I see determinate things and indeterminate things, so there is a quality to each and they are more like poles. Like determinacy and indeterminacy are properties of some thing before it is known and during which we inquire about it (like wisdom). — Fire Ologist

Sure, and that way of viewing it is understandable. I probably should have avoided the words "determinate" and "indeterminate," given that @Count Timothy von Icarus did not make that distinction.

And the Aristotle example is helpful. We must be aiming at some thing, but to the extent we are not sure what that thing is, or don’t know all there is to know about that thing, that thing has some indeterminacy to it.

But Banno is wrong because we can’t even identify or determine something specific, like “wisdom”, if it does not have something determinate to it. Count is right to say that, from the very start of the target practice, wisdom must have something determinate to it or we may as well be talking about “stupidity” or “my shoes”. There must be some determinacy before we make any meaningful move toward some particular or something specific and not vacuous. — Fire Ologist

Yes, that's right. "Possessing some determinacy vs. possessing no determinacy," is an either/or, not a matter of poles, and this is surely what Count was saying.

The fact that we switch from one analogy to you better analogy before expressly agreeing on the value of the first analogy, shows you trying to frame things, like you don’t like the framing. Why is that? Why do we need a better analogy? — Fire Ologist

Yes, this is a very good question. And I would add that (p ∨ ~p) is in no way a controversial claim, nor is it controversial that this represents a binary. When one's interlocutors are particularly stubborn one is forced to appeal to very uncontroversial premises. When they deny even these very uncontroversial premises, there is very little else that can be done.

See above. I never said it was a binary. I said that if one claims that one's epistemology is not "anything goes," then not all narratives can be equally correct. But if not all narratives are equally correct then in virtue of what is this judgement made? Nothing about that requires a binary, claims of infallibilism, etc., it simply requires the observation that if one can give no reasons for their standards then their standards are open to arbitrariness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A terminological point...

There are "binaries" involved in your approach. Namely, disjunctions utilizing a contradictory pair. I feel as if we almost need to return to Aristotle's explanation of the difference between a contradictory pair and a contrary pair...

[1] Either every narrative is correct, or else every narrative is incorrect.

[2] Every narrative is either correct or incorrect

[3] Either all narratives are equally correct, or else not all narratives are equally correct

[3a] Either all narratives are equally correct, or else some narratives are unequally correct

[4] Either one can give reasons for their standards, or else their standards are open to arbitrariness

[3], [3a], and (arguably) [4] utilize contradictory pairs, and they are the binaries that @Count Timothy von Icarus is reliant upon. [1] and (arguably) [2] utilize contrary pairs, and they are the strawmen that @J is reliant upon. But all five are presented as binaries, namely as two-place disjunctions with an exclusive-or. We need to avoid letting the word "binary" become yet another pejorative term conveying emotion rather than substance. Or if that's all it has become, then we should not use it if we want to do real philosophy.

See: Square of Opposition

We're 14 pages into the thread and Count Timothy von Icarus has tried to do little more than present the most elementary disjunctive syllogism:

Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc., or else not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
It is not true that all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
Therefore, not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
(Therefore, some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.) — Leontiskos

Note that @J's response is to continually try to restrict the domain to so-called " narratives":

Likewise, I simply can't imagine a serious scholar or thinker saying... — J

And in general, the people who carry on these debates are smart, professional, and entirely deserving of a respectful hearing. — J

Instead of acknowledging @Count Timothy von Icarus' obvious point that, "Some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.," @J time and again says, "No, because everyone who deserves a hearing deserves a hearing." Or else, "No, because every narrative within the subset of reasonable narratives must be deemed reasonable."

@J continually fails to answer the questions, fails to stay on topic, and instead recites tautologies. The obvious answer to @J is, "Yes, everyone who deserves a hearing deserves a hearing. But not everyone deserves a hearing, and you yourself do not grant everyone a hearing."

Put differently, there are two theses:

• 1. Every professional philosopher [deserves a hearing].
• 2. Everyone [deserves a hearing] (including everyone on TPF).

Which thesis is @J's? He keeps equivocating and vacillating between (1) and (2). He begins with (2), and then switches over to (1) when he fails to justify (2), and then after justifying (1) he switches back, pretending as if he has succeeded in justifying (2).

Note that [deserves a hearing] could be replaced with any of the other normative concepts under consideration. Whatever the normative concept, @J's equivocal arguments are the same.

I think the form of Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. Namely his ↪statement, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." That form reliably signifies a binary. — Leontiskos

Stating that all statements are binary does not show that all statements are binary, nor assign a burden to those whop deny that all statements are binary. — Banno

I will come back to the rest of your post, but dude, really? You think that when says, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't," he is saying that all statements are binary? How does that follow in the least? This strikes me as an unbelievable level of mischaracterization. If I say, "Either all X is Y, or else not all X is Y, and this statement is a binary," I am not therefore claiming that every statement is a binary.

You are still reading it as, "Either all narratives are [negative contrary/pole], or else all narratives are [positive contrary/pole]," despite the fact that this has been clarified multiple times. To say, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't," is the same as saying, "Either all narratives are [X], or else some narratives are not [X]." Anyone who accepts the PNC must accept that as a binary.

We're 14 pages into the thread and @Count Timothy von Icarus has tried to do little more than present the most elementary disjunctive syllogism:

• Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc., or else not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
• It is not true that all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
• Therefore, not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
• (Therefore, some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.)

He has been stonewalled by you and @J, not for any logical missteps, but rather because his first premise is, “all or nothing,” and apparently according to some special rule he is not allowed such a premise (despite the fact that the premise is nothing more than an application of the principle of non-contradiction - it is not "all or none," but rather, "some or none"). The stonewalling is moral and rhetorical in nature, “I can’t believe that you would engage in this all-or-nothing sort of reasoning!”

It’s a bit like going to a basketball game, and as soon as the first team team tries to dribble the second team cries “foul!” Then for the next twenty minutes the second team argues that dribbling is not allowed. The kicker is that the first team is accused of being “uncharitable” for trying to dribble the ball. On the contrary, I would submit that the level of patience and charity that Count Timothy has with you guys is mind-boggling! :yikes:

Are you going to allow his argument a hearing, or not? Is (p ∨ ~p) a permissible premise? Because if @Count Timothy von Icarus is not allowed to use (p ∨ ~p), then I can’t imagine what will happen when he says something controversial. If he is not allowed to dribble, then I can’t imagine what will happen when he tries to shoot. :zip:

This is why I effectively , "There is very little evidence that @Banno and @J are interested in playing basketball at all."

That is, J has been providing examples of where the binary does not hold — Banno

Okay. I would love for someone to point me to the place where @J provided a third option.

Further, why should it be up to us to demonstrate that the binary does not hold, and not up to you to demonstrate that it does? — Banno

I think the form of @Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. Namely his , "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." That form reliably signifies a binary.

A step back. Look at your example of this discussion being like shooting an arrow - to shoot well, you need a target. But that assumes that there is a target, that we already have the conclusion. — Banno

It assumes we have some kind of target, but it does not assume that we have the conclusion. If that were true then the archer having a target would be the same as the archer having a bullseye.

Perhaps a better analogy would be were we are working together on a construction, but do not agree as to the final result. — Banno

But I think we must have a target for our construction. We must have some aim at what we are intending to construct, however vague.

We might reach agreement on fitting this bit you made in with the bit I made, and work together towards something satisfactory to us both. — Banno

We could negotiate in deciding what to aim for and what to construct. That's pretty common. We'd still have a target, individually and jointly.

Why need we presume the conclusion? — Banno

To presume the conclusion is post hoc rationalization. An aim and a bullseye are not the same thing.

Sure. And in setting this up as a binary, he already forecloses on the possibility of it not being a binary. He presumes what was to be shown. That's why J fairly suggests he account is uncharitable. — Banno

Again:

Why does J continually fail to answer such questions? Does he want to argue for some third option? Does he think the animal doesn't have eyes, and it also doesn't not have eyes? — Leontiskos

This form looks like a binary: "Either some X is Y or else no X is Y." If you or @J think that @Count Timothy von Icarus is setting up a false binary (a false dilemma), then you have to provide an argument for why the binary does not hold. Specifically, you have to demonstrate the third option. Surely you agree that some logical distinctions are in fact binary? That not everything is non-binary?

You yourself appeal to contradictory binaries at times:

"Qualia" are either a something about which can share nothing, or they are the subject of the common terms we already use to talk about our experiences. — Banno

(and yes, I admit I hit you back first. ) — Banno

Saw this edit. Appreciate that. :up:
Allow me then to say that I was quick on the trigger at the beginning of this thread. Of course, I feel like we've been around this merry-go-round too many times by now. I anticipated it moving in this very direction, namely "monism."

So, can we agree that sometimes determinate/indeterminate are not contradictories? — Banno

All words have a semantic range. The question asks how the words are being used within a context or argument. @Count Timothy von Icarus's "some determinate content" vs. "no determinate content" is clearly a binary. Don't you agree? Or do you think it is impossible for him to make that distinction between some and none?

And maybe, that wisdom might sometimes not have a determinate content? — Banno

Again, the equivocation looms. Wisdom never has no determinate content. It may have semi-determinate content, but semi-determinate content involves some determinate content.


This is how the conversation might have been expected to proceed:

• @Count Timothy von Icarus: Do you think the term wisdom has some determinate content, or do you think it doesn't have any determinate content?
• @Banno: I would of course admit that it has some determinate content.
• Count Timothy von Icarus: So what determinate content do you believe it has?
• Banno: Regardless of what I think, I could be wrong, for I am not infallible.
• Count Timothy von Icarus: I agree, but that's beside my point. If you agree that it has determinate content then what determinate content do you think it has? In your opinion?
• ...

See if you can reply to these examples, rather than indulging in personal insults. — Banno

Like calling someone obsessive, like this?:

Others have an obsession with the same. — Banno

It's impressive how you squeeze hypocrisy into even the smallest posts. :wink:

Determinate/indeterminate is not a contradictory pair. Many things are partially determined. Borderline concepts - "baldness"; — Banno

Determinate/indeterminate could be read as a contradictory pair or a contrary pair. The point is that @Count Timothy von Icarus was obviously using it as a contradictory pair, which he even clarified. To be fair, @Fire Ologist introduced the determinate/indeterminate pair, not Count. Here is an example of what Count said:

Which is just to say, the term wisdom has to have some determinant content or else... — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Some" determinate content. So your examples of things which are "partially determined" all count as having some determinate content.

The vegan will ask, "Are there some animal products in this food, or not?" It's fairly clear that there are only two options here. This comes with the territory of the word, "some."

This is the thesis that post was responding to:

Logic is about language, not about the world itself. — ChatteringMonkey

Since you disagreed with the person who disagreed with this thesis, I am assuming that you affirm the thesis. Please correct me if you do not affirm the thesis.

[2] and [3] have the same logical structure as [1]. They are the same logical statements. — SophistiCat

They don't and they aren't, but leaving that aside, are you gainsaying the thesis that logic is about something other than language?

Logic is only about something insofar as we make it to be. It can be something perfectly sensible, like [1], or frivolous, like [2], or even nothing in particular, like [3]. — SophistiCat

Which of them do you say is about nothing other than language?

Exactly!

Thanks for your help. :lol: — Banno

Some here seem to have a prejudice against the very notion of contradictory pairs. For example:

There's clearly something in this all-or-nothing position that seems incontrovertible to you. I will keep trying to understand it, but no luck so far. — J

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Either the animal has eyes or else it doesn't."

This is not "all or nothing reasoning." It is called the principle of non-contradiction. Why does @J continually fail to answer such questions? Does he want to argue for some third option? Does he think the animal doesn't have eyes, and it also doesn't not have eyes?

I agree that it's the wrong way to put it. That's what I should have written, "sentences lack intellects," and the meaning of given sound waves, written symbols, etc. is wholly accidental and dependent on human beings. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good. I would also think here about pros hen or analogical predication. We can say, "The man is healthy," and, "The urine is healthy," but the latter sense of health is dependent on the former sense. I want to say that the same thing happens with truth. We can say, "There is truth in the man," and, "There is truth in the man's sentence," and even, "There is truth in the sentence," but the latter senses are dependent on the former senses. The story about why we are now tempted to reify that latter sense is something that would be interesting to investigate. Surely there are many reasons.

I would like to say though that the "set of all true propositions" is ens rationis, a hypothetical being of thought, the idea that "if I knew everything I could write it all down if I had an infinite list." It would take a while to unpack, but I think this is based on a deficient notion of truth, which maybe answers Banno's question about Great Lists. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. :up:

Aristotle's distinction between the simple apprehension of wholes (whose opposite is ignorance) and of judgement (whose opposite of falsehood) is interesting here. I'd want to associate the former more with intellectus, but I see your point that it also seems to be present within judgement. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, good. And that we apprehend the whole before we apprehend the parts, which inevitably places discursion in a posterior position.

Wayfarer pointed out this too. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Cool. I've yet to read the other responses, but I will get around to it.

Tim's objection, so far as I can make sense of it, is that if we allow a case in which it remains undecided if some sentence is true or false, then the concatenation of sentences contains a contradiction and anything goes. — Banno

Lol. This is some wild mischaracterization. It would be great for you to quote @Count Timothy von Icarus to try to substantiate this very strange reading.

Maybe more plainly, we speak of what is indeterminate and what is determinate.

And I agree there are worlds (or at least the world) that sits between these poles. — Fire Ologist

But is this right? Are "determinate" and "indeterminate" poles, or are they contradictories? If they are poles, then they are like the North Pole and the South Pole. If they are contradictories then they are like, "black" and "not black" where there is nothing in between.

Now if you think "determinate" and "indeterminate" are poles, then what is an example of an intermediate between the two? What is "the Equator" to these two poles? What is neither determinate nor indeterminate? It looks to me that they are contradictories, not poles (contraries), and therefore there is no intermediate.

I think @Count Timothy von Icarus' point is a bit like Aristotle's point that the archer must have a target. He must be aiming at something. If someone is said to have knowledge, then it must be knowledge of something. It would make no sense to say, "He is a very knowledgeable man." "About what?" "Nothing at all!" It is correct to say that our endeavors must have some aim, some goal (and therefore some determinate content). Either we are aiming at something or we are not aiming at anything; either the field of study has some determinate content or else it has no determinate content. That's the idea.

@Banno is again falling into that strawman strategy where he answers a question that is not being asked:

Why must wisdom "have some determinate content"? There's the idea again that if it has no "determinate content" then it is nothing, but that doesn't follow. The assumption is that without determinacy—without clear, specifiable content—“wisdom” is vacuous. But this is not a necessary conclusion. The leap from indeterminacy to meaninglessness is unwarranted. — Banno

@Count Timothy von Icarus spoke about "determinate content." @Banno pulled another of his bait-and-switches and substituted, "Clear, specifiable content." @Count Timothy von Icarus would surely agree that content which is not perfectly clear and specifiable need not be wholly indeterminate, but that is not at all what he was talking about. He was talking about a bare minimum of determinacy, in the sense that there must be some goal that the archer is aiming at, no matter how diffuse or subtle. @Count Timothy von Icarus is using determinate/indeterminate as a contradictory pair, for this is precisely what his argument requires. To interpret him as enunciating a contrary (or polarity) is ignoratio elenchus.

Likewise, I simply can't imagine a serious scholar or thinker saying, "How could I possibly be wrong?" — J

When you divide the world into serious and unserious, you have already provided a definitive judgment. It is not substantive to say, "Well yes, I agree with what you say, so long as we are not talking about serious people. With serious people it is much different." The "unserious" is just a special category of people you disagree with, and people you have relegated to a ghetto. The "serious" is just a category of people who all agree that they cannot be wrong about certain things, and therefore do not contradict one another on those things.

Don't you find it the least bit odd that the person decrying superiority schemes has relegated the whole human race into "the serious" and "the unserious"?

I promise this is the last time I'll mention it, but . . . . Chakravartty and Pincock? — J

If you "seriously" wanted to discuss it you would.

As an aside, there are lots of metaphorical possibilities that can be applied to the intellectus / ratio / will triad. I like the idea of reason as a boat with the skipper as ratio, the compass as intellectus, and the rudder as will. The compass "intuits" directionality, the skipper interprets the compasses readings and decides through a chain of reasoning where (s)he should steer the boat in accordance with them, and the rudder enacts the actual work of pushing the boat in the required direction. All three are needed for reason to be actualized. — Baden

Interesting image!

Nominal freedom, the right to respond to passions in varying ways---passions which themselves are provoked in ever more varying ways and to which we respond primarily in order to satisfy our sensuous appetites---takes precedence over ontological freedom, the space to respond according to reason, the telos of which is to increase the quality of subjectivity’s relation to its world—“to actualize the good”.

This castration of reason and freedom is too a castration of subjectivity that tends to lead to self-instrumentalization and self-commodification (of course the Frankfurt school has a lot to say about this, but I’m going to leave them aside here). — Baden

Good. Also, I think it becomes important to distinguish nominal freedom into different kinds, one of which is a right to "respond primarily in order to satisfy our sensuous appetites." If that is right then we would say, "Not all nominal freedom is problematic, but this kind of nominal freedom is problematic."

Regardless of level of abstraction, including mathematical abstraction, the dissolving of subject and object in a relation at the direct edge of experience is crucial as a base on which to build rational understanding. — Baden

True. :up:

This is where an openness to that direct edge of experience comes in and where nominal freedom, the freedom to choose from sensual options becomes much less relevant than ontological freedom, which is first and foremost an intuitive divination of the quality of these options that lends us the power to reject those of them that lack quality, or do not fit with the telos of reason which again is to deepen subjectivity’s access to the truth as direct intuitively accessed experience (wisdom) rather than mere second hand linguistic knoweldge. — Baden

I very much agree.

I think the particular lower faculty we are predominantly directed to in contemporary life is novelty as a good in itself rather than a signal to be investigated and evaluated by the intellect. That is, novelty is presented as a means for the will to directly manifest the experience of pleasure in a bypassing of the intellect. — Baden

There are some goods with a great deal of potentiality, such as novelty and money. Indeed, such good are strictly speaking worthless in themselves, but they are also a door to an infinite realm of valuable things, and so we often mix ourselves up by seeking them in themselves.

If we were to take seriously the idea of the intellect as a means to intuit the likely quality of potential behaviours instantiated by the will, or the ratio as a means to process the meaning of the possibilities of action in relation to a proper intuitive understanding of them, our contemporary milieu would look very different. In fact, in terms of power hierarchies and the accumulation of capital that largely determines them, it would be utterly transformed. — Baden

In Book 1 of the Politics Aristotle argues that one who views wealth (or capital) qua accumulation does not understand (intellect) what wealth is, or what it is for. Wealth is for the sake of sufficiency, not for the sake of profit or mere increase. The "potentiality" of money (namely that it is capable of buying all manner of things), tricks one into valuing it in itself, apart from the end of sufficiency. Similarly, one involved in "business" can trick themselves into thinking that their goal is mere increase of property or wealth, rather than sufficient property or wealth (i.e. property or wealth with a limit).

@Count Timothy von Icarus

I finally got around to reading this. A beautiful (kalos) piece! I appreciated its wholeness and integrity as a beautiful piece of writing which was balanced between the reason of the philosophers and the insights of the poets. The piece itself transcended the reduction of human reason to ratio. This drawing up of methodology into content is reflective of great works of philosophy.

My very first impression when joining TPF was this reduction of reason to ratio, and I wrote some thread drafts on the topic but decided not to post them. The way you tackled the issue was excellent, especially the use of Dante. You achieved the thing that I felt inadequate to achieve.

As far as critiques go, I thought it began to trail off a bit towards the end, but I would have to compare it to the larger essay to see if this was caused by truncation. It is hard to perfectly balance the thesis about ratio with an explication of the Divine Comedy, but I really like the use of beatitude and participation as a lodestar for the piece and for intellectus.

Now nitpicking, this was the one invalid argument that jumped out at me:

Utterances are acts, yet it is substances—things—that primarily possess being, and so it is people (and God) who primarily possess truth. — Dante and the Deflation of Reason, 3-4

"Substances primarily possess being, therefore people primarily possess truth." I don't think that follows, but to be fair, the sentences which follow upon this one iron out the difficulty a bit. What seems to follow is rather, "...therefore, substances are the primary object of truth." That people possess truth has to do with their intellectual nature.

This intersects with our disagreement in <this thread>, and what I would say is that the truth that humans possess is by and large related to ratiocination insofar as it involves comparison. It involves comparisons like, "This is that," or, "This exists (when it might not)." This isn't to say that we cannot extend truth to intellection, but there is a shift and difficulty in doing so. It remains to be argued that such a shift is analogical rather than equivocal.

Relatedly:

Ratio is the means by which we move from truth to truth and come to “encircle” new truths. The acquisition of human knowledge begins and ends in intellectus, but proceeds by discursive ratio. — Dante and the Deflation of Reason, 5

As I've said in the past, I tend to see ratio and intellectus as more closely intertwined. My thought is that inferential movement itself presupposes intellection insofar as one must see that the inference is appropriate and justified, even though seeing the validity of an inference is not a matter of ratiocination. So simplifying, if we have an argument with two premises, two intermediate inferences, and a conclusion, we have at minimum five "acts" of intellection, rather than three. What "begins and ends in intellectus" is each discrete inference, not just the entirety of the argument. So the five minimal "acts" of intellection are 1) seeing that premise 1 is true; 2) seeing that premise 2 is true; 3) seeing that the first intermediate inference is valid; 4) seeing that the second intermediate inference is valid; and 5) seeing that the conclusion is valid. Of course there will be many others besides these five, such as understanding the meaning of discrete terms within the argument.

The point here is not to gain precision over each quantitative "act" of intellection, but rather to note that there is a constant dance between stable understanding and moving ratiocination; between movement and rest. It is also crucial to understand that "formalistic" mindsets understand the manner and principles of rational movement, but not of intellection. This is precisely why they cannot move beyond "axiomatic" thinking, and why they cannot easily integrate their abstract formalizations into everyday life.

If you throw J's epistemic position into Chat GPT it identifies all the same issues I did, plus some others (although these seem ancillary to me). — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's pretty interesting! ...Not that it is too difficult to identify the problems, which are substantial, but it is a tidy critique on the basis of the "intersubjective" nature of LLMs, which is @J's epistemic bedrock.

I am curious, though, whether that reply was conditioned by your historical interaction with ChatGPT? Does that ChatGPT instance have access to your past history of interactions with ChatGPT?

(The "semantic drift of 'truth'" problem is something I thought about bringing up, but I decided it would be too difficult for them to understand. If @J were actually correct, then there could be no overarching word which captures correctness within each discipline. Each discipline would require a wholly different word/concept to represent its normativity (and even "correctness" and "normativity" could presumably not be applied to all). But again, this is too complicated for those who won't even consider simple objections.)

But I don't think I'm being unreasonable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You're not. I think you're giving @J and @Banno far too much credit. They are avoiding the questions being asked and failing to give arguments for their position. They won't even give a clear account of the terms that are being used within their accusations. Still, your charity in the face of that is admirable.

In the past @Srap Tasmaner has been able to lend a hand to a foundering position. Maybe he can do that here. Maybe he can clarify the thesis and the arguments that are supposed to attach to their position.

Yet even an appeal to internal consistency requires some sort of standard. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course it is, and it is a standard that @Moliere has within this thread. The fact that @Banno's championing of coherence clashes with @Moliere's ignoring of coherence is itself proof that those who favor the so-called "dissection" approach to philosophy disagree even among themselves about whether coherence should be applied as a criterion. @Moliere's tack highlights the fact that coherence (internal consistency) is a substantial criterion - at least if we are not to resort to "authoritarianism" in order to dismiss his incoherence.

This is the modus operandi of @J and @Banno. Someone claims that there must be some criteria and in response there is an immediate equivocation between some criteria and specialized or qualified criteria. For example:

If one cannot offer any criteria for making this judgement, then the choice seems arbitrary. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Such a narrative will, we hope, be "reasonable." And it has no strict criteria. — J

@J feels a need to qualify the criteria by adding the word "strict." He also puts "reasonable" in scare quotes.

Banno's approach is to utilize the strawman not of "strict" criteria, but of "final infallible" criteria:

Likewise, that we cannot rank all narratives against some final infallible standard does not entail that... — Banno

Count keeps asking a question about criteria simpliciter. @J and @Banno keep responding to a different question. They are responding to a question about "strict criteria," or a question about, "final infallible" criteria. No such question has been asked.

Why won't @J and @Banno answer the question that is being asked?
Why do they feel the need to answer a question that has not been asked and then pretend that they have answered the question that has been asked?

If I wanted to formalize it a bit, I might say that we're not advocating the abandonment of criteria tout court; useful, meaningful criteria (of value, of truth, et bloody cetera) are both local and modifiable. Local here meaning capturing as much of the context of their application as needed. (A question like "Is this a good car?" has no answer or too many without context.) Modifiable meaning that if your criteria can't evolve or aren't open to challenge or debate, you're doing it wrong.

And I think the counter, the demand for universality, permanence, certainty -- which will attack even what I'm saying here, "Are criteria always and everywhere like this? Then you're contradicting yourself!" -- should just be ignored as juvenile. This is not how serious people think. It's like lecturing Jerome Powell after taking Econ 101. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it is helpful to try to outline the two competing theses, but I'm not sure you're trying very hard. It looks like you attached a vacuous thesis to yourself and an absurd thesis to your opposition, which is pretty common on TPF.

If I'm wrong, then what are the two theses, clearly set out? And it would be helpful to try to be objective by skipping the epithets like "juvenile" and "unserious."

And I think the counter, the demand for universality, permanence, certainty [...] should just be ignored as juvenile. — Srap Tasmaner

But who is making that counter? Doesn't it just sound like a strawman on the face of it? And where in the thread do you find someone arguing for it?

A quick inlet into the problems with @J and @Banno's view is to look at where J argues that mathematics is authoritarian, music is non-authoritarian, and philosophy must be somewhere in between. Note his premise: mathematics is authoritarian!

This is the argument:

To assess a narrative and judge it good or bad requires a standard. To assess a narrative and accept or reject it requires a standard which one takes to be somehow definitive or elevated. If there are no such definitive or elevated standards, then rejection is never permissible. We would never say, "This does not fulfill some (arbitrary) standard, therefore it is to be rejected." To reject something requires judging that it fails to fulfill some definitive or elevated standard. To judge that it is beyond the pale. — Leontiskos

We are talking about judging contributions to some field, namely judging them good or bad.

Consider two normative concepts, the minimal-negative and the maximal-negative. I am calling the maximal-negative, "Beyond the Pale." The minimal-negative would be something like "low quality," or, "sub par." The minimal-negative and the maximal-negative are both judgments of badness.

What is my argument? What is the non-strawman argument? It is that everyone has a substantive minimal-negative and maximal-negative which they deploy, and that any reasonable definitions of "authoritarianism" within this thread generate hypocrisy, given that the one who accuses of "authoritarianism" leverages his own maximal-negative that is, by his own definition, "authoritarian." By "reasonable definition of authoritarianism," I mean something that is actually held and for which there is real evidence. The canard of, "Self-imputed infallibility," is an unreasonable notion of authoritarianism precisely because it is a strawman for which no evidence exists. If @J thinks that someone holds to a self-imputed infallibility despite their protestations to the contrary, then he will have to point to the evidence.

(Note that when you say, "This should just be ignored as juvenile," you are making a negative judgment that is likely a maximal-negative. Your judgment is certainly "authoritarian" according to @J and @Banno's criteria. You are deeming something beyond the pale and rejecting it, without allowing it recourse. That is what it means to ignore. If @Banno were the least bit consistent he would label you "infallible." And I would say that your own utterance involves the hypocrisy I pointed to, given that you must have a high degree of certitude that something is worthless if you are going to dismiss and ignore it as juvenile. It is self-contradictory to eschew certitude before "ignoring something as juvenile.")

The argument of @J and @Banno is quite simple. It is that <There is at least one maximal-negative that is unacceptable, and that maximal-negative is operative within TPF>. I agree that there are unacceptable maximal-negatives, such as those generated by self-imputed infallibility, but I don't see anyone here claiming that they are infallible and that anyone who disagrees with their judgments is eo ipso beyond the pale. What I see are people like @J and @Banno who consistently refuse to engage the arguments proffered, and then get red in the face when this is pointed out to them, resorting to name-calling such as "authoritarian" and "infallible." We're witnessing defensive rhetoric, not philosophical argumentation.


* We could also consider the minimal-positive and the maximal-positive, but that is not what people are interested in in this thread.

---

Modifiable meaning that if your criteria can't evolve or aren't open to challenge or debate, you're doing it wrong. — Srap Tasmaner

Let me elaborate on that parenthetical remark. By "authoritarian" @J means something like a definitive rejection of a view or person. So, "Not open to debate," is one way of getting at that. This creates a threshold at which the maximal-negative crosses over into authoritarianism. If someone's maximal-negative is beyond that threshold, then apparently they are an authoritarian.

But note that when you say, "[It] should be ignored as juvenile," you are engaging in definitive rejection. You are denying the view recourse by ignoring it. And when @J or @Banno ignore all my posts, they are engaging in definitive rejection. It logically follows that the three of you are "authoritarian," given that you engage in definitive rejection. This was actually the premise of my thread, "Beyond the Pale," namely that everyone engages in dismissal and even definitive forms of dismissal.

So the double standard is clearly evident. If the three of you did not engage in definitive rejection and deem certain things beyond debate, then there would be no double standard. Similarly, if I held that we should never deem anything beyond the pale, then I would be engaged in a double standard myself, because I candidly deem some things to be beyond the pale.

(The more robust point is that there are shades of negative judgments, and shades of definitiveness, and that even a minimal-negative involves a shade of definitiveness. Even to deem someone's belief sub-par or false involves a sort of micro-definitive negative. This is precisely why, elsewhere, @J posited the idea that deeming people wrong is itself immoral.)

The OP was a great set up for a for an important question. — Fire Ologist

Well, see:

Let's pretend for a moment that the OP is not another diatribe against your bogey of “monism.”... — Leontiskos

Banno is constantly making threads and posts that amount to, "Monism is authoritarian, and I won't say what I mean by 'monism' or 'authoritarianism'." It's propaganda in that none of it is amenable to argument. Indeed, it positively resists philosophical argument by mischaracterizing all of the views at each point, for example by pretending adversaries are championing "infallibility." Beyond that it likely violates the forum rule against evangelization.

I find this to be a very authoritarian position. Apparently you think that unless someone uses a form from your Great List of Valid Arguments they are creating a "fallacy." This is an inappropriate demand for completeness vis-á-vis argumentation. How can you know the entire list of valid arguments and when they apply in each instance? What's the criterion for this?

Now look, I thoughtfully considered that argument. It's consistent with my habit of practice, which is robust. I know good argument when I see it, and that argument is definitely one of them. Others agree!

You want to impose your One True Standard of Argument on us with your authoritarian List of what is valid, but I think there is a happy mid-point between declaring oneself infallible and in possession of the One True List of Valid Arguments and not allowing just any argument at all. I don't allow just any argument. I don't make just any argument. I try to only accept or make just those arguments that, per the case in question, would be justifiably valid according to my practice. But this is one of those cases. I have been thoughtful. My argument is valid here, not fallacious! — Count Timothy von Icarus

Too good. :lol:

I don't usually read Leon's posts. — Banno

As a sophist it behooves you to avoid them.

When you say something silly and another person points it out, apparently you think you can just rely on a rhetorical flourish, "You're not infallible! I can't believe you think you're infallible!" Failing that, you claim that there is no such thing as a justifiable standard for sophistry or anything else, so obviously you can't be engaged in sophistry!

Just imagine the real philosophy that might occur if not for all of these elementary threads.

↪Banno Tagging Count Timothy von Icarus -- In case you missed it, click on @Banno's post. — Moliere

Elsewhere @Banno considers such behavior to be "talking about others behind their back." What would happen if we held him to his own standards? The question that resonates throughout the thread. :wink:

Likewise, that we cannot rank all narratives against some final infallible standard does not entail that we cannot give good reasons for rejecting this narrative, and accepting that one. — Banno

If you were to remove the words, "final infallible," then you would be offering a real argument instead of a strawman. But I understand why you and @J won't abandon the strawmen. It would put you in a tough spot. It would put you face to face with the arguments being offered, and therefore with the problems of your strange position.

To assess a narrative and judge it good or bad requires a standard. To assess a narrative and accept or reject it requires a standard which one takes to be somehow definitive or elevated. If there are no such definitive or elevated standards, then rejection is never permissible. We would never say, "This does not fulfill some (arbitrary) standard, therefore it is to be rejected." To reject something requires judging that it fails to fulfill some definitive or elevated standard. To judge that it is beyond the pale.

Do we die on the hill of a metaphor? — Moliere

If Banno's categories of "dissector" and "discourser" are just "metaphor," and all dissectors are also discoursers and all discoursers are also dissectors, then what in the world do you think the thread is even about? When I contrast the builder with the destroyer (and you recast that as the builder and the critic), it makes no sense to respond by claiming that the destroyer is a builder. You can't distinguish builders from critics and then turn around and say that there is no difference, because the critics are builders, too. If there is no difference then why in the world would we make the distinction in the first place!?

It is more rigorous to speak this way as a matter of course, even when we are not explicitly comparing and contrasting builders with critics:

A doctor builds a house, not qua doctor, but qua housebuilder, and turns gray, not qua doctor, but qua dark-haired. On the other hand he doctors or fails to doctor qua doctor. But we are using words most appropriately when we say that a doctor does something or undergoes something, or becomes something from being a doctor, if he does, undergoes, or becomes qua doctor. — Aristotle, Physics I.8

Because it isn't. Not sure what else you could want in response to that. — AmadeusD

Really? "Because it isn't," is probably not going to be satisfactory to anyone, anywhere. What everyone, everywhere, will want is a reason why.

Perfect. In your example the state of affairs isn't false (jury is out, as it were, as described) but the belief is clearly false. — AmadeusD

Can you delineate what you mean by "the state of affairs," and what you mean by, "the belief"?

The fellow believes Trump dyed his hair. Is his belief false?

In a logical sense what we say is that his argument for the conclusion that Trump dyed his hair is unsound, but that this does not entail that the conclusion is false. I don't think it is correct to distinguish belief from proposition in that way and say that the belief is false but the proposition is not.

There are three propositions and three beliefs:

1. If *this video* is reliable then Trump dyed his hair
2. *This video* is reliable
3. Therefore, Trump dyed his hair

Belief/proposition (1) is true; belief/proposition (2) is false, and belief/proposition (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) because (2) is false. The belief/proposition, "Trump dyed his hair," is therefore neither known to be true nor known to be false. I don't see what grounds we have to say that the belief in question ("Trump dyed his hair") is false.

- :up:

I'm not quite sure from your reply how much we're on the same page re EKMs. But to clarify, EKMs are an abstract concept. The idea is that in recognition that technocapitalism creates abstract machines (such as media algorithms) that virally “plug into” our cognitive functionality and pathologize it towards habitual mental reflexivity, an EKM is a set of ideas that similarly plug into us but with the contrary intention of catalysing the kind of reflection we need to counteract media machines. This is another way of saying we need virally transmissible and catalytic abstract mechanisms to 1) help us to understand the precarity of our mental independence and 2) create frameworks of understanding that give us the epistemic confidence to act against prevailing cultural norms---to help us realize we're not alone in such "craziness". Less colourfully, we are in desperate need of sets of ideas that inspire people to divorce themselves from a system for whom their mental operations are little more than a substrate for its reproduction. — Baden

Okay thanks. I may have been misunderstanding the EKM to some extent. I guess I am wondering how that abstract metaphor of a "machine" would be thought to function, even metaphorically.

For example, consider this idea:

an EKM is a set of ideas that similarly plug into us but with the contrary intention of catalysing the kind of reflection we need to counteract media machines. — Baden

There is a possible objection here which says that machines by definition cannot do this, since intention and reflection require awareness, but machines diminish awareness (or something like that). If this objection is correct then the metaphor should not be that of a machine which does something for us, because the whole thrust of the desire for greater agency is that we need to do things for ourselves, so to speak. It is the idea that to yield up autonomy to a machine won't ultimately secure greater agency.

But the deeper question is simply asking how we approximate the "EKM" to create positive change. If such an objection is correct then it will inform the manner in which this approximation is achieved. Similarly, if the objection is incorrect then this will also bear on the outcome. One facet of your OP seems to be precisely the consideration that this objection is false (or at least not wholly true). It is to consider whether the enemy can be utilized to fight the enemy. I think there must be ways in which this is possible.

I suppose I am wondering if there are (autopoietic) cultures or systems which are naturally resistant to technocapitalism. Perhaps that is what the EKM is supposed to signify? Because it would be ideal if there were a positive alternative to technocapitalism, which did not require identifying and uprooting the technocapitalistic weeds. "If you have a healthy population of [this] in your garden, the weeds will take care of themselves."

Re capitalism. The last thing I want to do is attack capitalism in general. That’s like throwing a boomerang and then quickly tying your hands so rather than being caught when it returns, it bangs you on the head. Capitalism in a broad sense (including Chinese “communism”) is that very ideology that has made alternatives impossible. However, even within capitalism, technocapitalism and specifically its instantiation in forms of media that monopolize us cognitively can be taken on not only through individual resistance (refusal to engage with such media or severely limiting such engagement etc.), but also through public policy. A good example is Australia’s recent ban on social media for children. But it’s hard because we can understand we are being manipulated and still reproduce the processes of manipulation. So, for example, instead of just using social media blindly, we go on social media and tell everyone how bad it is and everyone agrees and we all have a good time and feel we’ve done something and meanwhile the train rolls on ever faster. — Baden

Good thoughts. I agree.

I think what's particularly bad about technocapitalism is that its suppression of ontological freedoms presents itself as an opening up of freedom through a bait and switch where ontological freedom is substituted by nominal freedoms — Baden

I agree that nominal freedoms can be inimical to ontological freedom, but I am wondering if ontological freedom can exist without nominal freedoms. Do you think we would still have ontological freedom if there were no nominal freedoms? Perhaps this is something of the "pharmacological" phenomenon?

It's not so much that agency and sovereignty are overpowered, it's that they are made invisible to us. We become primarily a set of mental operations that reproduces a bunch of social communications and consider it an important right that we should be allowed to do so and in ever greater variety, the breadth of which obscures the lack of depth. — Baden

Good - that makes sense.

I mentioned technology is "pharamcological", being both a poison and cure, but didn't mention that this idea was taken from Bernard Stiegler via Derrida from Plato's discussion of writing in "Phaedrus" where, though the advantages of writing are mentioned, the danger that a shift towards this technology would harm the human capacity for memory is also discussed. — Baden

This is helpful to me given that I am familiar with that text.

Similarly, the advantages of technology are clear enough and ideologically hammered into us, but the dangers, and particularly the dangers of seemingly benign forms, ought to be kept in mind. — Baden

Right!

I am aware of the problem you are highlighting but I really don't know how to make a dent in it, especially since the advent of AI and LLMs. I'm probably pulling this in a practical direction precisely because I am ignorant of how to address the problem.

Suppose you have a dome, and you need to keep a heavy ball on the dome. The goal requires constant balance, constant attention, and constantly preventing the ball from moving in any direction at all, given that movement in any direction will destabilize the ball.

Now suppose you have a basin (an inverted dome). Everything will find its way to the bottom of the basin, sooner or later. No effort is required to force something to the bottom of the basin, and it will be difficult to prevent such things from moving to the bottom.

The problem feels like the basin image and the solutions feel like the dome image. But maybe this is because the overall topography is technocapitalistic. Obviously the most promising solutions are those that attempt to alter the topography itself, whether for individuals or for society.

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc. A narrative about how to interpret and evaluate Beethoven's music, compared, say, to his contemporary, Hummel's, is going to say some things that are acceptable, true, and valid -- or at least try to. It will appeal to knowledge about the High Classical style, its aesthetic standards, the transition to Romanticism, European cultural history, and much more. — J

As @Fire Ologist aptly points out, what you are doing here is providing a "narrative." Your narrative involves the claim that there are many different criteria for what is to be considered acceptable/true/valid, and each criterion will generate a disparate set of acceptable/true/valid things. Call this, "J's narrative."

Now consider a second narrative, namely the narrative that although there are many different criteria for what is to be considered acceptable/true/valid, nevertheless each criterion will generate the exact same set of acceptable/true/valid things. Call this, "K's narrative."

Now go back to what Count has pointed out:

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected? — Count Timothy von Icarus

• Either:
  
  • 1) All narratives are acceptable/true/valid
    
    • ...and therefore J's narrative and K's narrative are both equally acceptable/true/valid.
• Or else:
  
  • 2) Not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid
    
    • ...and therefore either J or K's narrative may be less acceptable/true/valid than the other. It may even be the case that both J and K's narrative are unacceptable/false/invalid.

So do you choose (1) or (2)? Must we avoid (2) to avoid "authoritarianism"?

I think you're asking whether the truth of the "Some narratives . . ." statement is beyond debate -- whether it represents something we can be certain of. — J

But this is surely a strawman, given that acceptable/true/valid is not the same as "beyond debate."

Note too that you and @Banno can say that nothing is beyond debate / beyond the pale, but it is obvious that you don't believe that nothing is beyond debate / beyond the pale. When someone such as yourself judges something beyond the pale, you are obviously involved in quality discrimination. When you deem something to be beyond the pale (and beyond debate) you have deemed it to be of excessively low quality. It's more than a little bit ironic that those who are in the very process of carrying out a campaign against that which they deem to be beyond the pale also profess that nothing is beyond debate, and that anyone who thinks things are beyond debate is "authoritarian." "Authoritarianism is beyond debate, and by 'authoritarianism' I mean that which deems things to be beyond debate."

Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty might someday be considered a "mature work." It brings in a lot from the prior texts, and starts to work a lot of these ideas into the framework where the defining feature of modernity is the elevation of potency over actuality (matter over form, etc.). It's a study of notions of liberty in Plato and Aristotle as compared with Locke (and a lesser focus on later thinkers like Kant and Spinoza). I think this is perhaps the biggest thesis because it rings very true and the ramifications have obviously been huge. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for the overview of his works! I think this is the one I will read first, since it looks interesting and may dovetail with Simpson's book on Illiberalism.

I assume J has something in mind, like "we" (i.e. people) make the standards for mathematics (although this seems opposed to the idea that mathematical discoveries were "always there" so maybe not?) Otherwise, wouldn't something like medicine be quintessentially authoritarian? For, either the patient lives, or they don't. Either they end up disabled, or they don't. There is a clear arbiter of success. Likewise, for engineering, the bridge either collapses or it doesn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think his idea was that for mathematics a high quality answer is true and a low quality answer is false, so it's cut and dried. I don't disagree that these other things are "authoritarian." I think everything (worthwhile) is "authoritarian" in that strange sense, i.e. involving quality discrimination and also the notion of merit.

But the reasoning isn't very tight. For example:

"Is it structured to preclude objection?" And by "structured" I don't necessarily mean "by some agency." — J

"X is structured to preclude objection, and it is not structured to preclude objection by any agency." That's just a contradiction. I think the "systemic" avenue would be more fruitful.

A person who kills their patients through negligence, designs a bridge that collapses on people, or loses a winnable war is blameworthy. How could they not be? Likewise, academic dishonestly, e.g. falsifying data, is also blameworthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, and this is a huge problem for @J, namely the fact that there are blameworthy acts, and people do carry them out. Thus avoiding all systems that provide the tools to identify blameworthy acts looks like a flight from reality.

But note that, at face value, "A person who designs a bridge that collapses on people is blameworthy," is not true. All bridges will eventually collapse, and therefore this cannot be a sufficient condition for blame (and I think this is also why engineering is not as clear as mathematics). This relates to <this post>, where I similarly pushed back on a point where you imputed blame.

Of course we could read you charitably as saying, "A person who [negligently] designs...," but the broader point is that the phenomenon of fault is pretty tricky to nail down. It requires philosophical skill to nail down, and that skill presupposes a mind that is not prejudiced with respect to blame, either pro or con. I think Aquinas' treatment is excellent, but I also don't think there are four people on TPF who could follow it. My Beyond the Pale thread is a rough introduction to that whole question, and it was intended to generate interest in the fact that we all impute blame even though few of us have an understanding of fault.

-

This is all spot on. — Fire Ologist

I agree. :up:

We could think of a very simple example.

"Trump dyed his hair brown!"
"Why do you say that?"
"Because I saw it on the news, from *this video*."
"That video is a deepfake."
"Oh, okay. I guess _____"

Here are two options for the blank ("_____"):

A. Trump did not dye his hair brown
B. I have no good reason to believe that Trump dyed his hair brown

Good post.

If mathematical findings were "there from the begining" who exactly is the authority that is being "authoritarian" here? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea is apparently that mathematics is systemically authoritarian (in the same way that something might be said to be "systemically racist"). @J is doubtless invested in "anti-racism" as well.

<Anything which systemically favors [accusations of moral deficiency which bear on the deficient person's argumentation] is "authoritarian" in structure> — Leontiskos

Any alternative definition of authoritarianism could be substituted into the [brackets]. The idea seems to be:

1. If a field judges some contributions as being of better quality and others as being of lesser quality, then that field engages in quality discrimination
2. If a field engages in quality discrimination; then some people's contributions will be judged to be worse than others
3. If some people's contributions are judged worse than others, then it is possible to blame them for their inferior contributions
4. A field where it is possible to blame someone for inferior contributions is more systemically authoritarian than a field where it is not possible to do so
5. Therefore, a field is systemically authoritarian insofar as it judges some contributions as being of better quality and others as being of lesser quality
6. (And therefore mathematics is a quintessentially authoritarian field)

Note your argument:

1. Any discipline in which quality is measurable is authoritarian
2. In mathematics the quality of contributions is measurable
3. Therefore, mathematics is authoritarian — Leontiskos

Linguistically empathy implies a lack of differentiation between the two subjects whereas sympathy or compassion implies a retention of the differentiation between the two subjects.

See, for example, The Sin of Empathy, where the basis is considered and yet there is a clear preference for sympathy.

These are the same claims (the two in quotes). P is false. The "solve" you want isn't apt, as far as I'm concerned. P is false at "~R".

The error being that a failure to support one's belief doesn't entail the state of affairs being false. It does, however, directly entail that your belief in the state of affairs is false. — AmadeusD

Why isn't this just the fallacy of denying the antecedent?

Wouldn't that form be a sort of "debunking argument?"

...

A debunking argument will claim to show that the cause of your belief that p is not caused by p (or something that entails p). It is stronger if it also shows you now lack good warrant to believe p, but it can also just show that the relationship isn't direct. In this case, the warrant is undermined, not the conclusion. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think this is what I am talking about. When I said, "They begin [...] Our refutation [...]," I am envisioning a dialogue. The idea is that you convince the person who had held to R that R is false.

The broader idea is this. Let's suppose there is some unfalsifiable proposition UF, and that John holds to UF. Is John's belief therefore irrefutable? Certainly not, for he holds to UF for a reason. If one were to convince John that his reasons do not hold, then he would stop believing UF, even though UF is unfalsifiable. In response to @AmadeusD's ideas, I would say that what is unfalsifiable cannot be falsified, and therefore we lack grounds for deeming it false. Nevertheless, we need not deem it true.

(Even if we say that some of his reasons are unconscious, they are presumably still able to be addressed. Unconscious reasons do not generate irrefutability unless we are unable to affect such unconscious reasons. Granted, at this point we may be talking about something other than "refutation.")

D.C. Schindler might be my favorite philosopher currently putting out regular material (and he puts out a lot). I will say though that he has a tendency to sometimes be a bit too polemical on some issues, which I'm afraid might turn some people off. He also tends to be fairly technical, although I've only found his first book on Von Balthasar to be really slow going. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I was looking at his books. What books or articles would you recommend as a starting point?

But if "not anything goes," then how is one not making a claim to a "true narrative?" Apparently certain narratives can be definitively excluded. In virtue of what are they excluded and why isn't this exclusion hubris?

Second, either all true narratives avoid contradiction or they don't. If they don't contradict each other, then they are, in a sense, one. If they do contradict one another, you need some sort of criteria for when contradiction is allowed (which all serious dialtheists try to provide) because otherwise, if contradiction can occur anywhere, then "everything goes" (and doesn't go). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Clear and important points. :up:

Moreover, if the principles contain moral elements, this will collapse the idea of "being wrong" as mistaken and "being wrong" as immoral, definitely an authoritarian move. — J

Here is a general claim you make:

• <One should not accuse anyone of a moral deficiency which bears on their argumentation>

You see this as "authoritarian," and both of these claims of yours are moral claims.

You also hold to this:

• <Anything which systemically favors [accusations of moral deficiency which bear on the deficient person's argumentation] is "authoritarian" in structure>

The problem here is that, by your own criteria, your own claims are "authoritarian," and therefore you are involved in hypocrisy or performative self-contradiction. You castigate "authoritarians" as suffering from a moral deficiency which bears on their argumentation, and therefore violate your own rule. You say, "You can't accuse the wielder of an argument of immorality," and yet this is precisely what you are doing with your ongoing "authoritarianism" diatribe.

And stretching a point, you can even call this authoritarian: If you say otherwise on a test, the teacher will flunk you! But there's nothing pernicious about any of this. It comes with the territory of an accepted formal system. — J

Is it authoritarian or isn't it? And is authoritarianism pernicious or isn't it? Do you see how you are unable to answer such simple questions?

The other problem here is that, even in the first place, you are not able to say what "authoritarianism" is and why it is bad. This goes directly to my Beyond the Pale thread, where you are confronted with the question, "What is authoritarianism and why is it beyond the pale?"

That juncture between the intellect and the will when it comes to assent is a neuralgic point which seems to underlie a lot of the instability of these discussions. The great boon of a doctrine about how assent relates to both intellect and will, such as the Medieval doctrine, is that it allows us to think more carefully and countenance more honestly those assents of ours which are strongly volitional. — Leontiskos

The intellectually honest person would say to themselves, "Yes, my claims about authoritarianism are moral claims, and moral claims require defense. Therefore I will accede to defending my moral claims."

By this point I fully expect you to continue evading such simple questions and to persist in your incoherence.

The critic criticizes themself. They don't have to learn how to build in order to do that. — Moliere

So the critic is actually a builder? That's your solution? "Critics don't need any builders, because they are builders too!"

You are conceding my point, namely that builders are necessary. You've merely conceded it by magically making the critic a builder. You are not contesting my point that critics cannot exist without builders.

Note too that in the past you have claimed that, "This sentence is false," is an example of a sentence that is both false and true simultaneously. So in that case it fails the criterion of presupposing no truths. If you now want to change your analysis to say that it involves falsity but no truth (and therefore does not violate the LEM after all), then that looks like an ad hoc attempt to try to answer my challenge. The Liar's Sentence can't be true and false when you want to disprove the LEM, and then merely false when you want to object to a claim about the primacy of truth. Changing your mind in this ad hoc way is unprincipled reasoning. — Leontiskos

I don't see it as unprincipled when I'm directly telling you why I'm thinking what I'm thinking. I think we really can use different metrics at different times -- different solutions to the Liar's Paradox are valuable to know. There isn't a single way to respond to the Liar's Paradox as evidenced by the philosophical literature on the Liar's Paradox. There are times when dialethia are appropriate and times when the simple logic of objects is appropraite. — Moliere

This is nonsense, Moliere. :roll:

• Leontiskos on Tuesday: The LEM holds.
• Moliere on Tuesday: No it doesn't, because the Liar's Sentence is both true and false at the same time. So the LEM doesn't hold.
• Leontiskos on Wednesday: Truth has a primacy over falsehood.
• Moliere on Wednesday: No it doesn't, because the Liar's Sentence is false but not true. So truth doesn't have a primacy.
• Leontiskos on Thursday: You just contradicted yourself. The Liar's Sentence can't be true on Tuesday and not-true on Wednesday, depending on what proposition your passions want to contradict.
• Moliere on Thursday: No, I can switch back and forth like that. No big deal!

You are showcasing the incoherence of extreme skepticism, where your goal is just to contradict people, Monty Python-style, with no regard for your own incoherence and self-contradictions. This is a prime example of someone who is not interested in real philosophy; who won't even shy away from the fact that they contradict themselves without shame. You are apparently content to flip-flop back and forth like this for all eternity, so long as you are able to contradict everything at once. Good luck with that approach! Really - it will destroy you.

These are excellent quotes from D. C. Schindler both here and in your previous post. :up:
I will have to look into him more closely.

I don't think these folks understand how completely they are destroying the philosophical enterprise and the things they believe they are saving. On the other hand, there is also a thread of misology that has erected this so-called "epistemic humility" as its god, and cares not what happens.

See also:

The choices are "monism" or "pluralism," where the common individualistic rule is that argument and contention is not permitted. — Leontiskos

What happens is that there is a dichotomy set up between "monism" and "pluralism," where both share the premise that the individual is immune to rational influence. The "monistic" individual is immune via his own "authoritarianism," whereas the "pluralistic" individual is immune via pluralism. They are two sides of the same coin, and both undercut the notion of truth, transcendence, and the ability to influence one another via rational considerations.