It's common knowledge that it is. — Janus

Argumentum ad populum?

Here we go:

4. "There are many parallel, non-interacting worlds."

1. would be falsified if sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another were found. Do you disagree with that? If so, on what grounds?

2. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that one race is inferior to another could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?

3. would be falsified if you could imagine what sound evidence could look like. Do you disagree? If so, on what grounds. — Janus

"4. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that there are not many parallel, non-interacting words could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?"

So on your approach the many-worlds interpretation is falsifiable. As I said, on such a facile approach every proposition must be falsifiable. This approach says nothing more than, "It would be falsified if it were falsified, therefore it is falsifiable." The fact that you've been running with this facile approach for so many posts is rather crazy, and it's very hard to believe that you are being intellectually serious here.

You ask me to show you an unfalsifiable claim. — Janus

Yes, and I am still waiting for you to do that.

Two well-used examples of what are often characterized as unfalsifiable claims are the Multiple Worlds Interpretation in QM, and the Multiple Worlds hypothesis in cosmogony. — Janus

So what is the claim that you purport to be unfalsifiable? Give me an actual assertion/claim. I am trying not to put words in your mouth given that you keep accusing me of incorrect interpretations, but you need to provide some clarity. Here is Wikipedia:

The many-worlds interpretation implies that there are many parallel, non-interacting worlds. — Many-world Interpretation | Wikipedia

Is that the claim you hold to be unfalsifiable? If not, what is the claim?

From the point of view of moral realists like you and me... — J

Here's the sober truth: You are not a moral realist. Here is SEP:

Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism... — Moral Realism | SEP

Wake up, dude. Time to stop asserting things you know to be false. The reason you are constantly arguing against moral realism is because you don't believe it. You don't believe that there are factually true moral claims. Why pretend otherwise? Why deceptively play both sides and pretend to be what you are not? You will do yourself and everyone else a huge favor if you simply admit that you are not a moral realist. Until that happens the whole conversation is built on a pretense/lie, and that lie will continue to color all of the strange edifice built atop it.

The quote you exchange shows exactly the opposite of what you are claiming. — AmadeusD

You are wrong and I've just shown that clearly. — AmadeusD

I find it silly and clearly wrong. — AmadeusD

This is the sort of thing you do, and it has nothing to do with argumentation or philosophy. These are not arguments. You need to learn to give arguments for your claims. Obviously I am not the first to tell you this, nor will I be the last.

Honestly, I would suggest that you study the question of what an argument is, and then begin discerning whether your posts contain any (or how many they contain, and of what quality). There are a very large number of people on TPF who don't know what an argument is, so this is not specific to you. Understood aright, that question is not elementary; it is vastly interesting.

Faith is a subclass of beliefs, of cognitive dispositions about propositions, that have at least in part an element of trust in an authority mixed up therein. E.g., my belief that '1 + 1 = 2' is true does not have any element of trust in an authority to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is non-faith based belief; whereas my belief that 'smoking causes cancer' is true does have an element of trust in an authority (namely scientific and medical institutions) to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is a faith-based belief. — Bob Ross

A good approach. :up:

Either way, is this a fair demand? "For an ethics to be compelling and to be real ethics, it must match my definition of a sui generis moral good which I cannot define, nor give examples of, and which I have no clear notion of, given that I think my concept is itself wholly unintelligible." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ergo:

The reason the "morality" of "non-naturalism" cannot affect choices is because this "morality" is by definition undefined. For Michael a "non-naturalist" is just someone who has no idea what the word "moral" is supposed to mean. Anyone who has a definition of the word "moral" thereby fails to be a "non-naturalist." It's basically, "If you have an answer to my question, then you don't have an answer to my question. I'm only accepting answers from those who don't have answers."

So this is one of those cases where someone who doesn't know what a word means can't do things with that word. There is nothing strange about this. — Leontiskos

(Michael consistently does this same thing. He argues against morality, but when you ask him what he means by "morality" he admits that he has no definition. And yet when you offer a definition he says, "That's not the definition of morality." @J is in much the same boat, but he doesn't even have a grasp of logical argumentation in the first place and therefore his plight is a bit more pronounced.)

* The logical conclusion of this form of sophistry is that there are no unfalsifiable claims, for every single claim without exception would be falsified if it were falsified and is therefore falsifiable. — Leontiskos

No the logical conclusion is that a claim would be at least possibly if not actually falsifiable if we can imagine how it could be falsified, if we can say what falsification would look like, which is what I have done. — Janus

Do you think there is such a thing as an unfalsifiable claim? If so, try to show me one, and I will show you why my quote holds. I think you have used a clever trick to write the concept of unfalsifiability out of existence, in order to make your unfalsifiable claim falsifiable. I already explained the problems with that tactic earlier in the thread.

Let us call this the Hotel Manager Theodicy. It holds God to account for the conditions of the world in the same way one might complain about bad service. — Wayfarer

Good OP. I agree. We see this sort of thing constantly.

Besides, nowhere in the sacred texts of East or West is there a promise that the world will be free of suffering. Quite the contrary. Christianity, for example, is founded upon the image of a crucified Saviour, who bore suffering for the benefit of all mankind². Buddhism begins with the recognition that life is inevitably marked by suffering (dukkha). These traditions are not surprised by suffering; they take it as the starting point of spiritual inquiry. — Wayfarer

Exactly right. Such critiques seem to be wholly ignorant of actual religious beliefs and traditions. They strike me as a kind of naive escapism which is not able to deal with or confront the fact of suffering. It is not a surprise that those who do not confront that fact know nothing about religion.

The irony with this OP is that the "Hotel Manager" analogy presented is not a theodicy, but a critique. A theodicy is an apologetic. — Janus

Yes, but like most trolls, Banno doesn't read posts, so it isn't a surprise that his response has nothing to do with the OP. Wayfarer is talking about the sort of critique of theism which presupposes that God is a hotel manager, and such a critique is not a theodicy. A theodicy is supposed to vindicate God in the face of such a critique.

It doesn't require a moral judgment. I am at pains to understand how this question arose. — AmadeusD

with the way I described a moral judgment, namely:

Nevertheless, let's save the term "moral dismissal" for the situation where you dismiss someone based on a moral judgment of their own actions or behavior. Ergo: "I am dismissing you because of such-and-such an action of yours, or such-and-such a behavior of yours, and I would do so even if I had ample time to engage you." — Leontiskos

I elaborated on this idea <here>.

So let me quote the whole context of what you responded to when you merely asserted that it doesn't require a moral judgment:

But why isn't it moral? Why is it not a moral judgment to judge someone's ability to read the room and reflexively adapt their comedy routine? I am thinking specifically of the definition of "moral judgment" that we earlier agreed to. — Leontiskos

We are judging an action or behavior, and we agreed that such a judgment is a moral judgment, so it seems that the judgment of the comedian is a moral judgment. Do you have any argument to the contrary?

Feel free. I don't consider that judgment. If i'm marking a student's exam against a rubric of which out of A, B, C or D is 'correct' for each question, i'm doing no judgement at all. I feel the same applies here. — AmadeusD

Then give your definition of 'judgment.' It seems to me that looking at the rubric and determining which answer is correct will require a judgment, namely judging which answer is correct. Why is that not a judgment? It seems ad hoc to exclude that sort of act from being a judgment, just as it seems ad hoc to exclude the judgment of the comedian from being a moral judgment. What principled definitions are supposed to exclude such things?

More simply:

I think assessing against a rubric requires judgment. If you need a 10-foot pipe and you examine two possible candidates, you are inevitably involved in judgments, no? — Leontiskos

Thanks for the clarification, I think that I understand better now. — boundless

Okay, great.

Good points here! To me this raises an interesting question, though. I believe that most (?) Christians assume that one can't be righteous in an inerrant way without God's help. — boundless

I don't think that really matters. Let's suppose that when one enters into a marriage one believes that one will not be able to be faithful to the marriage vow unless the spouse is helping them. It makes no difference. That condition is already wrapped up in the ability to fulfill the vow. There is no need to think that someone who undertakes a vow must believe that they can fulfill it without outside help. They only need believe that they can fulfill it.

For example, if you join a monastery and take a religious vow, it is both true that you cannot fulfill the vow without God's help, and that you can fulfill the vow. This is because you can fulfill the vow with God's help, and when you take the vow you are presupposing that God will be there to help you. "With God's help," may even be part of the explicit formula of the vow.

Regarding the couples, I also believe that the couple can ask God's help to be able to commit the vow. So, they might believe that with God's help, they are able to respect the vow even if they themselves are not. — boundless

Right.

I see what you mean but even if we assume that we can make definite decisions, the traditional thesis that there is no possibility of repentance after death raises the inevitable question of why it should be so. — boundless

My point is that if the traditional position on the fixity of the will after death is such a hangup for you, then just ignore it. It changes nothing so long as we agree that humans can make definitive decisions (in which they in fact persist).

(It may be worth pointing out that universalists don't need to deny the fixity of the will at death. The fixity of the will at death has much to be said for it, and many universalists don't find it reasonable to question. Instead they claim that we don't have inside knowledge on what happens in someone's soul before they die. I.e. Everyone may secretly repent before they die.)

If, even in principle, the damned could repent, then why we can be sure that some will never repent? — boundless

If you want to hold that we can't be sure that some will never repent, go ahead and hold that. It doesn't logically imply universalism.

Both eternal (self-)damnation of some and repentance of all are possible scenario and we can hope for everyone. This would mean that we can legitimately hope for everyone. So, to me, the view you are expressing here is not logically inconsistent with a hope of universal repentance. — boundless

Rational grounds for hope are always different than rational grounds for assent. What you are effectively doing is switching from Hart's position to Balthasar's, where Balthasar is merely recommending hope. My answer is basically the same: philosophically speaking, sure; theologically speaking, no. By my lights verses like Matthew 26:24 exclude universalism, whether hopeful or firm. If no verses like that existed, then universalism would be theologically possible.

On the other hand, if the damned can't repent, this would imply an infinite retributive punishment of sorts. And in this case, the main question of the thread would arise (how a human being can merit a punishment of unending suffering...) — boundless

And question (1) <here> becomes more and more pertinent as we move along. There is a way in which you and @Count Timothy von Icarus are not paying much attention to what kind of thesis you are supposed to be arguing for. It begins to look like a, "Ready, shoot, aim," approach to the topic.

What I said is that a universalist that believes that 'being evangelized' is a necessary condition to avoid post-mortem purification then the universalist has of course a very rational motive to evangelize. — boundless

The same question arises: why is avoiding post-mortem purification so important? It's not important at all compared to the avoidance of Hell. It seems to merely be a motive of expedience.

But even this is not necessary to have a rational motive. An universalist might simply think that 'evangelizing' is a good thing to do, that it can help to avoid the temporary punishment both for him/herself and for others. There are plenty of rational motives that I can see. — boundless

But again, I never said there are no possible rational motives. I said . The evangelization doesn't need to be done. Of course, it can be done. We are capable of doing all sorts of things that we don't need to do. But it does not need to be done.

See, for example, this clip from N. T. Wright at 13:38. That's a pretty basic Biblical anthropology, where, "human choices in this life really matter."

Note that even if the argument were true, this would not exclude the possibility of the redemption of all, if the damned can still repent. — boundless

I was explaining why the universalist has no ultimate motive, not why the damned don't repent.

It depends about what you mean by 'philosophically demonstrable'. — boundless

What I mean is, Do you think you can demonstrate it on purely philosophical grounds?

I believe that here we are discussing if the traditional view of Hell is consistent with a proportional retributive model of justice. — boundless

We could ask whether Prometheus' punishment could be retributively just under any circumstances. I would say 'no', but that whole framing strikes me as a strawman. I don't personally know of theists who propose such a thing or who worship Zeus.

Considering that Christianity isn't the only theistic religion, I also believe that the discussion we are having here has a wider scope than being a discussion about a specific doctrinal aspect of Christianity. — boundless

A purely philosophical case is in no way a specifically Christian case.

-

BTW, I believe that the discussion we are having is also a very interesting way to explore what some concepts of 'justice', 'punishment' etc might imply, a reflection of what abilities we human beings really have and so on.

So, even if we are discussing under these kinds of things in the particular context of a religious doctrine, our reflections can give us interesting food for thought that can be applied in other contexts. — boundless

That's true, but I don't want to spend my free time endlessly discussing Hell. If we want to have a discussion of justice, I would rather do that in a less fraught context. For example, my thread from a different forum, "Is Justice based on Equality?"

What I am saying, is that what people are doing is saying that "X is good for..." — AmadeusD

So even though people call food good without any explicit qualification, you are reinterpreting everyone to be saying something else, namely that "food is good for such-and-such"?

one of the reasons we call food good is because it enables us to survive — Leontiskos

This is literally all i had said. — AmadeusD

It's literally not all you had said. In fact you contradicted that claim. Here is the exchange:

You did not respond to the claim that food is (deemed) good by all. — Leontiskos

It was an unreasonable claim in teh discussion. That is simply not how food is characterized. It is necessary to survive. Colloquially referring to this as 'good' is a psychological trick and not an ethical claim. Come on now. — AmadeusD

...you literally said that, "Food is good," is an unreasonable claim, that this is not how food is characterized, and that what we should say is that it is necessary to survive. It seems like you've done a 180 degree turn on most of these previous claims.

I can only repeat my previous reply. It's not a reasonable question, because I didn't intimate it was in question. You're not getting an answer. The question is ridiculous. What people? What acts? What reasons? Probably I eat for hte same reasons as other people, but there's very little chance I do some of my more personal things for the same reasons as others. The answer you want is a fugazi imo. "yes" tells you nothing whatsoever except that I think I know why everyone does everything they do, and "No" tells you nothing but "I am special". These are not part of our discussion and I am telling you, point blank period, the question is not helpful for what you want to know. Given that I am the source of what you want to know, I'm happy to just not respond if you re-ask this one. Take that as you wish. — AmadeusD

If you can't give truthful answers to questions posed to you, I'm not sure why you're on a philosophy forum. Your desire to understand where a question is going before answering it is a form of post hoc rationalization, where instead of simply giving a truthful answer you tailor your answer in a defensive manner in order to try to achieve some ulterior goal within the conversation. Consider your response:

I would want to know your motivation from 2 to 3 there - or perhaps, what you would expect one to say and what you think that might mean. — AmadeusD

...That's a bit like playing chess and then saying, "I'm not going to move until you tell me your strategy, so that I know where I should move." That's not how chess or philosophy works, and avoiding giving truthful answers for fear of being wrong is a great way to never be wrong, and to never learn anything. If you think someone will draw a false inference from an answer then you give the answer, see if a false inference is drawn, and then address the false inference. You don't refuse to answer.

These are not part of our discussion — AmadeusD

. Besides, who made you the arbiter of what is and is not part of the discussion? The reason you won't answer the question is because it shows your claim about the arbitrariness of the good to be false. If we all call food good for the same reason then your claim that predications of goodness are arbitrary is clearly seen to be false. One only refuses to move when they are at a loss. :razz:

Then you think "true" and "false" are synonymous with "good" and "bad".
I both disagree and find it silly. — AmadeusD

This is a good example of a false inference. It simply does not follow from what I've said that true/false must be synonymous with good/bad, and "I find it silly" is in no way an argument for that odd claim.

something must indicate that whatever proposition is, in fact, true or false, if we are to take those views — AmadeusD

But you are unduly stretching the meaning of the word "arbiter." The claim here that whatever it is that indicates that 2+2=4 is true is an arbiter is simply a misuse of the word "arbiter." I take it that we both know, if we are using words accurately, that it is not an arbiter that makes 2+2=4 true.

Perhaps you've missed, but I addressed this. He fails (on my view). YOu pointed me to an article. I read it. — AmadeusD

You've given no indication whatsoever that you read beyond the first page of the article. You haven't addressed or presented any of the arguments or points in the article.

In general, your fiat declarations of victory are not convincing, to say the least. If you are short on time, then delay the post. Don't make unsubstantial posts lacking argumentation and then declare victory.

1. would be falsified if sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another were found. Do you disagree with that? If so, on what grounds?

2. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that one race is inferior to another could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?

3. would be falsified if you could imagine what sound evidence could look like. Do you disagree? If so, on what grounds. — Janus

Yes, the same old disingenuous answer, "It would be falsified if it were falsified."* Your intellectual honesty dried up many posts ago. I guess we're done here, Janus. Good luck with these unfalsifiable, "metaphysical" claims of yours. :roll:

* The logical conclusion of this form of sophistry is that there are no unfalsifiable claims, for every single claim without exception would be falsified if it were falsified, and is therefore falsifiable.

Perhaps it wasn't expressed in the clearest of ways. — Janus

Isn't it just false?

Why bring it up again? — Janus

Because it seems to me to be the last point in the conversation when you were clearly on topic, namely the topic of falsifiability.

My claim really just consists in the observation that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims — Janus

Well let's look at some of your claims:

1. "There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another." ()
2. "No race is, tout court, inferior to another." (my paraphrase)
3. "there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims" ()

Since we are talking about falsifiability, what is your opinion? Is (1) falsifiable? Is (2) falsifiable? Is (3) falsifiable? The claims are all laid out in front of us; this should be a simple matter.

I think we agree that if some proposition is falsifiable then there must be a concrete possibility which would falsify it, such as the concrete possibility provided in <this post> by the flat Earther. So if you think any of these claims are falsifiable, then I would ask you to provide that "imaginative" possibility.

I think (2) is much clearer and easier to assess, but if you really want to look at (1) then I would say that (1) implies that there are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, equal to another. It precludes rational opposition to racism just as much as it precludes rational support of racism. It functions as a kind of nuclear option, and I don't see how that nuclear option could possibly help repel racism if it places the racist claim and the anti-racist claim on a par, as both being irrational (and ultimately unfalsifiable).

If you agree that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims then why are you continuing to argue with me? — Janus

Because I want to see if you are, "giving air to assertions which are not rationally justifiable."

I don't think the whole racist debate is just a sinkhole of unfalsifiable claims on both sides, akin to an astrological debate.* I agree with (2), but I don't think (2) or its mirror contradiction are unfalsifiable. In particular, I would not use a term like "tout court inferior" if I did not know what I meant by it.

* Feel free to substitute some other pseudoscientific candidate for 'astrology' if you like

Sure. Something I think is misguided. But I understand that this doesn't sit perfectly. — AmadeusD

Okay.

You've done nothing to support this. — AmadeusD

So you are claiming that things which enable us to survive, such as food, are not generally considered to be good? When I say that people call food good in part because it allows them to survive, and you disagree, I don't see that I am the one making the controversial claim. It seems obvious that one of the reasons we call food good is because it enables us to survive. I'm wondering if you sincerely disagree with that claim.

No. I'm telling you it was non sequitur. Feel how you want to about that. But it was loaded and I wanted clarification as to what you had loaded into it. If you don't want to give it, that's fine. I wont engage. — AmadeusD

No, I asked a simple question and you've avoided answering it twice now. The question is, "If so, are those rhymes and reasons altogether different than those which guide other people's acts?" If you need clarification on any of the words in the question, feel free to ask. I need an answer to that question.

I don't even know quite what you were getting at mate. — AmadeusD

It's not necessary to know what someone is getting at before answering their question. If that were the case then no one would have answered any of Socrates' questions whatsoever.

Not in the strict sense of those words. — AmadeusD

Right, and given that we can talk about true and false without an arbiter, I see no reason why we can't talk about good and bad without an arbiter.

Do we need an arbiter before we can see that 2+2=4? — Leontiskos

I'm sorry, are you trying to suggest that Ethics is a mathematical function? If so we have no basis for discussion. Otherwise, I can't tell what you're getting at in this reply. — AmadeusD

I'm sorry, but this is another avoided question. Do we need an arbiter before we can see that 2+2=4?

-

why would [and arbiter] be needed in ethics? — Leontiskos

It isn't. But if you want 'good' and 'bad' to mean much of anything, you need one. I don't claim they do, so I don't need one. — AmadeusD

So does it then follow that we also need an arbiter of the terms in "2+2=4" if they are to mean anything? Again, if we don't need an arbiter to interpret or know the claim that 2+2=4, then it's not clear why we need an arbiter to know that food is good. The whole "arbiter" argument requires some explanation.

In the first section, he outlines almost exactly what I've suggested Ethics functions 'as'.

"The prudential ‘ought’ rests for its force on the facts about the contingent desires and interests people have, and just tells one what one ought to do if one is to satisfy them."

I find nothing further on which would counter this position. It's arbitrary. Obviously. If you'd like to point me somewhere in the article, more than happy to review and adjust. — AmadeusD

Right, that's why I pointed you to the article. He captures your position very clearly before arguing against it. You've recognized how accurately he captures your position, and that's a good start.

"Scientific theories can be falsified insofar" means "scientific theories are falsifiable insofar" so I am talking about falsification. We won't get far if you keep presenting distorted readings of my posts. — Janus

Why did you switch to talking about falsification rather than falsifiability? Here is what you said earlier, when you were still on topic:

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. — Janus

(Again, this claim is simply false. Accurate theories can still be falsifiable even when they have not been falsified.)

Remember that the topic has always been falsifiability:

Specifically I want to explore the question of whether this claim is empirically or logically falsifiable. — Leontiskos

The attempt to discuss falsification apart from falsifiability is a kind of red herring, one which helps your case but which is in fact beside the point. (Note that one can discuss falsifiability via notions of falsification, or they can discuss falsification as a way of avoiding the question of falsifiability. You seem to be engaged in the latter.)

The further point is that no such evidence or proof is even imaginable, and I think that's why you keep saying my claim is unfalsifiable. — Janus

Well yes, if there is no imaginable evidence for your claim or the racist's claim, then both claims are unfalsifiable, are they not? It seems like you are on the verge of simply admitting that your claim is unfalsifiable, and such an admission would not imply that the racist does not have the same problem. If I just look at the two claims it seems obvious that both claims are unfalsifiable.*

* At least on your conception of reason

@Count Timothy von Icarus, @boundless

As far as I am concerned, there are two basic questions here:

1. Is it philosophically demonstrable that the doctrine of Hell is false?
2. Given Christian Scripture and tradition, is the denial of Hell reasonable?

I think the answers are both 'no'.

I'd say we are most concerned with the first question, and I am not yet convinced that either of you would be willing to answer that question in the affirmative. If we agree that the answer to (1) is 'no', then it's not at all clear what we are arguing about.

Explain how "unending torment with no possibility of improvement," could ever be in "someone's best interest?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I give my kid a choice between broccoli and a candy bar, and I accept his choice of the candy bar, does it follow that I don't care about his best interest? Respecting freedom is a pretty sound motive. To spin this and claim that I don't care about my son because I allowed him to choose would be a pretty tendentious interpretation.

Is God is capable of showing mercy on everyone? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is mercy just a magic wand that God waves which solves every problem? Traditionally mercy is not seen that way. At the very least it requires a kind of repentance, and repentance is a free act.

I have noted in the past that universalists and Calvinists are extremely close, in that both tend to be quasi-determinists who deny human freedom in one way or another. In either case the outcome is predetermined and freedom is not a real variable. I even suspect that we will see more and more Calvinists follow Barth in that universalist direction.

Of course I'm supposing injustice here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And to do so is to beg the question. Suppose you said, "What if someone does absolutely everything in their power to cooperate with grace and God damns them anyway?" I would give you the exact same answer, "Then God would be unjust. Why would you presuppose that traditional Christians think God would do that?" It is a strawman. No one thinks the guy who commits a few minor sins will be disproportionately punished for all eternity.

I am focusing on extrinsic punishment because human beings, while alive, are capable of repentance. If human beings utterly lose this capacity at death, it would seem to require some sort of extrinsic limitation that is placed upon them at death. A capacity they once had is now limited. If man has this "dual potency," it is apparently being constricted at the moment of death. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I said earlier:

I think there are good arguments for the fixity of the will at death even though it’s not a hill I would die on. But I don’t find it plausible, within the Judeo-Christian tradition, to say that the will can never be fixed in anything other than God. — Leontiskos

So let's pretend, for the sake of argument, that death has no substantial effect on us or on our ability to repent. What then? Does it suddenly follow that humans are unable to make definitive decisions (in which they persist)? Does it follow that in the Judeo-Christian tradition the will of intellectual beings can never be fixed in anything other than God?

To be fair, no. But I think that your example of the wedding made it clear. It is like making a oath. Am I wrong? — boundless

An oath is an example, yes. It is the language of "means" and "ends." So you might say, "I am going to go to the grocery store today." That would be an example of setting an end. Then you might say, "I will use my car to get to the grocery store." That would be an example of a means to your end. We could say that you have fixed an end regarding going to the grocery store. For further explanation, see ST I-II.1.

When Aquinas talks about someone who "fixes his end," what he presumably means is that someone fixes an end for himself qua person. Marriage is a good example of this because the couple is fixing their joint end in a way that is more substantial than merely going to the grocery store. In this way there is a sense in which one can define their own life vis-a-vis some desired end, or decide that some end is supremely desirable (and one could here think about Paul Tillich's talk of "ultimate concerns").

To fix an end of any kind does not entail that one will never change their mind, but it does entail that one can pursue the end without changing their mind. Hence my point about "can" rather than "must."

I see. But can philosophy and scripture/theology contradict each other? — boundless

Well, as I said, "if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition." Truth does not contradict truth, but not all philosophy and theology is true.

But there is a problem, here, I believe. You still have to explain why there is absolutely no hope of break the fixation of the will in sin. — boundless

Why do I have to explain that? Why don't you have to explain why there is no ability to fix one's end? That's my point about Aquinas: fixing one's end is uncontroversial.

But here in this life, it is assumed that we can repent. — boundless

On what basis? Theologically, it is assumed that we can repent in this life. It is also theologically assumed that we cannot repent beyond this life. So I don't see the argument.

Or we could just reify C. S. Lewis' imagery and say that repentance is always logically possible, but some will never repent. That is an orthodox position. It may or may not be a tenable position within Catholicism, but I don't really want to research that minute question.

The broad stroke simply says that humans are eventually capable of definitive decisions. I don't find that claim problematic.

Of course, he might not and we can imagine that the more time he remains faithful to this commitment, the more difficult is for him to renounce it. But he can still change his mind (i.e. repent) at any time and hopefully he does. — boundless

And if you want to think that way then I would just say that what is psychologically impossible can be logically possible. Someone who is confirmed in a certain decision or way of life will not change their mind, even though it is logically possible. These logical debates are ultimately debates of post-mortem anthropology, which strike me as unfruitful.

In the case of marriage, I don't see how 'making a sincere oath' necessary implies the ability to remain always faithful to the oath (in fact one can ask God's help to remain faithful precisely because of this). It certainly expresses the sincere intention to respect the oath, but failing to mantiain is also a possibility. — boundless

I think you are committing logical errors here, primarily modal errors. If one can promise lifelong fidelity then one must be capable of lifelong fidelity. If one is clearly incapable of lifelong fidelity then one cannot promise lifelong fidelity. You actually agreed to this earlier when you agreed that the person who does not think couples can fulfill the marriage vow do not in fact believe in marriage. It doesn't make any sense to say that the marriage vow is impossible to fulfill and nevertheless promote marriage.

In general, I don't think that an ability to make a oath implies an ability to remain faithful of it. — boundless

Suppose you make a promise that you know you can't keep. Are you promising or lying? I'd say it is merely lying.

Let's assume that 'being evangelized by other people' is a necessary condition for salvation. — boundless

Here's what I said:

In order to oppose universalism, one does not need to hold that all must be explicitly evangelized by humans in order to be saved. — Leontiskos

Strong exclusivism has problems, but they are not the problems of the doctrine of Hell. Tying the two together is no good.

-

I said:

If the essential goal is salvation, then on universalism the essential goal is inevitable, and need not be sought or pursued. — Leontiskos

Your reply was that a universalist might hold that evangelization is, "a necessary condition to be saved in this life."

I don't understand your argument. Are you saying that if the universalist doesn't evangelize someone then that person won't be saved in this life? Hasn't your whole point been that there is no reason to limit our actions to this life? If nothing changes at death then who cares whether they are saved in this life?

If one still believes that repentance is necessary, them 'it's not something that requires no labor'. — boundless

If an end is inevitable then it need not be pursued. A necessary means to an inevitable end is already a contradiction, if the means is supposed to be contingent.

Liberalism as I understand it stops with the first statement: From the state's point of view, your individual judgment is just that, and we will not interfere or tell you you are right or wrong. — J

But that's just nonsense. I don't understand the naivete which claims that the liberal state does not interfere with value judgments. Do you actually believe yourself when you say things like that?

A state which makes no value judgments cannot govern at all. Politics is no less bound up with values than morality. The fact that liberalism has brainwashed us to think otherwise is remarkable, and even impressive. :lol:

Doesn't this point back to the controversy surrounding the Pelagian heresy though? Man, on the orthodox view, cannot know and strive towards the Good on his own. His nous (intellect and will) are diseased and malfunctioning. Even in writers accused of being Pelagians like St. Jonn Cassian have a large role for grace and the sacraments in the very possibility of the healing of the nous, which is itself a precondition of knowing and choosing the Good as good (i.e. known and willed as good). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Apart from Calvinists and some Lutherans, no Christians really believe in total depravity. Calvinists don't accept a bidirectional potency, and it is true that for the hardcore Calvinist everyone else is a Pelagian, but I'm not sure Calvinists deserve much credit.

More generally, I don't think the anti-Pelagian tradition precludes a bidirectional potency.

The eternal consequences man can effect as man aren't bidirectional. For man to have this capacity in the upwards direction would mean something like Pelagius' conception of the righteous man who attains merit warranting beatitude on his own.

The other issue is that movement upwards, towards God, is classically conceived of as making us "more free." St. Paul used the language of "slavery in sin." So movement in either direction is not the same. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you are conflating a bidirectional potency with the idea that the two directions must be exactly parallel. Just because movement in either direction is not the same does not mean that there is no bidirectional potency. Indeed, I have never claimed that movement in both directions is the same.

There are mysteries in grace and mysteries in evil, and therefore the nature and relation of the two potencies is quite mysterious, but I don't see any of that supporting universalism (or the other extreme, which is a kind of extreme pessimism).

TBH, I find the dialectical of nature and grace to generally be unhelpful. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you don't distinguish between nature and grace I don't see how you could talk about Pelagianism at all.

At any rate, I think the larger issue would tend to center around God (and us as Christians) wanting "what is truly best for every creature." It is hard to see how eternal torment could ever be "truly best" for someone, nor how, if we are called to forgive everyone, we should ever want eternal torment for anyone. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do you think the doctrine of Hell requires that God or Christians must not want what is truly best for everyone? If so, why?

Consider a man born out by the Indus, who never had a chance to hear of Christ and dies as a young adult. He grows up in a violent culture, perhaps part of a low caste. And he does wicked things. Perhaps not abhorrent things, but "lower level mortal sins." And he cannot repent and turn to Christ, for he has never heard the name of Christ. Thus he dies in his sins. Might he benefit from purgation, or even the retributive punishment of justice? Sure. But after the first 9,999 billion years of suffering, does justice still require additional torment to be met out for his 20 miserable years on Earth? More to the point, is continued torment "what is truly best" for him? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are presupposing injustice here and then finding it in your conclusion. It could be simplified, "Suppose someone does something that does not merit Hell, and God gives him Hell. That's unjust." Yep, but no one thinks that God gives undeserving souls Hell.

Even if one has a strong place for retributive justice, there is a point at which, at least on human scales, it becomes sadistic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's what you yourself said:

Theologically, the focus on "extrinsic punishment" and "extrinsic reward," seems less helpful... — Count Timothy von Icarus

...and yet you are focusing on extrinsic punishment objections. Even Dante avoids those. I actually don't know of any theologians whatsoever who think in terms of extrinsic punishment. The passage I gave from Aquinas addresses this directly, with his points about the "disturbing of an order."

This is a thorny issue. If beatitude in union with God is the natural end of all rational creatures, then it would seem that the denial of this end could be seen as a punishment by itself. Yet, we normally don't think of withholding rewards—i.e., of withholding aid towards a dessert we cannot attain to on our own—as punishment. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's pretty basic logic. Something cannot be gratuitous and due at the same time.

Honestly, I don't find Hart to be a very good philosopher or theologian.* Above all he is a rhetorician, and a caustic, uncharitable one. Reading Hart and reading Christopher Hitchens is more or less the same thing, with a different topic and a slightly different style. If I want puffed up abuse with a small side of argument, those are the sort of people I read. If I want serious engagement, I look elsewhere.

I say this because people who lean on Hart tend to eventually draw on that same sort of rhetoric, and the arguments then become thin. The reason Hart appeals to that abusive rhetoric is apparently because he can't "get the job done" without it. Here on The Philosophy Forum I think we need to keep the arguments front and center and not become lost in rhetorical polemics. Beyond that, I want to preempt the idea that Hart counts as an authority, especially for "infernalists"—one of Hart's characteristically rhetorical labels. If someone wants to use one of Hart's arguments then they will have to present them in their own words, and try to find logic in the midst of all that bluster.

When this topic was popular a few years back I tried reading Hart, but it was impossible. The book is not written to convince or persuade. So I turned to Balthasar's first volume on the topic and read that instead. The arguments were fairly bad, but at least the conclusions were more modest.

As I said earlier, I think some forms of universalism are philosophically defensible, but I think they fail when confronted with Scripture and tradition.

What exactly is the nature of the punishment in Hell though? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Lewis' images in The Great Divorce or The Four Loves are quite good. Dante, Aquinas, or even Milton also offer good images. The basic Orthodox approach where the damned are burned by the face of God or love of God is another. More simply, here on Earth it is not hard to find cases of unrepentance, hardness of heart, hopeless fixation on evil, extreme hatred, etc. I need look no further than my own heart to see the basis and possibility for Hell.

Beyond all that, I don't see a need to put God in the dock, especially given that the philosophical attempts at demonstrating injustice don't seem to hold up. There are lots of revealed truths that I don't perfectly understand. That's not a problem unless I want to reject everything that I can't understand well.

I think this is an important issue because it is perhaps not "universalist" to deny that any soul is subjected to sensuous torments of infinite duration (the "cosmic torture chamber"), although it could also be seen that way. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have never found this objection very interesting. It's as if folks are super concerned about physical fire or sensuous torments—and this might be a materialist hangup. I could tell them that there will be no physical fire but there will be estrangement from God, and they would be relieved. That relief is a kind of irony all its own, as if estrangement from God is small change compared to the prospect of physical fire. :grin:

And this "differential cup size" might also be taken as a punishment — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't really buy all the claims in this thread of, "Might be taken as a punishment." I want more rigorous argumentation than that. I mean, democrats might take an unequal gift as a punishment, but so what? What does it matter that an irrational person might take something as a punishment? I would rather talk about things that are real punishments.

If everyone is "beatified to the extent they have made themselves able," this still might allow for a gradation (e.g. the metaphor of all cups filled to the brim, but some cups being smaller than others). — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is standard orthodoxy to say that there are different levels and experiences in both Heaven and Hell. Once this and the possibility of Limbo are recognized I think many of the injustice arguments dissolve.

The idea that sin is its own penalty tends to get washed out by the scale of retributive justice. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This sort of thing looks like a false dichotomy. It's a pretty old idea that Hell is sin as its own punishment, and that retributive punishment need not be extrinsic.

It rather suggests the eternal survival of sin, and that some knees will never bow and that some lips will never praise. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What are you reading, here? Romans 14? Philippians 2? Again, if we give someone with no horse in the race these verses, will they think they have anything at all to do with universalism? Apart from the fact that such an interpretation contradicts all sorts of other things that Paul himself says, the literal meaning of such phrases has to do with military conquest. For instance, the metaphor applies in a special way to Satan, whose knee will bow, and yet there is nothing implied about Satan being saved or rejoicing in this submission.

With universalism there is a very real danger of wishful thinking - of seeing things that are not there, stretching interpretations beyond their proper bounds, or (in a case like Hart's) using rhetoric as a compensatory strategy. Hart's interpretation of aion in Mt 25:46 is a spectacular example of this. In general I would be cautious of Hart's claims when he is high on his rhetoric horse (e.g. his claims about Biblical scholarship and aion). His ability to mislead is quite unparalleled. N. T. Wright's review of Hart's New Testament translation highlights what happens when a rigorous scholar comes up against Hart's polemically-motivated decisions.


* Granted, he often has his finger on the most pressing and popular theological controversies, even before they emerge as such, but the way he addresses such controversies strikes me as rushed and superficial. The slapdash precedent may be bad for the theological guild altogether - as if we must pronounce strong conclusions on the most difficult and upcoming theological issues even before they are allowed to properly emerge.

That is, I believe that one can fix his end in sin/evil (and have the, at least implicit, intention to remain 'fixed' in that end) — boundless

What do you think it means to "fix one's end"? Or even to fix an end? Are you familiar with this language?

Why not, say, annihilation — boundless

One could argue for annihilation from philosophy, but not, I think, from Scripture/theology.

If you believe that because you have trust in the traditional view of hell, that's ok, I guess. But here we are discussing the matter philosophically. In my opinion, the traditional view has difficulties to be justified even in a retributive proportional understanding of 'justice' for the reason I explained in my previous posts and even in this one, where I argued that even if one's fixation in evil/sin is irrevocable, then, the traditional view of hell doesn't necessarily follow. — boundless

Again, if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition. That's why universalists like Hart try to prove such a thing.

I think I can agree with that. But I believe that, unfortunately, even if one has sincerely that will at the moment of marriage, one's will might not irrevocably set. A 'change of mind' (in this case for the worse) is indeed possible. One might seek help from faith in God's help that this bad change of mind won't occur.

So, I guess that I can say that in the case of 'fixing one's end in sin', my point is similar. While one can will to remain in sin forever, such a will is not necessarily irrevocable. If one's will isn't irrevocable, then there is still hope in repentance, in turning away from sin. — boundless

Again:

No one is saying "must." What is being said is, "Can."... — Leontiskos

• Leontiskos: One can have the will to sin everlastingly
• boundless: Yes, but one might not have the will to sin everlastingly

What you say is of course true, and there is no incompatibility here. The doctrine of Hell does not entail that everyone goes to Hell. You require a much stronger thesis, namely, "One cannot have the will to sin everlastingly."

But for the better or the worse at least in this earthly life I don't think that we have the power to be irrevocably faithful to the oaths. — boundless

If you don't think we have the power to be faithful to oaths then you presumably don't believe we have the power to make oaths, just as the person who does not believe that a couple has the power to be faithful to their marriage vows does not believe in marriage. This goes back to my point that some don't think humans are capable of much (e.g. oaths, vows, eternal consequences, etc.).

So yeah maybe you are right here, ultimately the result will be the same, but evangelization would be still important. — boundless

Okay, good.

BTW, even for an anti-universalist the question of evangelization (or spreading one's theistic religion to make the argument more general) is IMHO no less mysterious. If people need to be evangelized in order to be saved and end up not being evangelized because some believers refuse to evangelize (or live wickedly), these people end up outside salvation which would be a problem if God wants the salvation of every human being. That is, the salvation of a person would then depend also on the choices of others.* — boundless

I don't see a problem with any of this. I think what you are saying is, "Salvation couldn't possibly depend on human choices," and the Judeo-Christian tradition just disagrees with you on that.

So the question of the role of evangelization in the salvation is IMHO a mysterious topic even in the anti-universalist case, at least if one assumes that God wants the salvation of every human being. — boundless

In order to oppose universalism, one does not need to hold that all must be explicitly evangelized by humans in order to be saved. What we are asking about is the motive towards salvation. On universalism there is no ultimate motive towards salvation. If the essential goal is salvation, then on universalism the essential goal is inevitable, and need not be sought or pursued. Subsidiary goals can of course be sought, but they won't have any effect on that essential goal.

I think the best argument against 'universalism' is what I believe is called the 'pastoral argument', that is at least some people would not bother to strive for salvation if they hear that, eventually, all will be saved (incidentally, I believe that ancient universalists tended to not spread that doctrine exactly for this reason...). — boundless

Yes, I believe that is precisely what we are discussing.

I don't think we properly recognize how illogical it is to keep a doctrine secret "exactly for this reason." In fact it seems downright sinful to mislead someone in that manner, namely to try to persuade them—via an omission—to labor for something that requires no labor.

If we are charitable then the universalist is relying on paradox, but to formalize a paradox doctrinally in favor of one side of the paradox is surely inadmissible.

- Which is where Banno almost always ends up within a thread. :up:

Scientific theories can only be falsified insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. — Janus

We are talking about falsifiability, not falsification. Scientific theories can be falsifiable even if they are not falsified.

I'm saying the claim that some races are inferior certainly seems to be unsupportable on the grounds that no one has been able to show any cogent evidence for it, and it seems impossible to imagine what cogent evidence would even look like. — Janus

Again, in that case it sounds like both you and your interlocutor are making unfalsifiable claims.

Again, "No one has been able to show evidence for it," is not a real argument. It is a kind of burden of proof claim. You and your interlocutor can keep telling each other that for all eternity. It goes nowhere. It is not a rational justification in any substantial sense. A good rule of thumb is to note that if your interlocutor can justly mirror back to you your "argument," then it isn't a substantial argument. See also:

(Note too that one could choose to question the racist's claim without asserting the contradictory claim. They would do this by saying, "What you say lacks coherence," or, "I don't know what you mean by tout court." If one wanted to take a "burden of proof" stance, that would be the way to do it, but I think that approach will fail. In short, it fails because the anti-racist is more committed to the tout court claim than the racist is. For example, a strong Darwinian could be a racist without a care in the world about any tout court claims.) — Leontiskos

In other words, if you really wanted to limit yourself to burden of proof jockeying then you would need to give up your claim, "No race is, tout court, inferior to another" (paraphrased). You would need to stop asserting it, believing it, thinking it, defending it, etc. But I think the most honest way forward is to simply admit that you/we do believe that claim, and then to ask whether we have any rational justification for the belief (and burden of proof jockeying does not really count as rational justification).

To see how weak the burden of proof claim is, one can simply place it in a syllogism and recognize the logical invalidity: <No one has been able to show me evidence for X; therefore X is false>. The only time that first premise has any bite is when the person is sincerely and even desperately seeking evidence for X, which is the exact opposite of what tends to happen. E.g. "I was raised Mormon. I really wanted it to be true. But I couldn't find any good evidence for it, and this threw me into depression."

Yes. Minor quibble: "inadmissible" shouldn't be taken to mean "unmentionable" or "intellectually disreputable." The point is that they can't play a deliberative role, other than as a statement of what the person believes. — J

How does this add anything to the conversation whatsoever? Did you think Wayfarer was using "inadmissible" in some other way? That's what the word means, after all. And clearly if something cannot play a deliberative role, then it is unmentionable and intellectually disreputable within deliberative contexts, which is precisely what we are talking about.

- Right, and if Simpson is right then Rawls himself admits that he has no non-subjective basis for the intuitions that ground his theory. The reasoning is very circular.

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. — Janus

I don't think this is right at all. I think the word "falsified" would make your claim true. It is not only inaccurate theories that are falsifiable. The very best scientific theories are also supposed to be falsifiable.

My claim is that racists cannot come up with definitive empirical proof that supports their case, and that their case is not logically self-evident. — Janus

That's just a burden of proof claim, as I mentioned <here>. And again, if one is banking on the burden of proof, then they cannot make the claim that you have made about no races being inferior. said that it is irrational to "give air to assertions which are not rationally justifiable."

That claim is falsifiable — Janus

It is only falsifiable in the sense that the , "If someone falsified it then it would be falsified," shows something to be falsifiable. But this is a vacuous sense of falsifiability, as I explained. The racist could say the exact same thing to you, "My claim is that Janus cannot come up with definitive empirical proof that supports their case, and that their case is not logically self-evident."

This is good progress, though. First, note that no one else even tried to rationally defend their opposition to things like racism. Everyone else said that is has nothing to do with rationality. So I think your attempt is more than anyone else has done. But you've run up against a wall. You aren't giving legitimate reasons for why your claim is falsifiable, or rationally justified. I think that's normal, namely that we forget how to rationally justify our societal taboos. It is much harder to remember how to justify something that has come to be taken for granted, than something which is an object of discourse.

My suggestion would be to think about a vegetarian who confronts you, "No species is, tout court, inferior to another." Do you have to stop eating meat? Is their claim falsifiable? Does "tout court" have a discernible meaning in that context? If we cannot enslave those of a certain race, can we enslave those of a certain species?

(Of course it is possible that this suggestion will only confuse you - haha. Still, if natural reason can make these sorts of judgments about species, then at least some "tout court inferior" claims are not nonsensical or unfalsifiable. Note too that racism only came to an end with substantive answers to the falsifiability question. Racism would never have come to an end if we just claimed that the racist had the burden of proof (because the burden of proof is culture- and time-relative).)

So how do bedrock disputes about the ontology of values get settled, if not by rational argument? Well, as I was saying before . . . this calls for metanoia, not dialectics. — J

It is worth noting that this is your whole project: Pyrrhonian skepticism in the service of non-rational "metanoia" towards some end. You are saying, I think, "No moral position is any more rational than any other moral position, so let's all stop arguing and just work on ...metanoia." Supposing we stopped with the dialectics, how would we go about the metanoia?

(The curiosity here is that if you go tell a Greek speaker that metanoia has nothing to do with rational argument and dialogue, they would look at you like you're from Mars. I suspect you are anachronistically infusing Protestant fideism into a Greek term.)

These look like thoughtful posts. I am aware of many exceedingly able-minded theists who are capable of defending the traditional doctrine of Hell, but don't spend a lot of time on it because of its negative nature. It would be like if someone claimed that murder never happens, and then in order to refute them you had to engage in the dark business of investigating and presenting cases of murder. C. S. Lewis actually said that writing The Screwtape Letters was very taxing for this same reason.

With that in mind, I am going to postpone a response until at least Easter Monday.

- That's an excellent argument, possessing power to convince even those who would tend to follow Singer. I've never heard that one before. :up:

Of course, a simple claim about the form or other characteristics of an object, in your example, the Earth, can be falsified by an irrefutable observation. Scientific theories are a different kettle of fish. There are those who claim that just as scientific theories can never be definitively confirmed as true, they can never be definitively confirmed as false. — Janus

So your response is to say that scientific theories don't need to be falsifiable? That doesn't seem like a promising route.

It is true that my claim that such is the case is also not falsifiable — Janus

If you are making an unfalsifiable claim, then I would say that is a problem. On your view such a claim would seem to be "metaphysics."

If the racist mirrors your claim then this is what they would say:

• Janus: "No race is, tout court, inferior to another."
• Racist: "Some race is, tout court, inferior to another."

Is the racist's claim falsifiable? Here is what a historical U.S. racist might have argued:

1. Black people are not intellectually capable
2. Those who are not intellectually capable are, tout court, inferior to those who are intellectually capable
3. Therefore, Some race is, tout court, inferior to another

Now even if this is invalid it still looks to be falsifiable. Specifically, (1) could be falsified by producing evidence of black people who are intellectually capable (and this is precisely how opponents answered and eventually persuaded many of these racists or their progeny).

But the invalidity issue is the crux, and it is what makes your claim unfalsifiable.* The invalidity issue arises from the ambiguity of the qualification "tout court." If you don't know what it means for some race to be tout court inferior to another, then the reason the claim is unfalsifiable is because it lacks a real sense or meaning. In order to claim that such an assertion is falsifiable one must explain what it would mean for one race to be tout court inferior to another, and how we could ever come to know such a thing.

(Note too that one could choose to question the racist's claim without asserting the contradictory claim. They would do this by saying, "What you say lacks coherence," or, "I don't know what you mean by tout court." If one wanted to take a "burden of proof" stance, that would be the way to do it, but I think that approach will fail. In short, it fails because the anti-racist is more committed to the tout court claim than the racist is. For example, a strong Darwinian could be a racist without a care in the world about any tout court claims.)


* At least given secular premises.

But you seem to just be using loose synonyms for good here, and having your anti-realist appeal to those. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. It is swapping out "good" for "harmonious" and ignoring the fact that you have the exact same problem that you began with.

This is of course because "harmonious" connotes goodness. It's like saying, "Oh, I would never serve you peanuts. Here is a Thai noodle dish." "But this Thai noodle dish has peanuts in it!" "Well yes, but the name of the dish isn't 'peanuts', so it shouldn't affect your allergy."

Note that this is yet another case in which @J takes exception at the way in which some other group is being represented and then purports to be representing that group. But we have logically consistent moral anti-realists on the forum, such as Michael, and they wouldn't touch the words 'bad' and 'good' with a ten foot pole, nor would they claim that things like pain or harmony have any force in justifying practical syllogisms. They would not claim to have any rational justification for preventing animal suffering. So I don't see that @J's logically inconsistent portrayal is even an accurate representation of moral anti-realism.

- I think you actually did fairly well in this exchange. But here is the error:

How come something that's worthy of choice therefore ought to be chosen? Don't we need an additional factor to take us over the bridge between "worthy" and "obligatory"? — J

"Ought to be chosen" != "Obligatory"

If it did, your argument would be sound. Your own example illustrates the same fact:

Or we might say, "You betrayed your partner. That was not a worthy choice, and you shouldn't have made it." — J

If "worthy" meant "obligatory," then you would be saying, "You betrayed your partner. That was not an obligatory choice,..."

(As an aside, "choice-worthy" != "ought to be chosen." We know this given the fact that we can identify multiple options as choice-worthy, even if we cannot choose them all. Semantic equivalence is not as common as your approach presupposes.)

@Count Timothy von Icarus

Consider a list of concepts:

• Bad
• Truly bad
• Actually bad
• Bad as a matter of fact

It looks to me that these all say the same thing, and they are distinctions without a difference. Someone like @J will claim that, for the moral anti-realist, animal suffering is bad but not truly bad. What is that supposed to mean? After the hundreds of posts I have read, it really looks like he has no idea what he means by that.

This is why these conversations tend to lack rigor. Unless someone can spell out the difference between 'bad' and 'truly bad', they need to stop making the distinction while pretending that they have done something substantive.

I would contend that the moral anti-realist cannot say that animal suffering is truly bad; that 'truly bad' adds nothing at all to 'bad'; and therefore that the moral anti-realist cannot say that animal suffering is bad. Of course, they can redefine 'bad' to mean something that it does not mean, but in that case they have not said that animal suffering is bad. They have only said that animal suffering is "bad."

What is "truly bad" supposed to mean?

there are particular facts about what is bad or good for X in the sense specified above — J

In what sense? You haven't truly specified a sense at all. What is occurring is hand-waving.

The anti-realist is happy to acknowledge the fact that suffering is bad for the beings concerned, in the sense that it's painful, undesirable, etc., but only in that sense. — J

If the anti-realist wants to actually abandon the concept of 'bad', then they should abandon the word. And the fact that you depend on the word proves that you haven't abandoned the concept. What you are saying is, "I am going to use the word 'bad' but I am not going to mean bad by it." That's nonsense. 'Bad' cannot be used without meaning bad, and if someone does not want to mean badness then they should not use the word 'bad'. Else we are just equivocating between a private language and a public language.

Or, "I will not say that X is bad, only that it is painful. And by 'painful' I am not connoting, in any way, 'bad'." Again, quite nonsensical. If one truly wanted to stop denoting or connoting badness, then they would use words that do not denote or connote badness. But if they do that then Count's point is even more obviously true, namely:

Sure. They just deny that the suffering of people or animals can actually be bad for them as a matter of fact — Count Timothy von Icarus

And if we are honest, this entails that they are unconcerned with the suffering of people and animals. If you cannot say that suffering is bad then you are not "concerned" with it in the relevant way.

I didn't, but reading back I can see exactly hot it comes across that way. Just had more to say about it, because a rejection would intimate i accepted the premise. Which was a bit shaky. Sorry for that. Should've been much clearer in what I was tryign to convey. I reject it. — AmadeusD

Okay, understood. I think I see what you are saying.

I think I'm judging myself in making that decision. What do my values purport to press me into? If I value the Hard Problem over the problem of Infinite Regress, I may go to speaker 2's lecture because I think my existing levels of value are secure and worth maintaining (i'm sure the implicature is clear here). That's a judgement on my own notions of what's worth my time.
Lecture 1 may have pushed me out of that, by being more interesting that my existing judgement and thus creating a new judgement about only that speaker (well, their speaking rather than the speaker). I'm not convinced this is right. But it gets me around the idea that I actually care what either speaker is doing in their respective rooms. I already care about X or Y in varying degrees. The efficient cause might be the literal speaking, but the final cause of any decision of that kind is one about myself, I think. Where I want to be, and what do I want to be doing? — AmadeusD

But when you say that the efficient cause is their speaking, you are getting at my point. Namely:

So if we consider both speakers as causes, then you judged the two causes and judged one better than the other (i.e. more interesting or time-worthy). I am not here supposing that you have morally judged either of the speakers. — Leontiskos

If you were merely "judging yourself" while making the decision, then you would have made the same decision even if you were entirely deaf. But that can't be right, and this is because you are also judging the audible content coming from the speakers' mouths (and this audible content is not coming from yourself). That is what I mean when I say that you judged the two causes (e.g. causes of sound waves) and judged one to be better than the other. Your own predilections also come into play, but they are not sufficient for the decision apart from the speakers.

I'm not gaining any new position on either comedian in making that decision. — AmadeusD

I agree, and I am not claiming that you are gaining new positions with the comedians or with the philosophy lecturers.

Whether or not I like Comedian A better than Comedian B is not moral.

Now you've entered the issue of conflicting elements of these comedians. Interesting... — AmadeusD

But why isn't it moral? Why is it not a moral judgment to judge someone's ability to read the room and reflexively adapt their comedy routine? I am thinking specifically of the definition of "moral judgment" that we earlier agreed to.

It's based on an assessment as against a rubric, and so I'm not actually making any judgement. Just looking at whether it fits the rubric. A does, B doesn't. — AmadeusD

I think assessing against a rubric requires judgment. If you need a 10-foot pipe and you examine two possible candidates, you are inevitably involved in judgments, no?

I get the distinct feeling this is missing your point though. Either way, I agree its less clear. I currently am comfortable with the above, but its an immature response to your TE so I might realise its nonsense. — AmadeusD

Okay.

I suspect that what you are really doing is trying to deny that such a moral judgment is objective. I have said that when you decide between the two philosophers you have judged them, but perhaps not morally (we could investigate whether that judgment is moral). And I have said that when you decide between the two comedians you have morally judged them. But I haven't said that either of the two judgments is objective.

I am married. — AmadeusD

Okay, good work. :smile:

It's possible I am somewhat unique in not using the phrase that way. — AmadeusD

I certainly agree that the phrase can be used/intended in different ways.

Therefore, the moral judgement (which seems to be there, i admit) is certainly not about it being a waste of time. — AmadeusD

Good - I agree.

The moral judgement you're talking about I think is just misplaced but it is moral.

...

Again, not entirely sure here but it looks like there is a moral judgement which is not about time-wasting. — AmadeusD

Let me expand on this idea of morally judging another:

It seems that to morally judge someone else is really just to judge their culpability. I would say that judgments of culpability are eminently rational—at least some of the time. If these three jointly sufficient conditions are fulfilled then a person is culpable:

1. They were able to act otherwise (and better) than they did act
2. They should have acted better
3. They know that they should have acted better

Similarly, for a praiseworthy or morally appropriate act:

1p. They were able to act otherwise (and worse) than they did act
2p. They should have acted as they did
3p. They know that they should have acted as they did

If it ever happens that 1, 2, and 3 are all true at the same time, then at least one culpable act has occurred. Do you agree with this, and if so, do you think it ever happens that all three are true at the same time?

It seems to me that sometimes when a spouse tells their partner that the partner is not listening, it is a moral judgment, and therefore the spouse holds 1, 2, and 3. Your suggestion of "willful misinterpretation" is a great example. We could substitute that term into the three conditions: <You were able to not willfully misinterpret me; you should not have willfully misinterpreted me; you know that you should not have willfully misinterpreted me>. When these three conditions are met then the complaint is just.

(On my view in order to say that (some) moral judgments are rational, we need only say that this sort of common and mundane phenomenon is rational.)

This is also why, for example, the comedian who can read the room is better and more praiseworthy (ceteris paribus). He knows that he ought to be reflexively attentive to his audience, he has developed the capabilities to be reflexively attentive to his audience, and he fulfills the requirement when necessary.

If this were true one would discover what a good therapy for liver cancer is solely by investigating people's opinions instead of by studying livers. The Wright Brothers would have had to develop a successful, good flying machine by studying people's opinions instead of aerodynamics. Farmers would likewise learn their trade by studying opinions about wheat instead of wheat. One would learn that wet, mossy logs are bad for starting fires and that dry tinder and kindling is good only though talking, not through the practice of starting fires. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. :up:

I tried to get at the same idea . @AmadeusD claimed that food isn't good, it's just necessary for survival. I pointed out that a primary reason people call food "good" is because it is necessary for survival. The ability of food to nourish our bodies is not "arbitrary opinion," and I think someone would be hard pressed to argue that the desire to be alive rather than to be dead is just "arbitrary opinion."

@Count Timothy von Icarus

It looks as though everyone in the thread is in at least general agreement on the nature of X (whether it is good or bad). By ‘X’ I am thinking of something like capitalism.

The disagreements come when one must decide whether X is attached to liberalism, and this is where the interminable question-begging arises. So if there isn’t some accepted to way determine whether X is attached to liberalism, and therefore some accepted way to determine what liberalism is, then there will be no way out of the question-begging.

(With that said, it seems to me that the folks who say that something like capitalism is not attached to liberalism simply lack historical and political knowledge, and are therefore unqualified to really weigh in on this sort of question.)

If one person holds a view that everybody else thinks is wrong and false, we will dismiss him either being a troll or some crackpot. Yet if there are many people who hold this view, then comes issues like is it a proper thing to say, is it acceptable in the Overton window of our society. If it's something that millions of people hold a similar view in our society, then we will likely give respect to the view, even if we personally oppose it. — ssu

Sure, but that's just a societal observation. It avoids all of the crucial questions of the OP. My post <here> addresses the things you are talking about, in a thread where they are relevant.

Check out <this post>. You are focused on what people, or majorities, or societies, deem to be beneficial or pathogenic. All you are really saying is, "If the society thinks the virus is pathogenic, then the virus will be treated as pathogenic in that society. And if the society thinks the virus is beneficial, then the virus will be treated as beneficial in that society." Of course. This is obvious. It sheds no light at all on the question of whether or why the individual or the society composed of individuals has formed a correct judgment about the virus. This form of circular reasoning has been very common in this thread, as if no appeal to the rationality of the virus-judgments is necessary. That sort of circular reasoning is just a recipe for societal tyranny, where everyone apes the societal trends and no one is able to think through the societal judgments rationally.

I think this is the right way to think of a 'moral' judgement in this context. — AmadeusD

Okay, great.

This probably happens, but in terms of habit, no, this isn't the case. What I'm thinking internally is "I have other things to be getting on with, and this is not satisfying enough to overturn my commitment to the other things" or something similar. I often engage in hilariously dumb conversations when I have the time (I find it relaxing, in some way, so there's no sort of sacrifice happening there). — AmadeusD

Okay, fair enough. :grin:

This one is a bit more complicated. — AmadeusD

I think you may have misread the sentence, or that instead of "reject" you read "accept."

Let me press you from two angles, first analytically and then experientially.

Suppose you are standing in the hall at a philosophy conference and you can hear two speakers giving two different lectures in two different rooms. You are listening to what each speaker is saying, trying to decide which lecture to attend. You can either go into the first speaker's room and listen to them, go into the second speaker's room and listen to them, or do something else entirely. Suppose you go into the second speaker's room, and let's call this the effect. On my view, a necessary cause of this effect is that you found the second speaker more interesting or time-worthy than the first speaker. So if we consider both speakers as causes, then you judged the two causes and judged one better than the other (i.e. more interesting or time-worthy). I am not here supposing that you have morally judged either of the speakers.

This is meant to demonstrate that even if we are concerned with our time, we are still judging others as causes and deciding which causes of dialogue or information are time-worthy. So far, so good? But now consider that people such as these speakers are often aware that others are judging them for time-worthiness. Switching now to comedians rather than philosophy lecturers, a comedian might think to himself, "This is going poorly; the audience is getting restless; therefore I am going to switch over to some of my older, tried-and-true jokes." He does this because he is aware of the fact that the audience is judging whether he is time-worthy, and he is adjusting his comedy routine in light of his interpretation of the audience's judgment.

Now suppose that two comedians are performing tonight in different locations but at the exact same time. You like both of them, but one of them is much better at this sort of reflexive adjusting of his comedy routine depending on the audience's reaction. He knows how to "read the room" better. Because of this, you decide to see him instead of the other comedian. At this point I think it is much less clear whether you have morally judged the two comedians. This is because you are judging the comedian's behavior, habits, abilities, and particularly his ability to be self-conscious and conscientious. At this point has your "time-worthiness" judgment of the "cause" become moral without ceasing in any way to be a judgment of time-worthiness? If not, then what would you actually have to do in order to morally judge a comedian or some other person?

(For Aristotle this is surely 'moral' (although that word is anachronistic), and there is no reason why a time-worthiness judgment must be a non-moral judgment.)


Now the experiential angle. Have you ever had a significant other? Because it is fairly common for a woman to say to her boyfriend, "You aren't listening to me!" Usually moral judgment is involved. Do you see that as irrational, given that it doesn't really seem to be a matter of time-worthiness? Could she ever be rationally justified in morally judging her boyfriend in this way?

As someone else's savior once said — Hanover

That's actually from Paul. :razz:

In my opinion what is so admirable about @Jamal's post is the courage it takes to admit a deep mistake. Namely, to reconsider a foundational presupposition that has shaped your life for a very long time, and on which you took strong stands. It is incredibly difficult to do that. So yes, it's a lot like Paul, namely his conversion in which he turned around in an entirely different direction and joined the group he had long been laboring to eradicate.