Maybe we can say that like we sense water and then sense ice, causality is something we sense over time, it’s a name for the “and then” when we mix water with cold air over time. So like the other physical things causality isn’t just a mental relationship, but the motion of objects. Causality is a type of motion like icey or liquid are types of water depending on the temperature. — Fire Ologist

I think that's basically right. My point is not that Hume is correct in dismissing causality, but the Humean-like arguments apparently do suffice to show that causality is not physical.

But this was the very question that awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber. His famous “answer to Hume” was, paraphrased, that we do not infer causality from observed sequences; rather, we could not even recognize those sequences as such unless the category of causation were already present in the intellect. The freezing of water is experienced as a physical transformation precisely because we perceive the world through the perspective of causality Causality isn’t a physical object to be found so much as a necessary condition for the coherence of experience.

Hume argues that since we never observe causality directly—only sequences of events—then causality must be a mental habit or convention, not something real, as it can’t be observed. But Kant says the fact that we can experience sequences as ordered events already presupposes the possibility of causal relationships. What makes experience possible is not just sensory data - as the empiricists argue - but the conceptual framework through which we cognise it. — Wayfarer

Okay, but how does any of that help your thesis which holds that causality is physical? Kant's answer to Hume does not involve the idea that causality is physical.

The repudiatory nature of wokeness is inconsistent with the metaphor of waking from slumber. — Leontiskos

Again, without having any actual knowledge of what “woke” is, couldn’t our current culture—our interests in the judgments we share, what matters, even what is rational—be asleep, as in unaware, of the world as it is... — Antony Nickles

Sure, but do you generally repudiate people who are sleeping or who are unaware? Negligence and sleep can go together, but they generally do not. So if someone is committed to repudiating others, then they should probably call them "negligent" rather than "asleep" or "unaware." In that case there would be less linguistic "violence" involved. It also explains why Buddhists don't go around repudiating everyone who is not awakened.

I knew this was going to get sticky. I am not arguing for activism as a means of persuasion, nor am I even arguing that activists deserve a discussion; only that, despite all that, we can make their interests intelligible... — Antony Nickles

Yes, of course, and I don't think anyone has claimed otherwise. The question is not whether we can but whether we should:

The question arises: Should we attempt to understand and sympathize with activists? — Leontiskos

I would go further and say that natural selection is itself a teleological explanation. It is a teleological explanation that covers all species instead of just one (i.e. it is a generic final cause). — Leontiskos

An interesting relates to this issue.

Why, thanks! Will read carefully. — Wayfarer

I finally got around to reading this. It was well-written and I enjoyed it. might like it insofar as it sheds light on the bottom-up nature of his "model-building," and might like it insofar as it is closely related to "reverse mereological essentialism."

Good essay and very carefully composed. Overall, I find it congenial, although I’m not as disposed to consider the theological elements. — Wayfarer

:up:

What I have argued here does not prove that evolutionary history is teleological and has a purpose, much less a divinely intended purpose. But what it does prove is that the random variation of traits that result in survival advantages does not rule out evolution having a teleological end or purpose. Evolutionary science is and should be neutral with respect to the question of whether the process of evolution has a teleology. If an evolutionary biologist claims that evolution has no purpose because of the role of random variation within it, that is not a scientific statement of evolutionary biology.

Yes, and I would go a bit further and say that Darwinian evolution is teleological, in much the same way that craps is teleological. It's surprising that O'Callaghan did not make this connection in his essay.

---

Here's a passage from your link distinguishing internal teleology from external — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that's an interesting excerpt. :up:

I believe that when we consider the way that internal teleology is 'given' to beings, it is necessary to conclude that this is a bottom-up process of creation rather than top-down. Top-down suffices to describe external teleology, but internal teleology, by which teleology is internal to each member, or part, of the whole, is necessarily bottom-up. — Metaphysician Undercover

Although O'Callaghan does not state it explicitly, I believe he holds that internal teleology is top-down. It is the internal natura of a living substance in which all of its parts participate.

According to the passage, what is given, is no specific nature whatsoever, but simply the will, or teleology to produce one's own nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where do you find that in the passage?

-

And that is nothing if not top-down! — Wayfarer

Yes, I tend to agree. Here is a quote that captures the thrust of the bottom-up vs. top-down distinction:

I said at the beginning that the two modes of explanation I was going to discuss were not themselves scientific theories but opposed metaphysical positions as to what the fundamental reality is to be investigated in a science like biology—the whole and its parts or the parts and their whole. — Teleology: What Is It Good For?, by John O'Callaghan

Top-down sees the whole as primary the parts as secondary, whereas bottom-up sees the parts as primary and the whole as secondary.

---

The people who deny this teleological purpose are in a way blind to it. They see things only in the external. This results in a failure to understand what an organism is. In a sense they look at individual organisms, or species and see them as one of those body parts that Frankenstein was working with. But this denies the essence of life which courses through those organisms. They should remind themselves that all life of this planet is one family, literally brothers and sisters of one common parent* and that they are a result of one continuous lineage of life. One life begetting another all the way through our evolution. — Punshhh

Yes, good point. :up:

But the relation being described—namely, the causal link between temperature and phase change—is a physical phenomenon. It reflects real, observable, and measurable interactions in the physical world. Water molecules slow down at lower temperatures; — Wayfarer

But why do you think that a relation between physical things is physical? Why do you think the speed of water molecules is a physical thing? Again, do you think that the world where a molecule changes speed has one more physical thing than the world where the molecule does not change speed? If a molecule's speed is physical then it seems that you must hold this.

Beyond that, Hume's response would be, "You have seen the constant conjunction between slow-moving water molecules and the formation of ice, but where is the cause? How do you know that it is the slow-moving molecules which cause ice?" The cause is itself neither observable nor measurable in the way you suppose.

And consider the world in which water never freezes. Surely that world has one less physical thing than our world, given that it lacks ice. But does it lack a second physical thing, namely the causal relation described by the consequence? — Leontiskos

-

The description of the relation is of course not physical—it’s verbal or symbolic, a product of language or mathematical formalism. No argument there — Wayfarer

I think I was pretty clear that I was talking about the "relation that obtains in reality between water and temperature." I did use the word "describe," but within the clause, "describes and accounts for the transformation." So I am not attempting to talk about mere words.

@NOS4A2 said that activism is not conversation. I think that's basically correct. Activism is focused on an outcome:

Activism: the use of direct and noticeable action to achieve a result, usually a political or social one — Cambridge Dictionary

Activism: a doctrine or practice that emphasizes direct vigorous action especially in support of or opposition to one side of a controversial issue — Merriam-Webster Dictionary

Activism: the policy or action of using vigorous campaigning to bring about political or social change. — Oxford Languages Dictionary

Generally activism is not an attempt to rationally persuade others to adopt a particular view. So if the wokist is an activist, then their activity is not aimed at rational persuasion. What follows is that to try to agree or disagree with an activist is a category error. The "game" that the activist is playing requires others to either support and ally with them, or else to oppose them (and because of this activism has a lot to do with "material positions"). The activist wants to achieve an outcome, and they aren't overly scrupulous about how that outcome is secured.

The question arises: Should we attempt to understand and sympathize with activists? And, supposing we want to play their game, should we attempt to understand and sympathize before we choose to either support or oppose them? I think some will say, "Yes, because we should always try to be compassionate and understanding, and therefore we should try to be compassionate and understanding towards the activist."

This gets complicated, but with @NOS4A2 I would say that the act of activism precludes this response to one extent or another. The activist is treating everyone, friend and foe, as a means to an end. Even if we grant for the sake of argument that we should prefer compassion and understanding, the advice that we should treat everyone with an equal amount of compassion and understanding turns out to be false. It is false because it is fitting to treat those who are attempting to use us as a means to their end with less understanding and compassion—and more suspicion!—than those who are treating us respectfully, as autonomous persons. It is no coincidence that everyone tends to treat activists with less compassion and understanding than those who engage them as equals, utilizing forms of persuasion rather than forms of coercion.

So I see 's response as appropriate. We can of course treat the activist as if they are not an activist, or ignore the activism that they are currently engaged in, but it is eminently reasonable to treat the activist as an activist and to recognize that they are attempting to use you as a means to their end. Incidentally, this is why one with the virtue of modesty will be averse to publicizing even true virtue, much less virtue signaling or engaging in activism. They will not be comfortable with achieving an end via improper means. Cf. Matthew 6:16-18.

How is it not? How did the fall in temperature not cause the water to freeze, or the corrosion of the main support beam not cause the bridge to fall? If causation is not physical, what is it? — Wayfarer

A more clumsy way to address this issue is to think about a cause in terms of a consequence relation. So in response to a question about the cause of ice we might provide a consequence (or "conditional" if you prefer): <If water continues to cool then it will eventually freeze>.

Now supposing the consequence really does represent a cause, is it physical? Is the if-then relation that obtains in reality between water and temperature a physical thing? The water is physical, and the cold temperature is physical, and the ice is physical, but is the relation that describes and accounts for the transformation itself physical? And consider the world in which water never freezes. Surely that world has one less physical thing than our world, given that it lacks ice. But does it lack a second physical thing, namely the causal relation described by the consequence?

Below I will give a bibliography as the translator will translate it — Astorre

Thanks, this is very helpful. :up:

I agree with your essay in large part. With that said, I think it is very natural for Christianity to navigate the area between monism and dualism, especially given the Platonic context of early Christianity. It strikes me as something Christians will need to continue to revisit and refine as time goes on.

A learned Western author who addresses the same sort of issue from an Anglican view and with an eye towards the Reformation is N. T. Wright. He has a famous quip: "Christianity is not primarily interested in life after death, but rather life after life after death." From his Western vantage point he will claim that the problem you identify was exacerbated by the Reformation emphasis on justification for the sake of a disembodied heavenly state.

Most concisely would simply be what the term implies: asleep or unaware. — praxis

Cf:

...it is also worth noting that wokeness is not inherently reactionary, at least in one particular sense. The name conveys this, "woke." "Awake." It is styled as a project to awaken the slumbering, not to chastise the aberrant. Obviously that didn't last long, but it does point to the idea that the genesis of the movement was not a reaction to something like the "anti-woke." — Leontiskos

From the moment I heard about "woke" I thought about the way that Buddhists use the same metaphor of awakening. Yet with time the gulf between a Buddhist approach and a woke approach has proved remarkably wide, and I think the Buddhists leverage the metaphor much more consistently. The repudiatory nature of wokeness is inconsistent with the metaphor of waking from slumber.

In any case, the words we have in the Book of Samuel are Samuel conveying the divine will, and that ambiguity runs through the text (i.e. whether it is God or Samuel making the commands... or both). If I had to judge, I'd say it's a mix of both. — BitconnectCarlos

Yes, that's a good point. Your emphasis on weighting different parts of the canon is edifying and intuitive. I was aware that such is a traditional Hebrew approach, but I had never witnessed it first-hand.

On a similar note, I was revisiting the book, Dark Passages of the Bible: Engaging Scripture with Benedict XVI and Thomas Aquinas. The author looks at the way that the Pharaoh of the Exodus story is variously described as having his heart hardened by God, as hardening his own heart, and as simply having his heart hardened (in a passive sense). The author is trying to demonstrate the manner in which the Hebrew understanding of God's action is in a continual process of development, and I would add that such a topic is inherently unwieldy and difficult to understand. For example, there is a constant vacillation in the Bible between the idea that everything is according to God's will (and therefore even evil things are brought about by God), and the idea that God does not do or will evil. I think that's a natural vacillation that can't be overcome easily or quickly, and the sacred texts inevitably reflect this reality.

- I think you're reading a lot of things between the lines that aren't there at all. For example:

he asserts that for Critical theory power is the central principle of society, and that it supersedes truth (such as that 2+2=4). But there is no central tenet of wokism arguing that 2+2 can equal anything we want it to (in spite of a handful of wokists who may or may not have made that claim), because critical theorists are realists, not radical relativists. — Joshs

Where does Barron claim that power supersedes truth for Critical theory? He points to the way that it can do that, and does do that for some Critical theorists. You seem to agree but want to dismiss that "handful of wokists."

Read more charitably, his point is that the broad genealogical lineage of wokism—especially its voluntaristic roots—is ordered towards the very things that we see in wokeism today.

Deconstruction shows what continues to bind together groups on either side of an oppositional divide, so one can never simply overcome what one opposes. — Joshs

Now apply that to your post, because you transgress this principle multiple times. You say, for example, that Derrida was critical of Marxism and therefore Marxism cannot be used to explain his thought. On the contrary, a critic of Marxism is by that very fact informed by Marxism - especially one who holds that one can never simply overcome what one opposes.

The first factual error I noticed is that he claims Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault belong to the Frankfurt school of critical theory (he says Derrida is the patron saint of critical theory) , which is not true. Instead, they were critical of Marxism and the Frankfurt school. — Joshs

Here's Wikipedia, which sort of sums up the way in which your post is filled with half-truths:

Critical theory continued to evolve beyond the first generation of the Frankfurt School. Jürgen Habermas, often identified with the second generation, shifted the focus toward communication and the role of language in social emancipation. Around the same time, post-structuralist and postmodern thinkers, including Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, were reshaping academic discourse with critiques of knowledge, meaning, power, institutions, and social control with deconstructive approaches that further challenged assumptions about objectivity and truth. Though neither Foucault nor Derrida belonged formally to the Frankfurt School tradition, their works profoundly influenced later formulations of critical theory. Collectively, the post-structuralist and postmodern insights expanded the scope of critical theory, weaving cultural and linguistic critiques into its Marxian roots. — Critical Theory | Wikipedia

As someone who began studying for his doctorate in Paris in 1989, Barron knows a fair bit about figures like Foucault and Derrida. He is probably not as up to date on your wheelhouse of "enactivism" given that that is a more recent movement, but I doubt his genealogy requires such a thing.

It's good of you to watch the video, and I would be interested to know if you think he identifies a philosophical root of wokeism that is inaccurate. But the things you are bringing up now read like quibbles, such as the idea that Derrida is not central to Critical theory because he did not formally belong to the Frankfurt School.

Edit:

critical theorists are realists — Joshs

This seems highly inaccurate to me, so after finding no evidence of this I queried Perplexity.ai:

Are critical theorists realists?

Critical theorists and realists are distinct groups, but there is overlap between some critical approaches and a philosophical position known as critical realism. In general, most critical theorists are not realists in the traditional philosophical sense—especially within the Frankfurt School tradition and related approaches, which often critique the very idea of objective reality and emphasize the role of social constructions and power in shaping what counts as "truth"... — Perplexity AI

So my intimation that your claim is highly inaccurate is now stronger. Note too that the folks on TPF who gravitate towards Critical theory generally do not consider themselves realists.

Probably a lot of ground-team type personalities reject current "woke" but still stand ten-toes deep on the original concept. — AmadeusD

True, and that seems to be one of the elephants in the room. I wonder if any within this thread would say that wokeness never got off the rails?

I want to say that causality is not physical because causality is a principle and principles are not physical. Or else negatively, because that which is physical can be directly seen, touched, and interacted with, and yet none of this is possible when it comes to causality.

Now we could say that the principle of causation which obtains among billiard balls “supervenes” upon the billiard balls. That’s fine, and it is a second-order consideration. Similarly, if in Euclidean geometry we have a set of points, lines, and curves, it does not follow that distance belongs to the same genus as points, lines, and curves. Distance is a second-order notion, and likewise, the distance between two physical objects is not itself physical. One reason we know this is because distance is infinitely divisible whereas physical objects are not infinitely divisible. So we cannot manipulate distance directly, but only indirectly by altering the points, lines, curves, or physical objects in question. Now someone might say, “If distance is not physical, what is it?” In the first place I would say that it doesn't really matter what it is, given that my point is that it isn't physical. In the second place I would say that it is mathematical. Of course the physicalist would claim that mathematics is physical, but his is a very unintuitive claim.

I would say that there is an analogy between the second-orderness of distance and the second-orderness of causality.

The transfer of certain particles from heated air (or metal, i guess) into the water, ramping up the potential kinetic energy in the water until it cannot contain the energy, and must "boil" to let off heat which it cannot contain.
That seems a physical causation train. Is that not what you're looking for? — AmadeusD

I think that's the sort of thing a physicalist would claim, but I think it involves a lot of metaphorical language and hypothesizing. Likewise, we could say that kinetic energy is transferred from one ball to another, and given that kinetic energy is physical this is a physical phenomenon. The problem as I see it is that "kinetic energy" is a kind of reified formalism - a theoretical entity that is imagined to be substance-like and yet is not held to actually exist, at least not with any certitude.

Beginning with Newton we have become less picky about the presence of such theoretical entities. Newton gave his account of gravity in mathematical terms and simply transgressed the convention which required him to provide the means by which one body acted upon another via gravitational force. His account was therefore criticized for being a matter of "spooky" or "occult" action - a kind of invisible or unaccountable influence at a distance of one body upon another. Newton was nonplussed. He didn't believe that his causal-mathematical account required any theoretical means—physical or otherwise—to justify it.

No, they couldn't. Without explaining what's happened at the moment of impact, we have no reason to think that a collision would cause movement, descriptively (we obviously do practically). Explaining what's happened at the moment of impact would be something of the form of my (likely inaccurate) description of heat causing water to boil. — AmadeusD

There is a gap present within, "We do not descriptively but we obviously do practically," and also within, "my (likely inaccurate) description." With Newton we might simply skip the one half, arguing that we have no need to give a description of what happens within the collision if our description will inevitably be inaccurate. Of course I'm simplifying this a bit, but the point is that when we talk about causality we aren't really talking about a physical thing. Maybe the gravitational influence of one planet on another is physical, but maybe it's not. Newton's causal account in no way commits itself to the idea that there must be a physical intermediary between the planets, and I think the same is true for causality taken generally.

No, I don't think that's right. Δ-temperatured air (sic) causes water to freeze. The air, when in contact with the water reduces the energy in the water to the point that its constituents cannot move rapidly enough to remain fluid. These are all physical. Temperature is a way to notate the complicated relationship between mass and energy, right? Can't see the gap, myself, which you are trying to fill. But I also don't see the explanation I'm looking for either... — AmadeusD

I would again say that "energy" is a highly theoretical entity, and is not obviously physical.

To be clear, none of this is particularly intended to support a physicalist account of causation. As noted, I don't understand how it occurs. But it seems to me we can get much further on the physicalist account than you're allowing. I would suggest some of Kim and Chalmers chats about causation in the mind/brain complex could be instructive as they are extremely detailed and minute. — AmadeusD

Okay. I suppose I am saying that the proposition that causation is necessarily physical ought to be a conclusion rather than an assumption. Also, I would say that the very fact that we can talk about causation without committing ourselves to physicalism (or to a physicalist account of causation) just goes to show that the concept is not inherently physical.

Which obtains, solely, in a physical, measurable domain. The premise seems wrong in this light... It is physical. — AmadeusD

I wouldn't say that "solely" is yet in evidence. Now we are apparently talking about efficient causation, and efficient causation will admittedly be quasi-physical. But things get tricky once we ask whether mathematics is an efficient cause of a particular gravitational force, or whether energy is an (intermediating) efficient cause on the billiard table. It at least seems fairly clear that energy is of a different genus than the two billiard balls.

I would probably say that energy is also second-order in that it is a potentiality. For example, a car with a given engine, weight, and amount of fuel will have a certain amount of potential energy. The energy is not physical; it is potential. It represents a real fact about the car's capacities which supervenes on various physical characteristics of the car.

This said, i think the most intuitive problem is that, generally, the 'woke' claim that morality is rational, but relative. If so, they have absolutely no place to make moral commands of others, even in their own culture. That is to say: one ought not throw stones once one denounces stone-throwing. — AmadeusD

Another problem is that many of the woke claim that everything is just a power game, a jockeying for power. The wokeness of such a person is apparently just a power game, just a jockeying for power. There is good independent evidence for this too, for example in the way that reasons run short when one wants to know why something like inclusion should be elevated above all other values.

So I think that if we read such people according to their own hermeneutic, then we also come to the conclusion that their philosophy is a power grab driven by primarily emotional factors.

In the hands of the better journalists delving into this socio-political phenomenon, the baby is a spectrum of philosophical positions, bookended on the right by Hegel and on the left by 1960’s French thinkers like Foucault. Throwing out the baby then means that one refuses to accept that reform of wokist excesses can take place within the bounds of these philosophical grounds, that these philosophies were unnecessary in the first place given that there are already perfectly workable, intellectually superior ethico-political frameworks to guide action. — Joshs

The Philosophical Roots of Wokeism with Bishop Robert Barron

I think the onus is on you to show why it's in question. — Wayfarer

The cause is in question because this is a thread about causality. We are not talking about Δ-temperature. We are talking about causality. So to talk about Δ-temperature apart from causality is beside the question.

To simplify it a bit, you might say, "The billiard cue was the cause; the billiard cue is physical; therefore some causes are physical." And I would point out that the billiard cue qua billiard cue is not in question. It is the billiard cue qua cause that is in question, and such a thing is not obviously physical. Indeed, prima facie, it is not physical at all. The-billiard-cue's-causing-the-motion-of-the-cue-ball is certainly not physical in the way that the billiard cue is physical.

- Good.

One could give a completely detailed and accurate account of the collision without any reference to energy whatsoever. — Paul Davies

I mostly think they couldn't. They might not use the word "energy," but the words they would use would mean the same thing as energy.

But energy is not physical. It is a property of physical systems. It is a way to account for the interactions that take place within a system.

Yes. How is it not? It is measurable with a physical instrument, and observable in the effects it has on matter. — Wayfarer

There are a lot of assumptions here, but let's take a step back.

You are saying, "Δ-temperature caused the water to freeze." So even if we grant for the sake of argument that Δ-temperature is itself physical, what is in question is the cause. What is in question is Δ-temperature qua cause.

Causation does not appear explicitly in physical ontologies. — SophistiCat

Would someone list within their physical ontology, "Δ-temperature caused the water to freeze"? I mean, if causation were physical then Hume would have just pointed to it. It would be a physical thing.

How is it not? How did the fall in temperature not cause the water to freeze, or the corrosion of the main support beam not cause the bridge to fall? — Wayfarer

Well look at your own examples. Are you claiming that a temperature reduction is physical? Or that corrosion is physical? Or taking my own examples, are energy and its transfer physical? Is motion physical? Is a relation between two physical objects physical?

Absolutely. I wrote an article a while back that World War II has become the "founding mythos" of modern liberalism. In doing this, it has made (generally manichean) conflict and struggle a bedrock part of identity formation in a way that is unhelpful. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, and I still find the article I mentioned here useful:

In a related vein is a very good recent piece in First Things, "The End of the Age of Hitler." I thought about posting it in Baden's thread on methodological naturalism given that it is a kind of moral parallel to the fact that a metaphysical vacuum is ineluctably filled. — Leontiskos

-

It's made for plenty of great media, but the problem comes when transgression is valued for transgression's sake. That's how you get caustic, counter-productive, purely performative activism. I'd also argue that it's how we got a real resurgence in unapologetic fascism and neo-Nazism. Hitler became the face of evil, the ultimate taboo, and so of course those who value transgression cannot keep themselves away from Hitler, even if only ironically at first (e.g., the Sex Pistols used to parade around in swastika shirts). But the "taboo appeal" of Hitler and fascism seems to have actually transformed into a potent recruiting tool for unironic Nazis. I'd argue that at least some of the continued appeal of the Confederate flag has similar roots. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting. I don't really disagree with any of that, but I want to say that the problem comes even earlier. It is a disproportion akin to C. S. Lewis' idea of "putting second things first." Quoting from the thread of fdrake's I mentioned above:

--

While this is correct, appealing to the inherent mismatch of ideals with reality is a cop out, and serves as an explanation for any impermissible act consistent with the operative principles of a society that allows it. Which is to say, it exculpates any moral evil imaginable. — fdrake

Sure, but aren't we ignoring the other side of the coin? Namely that appealing to the inherent mismatch of ideals with reality is a cop out, and serves as an explanation for any act inconsistent with the operative principles of a society that disallows it? As in, there was a downside to the French Revolution, and I'm not convinced your construal is able to come to terms with that downside. The promotion of an ideal is not unobjectionably good, given both that there is moral worth to the stability of the status quo, and that false ideals are very often promoted. — Leontiskos

--

...That is something like the confrontation between the progressive instinct and the conservative instinct. The question is something like this: How promising is this or that progressive ideal, and what cost should we be willing to incur in order to achieve it? My view is that to value every newfangled ideal above the status quo is to put second things first. Why? Because the novel ideals aren't worth much, and they are a dime a dozen. They need to be tested rather than trusted.

A terrible line has been crossed when transgression is valued for transgression's sake, but I want to say that the precursor is the undervaluation of the conservative instinct, or the status quo, or tradition (or whatever else one wants to call it). I don't think that line ever gets crossed without this preliminary error.

I don't think I'd say that we necessarily ran out of issues to champion. I'd say the larger issue is that every issue tended to take on the urgency and Manichean dimensions of the Civil Rights Movement. For instance, migration has obviously often been reframed as simply a continuation of the Civil Right Movement, where opposition to a maximalist immigration policy becomes a sort of explicit racism in the way Jim Crow was. Or Ta-Nehisi Coates (among plenty of others) looks at the Arab-Israeli conflict, and sees the Civil Rights Movement as the obvious analog. Some environmental issues disproportionately impact some minority populations, and so it becomes a Civil Rights-style issue, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, spot-on. :up:

Wokeness sees the dirty bath water and wants to throw out the dirty water while overlooking the baby.
Traditionalists want to preserve the baby, but overlook the dirty water and would rather keep it all. — Fire Ologist

Right. :up:
I tried to delve into this sort of issue in fdrake's thread.

I'm not really convinced an overly rational account of what wokeism is reacting to is possible, because I think @Number2018 is correct that the movement is more affective than rational. But I think wokeness is correctly construed as wanting to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Fdrake's posts in that thread are perhaps the best attempt I know of to characterize the issue from the woke(-ish) perspective.

Edit: I say "woke(-ish)" because steelmanning wokeism runs a severe risk of transforming wokeism into something it is not.

...it is also worth noting that wokeness is not inherently reactionary, at least in one particular sense. The name conveys this, "woke." "Awake." It is styled as a project to awaken the slumbering, not to chastise the aberrant. Obviously that didn't last long, but it does point to the idea that the genesis of the movement was not a reaction to something like the "anti-woke."

I find it hard to understand causation, properly, in physical terms. — AmadeusD

I think this is a central point, and I would just say that causation is not physical. I am surprised to see that there are a lot of claims within this thread which presuppose that causation is physical.

heat causes X — AmadeusD

"Heat causes water to boil."

Is this cause, in itself, physical? I doubt anyone would claim such a thing unless they are coming from an a priori physicalist paradigm. What is at stake is a kind of relation between heat and water, and I don't see how such a relation could be construed as physical.

Similarly:

The term Causation is a physical term that describes types of temporal organisation. — I like sushi

No, I don't think it is a "physical term." When one billiard ball collides with another and causes it to move, our talk of "cause" is not talk of something that is physically instantiated. Even when we speak about a transfer of kinetic energy, we could be talking about mathematics or physics (i.e. motion), but we are not speaking about a physical entity. Transfers and relations and even motion are not physical entities. They are meta-physical or rather meta-material.

Note too that causation does not merely describe the temporal organization of billiard balls. "At t1 the cue ball had w position and the 9-ball had x position; and at t2 the cue ball had y position and the 9-ball had z position." There is nothing inherently causal about such descriptions of temporal organization. It's rather important to recognize that when Hume talks about causation as constant conjunction, he has redefined the term and is technically equivocating. Hume means, "Given my presuppositions I can't make sense of causation as anything other than constant conjunction; therefore causation is constant conjunction." But causation isn't constant conjunction. That's not what the word means. The Occasionalists who influenced Hume explicitly held that constant conjunction (i.e. Occasionalism) is not causation.

Meaning, the current rebuke against wokeness shows fairly well what NOT to do (I think), but the anti-woke crowds’ arguments in favor of what TO DO were the reason wokeness arose in the first place - so we are destined to continue further struggle.

If we are seeing the end of wokeness, without something truly new to replace it, we are likely (at least to many) simply back to a place that gave rise to wokeness. Where is the Hegelian synthesis? — Fire Ologist

Well, there was no "anti-woke crowd" before wokeness, and wokeness ironically created much of the sentiment that it claimed to oppose, such as racism. I actually think wokeness is largely self-generated. I think it has to do with a "civil rights warrior" mindset that had largely run out of issues to champion, and so it had to start conjuring them in the form of "micro aggressions" and whatnot. Since at least World War II we have created a sort of internal righteousness monster that needs to be fed. If there are no obvious injustices then injustices must be conjured up or else minor issues must be magnified, even at the cost of great collateral damage.

This is an interesting and thoughtful essay. :up:

I wonder if you would be willing to provide a rough bibliography for your ideas?

To be very concise, morality cannot be coerced, and this is what the woke movement seems to most misunderstand. If you coerce rather than persuade someone to act "good" you end up subjugating them in a way that will be inimical to truly moral outcomes. — Leontiskos

Elaborating on this a bit, the coercion engaged by woke culture and the left in general has to do with manipulation of the Overton window. The natural effects of the natural Overton window are not properly called coercion (and neither are, for example, laws which are democratically recognized). An example of coercion proper is the manipulation of the Overton window, or the claim that someone's view is outside the Overton window when in fact it is not (and then the astroturfing of consternation on top of that).

These coercive and tyrannical tactics have largely backfired. The common people have rebuffed the woke attempt to forcibly shrink the Overton window and impose a highly idiosyncratic morality on the entire population. This is the manner in which the woke version of "morality from on high" has failed in our sociologically-inclined culture.

By saying "better (or more artistic)" you are conflating evaluation and identification. We identify art by whether it is artistic or not. If A is more qualified as art than B, A is more artistic than B. But this does NOT mean A is better than B. This is demonstrated by the meal example. Every 5 star Michelin meal is more artistic than salted oatmeal. But there are many 5 star Michelin meals I would rather eat oatmeal than them. — hypericin

You are conflating better simpliciter with better qua art. Someone who desires art will hold that what is more artistic is better than what is less artistic. You yourself claimed that, "a frowny face scrawled on printer paper with feces is worse than a Rembrandt." Obviously when I talk about some art being better than some other art I am talking about the idea of better art. I am not talking about, for example, the idea of better caloric content.

Much more effort, intention, time, resources, and training was devoted to the Michelin meal, all to create an object very carefully honed to modify the mental state of the consumer of the meal in a very specific way — hypericin

So you would say that something is more artistic depending on the, "effort, intention, time, resources, and training," that go into it? It would follow that if two people spend the same amount of effort/intention/time/resources/training on two pieces of art, then the two pieces of art must be equally artistic. Do you think that's right? You seem to be reducing the quality or artistic depth of art to the effort put forth by the artist, such that artistic quality is only a measure of the artist's effort.

We identify art by whether it is artistic or not.

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I do not have a grip on the better question, and doubt there can be an account independent of preference. To be sure, the Rembrandt is also vastly more artistic than A Foul Frown, which seriously confuses the question here.

...

Yes, we agree here. — hypericin

But does it really confuse the question to claim that there is a relation between the quality of art and its status as art? If there is no relation, then how is it possible that, "the person who makes a mistake with regard to the former is much less mistaken than the person who makes a mistake with regard to the latter"? If that which barely qualifies as art is justifiably more likely to be mistaken for non-art, then it would seem that what is less artistic is less art. It seems to me that your binary notion of art vs. non-art does not track with our experience. Note too that "preference" will become less central when we are talking about Rembrandt. Rembrandt will be recognized as art regardless of preference. The frowny face will not.

- Excellent OP. :up:

- Great post. :up:

- Yes, I think that's right. :up:

I think it would be art. The addition of salt, and the quantity added, is an aesthetic choice designed to modify mental state, in this case taste perception. Our "artist" may have chosen pepper instead, or, to really go all out, both.

But note, I agree with P and Q, and so I acknowledge that some art is more artistic than others. This meal would be a minimal example of art, barely belonging to the category at all, probably not enough to identify as art in an everyday context. Compare with a 5 star Michelin meal, much more artistic (but not better) , and which most everyone would call art. — hypericin

Hmm, okay.

No, and here you are again conflating identification vs evaluation of art. My definition is only for identification, evaluation is an orthogonal problem. — hypericin

But isn't it curious that in R I said "better (or more artistic)," and in your own posts you recognize that some art is more artistic? Usually if something is more artistic then we would say that it is better qualified to be art, so I don't see how you can so neatly separate identification vs. evaluation. Usually the definition of art is going to determine what is more or less artistic. What else could do the job? Or do we disagree on this?

Yet, I easily acknowledge that all the Michelin meals are more artistic than all the basic meals. — hypericin

To be clear, I think you are saying that the Michelin meal is not necessarily preferable to a basic meal, but it is more artistic.

I have the same question: Why? Why is the Michelin meal more artistic than the basic meal? Why is the Rembrandt better than the frowny face?

(A notable point of agreement here may be this: That which barely qualifies as art at all is much more likely to be mistaken for non-art than something which readily qualifies as art, and the person who makes a mistake with regard to the former is much less mistaken than the person who makes a mistake with regard to the latter.)

Control, though, is tricky for one reason only: The enforcement of gun control requires gun use. I'm unsure I need to explain why that's tricky. — AmadeusD

I think that hones in on the political sophistry or equivocation involved, which I pointed to in my . It is this: when one talks about "gun control," what they think they are talking about is controlling the availability of guns. By "gun control" they think they mean, "making guns scarce." But if you ask how guns are to be made scarce, it quickly becomes apparent that scarcity is achieved by giving all the guns to one set of people and having those people use the guns to coercively prevent others from obtaining guns. The parallel of nuclear disarmament is not even theoretically possible in the case of guns.

So by, "Making guns scarce," one actually means, "Making guns scarce for one group while making them readily available for another group."

If we ignore this political sophistry then the arguments look pretty good. Indeed, even if we confront the sophistry one might still think that it is preferable to give all the guns to one group of people (along with everything that entails). But once one spots the political sophistry the arguments in favor of "gun control" are no longer as strong or as easy to make.

The deeper point here is that this is a complex issue that does not have a simple, bumper sticker answer. We can't just cite a stat and foreclose the whole debate. For example, the prevalence of mental illness within a society is going to have a measurable effect on opinions about gun control. Feminist arguments are going to play a role. Disenfranchisement (vis-a-vis arms) is going to play a role. Gross homicide statistics are going to play a role. Trust or distrust towards the government and also one's fellow citizens is going to play a role. Still, I think the biggest blind spot in modern liberal democracies is the political sophistry noted above.

(NB: Aristotle held that in a truly democratic order, everyone would not only have a right to arms, but would also own arms and be trained in the use of arms. For the poor this would have to be provided, given their limited resources. Indeed, Aristotle held that an arrangement where the lower classes (i.e. the majority) either did not have access to arms or were not trained in the use of arms was not a democracy in any true sense. Even if the lower classes were able to vote they would still ultimately be powerless to maintain the democratic order if they did not possess the means of coercion that the upper classes possessed.)

No. By "experience" I mean, experience by the five senses. The effect of a benzo is not in the taste, but requires absorption into the blood stream. Drugs are human creations designed to alter physical state (and this alteration in turn, may or may not alter mental state). I exclude this, the alteration must arise from the experience of the purported art, in the above sense of "experience". — hypericin

Okay, that's a reasonable answer.

Similar for food. Food allays hunger by altering physical state. But, most food is also designed to alter mental state by the experience of it's taste, appearance, and smell, and so most (prepared) food is also art. — hypericin

Would it then follow that if we have a prepared food that is not art, and then someone adds salt to make it taste better, it has become art? I am not convinced that such a thing is correctly identified as art.

Why is this helpful to the question of "what is art"? To be sure, I think a frowny face scrawled on printer paper with feces is worse than a Rembrandt, by any reasonable definition of "worse" here, so I also believe R. — hypericin

Okay, fair. But how is one to judge better or worse according to your definition? The only characteristic on your definition is, "designed to modify the mental state of the experiencer." If that is the only characteristic in your definition of art, then it seems like better/worse could only be derived from the degree of modification intended or else achieved.

More concretely, is the frowny face drawing worse than a Rembrandt because it does not modify the mental state of the experiencer as effectively? Given that you used feces, isn't it possible that the frowny face would modify mental state more? On the view that I set out quality can be identified by looking at .

You will no doubt feel that mine is vastly too permissive, just as yours is vastly too restrictive to me. Yet we both believe P, Q. — hypericin

Okay, well it is promising that we both at least hold to P and Q. :up:

Art is a human creation (in the loosest, most permissive sense) whose experience is designed to modify the mental state of the experiencer. — hypericin

I worry that this isn't a real attempt at a definition, on account of the possibility that "art" is being presupposed rather than described.

For example, if we offered a description, "A human creation (in the loosest, most permissive sense) the experience of which is designed to modify the mental state of the experiencer," would we arrive at the definiendum "art"?

The first difficulty is semantic. The clause, "whose experience is designed," or, "the experience of which is designed," are both semantically problematic, because both presuppose that experience is itself somehow designed. Probably what you mean is that art is a human creation designed to modify the mental state of the person who experiences it, and that's clear enough.

First I will say that your idea does capture something that I find in many artists I know, so that's promising. But if this is the definition of art then anything designed to modify the mental state of the experiencer is art. Keeping with my example, this would mean that benzodiazepines are art. And if hunger is a mental state then every prepared food is art. This seems unlikely. Do you hold that benzodiazepines are art?

It may be helpful to introduce R beside P and Q, which includes a more specific genus:

• R: "Some art is better (or more artistic) than other art."
• ~R: "No art is better (or more artistic) than any other art."
• 1b. R v ~R

Would you prefer R or ~R? And is this where my understanding becomes "too restrictive"? Because I definitely think that some art is better than other art, at least on any reasonable definition of 'art'.

I definitely agree. It's also worth thinking about the way in which "morality from on high" is doomed from the start. For example, suppose the beliefs and activities of the affluent helped rather than hurt the lower classes. That's the best case scenario, but it is also quite limited given the way in which it inevitably becomes class patronization.

To be very concise, morality cannot be coerced, and this is what the woke movement seems to most misunderstand. If you coerce rather than persuade someone to act "good" you end up subjugating them in a way that will be inimical to truly moral outcomes. Furthermore, the people who are aided by the coercion inevitably feel inadequate and patronized, such as those who are haunted by the possibility that DEI quotas are the only reason they have their job. As an example, Martin Luther King Jr. was remarkably prescient in understanding that coercion and enmity are dead ends if the goal is the long-term improvement of race relations.

Yes, in the most general sense, "cause" and "reason" can be used interchangeably, and Aristotle's four causes are better understood as a classification of the types of explanations. Nowadays, when we use 'cause' in a more specific sense, we usually mean something like Aristotle's efficient cause.

But whether you are asking in a more general or more specific sense, the question still requires context to be meaningful. "Why a duck?" asked out of the blue, makes about as much sense as "What's the difference between a duck?" You can ask for the reason of a duck being in this place at this time (if that seems surprising), or perhaps you want to know about its plumage color or its evolutionary history or why it was served for dinner - all potentially sensible questions that can be answered in causal terms (i.e., by reference to how we understand the world to be hanging together). But to ask what accounts for the duck's existence doesn't seem sensible, because there is no way to answer such a question. — SophistiCat

But aren't Aristotle's four causes attempting to answer questions such as, "Why a duck?" The explanation for a duck will presumably include why it is in this locale, why its plumage is of a certain color, and what its evolutionary history (and genesis) is.

The crucial question asks whether such causal questions are disparate or interrelated. For example, whether Aristotle's efficient cause and material cause can both be named by the same name (i.e. "cause"). To take a simplistic example, someone might say, "We can't ask what causes ice. We can ask whether ice requires H2O and we can ask whether ice requires low temperatures, but those are two different questions." The answer is that they are two interrelated questions, and that to give the cause of ice we will need to answer both questions (and others as well). One cause/reason for ice is H2O and another cause/reason for ice is low temperatures, and yet they are both causes and they will both be needed to explain, "What accounts for the ice's existence." Surely someone who understands these two things about ice understands what accounts for ice's existence more than someone who does not understand these two things (ceteris paribus).

But to ask what accounts for the duck's existence doesn't seem sensible, because there is no way to answer such a question. — SophistiCat

I think that's the question that Aristotle and Darwin were attempting to answer, if in different ways. I don't see why it isn't a sensible question, nor why there would be no way to answer it. After all, the answers of Aristotle and Darwin both go a long way towards answering that very question.

If we hold to anything remotely like the PSR then I think causality is inevitable, because it is what accounts for phenomena (whether in your general or specific sense). Now it is true that giving a full account of an event or substance would be an ambitious project, but I want to say that the notion of cause/reason (aitia) is fairly clear, even if it is subtle.

Doesn't causation just explain the "why" of some event or substance? We usually think in terms of efficient causation, in which one is identifying the (moving) cause that brought about some effect.

Asking, "What caused it?," seems to be asking what accounts for its existence. Thus in the most general sense you have Aristotle's four causes, which are meant to explain the being of substances.

Good points, and I think that if we want to look at the foundations of what is happening with wokeness we will find that it stems from a morally robust culture combined with increased leisure. Or in other words, you have a morally conscious population of busybodies.

Whenever a group of people find more leisure time, they tend to become more involved in cultural and political issues. They wish to extend their influence into these areas. When such people are morally charged, and morally charged in the particular direction of identity politics, you get wokeness.

I think the increasing leisure is going to produce all sorts of similar phenomena going forward, even though the particular determination of wokeness will not be the inevitable outcome.

Egalitarian-relativism is actually somewhat common on TPF. @J often promotes it in the field of epistemology, and recently gave an unanswered argument against it .

So let's revamp @Count Timothy von Icarus' first premise for our new context:

1. Either some human act/creation is more artistic than some other human act/creation, or else no human act/creation is more artistic than any other human act/creation.

This is the same as saying:

• P: "Some human act/creation is more artistic than some other human act/creation."
• 1. P v ~P

So what do you think? Do you prefer P or ~P?


Another way to put it, closer to Count's initial phrasing:

1a. Either some thing is more artistic than some other thing, or else no thing is more artistic than any other thing.

This is the same as saying:

• Q: "Some thing is more artistic than some other thing."
• 1a. Q v ~Q

A similar question: Do you prefer Q or ~Q?

If we accept P and Q does that make us elitist? Note that ~P equates to the idea that every human act/creation is equally artistic, and ~Q equates to the idea that every thing is equally artistic, hence the egalitarian-relativism. I suspect that like @J and @Banno you will object every time someone offers an example of P/Q and yet at the same time you will avoid any explicit embrace of ~P/~Q.*


* In that other thread the pejorative which was applied to anyone who offered an example of P/Q was "authoritarian" rather than "elitist," but the parallel is clear.

Some of the uses of art I have in mind: mental stimulation. modulating mood. Experiencing intense emotions safely. Education. Passing the time. Having novel experiences.

Which of these is in accord with "the fundamental telos of art", and which is not? — hypericin

If art is meant for aesthetic experience or aesthetic encounter, then the modulation of one's mood is beside the telos of art. So if someone says, "I need to modulate my mood. I'm fresh out of benzos so I'll try looking at a painting instead," they are not interacting with art in the way that is primarily intended by the artist.

When craftsmen create art for money, when painting was funded by patronage, when novelists and musicians aim to earn a living and even get rich, when entire industries are oriented around the production of art.. telos, or not the telos? — hypericin

You seem to want black and white categories, but I'm afraid its more complicated than that. The act of selling art is not art. An "artist" who just wants to get rich and is only attempting to gratify the desires of the largest demographic is not much of an artist. An artist who wants to create something which has legitimate artistic value and expects remuneration for such a creation is doing art while expecting to be supported financially. But all artists are well aware of the temptation to "sell out," subordinating their art to the bottom line.

Aristotle would point out that the true artist wishes to create something that will be appreciated by the best artists, and they will not be preoccupied with the opinion of those who do not have an eye for artistic excellence. For example, a jazz musician will highly value the opinion of other jazz musicians who they deem to be highly talented, and insofar as their work is meant to be artistic it will be meant to resonate with that caliber of excellence. The excellence of art has to do with that form of appreciation, and money may or may not track that form of excellence. Still, the artist who is primarily striving after excellence is more of an artist than the artist who is primarily striving after money. This is why some of the greatest artists died poor and were never appreciated in their own lifetime.

What are the stakes of abiding the telos, or of violating it? Where is the telos, who has defined it? Could it be... you?

You talk about intention as if there were only one of them, and we all agree on it. Art has one intention, to be appreciated for itself. Sex has one intention, pleasure. Why imagine this? It bears no resemblance to reality I can see. — hypericin

I think you're just being stubborn. Do you have an alternative understanding of art to offer? Or are you just going to criticize my understanding without offering anything of your own? You somehow think that if we admit that 'art' means anything at all then we must be snobs, because if it means something then it doesn't mean other things. If art has to do with aesthetic excellence, then it doesn't have to do with large scale money-making, and this flies in the face of your dogma which holds that art is whatever we want it to be (and that art effectively means nothing at all). Being so averse to elitism that one runs to the opposite extreme does no good. It's not snobbery to hold that art means something. It is unanimously held among artists that art and money-making are not the same thing.

Kind of like how food is useful for sustaining life, but we don't use it, we eat it? — hypericin

"Use" generally implies perdurance, and therefore we do not generally speak about using food because food is consumed and does not perdure afterwards. Thus we will talk about using something like salt, where the stock perdures for a long time.

If you don't believe me then go to a museum and use the verb "use" to describe interaction with art. You will receive a lot of odd looks. Or find a gathering of artists and make the claim that someone who produces art only for the sake of money is no less of an artist than someone who is not primarily concerned with money. You won't be taken seriously. Art is something which is higher than use; higher than need/necessity. It is gratuitous in a way that overlooks those notions. We use a hamburger to satisfy our hunger. Someone who uses art when they are out of benzos doesn't understand what art is. It is not primarily a means of acquisition (or of anything else - to subordinate it as a means is already to have lost it).

The egalitarian dogma says that all art is equal, no one can be excluded from the circle of artists, and that art can mean anything at all, even "money-making." Reality says otherwise.