I take your point, and I think looking at one side of the work, there are a lot of questions on can bring to bear. There is good reason to wonder whether the analytic project as a whole was a misguided effort, despite seeming reasonable at its roots.

But, considering your point, and reading other remarks that Witt makes, I'm beginning to get the sense that, perhaps, he was critiquing that very project.

I think that Fooloso4 put it well when they pointed out:

Can we know that all objects are given? Can we know all possible states of affairs? At best we can know what states of affairs have occurred. But actual states of affairs are not the only states of affairs that are possible. If that were the case nothing new could occur.

Without making it explicit Wittgenstein has drawn a limit to human knowledge. This limit is distinct from that of what can be said and what is shown. — Fooloso4

Witt. seems to ultimately say that one cannot provide all the elementary propositions apriori; because you can never predict beforehand if you'll find yourself in a situation which needs a new sign. The world is logical, and human logic mirrors its form; we cannot say what that form is though. We cannot even think it. So, regarding epistemology we're limited to only possibilities we can think, but things could always turn out otherwise.

Concepts like "evolution" are one possible description of the world - we can arrange things in this way; but this is only one possible description, and we could always discover some new, better, description. We can, however, be certain that it will make sense, once given all the pieces; it will be logically in order.

All the point about the elementary propositions is now left in such state that all they can accomplish is, perhaps, as you've said: useful for making sure that scientific discourse is culled of unnecessary signs ...that is, they are simply a useful tool, but one cannot glean anything meaningful from them, because there could always be more. Science is meant to discover the states of affairs, first, for which the elementary propositions will follow insofar as if we understand anything it must be logical, and our language will mirror that logic when we attempt to express our ideas. We will always be able to analyze language and eliminate unnecessary signs, better displaying the logic that was always present, but this comes after the fact.

I'll just end with this quote from the work that I think is helpful insofar as its not technical, and also that it seems to express a general sentiment that Witt wanted to express for the work:

"All propositions of our colloquial language are actually, just as they are, logically completely in order. That most simple thing which we ought to give here is not a simile of truth but the complete truth itself.
(Our problems are not abstract but perhaps the most concrete that there are)" (5.5563).

We cannot abstract our problems away. We are always in a situation where we are forced to adopt the best picture we have of the world, and furnish the objects accordingly. Analysis cannot show whether you've got the right description, only whether the picture is logically in order.

Few...been out of town for a bit, and it seems I’ve missed a lot. A quick glance of the topics is interesting, and a lot to consider. I like a lot of the manners in which RussellA considers the ideas, but there are a few things here and there that I don’t think are quite right...I generally think the manner in which you’re thinking is fruitful, though. So, thank you...I'll try and work through it more.

I think Fooloso4 does a good job of raising some of the issues I have, as well as more I hadn't considered. I'll have to work through the discussion a bit.



While I firmly believe that you’re right – that in order to fully appreciate what's going on with a lot of the ideas in the Tractatus, that a familiarity with Kant is particularly helpful – I don’t agree that the analytic tradition was, in some sense, a watered down version of many of the ideas we see developed in Kant, though.

These thinkers were responding to Kant; this is why the neo-kantian movement finds its roots at this time in thinkers like Helmholtz, despite him being primarily a physicist.

Again, I really think its best to consider the discussion as part of, well, a discussion; not some philosopher or scientist screaming into a vacuum.

The question that scientists had been asking, at least, as far back as Francis Bacon was: “Can metaphysics supply us with genuine knowledge?”

That is:

“Can we know why something occurs, and not simply how it occurs?”

Hume answered: “No.”

Genuine knowledge only comes to us via the senses. We can only ever say how things happen, and never why. Therefore, we can never be certain of any of our knowledge, because despite seeing something a hundred times, it could always be the case that I am ignorant of the true inner workings of the phenomena, and in fact, it only repeats a certain pattern 100 times before evolving into some other pattern.

Kant didn’t like this. He thought we could have genuine metaphysical knowledge.

Kant answered the question: “Yes. We can know why things occur, and therefore be certain about them.”

Yes, we do gain knowledge through the senses, but this knowledge is a synthesis of empirical data that is categorized by the mind via independently existing mental structures. An internal logic, if you will, that orders and categorizes information we gain from experience. This is how we can be certain of things like “Cause and effect” and “1+1=2”.

This was awesome, but left us in a position where we could never untangle reality from what we supply. Sure, we could have certainty regarding why things occurred, but we could never know to what extent we are right regarding our picture of the world.

Hegel (I think) had a clever idea...basically, borrowing from Hume’s copy principle, he said we copy direct aspects of reality, but categorize and manipulate them with an inherent logic which we can study, isolate, and thereby know what exactly the mind supplies of experience. What remains will be reality, or the supposedly unknowable reality Kant left us with.

This was cut short, however, when studies during the tail end of the 1800s showed that we do not, in fact, copy reality in any sense. We translate the experience via sensory organs into electrical signals that are then reinterpreted by the brain. We could show, for example, that by stimulating specific nerves via controlled electric shocks, we could cause patients to “see” light where there wasn’t any.

This caused the “back to Kant” movement during the early 1900s.

This is why Mach starts trying to consider how we might break up ideas into elements which constitute them without appealing to atoms.

Which sets the stage for the neo-positivism / neo-kantian debate during the 1900s.

Witt’s Tract is certainly responding to this since he no doubt was familiar with the debate via Russell. Insofar as I don’t consider him to be sympathetic to the neo-positivism angle, I do wonder if the work can be read in a neo-kantian light? My tertiary knowledge leads me to think that Witt is trying to bridge the gap, somehow, but I cannot be certain of this.

Really interesting ideas....i'll have to catch up more when I have time.

Okay, so looking over it once more...

If, as Russell stipulates, x is a book, then there are no formal concepts in "T(x)". I don't know what () on the table means. — Fooloso4

A formal concept defines how the variables "T" and "x" are to "behave" or perhaps a better way to say it, is how they are to be understood.

These aren't like "proper concepts", such as "red", "hard", etc. which settles the external properties of complex objects.

In the proposition:

"The grass is green"

We have the presentation of a complex object with the material property of being red.
If we analyze the proposition into the elementary proposition we can the presentation of a "proper concept", which takes as input a simple object:

Fx

Now, we can in some sense talk about the structure of the elementary proposition, and we can note that whatever can be taken as input for "x" must be of a certain type, or kind. To this type corresponds a formal concept. We cannot, for example, input a proper number to which corresponds the formal concept of number for say, a simple object.

So, while we can say:

"There are two red fruits"

this analyzes into:

∃x(P(x)) ∧ ∃y(P(y) ∧ (x≠y))

There is no sign corresponding to the formal concept "number" despite what appears to be a number presented in the proposition.

Ah, yes, I think I've misread that bit, now that I've looked at it again.

I'll look it over again later :)

determined, like a law—even if just a law I give myself (with Kant). If you follow the law, you are good, even if you just try for something good. — Antony Nickles

I wouldn't say this.

You can fully believe you're doing the right thing, or that you're on the side of "good" and be completely wrong about this.

I don't believe that ethics is characterized by rule following, in general, but rather by the inherent struggle we have when faced with ethically challenging situations. It's rather, that there is no rule to follow for every situation. I cannot know prima facie if whatever action I choose will be good or bad, and its this very uncertainty that makes moral situations difficult to navigate.

Ethics springs from the desire to bring about the best situation in an uncertain world, and is characterized by the difficulty to act, even if we believe that we are right.

If an AI ever feels something that we might characterize as an internal conflict regarding what makes the most sense to do in a difficult situation, that will affect people's lives in a differing but meaningful manner, then perhaps I might consider it capable of moral agency.

In the function T (x), where T is on a table, the function T (x) is true if the variable x satisfies the function T (x). For example, T (x) is true if the variable x is a book.

As I understand it, the variable x is what Wittgenstein is defining as a formal concept. — RussellA

You're close, but this isn't quite right, I don't believe.

In the function: "T(x)", both "T()" and "x" show that to each corresponds a different formal concept.

"That anything falls under a formal concept [such] as an object belonging to it, cannot be expressed by a proposition. But it shows itself in the sign of this object itself. (The name shows that it signifies an object, the numerical sign that it signifies a number, etc.)

Formal concepts cannot, like proper concepts, be presented by a function. For their characteristics, the formal properties, are not expressed by the functions. The expression of a formal property is a feature of certain symbols. The sign that signifies the characteristics of a formal concept is, therefore, a characteristic feature of all symbols, whose meanings fall under the concept. The expression of the formal concept is therefore a propositional variable in which only this characteristic feature is constant" (4.126).

So, we cannot, for example, say:

"Red is a color" or "C(r)"
or
"1 is a number" or "N(1)"

for this is senseless.

Nor can we say:

"Color is a formal concept" or "F(c)".

The formal concepts are presupposed by the objects that already contain the characteristic features of the formal concept under which they fall.

This is why:

4.1271 – Every variable is the sign for a formal concept — RussellA

In: "F(x)"

"x" is a simple object in that it presupposes the general form, or general characteristics necessary of any input which can satisfy the function. This is to say, that there is a formal concept associated with it, but "x" is not itself a formal concept, nor does it name a formal concept.

:clap: :halo: :razz:

Objects are there behind the facts, but they are only useful for his idea of facts and propositions. Why doesn't he delve deeper into these initial beliefs? — schopenhauer1

And his ideas regarding facts and propositions is only useful insofar as it facilitates his goal of logically clear thoughts. I can't think of an object in space without a shape, for example so if I want to argue that some objects exists beneath my facts to explain it, I better construct them out of elements that have explanatory power, and tie back to reality. When I talk to others, explaining my ideas regarding what I think could account for the experience, if I can explain it by appealing to simple, necessary, elements of experience such as shape if it exists spatially and that shape must help to explain how it brings about the phenomenon in question.

Well, of course it's done through language. But that is not his major point. That is just a truism. — schopenhauer1

I wholly agree with this. This line of discussion came up in order to clarify my original statement that Witt is concerned with is the logical clarification of thoughts, because I cited him as doing so through language, to which you cast me as calling him a simple grammatician. Later on you say:

It's not just a matter of how they are grammatically phrasing their words. It's not just that Plato could have kept his theory coherent if he had just worded his ideas of Forms more syntactically correct, but rather, that the content of his thoughts are non-sense, and thus are beyond the bounds of language. — schopenhauer1

and I also agree with this. I, personally, do think that Plato’s theory of forms is nonsense – and I suspect that the framework presented by the Tractatus would label it as such. But, its important to note, that while it might be nonsense, it is not meaningless according to Witt. We can still talk about Platos theory of forms in meaningful language, but its wholly unclear.

His major point is that it is invalid to attempt to talk about the world outside certain bounds, that he sets out to limit. — schopenhauer1

While I can understand why you draw this conclusion, I think it’s slightly off in a few important ways.

1. Its not so much that its invalid to attempt to talk about the world outside of certain bounds, rather, it is unclear; that is, it lacks logical clarity.

2. He is not setting out to limit language. He thinks language is already limited, and those limits impose themselves on our understanding. Rather, he is attempting to investigate those limits, and show what needs to be the case in order for language to be clear. With this, one can draw an internal limit within the wider bounds of possible, meaningful, language. This is what science does, manufacturing more precise terminology than the wider sphere of language.

However, what I don't really agree with is just because he was an engineer, this confers greater approaches to philosophy. As RussellA quoted: — schopenhauer1

I agree with this, which is why I originally qualified my statement with:

(This is not a value judgement, btw). — 013zen

I don’t think it makes him any better or worse, it just makes him different in how he presents and thinks about certain issues.

Perhaps it's the acolytes that are more to blame. — schopenhauer1

This is a tale as old as time, my friend. Lol That’s why its best to focus on as much primary literature as possible, I feel.

Where do you think Witt stands? I present as evidence the "Whereof.." quote. — schopenhauer1

To circle back to my pointing out the version of the quote in the preface, wherein Witt ties the statement directly to the main project of “logical clarification”:

“What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.”

The spark notes on my take is this:

1. Around the time of Bacon, metaphysics began getting criticized for allowing things like religion into proper discussion meant to explain reality.

2. Little by little, philosophers stripped metaphysics of this, that, or the other thing.

3. By the second wave of positivism (Mach, etc), metaphysics was considered totally irreparable, and not fit to aid in meaningful scientific inquiry and explanation. This left us in a position where we could only talk about facts – ie experiences in science.

4. Some scientists formed an opposing view, saying that we could, in fact, speak meaningfully in science about things that we have no directly experienced of. They developed “picture theories” which supposedly were justified insofar as they followed logically from experience. Hertz’s only complaint about these “pictures” was that they contained useless aspects due to language.

5. Wittgenstein, familiar with this opposition via Boltzmann and Hertz, developed his own “picture theory” of language, which elucidated why one can be justified in using “pictures” in science (and what it even means for something to logically follow from experience), as well as tried to suggest ways to circumvent those useless aspects due to language that Hertz had commented on.

6. Picture theories were justified, Witt argued insofar as the pictures it was presenting were a possible arrangement of elements of experience, not simply whole experiences. What do I mean, what's the difference?

Consider the question:

“Does the sun orbit the earth or visa versa?”

Positivists, if placed in 600 BCE with no prior knowledge of the answer, could only report what is seen, and would have to concede that its a topic we can’t speculate regarding until we have more evidence. They would call the speculation of their contemporaries useless metaphysics.

A picture theory, however, would allow speculation, as long as you’re positing possibilities that logically follow from experience, and don’t introduce new elements without justification.

This difference is exemplified in the discussion between atomists and positivists, with the former saying they were justified in imagining atoms because atoms:

1. explained their experiences
2. were constructed using elements of experience, ie they had a shape, size, constitution (they were solid), they were movable, and they had properties like mass, all things science would expect something to have.

And by assuming some of these properties, we could explain what we experienced at the macroscopic level regarding gas expansion.

Positivist recoiled at this suggestion, with Mach calling them “useful fictions” – useful on paper, but in no manner suitable within serious scientific discourse.

7. Witt disagreed with this. Some metaphysics was admissible if it tied itself to reality by only using elements which we can make sense of, which as it turns out, means they are only constructed out of things we know are necessary from past experiences. Things like mass, weight, size, shape, etc.

This is, however, my personal line of thinking.

What I meant by this is that Socrates was not clarifying language itself but the notions and ideas of people, or its content. Wittgenstein is trying to determine what is in the bounds of language. — schopenhauer1

I hear you...What I am saying is that just as it isn't uncommon to flip through a Socratic dialogue, and see Socrates challenging what others say about certain things (such as the good), and through dialogue shows how the thought leads to problems, we see Witt doing the same. In the preface to the Tractatus, Witt says his concern is first and foremost thoughts, not language...he just happens to concede that it is through language that the analysis has to be conducted since that's how we communicate our ideas with one another.

Socrates would not even be deemed worthy of his discussions on Forms, The Good, and a whole range of other things, because they are not corresponding to a "State of Affairs" that can be determined as true — schopenhauer1

It's commonly accepted that we engage in metaphysics in order to arrive at an understanding of reality.
From the pre-socratics to today we have engaged in metaphysics, and our ideas have evolved with us. I wouldn't argue that studying Plato's forms isn't useful academically, but I wonder if its in any way equipped to be a supplement to the science of today.

My point is, let's assume that you're right and Witt is saying that metaphysics such as Plato's theory of forms, really doesn't belong in a modern day metaphysics. Wouldn't you agree? (I, personally, wouldn't necessarily take Witt to be committing to this view)

I was commenting on the idea that he was such an outlier that he was wholly different from the projects of other analytics of the time. — schopenhauer1

I am not saying that his project was different, but rather his approach, and some of his conclusions.

Is it so strange that someone that:

1. Graduated from a mechanical engineering program
2. Enrolled in an aeronautics doctorate program with the intent to design his own plane
3. Designed and patented his own propeller (tbh it was kinda a stupid design though lol)

And only after 5-6 years of this, when trying to manufacture his propeller, did Witt become interested in extremely complicated mathematics and learned about Frege and Russell.

After another 6~ years he wrote the Tractatus.

So, to the original point, I don't find it even remotely odd that someone that worked in mechanical engineering for 5-6 years and then worked on philosophy for another 6 years wrote something that was somewhat of an outlier when compared to a lot of the other analytics at the time. He explicitly references Heinrich Hertz in the Tractatus, and is quoted elsewhere saying that his line of thinking was influenced heavily by Ludwig Boltzmann alongside Frege and Russell.

Just as I would be surprised if someone were to tell me that some analytic philosopher from the 1920s developed some of his philosophy from physicists who were, for example, proving the existence of electromagnetic waves, and postulating theories of atoms in an attempt to explain thermodynamics, I am equally unsurprised that just such a philosopher came to some different conclusions than your standard philosopher. (This is not a value judgement, btw).

A defense of any ambiguously phrased sentence can always be said, "No, THIS is what the author TRULEY meant" — schopenhauer1

You've just summarized, like, 75% of the philosophy papers that I have read. xD

But, while I agree that its particularly bad in Witt's case, there is I think a reason that Witt considered philosophy, in some sense, a personal activity.

But if he is misunderstood so thoroughly, this whole project of trying to interpret the "right" Wittgenstein itself is insipid to me because it just speaks to the lack of good communication of the author; it's a lack of quality explanation of ideas. — schopenhauer1

Here I'd like to point out that, again, in the preface to the Tractatus, Witt literally says:

"Here I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task. May others come and do it better."

He was well aware that he wasn't the most articulate, but he thought there was something of value in his thoughts. I'd like to say that just as each of us is articulate to differing degrees, that being less articulate than another neither preclude one from engaging in philosophy, nor does it inherently suggest that the ideas are wrong, or not useful at their core.

I've read plenty of philosophers that I couldn't make heads nor tales of (I'm looking at you Hegel), but others are able to discover some merit within. There is a reason that Witt says:

"This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it - or similar thoughts."

You are extrapolating that, but I did not say that. — schopenhauer1

Truthfully, I was being a bit tongue in cheek :P

They are committing to a form of philosophy whereby any metaphysical or epistemological claims cannot be stated without being non-sense. — schopenhauer1

Positivists are. Not all analytic philosophers are positivists... it just so happens that historically, a lot of them have been.

Naturally. If philosophy started with "Naturally this that and the other..." that begs the question and is simply taking one's assumptions as given by fiat. — schopenhauer1

This is hardly the case. All philosophy, from Aristotle to Putnam has always started with some set of basic assumptions before moving forward. Its a perennial belief that can be endlessly quoted, and pointed out, whether it be a scientist assuming materialism or Aristotle assuming first principles.

Would you say what Socrates was doing and what Wittgenstein were doing were equivalent? This is itself some clever word-play. — schopenhauer1

Now you're not even trying to be charitable to what I'm saying, if you take that bit to be me simply saying, "Witt and Socrates were doing exactly the same thing in every regard" :P

This is hipster fandom talk — schopenhauer1

Idk what that means. Providing historical context is this "hipster fandom talk"?

I don't care that Wittgenstein felt misunderstood. — schopenhauer1

Then it sounds like you don't care to try and understand him, or the difference between his view and the other. If, when a philosopher says: "I don't mean x", the response is: "whatever, idc, sounds like you're saying x" then where else can one go? Seems the discussion is over.

This is an engineer or programmer doing philosophy like an engineer and programmer. — schopenhauer1

I'm sure you wouldn't want to say the analytic tradition is nonsense, despite being the result of logicians and scientists "doing philosophy " like logicians and scientists.

These folks were interested in what science could say about reality and how we can ensure that our theories map to reality. So, naturally they start from the assumption that our words should somehow tie back to reality in some guaranteed fashion.

Thank goodness we had physicists like Helmholtz, Hertz, and Boltzmann engaging in philosophy otherwise the atomic theory would have continued to be ridiculed by positivists and younger thinkers like Einstein would have never engaged with the concept of atoms, particles, fields, etc. In the first place since they lacked empirical evidence.

I think this is recasting Wittgenstein as just trying to be a simple corrector of grammar — schopenhauer1

This is a recasting of my position :P I take him to be concerned with the logical clarification of thought, which might occasionally involve critiquing how one uses a term, and whether or not it makes sense. This isn't new to philosophy, in any sense, with Socrates objecting to how folks use the word "good", Aristotle to how others use the word "cause", etc. How else are we meant to clarify the thoughts in our heads, except, by occasionally engaging in correction of language. This is not to say that correcting grammar is the goal in and of itself.

I think that it is the latter that is exactly what he is doing. — schopenhauer1

This is one possibility, and you're certainly welcome to it. As I've said, my personal opinion differs. I can understand, and see reasons to believe your position, I can however also see other evidence which steers my thoughts in another direction.

He was indeed basically a logical positivist. — schopenhauer1

One might wonder why then, upon returning from the war, and having his work acclaimed by the positivists, that Wittgenstein so vehemently rejected them. Why, Witt considered Russell's atomist interpretation so foreign to his own in spirit that he spent three years of his life trying to get the work published, despite being poor from having given his fortune away - in the hopes that he'd find someone that understood the work. That's a pretty strong response to a bunch of people basically understanding what you were trying to do.

He might protest such a label, and find value in various forms of "non-sense", but he still labeled it "non-sense" — schopenhauer1

The two groups are using the expression in two different manners. Again, without getting too in the weeds, the Tract uses three expressions:

1. nonsense
2. senseless
3. meaningless

these are not interchangeable. The positivists saw no distinction between these at the end of the day, they were all what you'd call meaningless. Wittgenstein, however, distinguishes these, and there's good reason to believe that Witt is using the expression nonsense similar to Frege in that its tied to elucidations which accomplish definite pre-scientific work in terms of settling terminology.

Basically, I think you are playing apologetics and putting early Wittgenstein as more heterodox than he was. — schopenhauer1

Rather, I am doing what we do in philosophy, which is try and furnish a reading of another's work with as much context as possible, whether it be historically or contextually. This is why there exist "readings" of philosopher x, and certain topics are discussed and debated. Why there are conferences, people researching and writing papers, etc.

You know, historically, positivism was actually very pervasive in society. What I mean, is that it had real "pull" in the scientific community. Einstein's theory of special and general relativity was influenced by positivism, believe it or not. Einstein says that concepts like "space" and "time" were not clear at all, and he prepossess redefining them in a relativistic fashion ala Ernst Mach. He argued that absolute space and absolute time were meaningless concepts, in that they were in no manner tied to reality. That's how we arrived at space-time today. But, Einstein was a student of not only positivism but also its main competitor, exemplified by people like Boltzmann and Hertz which was typically referred to as "bild theories" or "picture theories".

Boltzmann argued that positivism left science bankrupt, unable to furnish true understanding. He posited the existence of 'atoms' claiming that science could move past experience by developing "pictures" to represent reality based on logic. Ernst Mach was against the atomic theory, saying there was no evidence for the existence of such things, and for most of the early 1900s the atomic theory was ridiculed, and Boltzmann actually committed suicide from depression.

Einstein, younger than the old Mach and Boltzmann, took Boltzmann's picture theory as permissible and developed his own conception of the atom which was later proven to be the case. I don't think it's any accident that Wittgenstein also develops what he calls a "picture theory" and furnishes it with Frege's logic in a manner that echoes Hertz's development of pictures as logical pictures in his Principles of Mechanics. Witt also says that he was influenced by Boltzmann and Hertz, and he studied to be a mechanical engineer prior to studying philosophy, so he was no doubt familiar with the contemporaneous argument between positivism of Ernst Mach and the up and coming "picture theory" of Boltzman and Hertz that challenged it in an attempt to provide science with metaphysical speculation once again.

How is this the case when he clearly is trying to show that anything that is not about objects and how they "hang together" [ atomic facts/propositions.. yadayada, I'm not arguing his particularities so don't picayunish this point.. ] is "non-sense"? — schopenhauer1

Because he is not arguing that anything (i.e. a proposition) is nonsense if its not about how things hang together, etc.

Technical mumbo-jumbo aside, his goal is the logical clarification of thought, and while occasionally he does point out examples of propositions which are logically unclear, he never says that all propositions which don’t relate to objects, etc are nonsense. This is not the work associated with objects and facts, and all that stuff - they play a different role.

You point out the final statement of the work, but I’d like to say that its more succinct in the preface where Witt says:

“What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak [clearly] thereof one must be silent”

Positivism developed slowly, but from some basic assumptions, one of which was that metaphysics needed to be put on proper footing. This is what Bacon, Hume, Kant, etc. were concerned with...they thought metaphysics lacked clarity and rigor.

Wittgenstein, is attempting to say with the final statement that any metaphysical statement will have to first and foremost be made logically clear. Until this is done, we should be cautious of wasting too much time talking about it, since language will lead us in circles. Clarity must be established first.

Throughout the work, he tries to offer suggestions on how to do this, and also gives examples of other thinkers formulations and how they are logically unclear, offering methods to reformulate the idea in a more clear manner.

While its a little antiquated, I think a good starting point is the manner in which Frege considered it in The Foundations of Arithmetic. Philosophers from Mill, to Kant, to Frege were wondering two things:

“Are mathematical statements analytic or synthetic?”
and
“Are mathematical statements a priori or a posteriori?

Empiricists/realists like Mill thought we learned the meanings of mathematical statements by generalizing from experience. They are a posteriori. We see things in different groupings, and we generalize from there.

Both Kant and Frege disagreed with Mill, both thought that we learn the meaning of mathematical statements without any recourse to reality. Frege, to put it simply thinks it would be bizarre to suppose that my understanding of the number:

“6915027410”

is in any sense based on my experiences. To what experiences could I possibly point? This is true of mostly any and all numbers and combinations of numbers you might suppose outside the first few small numbers.

Kant thought mathematical statements were synthetic a priori and Frege thought that mathematics was analytic a priori. This is an important distinction, because it sets up the difference between psychologism vs logicism; the latter which, like empiricists hold mathematical statements to be mind independent facts versus psychologism which holds them to be mind dependent.

Kant thought, for example, that in the proposition:

“4+2=6”

Kant said that nowhere in the idea of “4”, “2”, or “2+4” is the concept “6” found. In order to show this, consider the following proposition:

“38102465 – 91042 = 38011423”

It’s obvious, that the random number “38011423” is in no sense containing the other individual numbers: “38102465”, “91042”

Then how do we know this statement is true? Kant's answer was that the necessary content was supplied by the mind. By the pure concepts supplied by understanding.

Frege argued that Kant misunderstood what the distinction between analytic and synthetic rested on. It was not based on the content of proposition, or the individual term's meanings, but rather, it related to one’s justification for accepting the truth of the statement.

Frege agreed with Kant, that the number “6” did not contain “4” or “2” or any number that can be added or subtracted to equal “6”, but we none the less know analytically that “6” must be the result of “4+2” because whether or not a statement was analytic or synthetic was based on whether or not it could be defined.

Mathematical statements are true analytically because they are provable, according to Frege. So, even if humans all died out, or never existed, the “Pythagorean theorem” will always be provable.

Why can't more speculative epistemology and metaphysics be discussed intelligently in a language community? Why must we follow or agree with his ideology on the bounds of language use? — schopenhauer1

I'd like to take a moment to step outside the bounds of this topic, and express some personal thoughts regarding the work, in general.

I, actually, take Wittgenstein to be attempting to break away from this tradition; what I mean is... I take him to be an ally to your cause. This, I know, is a somewhat contentious view, but it's one that I believe might hold. I get a sense that the mode of presentation, for the Tractatus, is an attempt to show this from within the very framework he ultimately challenges. Why would he do this? Well, consider for a moment, the setting in which the work was written. It was mostly written while he was actively engaged in world war 1, on the front lines, in the trenches. He finished the work while he was a war prisoner, and only managed to get 3 copies out, leaving himself without a copy of his own. He sent 1 to Russell, 1 to Frege, and 1 to Englemann, and I think its no accident that the first two's frameworks are largely adopted and assumed in the beginning of the text. But he often calls attention to the flaws in this thinking, and attempts to enrich the ideas present. Russell was his teacher, and Russell was taken by the tradition you're referring to - positivism. But, Wittgenstein was no positivist. The work, I think, is written for a positivist reader though - for Russell, perhaps in case he didn't survive the war.

Like any philosophical work, its written within a tradition, and just like any philosopher, it assumes certain manners of conceptualizing, but I take the work to ultimately be arguing against a staunch opposition to metaphysics, in general. I see him to be trying to re-furnish the metaphysics that positivists had stripped to all but "positive facts" or experience.

I believe that he is not saying that the single letters x, y, z are objects, but is saying that these single letters indicate possible objects, such that the variable x indicates the objects ball, elephant or sandwich. — RussellA

I agree with this, I believe. "x" is the domain, which are all the possible objects which can be taken as inputs to satisfy the function.

Consider the logical function F(x), where F(x) is true if the value x satisfies the function F. But as F and x are not only unknown, don't refer to anything and have no sense, F(x) cannot picture the world, and if cannot picture the world cannot be an elementary proposition. — RussellA

No, exactly as you said. If we take as a value of x some input which satisfies the function Fx, (with Fx being some value which can be said of x), then it is true, and would correspond with an atomic fact, which could be said of the world. I think Witt is drawing attention to the logical form of elementary propositions, but naturally in practice when we are analyzing specific sentences, as you point out, we do know the values for "x" and we know the form of the function, whether it be Fx, or some other function.

Logic by itself, functions such as F(x), cannot fulfil the role of representatives, and as representatives are needed in addition to logic to picture the world, functions such as F(x) cannot be elementary propositions. — RussellA

I agree, however it is only when supplied with content that elementary props say anything at all, and can form a picture of the world. To this, would correspond atomic propositions, which can do the work that elementary props, cannot.

They are elementary propositions.

the variable t cannot be the object — RussellA

I admit, that I was only armchair philosophizing about the atomic facts being something like mechanical laws represented in differential equations.

But, I'd like to point out that Frege took "time" to be an object, and while Witt. never comes down definitively (aside from referencing "time" as a "form of an object", I just wanted to point out, that its not unheard of within the tradition.

At any rate, I agree with, like 90% of your post. Its just specifics we differ on, right now.

I was thinking something similar, I believe.

My thought process was:

When we refer to "reality" or "the universe", we are referring to: the entire collection of objects (ultimately made up of quarks, leptons, etc.), space, and time.

However, what if these "things" had precursor, "things" that aren't like any of the "things" that we are familiar with as constituents of reality.

These original things can therefore be eternal - (like you say, perhaps fields) - and have existed always.
The only one of the original familiar elements that I take as having to also be an infinite precursor as well, would have to be time.

Maybe, like a chemical reaction, these original, always existing fields, could go for a long time before reacting. eventually, though, they do react, and space, and particles, etc. came to be, with time still existing from the original set.

From the above, it might seem somewhat confusing, what exactly is going on here, and what it means for atomic facts.

But, I think that understanding the analysis of proposition into elementary proposition can inform us a bit, what Witt might have in mind for atomic propositions. Consider, the proposition:

"The car is traveling at 60mph."

We might be able to infer that an atomic fact, for something like this, might be something like:

"v=d/t"

I wonder. This could also explain why Witt lists: "time" as a "form of an object".

By elementary proposition, we naturally think of expressions such as "the apple is on the table ", "grass is red". "the Eiffel Tower is in London", "the house is next to the school". — RussellA

These are examples of propositions, not elementary propositions; we can go through the difference between the two, a bit more, if you'd like, but for the sake of brevity, I'll just reference:

"The names are the simple symbols, I indicate them by single letters (x, y, z).
The elementary proposition I write as function of the names, in the form 'fx'', 'ϕ(x, y)', etc." (4.24).

This gives us a lot of information, but we can immediately see a couple things:

1. Examples of names (the simple symbols for objects) are: "x,y,z,etc.
2. Examples of elementary propositions are functions such as: "'fx'', 'ϕ(x, y)', etc.

Propositions, such as: "grass is red" analyze into the form: "Fx". "x" here is the domain of the function, or all things which can be accepted as inputs for the function. For example, I can say: "The ball is blue", "The elephant is big", or "The sandwich is soggy". Each of these have the same logical form, or analyze into the elementary propositions: "Gy", "Hz", "Ta", etc. So, the domain of a function is what is meant by: "object".

Presumably, we can infer that to the codomain of the function we can say being either true or false; to which corresponds an actual or possible state of affairs.

From this, we can immediately see that despite each proposition being totally different, the form of both the elementary proposition and the objects remain between each as the elementary proposition that the proposition analyzes into.

As pointed out in the "What Is Logic?" thread, it has become common to think of logic or any sort of rules as being the sui generis product of minds. They only exist "in here" not "out there." A theory of rules as grounded in human social practice sort of goes along with this tendency. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a strange view, and not one that I subscribe to. Logic, seems to me, in some sense to be mind independent. The logical statement, that say, "A=A", or the argument of the logical form: "If A then B, B, therefore A", seems wholly independent upon any social practice.

The application of logic, however, is a social practice. Namely, what counts as "A" and so forth in the practice.

If we think of the genes as rules, as the instructions for building the organism, the problem here is that the rules are wrong. The cells are producing the protein as instructed, but the slight variation in the protein leads to unintended consequences vis-a-vis function. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So, here is, I think the important point.

As you note in the OP:

Deck building games might ban certain card combinations from tournaments because following the rules correctly seems "wrong." It defeats the purpose of the game as a game of skill, or destroys its pacing, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it would be helpful to talk about it this way:

1. Any set of rules will have consequences.

2. These consequences can be beneficial or detrimental relative to accomplishing some function.

3. In the case of a game, the function is the developers' intention

4. In the case of nature, the function can be taken to be survivability.

So, you give an example where a mutation causes a variance in the manner in which a cell produces a particular protein strand which results in clumping of those strands within the eye leading to blindness.

Clearly, the rules are being followed and have consequences; insofar as those consequences are detrimental towards survivability, we can construe them as "bad" or "wrong"... but, remember that survivability is a function of the environment; we can easily imagine an environment where, perhaps, such a mutation isn't detrimental. We could call it benign. Or even an environment in which its somehow beneficial, who knows.

This is why mutations drive evolution relative to some environment.

But in order to determine whether or not the rules being followed are beneficial or detrimental, we need to speak relative to some function that we supply in our interpreting them as such.

The question is on what grounds, if you are not a panpsychist. — Lionino

I am not a panpsychist, I find the position unintelligible.

There seems to be a meaningful distinction between on the one hand, things like:

1. rocks, cups, tables, etc
and
2. amoebas, sponges, dogs, humans, etc

and it doesn't appear to be due to complexity.

In what this distinction subsists is the question.

We know that:

1. “The object is simple” (2.02)

Wittgenstein’s claim that objects must be simple stems from 2.021 when he says:

2. “Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound” (2.021).

So, Wittgenstein’s belief that (1) objects are simple is because (2) [they] form the substance of the world.

Understanding (1) requires understanding (2) then.

Regarding “substance”, Wittgenstein says:

“The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties” (2.0231).

This is echoed in 2.024-2.025, when Witt says:

“Substance is what exists independently of what is the case. It is form and content” (2.024-2.025).

So, we know of substance:

1. Substance is a form and content that subsists between possible worlds.
2. Since material properties are accidental, they are not what subsists between possible worlds.

Since, from 2.021, we know that:

“Objects form the substance of the world” (2.021)

We can infer:

1. Objects are what subsist between possible worlds
2. Objects are devoid of material properties

We see (1) in:

“Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs” (2.014).

and we see (2) in:

“Roughly speaking: objects are colourless” (2.0232).

No I get it. I think it's valuable what you're doing- putting this into context of what was the spirit of the time (logical positivistic thinking and the logical atomism of Frege and Russell), but I am criticizing this approach en totale, as exemplified in the Tractatus' view.

There seems to be a subtle subtext that Wittgenstein, Russell, et al. want you, the audience to accept beyond just their reasoning, their view of "What philosophy should be about (only logical propositions)". — schopenhauer1

Here, I think we should be careful.

The logical positivism of someone like Carnap or Neurath, and the logical atomism of someone like Russell was developed in response to Positivism, and in part the writing of the Tractatus.

The anti-metaphysical agenda of these movements, I don’t take to be exemplified by the Tractatus necessarily. I take the Tractatus to be influenced by these movements, and responding to them, not ascribing to them. There is a reason that after the Tractatus was written, and positivism became logical positivism, that Wittgenstein was dismissive of the anti-metaphyscial interpretation the latter ascribed to the work, and why despite Russell developing his logical atomism in response to Witt, that Witt still considered Russell to misunderstand his point.

In other words, RussellA quotes matter above:

How does language and thought relate to the world?
How does language relate to thought?
Does the world we experience only exist in the mind, or does it also exist outside the mind, and if it does exist outside the mind, how does the world we experience in our mind relate to the world outside the mind?
Is Neutral Monism correct, that apples only exist as concepts in the mind and outside the mind are only elementary particles and elementary forces in space and time?
Do tables exist outside the mind? — schopenhauer1

These are all excellent questions, and ones that I look forward to being able to work out together as we work out the basics.

All in all, this is barely even philosophy, it is pragmatics of the English language. — Lionino

As Wittgenstein once said:

“All philosophy is Critique of language” (4.0031).

Most people would say sponges are not conscious — Lionino

I would be willing to ascribe consciousness to a sponge, just not the same level of consciousness as I would ascribe to you.

But then again, are they reacting any differently than when a rock reacts when we kick it by flying away into my neighbour Giorgios' window? — Lionino

I take your point, that both are the product of mechanical laws, but I could say there is a distinction to made here insofar as the sponge’s reacting to external stimulus is the result of an internal process responding to the external stimuli, while the rock’s is due to an external process acting on the rock with no internal process.

The phone is a good mediator example insofar as it does have an internal state that responds to external stimulus, but still I think there’s a distinction here between the phone and the sponge. I can’t quite tease it out, yet, though. :chin:

What do you think?

You've only explained how these particular people thought of it, not if it's correct or not. — schopenhauer1

Correct. I merely wanted to try and remind you that Wittgenstein wrote the work during a time when it was, actually, quite normal to consider logically simple entities as indefinable, and those he respected most at the time - Frege and Russell - were guilty of the same thing.

Whether or not they are right about there being logically simple entities is another question entirely, but you can't circumvent the discussion by saying:

"Well, he didn't define 'x' so its all moot." He didn't define 'x' for a reason, and he gives his reasoning.

We can still attempt to approach an understanding of why and how Wittgenstein is using these terms.

One can perhaps understand Wittgenstein as a coherentist and not a correspondent theorist (although this view is contrary to popular opinion). — schopenhauer1

I take 2.0211 and 2.061 to speak against this:


“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true” (2.0211).

“Atomic facts are independent of one another” (2.061)

if Wittgenstein forfeits defining what objects are beyond vague notions, then the tower of babel is simply axiomatic and self-referential and points to nothing. — schopenhauer1

As Russell and Whitehead point out in the Principia Mathematica (An idea they adopted from the Italian mathematician Peano):

“Since all definitions of terms are effected by means of other terms, every system of definitions which is not circular must start from a certain apparatus of undefined terms” (PM, 95)

Frege, a mathematician working on similar problems, around the same time expressed a similar idea as Peano, Russell, and Whitehead:

"On the introduction of a name for something logically simple, a definition is not possible." (CO, 1).

Russell re-articulates the point later in his work “The Principles of Mathematics” when he says:

“...the indefinables are obtained primarily as the necessary residue in a process of analysis, it is often easier to know that there must be such entities than actually to perceive them” (The Principles of Mathematics).

Wittgenstein is a logician, and a mathematician, and his analysis of propositions into eventual simple, indefinable, objects comes from a tradition of doing so. As he stated to Malcolm:

"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try and decide whether this thing or that thing was a simple matter or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter" (A Memoir, p. 70). — 013zen

I think Robinson puts it well here:

“To a non-mathematician it often comes as a surprise that it is impossible to define explicitly all the terms which are used. This is not a superficial problem but lies at the root of all knowledge.” (Foundations of Geometry, 8)

His definition is like one in computer programming it seems — schopenhauer1

I think that, perhaps, you are on the right track thinking of it in this manner. An object seems to be a kind of logical place holder for a distinct logical category which can be taken as input within a function.


-----

This is the worst thread so far on Wittgenstein. Quite an accomplishment. — Banno

I’m very sorry that seeing others attempting to work through a text is so distressing to you; I can only wonder what a wearing process it has been for you to be present within a philosophy community for all these years.

I don't think there is much point in taking up the discussion — Banno

I can only imagine what a Socratic dialogue would have been like with you as the interlocutor.

Are lobomites conscious? If yes, they are conscious in the same way; if no, "Nancy is conscious and in the hospital" is an incorrect statement, and should be changed.

The counterargument is that what we mean by "conscious" is in fact an umbrella of related properties. But this is not a point I want to debate so I will just concede. — Lionino

They prefer to be called frontally incapable, I believe :p

But, my point is I don't know how to answer your question. If you're asking, "Are people that have had lobotomies aware of things?" I would say, in many cases - yes. But, I would think that they've lost some meaningful capacity that I think could be understood as a lessening of consciousness.

I'm curious what you mean by "awareness" though, like, if say, a motion detecting camera spots me, and follows my movements, would that count as awareness, or is it something more complicated for you?

Every world, real or imagined, must have a logical form in common. However different and changeable they are, their shared logical form subsists. This form consists of unchangeable objects. Their configuration is what is changeable. That substance is form and content means that it is logical and consists of unchangeable objects. — Fooloso4

Well put. How we are to understand "form" and "content" exactly, however, is still somewhat unclear, but I think you're on the right track by tying it to logic. And, as you point out, we can't appeal to classical conceptions of the word 'substance', it definitely doesn't seem synonymous with Aristotle's being since, logic deals with all possibilities, not simply what is the case. This was helpful.

Logic as the term is used in the Tractatus, is not primarily a human activity. Logic is not propositional. Propositions are logical. Logic deals with what is necessary rather than contingent.

That is a pivotal matter in the question of how much this work presents an epistemology or not.
— Paine

Good point. Objects are not treated as things to be known. To the extent there is knowledge of the world it comes from science not logic. — Fooloso4

I agree with this; its a good point.

I can't make a huge amount from those passages. I realise Frege is who he is in the history of Phil and particularly language use. So, may i despair a little... — AmadeusD

Frege was originally a mathematician, so his approach stems from that. When he began analyzing language, the tradition had always been to follow Aristotle. So, any proposition, say:

"Socrates is mortal"

is analyzed into two logical categories: "subject" and "predicate". I doesn't matter the proposition.

"The ball is red", "Pink penguins are dancing furiously", etc.

Frege thought this was imprecise, and limited. He thought language should be thought of as being more like a mathematical functions which are satisfied by certain inputs. Just as different mathematical functions can have different forms, and inputs, so can propositions in language. By thinking of it in this way, Frege was able to analyze a wider range of sentences and we now have second-order logic after centuries of only having Aristotle's first order logic.

My point, is that when Aristotle said that a proposition is a "subject-predicate" relation, he was saying that there was a meaningful difference between the role a subject plays logically in a sentence, and the role a predicate plays in the sentence; there's a difference. And he coined the terms "subject" and "predicate" to differentiate them. Frege, is doing the same thing, and coining his own words for logically distinct categories that he believes haven't yet been properly delineated in language. But, instead of inventing a new word, he chose to use stipulative definitions for words that we are already familiar with, because he wants to appeal to some familiar aspects associated with the word to help guide the reader or listener in the right direction. Frege called these "elucidations".

I see Wittgenstein as following this tradition, since he directly references elucidations in the Tractatus.

It all depends on whether, in the Tractatus, for Wittgenstein, language and thought are the same thing. — RussellA

I don't believe that they are the same in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein says:

"Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognized" (4.002).

Here Wittgenstein draws an analogy between "clothes" and "a body" with "language" being the clothing and "thought" being the body that is clothed. So, there is a distinction that is made between the two.

The elementary propositions "grass is red" "grass is green" "not grass is red" and "not grass is green" may be true or false — RussellA

These are examples of propositions, not elementary propositions, though.

He seems to have basically invented his own use of things like "language" "reality", "thought" and "object" and then run with it, in the same manner he apparently taught his student - everyone else is wrong. — AmadeusD

I don't actually take this to be entirely true. Wittgenstein is clearly writing within a tradition, and what I mean is I don't believe it was written in a vacuum.

For example, Frege wrote a paper called, "On Concept and Object", wherein he both explained that a commentator of his had misunderstood how we was using the word "concept" in a previous text, and also defended his using the expression that way. He says:

"It seems to me that Kerry's misunderstanding results from his unintentionally confusing his own usage of the word 'concept' with mine. This readily gives rise to contradictions, for which my usage is not to blame. Kerry contests what he calls my definition of 'concept'" (1).

He goes on to say:

"On the introduction of a name for something logically simple, a definition is not possible. There is nothing for it but to lead the reader or hearer, by means of hints, to understand the words as is intended" (2).

Frege thought that if logical analysis lead a logician, or mathematician, to conclude that there is a meaningful distinction for a particular category that has yet to be identified, that instead of inventing a new word, the person should use a familiar word in particular ways that showed its meaning; the word chosen pointed the reader in the right direction. He called these elucidations.

"When we begin science, we cannot avoid using words from ordinary language. But these words are for the most part not really appropriate for scientific purposes, because they are not sufficiently determinate and are fluctuating in their use. Science needs technical expressions that have entirely determinate and fixed references, and in order to make these references understood and to exclude possible misunderstandings, one gives elucidations".

Besides 'Concept', Frege uses the word 'object' in a stipulative way as well. And in a manner not unlike Witt.

https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224693&a=t&first_name=Gottlob&author=Frege&concept=Object#:~:text=Object%2FFrege%3A%20locations%2C%20times,the%20meaning%20of%20a%20subject.

The Tractatus makes references to many other concepts and manners of thinking that were present during his time.

His breaking down reality into nonphysical elements was what Ernst Mach was doing in the 1900s in direct opposition to the atomic theory of reality.

There is a reason that positivism became logical positivism and logical positivists and the vienna circle, all prominent mathematicians and scientists including Einstein (He was at least initially a positivist, although not directly a Wittgensteinian. He agreed with some of the public literature the positivists released) largely adopted the Tractatus initially. There's a reason Russell developed his atomism in response to the tractatus.

Well, I would. — Lionino

How about in an instance where we have two individuals: Tim and Nancy. Both recently awoke in the hospital after major surgery. Tim had triple bypass surgery, and Nancy had a full frontal lobotomy.

Clearly, I would say:

"Tim is conscious and in the hospital"
and
"Nancy is conscious and in the hospital"

But, if I were to ask in the sense of the OP: "Is Tim conscious in the same sense as Nancy?" we would all, I think, answer 'no'.

That much is not needed: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/conscious — Lionino

I Wouldn't say we are using 'conscious' in the same sense in the two sentences:

"Tim is conscious and in the hospital"
and
"Human's are conscious due to their brains"

In the first example, its clearly being used synonymously with being aware, and in the second sense, which is the sense I believe OP to be using, we can't simply substitute "awareness".

He complicates this by using the term 'object' in both cases without always making the distinction clear. — Fooloso4

I don't think that this is necessarily a bug, as much as a feature. Part of the work seems to be dealing with the idea that the meaning of a word or proposition is dependent upon how its being used.

"The sign determines a logical form only together with its logical syntactic application" (3.327).

It's an idea that stems from Frege's elucidations, and I don't think its any accident that Wittgenstein uses the idea of elucidations in the Tractatus.

"The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by elucidations" (3.263).

What do you mean by:

assemble a world — Paine

?

What do you make of:

4.12 Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it
— Ibid. — Paine

That there is a distinction between the form of a proposition and the logical form of a proposition. The form of a proposition, which re-presents reality, and its logical form, which can only be shown I believe. Propositions don't represent the logical form that they share with reality, but it is mirrored by the proposition.

Citing this is not an argument for 'precluding a possibility', as you put it. On the other hand, maybe this would be a good time for you to provide what supports your view of the text. — Paine

Which aspect of my view specifically? The belief that there even is an isomorphism displayed between thoughts, propositions, and reality? Or something else?

I believe that "consciousness" is a spectrum of capabilities. When we use the expression, we are using it in a manner which is influenced by our own consciousness. This makes sense, since the meaning we tie to a word is dependent upon our experiences.

When looking at our own consciousness, it seems to involves things like capacity for memory, emotions, reasoning, responsiveness to stimuli, etc. So, we might ask to what degree a thing is conscious insofar as it has such and such capacities. I would say that my dog is more conscious than say a plant, but I'd be willing to attribute some level of consciousness even to plants.

The order of the statements in the text begins with conceptions before introducing propositions. Is that order important to understanding what is presented? — Paine

I don't believe so. I think that, perhaps, Wittgenstein started with what was most accessible to him during the war, namely his thoughts. So he begins by deconstruction thoughts in logical space before moving to propositions.

The difference between what is said versus what is shown becomes a limit to what can be regarded as equal or the same. In that way, Wittgenstein is challenging what most have taken for granted. — Paine

I am still having trouble completely seeing how this precludes the possibility of an isomorphism. A proposition's literal form is not identical with its logical form. As Witt says:

"Russell's merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of the proposition need not be its real form" (4.0031).

This form is what's mirrored in thought. All the accidental features of the proposition fade away, so to speak, but this losing of accidental features does not suppose a loss of fundamental features which are mirrored in the picture in thought.

I don't think so. As I understand it, or perhaps misunderstand it, there are no simple physical entities or objects. Every physical object is complex. The problem is to explain how a configuration of simple non-physical objects results in a physical object. It may be that this indicates that I have got something wrong, but it may simply be that Wittgenstein would have said that such problems are a matter of science not logic. — Fooloso4

As you point out, every physical object is a complex. If I'm understanding you correctly, I take this to mean that what we might call "classical objects" are all complex. These are not Wittgenstein's objects, nor are they what correspond to his objects. You're right about this, I'd say.

The problem is to explain how a configuration of simple non-physical objects results in a physical object. — Fooloso4

I don't think it is Wittgenstein's problem in the Tractatus to try and explain how a configuration of simple non-physical objects results in a physical object. I think he dips his toe into the problem, but its a tangential problem to his overall objective. I actually believe that the history surrounding the Tractatus is much more focused on this problem, and if you're interested in that then you have a solid foundation for the problem that you're seeing. I definitely think its a problem that greatly influenced the Tractatus, and I am very interested in talking about that.