through the position and see if there's some way to render it coherent, and palatable to those on the other side as an example of the meta-ethic. — Moliere

Okay.

Capital-F Feelings are the truth-makers in this hypothetical meta-ethic. The sorts of examples I've given here are "X wants to be Y" -- the emotions arise because of the Feelings, to think of "emotions" as you do here: — Moliere

Have you given examples? I searched for "wants to be" on the first five pages on the thread and didn't find any occurrences.

I'd claim that when Jesus expels the money-changers from the temple that he is enacting a rationality because his anger is justified. — Moliere

But you aren't appealing to his anger, you are appealing to the justification of his anger, like I said <here>. This is not appeal to emotion; it is appeal to something which justifies an emotion.

"Calculus" is confusing on my part -- I just meant in the generic sense where logical symbol manipulation or the operations of a computer are also calculus -- so it need not even be numeric, and can even be a philosophical calculus rather than something truly mathematical. Spinoza's Ethics comes to mind here. — Moliere

Okay, but when I say "emotions don't do calculus" I am also saying that emotions don't do "logical symbol manipulation," or, "the operations of a computer," or, "philosophical calculus." Emotions don't do calculus in any of these senses.

Isn't the MS doing that?

Though I wouldn't do it for the MS position, I don't think ethics is a cognitive science either. Another reason a meta-ethics thread might be interesting. — Moliere

So you agree with me that your theory of emotion-subjectivism is not a (cognitive) science?

Couldn't it be both? Even for Plato -- if one is ruled by Passion then one would choose a Passionate ethic, just as the one who is ruled by Reason chooses the rational ethic, yes? — Moliere

Either the choice leads to the ethic or attachment to the ethic leads to the choice. It can't be both, because two things cannot simultaneously cause each other.

For Plato the one ruled by passion does not choose; passion is his master, and one enslaved to passion does not engage in rational choice (i.e. they do not engage in choice in obeying their master, only in carrying out his bidding). Contrariwise, the one who chooses is not "ruled by reason;" he is rational. Passion and reason are not for Plato parallel realities vis-a-vis enslavement or "rule." This is in line with common sense, for we do not say, "Don't get carried away by your reason!"

"I'm sorry, I won't do it again" or something like that works. The emotion would be guilt. The Feeling would be "I want to be accepted by my friends". — Moliere

I would say that neither of the quoted phrases are emotions or feelings. The first is a kind of promise and the second is the expression of a desire. But let's look at the latter quote:

(under the rendition that ought-statements are nothing more than this reduction to an is-statement of attachment, and an imperative, which is what my next chunk is on) — Moliere

I don't quite know what you meant by this, because I think a self-provided imperative is sufficient for an 'ought', and I don't think "an is-statement of attachment" is sufficient for an 'ought'.

Suppose you need to start drinking alcohol to be accepted by your friends. In that case you might say, "I want to be accepted by my friends, therefore I will drink alcohol" (non-hypothetical ought-judgment). Or you might say, "If I want to be accepted by my friends, then I should drink alcohol" (hypothetical ought-judgment). More realistically, you might say, "My friends will only accept me if I drink alcohol, so perhaps I should start drinking alcohol." The problem here is that your "Feeling" is equivocal, and the various senses over which it sprawls are the very senses that the debate is about.

More generally, "I want to be accepted by my friends" either represents/justifies a bona fide choice or else it does not. Someone might have started drinking alcohol years ago, and when asked why they did so, they might say, retrospectively, "I suppose I wanted to be accepted by my friends." In this case their desire explains their behavior, and Aristotle would call their subsequent drinking volitional but not deliberate (i.e. not chosen). On the other hand, someone might have made a deliberate decision to start drinking in order to be accepted by their friends. The three cases I offered just above relate to this possibility. But when you want to talk about the 'Feeling' of "I want to be accepted by my friends," there are a large variety of things that you could be talking about.

Do you see how this isn't a divorce of reason from emotion? — Moliere

Yes, more or less, but I believe the initial reason you posited emotion-subjectivism is because you did not want to bear the burden of justification that rational approaches require. So if we talk about "emotion" then we don't need to rationally justify our emotion, but if that same emotion can be a truth-maker for moral propositions then we can have our cake and eat it, too. We can avoid the pesky problems of rational justification while simultaneously possessing good reasons for our truth-claims. By reintroducing reason you reintroduce the onus of justification.

To be frank, I think moral subjectivism is goofy. I don't think professional philosophers hold it. It is no coincidence that there is no SEP or IEP article on it. I won't name names, but there are a handful of people on this forum who try to hold it. Bob Ross gave it up: good for him. Janus is distancing himself from it: good for him. I don't think charity requires us to prop up a theory without legs, lol.

Feelings are attachments to people, things, ideals, propositions, states of mind, patterns, and, in some cases, morals. And I've also allowed that "Feelings" may be collective, in some sense, to accommodate things like legal and collective -- not just individual -- moral rules. It seems to me that this must be the motivation for the MS position because they want to retain that some moral propositions are true in the way that it's intuitively felt, but don't believe there is an objective science or something along those lines. — Moliere

I think moral subjectivists do not see any way that moral propositions can be true or false, but they find this result unintuitive and so they engage in hand-waving and end up abusing language in the process. For example, the moral subjectivist wishes to have a notion of "truth" that is unverifiable and is not averse to contradiction. Of course such a thing is not truth at all. To say that everyone has subjective states which adequately ground truth-claims, even when these truth-claims all contradict one another, is not to be speaking about truth in any legitimate sense.

And another reason for a thread on the philosophy of emotion. — Moliere

I think it would be a more interesting topic. :up:

To lay my cards on the table, I don't really want to argue over a thesis that you don't hold, especially when that thesis has no authorities to legitimate it. It doesn't seem to me that it will be fruitful. I would rather talk about a thesis that you actually hold, such as error theory or a theory of emotion or a theory of moral 'oughts', etc. It would be different if the thesis had philosophical authorities behind it, but I don't see that moral subjectivism does. Of course, your attempt to salvage moral subjectivism has been admirable in certain ways, but I don't think it is ultimately salvageable, and given that you don't actually hold to the theory, you must not think that the arguments you are giving are that good. :wink: Plus if I let you go on there is the dangerous possibility that you actually talk yourself into this thing. :joke:

I am basically arguing:

P1: Ss relate to Ps in manner R.
P2: All Bs are Ss.
C: Bs relate to Ps in manner R. — Bob Ross

Right, and the OP itself is clear that beliefs are one kind of stance (P2). My point to @Moliere earlier was that cognitive feelings of the sort he has in mind would seem to just be another kind of stance:

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A feeling is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a feeling about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

P3: Feelings make moral propositions true or false.
P4: C1 and P3 being true are logically contradictory.
C2: Therefore, moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent. — Leontiskos

You can just as easily turn all of truth into another pseudo problem, something that is merely defined by a game that "works"—something that both defies and needs no metaphysical explanation. But when we reach a point where Goodness, Truth, our words, and now even our own conciousness itself have all been "eliminated" or "deflated," so as to avoid pseudo problems, things start to look a lot like Protagoras (or at least Plato's caricature of him). If it's games and feelings of usefulness all the way down, no one can ever be wrong about anything — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, good.

Reason is fundamentally the capacity to be aware of or to know whatever there is to be aware of or to be known, and to order actions, traits of character, emotions accordingly. Reason’s range is only limited by the range of knowables. If one confines the knowable to the scientific or the mathematical, one is left with a pretty narrow idea of reason.[10] Paradoxically it is those who most object to reason in this sense who also do most to preserve it, for they are operating precisely with this notion of reason when they reject it as too narrow to capture or to base the fullness of the human being. So they say, for instance, that beauty, goodness, dignity, and so on are not part of reason because they are not knowable—they are objects of feeling or imagination or intuition or something of the sort. Thus they reinforce the relegation of reason to the hard ‘objective’ reason of modern natural science. But this cannot be the notion of reason that Boethius is using, for this narrowing of reason is a phenomenon of post-medieval philosophy. The ‘reason’ of the classical tradition is as much involved with the beautiful, the good, the lovely, and things loved (for reason in some sense loves its objects, at least to the extent they are lovable), as it is with the mathematical or ‘factual’; indeed perhaps even more so.11 It is reason that brings about the fullness of the human being because it opens up persons to the fullness of what is; without it emotions and feelings and intuitions would be blind or empty.

[10] Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is a locus classicus here. Of course he did not think that the objects of science and mathematics were the most important or the only things. But he did, in the Tractatus, think they were the only things, besides logic, one could reason and talk about. On the other hand the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle and the A. J. Ayer of Language, Truth and Logic thought not only this but also that science, mathematics and logic were the only things simply. They lacked Wittgenstein’s mysticism. — Peter L. P. Simpson, The Definition of Person: Boethius Revisited, p. 6

---

I almost posted about this the other day, but decided I didn't care enough. This charity metasemantics they've cooked up, I mean, it's the sort of crap mainstream (analytic) philosophy has been getting up to for a long time. It's depressing. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I agree. Good post.

But it's toward the end there that I disagree. Yes ratiocination rests on something that isn't that, but I wouldn't call what it rests on intellection, which seems to suggest something like the grasping of self-evident truth, or something. — Srap Tasmaner

Not self-evident, but immediate. If knowledge (scientia) is truly possible via logical syllogism, then the “atomic” simples that logic presupposes must be known immediately (non-discursively). I am posting some quotes from Peter Simpson because I accidentally stumbled upon a paper where he discusses Wittgenstein’s use of Frege’s logic as leading Wittgenstein to “treat formal logic as a mirror of the world” (“Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on Self and Object”). So I looked through his works for related topics, and this paper comes close to our topic:

Turning to the question of the nature of mind first, it becomes clear in the De Anima that mind is able to abstract because it is active as well as passive. What is latent in particular things is brought to life, so to speak, and imprinted on the mind by the mind itself. Aristotle resorts to an analogy with light to explain this. As colors are not seen unless light first falls on them and makes them visible, so the universal natures are not seen in the particulars unless the light of the mind falls on them and makes them knowable. Now it is worth noting that one of the results which may be said to emerge from the debate about innate knowledge between Descartes and Locke, is that one cannot get out of sensible experience by itself all that is grasped by thought; some input beyond mere sensation is required. Aristotle would agree with this, but not with Descartes that that input takes the form of actual knowledge, nor with Kant that it takes the form of a priori concepts, nor indeed with Wittgenstein and others that it takes the form of the social and linguistic context; rather it takes the form of a different faculty or power that is endowed with its own distinct principle of activity (what medieval writers used to call its own “intelligible light”), which does not work by adding to the content of sensible experience (as the other solutions do), but by enabling more of what is already there to be taken out. — Peter L. P. Simpson, The Nature and Origin of Ideas: The Controversy over Innate Ideas Reconsidered, pp. 22-3

See also Simpson’s, “The Rejection of Skepticism,” and “Waking Realism,” and Stromberg’s, "An Essay on Experimentum," This is all somewhat related to 's point about Plato’s divided line.

Simpson’s primary interest is moral and political philosophy, but he sees the same thing there that you point to in analytic philosophy. For example, he notes that Rawls’ thinking is axiomatic, and ends in a blind appeal to current cultural intuitions. It is not pure stipulation in that it appeals to cultural intuitions, but it explicitly abstains from attempting to rationally justify those intuitions. The “input” for democratic thinking is consensus.

Instead, as you know, I'm with Hume... — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, and I am very much against Hume.

So yes, I'm inclined to agree that there is a sort of fatal flaw in much modern philosophy -- the pointless and unrealistic model building like we see here -- and that it can diagnosed as a failure to understand what the foundation of reasoning really is, but I see that foundation quite differently. — Srap Tasmaner

It seems like we are both reticent to get into a long conversation, but are you saying that everything should be simplified in favor of a simpler, probabilistic theory? What seems to be in question is that “input” that Simpson speaks of. I want to say that logic works quite well, and yet seems to be left hanging ten feet from the ground. The difficulty is anchoring it, filling in those last ten feet. I don’t find “probability” to be a great anchor, but I’m not sure how far we want to get into this.

The joke was quite intentional. — Banno

Okay, but the joke sidestepped the question. Are there advances in logic? Do these advances include advances in quantification? Once we begin to understand the history of logic we understand that advances in quantification are some of the most important kind. Your claims seem to commit you to the odd opinion that modern formal logic and its theory of quantification are eternal and unchanging. I think I spoke about idolatry earlier. :wink:

This is not an example of quantifier variance. It is a disagreement as to the domain. — Banno

I think you are failing to recognize just how stipulative/tautological your approach to this question is. You have defined away quantificational disputes, but does your definition have any real basis?

The existential quantifier plays out as a disjunct of the domain. List all the items in the domain, and if any one of them is an apple, then the existential quantifier will be true. — Banno

There is a close relation between quantification and the domain. So close, in fact, that to merely stipulate that every dispute about quantification is really only a dispute about the domain is a petitio principii. One person will say, “X is not in the domain and therefore cannot be quantified over,” and another person will say, “X cannot be quantified over and therefore is not in the domain.” An alternative understanding of quantification will result in a different domain, but a different domain need not necessarily result in an alternative understanding of quantification. I gave two examples: the unicorn and the Jeep (). The point is that there are two different kinds of differences of domain: merely quantitative differences and qualitative differences. A (merely) quantitative difference of domain results in an artificial difference of quantifier-qua-extension. For example, if one attempts to quantify over all mammals but omits unicorns because they were not known to exist (or vice versa) then a quantitative difference of domain results in a merely artificial difference of quantifier-qua-extension. But if one attempts to quantify over all things but omits universals because they are a nominalist (cf. QVD 295) then a qualitative difference of domain results in a substantial difference of quantifier-qua-extension. What we are concerned with are qualitative differences of domain, not merely quantitative differences of domain, and these qualitative differences of domain are what imply qualitative quantificational differences.

The nominalist and the “universalist” think about the contents of reality in a fundamentally different way, and because of this they quantify reality in a fundamentally different way. It is inaccurate to merely chalk this up to domain, as if radically different domains do not entail radically different quantifiers. In order to ignore this one would need to hold that quantification over a name or thing is the same as quantification over a universal, and this is untenable. As soon as we move beyond an empiricist domain and introduce different modes of being we also move beyond quantifier univocity. To ignore this is to beg the question in favor of empiricism, and obviously this will not do since the debates that the OP envisions can obviously take place between empiricists and non-empiricists. When we are thinking in this deeper sense of domain, quantifier and domain go hand in hand. We could artificially define one to encompass the other, but in reality they are two subtly different things that shift together.

Beyond that, I think that you are defining quantifiers in accord with your predilection for stipulation, and in turn with ontological pluralism. If domain were stipulative and arbitrary then quantification would be univocal, as you say (and this unique understanding of logic brings with it its own unique understanding of quantification). Yet if Sider is right that domain is not stipulative and an ontological structure holds, then a correct ontology will co-implicate a correct understanding of quantification and logic, and an incorrect ontology will co-implicate an incorrect understanding of quantification and logic. As history attests, there are different kinds of quantification and different kinds of logic.

Simpson has a nice paper that ends up looking at the way Wittgenstein’s logical inheritance from Frege leads him to to conclude that:

The self is pure medium, pure mirror for the world; their limits coincide. The self is, in a sense, one with the world. It gives way to it. Solipsism collapses into realism. — Peter L. P. Simpson, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on Self and Object, p. 10

Earlier:

The decisive role that modern formal logic is playing in Wittgenstein’s thought here can be illustrated also by reference to his account of names and objects. This itself follows from modern logic’s theory of quantification (invented by Frege), and Russell’s theory of descriptions. . . — Peter L. P. Simpson, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on Self and Object, p. 7

The nice thing about someone like Simpson is that he studied more than a few decades of the history of philosophy. Simpson’s point means that not only is modern logic’s theory of quantification substantial, involving its own presuppositions, but that theory of quantification is precisely what led Wittgenstein to some of his errors, such as his exclusion of dynamism from ontology. This absence of dynamism is a good example of a qualitative difference of domain that goes hand in hand with a specific theory of quantification. In Wittgenstein’s case it was his theory of quantification that led to his ontological error. :kiss:

The reason you see modern quantification as invisible, unimpeachable, and inescapable is because it is the water you swim in as someone embedded in the modern paradigm. Yet the more one contextualizes that paradigm, the more visible and contentful Fregian quantification becomes. In a hundred years it will be even more cleanly delineated in its historical context.

Maybe it helps to try to imagine a whole new vocabulary that we could use to describe said structure. Some areas get called “Gorp”, others “Vulp”, others “Cheeb”. These areas are, let’s say, definable in terms of their structural relations to each other – terms that would include “fundamentality” and “necessitation” – and are discoverable, and people can be right or wrong about which is which. So we lay out our map. Now the question is, “Which of those areas match with the terms ‛exist’, ‛real’, and ‛object’?” (There might be many more key structural elements; choosing three is just for purposes of example.) This is where the seemingly endless debate begins. But I think we need to get clear that a debate about terms is not a debate about structure, and it doesn’t follow that doubting privileged terms is the same as doubting privileged structure. — J

If we are thinking about the intractable "metametaphysical" disputes that you seem to have in mind, then suppose someone calls an area a Gorp and another disagrees and calls it a Vulp. If second-order equivocation is occurring (a terminological or conceptual difference) then there may be only an artificial disagreement, not a substantial disagreement. But if second-order equivocation is not occurring then there would seem to be a substantial disagreement. When one person says, "This is a Gorp," and another says, "No, it is a Vulp," they are disagreeing on what exists in that area. If we are to exclude ontological pluralism, then the dispute is over what actually exists.

What isn’t privileged is the terms associated with that structure -- not even seemingly rock-bottom terms like "exist". — J

Concepts are important, not terms, and I would say that the concept of existence is "privileged." If one person says, "A Gorp exists in this area," and another person says, "No, a Gorp does not exist in that area," then in order for the disagreement to be substantial the concept of existence must be common between the two speakers. Furthermore, in order for ontological structure to exist, there must be a true and normative understanding of existence. To say that no one concept of existence is any truer than any other is to fall into pluralism, and to close oneself off from the possibility of a true ontological structure.

What follows is something I wrote after thinking about your claim about the mereological composite alongside the other things I know about your background.

---

I am wondering if you are laboring under the now common assumption that reason is nothing more than discursive reason. In writing my thread on the breadth of the moral sphere I was attempting to rectify a common and radical moral error that lies at the root of so much moral confusion. If I were to do the same thing in attempting to rectify a common and radical error about the nature of the human intellect, I would write a thread about the idea that not all truth is known discursively. In fact when I first came to TPF I chipped at this problem here and there.*

To take an example, consider the proposition that 2+2=4. If someone does not understand this proposition or disagrees with it it is fairly easy to explain it, precisely because there is a discursive process by which we come to know this truth. We can break it down into (1+1)+(1+1)=4, and if more is required we can show that 1+1=2, 2+1=3, and 3+1=4. All of these steps are discursively accessible. But the simplest steps are not discursive, such as understanding the nature of unity (“1”), or understanding the nature of succession or combination. If someone does not understand these things then the base, 1+1=2, will not be accessible; and if these simple, atomic pieces of knowledge are not known (what Aristotle calls first principles) then there is no base for the discursive knowledge to build on, and 2+2=4 will be inaccessible.

Someone who thinks that all truth is known discursively will believe that discursive-syllogistic explanation is always possible, and that where such explanation fails knowledge does not exist. So they will think that if discursive-syllogistic adjudication fails in the case of claims about the existence of mereological composites, then knowledge of such a thing is not possible (i.e. it is not truth-apt). Or that if the basis of arithmetic, such as the existence of unity and succession, is not amenable to discursive-syllogistic demonstration, then arithmetic truths such as 2+2=4 will not be knowable (prescinding for the moment from the ontology of number).

More succinctly, the modern reduction of the intellect to ratiocination or discursive reason is reflected by the idea, “If you cannot explain how you know something, then you cannot know it.” I believe this is largely a result of the democratization and pragmatization of reason, where questions of consensus and therefore adjudication become supreme. But it is also a result of the Baconian manipulation of nature and the ascendency of science and logic (note that discursive-syllogistic reason is just logic). Habermas' understanding of reason as pragmatic also seems to be at play. The obvious problem with this, as Aristotle notes, is that logical demonstration is not self-supporting. Logical demonstration presupposes simple or primitive truths in order to get off the ground.* What this means is that someone who says they know something that cannot be explained is not necessarily a charlatan when that “something” is a first principle or a simple truth.** To claim otherwise would be to cut off the branch on which knowledge and logic rest.

So when you say that the dispute about the mereological composite must come down to conceptual or terminological equivocation, it is possible that you are drawing this false dilemma because you think that explanation must reign all the way down, like turtles. This is inextricably bound up with reducing human reason to discursive reason or logic, even though your motivation comes from what I would call the democratic turn. As I have learned in trying to explain this in the past, it is often very difficult for someone subsumed in modernity to grasp the fact that ratiocination presupposes intellection (that discursive reason presupposes non-discursive acts of the intellect). Even once it is grasped, working out the implications is a gradual process.

(One way to see this is to observe the way that modern logicians wish to make stipulation and axiom the king of the hill. Doing such a thing is like donning a blindfold to avoid looking at the glaring problem of how ratiocination (logic) could ever function or have any traction on the real world in the absence of intellection.)

* Some of my posts related to the topic: one, two, three.

** Strictly speaking it is not the truth which is simple but the means by which it is known (intellection). Truths are always simple, even though English philosophy is more quantitatively concerned with sound propositions than mere truths.

I'm sure you're not saying that there is a plain fact of the matter as to whether mereological items or universals exist, but I admit that I'm not sure just what you are saying. — J

I am saying that to claim that a dispute over [mereological composites] must be either conceptual or terminological is to ignore the possibility that it might be substantial, a dispute of "fact" or truth. It is to ignore the possibility that one person might be right and the other might be wrong about what they are intending to claim. This is another instance of the sort of relativism that Nagel generally opposes in The Last Word, for the legitimacy of the two philosophers' first-order arguments are precisely what is being dismissed when one thinks it could only be a conceptual or terminological dispute. Conceptual-or-terminological is a second-order reduction.

(And for the record, this isn't about skepticism concerning everyday objects. It's about how to divvy up metaphysical structure.) — J

If one person is right about how to divvy up metaphysical structure and the other person is wrong, then the dispute is not merely conceptual or terminological. In that case pluralism is false and Sider is correct that there is a true ontological structure. I would guess that Sider is not saying that every dispute must be substantial, but that he is saying that it is false to claim, "There is no ontological structure and therefore all of these ontological disputes are merely matters of communication breakdown."

The latter being these type 1 propositions. If ethical reasoning concerns and pertains to type 1 propositions then ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning. — Fooloso4

Nah, and it's hard to believe that you are even trying to interpret me correctly. The post is <here>. I was obviously using the example of 2+2=4 because Bob Ross had already been using it, not because I think ethics is the same as mathematics. The rather obvious point of that post is that ethical claims are about ethical truths, not beliefs (or beliefs about ethical truths). To read that post and assume that I think ethics is like mathematics is bizarre, and lazy.

Your premise that the activity of ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning is an opinion, a belief. — Fooloso4

'Never said it was. :roll:

There's a lot here, and in your recent previous posts. — J

Yeah, sorry about that. If I do end up getting away I wanted to leave some wood on the fire.

I would have thought "first-order equivocation" would be "the classic sense of two people talking past each other because they use [the same] words differently," but maybe that's not what you mean. — J

Right, I am calling that second-order equivocation. As I said above, equivocation in the standard (first-order) sense has to do with a single frame or speaker using a term in two different senses. Ergo:

In logic, equivocation ("calling two different things by the same name") is an informal fallacy resulting from the use of a particular word/expression in multiple senses within an argument.

[...]

Since only man [human] is rational.
And no woman is a man [male].
Therefore, no woman is rational. — Wikipedia | Equivocation

Or:

<Banks contain money; the river has banks; therefore the river contains money> — Leontiskos

Is there any "second-order equivocation" going on in the example I originally gave from Sider? — J

What Sider calls "talking past each other" is a form of second-order equivocation. Sider's example is the opposite, where instead of two people having one word with two senses, they have two words with one sense ("number"="fish"). In this case the two will think they are saying different things when they are really saying the same thing. In the case of second-order equivocation they will think they are saying the same thing when they are really saying two different things.

If I say “mereological composites exist” and you say “there is no such thing as a mereological composite”, which kind of dispute is going on? Are we disagreeing about concepts, while using the same words? Or are we holding the concept of “existence” steady, while (someone is) making a mistake in terminology? — J

The prima facie answer is that it is neither, and that a factual disagreement is taking place. At the root are disagreements of fact, such as disagreements over the maximal domain or disagreements over ontological structure. To simply assume that disagreements of fact are impossible is to have begged the question in favor of pluralism or Sider's, “in essence, quantifier variance.”

The first part of my response can be found here:

But we don't have the calculus of attachment just yet. — Moliere

How do you know? — Moliere

The point here is that whatever it is that establishes the hierarchy, it isn't emotion. Emotion does not do calculus. I am convinced that reason establishes the hierarchy, but I am content with the claim that whatever it is, it isn't emotion. This reduced claim seems sufficient to overcome emotion-subjectivism.

If the truth of all moral language just is the day-to-day operations of living, though, then I think emotions are exactly how hierarchies are established. Fear, guilt, and shame are powerful motivators in moral codes, and they are reinforced by social hierarchies established by emotional attachments. — Moliere

I think this misses the point I have already made about emotion-as-sign vs. emotion-as-cause. To claim that ethics is just emotion-conditioning would be to reject ethics as a cognitive science. "I act this way because my emotions determine me, and my emotions are determined by the conditioning that my parents and society imposed, and their emotions were determined by the conditioning that was imposed upon them, ad infinitum." This is more a theory of emotional determinism than a theory of ethics, and as such it destroys the agency of the human being (as already noted). Ethics involves making choices, not just being pulled around by emotions.

a person who is surrounded by people who shame them can feel guilt for that particular thing and want to change, or they can feel anger and define themselves against that group, and perhaps they can feel both at the same time in roughly similar proportion (and this is where the sense of free will comes from). Each leads to a kind of articulatable ethic that justifies the choice, so it really would depend upon whether or not the person is attached to this or that ethic if they speak the truth — Moliere

There is causal confusion at play, here. Does the choice lead to the ethic, or does attachment to the ethic lead to the choice? I think the cognitive aspect of ethics is again being trampled, especially if the attachment leads to the choice. Plato would say that reason (choice, deliberation) can be subordinated to the passions, but that this is a form of passion-tyranny.

In our example the man wouldn't say "One ought not lose their temper" -- that's goofy as hell for someone to say when they are contrite or angry or whatever genuine expression towards an ethic, and a real person's utterance would express this proposition differently. "One ought not lose their temper" is the proposition which the utterance can be reduced to, for the purposes of making the MS position philosophically palatable... — Moliere

But what is the "utterance" which can be reduced to, "One ought not lose their temper"? On your theory of emotion-subjectivism an emotion is supposedly translated into moral propositions of this sort, but I'm still waiting for you to cash out this claim that the emotion is the truth-maker for the moral proposition. Prima facie, the claim doesn't make any sense. What is the emotion that translates into the moral proposition, "One ought not lose their temper"?

The redemption story is one of recognition, shame, anger, and relief. The cognitive part is all the philosophy, but the reason people seek redemption isn't because of the cognitive part. — Moliere

You worried that I am divorcing reason from emotion, but here it seems that you are the one doing that. You contrast four things with philosophy/the cognitive part and assume that they are devoid of reason: recognition, shame, anger, and relief. I don't think emotions are separable from reason in this way. See for example my analysis of fear <here>.

Looking at the wiki definition ---

Ethical subjectivism (also known as moral subjectivism and moral non-objectivism)[1] is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

(1) Ethical sentences express propositions.
(2) Some such propositions are true.
(3) The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.[2][3]



3's the proposition under dispute for you, I believe. — Moliere

Yep. :up:

So for any true ethical proposition the MS would try to demonstrate that its truth is dependent upon the attitudes of people, and the same with any false ethical proposition. — Moliere

Yes, or that given the attitude we are to infer the truth of the proposition.

I think the plausible part of the meta-ethic is that statements of ethics have practical, relational components when they are being followed so there is a sense, if all ethical statements are social creeds and nothing else, then the truth of them, if ethical statements are cognitive, would have to depend upon the attitudes of people because what else is there? — Moliere

I think a shift is occurring here. Instead of trying to support moral propositions in the way that standard ethics does, the moral subjectivist turns to abductive ethical reasoning and combines it with the assumption that whatever best supports moral propositions, sufficiently supports moral propositions. I think the reason moral subjectivism is basically non-existent in professional philosophy is because it is recognized that even if nothing supports moral propositions better than attitudes, it remains the case that attitudes are insufficient to support moral propositions. In that case one turns away from moral cognitivism and classical ethics. (Cf. @Janus)

(Out for a few days)

I am seeing a bad argument against QV being made in the thread: <Quantifiers are not subject to second-order equivocation; therefore QV fails>. The problem is that this is valid but unsound, as the main premise is false.

All language is subject to second-order equivocation, including logical language. The meaning of one person’s concept is never univocally the same as the meaning of another person’s concept. There is no magical reason why this does not apply to quantifiers, and there is no magical reason why some disputes should not be reducible to quantifier equivocation. This is the first point.

Now one might object that even though all linguistic terms are subject to second-order equivocation, they still want to see how in particular quantifiers run into this problem. I think the example that Hale and Wright give is one way to see it (Banno’s fiat rejection notwithstanding). More simply, someone might contend that second-order equivocation occurs with the term ‘apple.’ An apple univocalist might take two different people and ask what they mean by the term. Both answer, “A red fruit.” He then shows each person a picture of a paradigmatic red apple, and both identify it as an apple. Has he defeated the thesis? The proponent of the thesis would probably say that he has only defeated a trivialization or strawman of the thesis. The proponent would probably take edge cases to demonstrate that second-order equivocation is occurring in more subtle ways.

Maybe the proponent would take each person, sit them in the same room, and ask them to evaluate the sentence < Ǝx(R(x) ^ A(x)) > (“There exists an x such that x is in the room and x is an apple”). In the corner of the room is a painting by Cézanne, and within the painting is depicted a paradigmatic red apple. One person says that the sentence is true and the second person says that it is false. Upon inspection we realize that the disagreement is not over whether the painting depicts an apple, but is instead over whether the quantifier captures it as an apple. Specifically, it is over whether an imaged thing exists through the image. This is an extensional evidence for quantifier equivocation, different from @fdrake's intensional evidence. The paper itself admits this possibility. It begins an argument:

It is worth noting that even if we concede that difference in domain entails difference in quantifier meaning, the quantifier-variance theorist is still not in a secure position. . . — Quantifier Variance Dissolved, p. 293

But eventually goes on to admit that there are many problems with its attempted response:

There are, however, a number of difficulties with this response. . . Second, even if the maximalist is inclined to rule out dialetheism by fiat, it is still unclear what the maximal domain ultimately is. After all, there is widespread disagreement about what exists. Just within philosophical theorizing, it is contentious as to whether any of the following items exist or not: mathematical entities, universals, possible worlds, subatomic particles, and even tables. For each of these items, arguments have been devised for their existence as well as for their nonexistence. Thus, to the extent that there is disagreement about what exists, the maximalist response ends up begging the question against all of those who deny the existence of any contentious entity that the unrestricted-quantification theorist intends to include in the maximalist ontology.

If the maximal domain is not a set, but some sort of (non-set-theoretic) collection of existent objects, the same concern will emerge in light of the controversial nature of what exists. In fact, it is unclear how exactly the maximal domain is supposed to be specified. In order to determine which objects are in such a domain, one needs to specify what exists. But it is unclear how to determine what exists, given that the specification of an ontology ultimately depends on the background theory that provides the identity and persistence conditions for the relevant objects. And typically, a difference in background theory leads to a difference in the specification of the ontology. — Quantifier Variance Dissolved, pp. 295-6

The gist of the counterargument is that wherever the maximal domain is substantially disputed there is (second-order) quantifier equivocation, and there is no shortage of disputes about the maximal domain. The apple-gazers and those who disagree over mereological composites in your OP are two examples of second-order quantifier equivocation, as is Hale and Wright’s example.

A primary objection is presumably that <If you believe in a unicorn and I do not, then your maximal domain is larger than mine by one, but the meaning of quantification does not change. You can quantify over your unicorn the same way you would quantify over a horse>. This is a legitimate objection when the dispute over the domain is over a matter of fact, like the existence of unicorns. The problem is that the relevant, “substantial” disputes are over much more than matters of fact. To disagree over a mereological composite is to disagree over what is quantifiable in a much more relevant sense than the unicorn. If I think a mereological composite is quantifiable and you do not, then we are almost certainly understanding quantification in different ways. These disputes can also go beyond existence, as the paper notes, “[maximal] quantification would range unrestrictedly over everything, whether what is quantified over exists or not” (297). These are the sorts of edge cases that a legitimate appraisal of quantifier equivocation needs to reckon with. The paradigm, “red apple” cases are not to the point.

The problem here is that quantification derives from the meaning of 'being' or 'exists', and this is one of the most elusive and foundational concepts, inextricably bound up with one's fundamental intellectual stance. — Leontiskos

Edit: For a more mundane and perhaps clumsy analogy, consider a scenario where we both drive a Jeep Wrangler. Now if I think Australia exists and you do not, then I will think I can drive my Jeep on Australia and you will not think you can drive your Jeep on Australia, but our dispute is over Australia, not the Jeep (i.e. "If Australia exists then quantify over the unicorn the same way you would quantify over a horse"). But if we go out driving and we find a rock formation, and we are both looking at this same rock formation, and I say "yes" and you say "no," then our dispute is no longer over the territory, it is over the Jeep. Or, it is over the territory insofar as it is related to the Jeep. This would be something like the paper suggests, where there is a dispute over whether it is possible to quantify over some thing that both parties take to be non-existent. The point here is that the claim that ontological disputes cannot be related to quantification is false.

There is never a shortage of irony in these parts:

: "Logic gives us a variety of ways in which we might talk about how things are. It does not commit us to this or that ontology."
: "Would you say that it is possible for advances in logic to take place?"
: "[Logic first took root within a transcendental metaphysic]"
: "perhaps logic has advanced since then?"
@Leontiskos: :roll:

As I explained in the absence of any other truthmaker belief is all we've got. I'm opting for intellectual honesty. — Janus

Okay, I see. You are proposing a kind of moral subjectivism derived from (attenuated) moral skepticism. "Because moral truth is not knowable we just have to go on a best guess or a feeling, but these are not firm or binding." I think this is a live view. I think it still has to contend with the OP. Here is what I have said:

According to Wikipedia ethical subjectivism is cognitive-propositional, and I have found this to be the case among self-professed subjectivists. I don't think you are disputing this even though your thesis draws near to emotivism, but here is the problem I see with subjectivism and emotivism:

1. Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others
2. Subjectivist and emotivist propositions are in no way binding upon oneself and others
3. Therefore, subjectivist and emotivist propositions are not moral propositions

(I.e. Subjectivism and emotivism are therefore not moral theories, because they fail to achieve normativity.)

"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. Feelings do not seem to be adequate to justify moral propositions. Going back to the OP, I would say that it is not only beliefs that are inadequate to justify moral propositions, but that feelings are also inadequate. — Leontiskos

Thanks - I will come back to the rest of your post but let me speak to this before signing off for the night:

But most ethics don't justify violence on the basis of anger at an individual. The attachments preached are love, loyalty, and so forth. Striking out of anger is usually shamed, unless there is some justification for the anger, so of course -- due to our attachment to "One ought not strike out of anger" we will follow that to its logical implication and also say to our risible friend "That's not a good reason, let's go cool off outside" — Moliere

I don't think the a priori guarantee that, "any particular ethic can parse attachments into the good ones and the bad ones," is redeemable, and this is especially true if moral subjectivism doesn't add up to a bona fide moral theory. (I don't think it does, in part because it doesn't seem to possess representation at a professional level.)

For example, "striking out of anger is usually shamed," but it does not follow that emotion-subjectivism is capable of such a prohibition. We can't assume that emotion-subjectivism will be able to do all of the things that normal ethical theories are able to do. If we assumed that then we could never make a case against emotion-subjectivism.

The interesting thing about, "One ought not strike out of anger," is that it is purely negative. "If this emotion tells you to strike, don't do it." If emotions are the things by which we are to know what to do, then what is the thing that tells us to not act on an emotion? It's not an emotion, because emotions don't persuade, they overpower or incline. What I am assuming here is that the experience of the emotion is what constitutes the truth-maker. Of course the emotion-subjectivist could draw up an extrinsic map about which truths are "made" by which emotions, and that map might include, "Anger $\to$ do not strike," but this is pretty weird given the fact that the experience of anger tells us to strike. Such a map apparently cannot be emotion-based if it is telling us to act contrary to emotion. (Anger is relevant because I do not think an emotion-based ethic would be able to restrain anger nearly as much as our common, rational ethics do.)

But I will come back to the rest...

Logic gives us a variety of ways in which we might talk about how things are. It does not commit us to this or that ontology. — Banno

Logic is the view from nowhere? Would you say that it is possible for advances in logic to take place?

A feeling isn't a non-cognitive stance taken towards the trueness or falseness of a proposition. — Moliere

Well I tend to agree, but you are the one claiming that feelings are truth-makers for moral propositions. :wink:

The Moral Subjectivist would just claim that the truth of the moral statements will come from those who speak those statements and their truth or falsity of their various commitments — Moliere

I don't really know what a sentence like this means, and because of that I dislike the word "just." :razz:

but the reason people enact them is due to some attachment, which can include a moral attachment like the example of the person who wants to get over his anger to become better. These sorts of feelings are just as much feelings as the ones which are more commonly named, in this broad use of "Feelings" — Moliere

I would say that to judge something good or worth doing is not a feeling. Adverting to my thread, a feeling is analogous to a hypothetical 'ought', and rendering a non-hypothetical ought-judgment requires taking into account the various hypothetical 'oughts' (including feelings) and then rendering a judgment. That judgment is not a feeling; it is the thing that takes feelings into account.

More simply, I don't think feelings are truth-makers for moral propositions. "I should smash this guy across the face." "Why?" "Because I have a feeling of anger." This is incomplete. The feeling of anger does not in itself make the moral proposition true. It may be true, and the anger may signal its truth, but it may also be false, and the anger may be a consequence of stupidity or error. The anger itself is not a truthmaker.

I would think that the Moral Subjectivist could agree that being dominated by emotions is a bad thing, though. — Moliere

At this point I disagree. Let me continue to class your variety of subjectivism as feeling-subjectivism (or emotion-subjectivism). Now if the emotion-subjectivist is to temper emotion, then they will need some non-emotion-based authority to step in to do that tempering. One cannot rely solely on emotions to underwrite the prohibition against being dominated by emotions. I can expand on this, but let's look at your example:

Rendering Plato's point in MS for someone who struggles with temper, say: The MS beleives "One ought not act on anger" which means "I feel disgust with myself when I act angry, and I want to be a better person", and if they do, in fact, feel disgust with themselves in that moment and want to be a better person then "One ought not act on anger" is true when that speaker says it. — Moliere

The premise here is an implicit emotion hierarchy, where disgust is worse than anger (or some level of disgust is worse than some level of anger). What establishes the hierarchy? What determines when the level of disgust is too high to be tolerated? If what are at stake are truly cognitive truths, then emotion itself cannot establish hierarchies or determine thresholds. It is reason which does all of this, and therefore reason is implicitly assumed in the background. The person who has a hierarchy of emotions has already gone beyond appeal to emotions.

I like your general statement. It seems to get along with the notion that reason and emotion aren't at odds, except you'd say that agents and patients aren't at odds.

I think we only become patients upon seeking a cure. Before that we may be sick, but we're not patients -- and I think that desire for a cure is an important part of any rational path to self-improvement. At the very least in terms of actually being successful in changing rather than listing things that we should be doing (but won't). — Moliere

Ah, let me clarify. I am using the term "patient" in a more classical-etymological sense. An agent is one who acts. A patient is one who is acted upon. The opposite of an action is a passion, for an action is something that we do and a passion is something that we undergo (or something that is done to us). The points in my last post were presupposing this definition. Colloquially we have phrases to represent this, such as, "Do not be carried away by your emotions!" When we become pure patients, at the whim of our emotions, something has gone wrong. E-motions are moving forces which are meant to coordinate with our agency, not to override and destroy our agency.

Emotivists (to my knowledge) don't claim that you are beholden to your emotions to act. Just that emotions inform moral proclamations. One can simply act against their emotions. I do this constantly. To me, one of the biggest benefits of emotivism is that it explains moral disagreement, even intrapersonally. I can have conflicted moral standpoints, because the views done rest of logical predicates (i.e confirming/disconfirming conclusions regardless of their valence). — AmadeusD

I think that tracks what I said in the edit <here>. In the quote you gave I was admittedly using "emotivist" in a looser sense to capture the family of views to which Moliere has been speaking. On this view one is justified in acting on the basis of emotion, even to the point where "The feeling is the non-cognitive truth-maker of the cognitive belief" ().

P2 would be "A belief is a cognitive stance taken..."

and P3 would be "Feelings make moral propositions true or false"

The feeling is the non-cognitive truth-maker of the cognitive belief. — Moliere

Okay, I thought you were classing your form of feeling-subjectivism as a variety of cognitivism. Regardless, the point is that P1 is not restricted to beliefs. Presumably the feeling-subjectivist is saddled with the same tension that feelings both can and cannot act as truth-makers for (moral) propositions. So we could rewrite P2 as something like, "P2: A feeling is a non-cognitive stance taken towards the trueness or falseness of a proposition." Again, I don't see how feelings have any more power to make moral propositions true or false than beliefs have.

But it can be modified pretty easily by noting that 2 can be changed to "feelings/the world make moral propositions true or false", and then there's no contradiction -- at least as I'm seeing it now. — Moliere

The same sort of inconsistency would arise as follows:

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A feeling is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a feeling about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

P3: Feelings make moral propositions true or false.
P4: C1 and P3 being true are logically contradictory.
C2: Therefore, moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent.

No I didn't — Janus

Yes you did:

Saying Torturing babies is wrong" is really just shorthand for the former "I believe......" — Janus

but my believing that does not make it so for them — Janus

And that is exactly why Ross is distinguishing (1) from (2):

1. Torturing babies is wrong
2. I believe torturing babies is wrong

The point is that (2) does not entail (1).

If I want to claim something is wrong tout court, then I need to be able to say what it is that makes it so, otherwise it is mere hand-waving. — Janus

No one is asserting that something is wrong tout court. That's not what this thread is about. You haven't understood the OP. I would suggest finding one of the many threads on moral realism and asking your questions there. This thread is about claims of the sort, < 2 $\to$ 1 >. See P1 of the OP.

I haven't anywhere said the two sentences are semantically equivalent. — Janus

You literally claimed that one is shorthand for the other. :roll:

- Are you conceding that (1) and (2) are different? Or are you ignoring your mistake and running to try a new argument?

If I say, "I believe torturing babies is wrong" then that amounts to saying, "I believe no one should torture babies". It follows that I believe it to be a normative claim. Saying Torturing babies is wrong" is really just shorthand for the former "I believe......" — Janus

1. "Torturing babies is wrong"
2. "I believe (1)"

As the thread has taken some pains to indicate, (1) and (2) are not the same thing. (1) is not shorthand for (2), just as "Aliens exist" is not shorthand for "I believe aliens exist" (). Claims about what is true are not shorthand for claims about what one believes to be true. Your idea here is a fantastic variety of relativism.

Now, occasionally in everyday speech we assert in the form, "I believe such-and-such" (i.e. "Such-and-such is true"). But in this informal speech what is being asserted is such-and-such, not the note of belief. Or else what this indicates is that one thinks such-and-such is probably true.

When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? — Leontiskos

If we are inquiring into whether something is right or wrong then the question of how we know that something is right or wrong is not a derailment. — Fooloso4

• Leontiskos: The activity of ethical reasoning is X; the subjectivist is not doing X; therefore the subjectivist is not engaged in ethics.
• Fooloso: Prove to me, via ethical reasoning, that abortion is wrong. More generally, how is anything proved to be wrong?

If you think that ethical reasoning as I have defined it is not possible, that's fine. Maybe the subjectivist also holds that it is not possible. In that case I think they should say, "I don't think ethics is possible, therefore I do this other thing instead."

I don't like to separate reason from emotion in such a hard-and-fast manner. There's a difference, but it's more of a difference because we've marked it in English -- the Subjective and the Objective -- but I think there's too much philosophical hay made out of the distinction.

Neither the passions nor the mind are primary -- they form a unity that is the judger. — Moliere

I don't hold that reason and emotion map to the objective and the subjective. One way to access Plato's point is to note that an agent can marshal and include emotions within their agency, but someone who is dominated by their emotions is to that extent not an agent at all. They are a patient (hence, "passions"). To grant emotions autonomy in themselves is to have cut oneself off from the ability to distinguish a proper relation to emotion from an improper relation to emotion, and it strikes me as self-evident that there are proper and improper ways to relate to emotion. More generally: we are simultaneously agents and patients; the emotivist excludes the former and the rationalist excludes the latter.

Yes, good spotting. "Ontologically neutral quantification" (which I bolded, above) is exactly what we want. It's a good way of describing the difference between the "exists" of quantification and the "exists" of ontology. — J

If you read the paper I don't think it is giving sound arguments for its claims, particularly in the section quoted. It is trading in "substantial inferences that are not sound" (). Perhaps it is aware of this insofar as it is using poetical words such as "illustrates" (certainly this "illustration" does not rise to the level of coherent argumentation). As is set out on pages 301-2, there are a plethora of different opinions on the relation between quantification and existence, and this itself seems to be good evidence that quantification does not have one univocal meaning.

As I see it too many questions are being begged. For example, the distinction between the "two roles" of quantifiers is also present in existence-predication. A phrase like, "There are some things better left unsaid," is primarily "quantificational" and not "ontological." Beyond that, the very claim that the "quantificational role" is entirely separable from ontology is the very question at stake. It can't just be assumed. Quine certainly didn't think such separation was possible. Part of the problem here is that the meaning of quantification, like the meaning of existence-predications, depends on the context and intent. Sometimes quantifiers are used with an ontological emphasis and sometimes they are not. But with Quine I would say that even where the emphasis is not on ontology an ontological commitment is still implicit. This is only escaped by stipulating that mental entities have no existence at all, which is clumsy and tautological in the sense that favors logical pluralism.*

* Edit: I see that is prepared to swallow this stipulation-approach whole and bite the bullet of excluding ontological structure. Again, ontological pluralism immediately rears its head. The question arises, "If the domain, the ontology, and the attendant quantifier semantics (and the logical system) are purely stipulative, then how is it that one stipulation could ever be more correct than another?" Positivism redux.

Is this really right? I haven't worked with modal logic deeply enough to say. Certainly I had in mind the standard use of Ǝ in non-modal logic, and I was under the impression that 'Ǝx' means 'Ǝx' no matter what may then be done to it in terms of possibility and necessity. But I'd welcome any help with this, as it's germane to the QV issue. (Is there a reason Finn and Bueno don't cite modal logic as an instance of QV?) — J

By my lights if the meaning of the existential quantifier varies in different logical systems then a basic premise of QV succeeds. fdrake is the king of logic in these parts, so I believe him. To be honest I would need to read more about QV to understand the exact contours of the thesis. Here are some related thoughts I put down when I was offline:

The more I think about this, the more it seems parallel to the debates on the univocity of being. This is, in fact, a debate on the univocity of quantification.

Quantification and predications about being are, in one way, like pointing. They point up the subject of discourse in order that it can be spoken about. Just as there is ambiguity inherent in pointing at something, so there is ambiguity inherent in quantification, but this ambiguity is always external to the pointer’s frame (that is, the frame of the person who is pointing). If I point at something, you may be confused at what I am pointing at, but I will never be. The same holds in logic. The “variance” that Hale and Wright suggest is not internal to a single logician’s frame. This would be impossible, for if the meaning of the quantifier varies in this way even within a single frame, then first-order equivocation results and the logic is destroyed. Quantifiers were designed to avoid this problem.

For this reason it makes sense for a logician to balk at QV and, despite all appearances, declare that “the misunderstanding must be produced by the language, not the quantifier!” (). From the strictly logical and axiomatic sphere, this tautologous assertion makes sense. But the problem is that the example does not present a scenario where the meaning of the quantifier varies within a single logical frame; instead it presents a scenario where the meaning varies between two different logical frames. The person who holds that <there exists something which is a compound of this pencil and your left ear> occupies a different frame than the person who holds <there is nothing which is composed of that pencil and my left ear>. I have been speaking about “equivocation,” but that term may be misleading insofar as equivocation usually means what I will dub “first-order equivocation,” namely using a term with equivocal senses within a single frame, or within the mouth of a single speaker. An example of first-order equivocation would be <Banks contain money; the river has banks; therefore the river contains money>. What Hale and Wright's example illustrates is second-order equivocation, where two frames or speakers are using a term or concept in two different ways. Thus if we were having a conversation about banks, and I was talking about river banks while you were talking about financial banks, then second-order equivocation would be occurring. I don’t think second-order equivocation exhausts the scope of QV, but it is probably the best starting point and it is also what Hale and Wright presented in the example. The more technical problem with the balking logician is that it is mere stipulation to claim that the quantifier is not part of the language. For the purposes of logic we are meant to treat quantifiers differently than the rest of the language, and perhaps we could call quantifiers “metalanguage,” but metalanguage is still language, and this becomes especially obvious in cases of second-order equivocation. It is not reasonable to claim, a priori, that quantifier meaning simply cannot vary.

The other thing to note is that while I am convinced that the inability of single-frame logic to capture analogical predication is at the root of the problem, there are plenty of philosophers—particularly Scotists—who hold that bona fide analogical predication does not even exist. But the Scotist would be much more careful with proposition (**) on page 303 of “Quantifier Variance Dissolved.” While the paper flat-footedly denies existence to mental entities, the Scotist would acknowledge that mental sets and instantiated sets both exist in the same way, and they would attempt to quantify over the “genus” or superset of these two existent sets before making the finer distinction. For example, they might try to say, “Among all existent sets, some are in the external world and some are only in the mind.”* Because quantification within a single frame must always hold steady, this finer distinction can never be done at the level of unqualified quantification.** Given its univocity axiom, this is really the only option for a formally logical approach, but to presume that the univocity axiom is more than an axiom is a mistake.

Finally, whether equivocation at the level of pointing or quantification is inevitable and insuperable depends, I think, on whether there is an objective ontological structure. Aristotle is explicit that the ontological structure of reality is substance-primary, and this means that thinking, pointing, and logic will always take their point of departure from substances. It is hard to understand the full implications that would result from denying that there is an objective ontological structure. Lots and lots of philosophers after Hume have attempted to erect dams to mitigate the damage that results if that levy breaks, but in the end those attempts may well be futile. I certainly think there is an objective ontological structure.

* This is not expressible in first-order logic without introducing existence as a predicate.

** One of the complications in all of this—and one of the ways that first- and second-order equivocation overlap—is that quantifiers are unarguably capable of capturing any one aspect of existence in isolation, but they are arguably required to “lock in” on that single aspect of existence within a given discourse once it is chosen. Quantifiers can never shift, at that unqualified level, between two different aspects or modes of being. One cannot quantify over mental sets and instantiated sets within the same discourse without introducing the superset. More generally, quantificational logic presupposes the ability to think about non-existent things, and therefore commits itself to the view that mental entities in no way exist.

- Aquinas' article on this topic is sort of fun to look at:

Article 1. Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?

[...]

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good."

I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (I-II:18:5). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

[...] — Aquinas, ST I-II.24.1

The quote from Augustine in the sed contra is actually very interesting as far as Thomistic moral philosophy goes. For Thomas all of the passions (emotions) are rooted in natural love. For example, fear is aversion to future evil, and because aversion to evil is always rooted in love of that which the evil destroys, fear is rooted in (natural) love. So if my dog develops a lump and I fearfully take him to the vet, I possess an aversion to a possible future evil (harm to my dog) which derives from my love for my dog. Following Augustine, if my love for my dog is properly ordered, then the fear I experience will be good. For example, even the simple fact that I took him to the vet is fear-induced, and it is presumably a good act, motivated by good fear. Yet if my love for my dog is disordered/evil, then the fear that I experience will be disordered/evil. For example, it may be out of proportion, tending to imbalance me in an undue manner.

True, but I could see how I slipped from cognitivism at the beginning into emotivism at the end when going back and re-reading, so it was muddled and confusing. — Moliere

Fair enough, although I think subjectivism easily falls into all of these ruts.

I'm playing with the idea, yeah, but I also genuinely doubt that the position must be internally inconsistent... — Moliere

I think it's mistaken but not necessarily inconsistent.

I think people take up duties out of emotional commitments to something or someone, and if they cease to have that emotional tie then the duty loses its appeal and what was a commitment becomes an ideal.

So, in a practical sense at least, our feelings are very important when it comes to moral propositions and maintaining duty. — Moliere

I would want to say that emotion often reinforces duty, but does not cause duty. For example, a friendship implies duties to the friend, and there will be an emotional reinforcement of this reality, but it does not follow that the duty derives from the emotion. In this case you have a rational emotion, because it is reinforcing a true duty. But given that there are also irrational emotions, emotion is not the per se thing that informs practical reason. We legitimately act from emotion-as-a-sign, but not from emotion-as-a-cause. We should say, "This emotion probably signifies that I have a good reason to do such-and-such," not, "This emotion proves that I should do such-and-such." A key problem with emotion-based moral theories is that they fail to make sense of the fact that moral obligations sometimes require us to ignore the emotions at play. Going back to Plato, the passions are not primary; they should not constitute the charioteer. They are secondary, and as such can be well-formed or malformed.

Edit: I actually think subjectivism is a cultural phenomenon, deriving from the you-can't-tell-me-what-to-do culture. Peter Simpson has a nice excursus on this in his, “On Doing Wrong, Modern-Style,” in Vices, Virtues, and Consequences. Subjectivist claims are not meant to be "binding upon oneself and others" (). Instead they are rooted in a defensive posture which wishes to safeguard personal autonomy. Emotion-based claims dovetail well with this, for they are not binding on anyone, and therefore infringe on personal autonomy in no way at all. But my initial point holds, for what is at stake is more of a teenager's attitude than an ethical theory. Of course, as Simpson points out, there is one traditional moral proposition present in the you-can't-tell-me-what-to-do attitude, namely the absolute prohibition against autonomy infringement.

- If you want to start a thread on abortion or the epistemology of moral obligation or intractable disagreement then you should go do that; I'm not biting on the derailment.

Thanks for the correction. So a subjectivist must be cognitivist. I didn't understand that. — Moliere

I don't know that you deviated from cognitivism. You spoke of "a cognitive expression of feeling," which is a bit opaque but still prima facie cognitive. My point was that whether we are talking about subjectivism (cognitivism) or emotivism (non-cognitivism), they both seem to fail for the same reason.

EDIT: Oh, regarding the end -- what makes feelings inadequate? And what if they aren't justifiers so much as truth-makers? — Moliere

I don't think they are truth-makers either. I just don't see how feelings confer moral obligations. I think the burden of proof is on the person who claims that their mere feelings establish moral obligations of some kind.

...so goes it that the sentiments make moral propositions true. — Moliere

Are you just playing devil's advocate, or do you actually believe that feelings can make moral propositions true? I mean, I don't usually say, "I wonder if I have an obligation to do such-and-such? Let me check in with Moliere's feelings to know for sure..." :razz:

Responding to the messiness of natural language, he/we’ve gone on to develop the quantificational apparatus and the ability to speak Logicalese, which really does clear up some of the mess, quite often. But it leaves us with puzzles too, like this one about whether quantifier variance is a coherent idea. — J

I would say that natural language always takes precedence over artificial languages which derive from natural language, and that trying to grant an artificial language autonomy seems to go hand in hand with positivism. Whenever we move from natural language to an artificial language we must be mindful of what is happening, along with the limitations inherent in any artificial language.

This would be the pro-QV position... — J

No, I actually don't think so. As is happening at various points in this thread, you are jumping to an extreme. I think you are under the spell of a pseudo-exhaustive dichotomy (false dilemma), "Either quantification is perfectly univocal, or else QV holds." This is the standard dichotomy of univocity positions, but if we spin things around then it seems obvious that both options are false, and therefore there must be a third option. The key is to discover this third option, this tertium quid. For Aristotle the mean between univocal and equivocal predication is called "pros hen" predication; and by the time of Aquinas it was developed and called "analogical" predication. Cf. SEP.

fdrake's post deftly exorcises both sides of the false dilemma:

That is what you see in practice though. There are no modal operators in propositional logic. But both modal and propositional logic are great. Their semantics also differ considerably. When you write the possibility and necessity symbols in a modal logic, you quantify over possible worlds. When you write them in a quantified modal logic, you quantify over worlds, and there's also quantification within worlds in the usual logic way.

Those quantifiers are introduced differently, and as the paper "Quantifier Variance Dissolved" notes that provides a strong argument for a form quantifier variance without a reduction of quantifier meaning to underlying entity type it quantifies over, and without committing yourself to the claim that there's a whole bunch of equally correct logics for the purposes of ontology. — fdrake

Your claim that "Ǝ never actually changes its meaning" is refuted by the simple fact that there are different forms of quantification available in different kinds of logic; thus falls the first, univocal horn of the dilemma. We are well aware of the problems with the second, equivocal horn of the dilemma (unrestricted QV). He points to the paper for evidence that an unproblematic variety of "quantifier variance" is possible ("variance" is to my mind a poor choice of word for the theory, for what is truly at stake is incommensurable variance or equivocation). In Medieval terms the unproblematic variety would be an instance of analogy, where the semantic relation between various forms of quantification is one of analogy. Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblance" is perhaps not too far off the mark, although I cannot speak to that notion with any expertise.

Edit: For a quick lesson in how quickly logicians become confused when they try to talk about natural language, see section "4. Ontological Pluralism," of Quantifier Variance Dissolved. There is some frightful confusion occurring there. What is happening? Logicians are treating natural language as if it were logical. Note, too, that one of the primary formal differences between natural language and logical languages is that the former includes analogical predication whereas the latter does not. Because of this the authors are not able to truly entertain the view they pretend to be considering, namely the view of ontological pluralism whereby there are "different ways of existing." Such an analogical claim is not representable in logic. This failure plagues their examples and argumentation. Wherever there can be found a border between natural and logical language these incommensurability problems arise, such as the border separating existence and quantification. This is the Achilles heel of analytic philosophy writ large. Logic is a two-edged sword, a tool like an exceedingly fine pencil that can be used to do marvelous, detailed work, but is incompetent in other, more broad-ranging matters. This is why some are apt to criticize analytic philosophy for being skilled at saying relatively unimportant things with exceptional precision. Aristotle was aware of all of this, along with the fact that substantial inferences are usually not perfectly sound, and that perfectly sound inferences are usually insubstantial. A work which combines enough strict demonstration to arrive at substantial conclusions without boring or losing the reader is very rare.

Glad to hear you say that. I'm not innovating here, I think, just trying to connect the dots. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure. :up:

I get that. I'm using "mathematics" pretty broadly. What I have in mind is the mathematical impulse, the attempt to understand things by schematizing them, abstracting, simplifying, modeling. A musical scale is such an abstraction, for example, and "mathematical" in the sense I mean.

You're right, of course, that as commonly used the phrase "mathematical logic" is just a branch of mathematics, but to me logic is very much a product of the mathematical impulse, as when Aristotle abstracts away the content of arguments and looks only at their form -- and then follows up by classifying those forms! And we end up with the square of opposition, which is a blatantly mathematical structure. You see what I mean, I'm sure. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, I understand. I tend to follow Aristotle and Aquinas, and for them the intellect or the reason deals with form (as opposed to matter); thus any kind of intellectual operation will deal with "abstracted" forms (e.g. shape, color, number, etc.). This is all the more true when it comes to discursive reason (and logic). Mathematics deals with one kind of form, namely number or quantity, and this is a very stark and useful form as far as pedagogy is concerned, but the intellect is able to handle all sorts of non-mathematical forms as well. So I don't know that we disagree very much, but I would want to say that mathematics is logical or rational rather than saying that logic or reason are mathematical.

Beyond that, I am wary of the mathematization of reason insofar as our technological age has a heavy predilection for mathematics. In other words, I think we have a bias in favor of math, given our modern Baconian desire to shape and control nature.

But I still say the foundation here is mathematical because with the brain we're really talking about prediction, and thus probability. The brain is a prediction engine that is constantly recalibrating. It instantiates a machine for calculating probabilities. The "following from" here is neural activity, which is messy and complicated, but has effects that are in principle measurable, and whose functioning itself is parametrized (concentration of ions and neurotransmitters, number of incoming connections and their level of excitation, distance to be covered by transmission, and so on). — Srap Tasmaner

Okay. I am not a physicalist and you will never hear me talk about the brain in these ways, but I don't really want to get into those things. I think that if one were to grant the premise that the human being is basically a kind of survival-oriented prediction machine, then a kind of Kantianism and pragmatism does follow, and human reason (and logic) will then be understood in this same light. Yet what I said earlier about faith is also relevant here, for I think that the reduction of the human mind or soul to logical-mathematical functions of this kind is "pidgeonholing" or "hamstringing." At the very least I think one should be open to the possibility that the human mind is able to engage in other, less pragmatic activities. (I get the sense that your understanding of mathematics is pragmatic, and that you would not be inclined to simply contemplate mathematical Forms with Plato.)

But his just thinking that doesn't get you there, to my mind. He was mistaken -- only because he was too early, really... — Srap Tasmaner

Perhaps, but I don't know that he has to be. I'd say that Hume's constant conjunction and the probability theories that tread similar ground are intellectually problematic insofar as they pre-pave a meta-rut for cognitive bias. For instance, we are now prone to mistake anthropological habits for natural probabilities. For example, one could look at our contemporary world and conclude that the human mind is inherently (and reductively) "mathematical" and technological, but I would contend that the evidence at hand is not a result of natural probability, and is instead a result of choices we have made, individually and collectively. Similarly, one might have grown up in Bavaria and have drawn the conclusion that all humans do, and always have, preferred Weizenbier. A wider scope would demonstrate that the preference for Weizenbier is conditioned, and is a human habit flowing from free choice and circumstance. When reason is reduced to constant conjunction or probability repeated decisions become self-justifying, and the distinction between knowledge and opinion dissolves.

You seem to be dragging me into the actual topic... — Srap Tasmaner

Hopefully. But I've said too much, and you are returning just as I am leaving, as I am planning to take a hiatus from TPF. Hopefully this doesn't draw me in too far. :grimace:

- As long as it is meant to binding then it fulfills the necessary condition I set out—a necessary condition which subjectivism and emotivism do not meet. Prohibitions against abortion are the same kind of propositions as prohibitions against murder. To say more would be to go beyond the scope of this thread and the argument at hand, and to move into a discussion of your personal political positions, which is probably what you are aiming at.

I think the easier rejoinder might be to let go of one or the other belief, if they agree with the argument, but redefine Moral Subjectivism in a palatable way -- for instance, a Moral Subjectivist will often say that it's not beliefs about the Moral Proposition which make it true, but our sentiments which make it true -- there's not a cognitive justification so much as a cognitive expression of feeling. What makes "One ought not murder the innocent" true is that when a person says

(1) "One ought not murder the innocent",

that statements means

(2) "I feel like murdering the innocent is abhorrent" — Moliere

According to Wikipedia ethical subjectivism is cognitive-propositional, and I have found this to be the case among self-professed subjectivists. I don't think you are disputing this even though your thesis draws near to emotivism, but here is the problem I see with subjectivism and emotivism:

1. Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others
2. Subjectivist and emotivist propositions are in no way binding upon oneself and others
3. Therefore, subjectivist and emotivist propositions are not moral propositions

(I.e. Subjectivism and emotivism are therefore not moral theories, because they fail to achieve normativity.)

"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. Feelings do not seem to be adequate to justify moral propositions. Going back to the OP, I would say that it is not only beliefs that are inadequate to justify moral propositions, but that feelings are also inadequate.

Why would moral theories be required to answer this question? I think most moral theories simply do not answer the question at all. — Leontiskos

But why are they required to? If they are objective, they need to answer that question because it is the question that underlies all moral questions. — Philosophim

I see little evidence for such a claim. As a theist I agree that existence is good, but there are non-theological forms of ethics.

How can you claim how one should exist before you can claim that they should exist at all? — Philosophim

Those who take existence as a given can still do ethics.

Wouldn't be the first time, but he was addressing the topic, and I have yet to develop an interest in doing that. — Srap Tasmaner

I was addressing the topic as well, and so your attempt to address my post without addressing the topic would be difficult. If quantification and/or existence is straightforwardly univocal (as some here seem to hold), then it is hard to see how a theory like QV could even be entertained. @fdrake managed to "save the appearances" in both directions, so to speak.

Still agree? — Srap Tasmaner

Quickly, not quite. I do acknowledge that mathematics is a paradigm of logical thinking, and that Plato was heavily influenced by it, but I don't think logic is inherently mathematical, I don't think "mathematics is good at treating of [everything]," and I don't think mathematical logic is necessarily the epitome of logic. In fact at my university mathematical logic was very much acknowledged to be but one kind of logic, and I think this is correct. As someone who has formally studied computational logic, mathematical logic, and philosophical logic, I see no reason to universally privilege mathematical logic.

If we want to see this we need look no further than to one of Plato's direct successors, Aristotle. Aristotle is the father of formal logic, and his logic seems to have more to do with knowledge, biology, and classification ("substance") than with mathematics. In particular, as a scientist Aristotle would begin to develop systematic ways of thinking about non-necessary properties of real objects (proper accidents, accidents, etc.). Aristotle was more interested in representing the way the human mind draws conclusions than adhering to an a priori mathematical paradigm, and I think this makes for a much stronger logic. I think one could pick out mathematical logicians and philosophers throughout history (Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, right up to contemporaries like Frege), but to reduce logic to mathematics (or to privilege the mathematical paradigm as primary) would be to overlook lots of other, more natural-scientific thinkers along the lines of Aristotle. I don't think a priori mathematization is ever more plausible than Aristotle's a posteriori approach.

Do as you like, I just don't see the point. We can talk about existence all we like without dragging quantifiers into it, — Srap Tasmaner

The question here is different. It is the question of whether we can speak about quantifier variance without talking about notions of existence.

It's a funny thing. This is all Quine's fault, as I noted. "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" comes out as a deflationary slogan, but what we was really arguing for was a particular version of univocity: the idea was that if you quantify over it, you're committed to it existing, and he meant "existing" with the ordinary everyday meaning; what he was arguing against was giving some special twilight status to "theoretical entities". If your model quantifies over quarks, say, then your model says quarks are real things, and it's no good saying they're just artifacts of the model or something. --- The reason this is amusing is that all these decades later the consensus of neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists, so far as I can tell, is that absolutely everything we attribute existence to in the ordinary everyday sense -- medium-sized dry goods included -- is an "artifact of the model" or a "theoretical entity", so the threat to univocity Quine was addressing never actually existed, if only because the everyday meaning of "exist", the one Quine wanted to stick with, is in fact the "twilight" meaning he wanted to tamp down. And so it goes. — Srap Tasmaner

Interesting, but this seems to prove the point insofar as Quine's notion of existence (and quantification) differs from the approach of neuroscience. Here enters again the questions of the OP.

That's the gist, or part of a gist, of my view. — Srap Tasmaner

It is a common view these days. I will leave my objections for another day. :wink:

b. This leaves two answers to the question, "Should there be existence?". They are, "Yes", or "No". — Philosophim

Why would moral theories be required to answer this question? I think most moral theories simply do not answer the question at all.