So is this your argument?

<A 4th century B.C. essentialist did not believe that water was H2O, therefore water was not H2O before 19th century chemistry>

I don't see how Aristotle's essentialism makes it true that <If Aristotle did not believe water was H2O, then water was not H2O>. Again, the antecedent disproves 1a, not 1.

P1 is False. 2 counters the claim that water was always H2O -- in Aristotle's time, water was not H2O. Aristotle in particular stood against Democritus, so we even have reason to believe Aristotle would oppose the belief that water is always H2O. — Moliere

Okay thanks Moliere. Let's think through this:

You made three basic claims, and the second and third were meant to contest essentialism:

1. The essentialist would be likely to say that water is H2O (or that water is always H2O).
2. Water was not H2O before 19th century chemistry.
3. "Water" nor "H2O" "pick out" what water or H2O is.

Now let’s look at three equivocal senses of essentialism:

1. The essentialist would be likely to say that water is H2O (or that water is always H2O).
1a. The essentialist would say that the term “water” signified H2O before 19th century chemistry.
1b. The essentialist would say that the description “water” “picks out” what water is.

Now you began the discussion with (1), which was a great start. (1) is certainly true. But then you immediately began to equivocate between (1), (1a), and (1b). (2) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1a)... — Leontiskos

P1. (2) does not contradict (1)
P2. (2) contradicts (1a) — Leontiskos

You say, "In Aristotle's time, water was not H2O." You say, "We even have reason to believe Aristotle would oppose the belief that water is always H2O."

It still looks like you're fixated on 1a rather than 1. You are focused on what someone before 19th century chemistry (Aristotle) would say the term "water" signifies. Note that whether water was H2O before 19th century chemistry has nothing to do with what Aristotle or anyone else thought. Only the question of signification has to do with what people like Aristotle thought, i.e. only the question that pertains to 1a.

So if we follow your reasoning and say, "Aristotle did not think water signified H2O (or was H2O), therefore in Aristotle's time water was not H2O," then the claim contradicts 1a, not 1. I can explain further if you require it.

From earlier:

My guess is that you think water was not known to be H2O before the 19th century, which is a very different claim. You have switched to talking about signification, which is tangential to the crux of essentialism. — Leontiskos

Posts like this ↪Leontiskos are a part of the reason that J and I moved our conversation to the PMs. J. would have understood that. Butt out. nothing to do with you. — Banno

Not sure how I am to "butt out" of a PM I am not a part of.

Note that I have known @J longer than anyone here. I was the one who him to the forum. I was having private dialogues with J before you had even been acquainted. When you were being invited to engage J’s threads and , I was actually reading the sources J presented and engaging them—something you have been .

What I concluded is that the reason @J has such a penchant for playing devil’s advocate is because his ultimate concern is to oppose strong knowledge claims. Thus if someone makes a strong knowledge claim, J will oppose it even if he agrees with it. This reflects a problematic telos for philosophical inquiry, and I have been pointing that out.

Now, at last, J is beginning to consciously probe his own premises in that area. He is beginning to identify the moral fear that underlies his reservations about strong knowledge claims. I think that’s great, which is why I encouraged him by telling him that he is asking and that I am his recognition of the moral motivation. Only once that moral motivation is discerned does it become susceptible to critique, and I think J would become a better philosopher if he moved beyond that strong fear of knowledge claims. I worry that he seeks the truth until he finds it, and then abandons it because he thinks knowledge claims are "morally questionable."

You're a bit of a dill, really.

I'll try again. J and I are talking on a PM, not a forum page, about issues hereabouts, in order to avoid irrelevant shite posts such as these.

And he will have understood the suggestion that we keep the discussion of that question until we get through our discussion in PM.

Have you more to say on a topic that does not concern you? Please feel free to keep it to yourself. — Banno

If you have something of substance to add to the thread, by all means do that. If not, please cut it out with the harassment.

Butt out. nothing to do with you. — Banno

The forum topics are available to all members, are they not? As I said, if you don't want to answer J's questions, don't. But don't get mad when other people do. Some of us do want to discuss those questions of J's.

Let's see what response this post elicits. — Banno

I would say that instead of engaging in ad hominem you should give philosophy a try.

Here is the question:

In short, if you start from premises you believe you can show to be foundational, does that commit you to also saying that everything that follows is rationally obligatory? That you are caused to so reason? — J

Here is your answer, as usual:

Phhhh.

Big issues. Let's leave it aside for now. — Banno

Just because you don't want to answer @J's questions doesn't mean no one else can.

The question of whether one is obliged to be rational goes hand in hand with the question of whether one is obliged to believe that those who hold contradictory propositions to one's own are holding falsehoods. Pretty basic stuff. Here is @J's phrasing:

The worry here is that the foundationalist philosopher who believes that everything of importance can be demonstrated apodictically, thus resolving all disagreements in favor of a position they hold, will treat those who disagree as if they must be doing something wrong, whether due to ignorance, stupidity, stubbornness, or malice. — J

And the first question is, I have proposed, much more simple. It is, "If we believe that some proposition is true, then must we believe that those who contradict that proposition hold to a falsehood?" This would be a good starting point for J, and one which is less polemical and charged than one fashioned with the various pejoratives he is leveraging in this paragraph (e.g. "apodictic," "ignorant," "stupid," "stubborn," "malicious").

Here is the moral fear I referenced:

The idea that there is only one right way to see the world [...] seems morally questionable. — J

And again: if we hold that some proposition is true, then apparently we have claimed that all contradictory propositions are false (and that this is the "right way to see the world"). So what do we do with that? Is the moral fear justified? Or when we affirm that a proposition is true are we not saying that that is the right way to see the world?

This would involve some good will on the part of [Leontiskos] [...] It might involve not dismissing someone as "beyond the pale"; — Banno

My whole thread presupposes the idea that not everyone should be dismissed and yet everyone agrees that some people should (indeed early posters mistakenly read the OP as claiming that no one should be dismissed!). So it raises the question of what criteria are legitimate for such dismissal. Your insinuation that I haven't considered the possibility that someone should not be dismissed as "beyond the pale" is simply a bad faith reading of the thread and my posts here. (Note that the whole point of my post was to point out that not every falsehood is held in bad faith. The point was that Count was jumping too fast when he jumped to "bad faith.")

What you are yet again doing is making an interesting discussion personal with ad hominem attacks, which is why I tend to ignore you.

(Since you have a tendency to notify @Jamal about everything you find questionable, and because you tagged him in that "call-out" of me, I will add him to this post as well.)

- No problem, apology accepted. :up:

Still, I think formal or quasi-formal argument would be helpful, especially insofar as we draw near to more difficult topics. I don't mean to be a pain, but also bumped us off a topic that is genuinely interesting. It is the question of the relation between the good, the true, and motivation. One could say, "They wish to substitute emotion for evidence" (Russell), but there is a much more philosophical way to investigate that issue.

Is the desperate mushroom-eater merely acting emotionally? The answer is not so obvious. Nor is it obvious that in seeking the good (life) he is forfeiting intellectual honesty (truth).

Then you have some authors who claim that the motive for faith is the good, not the true. For example, why do we listen to the weatherman? Is it primarily because we are interested in what is true, or because we are interested in what is good? It actually seems that the answer is "the good" - it is a practical consideration. We wish to know the truth about the weather precisely in order to know how to act well. For the Medievals this will bear on what is called the transcendental convertibility of the good and the true.

Wouldn't this just be true in general. If we think we know something, and people do not accept it, or affirm something contrary, we think they are ignorant in that matter (or I suppose acting in bad faith). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quoting from, "Beyond the Pale":

For me the most interesting question asks from whence the moral disapproval arises. One person thinks black people are inferior to white people; another thinks black cats are inferior to white cats; another thinks black pens are inferior to white pens. Supposing that all three are irrational, why does moral disapproval attach to the first but not to the second or third? All of our various pejoratives seem to signal irrationality, but we do not deem all forms of irrationality to be immoral. Is there some added ingredient beyond irrationality that makes racism or bigotry immoral. Malice? Obstinacy? Harm? — Leontiskos

1. I hold X to be true
2. Therefore, I am committed to saying that Joe, who holds ~X, is holding to a falsehood

The question is, "What is Joe, according to me?" Certainly he is wrong. Is he ignorant? Possibly, depending on one's definition. Is he acting in bad faith? No, not necessarily.

No, not really. If anything, it might go in the other direction. I have seen a great many people be quite aggressive in asserting pluralism and relativism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is right, and I think it is because realists like Aquinas care about the answering the question of culpability accurately. If you are a consistent realist then you won't want to ascribe culpability where none exists. If you are a relativist then everything is much looser. Relativists don't tend to work out theories of culpability, or innocence, or guilt, or correct reasoning, or incorrect reasoning, etc. Therefore they tend to err in both directions: they can treat the innocent as if they are guilty but they can also treat the guilty as if they are innocent. They lack rigor when it comes to assessing culpability, because if there were a proper way to assess culpability then relativism would be false.

As a quasi-relativist @J tends to clump all of the negative predications together: wrong/ignorant/culpable/irrational/neglectful/malicious/obstinate/harmful. He says, "If we [believe in truth] then we will end up making accusations of that stuff!" The answer is, "Yes, and people do commit those acts, but not every act which supports a falsehood is guilty of the same crimes. For example, not everyone who speaks a falsehood is doing so in bad faith."

Edit: I also think that this is just bad reasoning in general: <Y is bad and sometimes it follows from X, therefore we'd better do away with X>. As long as X is a central, complex reality of human life, you shouldn't just do away with it. That sort of reasoning is why germophobes would never leave their house. It is the irrational subordination of love/desire to fear.

At this point if the conversation is to continue then I think you need to offer formal argumentation, because you have . So if you want to offer an argument, formalize it and I will accede to answering.

The worry here is that the foundationalist philosopher who believes that everything of importance can be demonstrated apodictically, thus resolving all disagreements in favor of a position they hold, will treat those who disagree as if they must be doing something wrong, whether due to ignorance, stupidity, stubbornness, or malice. And we can't limit the "wrong" to "intellectual wrong," because the whole foundationalist picture is supposed to hang together, such that ethics follows from metaphysics, or at least depends upon it. Thus it is not merely possible but necessary that to be mistaken in one area is to be mistaken through and through, at least on the big-picture significant questions. — J

I'm really glad that you are beginning to perceive the moral foundations of your philosophical project. Your whole project seems to be motivated by this moral fear. In the past I have dubbed it "pluralism as first philosophy."

Note your thesis: <If we think this way, then we will end up being immoral>. Your own relativistic approach destroys this thesis as much as any other thesis. The idea that this thesis represents the "right way to see the world" is, on your reasoning, "morally questionable." If we say that your thesis is true, then we have made other things false. And therefore people who disagree with your thesis are affirming falsehoods. But if this situation is "morally problematic," then it seems that we cannot affirm any truths at all (lest we fall into the "moral error" of thinking that someone else has erred or uttered a falsehood).

Logical consistency would require you to avoid all truth claims, and the curious thing is that, in some ways, this is precisely what you do. Some of the time you follow your own advice in this. Of course, much of the time you don't, namely when you say things are true and argue against those who disagree with you.

One of the great boons in understanding that intellectual habits can be immoral is understanding that we are not beyond reproach merely because we are engaged in some argument or another. The boon is understanding that bad faith argument exists, and that we are capable of it. Once that occurs the possibility for a great deal of growth opens up, in that one can begin to rectify their vicious (in Aristotle's sense) intellectual habits.

(Note how closely this relates to the thread, "Beyond the Pale," where the central question asks what forms of falsehood or irrationality are beyond the pale and which are not.)

Anyway, I’ve read most of the thread you’ve recommended and skimmed the rest of it. I’ve also read Why Liberalism Failed, as I mentioned. I’m still curious why it’s good for me. — praxis

Okay, great. My point was that even the most tolerant do not tolerate everything. When I say that Christianity values unity in plurality, I am not saying that Christian tolerance is without limit.

What I meant was that religious influence is used for a variety of purpose, many of which are good of course, but many are self-serving or worse. I think it should be used for what it claims to offer, and nothing besides. — praxis

A good thing should never be used for an evil purpose. I agree, but human realities don't work that way.

No curiosity, so no respect needed, and no real conversation. Frustrating bummer here on TPF. — Fire Ologist

Yep, good post. :up:

On a philosophy forum my request is actually extremely meager. It's that evangelistic begging-the-question does not happen again and again and again. For example: that we could have a discussion about faith without constantly begging the question and assuming that it must be irrational.

So if an atheist is to philosophically engage a believer on the topic of religion (or faith), then they are not philosophically permitted to simply presuppose that religion is irrational. They are not permitted to define the religious act in terms of irrationality. That imposition and begging of the question is precisely what is unphilosophical. Instead they must argue for the conclusion that religion is irrational, using premises that are acceptable to their interlocutor. That this has not occurred in this thread demonstrates the problem and the unseriousness of this form of atheism. — Leontiskos

- :up:

- No worries. I just find that when people ignore parts of posts they seldom come back and return to them later. Maybe you were planning to do so.

Today we'd say that Lavoisier had a "better" understanding than Aristotle, but tomorrow we may say the opposite if we find out teleology was right after all. — Moliere

I think you've presented a canard of "teleology," but let's accept it for the sake of argument. Does "water is H2O" contradict "Water wants to sit atop Earth"? It looks like Lavoisier did not contradict Aristotle even on that reading.

But you ignored this:

If you disagree, then assign truth values to P1-P4. Be clear about what you are saying. If you say you disagree then apparently at least one of the truth values must be false. — Leontiskos

I actually think you've ignored that sort of question over and over throughout this conversation. You are ignoring requests for clarity.

- I agree. That "reductionism" is a large part of why his thought is more amenable to modern man, and why he is a good mediator.

I disagree — Moliere

Er, but how are you disagreeing?

Again:

(2) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1a). And (3) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1b). — Leontiskos

So:

P1. (2) does not contradict (1)
P2. (2) contradicts (1a)
P3. (3) does not contradict (1)
P4. (3) contradicts (1b)

If you disagree, then assign truth values to P1-P4. Be clear about what you are saying. If you say you disagree then apparently at least one of the truth values must be false.

that when Aristotle described water without use of H2O he said true things about water which are no longer true today. — Moliere

Why? Klima's whole point is that what Lavoisier & co. discovered does not falsify what came before. That Lavoisier understood water better than Aristotle does not mean Aristotle had no understanding of water, or that Aristotle's understanding of water was false.

I thought I was cogently arguing for my point rather than it having three different meanings. — Moliere

Well here are two claims. Do you agree or disagree with them?

(2) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1a). And (3) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1b). — Leontiskos

One interesting way of phrasing the issue: If realism depends upon epistemic positions that must be taken on pain of self-contradiction, would that mean that even the most apparently entrenched philosophical disagreements not only are in principle resolvable, but must be so? — J

I think you have been asking some good questions of late. This is one of them. :up:

I would phrase it this way: <If foundational premises are known to all, and if every proposition is either true or false only in virtue of foundational premises, then every rational error is a self-contradiction>.

The problem I see with your phrasing is that "realism" is not enough for your "pain of self-contradiction," since realists need not claim that every truth is epistemically transparent.

In short, if you start from premises you believe you can show to be foundational, does that commit you to also saying that everything that follows is rationally obligatory? That you are caused to so reason? — J

How about, "If you start from premises you believe to be true, does that commit you to also accepting everything that validly follows?" Yes, that's actually called logical soundness.

Whether or not we are "caused" to be rational is a mystery and a paradox.

No, that would be ruled out — J

Would it be ruled out on pains of "obligation"? That is the question you are asking yourself. If you think it is "morally objectionable" to say that a conclusion logically follows from a set of premises, then it is in no way clear how, "That would be ruled out."

The idea that there is only one right way to see the world, and only one view to take about disagreements, seems counter to how philosophy actually proceeds, — J

Is it, though? If philosophy didn't hold that there is only one right way to see the world, then philosophy would not be a unified discipline. Philosophy actually presupposes that every philosopher can fruitfully talk with every other philosopher. There are no incommensurable philosophers. So I think philosophy proceeds according to the belief that there is only one right way to see the world. If you didn't think there was a right way then you wouldn't argue at all.

@Moliere

I want to revisit our short but illuminating discussion, since it is such a clear model for what tends to happen on TPF with discussions of essentialism. You made three basic claims, and the second and third were meant to contest essentialism:

1. The essentialist would be likely to say that water is H2O (or that water is always H2O).
2. Water was not H2O before 19th century chemistry.
3. "Water" nor "H2O" "pick out" what water or H2O is.

Now let’s look at three equivocal senses of essentialism:

1. The essentialist would be likely to say that water is H2O (or that water is always H2O).
1a. The essentialist would say that the term “water” signified H2O before 19th century chemistry.
1b. The essentialist would say that the description “water” “picks out” what water is.

Now you began the discussion with (1), which was a great start. (1) is certainly true. But then you immeditely began to equivocate between (1), (1a), and (1b). (2) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1a). And (3) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1b). But (1a) and (1b) are pretty clearly strawmen, and so there are no arguments being leveraged against the actual thesis that you yourself set out, namely (1).

That’s a good snapshot of what seems to always happen in these discussions. It's also why my so-called "transcendental error" is apparently not an error at all. Those who call it an error are relying on straightforward equivocations in their arguments.

it's not relying upon the science for its point — Moliere

If it's not relying upon the science then apparently Kripke would have made the exact same argument in 1700, before the science had occurred. Is that your claim?

It's a point about how there are a posteriori necessary truths -- it doesn't say that water is H2O — Moliere

A necessary truth is true. If it is necessarily true—a posteriori—that water is H2O, then it is true that water is H2O.

When you are reading Kripke on this issue, if you don't begin with an interest in developing the notion of rigid designation, then his whole project will be opaque to you. In general you first have to understand what a philosopher is really doing if you are to understand their reasoning. And if you provide a critique of a philosopher which has no relation to what he is really doing then the critique will fall away without anyone taking notice.

(What a philosopher is really doing = that philosopher's proximate telos. It is "What they are really up to." The percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water has nothing to do with Kripke's telos.)

Since faith is the centerpiece of religion... — Hanover

This hasn't been mentioned in the thread, but religious scholars will point out that faith is only central to revealed religion (i.e. revelation-based religion). In non-revealed religion faith is no more central than it is in other traditions or institutions. For example, I would argue that institutions like the military are much more faith-centric than non-revealed religion.

In the West we have a tendency to conflate religion with Christianity (or else Judeo-Christianity), and the notion that religions can be referred to as "faiths" is one symptom of that. This is yet another incentive to get clear on what is actually meant by 'faith'.

...it seems its answer would lie somewhere in a theological discussion that preceded our conversation. — Hanover

...but digressions aside, I agree.

Mostly I think it would be great if we could discuss religious topics without anti-religious evangelization constantly occurring. But that's the way it seems to go on the internet: the atheists require that every religious discussion must be reduced to a discussion (or assertion) about whether God exists.

I don't think he hopes to apply it to reality as much as he's making a point about logic. — Moliere

Er, it is crucial to understand that Kripke's claim is not merely logical. If it were merely logical then it would not be a posteriori at all. That it is not merely logical is much of the point.

I don't think this is a good way to do philosophy, or what most people do in philosophy -- but he wasn't claiming a conspiracy theory as much as speaking a false assumption. — Moliere

Even if that is true, the mountain of quibbles does not actually succeed in showing that water is not H2O. When chemists or philosophers say that water is H2O they are not claiming that every natural body of liquid that anyone labels 'water' is pure, undiluted H2O. :worry:

My example would be Kripke’s attempt to show “water is H2O” is a posteriori necessary truth. This is not a demonstration of something true of realty but a construction of his imagination that he hopes applies to something in reality. — Richard B

The point that Kripke is making is untouched by such quibbles. Kripke is not making any claim about the percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water.

This whole idea “Water is H2O” is a sorry attempt by particular philosophers to gain some credibility from science to demonstrate how their theories have some sort of application to reality. — Richard B

This is a lot of nonsense. <Here's> a primer for you on the scientists involved in 18th and 19th century chemistry who discovered the molecular composition of water. The claim that "water is H2O" is not some philosophical conspiracy theory.

- Fair enough. I think you are getting tripped up on the difference between signification and supposition.

I'm still sensing the same transcendental error though: interpreting others such that they have to mean "x" (in this case x = essence) because else they'd fall into incoherence, and here are the reasons why they really mean "x". — Moliere

If someone thought that water was not H2O before the 19th century then my assumption about them would be wrong. You claim that you think water was not H2O before the 19th century, but to be honest I don't really believe you. My guess is that you think water was not known to be H2O before the 19th century, which is a very different claim. You have switched to talking about signification, which is tangential to the crux of essentialism.

Yes, that's what I think. "water" nor "H2O" -- to use a phrase from your paper that I've only glanced at -- "pick out" what water or H2O is. — Moliere

But you must be able to see the strawman here? You say, ' "Water" does not "pick out" what water is.' But who in the world is saying that "water" "picks out" what water is? As if anyone with the five-letter token w-a-t-e-r would automatically understand what water is?

Again, Klima:

Of course, this move will make ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ have the same signification, that is, synonymous. Yet, this need not imply that whoever knows the signification of ‘water’ would thereby know that water is H2O. For one of course can have perfect possession of the concept of water without having any idea of chemistry whatsoever. What this person does not know is only that the chemical concept, which he or she does not have, picks out the same essence that his or her concept of water does. — Gyula Klima, Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism, 18

When we don't have that level of description -- namely, before chemistry became popular. — Moliere

So water was not H2O before chemistry became popular?

From the set of sources I already gave you, see Gyula Klima's, "Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism." He discusses water and your (very common) objection on the last three pages, especially on the last page.

Cool. I'll be honest in saying I don't think I'll be reading these anytime soon, but she looks interesting to me — Moliere

Glad you're open to reading substantial sources. :up:

I like the notion that the medievals are good or better in various ways, I'm only skeptical because I think the attraction is a Romantic one: for a time that never was. — Moliere

With Klima and most Aristotelians, we move on after finding contemporary philosophy subpar and realizing that there is something better.

I think I can characterize what is meant by an essence, which is why I'm anti-essentialist -- I'm against this particular rendition and various other possible renditions that basically fit. I'd say "essence" is what makes an entity what it is: water can be wet or solid, but it will always be H2O, for instance. — Moliere

So if the essentialist says that water will always be H2O, and you're against essentialism, then what do you say water is? Specifically, if you disagree, then when will water not be H2O?

Sounds to me like a transcendental error -- if they speak in this way, with nouns and such and believe it's true, then they must believe in essences even while proclaiming that they do not. — Moliere

It's no coincidence that none of them can accurately characterize what is meant by an essence.

For both of you: I dropped references to freely accessible works related to this in a different thread. <Here> is the search. Use Ctrl-f on "Klima" and you will find most of the sources. Note that the SEP article on Universals is also Klima's, and that Spade's piece is also on point.

Now you have sources if you want to learn. :wink:

- If you find the places in Aristotle where he develops the concepts you will see him considering and critiquing the alternative theories on offer. I don't say that the idea of substances was entirely foreign to Aristotle's age, but rather that it was much more foreign to that age than to our own. We have been simmering in the Platonic-Aristotelian soup for 2,500 years.

I don't know a lot about Aristotle, but I've gathered that talking to him would be more like talking to a scientist than a philosopher in the contemporary sense. He lived in what some call the "age of essence." So he would just assume that the essences of things are available to us and we talk about them. I think he was foundationless about that? Is that true? — frank

Pretty much backwards. Essence is more familiar to us than it was to Aristotle's age, because we are children of Aristotle. Aristotle was forging something which was in competition with the theories of other ancient philosophers.

Nutty TPFers like to inveigh against essences, but they are all essentialists. They log off and immediately start talking about dogs, trees, cars, water, etc.

Doesn't that amount to demanding that the absurd premise in a reductio be true in order for a reductio to be successful? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. @J does not understand how a reductio works. As I've pointed out before, a reductio does not prove falsity per se. Instead it proves inconsistency or incoherence.

Nevertheless:

But Aristotle reasons:

If the skeptic is right, discursive knowledge is impossible.
But discursive knowledge is possible.
Therefore the skeptic is wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see Aristotle doing that according to the SEP article you cite {supposing this is meant to represent a reductio}. Indeed, I think Aristotle would see this as a sub-optimal response to the "agnostics," one which fails to address the better part of their challenge. More precisely:

A "demonstration" would generally be a syllogism in this context, although obviously there is a sense in which demonstrations can be less formal.

...

Points 1-6 are a discursive demonstration. The skeptic is claiming to have demonstrated that discursive knowledge through demonstration is impossible through the use of discursive demonstration. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In Aristotle's precise sense a demonstration is not merely a syllogism, and the "agnostic" is not giving a demonstration. Therefore they do not fall afoul of the reductio. For Aristotle a mere syllogism or argument has "unsecured" premises, so to speak, whereas a demonstration has premises which are first principles (and are therefore securely known in one way or another—the way is here the point at issue).* This is why a demonstration produces scientia proper - the highest form of knowledge. So when the "agnostic" says, "Therefore, nothing can be demonstrated," they are not excluding forms of knowledge which are weaker than scientia, and their conclusion would be one such example. The Pyrrhonists are doing a similar thing when they distinguish acceptable from inacceptable qualities of certitude.

Note too that it would be very rare for someone like Aristotle or Aquinas to place an argument in their opponent's mouth which is susceptible to a reductio. With rare exceptions, that is bad form, intellectually speaking.

It's worth noting that a quasi-skeptic like @J could probably find allies among the "agnostics" or the Pyrrhonists.

* More precisely, a demonstration is a syllogism or argument whose premises are first principles (and are therefore "securely" known). Thus syllogisms and arguments are not necessarily demonstrations.

I have a certain degree of sympathy for Luther's ideas. If one's Christianity consists primarily in going around and doing good deeds to elevate one's spiritual status, why not just be a Jew (or a Muslim?) Why the need for Jesus? You have your deeds.

Not a good man, but a man who delineated firmly between religious traditions to attempt to reform and preserve his own. — BitconnectCarlos

That's fair and all, but on the other hand, why the need for Jesus if "simul iustus et peccator" is all one anticipates; snow-covered dung?

Interesting thoughts. I would say that Peirce is a significantly unique thinker, in that he defies a lot of the standard categories. He is certainly a mediator between contemporary philosophy and Aristotelian realism. I also tend to see him as transcending the idealism-materialism dichotomy, although here we run into the difficulty of slippery definitions, particularly with respect to idealism.

Lost a long post... :confused:

Basically I think Wayfarer is right in the discussion with Metaphysician Undercover. The Categories supports Wayfarer ('man', 'horse', but no mention of bronze) and Metaphysics Z does not bear on the question, which are the two central places where Aristotle discusses substance. Aristotle takes things like 'man' and 'horse' as the paradigmatic examples of primary substances.

Lol, the hallmark of all religions is the expulsion of dissonant voices. — praxis

A good thread for you: The Myopia of Liberalism

That can be used for a variety of purposes. Shouldn’t there be just one purpose though? — praxis

Unity in plurality, like Tallis' polyphony, is the Christian watermark.

And sacred text are eminently amenable to reinterpretation, unfortunately. — praxis

Unlike Plato, or Sextus Empiricus, or Aquinas, or Descartes, or Kant, or Wittgenstein, or Heidegger, or Adorno? Plurivocity is the sign of a rich text.