I got to take a class once with Richard Bernstein, and I remember his credo, which was something like this: "You have to restrain your desire to respond and refute until you've thoroughly understood the philosopher or the position you're addressing. [And boy did he mean "thoroughly"!]. You really don't have a right to an opinion until you're sure you've achieved the most charitable, satisfying reading possible. Otherwise it's just a game of who can make the cleverer arguments." — J

There are at least two problems with Bernstein's advice. The first is that there are thousands of philosophers, and if we could not critique and dismiss any of them until we had "achieved the most charitable, satisfying reading possible," then we would be bound to read only a handful of them, precisely the ones we were accidentally introduced to first.

The second is that the quality of philosophical engagement is a mean, not an extreme. Bernstein errs in thinking that it is merely a function of the philosophical author, but in fact it is a mean between the reader and the philosophical author. Thus someone who is less intelligent ought to have a less stringent criterion for critiquing. To deny this is to misunderstand the nature of quality philosophical engagement, and it is also to hamstring the development of philosophy students. To simplify, if you are reading something that seems really dumb, then you should call it dumb and go find something that you find more intelligent. There is no need to lie to oneself and pretend that it isn't dumb. Maybe you will later find out that it wasn't dumb, but the better decision is still to admit what you believe to be the case and move on for now. To cling to that which has no rationale that you are able to articulate is a form of intellectual dishonesty. The capacity to admit that a position is irrational—whether your own or an author you are reading—is crucially necessary for intellectual honesty. If one cannot identify such irrationality in others, then, a fortiori, they will be blind to it in themselves. As always, there are errors on both sides: it is erroneous to fail to give credit where due, and it is also erroneous to give credit where it is not due.

What Bernstein is trying to do is to get his students to avoid sophistry, and that is a noble cause. If we pick up an author who we have reason to believe is worthwhile, then any refutation we give must be the refutation of a substantial thesis. If the author is worthwhile, then for anything we refute, it must be understandable why the author would hold to it.

Do you read what you write? “putative” means that the implication that is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication. What’s so hard to understand? — neomac

If you want to distinguish so strongly between believed logical implications, and other logical implications, then why don't you point me towards a logical implication that is not believed? Because you seem to think that if "the implication is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication." What this means is that in order for there to be a real implication it must not be believed to hold. You will have to point me towards that real implication, the kind that is not believed to hold. Where can I find that?

Stating a logic implication doesn’t make it true. — neomac

So you say:

Namely, 23 does not result from the arithmetic sum 2+3. — neomac

You stated an implication, but that doesn't make it true. So what does make it true?

Note that your focus on "objective implication" is beside the point. Here is my argument:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

We could write this as a conditional, "If S → P and P is truth-apt, then S is also truth-apt." That is "objectively true," if you like. We could adapt it for belief, "If someone believes that S → P and that P is truth-apt, then, logically speaking, they ought to believe that S is also truth-apt." Of course this is redundant, given that whenever we present an argument we are attempting to influence the beliefs of others.

Originally you were arguing that if S → P then both S and P must be truth-apt. Sure, I agree with that, but I want to specifically highlight the independently-derived truth-aptness of P given my interlocutors and the positions they are holding. In any case it seems that some of them would be tempted to say that if P is undecidable then it is not truth-apt.

That's what makes Aquinas, while very similar in some respects, quite different. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, Aquinas does depart from Aristotle occasionally. On this occasion he is hyper-aware of his departure. Metaphysically, when it comes to material existence Aquinas stays very close to Aristotle, whereas at the extremes he departs a bit (e.g. prime matter, God, angels, etc.).

(@Bob Ross)

I would agree that advocates of a worldview that hold skepticism in high regard would be better received if they portrayed their position as aspirational as opposed to already being on a higher plane. As in, they can believe skepticism is the best approach, although they admit the standard is rarely fully achieved. — Hanover

I agree. And it may be that their thesis of skepticism is so broad that it is hard to produce concrete arguments in its favor, but I nevertheless think that we want rational arguments rather than moral preferences when deciding whether skepticism is the best approach. The skeptic can be construed as humble or at least as possessing "epistemic humility," and that is deemed morally valuable within our culture, but presumably on a philosophy forum we want to ask whether skepticism is rational, rather than asking whether it is moral.

I still don't find the position sustainable just due to the impossibility of not having bias toward certain foundational standards, but direct declarations of superiority while claiming no one standard inherently superior strikes me as facially inconsistent as well. — Hanover

:up:

I'm sorry I made a mistake. I was trying to do your work for you. I should have just asked the question. Given that "3>1" is not empirical (even though it is truth-apt), how do you classify it? — Ludwig V

A few posts ago I wanted to clean up the conversation because you had created so many different tangents, and now I fear the same thing is happening. You claimed that what is truth-apt is empirical, I pointed out a counterexample, and you seemed to agree. But now you want to go on another tangent, this time about how exactly we should classify mathematical propositions. Why the tangent? What purpose of ours does it serve to answer such classification questions? I simply cannot afford so many new tangents every few posts.

Summarizing, I said this:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

You have offered what I see as two basic responses. Your first response was that there are some things that do not imply any propositions, and you gave the example of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions. My response is that if we cannot suppose that S → P then there is no objection to my claim, but that this only holds for some S's.

Your second response is something like the idea that, entirely apart from the question of truth-aptness, there are some P's which are not decidable, and those P's will not be sufficient to falsify S. My response is to concede the point, but yet claim that this only holds for some P's. So we are running into Square of Opposition difficulties:

• Leontiskos: Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is.
• Ludwig V: Some S's do not imply any P.
• Leontiskos: That is not sufficient. Unless all S's do not imply any P, my point will hold for those S's which do imply some P. Do you hold that all S's do not imply any P?
• ...
• Ludwig V: Some implied P's are undecidable.
• Leontiskos: That is not sufficient. Unless all implied P's are undecidable, my point will hold for those P's which are decidable. Do you hold that all implied P's are undecidable?

That's an interesting thought. Do you have an example? — Ludwig V

An example of a decidable P which follows from your chosen example of the Christian way of life would be, "Creation is good," or, "Care for the widow and orphan," or, "Do not commit abortion (or else exposure of infants)," or, "Jesus was resurrected from the dead."

Again:

In fact I would say that if a way of life lacks all such implications, then it is altogether otiose. — Leontiskos

A way of life which implies nothing at all hardly seems to count as a way of life.

I agree that remark would not help their case. One cannot just announce that a proposition is protected from refutation. One protects a proposition from refutation by the moves one makes in the argument. In the case you give, I would expect the Christian to reject the second premiss "God does not exist". — Ludwig V

But if they must engage in argument to protect P from refutation, then P has already been taken to be truth-apt and decidable. We were talking about a priori ways to protect P from refutation, such as denying its truth-aptness or its decidability.

I'm sorry. I was under the impression that when a philosopher uses the arrow of implication, by convention they are talking about material implication. But you are right, modus tollens etc. are much older than Frege's logic. — Ludwig V

Okay, then we understand each other.

St. Paul might be a good example.

...

But the point here is that although St. Paul did radically change his way of life, he still managed to live in the same world as the rest of us, so did not abandon large parts of the way of life he was living before his conversion.
The critical role for standard philosophy of ways of life is that they establish and enable our practices, including our ability to formulate propositions, evaluate them and so forth (and I include making judgements of value in this). St. Paul may have modified his beliefs, but the fundamental abilities were not touched. They were differently applied. — Ludwig V

We could simplify the story and categories a bit and just say that St. Paul encountered something which caused him to decide to abandon Judaism and embrace Christianity. Your objection is something like, "Ah, but Judaism and Christianity have a lot in common, therefore he did not abandon his way of life; he just modified it."

You're still claiming that, "The scope [of changes to one's way of life] is limited." Well, what limits it, and why? What counts as an abandonment and what counts as a change, and why can humans only change but never abandon their way of life? All of that looks rather arbitrary to me.

And what if we look again at your chosen example, the Christian way of life? People obviously abandon the Christian way of life, so it sure looks like abandonment of things that you deem ways of life is possible.

I've got very confused about whether it is the Christian way of life that demonstrates the existence of God or God that demonstrates the Christian way of life. Perhaps even both? — Ludwig V

Implication can be two-way, even though the various reasons will be chronologically limited.

As we get deeper into this, it is necessary to question your use of "validate" here. Ways of life do not, in themselves, validate anything. They are the foundation on which we build our practices of validating things. — Ludwig V

What is happening is that you are equivocating on "ways of life." The equivocation was present even when you were talking about Wittgenstein, for even there you referred to both non-justificatory schemas and justificatory schemas as ways of life. But your chosen example of the Christian way of life certainly does validate certain propositions.

Here is the place where you spoke about justificatory schemas:

As Wittgenstein is worrying about the foundations of rationality, there is a much quoted moment when he comes to the end of the justifications that he can offer and exclaims "But this is what I do!". An example of this point in argumentation is concluding that, since S implies P and S is true, P is true. There is no more to be said. — Ludwig V

Obviously, given what you say here, S implies or "validates" P.

But all of this goes back to the some/all problem. Do you really think that all S's imply no propositions?

(Believe it or not, this is new territory to me, and I'm thinking on my feet. So things may change.) — Ludwig V

Okay, thanks for letting me know.

The horseshoe effect connects megalomania solipsism and Carl Rogers listening-relativism. In both cases one arrives at a flattened and arid landscape, just by different routes. With the first the whole class listens to one person who expounds their ideas, and no one else gets to talk. With the second it is exactly the same, except that each person is given their solipsistic opportunity to speak before everyone walks home in isolation and silence. The choices are "monism" or "pluralism," where the common individualistic rule is that argument and contention is not permitted. No distinction between argument and imposition is possible. To argue is to impose, and to do this is to be an immoral exclusivist who does not judge all ideas equal. It is to fail the criterion of democracy in the realm of ideas. Influencing another individual's thoughts and beliefs is off-limits, because it presupposes the inequality of ideas.

Of course, thankfully most of the resident "pluralists" do not do this consistently. But if Banno's philosophical summum bonum of disagreement is to function, then there must be a legitimate motive for disagreeing. If we do not presuppose that error exists, then we would never disagree; and error cannot exist without truth going before it.

we needn't kid ourselves — Hanover

We needn't kid ourselves, but so many do. So many pat themselves on the back, "He is so sure of himself with his truth-claims and propositions. I am unsure of myself, and I just knock things down. I take nothing for granted. How much better I am!" They do not understand that the wrecking ball presupposes its own truth-claims and foundations, but when the goal is virtue-signaling it doesn't much matter.

I just find the very concept of anti-worldviewism hopelessly paradoxical because it's a worldview unto itself. — Hanover

I would call it a performative contradiction rather than a paradox.

If we apply this insight philosophically, we see that striving for a complete worldview may not only be impossible—it may be misguided. — Banno

But what's interesting here is that the religious thinker usually holds that God is inexhaustibly intelligible, and therefore they actually have a reason for openness to reality. Hence the reason why secular thinkers like Banno's Logical Positivists are so enclosed upon themselves and parochial: their premise is that there is nothing in-principle inexhaustible about reality; and their failure leads to a despair that then leads to vacillation between various forms of irrational optimism and various forms of despair and deflationism. Note too that the formalistic and theory-laden approach to explanandum and explanation has already trapped itself before it has begun. In reality there are no hard and fast divides between the so-called "object language" and the so-called "meta language." Both are artificial constructs needed to uphold a Great Divide that in truth does not exist.

Even the pragmatist should be able to see that in order to avoid both despair and presumption one needs a legitimate object and reason for hope. One needs movement afresh without cynicism towards the past or despair of true progress in the future. In today's climate what is needed is philosophy rather than diatribes, ideology, and virtue signaling (i.e. the reduction of thinking to public moralizing - the "comprehensive views are naughty" propaganda of liberalism).

You seem to think that there are truth-claims apart from beliefs. If I question P and someone says that P is justified on account of S (or that P is true because of S), then we have a putative logical implication between S and P. This shouldn't be as hard as you are making it.

You seem to think that the person is not asserting a logical implication between S and P, but I really don't follow your reasoning. If some onlooker said, "They don't believe P because of S; rather, they believe P because of T," then we would have to talk about beliefs, causality, and all of the other tangents you want to bring in. But there is no need, because we are talking about people who are claiming justification for their own beliefs, and that's what logic always is. There is no such thing as logic apart from minds and beliefs.

But by ‘matter’ he is not referring having mass but, rather, a substrate of
potential—right? — Bob Ross

One place where Aristotle defines matter, he says the following:

For my definition of matter is just this-the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists in the result, not accidentally. — Aristotle, Physics 192a31

If so, then how does this seed’s actuality (form) conjoined with its potency (matter)? If it is potential, then it is nothing (non-actual); which would entail there is nothing conjoined with the form (the actuality). Otherwise, there is something that is real which is mere potential (matter) that is conjoined with what is actual (form); and this admits of a nothingness that is something—doesn’t it? — Bob Ross

I think you are conflating matter with potency. There is a relation between the two, but they are not the same thing.

More generally, for Aristotle matter and form are not two substances that must be added together and conjoined by way of some third thing. Hylomorphism is the doctrine that substances are matter-form unities.

But isn’t it the actualizing principle that actualizes something already actual in a way that that actual thing (which was changed) could have been affected that accounts for change? Why posit some real potency which receives the form? — Bob Ross

Material form is not subsistent apart from matter. That's just not how reality works. We don't say, "The round," we say, "The basketball is round."

Likewise, if God is pure actuality because He has no parts (and thusly no possibility of receiving any actualization) and actuality actualizes what is actual and matter is a substrate of potency, then how could God create matter? Wouldn’t the existence of matter, in this sense, necessitate that that which can receive actuality (i.e., matter) must be so different than what actualizes that it is coeternal with it? — Bob Ross

I think that’s basically what Aristotle thought. He certainly did not think God creates matter.

But note that Aristotle in no way wants to begin with God. Aristotle wants to begin with things that we naturally understand, like stones and animals. Aristotle would not accept your presupposition that we should begin our inquiry with God.

I guess one way of thinking about it would be that Aristotle would say there’s a substrate of potency conjoined with actuality; whereas I am thinking about it as an imposed arrangement (form) conjoined with actuality. I don’t see what this ‘magical substrate of potentiality’ is doing.

Likewise, potency is nothing: it is not actual, but what could be actual relative to the nature of a thing—relative to what its parts can receive. Therefore, real potency is a contradiction in terms: a substrate of potential is a nothingness that is real. — Bob Ross

I think you are getting closer here.

I would actually recommend looking at Physics I.8, given that your objection to matter (but really potency) is so close to the view that Aristotle examines there.

You are saying something like, “What use is potency if it doesn’t do anything?” Aristotle begins his dialectical portion by looking at those who denied the existence of change:

The first of those who studied philosophy were misled in their search for truth and the nature of things by their inexperience, which as it were thrust them into another path. So they say that none of the things that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, because what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible. For what is cannot come to be (because it is already), and from what is not nothing could have come to be (because something must be underlying). So too they exaggerated the consequence of this, and went so far as to deny even the existence of a plurality of things maintaining that only what is itself is. — Aristotle, Physics I.8

Aristotle’s answer to this puzzle seems to be the same answer to your own quandary. You will have to read it, but the key is that matter is not merely “what is not” and form is not merely “what is.” In fact Aristotle will go on to distinguish matter from privation in chapter 9.

I think it is right to say that proximate matter and form are the same thing, but seen from a different angle. Proximate matter is the thing qua potency and (substantial) form is the thing qua actuality. In these characteristic examples of material substances there is no such thing as (proximate) matter apart from form or form apart from matter. For example, when we talk about the form of a bronze statue we are not talking about something apart from the bronze. We are talking about something that the bronze possesses within itself; something that inheres in the bronze.

This gets at the heart of my confusion: hopefully you can help clarify it. If the intellect, or anything, has no matter but has potential; then matter is not the substrate of being of a thing nor the parts which comprise it. So may main question to you is: what is matter? — Bob Ross

Yes, I think this is the question you are asking. I want to say that for Aristotle "matter" and "form" begin as common terms that are then fleshed out philosophically. So if we look at a bronze statue then the matter is the bronze and the form is the shape. And then we could look at the bronze itself, which is proximate matter (i.e. matter conjoined with form), and say that the matter of bronze is the various compounds of the alloy, and the form is their configuration and proportion.

The form is something like the "shape" or intelligibility of the thing, whereas the matter is that which receives the form, or that in which the form inheres. Again, they are not separable, but rather two principles of unified being. So bronze is matter qua statue, and the various compounds of the alloy are matter qua bronze (and then we could go on and on, examining the proximate matter of the compounds, etc.).

Matter is something like that in which the form inheres; the non-accidental substratum of the matter-form unity. It's not a layer cake where matter is on the bottom, form is on the top, and you need an intermediate layer to conjoin the two.

If you want to talk about reasons to believe, then they shouldn’t be confused with logic implications. If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, not even between their descriptions (if S = “I believe that an apple is on the table” and P = “I experience an apple on the table”, then “S → P” can be false, because S can be true while P false). — neomac

Reasons given for truth or true belief are logical implications. "There is an apple on the table because I see it" - <See → exists>. The implication need not be infallible or necessary, so it matters not that it "could be false." Belief is always implicit in truth-claims and logic claims. No one says, "S → P, but I don't believe S → P."

If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, — neomac

If you believe that your vision of the apple implies its existence, then you believe the logical implication. Of course believing something does not eo ipso make it true, but there are no truth-claims apart from beliefs.

If I am right, then it seems like we can get rid of 'matter' (in Aristotle's sense) and retain form (viz., actuality). — Bob Ross

I want to say that Aristotle's view is based on his belief that change occurs. So suppose a seed (along with the soil and moisture) changes into a seedling. There is both something that is common to the seed and the seedling (matter) and also something that is different (form). Aristotle does not think it is right to say that there is only a change in form, with no underlying matter which accounts for the continuity between the seed and the seedling. To say that would be to deny the existence of change (because in that case the seed never changes into a seedling, despite the fact that the two phenomena are juxtaposed).

But the view is difficult to understand insofar as neither form nor matter are separate substances. They are more like explanatory principles of material reality. So you say:

Matter (i.e., real, pure potential) is posited as real, instead of merely positing actuality shaping actuality — Bob Ross

Pure potency is "prime matter," which is a contentious topic. Yet for the most part Aristotle will say that all matter is informed—certainly all the matter that we encounter has form within it. So we can never point to formless matter. Matter is a principle of material being, not a species or substance.

- You are literally pitiful. The depth at which your head is buried in the sand is unprecedented.

I think what a lot of people are stuck on is "undecidability," so to speak.

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

You want to say, "Ah, but there are cases where S and P are both undecidable, even if they are truth-apt." You seem to think this is one of those cases: <[Christian way of life] → God exists>.

I grant you that if P is undecidable then S will not be falsified by P. Note that in that case what I say still holds, it's just that no modus tollens is practically possible.

In a practical sense I am thinking of P's which are decidable, and I think that all substantial ways of life will imply P's which are commonly recognized to be decidable. So if our age thinks God's existence is undecidable, then a better P for the Christian way of life would be historical, political, or ethical propositions which are thought to be decidable. The Christian way of life implies all sorts of propositions like that. In fact I would say that if a way of life lacks all such implications, then it is altogether otiose.

Yes, I hoped you would want to add propositions like that. Do we call them necessary or analytic? Or both? — Ludwig V

I don't follow your disjunctive syllogisms here. You said:

because it is said in philosophy that all claims of existence must be empirical. The alternative (unless all religious beliefs are pseudo-propositions) is that they are analytic or meaningless. Neither of which really make much sense. However, empirical or analytic are not the only options. — Ludwig V

"All philosophical existence-claims must be empirical. The alternative is that they would be analytic or meaningless, which is not right. But empirical or analytic are not the only options."

I don't follow any of that. And now you are saying, "'3 > 1' is not empirical, therefore it must be necessary [inclusive or] analytic."

Yes. I don't think this is a key idea at all. It goes nowhere. — Ludwig V

Why?

First, it is statements or propositions that substitute for the variables in a formula like that. You cannot substitute the Eiffel Tower for either S or P. But ways of life and practices are about what you have to know - be capable of doing - before you can make a statement, never mind draw an inference from it. — Ludwig V

If that's how you define a "way of life," then apparently there is no way of life that implies any proposition. But in that case, what are you supposed to be disagreeing with? Nevertheless, Wittgenstein would never say, "It's just what I do," about a way of life understood in that sense.

Apparently you are trying to say, "Yes Leontiskos, I agree with you. And I don't think ways of life ever imply propositions."

It looks like you want to substitute the Christian way of life for S and God's existence for P. Or is it the other way round? Never mind. — Ludwig V

Sure, if you like. Here is an atheist argument:

1. [Christian way of life] → God exists
2. God does not exist
3. Therefore, the Christian way of life is false or invalid

That's a perfectly valid argument, and the Christian can't say, "Oh, but ways of life are not truth-apt, so your argument is illegal. My way of life is, 'protected from refutation.' "

Yes. That was a pragmatic decision. But it's scope is limited. The idea that a fact about the world might persuade to wholesale change in our way of life misunderstands what a way of life is. But amending or revision does not seem impossible to me, though I have no idea what Wittgenstein would say about the idea. — Ludwig V

Why would anyone amend or change their way of life, on your view? Isn't it precisely because the way of life is undermined in whole or in part by something they come to understand? Do you have any principled way of "limiting the scope" of the idea that P can invalidate S?

Subject to the restriction that propositions emerge from ways of life via practices, so the changes will be changes of detail.
But it is worth remembering how much Christianity has changed in the last three hundred years. — Ludwig V

They can be changed in part or in whole. New discoveries can lead to modification of ways of life or full-scale refutation of ways of life. When Darwin wrote his book some Christians modified their Christianity and others abandoned their Christianity (while others were uninterested altogether). There was no "limited scope" preventing the wholesale abandonment.

"Holding P because of S" does not necessarily refer to a logic implication between P and S. — neomac

Yes, it does, in precisely the way that is required for the relation I have pointed out. If someone holds proposition P because of S, then S is truth-apt. It doesn't matter if, for instance, S is one conjunct within a conjunctive antecedent (i.e. if S is only jointly sufficient along with other conjuncts).

Can you quote the claims which triggered that comment of yours I quoted in my first post? — neomac

Why insert yourself into a conversation if you do not understand the context?

I was thinking of know-how mainly, but yes I know he's fine with inference that's informal. — Moliere

Well you said, "But what if I called something that was not categorical knowledge?"

we may be wrong about it, but there is some kind of essence to be right about — Moliere

Right: like "water is H2O." Again, Darwin, Lavoisier, and Kripke all believe that there is something to be right about.

Kant's cognitivism is empiricist, like Aristotle's, but he cuts off metaphysics as scientific knowledge, unlike Aristotle. — Moliere

Yes, but people will argue until the cows come home whether Kant is an empiricist. Whatever he is, Kant is a strange hybrid.

But I'd go further there and say there are rational passions -- just not eternally rational passions. They're developed within a particular community that cares about rationality. — Moliere

Okay, I can see how you would run that.

I think this is now becoming very diffuse. Thanks for the discussion, Moliere.

One way we might retort back is that reality is wider than exhaustive disjunction, yeah? — Moliere

Sort of, but my point all along has been that if we say that then we must also say that Hume is wrong. If we believe something that contradicts Hume's argument—such as that his disjunction is not exhaustive—then we must hold that Hume's argument is unsound, i.e. (3). It seems to me that you do not understand this. You do not understand that when you contradict Hume's conclusion you must also hold that his argument is unsound.

See, this is the bit I think we clash on the most. Soft neo-Aristotelianism makes enough sense to me, but if we start talking about Aristotle Aristotle then I have to say that I don't think he already did that. — Moliere

But why do you claim that Aristotle did not do something when you have such a lack of familiarity with Aristotle? That's the problem I have with anti-Aristotelians: they ignorantly dismiss Aristotle on all manner of topic. Myles Burnyeat identifies the precise place where Aristotle does what you think he did not do in his article, "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the logic of persuasion." (See also his, "The origins of non-deductive inference.")

I'm not opposed to tutorship at any time -- I'll never learn it all. Someone else will always know more than I. And likewise I know more than others on certain things and in the right circumstances I'll tutor them. — Moliere

Well when I said I recommend tutoring, I meant that I recommend that people tutor. But learning or being tutored is also good. Were you to tutor children I think you would soon realize how false is your idea that knowledge is about guess-making.

I don't recognize that at all. I would rather make the inference that if empiricism is the only option and induction is impossible then knowledge must not be derived from induction -- there must be some other way of rendering empiricism, since we know that we know some things. — Moliere

Again, Hume gives a proof via exhaustive disjunction. The retort, "There is a disjunct you missed," is sort of tangential to the whole spirit of the thing. In this case you seem to be saying that we could have direct empirical knowledge of rational relations, which seems unlikely.

But what if I called something that was not categorical knowledge? :D — Moliere

Then, as with everything else, he would point you to the place where he already did that. :wink:

I think we'd like such a thing, but it's not always appropriate. Also I think that such a thing takes a great deal of work, and sometimes I see the play in philosophy as undervalued. Further I think that philosophy is generally undervalued by people because they don't understand that it can be fun -- we need good tools and arguments are great, but there really is this erotic side to philosophy that I think would benefit people because if they like philosophy then they'll employ it more widely. — Moliere

I'd say that folks who are making random guesses are not having as much fun as those who know how to achieve their end, and that anyone who thinks they are merely guessing, but has consistent success, already has a method that they just don't understand. But I'm sure you disagree on that.

It is quite beautiful, though, when one moves beyond random guesses and begins to understand rationality proper. It is as if they step into a new world. This is why I recommend tutoring.

This means we ultimately decide everything, through, in Satan's words, the "unconquerable will." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, good.

You can also see this tend in the idea that ontology might be oppressive if it is not creative. On the classical view, this makes no sense. Ignorance is a limit on freedom, and being creative in error just binds you in ignorance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agreed.

Next, Marxism had been fairly popular in the West, particularly in academia, for a long time. But by the late Cold War, the many infamies of Marxist regimes had come to light and they seemed more like the norm rather than the exception for that ideology. People had already argued that capitalism was bankrupt and couldn't turn back now. Yet their great alternative was revealed to be more akin to Hitlerism than utopia, and no new alternative was forthcoming. So there is a sort of reflexive shell shock militating against strong belief. — Count Timothy von Icarus

True.

So that's the broad context, but then this is paired with a number of influential skeptical arguments of "skeptical solutions" to questions of knowledge. Wittgenstein, who has been interpreted in extremely diverse ways, is especially influential here. The linguistic turn and a tendency towards deflationism (or just bracketing out questions of truth) in logic also helps. I mentioned this in the thread on pragmatism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good points all around. :up:

On the one hand, you have Analytics who, burnt by incompleteness and undefinablity, decided that, since truth couldn't be defined to their satisfaction, it simply could not exist. The rules of their "games" were thus the ultimate measure of truth, and since they had very many games there must be very many truths, with no game to help them choose between them.

Elsewhere in the Analytic camp were those who became so committed to the idea of science as the "one true paradigm of knowledge," that they began to imagine that, if science couldn't explain consciousness, then consciousness (and thus conscience) must simply be done away with (i.e. eliminative materialism, which gets rid of the Good and the agent who might know it).

From the other side came Continentals who came to define freedom as pure potency and power, and so saw any definiteness as a threat to unlimited human liberty. On such a view, anything that stands outside man must always be a constriction on his freedom. Everything must be generated by the individual. Perhaps we can allow the world to "co-constitute" with us, but only if a sort of freedom and agency, which in the end is really "ours" anyhow, is given to the world.

The result is a sort of pincer move on the notions of Truth and Goodness (and we might add Beauty here too.) We might envisage the two armies of Isengaurd and Mordor. The first is motivated by belief that it cannot win. The second, by pure considerations of power, and so it assumes that everyone else must have the same motivations.

Good stuff. Also, it would be great if you learned how to add links to your quotes. :razz: You can actually highlight text, click "quote," and the website will do it for you.

A. This misses how heroic and good historical events (e.g. ending slavery) also involve strong conviction; and

B. That plenty of disastrous events, e.g. the fall of the Roman Republic and the later collapse of the Western Empire, stem more from a lack of conviction, not a surfeit of it. As Yeats put it:

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

Sounds familiar. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that's also a good point.

Republic, 442 b-c is one place (using the analogy of the city). I think Plato refers to the spirited part of the soul as the "natural ally" of the rational part when he first introduces the typology .. too, and maybe in a few other places. This comes out in the chariot image of the Phaedrus too. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure. I am familiar with those but I will revisit them.

I think you can find the same sentiment expressed at many points in the Philokalia though, for example by Saint Diadochos of Photiki, who, unlike many Pagans, does not see the irascible appetites, or anger in particular, as bad, but rather sees them as tools for rebuking the appetites, passions, and demons. He memorably advised that one fashion a whip from the name of Christ and drive out the demons from the soul as Christ drives out the merchants from the temple (the body itself being a temple to the Holy Spirit). — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's fair, although that tradition is also wary of anger, if not spiritedness per se.

St. Thomas lays out a similar role for the irascible appetites in the first part of the second part of the Summa (roughly questions 20-30 IIRC), where he covers all the appetites (concupiscible then irascible) and discusses how none are evil of themselves, but are evil in their use (object, ordering to reason, or effect on habit). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and you have Thomas following Aristotle in contending that a lack of anger can at times be a vice.

A deficiency that might be compounded if you did things like cut the cultural canon (Homer, Virgil, Milton, etc.) out of education due to concerns of "bias." Having removed all "bias," nothing supports one view over any other. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right!

Once tradition is considered evil and reason is considered impotent, a sort of anti-tradition revolutionary mindset is largely all that's left (along with the ascendancy of the victim).

But, knowledge-first: We know things. How do we know things? I take it that Feyerabend demonstrated the impossibility of building a science of science from axioms or what-have-you in the vein that Popper was doing. So if we know things, and some of those bits of knowledge are scientific, and we have to learn how to learn scientific knowledge (which I think we do), then there must be some other kind of knowledge other than science. For me I turn to current practice, and history (or, really, just "history" properly understood) to answer that question: So there are at least two kinds of knowledge, science and history. — Moliere

Related, the discussion between Srap and I beginning <here>.

it's a "real" philosophical problem, but as per rule 1 solving it won't destroy all knowledge. — Moliere

If someone were to show that empiricism is the only option and induction is impossible, then they would destroy all knowledge. What troubles me is that you don't seem to recognize this. You would apparently just pivot and claim that there is some fundamental divide between philosophy and life, and that knowledge pertains to life (cf. my post <here> about the crucial move of 3).

obsessed with categorical methodology, or with proving oneself right — Moliere

Strawmen, I think. If you found another category Aristotle would say, "Great."

Hence the notion that philosophy is like a garden or a forest -- with a garden you've cultivated it, but there's some structure there and we know how it grows, and with the forest it's more "in the wild", waiting to be discovered, cut down, replanted, re-invented and so forth. Of course we're not separate from this forest or garden -- and really I'm still talking about ideas here, I just think they move and have a life of their own -- so we can effect how it looks over time as it effects our thoughts too. — Moliere

At the end of the day, whether garden or forest, I think we need something more robust than a gesturing towards "guesswork." Foresters have their tools just as gardeners do. No one is just running, day after day, with random guesses. To run away from Aristotle so vehemently that we oppose method itself strikes me as irrational.

Part of the joke I've been enjoying is that all I've been doing to Aristotle is Aristotle's method to Aristotle — Moliere

Except I don't think that's anywhere close to true. Aristotle accurately and charitably characterizes his opponents before answering them. You've not done that. Here is an example:

• Moliere: Aristotle's induction would be valid if he first observed every member of the set.
• Leontiskos: Observing every member of a set and then drawing a conclusion about every member of a set is not induction at all.
• Moliere: *crickets*

Else, if it destroys all knowledge and philosophy, why did he continue to do philosophy, and even write a history of England? — Moliere

Of course, because he couldn't see it. Lots of folks engage in performative self-contradiction. But it doesn't destroy non-empiricist philosophy, that's true. I would have singled that out if I knew you were positing a priori categories or conditions of knowledge.

Would it be inappropriate bias to object to slavery as a matter of law? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If the whole of political life is already mere bias, then I can hardly see how you can maintain your objection to religion being involved in politics on account of it also being biased. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why is the default preferable If it is also just bias? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Great points. :up:
What you describe as "default" I have previously described as @Janus's exclusive reliance on "burden of proof" claims. His one and only argument, at bottom, is, "They have the burden of proof, not me."

I seems pretty clear that @Janus embraces irrationality when confronted with these problems. This is a broader problem, in that, on TPF, discussions of ethics or politics or metaphysics are usually wholesale irrational. The current state of philosophy is incapable of addressing such topics in a rational manner. That's why the threads on logic or mathematics or reference are so popular: because they represent that small slice of reality where the Western mind can still manage to engage in rational thought. Asking someone like @Janus to consistently apply his theory to laws against slavery results in an endless circle of non sequitur responses, or in other cases, brazen equivocation.

Note though that if you ask Rawls why religion must be excluded from the public sphere, you will get the same sort of fumbling incoherence. This sort of incoherence is part and parcel of our epoch, and has been imbibed deeply by the post-WWII generation. The younger generations are so appalled by this sort of irrationality that I fear we will see a strong pendulum swing.

Good, but what is the premise of your point here? It is that, "No one would ever say that S implies P and yet S is not truth-apt." But we have folks doing that all the time on TPF, including within this thread. We regularly see folks who respond in this way: "Why do you hold P?" "Because of S, but S is not truth-apt." One of the examples I pointed to was an entire thread arguing for that idea.

The point is that metaphyseal posits cannot be more than purported truths in that they fail to be subject to demonstration. — Janus

This would have the potential to be a fruitful conversation if you knew what you meant by your terms, but I don't think you know what you mean by either "metaphysical" or "demonstration." By "metaphysical" you seem to mean, "Stuff I don't think can be demonstrated," and by "demonstrated," you seem to mean, "intersubjectively agreed upon." This is basically a less coherent version of the equally circular, Rawlsian notion of "public reason."

They are obviously not demonstrable to the unbiased — Janus

:lol:

You may as well just put an exclamation point on the end of your assertion and pretend that you have done something philosophical. Each time I point out the problem you can add an extra exclamation point.

Your reading skills are truly woeful if you are writing honestly here. I have said many time I hold some positions which are not demonstrable, just because they seem intuitively right to me. I have also said I think it is fine for others to do the same. I have also said that I see no reason to expect others to agree with me about my intuitively held beliefs. The problem is when people conflate such intuitively held beliefs to be absolute truth. — Janus

Is the thing that "seems intuitively right to me" truth-apt? Isn't it precisely, "The thing that seems intuitively true to me"? And so the ever-looming question asks what is meant by these strange utterances such as, "Absolute truth." Does it seem intuitively true to you, but not intuitively absolutely true? Are these distinctions really thought to be meaningful?

You argue that metaphysical truths are demonstrable and yet you cannot explain how they could be demonstrated. — Janus

I don't think you even know what a "metaphysical truth" is. It is not a stable category for you. Apparently you think that everything which is "indemonstrable" is "metaphysical." And apparently if we came up with a demonstration for something that previously lacked one, then it would magically transform from a metaphysical claim into a non-metaphysical claim. None of this is principled reasoning, and it is pretty hard to answer your request when you don't even know what you mean by a "metaphysical truth."

A well-accepted metaphysical truth would be the PNC, which Aristotle argues for in Meta IV. And given your remarkably strong reliance on intersubjective agreement, the PNC must be a demonstrable metaphysical truth (since virtually everyone recognizes it).

:roll: I was interested in phenomenology for many years and took undergraduate units in Heidegger and Husserl. How about you? — Janus

And you think Heidegger and Husserl limit themselves to what experiences seem like?

The point here is that you called phenomenology "quasi-empirical," and then you said that mysticism is a variety of phenomenology. I am wondering if you therefore deem mysticism quasi-empirical.

You're remarkably good at either failing to see the point or at deliberately changing the subject to avoid dealing with what is problematic for your position. The point is that metaphyseal posits cannot be more than purported truths in that they fail to be subject to demonstration. That they cannot be more than purported truths was the reason I wrote "metaphysical "truths". Why harp and carp on it when I had already explained that? — Janus

But it has already been pointed out to you in some detail, by multiple persons, that your second sentence here does nothing more than beg the question. People who think metaphysical truths exist also think metaphysical truths are demonstrable. What good is your assertion otherwise? It makes no difference that you say metaphysical truths are not demonstrable, given that you have no argument for your assertion.

This is very close to your failure to justify an anti-slavery position. By all of your own criteria, "Slavery is wrong," is an unfalsifiable metaphysical position. And yet you hold it all the same, without argument or rationale. So you basically hold "metaphysical" positions when you want to, and you object to others holding "metaphysical" positions when you want to, and there is no rational basis in either case. It's just your will. Whatever you want, regardless of arguments.

The phenomenological study of mystical experience would consist in investigating the ways in which those experiences seem, just as the phenomenological study of everyday experience consists investigating the ways in which everyday experience seems. Phenomenology is, or least the cogent parts of it are, all about the seeming. — Janus

So you think phenomenology limits itself to what experiences seem like? Have you read any phenomenology?

What happens if we change the designation to "The man over there who I think has champagne in his glass is happy"? That's where Kripke himself winds up: "The speaker intended to refer . . . to the man he thought had the champagne in his glass." Has the speaker still made a mistake in reference? I think we have to say no. The reference is now based on something the speaker thought, not something that is the case about Mr. Champagne. The speaker can point out Mr. Champagne to me, explain that the man is being designated according to a belief the speaker has about him, and we can both usefully talk about that man and no other. Whether or not Mr. Champagne really has champagne coudn't be relevant. — J

Building on what said, this essentially contravenes your earlier observation, 'I shall use the term "Glunk" to refer to the man that I call "Glunk".' Note that part of the problem here is that 'Glunk' is not a term that is serviceable for triangulation, because it has no common meaning between the two speakers. This is the same problem with your, "The man who I think..." Mere thoughts are not common between speakers, and therefore are not serviceable for triangulation. This is why your revision does not add anything - because your interlocutor cannot read your thoughts. The reference still succeeds or doesn't succeed on the basis of the claim that the man is holding a glass of champagne.

Has the speaker still made a mistake in reference? I think we have to say no. The reference is now based on something the speaker thought, not something that is the case about Mr. Champagne. — J

It is now based on something thought to be the case. There is no escaping the assertion of what is the case (and this is equally true on TPF, where it is unavoidable to give opinions). The revision is only useful insofar as it introduces an explicit margin of error. It is only useful insofar as it says, "The man over there who is holding a glass which appears to contain champagne." The idea here is that the interlocutor will be helped if the possibility of an erroneous appearance is pointed up. But apart from that, revising to thoughts is no help at all, given that thoughts are private. "That man over there of whom I am thinking," is not going to suffice for a common reference. We say, "The one I am looking at," or, "The one my right foot is pointing at," but not, "The one I am thinking of." So, "I am thinking of the one I am thinking of," is an infallible statement, but it won't be helpful when it comes to public reference.

What I see is that the way we generate knowledge requires a priori assumptions, rather than knowledge -- or we might be tempted to call it knowledge after relying upon it or proving it or some such, but if we do there's be some other a priori assumption by which we are doing it. — Moliere

Plato begins with the a priori, empiricists like Aristotle move away from it, and then after Hume objects to empirical induction there is a natural move back to the a priori (with Kant). So sure, if you do that then you circumvent Hume to a certain extent. I wasn't expecting you to go the a priori Platonist/rationalist route.

So enter Kant -- he puts the rationalist spin on his philosophy but then I think he has a more romantic undertone which relies upon emotion than stated. Much in the same way we can look at Hume as a rationalist we can look at Kant as an emotivist and not because this is some defect in their thought or some such. What Kant adds to his moral theory is that there are proper kinds of emotions in order to claim one is acting morally or elsewise. That emotion is respect for the law itself. — Moliere

I think Kant does do the a priori thing in response to Hume, but I don't agree with any of this about Kant being an emotivist.

Similarly, Kant and lots of philosophers think emotions are reliable when formed and ruled by the reason. Like, you know, Aristotle.

"Truths" as I intended it translates to "purported truths". — Janus

Well there's your equivocation. Truth and purported truth are two different things. When you say "truth" and mean "purported truth," you are equivocating in order to try to salvage a bad argument. Everyone knows that purported truths are not the same for all. Nothing notable there.

Have you thought of a reply to <this post> yet?

It certainly is. I'll do my best. — Ludwig V

Okay.

This is the remark that I responded to. — Ludwig V

Right: so we are dealing with the thesis that religious claims are not truth-apt (or in your case, some religious claims are not truth-apt). I think you are the first person in the thread to admit that you believe such a thing, so that's good progress.

This is the remark that I responded to. I took truth-apt to mean true-or-false, (i.e. empirical) and responded because I do think they are not true-or-false. — Ludwig V

Well, I would first say that something which is truth-apt is not necessarily empirical. "3 > 1" is truth-apt, but not empirical, for example. But I would agree that a proposition which is truth-apt is true or false (or else capable of being true or false).

OK. So where do you want to start? — Ludwig V

Well I think <this post> of mine is the thing we have primarily been focused on. The key idea:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. S could be a way of life or practice. — Leontiskos

One would object to this by saying, "In such-and-such a counterexample, S → P, and P is truth-apt, but nevertheless S is not truth-apt." Do you or Wittgenstein have such a counterexample?

In practice, our lives are more complicated than that, and our ways of life and practices are always liable to development and change, often in response to facts about the world. But the relationship goes two ways and is more complicated than material implication. — Ludwig V

Here it seems that you are conceding my point. You seem to recognize that we might encounter a fact about the world (~P) which causes us to change our way of life (S). Nowhere have I claimed that material implication exhausts the point I am making, and therefore your point about material implication does not actually count as an objection to my thesis. In fact I don't see that it has anything specifically to do with material implication. It has to do with implication and the possibility of modus tollens, which was already inherent in the implication relation long before Frege succeeded in introducing material implication. See also:

I mean, you could give your definition of "true," but the point here is that if ways of life can be validated by propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions. — Leontiskos

If you want to say that P can invalidate S rather than that P can falsify S, I won't quibble with that. Are we disagreeing on anything more than that?

I could have more accurately said, "The point here is that if ways of life can validate propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions."

That people used to often read aloud might also be a reason for the heavy preference of verse up until the modern era, the epic poem being for them what the novel is for us, and even scientific and political topics were covered with poetry. Another common hypothesis is that it is easier to remember text that is in rhyming meter and books were so expensive that memory was essential. Also, you can often do more emotionally and thematically with clever verse using less text, and when you have to kill a bunch of oxen to make a single book, economy is key. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and I think the recovery of reading aloud would be a good thing. Simpson talks about the development of poetry as part of the natural progression of culture's orientation towards a comprehensive end:

Further, methods and principles will be looked for everywhere, and those who, because of advancing community, have leisure from necessities through being served by others, will look for principles and methods in the things of leisure, particularly in counting and numbers, and in the regular motions of the heavens. Records of the past will be examined and ways to preserve memory fostered, in particular by forms and patterns of words that in their rhythmic features lend themselves to easy recollection. Poetry will develop, and those skilled at composing or remembering poems will be prized and honored. At some point, ways of recollection that do not rely on living memories will be invented, such as by marking shapes on long-lasting material objects: walls of caves, pieces of wood, cured animal skins, baked clay, or beaten metal. Pictures that are direct copies of visible objects will likely come first, but the need for more abstract shapes, such as to record numbers or the sounds of human speech, will be felt and find varying solutions. But throughout all will remain the mysterious riddles of the universe and whence it came and how it always remains, and where and what are the hidden things, the dreams and visions of the night, strange foretellings of the future, sudden intimations of events far away. The riddles of man himself will figure largely among these mysteries, the mysteries of love and peace, hatred and war, success and failure, advance and decay, birth and death. — Peter L. P. Simpson, Political Liberalism, 72

-

- Sounds good.

Thanks. It's good to know I was not wrong. — Ludwig V

I miffed that a bit. It was actually St. Augustine writing about St. Ambrose, who practiced silent reading. Augustine found it strange.

Roughly, I want to convince to feel, behind every thought you have and every word you utter, millions of years of evolution and hundreds of thousands of years (at least) of culture. The thoughts and words of countless ancestors echo through your thoughts of words. Everytime you choose as the starting point for analysis "What am I doing all by myself?" that's a mistake. It's the tail wagging the dog. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is why people like @J talk to themselves aloud. It creates a quasi-externalization and a quasi-triangulation.

We start as early as possible learning to see the world through the eyes of our caretakers. I think talking builds on and elaborates this fundamental orientation of ours toward communal cognition. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, but we see the world through their eyes. Your granddaughter asks implicitly, "Am I doing it right?" I don't think she is implicitly asking, "Am I doing it your way?" That's why I think—at least according to a prominent rational aspect—the parasitic move is secondary. If I tell my nephew what a spider names, or how many legs a spider has, he is immediately thinking in objective terms. He thinks, "A spider has eight legs," not, "My uncle says/thinks a spider has eight legs." The shift to the latter is actually quite complex and difficult. In fact the concept and basis of error eludes most of the TPFers on a regular basis.

Well, there is a theory that reading in the ancient classical world was always reading out loud. Reading to oneself in sllence developed later. Sadly, I have lost my note of where I got this story. — Ludwig V

St. Augustine found St. Ambrose's silent reading strange and abnormal, which is one evidence we have for that thesis.

Yeah that's quite interesting, and I think both (yours and mine) represent types of triangulation.

A further curiosity is that parasitic reference has to be self-consciously contrastive, so it's the sort of thing a parent can engage in; on the other hand, children are said to be learning when they manage this sort of "playing along," "calling things what you call them," but they lack the distinction between the two ways of doing this. — Srap Tasmaner

That's right, and therefore I think the interesting question asks how parasitic or triangulated reference fits into reference in general. There is certainly a sense in which parasitic or triangulated reference is secondary, and this is seen in the way that the child does not begin with it. I think it is also true that lying requires parasitic or triangulated reference, and lying too is a secondary form of reference.

More generally, people are doing slightly different things when they refer, but it would seem that all acts of reference have commonalities.

Suppose you ask me who that guy is holding the glass of champagne, and I realize you mean Jim, but I happen to know Jim is holding a glass of sparkling cider. I could silently correct you and just answer "That's Jim," but in doing so I will have implicitly endorsed your claim that Jim is drinking champagne.

We are again in the territory of farce. — Srap Tasmaner

Cf.:

To use a referring expression (whether a definite description or a proper name whose meaning is fixed, a la Russell, by some definite description) to refer constitutively is to intend to refer to something one has in mind while conceiving of the intended referent under the description in question. To use a referring expression to refer parasitically is to intend to refer to something one has in mind without conceiving of that thing under the description in question—typically, because one believes for one reason or another that the description does not genuinely apply.

For example, Smith remarks to Jones about Andrew Lloyd Webber’s treatment of a particular leitmotif in Phantom of the Opera, referring to him as ‘the most significant British composer in history’. Jones, no fan of contemporary musicals, might co-opt Smith’s description and reply by saying ‘The most significant British composer in history is a hack’. In making this retort, Jones does not contradict himself, nor even impugn any other British composer by implication. Jones employs Smith’s preferred description to refer to Smith’s intended referent, even though Jones does not believe that the description is actually true of the intended referent. Smith uses the description to refer constitutively to Webber: the description constitutes part of Smith’s conception of Webber, at least on this occasion. Jones uses the description to refer parasitically: he borrows part of the conceptual content of Smith’s conception of Webber in order to refer to the man, but he does so without adopting that conceptual content as part of his own conception of Webber.

Such is the phenomenon of parasitic reference with respect to bona fide objects. It can also function, however, in connection with mere thought objects. For instance, if a child were to ask her parents how long they think it takes Santa Claus to circumnavigate the globe from his shop at the South Pole, they would not be acting irresponsibly (or not obviously so) were they to correct her by pointing out that, as they understand it, Santa’s shop is located at the North Pole. When the child uses ‘Santa’, she conceives of her intended referent as a jolly old elf who delivers toys to children at Christmas by means of a flying-reindeer-drawn sleigh, etc. But when her parents use ‘Santa’, they conceive of their intended referent as a certain fictitious character whose existence is falsely (though benignly) affirmed by parents and others. They refer to that which their daughter has in mind by borrowing part of her conception of Santa, but they do so without adopting it as part of their own conception. They do not believe that Santa lives at the North Pole, but they encourage their daughter to do so in order that the thought object to which she refers by her use of ‘Santa’ will conform with the popular conception of him. So the parents are free to assert that Santa’s shop is located at the North Pole and to deny that it is located at the South Pole without thereby committing themselves to the existence of a jolly old elf who weighs more than ninety pounds, lives north of Minnesota, and so on, because they use ‘Santa’ to refer parasitically rather than constitutively. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof - link to related thread

...he can't help but draw the consequences when thinking philosophically. — Moliere

Okay, but would Hume himself say that this makes the drawing of the consequence justified? I don't think he would.

So suppose we ask, "Are we justified in claiming that the offspring of two tigers will be a tiger" (which is asking whether we have true grounds for such a claim)? I think the Humean answer is, "No." And I don't think emotions or habit or anything else like that is going to come to our aid, even if Hume might have thought so.

If this were not so then one could answer Hume's challenge to induction by simply saying, "Oh, but our emotions and our habits provide legitimate grounds for the inductive claim."

The skepticism doesn't undermine knowledge as much as note how human beings' rationality is embedded with their emotions. — Moliere

...So I don't think this goes anywhere. If Hume indeed held it, then it is merely another problem with his thought. For instance, if our inductive propensities are not grounded in our rationality, but instead in our emotions, then in order to say that the inductive propensities are reliable we would have to say that our emotions are "reliable" in some sense. I don't see that going anywhere within Humean thought.

Else, what is the idea here? Is it that Hume would say, "Oh we don't know that the offspring of two tigers is a tiger via our reason, but we do know it via our emotions"?

The point here is that if Hume's argument is sound, then it counts against Aristotle (and everyone else, too). So do you think it is sound or not?

Aristotle is at the very least saying that someone who achieves familiarity with tigers will be able to identify tigers, and they will have at least a partial understanding of tigers. They will likely know, for example, that the offspring of two tigers is a tiger. There is nothing in Aristotle about "mathematical induction," as if it were some kind of formal inductive proof. The article I pointed you to is all about Aristotle's notion of experience and what is contained therein.

But again, this is the central question: Do you hold that Hume's argument is sound, or not? If you don't then you can't appeal to it. If you do then all of my unanswered questions loom. You can't maintain your praxis in which it is simultaneously sound and unsound.

I have noted that we could just not know. — Moliere

But that's not what you've done in this thread. You haven't claimed that we don't know whether the offspring of two tigers will be a tiger.

Regardless knowledge does indeed begin with listening to others. Without the ability to hear a teacher, say in an academy or some other setting that's not controversial, one doesn't obtain knowledge. — Moliere

It does, but not to just anyone, but to those who know.

We don't go to the degree of questioning whether the induction is a logically valid construct for our inference -- in our everyday life the way we determine what is real is through that interactive process with one another. — Moliere

I would suggest re-reading this post more seriously. "I know it because someone told me," is not a response to Hume. And if you think there is some schizophrenic divide between philosophy and life, then I think you need a new philosophy.

I don't think the process of knowledge generation is constrained by logical validity — Moliere

Then why the hell have you been arguing for page after page that Aristotle lacks knowledge because he lacks validity? Hint: it's because you've been saying things that you know are not true. For instance, you've been saying that your theoretical objections refute knowledge of species or else knowledge via induction, and yet now it seems that you don't actually believe that theoretical objections are sufficient for such refutations.

In any case, your whole idea that induction is an inference that is supposed to be valid is a strawman. Valid inferences are deductive. Induction is not formal in that way, and has never been said to be. This is related to the incoherence of your whole notion of induction:

The problem with your construal is that it isn't induction at all. It is not an inference at all, but a tautology. "I have seen three swans and they all have wings; therefore three swans have wings." Or, "I have seen every swan that currently exists, and they all have wings; therefore every currently-existing swan has wings." No induction is occurring here, much less any inference at all. If you go from "all tigers" to "all tigers" then you haven't made a move at all, and you have certainly not moved to a "more encompassing category." — Leontiskos

I wonder. Consider Newtonian mechanics, as employed in space flight. It's good enough to get the job done. But it's no special relativity! Isn't sometimes a rule of thumb - or a lower resolution argument sufficient to get us from a to b? — karl stone

If someone understands Newtonian mechanics as accurate within a (comparatively large) margin of error, and they wield the theory according to that understanding, then they have done nothing wrong. It only becomes a problem when they erect a double standard by wielding the theory against others in a different way than they understand it themselves. So for example, if they wield it against others as if it has a small margin of error, and they wield it against their own thought as it if has a large margin of error, then they are involved in the rational error I am highlighting.

We can just say "Rule 1 of this discussion: We know things" — Moliere

You can say that, but then you have to accept 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Upon thinking that we can see that [...] though there's the philosophical puzzle of the problem of induction we still know stuff. — Moliere

You can't do that without accepting 3. Your error is 5. You think the "problem of induction" is a problem for Aristotle, but not for your lackadaisical positions (like, "I've been told, therefore I know"). That's nuts. If Hume's argument doesn't count against you, then obviously it doesn't count against Aristotle or anyone else. Let's be done with these double standards.