as I have answered you about the stabbing that reanimates — schopenhauer1

No you haven't. You haven't answered <the most recent post> on the so-called "stabbing counterargument." You just pointed to Benatar's book hopefully without engaging any of the points.

Also to add, yet again, when I mentioned Benatar, [...] It wasn't to introduce Benatar simpliciter. — schopenhauer1

Well it sounds like you were not talking about Benatar simpliciter and I was not talking about Benatar simpliciter. So we can stop talking about Benatar simpliciter and instead talk about the determinate and static argument that we have associated with him.

My "thesis," to use your term, is that the Creed starts with the words, "We believe...." As such, I'm satisfied it's not just a throw-away line at the beginning of a prayer, but instead a much thought out and carefully weighed expression of how they thought Christians ought to profess their - their what? - their faith. Nor would I call this a "thesis," it is a fact. — tim wood

No, your thesis is that Christians who believe in God's existence do not necessarily affirm that it is true that God exists. Given that you aren't honest enough to admit this after so many posts, I think we can be done. I don't like talking to folk who rely on evasion, equivocation, and ambiguity to avoid engaging in real philosophy.

No. I wasn't making any such argument. I was just pointing out what is easily recognized with sufficient knowledge of history. — wonderer1

So you were just pointing something out for no reason and with no point or purpose or argument? This is highly unlikely.

Well, I think it is ambiguous and I didn't recognize that. However, because he says the "the many" are not fit to rule and therefore implies that some, but not all, are fit to rule, I should have realized that your interpretation is correct. So you are right. — Ludwig V

Okay, thanks for that.

I'm in a bit of a quandary here. There are two conclusions in this argument. One is about leaders. I don't have any violent objection to that argument. I think it's false, but I'm not sure that I can be bothered to refute it. In practice, it wouldn't make any difference. The other is about slaves, and I cannot accept that it is right, or even all right, to enslave any human being. — Ludwig V

The two arguments come together insofar as masters/rulers and slaves/servants are two sides of the same coin. If one is fit to rule then they are not fit to be a slave, and if one is fit to be a slave then they are not fit to rule. This maps to a proficiency with the mind vs. a proficiency with the body, "Hence natural slaves will be those from whom the best work one can get is the use of the body" (Simpson, 5).

If we can identify characteristics that make someone fit to rule, then it follows that people who do not possess those characteristics are not fit to rule; it does not follow that they are slaves, or fit to be slaves. We could, instead, characterize them as natural followers or maybe natural independents (compare Simpson on tame and wild animals p.4) — Ludwig V

For Aristotle a slave is a natural dependent in that they require the economia of a master to flourish. To take a bit of a contrived example, the worker on the early Ford assembly line requires Henry Ford's ingenuity in order to have a wage, and Henry Ford's ingenuity requires manual laborers in order to come to completion. The difference is that Henry Ford is capable of performing the manual laborer's job whereas the manual laborer is not capable of performing Henry Ford's job, and because of this the dependency is not entirely symmetrical.

B. You may be mistaken, however, to think that "the rational are more fit rulers than the irrational" is empirical. I may be wrong, but I think that, for Aristotle at least, reason is the faculty that enables us to get things right. A leader needs to decide the best thing to do and how to do it; so, by definition leaders need to be rational. — Ludwig V

I see it as a truth that could be confirmed empirically, but need not be.

If slavery comes naturally to some people, why is it necessary to enslave them? — Ludwig V

Simpson's point in the quote you provide is that it is not necessary to enslave them (nor to not-enslave them).

A natural slave would accept slavery when it was offered. Voluntary slavery is a contradiction in terms. — Ludwig V

Voluntary slavery is not a contradiction if we attend to Aristotle's terms. Indeed, it is not clear that voluntary slavery of any kind is an analytical contradiction.

That's a most confusing sense of "nature". In the real world, disease is entirely natural. That's why we take many artificial measures to restore us to health.
We are in two minds about nature. Sometimes we consider that what is natural is good. Sometimes we consider that it is bad. It depends on the case. No general evaluation can stand up to the facts. — Ludwig V

A disease is contrary to human nature. That is the point. If it were not contrary to human nature then the human will and immune system would not oppose it. It is not being said that disease is contrary to Nature in some absolute sense.

So this is why we shouldn't debate Benatar's full position here without actually having Benatar's full positions available to us. — schopenhauer1

Whenever we are considering a position on TPF we are considering a determinate and static position. Thus "Benatar's position" within our conversation denotes the argument you attributed to Benatar early in our conversation (link). You used a Wikipedia article and a personal gloss to represent the argument. That is what I am referring to.

Now it seems that you recognize that his argument cannot meet my objection, and the logical thing for you to do is to say, "Okay, I see the problem. I will have to get back to you on this. Maybe I will look at my Benatar books and see if he has anything to say to this."

It is not a legitimate move to say, "No, that objection doesn't count because you haven't read his book(s) on the topic." If we had to read a book on TPF every time we made an argument there would only be a few posts each week. You presented a version of Benatar's argument, I responded to it, and now the onus is on you to respond in your own words. Take your time and review Benatar's books if you like, but don't say that my objection is null because I haven't read a book. Besides, the first you've spoken about his books addressing this objection was yesterday.

@schopenhauer1

Last night I had a dream that I was back in elementary school and on this day we were taking standardized tests. There was an oppressive seriousness and nervousness about the whole thing, as if 5th graders were sitting for the SAT. On top of this, due to some sort of funding problem the test questions were poorly written and the test booklets included copy errors and print deficiencies, which added a deciphering element to the testing. In the grand scheme of things the whole endeavor was a bit ridiculous, and there was the sense that if one of the 5th graders had started giggling the whole room would have broken out in laughter, popping the bubble of faux seriousness.

This seems reflective of antinatalism. It is Harry Potter exorcising the Boggart with the charge, "Riddikulus!" That is the correct response to Benatar, and the reductio is meant to aid one in seeing it. The entire paradigm is warped and corrupted, and the argument is bizarrely indifferent to the very moral nuances that it ought to be self-consciously attentive to. Such an argument is like a necessitarian Magic 8-Ball with only one response, "Therefore, antinatalism," which response is given regardless of the circumstances.

A lot of this comes back to the wisdom of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. A key to unlocking that text is the idea that the foundation of practical ethics is identifying and emulating the virtuous man. Much of Aristotle text is just drawing out what we already know about the virtuous man, and part of this is the fact that the virtuous man possesses liberality or generousness. When we simply set the generous man alongside the stingy man we know indubitably that the generous man is to be emulated and the stingy man is ridiculous. The virtue of liberality has to do with one's fundamental orientation towards life, and this is inevitably related to one's fundamental orientation towards posterity.

When a child cuts their finger and collapses into hysteria the witty parent will take them in their lap, study the finger carefully and seriously, and then pronounce the judgment, "There's nothing for it. We need to amputate!" The child cannot help but laugh, and in laughing their whole demeanor is changed. The parent's playful humor makes the child generous and overcomes their stinginess and self-centered gravity.

In fact I was recently at my cousin's wedding, and the food at our table was extremely late, arriving about 90 minutes after dinner was supposed to begin. At about 30 minutes into the dinner my nephew received his kid's meal: chicken strips, mac and cheese, and cauliflower. Everyone was gratified to see that at least someone had received their meal, and it looked to be the ideal meal for a hungry toddler. But to everyone's surprise he lost his shit and had a complete meltdown. This caused the whole table to erupt in laughter and festivity. We later learned that his mother had been misinforming him for weeks that the wedding would be wonderful and he would have a delicious meal of chicken strips and French fries - oops! I don't know that he even prefers French fries to mac and cheese, but the expectation threw him. It was a teaching moment for him where he learned that life is bigger than his misplaced French fries, and in time he will learn that life is bigger than many other disappointments, too. As Eichendorff said, "Thou art He who gently breaks about our heads what we build, so that we can see the sky—therefore I have no complaint." (The irony here is that children solve the problem of antinatalism, for it is hard to believe that anyone with the task of parenting a child could subscribe to antinatalism.)

It seems that all the opposed are agreed that antinatalism will not be cured by more of the overly serious, self-centered gravity of analytical argument. Such is not its cause and such is not its cure. What the antinatalist lacks is the subtle virtuous demeanor that Aristotle attempts to paint, and such a thing cannot be bought and sold with mere arguments. The cure for the ridiculousness of antinatalism is laughter, for like the child on the parent's lap we cannot help but laugh at the prognosis. You need only join in and we will be laughing with you and not at you. :wink:

It's just an aspect of the inherent divisiveness of Christianity. — wonderer1

This is a good example of the non sequitur I referred to earlier. "Christians are divisive, therefore Mormons are Christians." The conclusion does not follow. The argument could only plausibly function as some variety of ad hominem.

Not at all.. If one is reanimated when stabbed, that changes the very conditions of the world itself. — schopenhauer1

Why should I believe 3a or 4a?

The other problem here is that most 2a's presuppose the falsity of 1a, whereas 2 does not presuppose the falsity of 1. Or in other words, Benatar's argument contains no implicit logical clause, "...Unless the world is situated such that happiness far outweighs suffering for all." That's the very problem with his argument that is being highlighted.

Contrariwise, prohibitions against stabbing are premised on pain, injury, and mortality, and therefore the sort of world you suggest logically invalidates the prohibitions (and hence 3a). This is completely different from Benatar's argument, for the case I gave clearly does not invalidate his prohibition. That's why, in a fit of honesty, you told me that the question may need to be reconsidered in light of such new circumstances. So if you want to pull your head out of the sand you will answer the question: What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to.

So AGAIN, you ignore the answer I gave you? That is twice you ignored my answer. Why didn't you quote what I quoted you?? — schopenhauer1

Because your quote was a dodge. I asked you why you would reconsider in that world and you pulled the escape hatch and refused to answer, instead changing the subject. I answered your red herring in the thread:

It wouldn't be wrong in the same way as it is now. But your theoretical does not function as a reductio to any argument that I have offered, and that is the primary difference. — Leontiskos

Here is the argument:

The problem occurs if this is a valid argument:

1. Suppose every living human being is guaranteed a pinprick of pain followed by 80 years of pure happiness.
2. [Insert Benatar's antinatalist argument here]
3. Therefore, we should never procreate

Are you starting to see the reductio? The reductio has force because we know that any (2) that can get you from (1) to (3) is faulty argumentation. — Leontiskos

What is your parallel supposed to be?

1a. Suppose one is reanimated whenever they are stabbed.
2a. [Insert anti-stabbing argument here].
3a. Therefore, we should not stab.
4a. (Any 2a that can get you from 1a to 3a is faulty argumentation.)

This fails because we have no reason to believe either 3a or 4a. There is no parity between these two approaches. It's an ad hoc dodge.

This is rhetorical blather. First off, I DON"T EVEN USE Benatar wholesale. His asymmetry, if I do mention it, is a way to jump off but I have my own variations of it, which I have taken painstaking time to outline over the course of MANY threads over MANY years.. To have you pin me to one line of reasoning, like that is a subtle but malicious form of uncharitable reading.. But keep mistaking me for Benatar. — schopenhauer1

You are drawing up more escape hatches because you see your argument failing. You are the one who brought up Benatar, not me. It isn't courageous or rational to give your arguments conditionally, such that if they succeed then your position is vindicated but if they fail then you're none the worse for wear.

Funny you defend this ghettoizing of the topic of antinatalism (something you vociferously disagree with), and yet you bring up a topic we discussed way back.. Something which I can't easily look up BECAUSE of this ghettoization whereby EVERYTHING related to antinatalism, no matter what thread/topic is squished into one long thread. So perhaps it is the limitations of PlushForums, but I am proposing a way to give people the ability to create new threads on the topic, so that conversations can be logically viewed. — schopenhauer1

Use the link I already gave you, which makes it super easy to navigate the discussion. You can make such a search more precise by searching for "schopenhauer1" instead of "." In that case it will only display the posts of mine within this thread that include your username. You can also reverse the search to see a chronological list of your posts to me within this thread. Problem solved. :wink:

Oh fuck no, because I don't see this world as ever being just a pinprick. Did you find my response? — schopenhauer1

By burying your head in the sand in this way you prove yourself unserious.

Suppose we lived in that world. And suppose Benatar came along and gave the same argument you think is so great. What would you say to him? Would you "shh!" him and sweep him under the rug!? "Don't give that argument in this world! I like birth in this world! Arguments aren't about what's true, they are about what I want, and we don't talk about the arguments that don't suit what I want!"

You're doing the same basic thing when you bury your head in the sand. You recognize that the argument proves too much but you want to believe its conclusion so you refuse to address the objection. This is precisely the sort of irrational motive I spoke about in the other thread. It's like playing soccer with a guy who uses his hands whenever he starts losing. My solution is to find someone else, who is actually interested in playing soccer. Or find a game in which the person is not irrationally devoted to a predetermined outcome. For whatever reason you show yourself unable to play by the rules of rational argument when it comes to anti-natalism.

- To be fair, many of my posts in this thread were written with the awareness that they are vulnerable to imprecise objections, and deification represents one of those imprecise objections. Given that there is nothing precise happening in this thread, I don't find it useful to try to erect bastions against possible misinterpretation at each step. Still, my edited posts in this thread involve additions, not retractions.

Christians and Mormons are a bit like bees and wasps. The uninitiated is liable to confuse them but someone who understands their significant differences—their respective theologies and histories—will see them as very different animals. Of course if one doesn't care and only wants to avoid being stung, then one can think of bees and wasps as identical.

schopenhauer1 would seem proof this ain't so. :grin: — apokrisis

Yes, but it should go without saying that schopenhauer1 is the exception to that claim. :grin:

I enjoyed your recent posts, beginning on page 32. I suspect schopenhauer1 regrets pulling you into the thread.

- My two cents - I think the decision that was made was the right one. It's not ideal, but I don't see a better option given the current constraints of PlushForums.

---

(from other thread)

At one point in our exchange you nearly stopped dodging my reductio. At that point you said:

Supposing only a pin-prick was the suffering, I guess the scenario could be reconsidered. — schopenhauer1

And I replied:

Reconsidered on what basis? — Leontiskos

To recap paraphrastically:

• Leontiskos: Benatar's argument for anti-natalism would hold good even in a world where everyone received a pinprick of pain followed by 80 years of pure happiness. Therefore the argument is not reasonable; it proves too much.
• Schopenhauer1: Supposing only a pin-prick was the suffering, I guess the question could be reconsidered.
• Leontiskos: Reconsidered in what way? If Benatar's argument is sound then it would hold good in that world. If it would not hold good in that world then it is not sound.

The fact that you admitted to reconsideration shows that you do see the force of the reductio, but you failed to follow through and actually do the hard work of reconsidering Benatar's argument and your position.

Where's yours? — schopenhauer1

Presumably where I left them, and whatever other threads you were then drawing anti-natalism into.

This thought experiment is highly unsophisticated and further, irrational. Suppose somehow? The somehow, or the 'in some way' would have to be explicitly stated and put forth, otherwise it's an exercise in futility. — Ray Liikanen

Yes, true.

It's a bit like asking, "If you left the United States, where would you be?" Well, it depends a great deal on where, when, and how one leaves the United States.

Or else, "If your car broke down, what parts and tools would you buy to fix it?" Erm..

But to be fair to the OP, it sets a suitable pace for what has been a remarkably silly thread.

Just for fun, here is a phenomenological discussion of why new car colours suddenly look so weird and wrong. — apokrisis

I haven't watched the video yet, but my guess is that it has something to do with them being nardo putty-looking ass whips.

- That post was never edited.

...And deification is an example of the Christian participatory metaphysic, not a counterexample against it.

- :up:

My sense is similar, namely that anti-natalism is a kind of second-order malady rather than a first-order thesis. It seems to stand on the circumstantial situation of the proponent rather than on its own intellectual legs, and my guess is that anyone who holds it on purely intellectual grounds could be dissuaded in time. It's hard to understand it any other way when the arguments are not sufficient to justify the conclusion, nor the tenacity with which the conclusion is held.

They believe they'll one day become Gods, no? — BitconnectCarlos

Sure, and because of that they might view Christianity the way Buddhists view Buddhism, namely as a vehicle that can be dispensed with once the destination is reached. But to make the Christian participatory metaphysic temporary and superable is already to have left Christianity behind.

Trying not to forget about this one:

My position argues from the point of view that even chaos can’t help but self-organise itself into some form or order. Chaos negates itself. Therefore order emerges. — apokrisis

Okay.

Yes. When learning about Peirce as a group of biologists and complexity theorists in the 1990s, the Peircean scholars making sense of his vast volume of unpublished work were mostly theology researchers. Deely was one. — apokrisis

That makes sense.

It depends how much information we have about the situation. If you know that the U(1) symmetry of electromagnetism is the simplest possible chiral form, then it is not a surprise that the Big Bang did not stop evolving until it arrived at that final simplicity.

If you know that the chemical reaction with the most bang for buck on the planet Earth is the redox reaction of carbon-oxygen bonds, then it is no surprise that life on Earth kept evolving until it not only could harness this reaction but even set up the planet to have its Gaian balance of oxygen and carbon.

So the basic entropic race drove the Cosmos towards an ultimate symmetry breaking simplicity, and Life, as the negentropic response, was driven towards its maximum negentropic advantage.

The goals existed in dialectical fashion. And they forced Nature through a whole set of unlikely hoops so as to arrive there. — apokrisis

Okay, good. This helps me understand your thermodynamic approach with a bit more resolution.

Science earnt its keep by being the epistemology that delivered a mechanised world. Teleology could take a back seat as technology was the pragmatic point. Humans existed to supply the point of a world of machines.

But when it comes to now incorporating telos into science, the mathematical inevitability of topological order or dissipative structure is how that is happening.

That could be seen as a thumbs up for Platonism, divine immanence, idealism, or whatever. Or it could be seen as the arrival of a structuralist understanding of Nature that rides on the back of stuff like Lie groups, thermodynamics, path integrals, and Darwinian selection. — apokrisis

What would you see as the adjudicating factors between the two conceptions?

If we are approaching it from a purely scientific angle, then my hunch here is that Platonism requires at least some form of meaning- or explanation-recursion, and one which points in the direction of transcendence. This would be something like the Platonic rationale for rejecting a brute fact scheme. If such a thing is not present then I don't know where a scientific argument for Platonism would come from.

- Ah, well that unfortunately confirms my suspicions. It's good for you but bad for your cohort! :grimace:

Ultimately, for the Christian, what matters is who is in Christ. — BitconnectCarlos

Those who set themselves up as God are not in Christ.

- If you are going to continue to refuse to explain what your thesis is, then obviously I should stop wasting my time with you.

The point is that unicorns both exist and don't exist. That leaves the problem of defining "existence." Belief neatly sidesteps the problem. — tim wood

To say that something is and is not is a prima facie contradiction, and belief does not sidestep the problem in the least. What is required to solve the problem of the contradiction is a distinction:

• Unicorns exist as concepts in the human mind.
• Unicorns do not exist truly, in nature as primary substances.

Or:

• God exists as an immaterial being.
• God does not exist as a material being.

You can take it as a general rule of life that to say one believes X is to say that one believes X is true. I repeat:

What is the crux of the thesis you are proposing? It seems to me something like, <Christianity does not teach that God exists>, or else, <Christianity professes belief in God without in any way committing itself to God's existence>.

If this is not what you are saying, then what are you saying? — Leontiskos

Yet I'll take [X] over [Y]. — BitconnectCarlos

We are not discussing the question of who you "will take." We are discussing the question of whether Mormons are Christian.

- I have seen you do little more in this thread than make arguments from authority. The authorities you appeal to are SEP and "science," and you misinterpret them both. Each time you try to give actual arguments in your own words, the arguments fall to pieces, and this is no coincidence.

The convention "literally" has had to undergo a redefinition because of it's constant misuse. — AmadeusD

Yes, and as you seem to imply, this is a rather different claim than Michael's. It is the claim that we should stop thinking of redness as a property of pens, as opposed to the claim that red refers to a percept in common use.

'Red' is a word which does not refer to a percept.
If we like we can talk about red-qua-percept, and this is obviously to talk about a percept.
<We should redefine 'red' to mean red-qua-percept> is a claim, and it is a claim which I believe runs into rather significant problems.

We use language differently. Great! "red" conceptually is a percept (lets pretend) and "the red pen" or "the red percept" is a label which is conventionally used to cut-down the actual phrase "Items we use to write with, containing ink flowing to a nib, which reflects light in "such and such a range" so as to trigger, under normal circumstances, that percept referred to as "the colour red" as a property of the brain-generated image of the object viewed by the sensory organ". But we don't say that. We say "red pen". — AmadeusD

Look, pens and percepts are different kinds of realities, reflecting different categories. The categories are not interchangeable. And observe what happens when you try to interchange them:

• "the red pen" or "the red percept" is a label which is conventionally used to cut-down the actual phrase "Items we use to write with. . ."
  
  • 1. "the red pen" is a label which is conventionally used to cut-down the actual phrase "Items we use to write with. . ."
  • 2. "the red percept" is a label which is conventionally used to cut-down the actual phrase "Items we use to write with. . ."

Now I truncated your sentence for brevity, but note that (1) is true and (2) is false, and this is because pens and percepts are not interchangeable. A pen is an item we write with, whereas a percept is not. "Red pen" and "red percept" are two fundamentally different kinds of linguistic entities.

That the pen is red just is that it (ordinarily) appears red, and the word “red” in the phrase “appears red” does not refer to a mind-independent property of the pen but to the mental percept that looking at the pen (ordinarily) causes to occur. — Michael

This is another example of the category error conflation between an object-predication-intention and an efficient-cause-intention.

<"The pen appears red" does not refer to the pen but to a percept>

When we speak about the pen we are speaking about the pen, not about percepts. Pens and percepts are two different things. Maybe you (erroneously) think everyone should replace all of their color predications about pens with predications about percepts, but this in no way shows that when people talk about red pens they are doing nothing more than talking about percepts.

I don't plan to draw this out, but Banno's argument is worth affirming. I've had enough discussions with you to know that this conversation is going nowhere. In fact while having discussions with you in the past I received PMs from others, "Just be aware that conversations with Michael go nowhere. Don't inflate your expectations."

- Interesting. :up:

I am surprised to find these views among an undergraduate in Australia. Are you abnormal within your cohort, or is the rest of your generation on the same page?

Aristotle says that most Greeks are not fit to rule. It is implied that some are. Nothing is said or implied about all Greeks - or barbarians. — Ludwig V

Right, "Aristotle says that Greeks are fit to rule," does not mean that Aristotle says that every Greek is fit to rule.

The first sentence of Simpson's summary makes it quite clear that Aristotle equates the natural with the moral. So Aristotle's empirical case is not what we would call an empirical case at all. It is built round his moral principle that the rational should rule over the irrational. I'm sure he would accept that that is not always the case in practice. He would say that when it is not the case, something unnatural is going on, meaning that something wrong is going on. So his claim is fundamentally a moral claim, not empirical at all. — Ludwig V

Aristotle argues that the rational are more fit rulers than the irrational, and he thinks this is empirically demonstrable. He also argues that Greeks happen to possess the rational qualities most suited to ruling, which is also an empirical point.

But again:

Aristotle says that Greeks are fit to rule because they have x, y, and z characteristics. He does not say that Greeks are fit to rule because they are Greek. — Leontiskos

1. Anyone who possesses x, y, and z characteristics is fit to rule.
2. Greeks possess x, y, and z characteristics.
3. Therefore, Greeks are fit to rule.

Empirical arguments can be offered for (1), but when I spoke of the empiric nature of Aristotle's argument I was pointing to (2). This is because the counterargument against Aristotle (or else his successors) is that there is no middle term and therefore no argument. It is the idea that Aristotle has nothing more than a blind predilection for Greeks. But this is false, and because he gives an argument of this kind, if it can be shown that barbarians possess x, y, and z characteristics to the same extent that Greeks do, then Aristotle can be shown to be wrong about favoring Greeks over barbarians. (2) is an empirical claim, and because of this the conclusion which utilizes it is also empirical. (1) is beside this point.

In discussing Mormonism, you're confusing me with someone else; I've expressed nothing on the subject. — tim wood

In your response <here> you entered directly into the Mormonism discussion, which is what I was responding to.

You seem unclear about your own topic. On the one hand, people will claim all kinds of things, on the other is the question as to what something is and is not. — tim wood

The original topic between us, which you began, is about the Creed and its significance. Note that you began with the premise that the significance of the Creed tells about the essence of Christianity, and thus that the two topics are not separate.

On the topic of what Christianity is, with respect to the existence of God, I offer the following excerpt.

"[T]he proposition ‘God exists’ would seem to mean that there is a being more or less like human beings in respect of his mental powers and dispositions, but having the mental powers of a human being greatly, perhaps infinitely, magnified.... I have no fear of being contradicted when I say that the meaning I suppose to be attached by this author to the proposition ‘God exists’ is a meaning Christian theologians have never attached to it, and does not even remotely resemble the meaning which with some approach to unanimity they have expounded at considerable length....The creeds in which Christians have been taught to confess their faith have never been couched in the formula: ‘God exists and has the following attributes’; but always in the formula: ‘I believe’ or originally ‘We believe in God’ ; and have gone on to say what it is that I, or we, believe about him." An Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 186-188. And here:
https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.187414/page/n195/mode/2up — tim wood

Thanks for giving a source for your claims. First I want to note that Collingwood's argument against the "God" of the logical positivists on pages 185 and 186 suffices also as an argument against the Mormon conception of "God" as something compatible with Christian thought.

Now I think Collingwood becomes confused when he goes on to talk about presuppositions vs. propositions. When the Creed talks about God it is not talking about a presupposition of natural science, and Collingwood is right in saying that, "[The Christian Church] has not consistently taught that there can be no proof of God's existence."

But I don't want to get bogged down in Collingwood's personal project. What is the crux of the thesis you are proposing? It seems to me something like, <Christianity does not teach that God exists>, or else, <Christianity professes belief in God without in any way committing itself to God's existence>.

If this is not what you are saying, then what are you saying?

Or to dumb it down, I hope not fatally, two questions to be answered in turn. Do you believe in unicorns? Do they exist? — tim wood

What sense does it make to believe in unicorns without believing that unicorns exist? These look to be strange word games. Are you a Christian who claims to believe in God without believing in God? Are these positions related to your own claims?

Believe: to think that something is true, correct, or real — Cambridge Dictionary

"Christians" have been accusing each other of blasphemy, setting each other beyond the pale as apostates, heretics, heathens, or whatever, from before the time when the Bible as we know it was compiled; the texts to be included and those to be exiled to the Apocrypha were part of that conflict. Whatever consensus of belief has come to be accepted by you or anyone else about what constitutes a Christian has been arrived at through debate and conflict that has rejected more inclusive positions. — unenlightened

This is not an argument. It is an emotional appeal for inclusivity.

I should have anticipated that introducing the term "blasphemy" would elicit moralistic non sequitur from a secular audience (which is also ultimately self-contradictory, but I digress). The argument remains:

1. It is blasphemous for a Christian to consider themselves God's ontological equal, either now or in the future.
2. Mormons consider themselves God's ontological equal, either now or in the future.
3. Therefore, Mormons are not Christians.

"Blasphemy is mean" is not a logical response.

You, if I understand aright, maintain that they held that God existed. I merely that they believed that God existed and were explicit in that distinction. — tim wood

This strikes me as deeply confused, and I have no idea why you believe such a thing.

Cutting to the chase, you think that ancients, including Christians, did not make firm claims about supernatural entities. You think they only "believed" things about supernatural entities, which you say does not even rise to the level of predicating existence.

The simple answer here is the one I gave at the outset: any belief that is worth killing and dying for is a belief held with strong certitude and conviction, and the ancient world was full of religious and supernatural beliefs worth killing and dying for. Speaking specifically about Christians, they were willingly martyred for their beliefs, and there were severe internecine persecutions following the Council of Nicea on both sides. There was leniency up to a point in the Empire, but there was also some umbrella of orthodoxy which was enforced quite strongly, before and after the Christianization of the Empire.

To take but one famous example, for refusing to accept Monothelitism in the 7th century Maximus the Confessor was found guilty of heresy, was tortured, had his tongue cut out, had his right hand cut off, and was sent into exile for the rest of his life. Apparently Maximus' opponents did not fully understand the nuance of your distinction between Maximus' "believing" Dyothelitism and Maximus' "holding" Dyothelitism. :grin:

...And again, I think your distinction is nonsensical all throughout. On this forum we have some rare folk who go about saying they believe X but they do not believe X is true, and this strikes me as a deeply confused position. No one can ever get them to say what it means to believe X without believing X to be true. Traditionally the "belief" distinction has to do with the mode of assent, not with the conviction or certitude involved.

You, if I understand aright, maintain that they held that God existed. I merely that they believed that God existed and were explicit in that distinction. — tim wood

I could go on, as there are so many problems with your theories... The reason folk in the modern world are shy about professing belief in God is because the society is increasingly secular, and because of this it is unfashionable. So they make up new concepts of "belief." But in the ancient world most everyone believed in supernatural entities, it was only a question of which one(s) and where. That God or gods existed in some form was a fact of the ancient world, and there was no shyness about affirming it. The trouble came only with worshipping or denying the wrong ones. In the ancient world to say, "I believe that gods exist," would be like saying today, "I believe that cars exist." The natural response would be, "And...?"

It is perhaps also worth noting that the Creed was never primarily about the existence of God. That was taken for granted and obviously affirmed. The profession of the Creed is much stronger than that. It is something like a marriage vow. It represents a kind of relationship and covenant with God, hearkening back to the Hebrew Shema.

I don't think fundamental Christianity requires any super specific philosophy about what God exactly is. Hell, I don't think most Christians in history even gave that question much thought - and that's equally true of most Mormons, among whom this "god as man" doctrine is obscure and niche and not at all universally accepted. — flannel jesus

Mormons think they will ontologically become an independent "God." Christians think it is blasphemy to say such a thing. But no biggie, right? No significant difference there. :groan:

Agreed. Christians believe in God. — tim wood

It is simply the question of what is meant by "God" in that sentence. And we don't even need to do a deep dive into the term. We need only ask, "Would it include a formerly mortal human who is eventually given special powers?"

And I trust you will see this as a not-so-simple question — tim wood

It is an enormously simple question to determine whether the Mormon believes in the "God" just mentioned. I'm still perplexed that we are having this conversation at all.

You're asking me which percepts the word "red" refers to. I can only answer such a question by using a word that refers to these percepts, and given that there is no appropriate synonym for "red", all I can do is reuse the word "red".

...

There's nothing "viciously circular" about this. — Michael

Er, this is a quintessential example of vicious circularity. The fact that you can only answer such a question by giving a circular answer just shows that your account has failed. If you were correct in saying that 'red' means a percept, then your answer to Banno's question would viciously recur as follows:

• (Option 1: 'Red' = 'Red percept')
• "Red percept"
• "[Red percept] percept"
• "[[Red percept] percept] percept"
• "[[[Red percept] percept] percept] percept"

Or else:

• (Option 2: 'Red' = 'Percept')
• "Red percept"
• "[Percept] percept"

(As Banno indicates, option 2 fails to distinguish red from any other percept)

Cf:

every red is a percept — Michael

The red percepts... — Michael

If every red is a percept then it makes no sense to speak substantially about red percepts. The equivocation becomes more clear if you compare, "The red pen," to, "The red percept." If we follow your lead and reduce each statement consistently, then the first renders, "The red percept of the pen," and the second renders, "The red percept of the percept" (or else via option 2, "The percept of the pen," and, "The percept of the percept"). This all reflects a muddled understanding of language. Predications of color cannot be reduced to predications about percepts in the way you claim. You are involved in category errors which conflate an object-predication-intention with an efficient-cause-intention. It is two different things to talk about the redness of an object as opposed to the percept which mediates that redness. You are simply incorrect to claim that whenever we are talking about the redness of an object we are talking about nothing other than the percept which mediates that redness.* Your attempt to try to treat color predications as percept predications demonstrates that color predications are not percept predications at all, which should have been obvious from the start.

We can also see this by noting that we generally only refer to the perceptual apparatus when we are speaking about perceptual aberrations or abnormalities. For example, when colorblindness enters the conversation recourse to the perceptual apparatus of the colorblind subject will be at hand. But if we cannot distinguish the red object from the red percept, then we will no longer be able to talk about colorblindness, or any other kind of abnormal visual processing. Ironically then, if 'red' meant only a percept we would lose a great deal of scientific rigor. (This is similar to the Protagorean, "Man is the measure," result, which is akin to the way your approach overstates the case. Perceptions are not interchangeable with realities, even when it comes to color. Someone who forgets they are wearing red-tinted glasses might call a white ball red, but we all recognize that they are wrong despite their percept.)


* Your "scientific" argument would be more correctly exposited if you claimed that the subject commonly commits an error of inference regarding the cause of their visual experience. In that case I think you would still largely be wrong, but at least in a more plausible way.

- :up:

I agree regarding Kendi et al. I guess this is just a great counterpoint as its two prominent, intelligent black men basically saying 'not my circus'. It's neat. — AmadeusD

For sure. It helps remind me that one is not insane to question this stuff and that plenty of other folk are also questioning it. Perhaps that would be another reason to read the book.

- Okay good, that's what I figured. :up: I think you are right that there is a lot to be said once we get past the low-hanging fruit, and people are probably talking past one another to some extent. But the great thing about the internet is that there is always more low-hanging fruit to be had, whether self-generated or not. :grin:

Or if we want to go back to the horse's mouth:

The point of this is that it is empirically proven that an internal, subjective experience can be evoked by direct brain stimulation. This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience. The smell you smell is the product of stimuli upon the brain, so the perception is entirely the creation of the brain. — Hanover

1. "The point of this is that it is empirically proven that an internal, subjective experience can be evoked by direct brain stimulation."
2a. "This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience."
3. "The smell you smell is the product of stimuli upon the brain, so the perception is entirely the creation of the brain."

(3) seems to be a non sequitur plain and simple. There is nothing at all here which proves that perceptions are "entirely the creation of the brain."

But what about (2)? An example would be, "Some people have visual hallucinations, therefore we cannot conclude anything about external objects of sight from the input of our eyes." This looks like a bad argument, albeit not necessarily false. The conclusion depends on the frequency and nature of the aberrations. I would simply say that not all visual aberrations result in the unreliability of sight. Instead of (2a) we could draw (2b) from (1): <Therefore sight is not infallibly a response to an external object>. At the end of the day the question is whether it is more rational to draw (2a) or (2b), and I think the answer is obvious.