Goodness, a resurrection from five years ago. This thread was an analytic response to the vast amount of rubbish written about belief on these fora. As such the OP is a summary of what I take as the standard understanding of belief found in recent literature. — Banno

Thanks for the welcome. Yes, I have been doing a lot of resurrecting. :blush: I find that some of the older threads are more interesting than the newer ones.

It makes sense that the OP is based on more recent literature. I tend to read older philosophers and therefore some reorientation is often required, but I think Kit Fine’s distinction between modal and essential properties is lurking in the background of this topic, and he is himself resurrecting a much older notion.

Thanks for the interesting quote from Searle. It’s curious how strong he is in that last sentence. Often when I read Searle I find myself agreeing with him almost entirely, but with some remainder, like a single puzzle piece that is missing. In this case I think that an undue abstraction occurs when the emphasis is placed on the relational quality between proposition and believer. I think Searle believes that an undue abstraction occurs when the proposition is reified, which is apparently a common occurrence in contemporary philosophy. The more concrete and less abstract alternatives would be, respectively, an emphasis on assent, and designating the content of the belief as “objects and states of affairs in the world independent of any proposition.”

While I think Searle is right to resist an overly abstract notion of belief, I can’t agree with his claims about propositions. Searle seems to think it would make sense to say that propositions could be the object of belief. I mostly agree with that propositions point to content, not to a reified designator. Or as Aquinas says, “Now the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through their means, so is it in belief.”* But if Searle is responding to contemporaries who do reify propositions in this strange way, then what he says would make sense.

This struck me not as something novel, but as a clarification. In particular it relates to a conversation with @Sam26 and @creativesoul as to whether beliefs can all be expressed in words, or somethign like that. I had not expressed this clearly enough. — Banno

Perhaps it is only a difference of words, but your OP is quite emphatic that belief is propositional, whereas Searle is claiming that it is (usually) not. More specifically, Searle seems to think that propositions can capture the content of beliefs, but that the object of belief itself is usually not a proposition. Would you agree with Searle that beliefs are usually non-propositional?

Stipulating definitions is treacherous, as I've shown elsewhere, and this thread should be read as analysing belief rather than providing a definition. — Banno

This is a longer conversation, but as a throwaway comment I will just say that I’m not sure we can talk about a thing without a definition, stated or unstated.

If I were to choose the aspect of belief that is, as it were, most central, it would be that beliefs explain actions. Given that, while "to think with assent" has its merits, it is insufficient in that sometimes we act without thinking - that is, not all our beliefs are explicit. — Banno

Okay, that’s an interesting argument. For clarity’s sake:

1. Beliefs explain actions
2. Some actions are taken without thinking
3. Therefore belief is not a species of thinking

First I want to note that in your OP you claim that belief explains but does not determine action, such that we can act contrary to our beliefs (and I agree—I do not believe that every action requires a belief which explains it, e.g. akrasia). That was years ago, but if you still hold such a view then apparently not all actions are explained by belief, which is what your argument would require.

Second, while I agree that beliefs often explain actions, I should also think that beliefs often do not explain actions. Searle’s example, “John believes that Washington was the first president,” has no apparent impact on action, and yet it is surely a belief. John might believe any number of trivial propositions about things like history or astronomy that have no impact on his actions. Thus it seems that the aspect of belief you have identified does not cover all belief. Furthermore, in general I don’t understand the rationale for making belief orbit around action.

Third, I am not convinced there are non-propositional beliefs, although perhaps I should read your exchange with Sam26 and creativesoul. I tend to think that implicit beliefs are propositional. For example, if I am driving and I brake when a child runs into the street, I am acting on the belief that, “If I brake I will not hit this child,” even though this belief is not explicit or formulated or conscious. Admittedly the thinking would not need to be discursive or consciously carried out. It is fast thinking, but it nevertheless involves a mental act.

But maybe the English word "thinking" is too narrow for this broad notion of belief. Certainly there is a mental or cognitive act occurring. Perhaps a different genus for the definition is preferable, such as 'propositional attitude', or Searle's, 'intentional state'.

You believe, arguably, that I am not writing this while floating in space in the orbit of Jupiter, yet until now that belief had not been explicated. — Banno

This is a bit tricky. I would want to say that it is something I do not believe, but not something I do believe. Or rather, it was. Now that you have brought it to my attention I have assented to it and I believe it. That I believe you are sitting at a computer on Earth explains why I would assent to any entailed propositions that are brought to my attention, or which become generally relevant.


* Summa Theologiae, II.II.Q1.A2

I see this as a Sartrean-type dilemma where the ethical thing to do is to simply choose and take responsibility for our choice rather than try to justify it by any particular theory that would abstract us away from such responsibility and in any case could provide nothing more than arbitrary grounds for judgement when considered meta-ethically. — Baden

It seems to me that sometimes taking responsibility requires providing justification, and then taking responsibility for that justification. A failure to provide justification could equally be seen as giving way to arbitrary grounds for judgement.

We see a huge difference because the child is not in front of us but in the abstract world of ethics there are few theories that would consider that difference valid. — Baden

I don't find Singer's argument persuasive, but the ethical principle at play here is subsidiarity, which says that we have a greater responsibility for our family than for our neighbors; for our neighbors than for our fellow citizens; for our fellow citizens than for non-citizens, etc. Responsibility moves outward in concentric circles, and each agent is a locus of responsibility for those around them.

---

Because you're important to the town, you've been allocated a shelter ticket along with a few +1s you can bring. — Paul

Probably my mom would be willing to sacrifice her life for the younger generations. If she were unwilling, I would take her. A lot of this depends on why I was granted a +1 in the first place.

The big liability of LLMs is that, in those cases where (1) their knowledge and understanding of a topic is tenuous or nebulous, and (2) they ends up making stuff up about it, they are quite unable to become aware on their own that the opinion they expressed isn't derived from external sources. They don't know what it is that they know and what it is that they don't know. — Pierre-Normand

It seems to me that this is the big liability for us, namely that we don't know what it is that ChatGPT knows and what it is that ChatGPT doesn't know. We can attempt to verify its claims and quantify its accuracy, but probably a lot of what is being done and what will be done is taking ChatGPT at its word. That is, whenever we trust ChatGPT we have taken our thumb off the line that tests whether the response is true or false, and ChatGPT was created to be trusted. What could happen, and what very likely will happen, is that the accuracy of human literature will be polluted at a very fundamental level. We may find ourselves "at sea," supported by layers and layers of artificially generated truth-claims, none of which can any longer be sufficiently disentangled and verified. Verification requires the ability to trace and backtrack, and my guess is that this ability will be lost due to three things: the speed and power of the technology, a tendency towards uncritical use of the technology, and the absence of a verification paper-trail within the technology itself.

G.E. Moore, in his Principia Ethica has claimed that good is a simple and indefinable. — Shawn

A good Aristotelian-Thomistic response to this comes from Dr. Peter L. P. Simpson's freely available article, "On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas." Here is an excerpt:

As Moore first coined the name ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and initiated the debate about it, one should begin with him. According to Moore, the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy concerning the idea of goodness. Goodness, he said, is a simple, indefinable notion, like yellow or red, and the fallacy is committed when people try to define or analyze it. For when they do try to define it they always identify it with some natural or observable property (as pleasure, say). But good is not such an object. It is a nonnatural property that is unique and peculiar to itself.

There are two parts to this claim. The first is that good is indefinable; the second is that it is something nonnatural. Moore endeavored to establish the first part by means of the so-called open-question argument. Whatever definition one proposes for good, he said, it is always possible to ask of the definition whether it is itself good. For instance, if one defines good as pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness, it is always possible to ask, with significance, whether pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness is after all good. But this would be impossible if the proposed definition really were a definition. The question would then not be significant. Good would just mean ‘pleasure’ or ‘what promotes the greatest happiness,’ and the question whether pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness is good would not be a significant or open one. It would be answered in the asking. This result will always happen whatever definition one proposes for good. Hence good must be indefinable. — Peter L. P. Simpson, On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas, pp. 2-3

(16 months have passed since the previous post)

Searle has me re-thinking this. Rather then a relation, B(a,p), it's better to think in terms of "p" as the content of the belief. That brings out the intentionality of the belief. That is, B(a,p) hides the problems of substitution salva veritate. — Banno

Could you maybe say more about the way your thinking has changed?

I myself would not want to define beliefs in terms of relations between individuals and propositions. In your OP you shy away from calling this a proper definition, but because it is the primary characteristic of belief on offer, and because it is proposed as "a basic structure or grammar for belief," it effectively functions as a definition. Apart from the idiosyncrasies of modern logic, I don't know why the relation model should take precedence. I am also wondering why a definition of belief must be circular in some incoherent way.

As a jumping off point, Aquinas offers an Aristotelian definition of "to believe": to think with assent.* "To think" is the genus and "with assent" is the specific difference. He proceeds to clarify the exact meaning of each part of the definition, but because he is ultimately concerned with a narrower concept of 'belief' the clarification is not really important for this thread.

I agree with Aquinas: to believe is to think with assent. Namely, one is both thinking about some proposition and also assenting to it. A belief, then, is an adherence to some proposition that we have thought about and have assented to, and that we continue to assent to.

I largely agree with your OP. I agree that a belief is a propositional attitude, does not imply truth, involves affirmation, makes sense of error, is dynamic, and explains but does not determine actions. But I wouldn't want to use the relation idea as a definition or a quasi-definition of belief. I think it is a way to characterize belief, but that it does not capture the essence of belief, and therefore it will lead us astray if we come to depend on it in a tight spot. There are different ways to criticize it, but I would want to say that it doesn't provide us with much insight into what a belief is. We have relations with all sorts of things, and therefore to call belief a relation does not provide any useful way to distinguish this relation from other relations. Specifically:

1. "John believes that the sky is blue"
2. Believes (John, "The sky is blue")

I'm not sure what (2) adds to (1). I am not sure how it provides any additional information or insight into the reality of belief. If someone says, "What's a belief?" and I respond, "It's a relation between an agent and a proposition," then I haven't done much work to narrow down what we are talking about due to the fact that we have many relations to propositions which are not belief (e.g. doubt, ignorance, curiosity, guesses, proof, etc.). This obviously gets into your thread about Kit Fine and necessary properties vs. essential properties. For Aristotle a relation would be a necessary property of a belief, but if it does touch on the essence it surely doesn't get to the heart of the matter.

But anyway, maybe I am quibbling or barking up the wrong tree. I know you didn't offer the OP as a precise definition. I guess my main point is that if we are going to talk about belief in itself then we will have to talk about its definition. Perhaps the OP was meant to respond to certain misconceptions and that is why it was phrased in this way? Yet you mentioned Searle and trying to account for the intentionality of belief, and I think "assent" does something to capture this.


* Summa Theologiae, II.II.Q2.A1

For me, what is salient here is the failure of the modal account of essence. — Banno

I know Fine is influenced by Aristotle, and he makes an allusion to him in the paper, but here are some places where Aristotle says similar things:

A property is something which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a property of man to be capable of learning grammar; for if he is a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if he is capable of learning grammar, he is a man. — Aristotle, Topics I.v (102a17), Tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge

(Not only modal properties, but even convertible properties need not enter into the essence.)

But the converse of this last statement does not hold; for to show that [two things] are the same is not enough to establish a definition. — Aristotle, Topics I.v (102a14), Tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge

He also talks about the difference in Posterior Analytics, for subtle logical mistakes can occur when one mixes up modal/necessary properties and essential properties.


The Medievals who followed Aristotle called this a "proper accident" (proprium accidens):

Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I.II.Q2.A6

The idea is that mortality and rationality belong to man's essence, whereas risibility (the ability to laugh) is always found in men but is not an essential property.

(Resurrecting an old thread)

It needs to be said that doing philosophy is extraordinarily hard. Almost anyone can notice the smell, but fixing the leak requires some unusual skills and background. — Banno

Yes, but isn't there a third option? Isn't it possible that someone's nose gets to be a bit too acute and they start noticing smells that are perfectly normal, and then drawing the false conclusion that the plumbing system needs to be overhauled? This is how most people view philosophers, and it isn't always implausible.

But if the plumbing is working then we would understand it. — Banno

I'm not so sure. I think was saying that most of the things that work are things we don't understand, and that seems right. Epistemology looms large in modern philosophy, but perhaps this is an aberration.

Is there a problem with how umbrella terms are talked about? — Judaka

I would say that vague terms facilitate poor reasoning and claims that are based largely on emotion, and that umbrella terms are vague terms. The key is to disambiguate ambiguous terms, and to make sure that we understand what someone means when they use a term.

Our last discussion, on fixability and unfixability, was in many ways a disambiguation and clarification of those terms. This doesn't mean we were just arguing about words. We were clarifying words in order to then move forward and decide whether the propositions that those words signify are true or false. Words need to be reasonably clear in order to come to such conclusions and to avoid talking past one another.

Predictability is the most straightforward and intuitive path towards inductive (or abductive, if you prefer) inference of determinism. But induction (abduction) is not exhaustive by its very nature. — SophistiCat

Certainly it is true that an inductive or abductive approach would not fulfill the canon of exhaustive predictability, but this only means that the strongest form of justification is not available on an inductive (abductive) model. You could think of exhaustive predictability as an unattainable limit if you like.

On the other hand, if you are looking at a formal model, you may be able conclude whether or not it is deterministic without demonstrating predictability, simply by analyzing its structure. — SophistiCat

Yes, but this is the man-made (artificial) case that I excluded. The determinist's claim is not a claim which limits itself to artificial realities. There is no formal model to justify the determinist's claim, which is a claim about all of reality.

Yeah, I didn't get that bit. I don't need to know everything in order to know (or have an opinion about) something. — SophistiCat

Okay, fair enough. Since our approach to the act of understanding may be different, I may be begging the question here. I would want to say that an intellect which understands something transcends that thing through its act of understanding. So if I understand a Roomba vacuum in its entirety then I have, at least in some way, transcended it. I have contained it in a way that it has not contained me. A concrete example of this would be the case where I am able to predict its movements whereas it is not able to predict my movements.

From there I want to say that 1) to assert that something is deterministic is to imply exhaustive (in-principle) comprehension or standing-over or encompassment; 2) to assert that all existing things are deterministic entails asserting that I myself am deterministic; 3) to assert that I am deterministic involves applying (1) to myself; but 4) I cannot pretend to comprehend or stand over or encompass myself, for it is impossible for something to stand over itself or encompass itself. I cannot understand myself in the way I can understand the Roomba, for the act by which I understand myself can never itself be fully understood by myself. (Let me know if this reasoning is too fast or loose. Because I am largely ignorant of your views I may be shooting at the moon.)

The weak premise here is surely (1). Someone will say, "I am not claiming exhaustive comprehension, but only a probabilistic opinion." To be naively concise, my point is not that the act itself is an act of comprehensive understanding, but rather that the supposition or hunch or opinion contains within itself a failure to recognize the boundary of (4). "I have a hunch that I myself am fully explainable in terms of deterministic principles," involves the idea that a theory which came from minds itself fully explains minds. But that can't be. Just as a mind cannot comprehend itself, neither can a theory produced by a mind comprehensively explain minds. Whatever else we want to say determinism is, it is surely also a theory.

So feel free to have a go at (1), but do give me some insight into your own views in the process.

Well, I don't share that conviction, and neither would any determinist, obviously. — SophistiCat

This is a different argument. I don't want to stretch this post too long, but I want to say something about it. Would you be willing to grant that it appears that the act of understanding is neither necessitated nor inevitable? Or does it simply appear to you that an act which is accepted to be necessitated, like two billiard balls colliding, and an act of understanding, like Pythagoras' act of understanding the Pythagorean theorem, equally possess the quality of "necessitated"? It seems that we usually take necessitation to preclude knowledge, e.g., "He's just parroting the definition of the Pythagorean theorem to pass the quiz. He doesn't really understand it." (Although this example doesn't utilize strict causal necessitation, it does utilize instrumental or consequence necessitation, i.e. <It is necessary to recite this theorem in order to pass the quiz, therefore I will recite the theorem>.)

But determinism is a "final and absolute truth about the world,"... — Leontiskos

No, it's really not. — SophistiCat

Going back to the original source:

...I would maintain that it is close to what is usually meant by determinism in the sciences, which are concerned with specific laws and theories, rather than final and absolute truths about the world. — SophistiCat

A scientist who calls an arbitrary system deterministic—such as a Roomba vacuum—is not thereby a determinist. Determinism is a philosophical theory about the entirety of existence, not some subset of it:

Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Causal Determinism

If SEP is correct, then what is at stake is "every event," not "some events." In the argument above, then, determinism enters the stage with the antecedent of (2), "Asserting that all existing things are deterministic."

So apparently determinism is an absolute truth about the world and not a limited truth about certain parts of the world. But is it "final"? Above when you were talking about quantum mechanics you spoke of provisional theories. If you are claiming that determinism is provisional and therefore not final, I have no complaint. I would say that the certitude with which a theory is held belongs to the particular theorizer in question, not to the theory, but I don't think any of my arguments stand or fall based on the theorizer's level of certitude.

The reported language that the NAACP, business owners, labor leaders, black workers, white workers, social workers, bureaucrats, etc. all reflected a very clear understanding of how racism worked, what its costs were, how detrimental it was to blacks, and what kind of solutions were needed. — BC

What's interesting to me is that addressing racism was not viewed as an end in itself, at least by the slaughterhouses. In that case addressing racism was a means to the end of a safe work environment and ultimately a productive business. It seems to me that in the past racism was never really viewed as an end in itself, and perhaps this was a good thing. Today we see the emergence of a new form, where "solving racism" is actually an end in itself, a goal which has become somewhat detached from the negative effects of racism. This is not the primary phenomenon, but it does exist and it seems to be growing. Two reasons that may help account for this are the extreme moralizing of the issue, and the new notion of "systemic racism."

So then maybe there is a sense in which the word 'racism' is understood differently in our day. Perhaps it has accrued connotations which identify it as a center-stage issue, the opposition of which is an end in itself, which is different from 1919 when it was viewed as one among many in an interrelated constellation of detrimental societal factors. The older approach shares some of the same merits as the "class approach" which I advocated in my last post.

(I assume you meant 1919 rather than 2019)

Yes. I would suggest that achieving social (or racial) justice will mean black's access to better education ----> better jobs ----> better housing ----> in better neighborhoods. Skip the "anti-racist training programs", skip black English, forget about micro aggressions, etc. etc. etc. DELIVER first rate education and training programs. Make sure there are no artificial barriers to equal access to good jobs; enforce equal access to housing in any neighborhood. In other words, make it possible for blacks to work and live as well as whites.

Will that automatically result in the disappearance of prejudice? No, not immediately, but prejudice will matter less. — BC

IF the material means can be significantly improved, and if working class financial security cam be achieved (a revolutionary goal, not something that is going to happen under the current regime) race hatred can be reduced--maybe eventually expunged (but don't hold your breath waiting), — BC

Great posts. :up:

It seems like there are two models on offer, one which aims to benefit racial groups and another which aims to benefit class groups. I think the latter is easier to enact because it is based on aid, not balance. Welfare legislation could address the lower class by granting aid based on income, and the goal here is simply to improve the conditions of the lower class. Racial legislation is much more unwieldy because it attempts to rebalance the entire existence of two or more races. It is more difficult because the selection process is more complicated than an income threshold, the reparations approach is unwieldy, the motivations are less universally accepted, and the goals are more complex and less determinate than simply improving material conditions. Given that the class approach will also have a great impact on the race problem and is less prone to "aggravate race hatred," I think it should be the primary focus. I'd say the race problem requires a solution that is more organic and grassroots, and less systematic and governmental (in the sense of the Federal government). Dispensing with subsidiarity when it comes to race issues is a danger.

I suppose you can use it to compute the rate of change in distance between the two objects, but that rate isn't acceleration. — noAxioms

Great posts all around. :up:

I think you are on the right track, but perhaps it would be instructive to examine your definitions of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity':

To clarify the terminology: by 'objective', I take it to mean, generally, 'a proposition of which its truthity is mind-independent"; and by 'subjective', I take it to mean the inverse: 'a proposition of which its truthity is mind-dependent".

I cannot say that truth is objective, because without a subject it cannot exist; however, I cannot, equally so, claim that it is subjective (for the truth is surely not equivalent to the asserted being but, rather, its correspondence to reality). — Bob Ross

If a proposition is objective when its truth value is mind-independent, and there are no truths or truth values which are mind-independent, then there are no objective propositions. The same holds of subjective propositions given your assertion that truth is not subjective.

Thus the problem arises that, according to your definitions, objective and subjective propositions do not even exist. This isn't odd; it happens all the time. The words 'objective' and 'subjective' tend to be vague, ambiguous, and historically recent. Attempts to pin them down are quite hard.

That said, I agree with you that truth involves a correspondence between mind and reality, and therefore cannot be reduced to either one in isolation.

You make some good points, and I think you are right to note that what works for a classroom discussion will be somewhat different from what works for an online forum.

To remain silent may be an important form of participation. One in which one thinks about what has been said rather than thinking about what to say. — Fooloso4

I am considering the thought that in a classroom discussion one tends to know that their voice is being attended to. Silence in the classroom can very often signify the fact that listeners are processing and considering, and there are all sorts of other cues which can be used to help discern such a fact.

With an online forum, on the other hand, silence is highly ambiguous. If there is a 'like' button or some other way to evaluate posts then one can glean a better sense of the silent participation in a thread, but apart from that one only knows if their voice is being heard when someone replies. Even when there is a 'like' button the ambiguous silence is still quite strong. This inevitably means that threads and posts are written to garner replies rather than to garner attention.

The interesting thing about this forum is that when I came and read Baden's guide to writing an OP, I was prepared to write thorough and high-octane OPs. But then I noticed that almost no one is following those guidelines, and the OPs that do follow them receive much fewer replies. This doesn't mean that the "research" model for OPs is suboptimal, but that model probably produces more pondering and silent listening, which in turn produces ambiguous silence.

What I would like to eventually do [...] is create a list of key ideas from various philosophies that promote a real eudaimonic way of living. — Dermot Griffin

In another thread I quoted Hadot to try to balance a one-sided understanding (link). An important thing to remember is that for Hadot praxis is no more universal than theory. Each philosophical school of antiquity recommended different practices, which were suited to the different forms of theory or discourse. Different theories of eudaimonia resulted in different practices. Mixing the different practices haphazardly is therefore a very unnatural thing to do, at least prima facie.

What one would apparently be doing would be sifting the body of practices through a particular sieve in order to produce a particular effect. It may be that one wants to show certain commonalities between the practices, or one wants to show how certain practices of antiquity are similar to some of our own received wisdom, etc. That's well and good, yet the notion that in antiquity there were lots of different theories but one set of underlying practices is quite false. The different practices were as contentious as the different theories. Introducing the notion of praxis does not bring with it the effect of agreement between different schools, nor does it necessarily introduce a common ground. In fact it can have much the opposite effect, revealing schools which were much more drastically different than our modern day schools of philosophy. In the modern day the different schools do, by and large, share the same praxis. This was not always so.

The position I'm taking, and your thoughts and objections to this is what I am seeking, is that free speech absolutism (a title Elon Musk has given himself) is not an ideal, but places the considerable power of the press in undeserving hands, whose objective isn't to seek higher truths and dispense with ignorance, but is for their own personal gain and self-promotion. — Hanover

I was trying to understand whether these last few clauses were directed at Musk or those who would use a platform like Twitter. From what you say in the following, it seems to be Musk:

No, it's just self-promotion, which is the driver of all social media. He's trying to show that his new branded version is better than the old, so everyone should come back and see what he's got in store. PT Barnum is waving people in to see the show. — Hanover

I think that's mistaken. It seems to me that Elon Musk is highly idealistic in all sorts of ways, and that there are genuine principles at play here. But I should think that this is beside the point because the thread is presumably about something which transcends Musk's personal motives. Inculpating Musk on the basis of motive won't answer the question about Mill and free speech absolutism. If the thread is to go beyond a personal criticism of Musk, then we must at least take him at his word instead of claiming that he is merely hiding behind the facade of free speech absolutism.

He won't act from conscience. He'll count beans. If removal of the post will increase profits, that's what he'll do. It has nothing to do with consistent application of standards, good citizenship, or anything beyond gaining the best return on investment. — Hanover

And in this post "self promotion" narrows to "material gain," which I would say is an even more difficult charge to sustain. Bean counters don't acquire Twitter. The value of these social media companies is highly dubious, even more so now that their main source of income (micro advertising) is coming under scrutiny. Tesla is hands-down the better investment, and Musk was in a perfect position to refocus his energies there. Instead he made an idealistic intervention into Twitter, which from a financial perspective was foolishness.

I think free speech absolutism is the wrong road, but I don't think the personal charges you are bringing against Musk stick. Even if they did, I think the more interesting conversation would take him at his word. Returning to your thesis:

The position I'm taking, and your thoughts and objections to this is what I am seeking, is that free speech absolutism (a title Elon Musk has given himself) is not an ideal, but places the considerable power of the press in undeserving hands, whose objective isn't to seek higher truths and dispense with ignorance, but is for their own personal gain and self-promotion. — Hanover

This isn't an argument against free speech absolutism, it's an argument against Musk. There is no inherent connection between free speech absolutism and placing power in the undeserving hands of a tyrant or oligarchy. Even if we think Musk is a tyrant (or someone who is greedy, unscrupulous, and undeserving), the argument would seem to be invalid.

Mill's ideal cannot be accomplished without an adherence to these [journalistic] standards. — Hanover

Granting this for the sake of argument, does the ideal require institutional censorship?

I myself do not think Mill would accept Twitter as a counterargument, mostly because Twitter isn't even 20 years old. Presumably Mill's anti-censorship argument takes a much longer view than 20 years. To his credit, all of the garbage on Twitter will likely be irretrievably lost in the next 30-40 years, just like the public square banter of the past.

Regarding Mill and free speech absolutism, the first question is historical: Did Mill promote a form of free speech absolutism? I would uncritically venture to claim that he did, and in the very section of On Liberty that you quoted from. There he is launching his argument that, “The power itself is illegitimate,” namely the power to coerce in matters of thought or opinion. He denies the power even to governments—even to the best of governments.

The second question is whether free speech absolutism would further Mill’s goal as it is interpreted in the thread, namely, "reaching higher truth." Suppose we look at all of history and the degree to which it has achieved Mill’s goal, and then we theoretically tinker with the variable of free speech. How do we suppose the tinkering would affect the degree to which Mill’s goal is achieved? If we turn the knob towards free speech absolutism, is Mill’s goal better achieved? What if we turn the knob away from it?

I think this thought experiment favors free speech absolutism, because history itself acts as a refining fire, burning away intellectual dross, especially as empires fall. The fire is not overwhelmed by too much raw material, and everything that is of high quality will pass through unscorched. The propagation of low quality material is more costly and therefore probabilistically less likely to occur than the propagation of high quality material. Humans are more keen to pass on what is valuable, beautiful, useful, and true, than they are to pass on the dross. Furthermore, any "scorching" would come more from censorship than from anything else. Thus at least on the long view, free speech absolutism seems to aid Mill’s goal.

But the third and final question asks which of the two better further Mill’s goal: free speech absolutism or intentional truth-seeking? In this case I think the answer is that intentional truth-seeking is much better at furthering the goal. At the same time I do not think that either Mill or Musk would disagree with this, and I also do not think that intentional truth-seeking (including journalistic standards) necessarily requires censorship. The idea here is that truth does not require censorship to help it win the day (or the century, or the millennium). Since intentional truth-seeking and good journalistic standards will further Mill’s goal even where censorship does not exist, journalistic standards do not represent a counterargument to free speech absolutism. I am sure Musk is in no way opposed to journalistic standards, nor need he be. He would probably just say that Twitter is the public square, not a journal, but that those who freely adhere to strong journalistic standards are crucially important voices within the public square. Apparently neither Mill nor Musk would be forced to sacrifice journalistic standards for the sake of free speech absolutism.

The reason I myself am not a proponent of free speech absolutism is because I believe some limited censorship aids the health of a society, and I am thinking of things even beyond Musk’s willingness to adhere to U.S. law. I don’t know Mill so well, but I would be willing to follow Plato and Aristotle when it comes to this topic. I would have agreed if your original statement had been leveled at Twitter users rather than Musk, and so would Plato. It seems to me that an undue focus on Musk has mucked up the analyses. Beyond that, I’m not convinced the characterization of free speech absolutism is as robust as it ought to be, but that’s for another day.

In any event, I take the position that objectivity is an impossible standard, and not even one worth pretending to advance. We all have some perspective and point of view and those biases are inevitable. I think the better practice is to try and be balanced, which means offering competing perspectives without favor toward one or the other. — Hanover

It's hard to disagree with that, but let me try. :razz: I should begin by saying that I think all of the recent attempts at "objective news" have failed, and that a competing-perspectives approach like theflipside.io is currently the best option. So your claim is empirically verified, but...

Even if objectivity is an impossible standard, I would say that it is still worth aiming at, and that it is worth aiming at in a very focused and effortful manner. First I would suggest that some events are objectively news-worthy, e.g. "A hurricane hit Florida." There are also objective ways to report such an event, like reporting the magnitude of the hurricane, the locations affected, the damage and harm incurred, and the aid strategies being carried out. Although we all know that hurricanes can be politicized, I think it is plausible that hurricanes are not inherently political or partisan events.

But what would it mean to be objective in the case of more complex, non-natural events? In that case I think objectivity is the telos of the competing-perspectives approach. If this is right and the competing-perspectives approach is, in part, a means to objectivity, then it cannot function as a replacement for objectivity. If a competing-perspectives approach were a mining operation, then objectivity would be the gold that is ultimately mined, and it would not make sense to prefer the mining to the gold.

On this model, then, objectivity is the neutral ground which lies between biased partisanship. For example, if the left has a selection bias in favor of black deaths and the right has a selection bias in favor of police deaths then objectivity with respect to any relevant events involves reporting which balances both of these biases, grounding itself in facts rather than interpretation (so far as this is possible).* I think this is what a competing-perspectives approach seeks to access: the ground-level events, unadulterated by partisan hijacking.

The notion of objectivity is particularly important because the need for objectivity will correlate to an issue's "political charge." The most politically charged issues will demand the most objectivity, and the least politically charged issues will require the least objectivity. What I mean by this is that the degree of intent and effort required in order to achieve a similar level of objectivity will vary depending on the issue. Given our cultural context, it is harder to objectively report the George Floyd event than it is to objectively report the hurricane event. Similarly, it would be harder to judge the alleged crime of one's child than to judge the alleged crime of a stranger, for where bias is more prevalent, objectivity is more difficult and elusive.


* This balancing cannot be a simple mean between two interpretations lest it succumb to intentional manipulations of the Overton window by one or both sides. It must instead be grounded in a tertium quid, an independent reality.

This is a great forum. There are all kinds of different people here and there. Don't judge the site by that thread. I've been here for a while, and I share your repulsion... moreso because it's coming from a position of power, and such people should set the best example/standard. — creativesoul

Thanks, and I agree that this is a great forum. Even the fact that I missed a day and now this thread has so many thoughtful replies is indicative of a healthy forum. And you are right that the specific difficulty is the "position of power" associated with the post. If there is an elephant in the room, that's it. To be honest, I just grabbed SophistiCat's extension and put the user on ignore. I haven't had a low-level atheist-vs-theist argument in almost a decade now, and this is the last place I would want to.

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Thanks, Baden. And I agree that low quality theistic arguments foster low quality atheistic arguments, and vice versa. It's like a strange limbo contest.

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So, more than focusing on what "evangelical" means, maybe not enter a conversation if your objective is just to throw rotten tomatoes at the other side. — Hanover

Thanks, that was a great post and I very much agree. I may have been looking for the word "proselytism" rather than "evangelism," although they are sometimes used in the same sense. I feel like I could write a great deal in response to your post, but I will just give a nod to the idea that "tomatoes without arguments" is the key problem, and is harmful to a philosophical atmosphere. Particularly in an OP.

Right, my claim is that there is no mechanism for switching gears, an understanding that drastic improvement is possible will never be invalidated. — Judaka

Isn't this thread supposed to be a means to invalidating that interpretation, in which case the thread itself would serve as a partial mechanism for switching gears? It seems to me that in creating this thread you have decided that the opposition is persuadable? And this is why you are trying to persuade?

I agree that the truth is crucially important, but even the most ardent effort to understand it will still leave much ambiguity. When dealing with uncertainty, ideas of risk/reward come into play, and we must decide what options work best. The risks as a culture of judging ourselves as less capable than we are in influencing our personal outcomes, and of risk that judging ourselves as more capable than we are. That is what we must juggle. — Judaka

Okay, but isn't this still a question of truth? There is an estimation of capability, and then there is a judgment as to how accurate that estimation is. As you said, we might say, "We are less capable than this estimation supposes," or, "We are more capable than this estimation supposes." Both are judgments of truth. That said, I do agree that there is a pragmatic aspect where we should err on the safe side instead of focusing exclusively on truth.

We have very similar views, and where we seem to disagree, possibly, we would agree if the nuances were laid bare. — Judaka

I imagine that's right.

True, though this is a case where a person had no control over the outcome at all. It becomes murkier when someone did ostensibly have a way to avoid the consequences of their problem or when they're actively contributing to it. You've let Bill off the hook where his parents taught him bad spending habits, whereas many wouldn't. — Judaka

Well, what I said is that we don't have enough information to conclude that Bill is necessarily at fault. More premises would be required to draw that conclusion. If Bill exacerbated his spending habits in a way that is not accountable by what his parents taught him, then he begins to assume (partial) responsibility. The same is true of the addict, who can exacerbate his addiction in a culpable manner.

But yes, I agree that in practice it is difficult to sort out questions of culpability.

Hmm, but a disease is so straightforward... — Judaka

Well the analogy limps, but I think it also sheds light. Look, in real life people really do shift from viewing things as 'fixable' to viewing them as 'unfixable', and it relates their perceived effort and perceived possibilities. Insofar as they think they have exhausted all or most possibilities, they will begin to view something as unfixable.

As for self-help, well, sometimes people are just selling hope because hope sells. — Judaka

True.

Education + changing attitudes + increasing awareness of the complexity of factors & will, changing how we perceive responsibility and blame, etc, I can agree with all of this. — Judaka

I think we are in agreement on all of the big questions.

Thanks for participating in this discussion with me. I'm impressed by your willingness to engage with such a complicated, original topic, despite it being presented suboptimally. I appreciate your effort to ensure we weren't just talking past each other.

Although I'm happy to continue discussing something if you feel it's worthwhile, and I'll let you reply to what I've said regardless, I'm pretty comfortable with where we're at. — Judaka

Thank you as well. It was a refreshing and honest discussion, not to mention interesting! It was a nice introduction to the forum for me. :smile:

And yes, I am also comfortable with where we're at. No need to reply further if you don't feel inclined.

Best,
Leontiskos

Religious voices don't stand much of a chance here on the forum. — T Clark

Academic philosophers skew heavily towards atheism and the West has become more and more secular since the Enlightenment, so it is to be expected that a philosophy forum will resist religious approaches. Still, I expected the anti-religion to be a bit more robust given the context of a philosophy forum. The Reddit/Twitter level "Santa Claus and Fairy Tales" trope caught me off guard. Oh well, there are plenty of other interesting topics to engage.

Also, I respect the principle that an OP which has received substantial replies is usually not deleted, even if the OP is sub-par.

Okay, that makes sense. Thank you for the thorough explanation!

...because there’s nothing special about your particular religion. — Mikie

More personal insults, then, just like the OP.

It’s not anti-religious. I’m speaking to those capable of recognizing their own religion as a product of their upbringing. — Mikie

The idea that only a select few are "capable of recognizing their own religion as a product of their upbringing" is anti-religious polemic. This should be obvious.

Okay, thanks for the clarification. May I ask a related question? I usually see the word "evangelism" used to mean something like, "an overly simplistic attempt at persuasion," such as simplistic unsolicited advice about what others ought to believe—exactly what Mikie's thread is. Keeping this in mind, I see older moderation trends along the lines of, "Not enough research went into your OP, so we deleted it." Is 'well-researched' still a criterion for OP's? Or has this criterion shifted with time?

The argument is simple: because one happens to be raised in a Christian culture... — Mikie

That's not an argument, it's a cliché, just like your Santa Klaus cliché and your fairytale cliché. If your intent was to bring an end to boring religious discussions, then you should be informed that bundling together a bunch of anti-religious clichés in an anti-religious OP will certainly have the opposite effect.

Cool. So perhaps move this to the Feedback section. — Mikie

This is already in the feedback section.

I'll look forward to an answer from a moderator regarding the question of what is and is not evangelization.

The thread is nothing more than evangelistic propaganda. No arguments; just assertions which tell people what they should or should not believe. This is the definition of evangelism understood as a pejorative. Again, if this isn't evangelism, then what is?

It sounds like you have an axe to grind, but given that your post contains no arguments and has no relation to philosophy, why post this sort of thing on a philosophy forum? Twitter would seem to be the better option, and 280 characters is more than enough to express such a simple sentiment.

Thanks for your response, . I am enjoying your posts. Thanks too for your ignore extension.

...so determinists do not need ad hoc assumptions to defend against the paradox of predictability, as long as they are willing to concede that some types of predictability are not realizable in principle in a deterministic universe. — SophistiCat

Echoing my elaboration post, what justification is required to claim that a system is deterministic? Exhaustive predictability is the strongest form of justification, is it not? At least when it comes to systems which are not man-made (artificial)? And at the very least, everything in the system must at least plausibly be in-principle predictable. It's not at all clear to me that the thesis of determinism can be separated from a claim of in-principle predictability, and if this is correct then where in-principle predictability is incoherent, determinism fails.

I would want to say that no intellect which understands determinism could be deterministic. If such an intellect claims that it itself is deterministic, then either it does not understand what determinism means (and is therefore equivocating), or else it does understand what determinism means and is drawing a non-sequitur. To understand what determinism means is at the same time to place oneself outside of the deterministic paradigm. As I said in my follow-up, the theorizer can never be accounted for by his theory (at least in the way the determinist supposes he could be).

Though I am not a committed determinist myself... — SophistiCat

Right: earlier you said:

At the same time, I am not convinced that there is one true theory to rule them all at the bottom of creation. Which in turn makes it meaningless to ask whether the world is really deterministic or indeterministic. — SophistiCat

I think it is nonsensical to claim that the one true theory to rule them all, at the bottom of creation, is determinism. Even logically speaking, if determinism were true we would never be able to know and understand that fact. Supposing we had truly understood and encompassed that fact, then our mind would have transcended determinism, in which case it would not be true.

I originally said that the minimal definition of determinism that does not commit to predictability of any sort is the more conventional one. That can be debated, but I would maintain that it is close to what is usually meant by determinism in the sciences, which are concerned with specific laws and theories, rather than final and absolute truths about the world. In such contexts distinguishing deterministic and indeterministic systems is meaningful and useful. — SophistiCat

But determinism is a "final and absolute truth about the world," and even the minimal definition, provided in your very first post, is committed to in-principle predictability. Scientists predicate—and are justified in predicating—determinism of subsystems. This is meaningful and useful. But the philosophical theory of determinism does more: it predicates determinism of the set of all things, including the theorizer. This, I say, is neither meaningful nor useful.

I think it is worth making explicit your stakes if you are going to argue for a particular demarcation. Why is unrestricted in-principle predictability important to you? — SophistiCat

I am an advocate of human freedom, but more than that, I am often led to believe that determinism is just incoherent. Or more precisely, the claim of determinism is incoherent, at best involving an equivocation which invalidates it. My guess is that this rests on my conviction that true knowledge—which is different than Plato's "true opinion"—cannot be necessitated. If we had true knowledge that determinism is true, this would mean that all our knowledge is necessitated, in which case our belief regarding determinism could not be true knowledge at all. It is only coherent to claim that subsystems are deterministic.

(I realize this post involves many redundancies. In my defense, I wanted to try a few different angles because in the past the argument has been difficult to convey.)

Check out this amazing talent. One guy, one guitar, many, many layers. — Quixodian

That's a whole 'nother level. I've never seen anything like it.

No, as it would require an infinite recurrence. — Jabberwock

'Pick an option opposite to what you would have picked' is unrealizable both for humans and for determinate machines — Jabberwock

I think these are different issues. For a libertarian, the difference between a human and a computer lies precisely in the fact that humans do possess infinite recursion. We can reflect and bend back on our own thought in a way that is not limited. The second quote here isn't as interesting, and I doubt it is even true, though this depends on definitions. A computer could be programmed to switch its output to "output = !output" as a response to an input command. But strictly speaking, counterfactuals do not exist for computers.

I guess I'll just visit Srap if I need a more accurate record. :lol:

I had meant to contrast improving personal outcomes, from drastically improving or solving them. — Judaka

Sure, that makes sense.

What I mean by "unfixable factors" is that any solution would fall outside of what can reasonably be construed as self-help. — Judaka

So the idea is that an "unfixable problem" might have a solution, but that solution would fall outside of the competence of self-help.

By impersonal, I meant, advice produced for mass consumption, or non-personalised. "How to Improve At X - for anyone" vs "How to improve at X - personal plan for Bill". — Judaka

Okay, so when you speak about self-help you are referring to the sort of resources which are not tailored to a particular person's unique situation, right? That's a helpful clarification.

All of this helps get at the question of why we would focus on unfixability. We would focus on it because by it we are led to understand that some of the solutions to problems labeled "fixable" are not accessible to those who are using self-help methods, where "self-help methods" are those methods that utilize resources produced for mass consumption. Therefore the people who are facing these problems should aim for improvement rather than a complete fix, at least if they are limited to self-help methods.

I have contended that there is no mechanism for knowing our limitations for influencing our personal outcomes. No matter what is done, there will always be something else that can be done. Do you disagree with this? — Judaka

I still think my disease example serves as an analogy. The 100th victim who is dying in old age on his deathbed has not, in a logical or empirical sense, exhausted all possible interventions. But he can still have good justification for his claim. Strictly speaking, I agree that failure never proves that the task was impossible, but I also think that claims and estimations can be made with respect to what is impossible, and they can be made with reasonable justification.

But where are you going with this? If I agreed, where would you take us? I assume you are going to say that claims of fixability are unfalsifiable, and that optimists who focus on the fixable can never be deterred because we can never prove that something is unfixable.

We will always assume improvement is possible... — Judaka

I see this as a cultural assumption which is therefore contingent. In general I think the assumption is much less common in non-democratic societies and historical eras.

I believe certain conceptualisations of free will are a primary source of the issue, I imagine that you would agree. — Judaka

Yes, I think so.

If a person is in control of their personal outcomes, then they should take responsibility for them, and they should take the blame for them. I view this as a logical connection, it seems you don't agree. — Judaka

Oh, I would agree with that. Wherever responsibility exists, blame can exist. That's part of what "responsibility" means. In my example of the person who had a cocaine addiction from infancy there is neither blame nor responsibility. In that case the person is not in control of the personal outcome of cocaine addiction.

As I said previously, the "truth" is not a feasible option... — Judaka

I think this is probably where we disagree. I would say that even if truth is only something that we approximate, it is still crucially important. I think that seeking "good outcomes" goes hand in hand with truth, in part because it implies that some outcomes are good and others are bad. I also think that true "conceptualizations" correlate to good outcomes.

Although it was earlier on in this discussion, where you undoubtedly had a different understanding of what we were talking about, you said the self-help context should exclude unfixable factors. Do you stand by that? — Judaka

Interesting question. To be honest, I am still fuzzy on what you mean by 'unfixable'. Apparently by 'fixable' you mean that a full solution is possible, such that we do not need to be satisfied with mere improvement. Logically speaking I want to think that 'unfixable' does not exclude improvability, but I don't know for certain how you view the relation between unfixability and improvability. Can what is unfixable be improved, or not?

Is it accurate to say that you think we should be able to proceed as normal, and just educate people to get rid of their irrational interpretations? — Judaka

No, and thanks for asking for clarification. Here is what I said earlier:

This is the question of whether we ought to combat false societal beliefs with education and argument, or with societal conditioning. I imagine that both are necessary, but I prefer the former. — Leontiskos

I stand by that. Both are necessary but I would give greater weight to education. The same would apply in general to the way that we address problematic phenomena in a society. Both would usually be necessary.

That passage about Pierre Hadot makes the point that philosophy in the classical sense was a matter of practice and (I suppose) self improvement (although I don't like that term much) rather than just arguments about concepts. — Quixodian

Also included is the idea that without praxis, one's theory will be limited and stunted. Hadot thus points to a deep interrelation between the two in the world of ancient philosophy. Here is a nice quote:

The Stoics made a distinction between philosophy, defined as the lived practice of the virtues of logic, physics, and ethics, and "discourse according to philosophy;" which was theoretical instruction in philosophy. The latter was in turn divided into the theory of physics, the theory of logic, and the theory of ethics. This distinction had a quite specific meaning within the Stoic system, and it could be used in a more general way to describe the phenomenon of "philosophy" in antiquity. Throughout this investigation, we have recognized the existence of a philosophical life—more precisely, a way of life—which can be characterized as philosophical and which is radically opposed to the way of life of nonphilosophers. On the other hand, we have identified the existence of a philosophical discourse, which justifies, motivates, and influences this choice of life. Philosophy and philosophical discourse thus appear to be simultaneously incommensurable and inseparable. — Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, p. 172

Unfair in what sense?

That was a minor suggestion, though. I realize the forum already fought just to get the ability to edit, so tinkering with that ability is probably not a high priority.

Is there a philosopher (or more than one) from the Orthodox side you see as a counterpoint to the western Scholastics? — Paine

There is an interesting book by Martin Laird that grew out of his dissertation. It is called Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith. I think it strikes a counterpoint to Augustine, and to my knowledge it is characteristic of the Cappadocian Fathers as a whole (Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus).

Perhaps another way to ask that is, was there a parallel equivalent of the Renaissance on the other side of the Schism? — Paine

There very much was. The Palamite or Hesychast controversy took place the 14th century and began with the disagreement between Gregory Palamas and Barlaam of Calabria. Barlaam was one of many renaissance thinkers in the East who were hearkening back to Greek philosophy and learning, and encouraging a more syncretistic approach.

A common Eastern narrative would say that the West accepted the renaissance of Greek and Aristotelian thinking in the medieval period whereas the East rejected it, and this deepened the schism. I think that is simplistic, but there is some truth to it.

If we were talking about some sort of absolute rules, we don't need to prioritize consequences, and, thus, one could just throw out premise (6). — ToothyMaw

As far as I can tell, premise (6) is a tautology. Is there some significant difference between an 'outcome' and a 'consequence'?

Okay, that's fair enough.

Okay, thanks, I will do that. I had tried searching for a space, which didn't work. That's all the farther I got with hacky workarounds. :grin: