What's the problem with 1st and 2nd person assertions? — frank

Compare
1) The cat is on the mat.
2) I think that my cat is on the mat.

Would you agree that the two statements assert different things? If so, the problem is how to understand the context of 'The cat is on the mat', and its truth conditions, in some alleged independence of anyone's thought (or statement).

In a court room, the disposition of the defendant may depend on what a witness says, so we're very confident.
— frank

This sounds interesting but I don't quite follow. What is it we're confident about?
— J

That the content of an assertion is knowable in principle. I thought you were leaning toward skepticism about determining what a speaker means. — frank

OK, I see. No, my puzzlement is about how to understand what "assertion" refers to, not so much a skepticism about "meaning" in general.

So my answer to this question:

But is this confidence based on observation? On reason? Or is it apriori? How would you answer that? — frank

would be, "Some combination of observation and reason. Not a priori. Perhaps especially not in a courtroom, where a hermeneutics of suspicion is appropriate."

It's this idea that every assertion X(p) has to be a judgment. If I assert, in this special sense, "The cat is on the mat," I'm understood also to be asserting, "I judge that the cat is on the mat."
— J

Have you said more here than that to assert "the cat is on the mat" is to assert that "the cat is on the mat" is true? Not seeing it. — Banno

I'm trying to bring in the 1st person judgment. We can stipulate that we will use "assert" so as to mean that "The cat is on the mat" and "It is true that the cat is on the mat" assert the same thing. Indeed, this is very often how we use "assert." But does this get us to "I judge that the cat is on the mat" or "I judge that it is true that the cat is on the mat"? Are these formulations also meant to say the same thing? How?

But the meaning of an assertion is often, if not always, determined to a greater or lesser extent by the context. For example, whether "the cat" refers to Felix or Tiger or... is determined by the context. So is the reference of "the mat". Then what does the unity independent of the context of assertion amount to? — Ludwig V

Yes. I was using "we want to imagine" with a skeptical accent. Can we really imagine it? How much of formal logical structure depends on this imagining?

The implication is that every time I assert P, I am also asserting every logical consequence of P. I don't think that works at all. — Ludwig V

This is another way of showing the issue. In one sense of "assertion" -- the "contextless" one -- any statement asserted as true would carry with it all the logical consequences. But if "assertion" is understood as a perspectival, 1st-person activity, then no, just as you say.

At the same time, because you asserted it and I asserted it, there are clearly two assertions. It just depends on what criteria of identity you choose to apply. — Ludwig V

And perhaps a good way to talk about that is to distinguish between assertion and utterance. You and I have made two utterances of a single assertion, not two assertions. More in line with Fregean "thoughts".

That's to stipulate that we are playing by Frege's rules, keeping "the cat is on the mat" constant in order to look at "it is true that..." and "it is possible that...". We might alternately stipulate Wittgenstein's approach from PI, and look to the use of "the cat is on the mat" - a hedged assertion, or an expression of hope or fear, or a counter to someone's denial.

. . . .

It's just not the case that one and only one of these ways of talking must be the correct one in all circumstances. — Banno

Yes, good. My question was closer to Witt than Frege. As you've shown me, 1st-person assertion is a bit of an issue for Fregean logic. I was wondering how two individuals might separately use an assertion about the cat -- or the blanket.

They also want to say, it would seem, that there's no logical space between "You are cold" and "I judge you to be cold."
— J
There's clearly a logical space between the two. If the first is true, the second may be true or false. — Ludwig V

No, sorry if I wasn't clear. The issue is not that "You are cold" could be true, independent of whether I judge it to be the case -- I think that's the example you're describing. Rather, the issue is that if I assert "You are cold," I must also be asserting, "I judge that you are cold."

It's this idea that every assertion X(p) has to be a judgment. If I assert, in this special sense, "The cat is on the mat," I'm understood also to be asserting, "I judge that the cat is on the mat."

I agree with that, but I can logically separate him from the proposition he's asserting. — frank

Yes, hence the rather mysterious nature of a proposition. We want to imagine a proposition as independent of a context of assertion. That's why 1st- and 2nd-person assertions give so much trouble -- they can't have their indexicals paraphrased away (on some accounts).

In a court room, the disposition of the defendant may depend on what a witness says, so we're very confident. — frank

This sounds interesting but I don't quite follow. What is it we're confident about?

He might write ""The speaker holds true the sentence 'The cat is on the mat.'" This makes clear that the speaker is doing something with a sentence. — Banno

I feel a little foolish, but . . . does this construal allow for us also to say things like "The speaker suggests that 'The cat is on the mat' is likely to be true"? This, to me, isn't simply the same as saying "The speaker holds possible the sentence 'The cat is on the mat'." It's not just that the speaker is pointing out a possibility; they're also opining on a likelihood. I'm trying to work this back around to the ways we actually say things, which are so often in various grades of assertivity and certainty. The more I think about this, the more I appreciate the assertion-stroke!

Can someone relate it back to the theme? — Banno

We've gone off Williamson, sorry.

I judge someone to be cold and hand them a blanket, then I am asserting that they are cold; I cannot remove myself from my assertion, — sime

I agree, but if I also hand the guy a blanket, I'm making the same assertion you are: that he's cold.

My act of asserting can't be your act of asserting, but the proposition we're asserting is the same. — frank

This is the example I raised the assertion problem about.

Let's allow that handing someone a blanket counts as some kind of assertion; perhaps phrased as "You look cold to me."

But sime wants their blanket-assertion to mean something different: "I judge you to be cold." They also want to say, it would seem, that there's no logical space between "You are cold" and "I judge you to be cold."

Now if you also hand the guy a blanket, we really don't know what you're asserting. Is it more like the general version I was suggesting?: "You look cold to me." Or might you be claiming something stronger, like sime?: "You are cold" or "I judge you to be cold." Or some third thing, perhaps, "If I were you, I'd be feeling cold"? (Let's not even bother with examples like "I thought you might like to have a look at this blanket," or its infinite cousins. We'll assume both of you can read the (cold) room!)

Hence my question: Are you two really asserting the same proposition? You may be. But the concept of assertion is just too elastic for us to know for certain.

That's all the question amounted to. Nothing tricky, I hope, I just wondered whether, in this case, you saw some way in which an assertion is automatically pegged to the same thing both are "saying".

Are you pointing to the ambiguity that may be there with communication, especially nonverbal? — frank

Sort of. I'm pointing not simply to ambiguity about communication, but ambiguity about how we understand assertion. As you say, many philosophers want to nail this down, but doubts have been raised, I think rightly. We could have you and sime speak very precisely to the cold guy and there would still be issues about 1st-person assertions.

I don't think It's true that and it's possible that have the same meaning. — frank

Right. Can they both frame assertions? I would say so. Then is "the proposition we're asserting," in the blanket example, really the same? How would we state that proposition?

That's an especially interesting category [preference for the new] because I can see how it ties into the ideas of thinkers, too. — Moliere

And virtually the entire history of 20th century arts in the West! As I'm sure you know, the question of novelty or originality as an aesthetic value has been championed and then derided, back and forth. The debate in turn centers on whether self-expression is a key element of art; if so, then one ought to strive at least for a degree of originality. One wants to "sound like myself," and not some predecessor, however influential.

How far does this parallel philosophy? Great question. (My hesitant answer: Not very far. But that's my taste again.)

My act of asserting can't be your act of asserting, but the proposition we're asserting is the same. No ontological implications there, it's just how we understand assertions. — frank

Digging a little more deeply into that: Does this understanding of assertion commit you to including both "it is true that . . ." and "it seems quite possible that . . ." as assertions? If so, do they assert the same thing?

Why are you more drawn to particular philosophers, schools, styles, or problems?
They tend to focus on aporia which align with my own speculations or reflectively throw me into question. — 180 Proof

Yes, the theme of being drawn to inquiry or puzzlement as an aesthetic choice in phil. I resonate with that, especially if "aesthetic" is broad enough to include a desire to shape my own life through inquiry.

What if the aesthetic justifications we offer are such as they are on account of our culturally/ historically conditioned intuitions and preferences? — Janus

Yes. They're hardly ever otherwise. The OP question prompts us to ask, So what about that? Is this a mark against using our (conditioned) aesthetic criteria? Not universal enough? The discussion around that question might look very different from one that's similarly phrased, but concerns rational justifications that are called into doubt as culturally or historically relative. Here we're used to seeing an often acrimonious debate about whether "historical rational standards" is even coherent.

Got it, thanks.

But it is important to appreciate that it will never be the exact same sense, because the form of life or hinge making Moore’s assertion intelligible in the way that he means it is slowly morphing over time , but much more slowly than the empirical assertions and language games that it authorizes — Joshs

This is an interesting point, but I missed what follows from it. You go on to show how the duck-rabbit "game" is embedded in a host of other background conditions. And you draw attention to Witt's point that we don't apply a rule when we play this game. All fine, but what were you meaning to say about the slow changes that occur as a form of life "morphs along"? That the duck-rabbit game may eventually no longer be playable?

The dependency seems rather indirect — Pierre-Normand

I'm not completely convinced it's a dependency relation, but something in the neighborhood for sure, and I could be persuaded. Other than that, both you and @Leontiskos are drawing the right conclusion from Darwinism, seems to me. Surely Darwin would agree?

Thinking more about this, I guess everything I’ve said boils down to me being interested in what I find satisfying, not necessarily what I find beautiful. Is that an aesthetic judgment? — T Clark

Good question. Pretty sure the OP wants to encourage an expanded use of "aesthetics," so I'd say yes. And it's interesting again because to really reflect on your question about "satisfying," we have to step away from received or common meanings, and ask what it means for me to be satisfied by an idea or its presentation. Is it like "feeling good"? Not exactly . . .

It’s the ideas that matter. — T Clark

What I'm asking is if there's a reason you're attracted to this or that idea/author — Moliere

For some reason I keep reflecting back on this.

Partially it's because the concept of something "mattering" is nice and broad, and invites real reflection. It allows for the OP's questions about aesthetics to be introduced. It's also a reminder that what matters to me is probably not much constrained by "what ought to matter" -- if there is such a thing.

But I'm also thinking about an idea mattering. I take T Clark to mean, more or less, that they'll pursue a philosopher depending on whether the ideas are in some way intriguing or important. I certainly do the same. And yet . . . the ideas in almost any work of philosophy interest me, when viewed from the correct angle. If it's good philosophy, it's going to intrigue me, and most of my candidates for reading are good philosophers. So why this one rather than that one? Rorty used to say that he just didn't have an itch where some philosophers wanted to scratch. And vice versa, I suppose.

How this fits into an aesthetic appreciation, I'm not sure, but "an idea that matters to me" seems to be square in the middle of why I'll read the next book I'll read. Oh and I guess I should add: The more I'm familiar with some particular conversation around an issue, the more I'm likely to feel that the next contribution to that conversation will contain "ideas that matter."

But then he faces another challenge, to explain how come those truths that he doubted a little while ago are now seen as are irresistible. — Ludwig V

That challenge, he can handle, in the same way he restores certainty to all the items formerly doubted. More troubling is the "appeal to inattention," a curious defense. Does D have to say that he should not have doubted the "eternal truths"? Or that he should not have been inattentive to them? Does this amount to the same thing, if they're irresistible?

Is the duck-rabbit’s not being a lion is simply true, is it simply true in the same way as Moore’s declaration that ‘this is a hand’?
— @Joshs
I think the duck-rabbit's not being a lion is simply true. — Ludwig V

May I rephrase? Neither of you is debating some point of identity. The claim boils down to, "When I look at the duck-rabbit, it is not possible for me to see a lion." That, at any rate, would be the first-personal version. Should we expand it?: "It is not possible for anyone to see a lion." This all seems to depend on what sense of "possibility" you want to invoke. I guess we should ask Joshs, "Do you mean that we should acknowledge that someone, somewhere, could be taught to see a lion in the duck-rabbit?" If that's the idea, I agree; it is not strictly impossible. But I agree with Ludwig that this has little to do with metaphysics, unless the sort of "Continental-style" use of the word that Josh mentions is needed in order to imagine these uncanny lion-seers. That is, perhaps you need a whole different "inheritance from a community," not just an odd fact about what can be seen in the duck-rabbit.

What about "this is a/my hand"? (If we say "my," we arguably up the certainty factor.) There are two possible rephrasings here, I think: "1) It is not possible for me to not see this as my hand" and "2) It is not possible that this is not my hand." I think Ludwig, and maybe Moore, mean the first; my hand, when seen, has the property of self-evidence. Again, though, is it possible to imagine a tribe or culture in which "being a hand" was not an important thing to notice? In such a case, I suppose I could see my hand but not be sure that "this is a hand," because I don't know the concept.

As for the 2nd rephrasing, we enter semantical issues. Could what I believe is "my hand" be something else? Depends on what we want "my hand" to mean. If I include in "my hand" the idea of "flesh and blood part of my body, which is also flesh and blood, and to which I am related in the ways I believe I am," then sure, doubt is possible. Brains in vats, Matrix, et al. But if we simply mean (as Descartes does, when speaking about "thought" or "doubt") "this apparent experience of an object that I am having," then it's hard to see how this could be doubted by some other metaphysic or belief system. (allowing "object" as a neutral noun, for lack of a better one)

So, is there a difference between "not being able to see the lion" and "not being able to not-see my hand"? Does either one equal "simply true"? I'll keep mum.

Natural selection isn't a mechanism that renders teleological explanations otiose. It is rather a general mechanism that explains how the development of teleologically structured organisms is enabled by random mutations and selective pressures. — Pierre-Normand

I would underline this as the key point in the discussion: If it's true, which I think it is, then it allows us to say that "birds gather twigs in order to build a nest" is explanatory. The role of natural selection arises at a different level of description, having to do with how such bird-intentions wind up being chosen and facilitated. (And of course we mustn't read this as saying that a bird "knows what it's doing" under the same description we would use.)

Very interesting discussion, thanks.

Terrific questions, thank you. Also terrifying!

Just for a place to start: Yes, I have a sense of my own taste in philosophy, and I've noticed that it can change over the years.

Some things stay consistent, though. I appreciate good writing and have trouble with what I consider turgid prose, though this is not a very profound reason for choosing Philosopher X over Y. I also want the philosophy I read and practice to help me understand who I am. What that means continues to be an open question for me, but it unquestionably involves what you're calling aesthetics.

One more observation: I enjoy the philosophical activity of questioning, of finding good questions and understanding why they provoke me. I'm much less interested than I used to be in the possibility that true-or-false philosophical answers will turn up -- or perhaps I should say, T-or-F answers to good questions.

There's a ton more to say but I want to read what some others will respond.

what it is that explains that whatever physical state B the system happens to be caused to instantiate would be such as to subsequently lead to a state C that instantiates the relevant goal is the specific functional organization of the system — Pierre-Normand

Yes, very good. The indeterminacy doesn't carry over to the functional level, so to speak, where all As and Bs and Cs have the same function relative to that system.

I don't recall any commentary that takes on board his inclusion of mathematical truths in his methodical doubt.
Perhaps J could check Williams' book and see what he says? — Ludwig V

I think I have Williams' answer here.

He says that Descartes used the term "eternal truths" for what we might call the truths of mathematics, logic, or analyticity. Such truths have the characteristic of "irresistibility" -- once understood, they are seen as necessarily true. When Descartes begins his journey back from doubt, he finds that these eternal (analytic) truths are indeed clearly and distinctly seen to be true. So, Williams asks, how did Descartes overlook this fact previously? How was he able to apply methodical doubt to a series of propositions he now finds irresistible? I think this was your question as well.

Williams writes:

The Doubt got as far as it did only by a measure of inattention. Descartes suspended in the Doubt, managed not to believe, a number of propositions which he now acknowledges to be irresistible; so he cannot have been, at the time of doubting them, properly thinking of them. Descartes accepts this [Williams provides several references]. This gives us another sense in which the Doubt is a 'fiction', besides the now familiar point that it is the procedure of a Pure Enquirer: it also has to proceed by not totally attending, in some cases, to what it is doubting. So a proposition can be really irresistible, and yet there be times at which I can doubt it, namely if I do not think clearly enough about it. — Williams, 186-7

Hmm. What to make of this? It sounds like a flaw in the process of methodical doubt, though Williams doesn't go that far. Also, while he provides the references for Descartes' agreement to this construal, he doesn't quote from them. I think I will chase them down and find out what Descartes actually said. Presumably D himself didn't think this was a flaw, and I'd like to know why.

To be continued.

Extremely interesting reply, thank you.

Continentals, by contrast, have a zest for beginning with every conceivable question that can be asked about every conceivable aspect of the world — Joshs

This is what I would have called genetic priority, a statement about method, and it's very true. The ordering of ideas in Anglophone phil is usually pretty clear, and not every idea -- especially the perceived foundational ideas -- is questioned or even mentioned. Whereas with much Continental phil, there is this sense that what comes first, methodologically, really matters, and has been carefully examined. So again, I'm raising a brow at calling this "ontological priority" but so what, the insight is important under any name.

The result is that not a single word of the language can be simply taken for granted by way of a conventionalized meaning, and reading a work requires learning an entirely new vocabulary — Joshs

I hope we agree that the bolded phrases are exaggerated -- this is the kind of hyperbole that can be off-putting. I'm fine with saying that most key terms can't be taken for granted, and in reading this kind of phil we have to resist our impatience, our desire to settle for a familiar meaning. Are you OK with that?

the differences between writers like Heidegger and Deleuze on the one hand and writers like Williamson are more than just stylistic. They are also substantive. — Joshs

Definitely. I've been interested in the comments on this thread which focus on aesthetics, but I don't think that's whole story, and maybe not even the most important part, though it makes me eager to continue that discussion.

When one stumbles upon what one believes is an original way of looking at the world, there are many styles of expression one can adopt to convey these fresh insights. — Joshs

I like this way of putting it because it sidesteps the tendency you noted, of throwing shade on ways of doing phil that are either "too conventional" or "too obscure," depending on one's preferences. Questions will come up about the relative value of originality, and whether the insights are in fact insightful, but that ought to be considered within the discourse, not prejudged.

I am not well-read in Descartes, but I have the impression that he is looking for substantive or metaphysical proofs of existence, not merely stipulative semantic ones. — Janus

I agree. So the question is whether the "I" in "I think" can survive the change to "there is thinking going on," not semantically, but in terms of a demonstration of some actual entity called "the self" or "I". As I mentioned, Williams goes into a lot of detail on this and I don't have it all under my belt, but his main point boils down to claiming that "thinking is going on" can't be given content without some indexical, and that it would be perverse not to accept the most likely candidate, namely "I". He acknowledges that this doesn't provide much knowledge about the self -- but so does Descartes. In fact, Williams says:

The question whether there could be a replacement which fell short of 'A thinks' [that is, something impersonal we could use to replace 'cogito'] is not one that I shall pursue further. The point is that some concrete relativization [indexical] is needed, and even if it could fall short of requiring a subject who has the thoughts, it has to exist in the form of something outside pure thought itself. — Williams, 100

So that's possibly equivocal. I read him as mainly wanting to defeat the idea of an "impersonal formulation," not necessarily concluding that the Cartesian "I" is our only alternative.

Questions of interpretation don't have closure in the way that questions of information or even rationality sometimes do. — Ludwig V

Something like this would be part of my reply to @Janus as well. But as both of you have noted, we can construe "metaphysics" in a number of ways, any one of which will be more or less conducive to the "closure" question. So perhaps not a fruitful line of inquiry.

I don't know enough to argue about the finer points of 17th century French or Latin usage in 17th century France. Does he back his claim up? — Ludwig V

He quotes this, from the Principles:

"All forms of consciousness (modi cogitandi) that we experience can be brought down to two general kinds: one is cognition (perceptio), or the operation of the intellect; the other is volition, the operation of the will. Sensation, imagination, and pure intellection are just various forms of cognition; desire, aversion, assertion, denial, doubt, are various forms of volition."

and concludes that

For Descartes, a cogitatio or a pensee is any sort of conscious state or activity whatsoever; it can as well be a sensation (at least in its purely psychological aspect) or an act of will, as a judgment or a belief or intellectual questioning. — Williams, 78

To give the most charitable hearing to Descartes' project, I think we ought to agree that this is what he meant. Consider a memory -- say, of the Brooklyn Bridge. When it comes to mind, do we say that I have "thought" the Brooklyn Bridge? Not really; in English, that's awkward. But such an example would surely serve for Descartes' point -- if I can have such an experience, I must exist. Whether we call it an English "thought" or a French "pensee" or simply a mental event doesn't really affect the point.

When you say “actual questions of right and wrong” are you thinking of judgements justified by rational thought and violating them would be irrational? — Mark S

Good question. No, I wasn't wanting to bring rationality into it at this point. The comparison I'm inviting between "actual" and "descriptive" would be this: An actual question of right and wrong would not reduce to its description. And I admit that "actual" is probably tendentious; perhaps I should have said "traditional." In other words, traditional moral talk asks whether X is "really" good or "really" right. It doesn't explain those terms by describing them in some other terms. Whereas descriptive moral talk does just that. It proposes that the only "real" thing going on here is an evolutionary strategy that helps humans survive. X may be characterized in those terms, and it may be pointed out that X is therefore also, traditionally, considered a "moral" behavior, but "moral" is always in quotes, because it is a description, not a conceptual analysis.

I can add that Joe is morally “wrong” to violate what is inherently moral in our universe . . . However, I cannot say that his choice is irrational. — Mark S

Again, I agree about the rationality question, and I wouldn't confront Joe on those terms. True, if we're going to say anything to him, we'd probably propose some reasons or arguments why he should prefer the inherently moral in our universe. But that can be done without claiming he's irrational to disagree. My question is, Are there any such arguments, given your thesis? It sounds like you agree that there are not.

Could Joe’s rationality or irrationality when he acts’ immorally’ be a distinguishing characteristic (along with moral ‘means’ vs moral ‘ends”) between the two kinds of ‘morality’ under consideration: Cooperation Morality and traditional moral philosophy’s moral systems? — Mark S

I don't think so, as above.

When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation." — J

If I understand your OP question, this is a good result, or at least good enough. For my part, I think it leaves a lot of unanswered questions about what ethical choice is, largely because I'm a semi-demi-Kantian about ethics and I don't think we can leave anyone out -- it has to be universalizable. So if we can't earn Ornery Joe's assent, we haven't set the problem up correctly.

A whole other thread!

@Joshs

This is how I (mis?)understand Deleuze.

↪J
Perhaps this helps. — GrahamJ

Yes, thanks, and it's close to the sort of paraphrase I would have offered. The problem for me -- in my language, that is -- is that none of this is about anything that could be called "ontological priority." If we said "conceptual priority" instead, what would be lost? What would be gained is that we're now using a much more familiar idea, both within analytic phil and in educated non-specialist discourse. That doesn't automatically make it the best way to go, of course -- especially given the concerns raised earlier about "familiarity" -- and that's why I'm asking what "ontological priority" may be contributing that "conceptual priority" does not.

So, the doubter can doubt everything, but the act of doubting reveals his own existence. — Ludwig V

Just a quick response for now: Yes, this is what Descartes says too, and Williams tells us that both "je pense" and "cogito" were much broader than the English "I think". Descartes would have meant something closer to "I have mental experiences" or "I am conscious". The cogito does not imply a consciously formed thought, as we might say in English, "I thought of that" or "I had that thought." And this becomes important in understanding exactly what Descartes believes we can infer from the cogito: You don't have to form the thought "I think" in order to be thinking, on his usage. Self-awareness is not part of existence.

Don’t get your knickers in a twist . I’m not in philosophy to insist on do-or-die, right or wrong ( Heidegger spent his career deconstructing the concept of truth as correctness). — Joshs

Knickers untwisted! :razz: But the binaries "essential-or-meaningless, succeed-or-fail" are from the Heidegger quotes, and if he doesn't believe he's correct about what he says, he's doing a very good imitation.

‘summarize the ideas of a philosophical school in a way that is reasonably consonant with the community of scholars who inhabit it or you haven’t understood’. Before we can get to the agree or disagree part, we have to get past this key first step. — Joshs

Yes. And so often the step is skipped. It raises a huge question -- bigger than can fit in this thread, probably -- about whether the conditions for understanding are the same as the conditions for verification. But in a case like this, since my understanding of Heidegger on this subject is shaky at best, I have no opinion on whether he's saying something insightful.

Difference must be understood as ontologically prior to identity. — Joshs

OK, I'd like to understand this. Do you believe it's possible to offer a explication that launches from common English uses of the key words (difference, understand, ontological, identity), or would an explication necessarily bring in further technical terms?

I'm reminded of how one of my good friends, who's a physicist, talks to me about his work. At a certain point, inevitably, he'll say something like, "Well, you'd need the math now," and we both know I don't have it. But . . . before reaching that point, he's able to use my language -- non-technical but educated English -- to explain a great deal. He believes that, as a specialist, he has an obligation to do this, as best he's able, which I appreciate very much, since I learn a lot. I will never completely understand the topics he talks about, and as for having an opinion about whether he's "right" about some thesis he puts forward . . . that would be ludicrous. But there is absolutely some translation going on.

So I guess that's my question to you. Can something like "Difference must be understood as ontologically prior to identity" be translated into my language? In my language, neither difference nor identity have anything like ontological priority, because they aren't entities. You see what I mean . . . I can think of some possible paraphrases that do make sense in my language, but I'm afraid they would miss Heidegger's point.

I thought I was clear in my OP that the subject was the usefulness of understanding the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense (what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’) and NOT what we imperatively ought to do. — Mark S

You were. Thanks for pointing me back to it. You're doing a careful job of trying to find a way to separate out the idea of a "moral fact" as a universal fact about humans, from the idea of a "moral fact" as a value about what is right and wrong. If I'm right that this is your program, I don't think it quite succeeds.

You argue that "moral sense" equates to "what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’." I think you mean that it follows that therefore, if anyone refers to their moral sense, they are referring not to actual questions of right and wrong as usually discussed in ethics, but rather to the built-in behaviors that our species is endowed with, both biologically and culturally. OK, fair enough.

So when we return to the question of individual behavior, you rightly ask why one should choose to adopt these built-in cooperation strategies -- since, however hardwired they may be, we know we can act against them

You ought do so if you prefer following Morality as Cooperation’s prescription for moral ‘means’. And "prefer" would usually be because you prefer the consequences as an instrumental choice. — Mark S

But now we're right back in the middle of ethics as usually discussed. Here are the good reasons for following a particular maxim, and here's Ornery Joe saying, "Well, I don't prefer the consequences." Is there something further that Morality as Cooperation can say to Joe? Is he "wrong"? I don't see how he can be. He sees the universal "moral fact" about cooperation and claims he doesn't give a toss.

So . . . the question I'd put to you is, Does this matter? Can we get the most out of "moral facts" and use the Cooperation thesis to point a path forward, without worrying about the likes of Joe, and the usual disputes about ethical reasons? You could, for instance, say something like, "Look, we understand how 'morality' came about -- it's a way of improving cooperation and helping cultures thrive -- and that's plenty good enough. Some people will never get it, and insist on a different kind of reason for what they call moral behavior, but that's irrelevant. We can still use the 'moral fact' of a universal cooperative strategy to help us decide many important questions about how we ought to behave. When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation."

I put a lot of words in your mouth, but is that close to your position?

But what he’s trying to say is that, as Wittgenstein would agree, to understand anything in a fundamental sense is to understand it in a new way, in a fresh context. To treat what is understood as already familiar as a derivative of a pre-existing scheme or picture is to render it meaningless, to fail to understand it in Heidegger’s primordial sense. — Joshs

Again, I'm curious what this amounts to without the hyperbole. To understand anything in a fundamental sense is to understand it in a new way? Why? Couldn't the old way have been fundamental too?

And "to render it meaningless"? Why so drastic? Why not just "to construe it in a less interesting way than the writer intended"? And I'm sorry, but what the heck is a "primordial sense"?

You see where I'm coming from (hopefully with both our senses of humor intact :smile: ). I would very much like to see Heideggerians and others who followed his path stop treating all these matters as if they were do-or-die, right-or-wrong, essential-or-meaningless, succeed-or-fail, agree-or-you-haven't-understood, etc., etc., and aim for more modesty and, dare I say, humility. We're all in this conversation together.

What's curious is this "Let A = ..." business.

"Let A = ..." is a sort of snapshot of the translation process. — Srap Tasmaner

Very good. Reminiscent of Rodl's "naive" questions about what 'p' is supposed to represent.

The labeling is not all that important to me, but I don't think it's helpful to ignore the difference between what is clearly technical work and what isn't. Call it all "philosophy" if you want, but you'll still need some terminology for that obvious distinction. — Srap Tasmaner

Hear, hear. This is what is important: There is an obvious distinction, and we can probably find some consensus on terminology that eschews the "phil/not phil" binary. I've grown used to thinking of what you're calling technical work as simply "semantical or logic-derived analytic phil." A bit cumbersome, maybe, but as you say, we all more or less know what we're talking about.

I think we should also try to avoid a value judgment about what is better or worse philosophy -- style-wise, that is, not in terms of interest or rigor or clarity.

There is, for example, no actual philosophical work by anyone anywhere in this thread. At least on this view. Strictly speaking. — Srap Tasmaner

I know what you mean, and the mathematical analogy makes clear what "actual philosophical work" might look like, on this view. But I think -- and don't you? -- that this view is wrong. Two reasons: First, to hold the view, you have to dispute or ignore the overwhelming consensus; you have to deny that all the "non-mathematical" philosophers are also doing philosophy.

Second, this view is ameliorative. It proposes a way that philosophy should be understood and practiced, and suggests that we come up with a different word for what the others are doing. This seems unnecessarily radical. As was pointed out elsewhere in this thread, we have the same situation involving the post-structuralists or continentals, to speak loosely. I don't think we should encourage wrangles between overarching schools of thought and practice about who is "really" doing philosophy. I'm happy to read the Williamson paper as a defense of more rigor and care within analytic phil. I don't need to be persuaded additionally that this is the only way of being philosophical.

There is a raft of issues about the cogito. — Ludwig V

Oh, indeed. Descartes himself dealt with a number of objections from people who pointed out that the "I" in "I think" could use a lot more specification. And there is the so-called "impersonal cogito," which considers whether it should more properly be phrased as "there is thinking going on" rather than "I think". (Williams analyzes this one at some length and believes it is an incoherent objection.)

I meant to say that it has been amply demonstrated that metaphysical certainty in the traditional "absolutist" sense is impossible to attain. Would you not agree that Descartes was attempting to discover what he (and by extension, we) could be certain of vis à vis what necessarily exists? — Janus

Yes, I would (and of course we understand that "necessarily exists" doesn't mean "must exist". It means, given the fact of thinking, then necessarily I must exist.) And given the continuing lively debate about Descartes' project, and much else in metaphysics, I say again that "amply demonstrated" and "impossible" are too strong. I'm agnostic, leaning toward skeptic, about metaphysical certainty, but the debate is hardly over.

As I think Ludwig is suggesting my point was that any discourse which purported to deny the LNC must necessarily be involved in an incoherent performative contradiction because to do so would undermine discourse itself. — Janus

Yes, with a few qualifications about the type of discourse. I appreciate the reminder from Ludwig that logical truths and their role in reasoning was a different animal, back in Descartes' time. It is part of Descartes' interesting "flavor" that his approach is so subjective, so first-personal, attempting to find certainty in experience rather than what we would call analyticity.

the space of causes and the space of reasons. The latter cannot be understood (parsimoniously at least) solely in terms of causes. — Janus

I agree. In the current context, though, Ludwig probably meant "empirical" to cover both. Oh yes, I now see he agrees with Sellars. But the problem being raised is whether:

The price of absolutely certainty is paralysis in the empirical world.

which would remain a problem however you choose to construe "empirical." My view is that there's no reason to restrict one's actions to what can be based on certainty. It's a good question whether Descartes would have viewed lack of certainty as a reason for inaction. Maybe it's somewhere in his writings.

Perhaps J could check Williams' book and see what he says? (about mathematical truths) — Ludwig V

I will. The book is so good that I'm reading it slowly, lots of notes, and have only gotten to God! Williams is quite hard on D here, as are most philosophers I've read.

Williamson finishes by explicitly acknowledging that his own essay does not meet the criteria it advocates.

He couldn't, becasue the essay is not an argument as such, so much as an aesthetic critique. He is showing us again what is beautiful in philosophy, and what isn't. — Banno

This is possibly the most interesting part of the paper, for me. We could take W's remark to mean two things:

1) I have not lived up to the highest possible standards of rigor here, though I have tried.

2) The nature of what I am saying in this paper contradicts, or at least blurs, the whole idea that the only good philosophy is "rigorous" philosophy of the sort it advocates.

I rather take him to be saying the former. But I think he ought to say the latter, perhaps along the lines that you paraphrase.

Despite all the talk of rigour, logic, clarity, and convergence, Williamson’s piece is fundamentally rhetorical: — Banno

If "rhetorical" is taken as the alternative to "argumentative," then yes. But rhetoric often gets rejected as not philosophy at all -- and sometimes for good reason. W's paper is very clearly philosophy. But from its very title, "Must Do Better," it is meant to be ameliorative. A certain course is being recommended, not merely analyzed. What sort of philosophy is that?

What is philosophy for?

That's the question that will decide what you think philosophy is, and how you will do philosophy. — Banno

Or we can pose a question Witt might pose: Is this language on holiday? in this sense: We seem to be asking for a definition, or at least a useful description, of an activity that, among other things, constantly asks the question "What is philosophy?" Does a question about itself still mean anything?

I think it does, and believe strongly in the self-reflexive character of philosophy, but I'm not sure how to fit that into a question about what philosophy is, or is for. Not saying it can't be done, I'm just uncertain how to proceed.

I have no idea what the third means. — T Clark

Yes, and it's the third one that connects with a "pure" good will that does not consider ends to be reasons for acting.

J, thanks for your careful response. — Mark S

And thanks for yours.

I definitely want to reply in depth to your points -- you're right, for one thing, that I'd forgotten the thrust of your OP -- but will shortly be offline probably till "my" tomorrow. (it's 8:45 am EDT, USA, now, where I live). So, since I don't want to do a hasty job .. . till then.

You have to appreciate these remarks in the context of Heidegger’s critique of technology. When he says that the “immediate effectiveness must remain foreign to all essential thinking, because such thinking, in its truth, must be prevented from becoming “familiar” and “understandable” to contemporaries”” , he equates the the familiar and immediately effective with the technologizing instrumentalism of empirical science as well as the Cartesian metaphysics that grounds it.Philosophy cannot be the mere putting into practice of a pre-conceived plan. — Joshs

Thanks, that's helpful, and probably connects with @Janus's insight about "knowing that" and "knowing how." As long as we acknowledge that Heidegger's context in re technology is not the only one from which terms like "essential thinking" can be evaluated, I'm fine with it. Well, that's not quite true . . . in general, I wish Heidegger and other continentals could be a little less pompous in their language. But as I don't read German and would to have struggle through difficult French, I don't really know their language, so perhaps that's unfair. Suffice to say, it doesn't translate well.

I think Heidegger is referring to his distinction between between vorhanden "present at hand" knowledge and zuhanden "ready to hand" wisdom. I see that distinction as being basically similar to the distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how". — Janus

The connection seems right to me. I'm willing to believe that Heidegger at least had this partially in mind, especially given what @Joshs says above, about the tension between the two types of "rationalization" that so many philosophers were concerned with at that time. As Josh writes, the fear is of a process "which turns everything into order-able standing reserve, including human beings." How do we prevent "rationality" from becoming Weberian "rationalizing," the instrumentalization of the world? What is "at hand" can be taken either way.

But I also think the Heidegger passage is more combative than that. He writes:

such thinking, in its truth, must be prevented from becoming “familiar” and “understandable” to contemporaries.

"Prevented" is very strong, especially when coupled with "in its truth." If he'd said, "in its misunderstanding" or "in its misapplication," that might be different. But H seems to want it both ways: "What I'm saying is true, but don't you dare claim that it is 'understandable.' That would be to turn it into a technology."

What I really think: This is all rhetoric of a bygone moment in philosophy. We can find plenty to think about in Being and Time without worrying about whether H was often defensive and hyperbolic.

Can you take a stab at what you think it means? — Janus

Sure will, but probably not tonight, life calls. Appreciate the insight.

They wanted desperately to be understood, tried every way they could to be understood, but also knew that fundamentally new ways of thinking are not commodities whose communication is guaranteed by use of the right words. — Joshs

Good. That makes Heidegger's hyperbole here a bit suspect, doesn't it?:

precisely this misinterpretation of all my work (e.g., as a “philosophy of existence”) is the best and most lasting protection against the premature using up of what is essential. And it must be so, since immediate effectiveness must remain foreign to all essential thinking, and because such thinking, in its truth, must be prevented from becoming “familiar” and “understandable” to contemporaries.

The bolded statements are kind of criticism-proof, aren't they? Reading them as a literary editor (which I am, partially, IRL) they also seem defensive and self-consoling in the face of lack of acceptance. Why couldn't he just say, "My stuff is hard. It'll take a while," instead of making it a hallmark of "essential thinking" or "genuine philosophy" or whatever?

But human, all too human . . . as are we all.

Yes, Nietzsche is a good response, should have thought of him myself. Except . . . do you really believe he didn't want to be understood by his contemporaries? that, indeed, if he had been, he would have felt he hadn't done worthwhile philosophy? That doesn't sound like him, except when he's in a very bad mood.

For that matter, Heidegger did not exactly shy away from praise, or conversation with peers.

immediate effectiveness must remain foreign to all essential thinking,

It's an . . . unusual claim. Does anyone know whether another philosopher besides Heidegger ever said something similar? Reminds me of Beethoven saying that his final music was "for a later age."