- Okay, thanks.

-erroneous post-

clearly designed for the purpose of that refutation — Metaphysician Undercover

Every premise is designed for the purpose of the conclusion, and every premise of a refutation is designed for the purpose of the refutation. Perhaps you are the one begging the question, here.

The conclusion "this act refutes Berkeley" is only derived if the very dubious premise (this act will refute Berkeley), which is designed specifically for that purpose, of refuting Berkeley, is accepted. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's how arguments work. You design premises to reach a conclusion. This whole thread is a testament to the fact that it is not dubious, for the precise point of Tallis' paper is to show that it is not even an ignoratio elenchus, much less a begging of the question. "In what follows, I want to persuade you that the stone-kicking may deliver more than may be apparent at first sight."

Part 1. The Modern vs. the Medieval Conception of Reference

Russell and reference via quantification -- Quine's slogan -- misinterpretations of Anselm -- intention, medieval reference, and ampliation -- entia rationis -- ontological commitments -- correctly interpreting Anselm

Here are the first few sentences of the paper:

Saint Anselm’s proof for God’s existence in his Proslogion, as the label “ontological” retrospectively hung on it indicates, is usually treated as involving some sophisticated problem of, or a much less sophisticated tampering with, the concept of existence. In this paper I intend to approach Saint Anselm’s reasoning from a somewhat different angle.

First, I will point out that what makes many of our contemporaries think it involves a problem with the concept of existence is our modern conception of reference, intimately tied up with the concept of existence. On the other hand, I also wish to show that the conception of reference that is at work in Saint Anselm’s argument, indeed, that is generally at work in medieval thought, is radically different, not so tied up with the concept of existence, while it is at least as justifiable as the modern conception. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding, 69

---

Edit: I received a PM from someone essentially asking, "What's the fuss?" If you are not familiar with the modern conception of reference stemming largely from Bertrand Russell, and also the way that quantificational logic understands existence via figures like Frege and Quine, then the paper may be somewhat opaque to you. Certainly the first section will be opaque. Nevertheless, the latter sections of the paper might be more accessible even to those who are not familiar with the modern tradition.

I think you've noted before that we need to do some tinkering within Fregean logic to accommodate the 1st person. Would you agree with Rodl that, without such tinkering, there is indeed a difficulty presented for the "doctrine of propositions"? — J

Think about it this way: if we zoom out then force represents subject/subjectivity and content represents object/objectivity. Now with Kimhi you were searching for "Monism," and I assume that the same sort of thing is at play with Rodl?

Because if the critique of the force/content distinction is ultimately that it is dualistic, then I'm not sure where else there is to go. "Monism"? I would have to know what that means, but if there is more than one thinking subject in the world, and there is at least one common object of thought, then the dualism of subject and object is both inevitable and true.

That is, if we don't know what it is about the force/content distinction that is disagreeable but we just keep shooting at it anyway, then what is it we are aiming at? The duality of subject and object? Because as long as that duality exists I don't see how force/content will go away.

I do see the problem Rodl (and Kimhi) see. How can there be objective content that is also thought? — J

Is it any less pressing to ask, "How can there be non-objective content that is also thought?"

it's an ancient epistemological puzzle — J

Where do you find it before Descartes?

Either way, what is the teaser for how self-consciousness solves the problem of the objectivity of thought?

@Paine, how would you characterize the "big picture" here, especially with respect to the OP? Rödl says that the I think accompanies all my thoughts, or at the very least he wants to place a very strong emphasis on self-consciousness in thinking and judging. It seems overboard. What is the context that would account for this sort of emphasis? Thanks.

Judging from Rödl's work as it is presented here by those who are reading him, he seems seriously confused. — Janus

Yeh. A thread like this really needs to provide a clear account of the motivations behind the strange thesis.

"Why in the world would he do/say that!?"
"Because he was being chased by killer bees."
"Oh, okay. I get it now. Thanks for explaining."

Well for Aristotle the soul is the principle of life, so if Truman's body still has a principle of life, then he is not fully dead. But of course if we hold to a view where the soul perdures apart from the body after death then there arises the tendency to identify Truman with his perduring, separated soul.

Some contemporary Aristotelians suggest that Aristotle didn't think that artifacts had forms, because they think that an Aristotelian form has something to do with life. — Arcane Sandwich

Yes. For my teachers an artifact has a form, but not a substantial form. Yet a substantial form would not need to be soul/life, for there are inorganic compounds with a substantial form. Nevertheless, I agree that this last part is more controversial.

We would not say that Truman himself is identical to his life, rather we would say that Truman is alive. He has the property of being alive. It's an open question what happens when Truman dies. Is he still Truman, but dead? If so, then his form wasn't his life, after all. Or, one would instead say that it was, and that when Truman dies, what remains is no longer Truman. Instead, what remains is merely Truman's body. For someone like me, who claims that every human is identical to a living brain in a body, this is problematic. — Arcane Sandwich

Right, so the question has to do with how the "property" of life relates to Truman, namely whether it is something he needs in order to be himself. Or put differently, whether it is nonsensical to talk about Truman apart from his life.

Sure thing. But it will work better for substances than for artifacts a la material constitution. Granted, a similar problem would occur if the real Athena were flattened (as least if she were mortal). You would have a clump of matter that was Athena a moment ago, but no longer is (i.e. you would have substantial change).

Truman's formal cause, on the other hand, is not his two parents, it is instead his form. When I say that Truman exists because someone is Truman, I am not referring to Truman's parents, I am referring to Truman's form. — Arcane Sandwich

Perhaps what is happening here is that you want the referent for 'Truman' to be more than the bare particular of predicate logic, i.e. you want for Truman what is for species an essence. That is, you want to reference a primary substance rather than a bare particular.

If that is right, you may be interested in Gyula Klima's "Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism," where he compares a Kripkean formulation of essentialism to an Aristotelian formulation of essentialism, and includes formal semantics for signification and supposition, which involves the notion of inherence. Paul Vincent Spade also has an informal piece digging into the metaphysical differences between the two conceptions, "The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on Some Big Themes."

Note that Banno's whole logical horizon is bound up with the bare particulars of predicate logic, so I'm not sure it is possible to easily convey an alternative semantics to someone who who has never been exposed to an alternative paradigm.

- Then continue to go on contradicting SEP as you bristle, by all means. :up:

If you want to talk about empty domains, go ahead. — Banno

Why did it come up? Because we were talking about ontological commitment and SEP utilizes the empty domain as a useful way to talk about ontological commitment. See my post <here> for the genesis.

That the domain is not empty is a presumption for first order logic anyway — Banno

A convention. This happens to be a conversation about challenging conventions.

The very that that it is possible to "talk past one another" relies on it not being the case that we always, or even mostly, talk past one another. — Janus

If the quote <here> were true then we would talk past one another much more often than we do.

You should know better than to confuse the metaphysical with the empirical. The point of the principle of falsifiability was to be able to distinguish metaphysical from empirical claims, but it does not aim to falsify metaphysics. In other words, a metaphysical posit is not challenged by its not being falsifiable. — Wayfarer

No, I don't think that's right at all. The same principle holds in metaphysics, or more generally, in argument of any kind. It's called the principle of sufficient reason. If there is no possibility of refuting Berkeley's claim, then it transgresses the principle of sufficient reason (for in that case Berkeley has no reason to assert it). Falsifiability is not limited to empirical matters; it's just that in non-empirical matters the falsification takes a non-empirical form.

You’re right that much of our own minds and bodies remains unperceived from our subjective perspective. But when we turn our attention to these unperceived attributes—whether mental or physical—they are thereby brought into the realm of perception and cognition. — Wayfarer

Sure, but Tallis' point stands. The lymphatic system continues to sustain us, perceived or unperceived. Tallis would not disagree that perceptible objects can be perceived at one time and unperceived at another.

The reason Johnson's argument is curious at all is because Berkeley's claim that matter does not exist is so implausible. Or in other words: Berkeley has the burden of proof. If he didn't, then Johnson's action would not attract as much attention as it has.

I really don't know Berkeley well enough to say how he would interact with Tallis, but Tallis' paper is somewhat interesting.

So I think the target is more various philosophical notions of reference rather than the whole ability to communicate. — Moliere

What I'd commit to is the idea that though reference is inscrutable we can still communicate. — Moliere

"How we manage to refer is mysterious, but what is being referred to is not indeterminate."

Yes?

Or:

"How we manage to refer is inscrutable, but what is being referred to is not inscrutable."

- A very useful post. :up:

and obviously just intentionally designed to produce the conclusion desired — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't grant your imputation of specious motive.

So does Tallis’ argument effectively challenge Berkeley’s idealism — Wayfarer

I think it's at least reasonable. He seems to be saying that we know matter exists in the first place because of our experience of our body, and it is the interaction of Johnson's material body with the object of the rock that secures the conclusion that the rock is material. I said something similar to Tallis' premise recently:

I think the question is whether sense of self is direct or indirect. If it were direct, then it would seem that there is nothing I would not know about myself. I would be fully transparent to myself. If it is indirect, then self-consciousness is not always present. — Leontiskos

Experience of our bodies shows us that there are existing things which are important and yet are not perceived:

My own body, however, delivers more to justify the intuition that it has a being that goes beyond perception.

For a start, the extent to which I experientially access my own body is very limited, and variable. Many of my organs, and most of the processes that take place in them, are hidden from me; and yet they are the continuous necessary conditions of my being alive and perceiving anything. I don’t know about you, but my lymphatic system has given me no notice of its essential existence over the many years of my life, but I wouldn’t be without it. More to the point, there is the necessary, if implicit, role of parts of my body of which I am unaware, or only patchily aware, when I perform ordinary actions. — Tallis

• If my lymphatic system did not exist, then I would not exist.
• But I do exist.
• Therefore, my lymphatic system exists.
• But my lymphatic system is not generally perceived.
• Therefore, unperceived things exist (i.e. matter).

And if Berkeley says that God constantly perceives Tallis' lymphatic system, Tallis might ask whether that sort of reliance on God constitutes a falsifiable claim.

Most of this seems to depend on just what definition of 'matter' we place in Berkeley's mouth.

There would be no reason to say they are talking past each other in any radical sense because their verbal dispositions are the same so they communicate perfectly. — Apustimelogist

Except Quine literally says, "the meanings or ideas expressed in their identically triggered and identically sounded utterances could diverge radically." If the meanings and ideas expressed by our identical utterances diverge radically, then I would say we are talking past each other by definition.

This is what I think it comes down to:

Are you saying that even if they do talk past each other, they won't tend to register each other's speech as inscrutable? — Leontiskos

The thesis you offer is that they would be objectively talking past each other without even knowing it. But that becomes more implausible the longer we draw out their conversation (say, from 15 seconds to 2 minutes to 5 minutes to 30 minutes...). The longer we talk the more likely we will realize that we are using words in radically different ways.

So, my question is the following: does ¬∀ have ontological import? How could it not, if it's equivalent to ∃? And if that's so, then does ∀ have ontological import, since it's equivalent to ¬∃? — Arcane Sandwich

I would say that the first thing to note is that what is equivalent is not ¬∀x(Fx) and ∃x(Fx), but rather ¬∀¬(Fx) and ∃x(Fx) (as well as ¬∃x(Fx) and ∀x¬(Fx)).

Second, all of these puzzles tend to revolve around different senses of negation. In this case, whether ∀x(Fx) is ontologically committing is an interesting question, but ¬∀x(Fx) seems rather different with regard to ontological commitment. This is because ¬∀x(Fx) will be uncontroversially true whether the domain is empty or whether there is merely nothing that falls under the predicate F. Ergo: it is not controversial whether ¬∀x(Fx) involves ontological commitment (because it is consistent with an empty domain), whereas it is at least somewhat controversial whether ∀x(Fx) is ontologically committing (because it is arguably inconsistent with an empty domain). Put slightly differently: a non-empty domain does not foreclose the question of ontological commitment (with respect to that domain), whereas an empty domain does not bear on the question of ontological commitment, because there are no entities in question at all.

It is also worth noting that appeals to the Tree Proof Generator (originally linked by Banno) are a form of begging the question. We are asking whether the ontological-commitment relation between the universal and existential quantifier should be different from the classical conception. The Tree Proof Generator just tells us what the classical conception is. It says nothing about whether it should be the way it is. For example, on inclusive logic your (2) does not follow. (Banno often begs the question with the Tree Proof Generator in these metalogical discussions.)

Maybe it's just me, but I fail to understand how and why someone would treat ∃ and ∀ differently, as far as the discussion about ontological commitment goes. — Arcane Sandwich

Note that I proposed this, as it avoids the negation puzzles:

This is what we should probably assess, even though (3) is farcical:

3) ∀x(Sx ∧ Bx) - Everything is a beautiful siren.
4) ∃x(Sx ∧ Bx) - Therefore, some [existing] siren is beautiful.

i.e. "If this is valid, then the universal quantifier must have ontological import." — Leontiskos

...but the difficulty may be unavoidable, given that no one would actually accept (3) were it ontologically committing. That is, someone who holds that universal quantification is ontologically committing would almost never use the universal quantifier to make unconditional claims, such as Sx ∧ Bx.

I say that neither of them does. — Arcane Sandwich

I agree. More precisely, logic should be semantic in the first place, not ontological.* This is that difference between immediate signification and ultimate signification. When we proffer a logical sentence or argument, we are engaged in a form of ampliation. We are saying, at least in the first place, "How does this look to you? I am not committing to it. Let's first consider it as a thesis before committing to anything ontologically." Nevertheless, this "consideration" involves ontology secundum quid, precisely because part of our consideration is a consideration of the ontological question. Of course Quine might claim that we are never really arguing over existence, but that seems wrong on its face. With that said, the radical difference that arises by shifting to a "particularizing" quantifier is often underestimated.

(This is similar to Kimhi's quest to find force in Frege's content.)

* Note that this is precisely why essentialism is frowned upon in modern circles: because the modern form of logic is prejudiced against it. The closest predicate logic can get is modal essentialism, which is at best a problematic, second-rate form of essentialism. This is why Klima reworks the logical landscape before arguing for traditional essentialism. He provides a semantic logic that is neutral to the ontological question of essentialism before setting out the sense of traditional essentialism. He takes away the modern logician's hammer and replaces it with a more flexible tool before offering them something other than a nail.

I’d rather not be accused of making accusations — Wayfarer

Well <here> is the accusation I had in mind, and I pointed out the same error in two subsequent posts, here and here.

I think it is important to understand that Johnson is not begging the question, but the point is made and I'll leave it there.

- You find SEP unreliable?

In Free Logic or Inclusive Logic, the existential quantifier explicitly asserts existence when paired with a predicate like ∃x(x=t), and existence becomes a property rather than a background assumption tied to the quantifiers. — Banno

This is the point at issue, and according to SEP it is at best a controversial claim:

Whether such [Meinongian] logics can legitimately be considered free is controversial. On older conceptions, free logic forbids any quantification over non-existing things...

Historically, quantification over domains containing objects that do not exist has been widely dismissed as ontologically irresponsible. Quine (1948) famously maintained that existence is just what an existential quantifier expresses. — 5.5 Meinongian Logics | Free Logic | SEP

So free logic is not free of Quinian intuitions, even though there is a push to abandon Quine's formula and make the logics more purely semantic, at least in some quarters. But I don't want to obscure the original question:

Does the statement "All sirens are beautiful" have ontological import, in your view? — Arcane Sandwich

But it's equally the case that Johnson misunderstands Berkeley. Johnson is intending to demonstrate that Berkeley's argument entails that the stone does not really exist, but Berkeley doesn't make such a claim. — Wayfarer

And therefore:

What you are accusing him of is ignoratio elenchus, not begging the question. — Leontiskos

I clarify this because you have accused others (including myself) of the so-called "argumentum ad lapidem," and so it is worth recognizing that it is not the informal fallacy of begging the question (which is what the Wikipedia writer is really claiming). Both are informal fallacies, but one requires a response/clarification and one does not.

Ignoratio Elenchi

Johnson's exclamation is the historical origin of the expression 'argumentum ad lapidem'. — Wayfarer

If Wikipedia says that Johnson was begging the question, then I say that Wikipedia is wrong. It happens.

Just out of curiosity, how would you handle the claim that the universal quantifier must have ontological import, if the existential quantifier has it? It would seem that whatever import ∃ has, ∀ must have it as well. — Arcane Sandwich

If Ux(Sx⊃Bx) then ∃x(Sx⊃Bx) follows — Banno

He seems to be asking whether the ontological import of existential quantification implies the ontological import of universal quantification. I think the point you are making has to do with what is called "inclusive logic" (or rather, inclusive logic is what fiddles with the ontological import of the universal quantifier):

It follows because, in classical first-order predicate logic, universal sentences have existential import: ‘∀x φ(x)’ logically entails ‘∃x φ(x)’. If we want to allow ‘∀x φ(x)’ to be true even when there are no φs (because there is nothing at all), then we do not want it to carry any ontological commitment. Ontological commitments should reside entirely with the existential quantifier. Implementing this is easy. We simply do logic so as to include interpretations with an empty domain—so-called, inclusive logic. According to the truth conditions for quantifiers in inclusive logic, all universal sentences are true in an empty domain, and all existential sentences are false. Once we have made the shift to inclusive logic, we can also say, what seems right, that conditional existential sentences—such as, ‘∃x φ(x) ⊃ ∃x y(x)’—carry no ontological commitment. — Inclusive Logic/Free Logic | Ontological Commitment | SEP

I think free logic has to do with the ontological commitments accompanying singular terms or unbound variables. Instead of rejecting them like Quine did, free logic retains singular terms but deprives them of any accompanying ontological commitment (cf. the same SEP section).

Thus for free logic this does not follow: If (Sy ∧ By) then ∃x(Sx ∧ Bx)
(Because the singular term y is not ontologically committing, whereas the existential quantifier is ontologically committing. Hence you could talk about beautiful sirens without committing to their existence.)

Just out of curiosity, how would you handle the claim that the universal quantifier must have ontological import, if the existential quantifier has it? — Arcane Sandwich

Quine certainly thought so, but I don't know the arguments for that claim. That is, to say that if the existential quantifier has ontological import then the universal quantifier must also have ontological import is to reject inclusive logic.

Note that for the medievals affirmative categoricals are "ontologically committing":

If any of the two terms of an affirmative categorical is “empty”, then the term in question refers to nothing. But then, [...] “every affirmative proposition whose subject or predicate refers to nothing is false.” — Gyula Klima, Existence and Reference in Medieval Logic, 3

---

1) ∀x(Sx ∧ Bx) - All sirens are beautiful.
2) ∃x(Sx ∧ Bx) - Therefore, some sirens are beautiful. — Arcane Sandwich

If Ux(Sx⊃Bx) then ∃x(Sx⊃Bx) follows — Banno

Note too how Banno's rewriting of the conjunction as an implication adds an additional layer of complexity. He rewrote it because Arcane's (1) actually means, "Everything is a beautiful siren," but the reason Arcane wanted a conjunction is because he was interested in ontological commitment, and a conditional obscures the idea of ontological commitment. This is what we should probably assess, even though (3) is farcical:

3) ∀x(Sx ∧ Bx) - Everything is a beautiful siren.
4) ∃x(Sx ∧ Bx) - Therefore, some siren is beautiful.

i.e. "If this is valid, then the universal quantifier must have ontological import."

This is nowadays taught as an example of an informal fallacy ('argumentum ad lapidem') — Wayfarer

I have never heard it taught that way. It seems like an erroneous reading. Here is what Wikipedia says:

Appeal to the stone, also known as argumentum ad lapidem, is a logical fallacy that dismisses an argument as untrue or absurd. The dismissal is made by stating or reiterating that the argument is absurd, without providing further argumentation. — Wikipedia

I don't think it's hard to see that Johnson is not doing this. He is not saying, "You're wrong because you're wrong." In fact he is giving an argument, not begging the question. What you are accusing him of is ignoratio elenchus, not begging the question.

What is his argument?

1. If Berkeley were right, *this* would never happen.
2. But it did happen.
3. Therefore, Berkeley is wrong.

Note that this is perfectly valid. You are merely disputing premise (1).

Further, how does one dispute premise (1) without themselves begging the question? They must explicate Berkeley's theory at least to the extent that a rejection of (1) is understood not to be an ad hoc rejection. That is, the listener has to come away saying, "Ah, I see what Berkeley was saying, why he was saying it, and why it does not entail (1)." That's basically the question: supposing Johnson's first premise is false, then what does follow from Berkeley's "idealism"?

(I've read the article, but I want to revisit Berkeley before I would comment on it.)

That is, it in effect has two domains, one of things that exist and one of things that... do not exist. — Banno

Rather, the rejection of Quine's "to be" usually involves the idea that existence is not a predetermined category or domain. So, fiction aside, the crucial point is that you can posit an idea while prescinding from the question of whether or not it exists.

How Bunge does this would be interesting to know, but note that he does not separate existent things from non-existent things. Instead he separates existing concepts/constructs from existing things. My guess is that he would say that an existing concept may or may not attach to an existing thing. Presumably Quine's point would hold with concepts, namely that there are no non-existing concepts. The intuition behind Quine's point is upheld throughout all of historical philosophy,* but what usually happens is that mental existence is second-tier, such that we can usefully talk about thoughts, intentions, beliefs, hopes, etc., without according them the status of things (entia). Nevertheless, there are no non-existent thoughts - at least identifiable thoughts.

* The intuition being what Novak calls the principle of reference, "(PR) It is impossible to refer to that which is not."

No clear way of showing just how words refer to what we take them to refer to? — Janus

I think that's a good candidate. Quine may be saying little more than that terms are inscrutable apart from context ("holism").

What is Quine's intended conclusion? I don't think it is as radical as is being assumed. In a 1970 paper he says that the gavagai example is very limited, and demonstrates the inscrutability of terms rather than indeterminacy of translation of sentences. — Leontiskos

There is an irony in the general analytic tendency to ignore medieval thought (continentals do too, but less). No other period reflects the rigor and professionalization that analytic thought praises, nor the emphasis on logic, semantics, and signification, more than (particularly late) medieval thought. The early modern period has an explosion of creativity in part because philosophy was radically democratized and deprofessionalized (leading to both creativity of a good sort and some of a very stupid sort). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, yes, yes! The reason I find Aquinas so useful on forums like this is because he is so close to analytic methodology. There is literally a school of thought called, "Analytic Thomism." But there are those who recognize this, such as Peirce, Deely, and Klima. A big part of Klima's project is demonstrating how medieval logic was more advanced than modern logic, and solves the modern problems better (such as, say, Russell's King of France).

And as I pointed out earlier, both approaches achieve a systematic quality that can make them opaque to outsiders, and that when developed too far will lead to a revolt from laymen.

It's unfortunate because so many debates are just rehashes that could benefit from past work, whereas contemporary thought also has a strong nominalist bias that even effects how realism might be envisaged or advocated for, and the earlier period does not have these same blinders. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, although it is worth remembering that the late medieval period became very "nominalist," and therefore at that point you get very precise debates on so many of these issues. The fact that the nominalists had so simplified the landscape was a big factor in what survived. The Via Antiqua was harder to transmit than the simple nominalist framework.

At the end of the day, it's not about Quine vs Bunge. It's about whether or not we ourselves agree or disagree with what they're saying. Who knows? Maybe they're both wrong. — Arcane Sandwich

Good points.

There are many key points that I disagree with him, for example I don't accept his dichotomy of conceptual existence and real existence (there's only real existence as far as I'm concerned). — Arcane Sandwich

For the sake of simplicity I removed from a recent post the comment, "The trick for anyone opposing Quinian Actualism is drawing out the relation between conceptual and real existence."

The reason I like the incorporation of Bunge into the thread has to do with what I called the precritical view, which is what I see as the proper starting point. If we start with the view that existence is not a predicate we are likely doing little more than parroting some popular philosophical idea. I mean, if everyone on the forum had a degree in (the exact same area) of philosophy, then sure, we could pick up a controversy at the most complex and developed juncture. But it is far from the truth that everyone has a degree in philosophy, much less the exact same area of philosophy. On such a forum the precritical view cannot be wholly ignored. Bunge provides confidence to the one who thinks it might be a dumb question to ask why existence can't be a predicate.

If all of their dispositions to verbal behavior under all possible sensory stimulations were the same, then what would happen if they started talking to each other? — Apustimelogist

Doesn't the quote you provide imply that, if they started talking to each other, they may talk past each other entirely? If, "the meanings or ideas expressed in their identically triggered and identically sounded utterances could diverge radically," then they could simply talk past each other. Are you saying that even if they do talk past each other, they won't tend to register each other's speech as inscrutable?

Quine clearly thinks that inscrutability of reference is not a barrier to communication — Apustimelogist

What definition of "inscrutable" would you offer, such that inscrutable reference poses no barrier to communication?

- Cheers. :clap:

becasue it seems to me to be much the same as what Quine says, but in set-theoretical language — Banno

Then I'm not sure you appreciate what a living, breathing position opposed to Quine's would look like. If that is right then it makes sense that you couldn't conceive of anyone objecting to Quine.

Bunge offers an existence predicate where Quine refuses the very idea of an existence predicate. That's the central difference with regard to the issue we have been discussing.

And here he sensible removes empty sets. Can I point out that this is very close (perhaps identical?) to a set-theoretical version of Quine's "to be is to be the value of a bound variable"?

((P) ≠ ∅) ≡ ∃(x) (Px) — Banno

If we want to compare Quine and Bunge on existence, shouldn't we compare what Quine says on existence to what Bunge says on existence? You are comparing what Bunge says on the reality of a property to what Quine says on the the existence of individuals. That seems misdirected.

But even here, Bunge says that a property is real when there is at least one individual that possesses it; whereas Quine says that quantification brings with it ontological commitment (which Bunge in fact explicitly rejects).

Still, what to think about your "removal of empty sets"? Note that for Quine an empty domain is disallowed simpliciter. There is no formal stricture because there is no existence predicate that would need to incorporate it. Contrariwise, Bunge is giving a definition of a property's being real. For any property, if there is at least one individual that possess it, then it is real, and if there is not at least one individual possessing it, then it is not real. So even if we compare properties to individuals and "real" to "exists," even then there remains the fundamental difference, namely that Bunge provides for himself the ability to say, "Property P is not real," whereas Quine refuses to provide for himself the ability to say, "X does not exist."

(The standard move of appealing to the empty set in order to characterize existence is precisely what Quine objected to, because that appeal inevitably presupposes some kind of existence predication.)

And the answer given is much the same as that offered by first-order logic. — Banno

If this is true, then it's only because first-order logic has abandoned Quine's understanding of quantification. For Quine nothing "Pegasizes."

(Hopefully @Arcane Sandwich will clarify the issue as well as any mistakes I've made.)

The trouble starts when "Some sirens are beautiful" is treated as a non-empty set; — Banno

's post anticipates this objection if you continue reading the quotes in sequential order, eventually arriving at:

(i) x exists conceptually = df For some set C of constructs, ECx;
(ii) x exists really = df For some set Θ of things, EΘx.
For example the Pythagorean theorem exists in the sense that it belongs in Euclidean geometry. Surely it did not come into existence before someone in the Pythagorean school invented it. But it has been in conceptual existence, i.e. in geometry, ever since. Not that geometry has an autonomous existence, i.e. that it subsists independently of being thought about. It is just that we make the indispensable pretence that constructs exist provided they belong in some body of ideas - which is a roundabout fashion of saying that constructs exist as long as there are rational beings capable of thinking them up. Surely this mode of existence is neither ideal existence (or existence in the Realm of Ideas) nor real or physical existence. To invert Plato's cave metaphor we may say that ideas are but the shadows of things - and shadows, as is well known, have no autonomous existence. — Bunge (1977: 157)

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But if our domain is Greek myths, we are welcome to say that "There are beautiful sirens" — Banno

If we want to depart from Quine then we are welcome to say that. And we should depart from Quine, so I agree that we are welcome to say that.

One could retort that in "quantifying over" myth-concepts we are rightly committing to their existence, but for Quine there are no existing myth-concepts, and therefore it is incorrect to "quantify over" them. The disagreement itself is a substantial existence-dispute over the existence of myth-concepts like Pegasus, and if one cannot "quantify over" myth-concepts then one cannot have the disagreement over their existence.

Although I have only skimmed it, I think Klima's, "St. Anselm's Proof," (formal citation) (original chapter) would be an excellent paper for a reading group. It covers most everything we are talking about here (intentional identity, reference, interlocutors' possibilia, Quine, systemic impasse...). It would also be engaging given how interested people are in Anselm's proof.

Eventually I want to either do a reading group on this, essences, or else universals. Universals would be the most accessible, but any of them would contribute to mitigating the ignorance and prejudice surrounding these topics.

The idea of existence as quantification is rather, wherever I have seen it presented, that people come with their ontologies, and we can now examine them in terms of quantification (rather than say entailment) in order to determine what their ontological commitments are—not "all philosophers should accept the same set of universal ontological commitments, which include anything we can possibly speak of (but don't worry about this being too broad because ontological commitments now carry no weight at all)". This makes the whole notion of Quine's approach as a "test" between theories meaningless. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a key point in my opinion. If a logical system is to be able to accommodate various different ontologies, which can then be compared to one another, then it cannot have existence- or ontology-commitments. And of course there is an important sense in which Quine's system aspires to have this character, but a system which has this character cannot define existence into its implicit formal semantics. One cannot test two competing theories if one cannot recognize that one of the theories is quantifying over non-existents. And if one cannot test two competing theories then one cannot argue, and if one cannot argue then one cannot do what logic was invented to do.

More simply, when Quine says that "to be is to be the value of a bound variable," he is not talking about existence, but rather about putative existence. "When you bind a variable you take the referent(s) to exist," not, "When you bind a variable the referent(s) exist(s)."

Well, at least for Quine there is only one logic (justifying that is another thing.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, the idea is that when Quine runs up against an interlocutor who is quantifying over what Quine holds to not exist, Quine will appeal to the meta-language (instead of running the risk of begging the question by appealing to his own domain). In doing this Quine is inevitably "quantifying over" possibilia in the meta language. That's how you talk to another human being you disagree with, after all.

Then the deeper point is that whether you appeal to the meta language or an object language (that can handle the disagreement), what you've got to do is give arguments for your position. The only reason Quine would appeal to the meta language is because his object language lacks the resources to adjudicate the dispute. If Quine stuck to his guns and refused to quantify over possibilia then he would not be allowed the move of telling his opponents that entities in their domain do not exist. That is, a logically consistent Quine cannot argue with anyone, because argument involves showing your interlocutor that something they believe to exist, does not.

In other words:

...for what is central to Quine's criterion is that one cannot quantify over entities without incurring ontological commitment to those entities. To use quantifiers to refer to entities while denying that one is ontologically committed is to fail to own up to one's commitments, and thereby engage in a sort of intellectual doublethink. Quantification is the basic mode of reference to objects, and reference to objects is always ontologically committing. — Ontological Commitment | SEP

If one cannot refer to an entity that one is not ontologically committed to, then one cannot engage an interlocutor who believes differently than oneself. The pluralists should be especially wary of such a scheme.

This sounds like the anti-metaphysical movement redux. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is, but at least in this case, "They know not what they do."

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Yes and no. What I would rather is that "existence/being" should be declared meaningless, dead by the thousand cuts of equivocation and ambiguity. — J

Then what are Sider and his opponent disagreeing on when they posit two different ontological structures? Existence is what people argue over, @J. Get rid of 'existence' and you've gotten rid of every possible disagreement. For example, when we disagree over an interpretation of Quine we are disagreeing over the existence of evidence for an interpretation. Then we can go to his texts (which is something we have not at all done in this thread) and adjudicate the question of what exists in those texts. Get rid of existence and you've gotten rid of every disagreement. I don't know that you have the slightest conception of what you are talking about.

"Now I completely agree that this [Quine's motto] tells us next to nothing. [i.e. it is trivial.] (In particular, it is neutral about some of the uses of "exist" that traditional metaphysics wants to privilege as "real existence" or "what being means" or some such.). But nor should it be controversial." — J

The possibilism debate isn't resolved with a quip. Seriously, go read a paper on the possibilism debate. Inform yourself a bit before you offer an opinion. You don't even seem to understand the stakes or the motivation behind Quine's quip.

no matter what words we use for our labels — J

Clearly you are the one who struggles with metaphysical superglue. No one is fretting over the token e-x-i-s-t-e-n-c-e.

What it shows is that structure -- which is what we care about — J

"Is what" => <the existing feature>. If we care about the structure of the world, then we care about how the world exists. Structure1 represents one way in which the world exists, and Structure2 represents another way in which the world exists. When you say, "The world's structure is Structure2," you have made an existence claim. You have said, "Structure2 exists as a feature of the world and Structure1 does not." And when you say, "The world's structure is not Structure1," you have quantified over something that is non-existent-but-possible.

Quine clearly thinks that inscrutability of reference is not a barrier to communication — Apustimelogist

Why do you think that?