Sorry for the late reply. Work has been busy, lately, and I've needed time to parse your comment. Truthfully, however, it has still been quite difficult to determine, exactly, why we're at loggerheads. With that being said, I believe it's regarding how we are interpreting the notion of "logical space".

As you point out:

a) Wittgenstein does not say that the picture that presents the facts is something in the mind — Fooloso4

I agree that he does not explicitly say this; this is how I am making sense of the notion of "logical space". Would you admit that there is a clear distinction being made between, on the one hand:

1. Pictures - in logical space
2. Facts - not in logical space

b) A fact does not present the world. The picture presents the facts. — Fooloso4

I do not disagree with this.

A Picture does present the facts, in logical space. A fact, is simply that, a fact. It is a fact, for example, that I am typing this comment. That fact does not exist in logical space, it just is...it can, however, be pictured in logical space, and the picture is what presents the fact.

The space in which it occurs is logical space. — Fooloso4

And where is that space, exactly? It's certainly not physical reality. Physical reality is only what is the case, namely positive atomic facts.

1. Wittgenstein is making a distinction between facts and things or objects. The world is all that is the case. Facts and not things determine what is and is not the case. That a thing can exist in a state of affairs is not accidental. The possibility of it occurring in states of affairs is necessary. This necessity is logical necessity. — Fooloso4

I don't disagree with your main points, you and I have similar understandings, which isn't wholly strange...but, I find your point here a bit muddled, and doesn't appreciate the depth of the notion of logical space. Let me see if I can explain...

There are three things that are pointed out about facts:

1. They determine what is and what is not the case.
2. The existence of a fact means the existence of an atomic fact.
3. The world is determined by them.

When you say:

"That a thing can exist in a state of affairs is not accidental. The possibility of it occurring in states of affairs is necessary. This necessity is logical necessity" — Fooloso4

You are conflating facts and atomic facts. The possibility of a thing occurring in an atomic fact is a logical necessity.

Note that Witt says that the existence of a fact means the existence of an atomic fact.

Later, he says:

"The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality.
(The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact,
their non-existence a negative fact.)" (2.06)

This is important. Reality, is the existence and non-existence of atomic facts, while the world is only the existence of an atomic fact.

This is because the world is limited in a manner that reality is not. The world, that is determined is determined by a possible arrangements of objects. But reality is made up of only what obtains. This is because, you cannot know, for example, that I am not a sophisticated a.i. that you've been conversing with this whole time.

Your view fails to appreciate the common sense aspects of Witt's view without being - in my opinion - wholly wrong. But, by understanding the distinction between on the one hand, reality, and on the other the world, you see that reality isn't determined by facts it is all facts...positive and negative. The world, however, is determined by positive facts, things we've experienced, and with it comes all possibilities left open to it. But, reality, is simply what is and isn't.

Logical space is the playing field of those possibilities, but they are lacking insofar as epistemologically it gets us only possible knowledge.

That is Steven Pinker's position — isomorph

but we have not progressed as far as we think we have because we have the ability to alleviate much of the suffering that continues in the world, and much of it is autogenic, not just from natural catastrophes. — isomorph

It's interesting that you mention Pinker, because his overall thesis is simply that the world is getting better, and that this is quantifiable. A subset of his argument is that the upward trend of science is one factor. But, we are also bringing people out of poverty faster and faster, and if we accept the more general thesis, the world does seem to be working out those "autogenic" issues that you mention.

With that being said, by referring to these issues as "autogenic", it suggest that they are in some sense intractable, and therefore the claim that us being unable to solve them is indicative of our shortcomings, doesn't make much sense...especially if we admit that by and large, some of these issues are in fact becoming better.

With that being said, I don't think anyone is willing to admit that we couldn't perhaps do better in a number of areas, but that might always be true. I think you are right that many issues are "autogenic", and therefore one can only elevate them to a degree given certain variables. Some idealistic paradise is only as possible as having infinitely attainable resources, otherwise there will always be disparages among the population. Lessening that is obviously the goal, and its one we seem to be moving towards.

Science has learned, I agree with you, but, humans, in their core, have not changed that much. "Technical sophistication, misprision and convoluted errors" is what I said earlier, and I still think that is a true characterization of humanity, past,
present, and future. — isomorph

The degree of each has improved, though. Remember, evolution takes time. You say humans haven't changed much since the time of Socrates, and I'll happily grant that, but we both admit that we have changed in some manners for the better, and we can both I'm sure admit that evolutionarily speaking, that's quicker than a bone becoming vestigial.

That is a truly idealistic thought. I am not an idealist, and I think we are already all human with our science, conspiracies, warts, and all. — isomorph

I'm sorry, I don't take your meaning. I, too, believe that we are human, but I also admit that, like anything, we are changing and evolving, simply conceding that typically change takes time on scales much greater and the fact that we've improved at all at the rate we've done is not negligible. We obviously have much to improve on, though.

I do disagree, but gave you a chance to clarify what you meant. — Fooloso4

I see now what you meant; I was just confused because I had already been attempting to clarify all along the way :sweat:

At any rate, yes, you disagree...and I can appreciate your perspective, I'm just not certain that its correct. I don't outright disagree with you, however. You make some claims that I agree with. For example, you said:

What is presented "by" pictures are not the facts themselves that are presented in the picture. The picture re-presents what is pictured. It is an image of it. — Fooloso4

I agree with this. This is the same in my view.

I previously said:

“We make to ourselves pictures of facts” (2.1).
“The picture presents the facts in logical space” (2.11)

So, here there is a distinction being made between “facts” and “pictures of facts”. — 013zen

We both make the distinction between facts, and pictures which re-present the facts.

Something I disagree with, is when you say:

Your use of the term 'presented' is ambiguous. — Fooloso4

If you read the comment, I am only using the term insofar as I am quoting the text wherein Witt uses the expression "presented" here:

"The picture presents the facts in logical space" (2.11)

So, while I understand that you disagree with me that the world is made up of pictures, we need to somehow make sense of the fact that:

1. Fact in logical space make up the world
2. Facts are presented in logical space by pictures

What I take Witt to be saying is: The fact is re-presented as pictures in logical space. An exhaustive collection of all the facts re-presented in logical space, as pictures, form the world.

What do you mean by constitute? — Fooloso4

What else could I possibly mean by constitute? :razz: And, your next response shows that you take my meaning.

The world is not made up of pictures. — Fooloso4

You just disagree.

I gave quotes which seem to suggest that the world is, in fact, made up of pictures. Let's talk a bit about them.

We both can agree that in the Tract, the world is composed, or constituted by all the facts in logical space.

1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.

Witt, later says:

""We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (2.1).
"The picture presents the facts in logical space" (2.11)

So, the facts in logical space that make up the world are presented in logical space by pictures.

A fact, can only "exist" in logical space and present the world insofar as it is a picture.

I'm interested to hear what your take on the relation between:

1. Reality
2. Facts
3. Pictures
4. The world

How does it all coherently fit together and to what purpose?

The world is not made up of pictures. Nowhere does Wittgenstein say this. — Fooloso4

Witt tells us that:

“The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts” (1.11).

“The facts in logical space are the world” (1.13).

So, all of the facts, IN logical space constitute the world. But, in what sense is a fact in logical space?
Well, later Witt says:

“We make to ourselves pictures of facts” (2.1).
“The picture presents the facts in logical space” (2.11)

So, here there is a distinction being made between “facts” and “pictures of facts”. The latter presents facts in logical space, and thereby constitute the world.

A fact itself cannot be presented in logical space, only pictures of facts can be presented in logical space.

There are not "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality", with one being in the mind and the other not.
— 013zen

Isn't that what you said?

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind.
— 013zen — Fooloso4

No, read the two comments carefully. In the former, there are two concepts: "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality" with one being in the mind and the other not being in the mind. I do not adopt this view.

There are only pictures of reality presented in the mind. These picture, in the mind, constitute the world.

↪013zen Sure, sounds like Wittgenstein's approach is more of a style of Marriage between Science and Philosophy, where as Russell and the others were more of trying to make a baby out of Science and Philosophy? — DifferentiatingEgg

The discussion is centered around the ancient distinction between science and metaphysics, with the latter being the domain of philosophy.

Aristotle said we engage in philosophy to explain why things happen, as opposed to science which explains how they happen.

Bacon, calling philosophy and metaphysics the "handmaiden" of the sciences calls attention to this relation, and sets to set up philosophy in a manner which can be truly helpful to science.

Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, etc all trying to establish this agenda at different times in their projects, set out to establish a course for philosophy wherein one could derive genuine metaphysical knowledge.

Russell and others came in after this, and were concerned with the same project. They thought philosophy should mirror the rigor and style of mathematics, whereby things could be "proven" true.

Witt, I think is commenting on this, saying that this conception of the relationship is wrongheaded. Philosophy can only aid the sciences by clarifying what science provides us. It can't, on its own, tells us what's true.

So, to summarize, I take Russell and other's approach to the relationship between science and philosophy to be constructive in their conceptions. They thought philosophy could provide insights that go above and beyond science. Witt takes the relation to be more interpretive; philosophy can only help clarify thoughts for scientists.

They say nothing about the world. Treating them the way we treat propositions leads only to confusion and fallacy. This does not mean that ethics and aesthetics and unimportant, but that they are so important that we should not regard them as something other than they are. — Fooloso4

I agree with this. What originally got me interested in Witt many, many, moons ago was my BA thesis on Wittgenstein's ethics. It's clear that Witt considered ethical considerations important, but academically stale.

As you say, he suggests that the common theme of treating "the good" as an adjective, or something to discover about the world is entirely wrong headed, and leads to confusion.

The ethical dimensions of the Tractatus have always been of interest to me, especially considering the letter Witt wrote to Von Ficker wherein he identifies the purpose of the work as "ethical".

Would you say Wittgenstein was attempting to bridge the gap between the disciplines of science and philosophy? — DifferentiatingEgg

It depends on what you mean by "attempting to bridge the gap".

Witt is quite clear that he considers Science as an activity involved in one type of business, and philosophy another activity....he does believe, however, that the activity of philosophy can, if anything, be helpful to the activity of science, without taking part in the activity of science itself. The relationship is mutually beneficial, but each is doing their own thing.

"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.
(The word 'philosophy' must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences)" (4.111).

"The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity...

Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the
thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred." (4.112)

"Philosophy limits the disputable sphere of natural science" (4.113)

It doesn't. You make a distinction between the world as pictures in the mind and reality not being pictures in the mind. — Fooloso4

So, this all depends on what we take Witt to mean by "logical space". Where or what is logical space?

For this, I draw on Frege's writing in "The Thought" wherein he wants to say that there are ideas, such as for example Pythagoras' theorem which is true regardless of what anyone thinks about the theorem, and seems to exist in its own space, therefore. It can exist in the mind, and form the content of thought, but is in some sense mind independent without being a "part" of reality.

I think Witt has a similar conception. Logical space is like the the common playing field of thoughts, without being tied to any individual instance of thought.

I can, for instance, imagine a purple pig dancing the macarena while smoking a joint, and despite existing in my mind at the moment, its possibility lies in logical space prior to the thought. Someone else can have the same thought, or may have already had the same thought before me; it isn't a genuine creation of my mind, but it is instantiated in my mind.

Pictures and the world exist in the logical space...they mirror the logic of reality, but they are distinct from it and exist separate from it.

What do you find in the text regarding pictures that is true of the world but not true of reality? — Fooloso4

"What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner rightly or falsely is its form of representation" (2.17).

The only commonality between pictures which compose the world, and reality, is the logical form of the picture and the state of affairs it is a picture of.

Wheren does he make a distinction between the pictures of the world being in the mind and pictures of reality not being in the mind? — Fooloso4

This is tangled.

The world is made up of pictures, and those pictures are pictures of possible or actual reality. The world, is a possible picture of reality.

There are not "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality", with one being in the mind and the other not.

That suggests you agree with Russell in a way that I do not. Russell says: — Paine

I apologize, I must have been unclear in my writing. I was trying to say that, from Russell's perspective, such seems to be the case. I do not agree with Russell on this point.

I hardly feel that our idols are becoming less perverse. — isomorph

Well, let's consider, for a moment, some of Bacon's idols.

1. The tribe, or the belief that our senses exhaustively tell us what's true.

With the advent, development, and widespread adoption of Scientific inclination, with an increasingly upward trend...more and more people are utilizing precise instruments to collect and analyze data.

2. The cave, or personal beliefs about what's true.

Folks are becoming more open to other perspectives, it seems. This seems to suggest that people are willing to think outside their own "caves" these days, if you will.

3. The Marketplace, or belief about the meanings of words, and the extent to which they determine what you take to be true.

This one is trickier. I don't think I can cite any clear example of this. I take this idol to be remedied by practicing philosophy, generally speaking. But, I can't be certain that people are becoming more philosophically inclined. If anything, this idol might be getting worse.

4. The theater, or acceptance of established truth, and what is true.

This, again, I take to be remedied by the upward scientific trend. Insofar as a core tenant of science is that of falsification, and the acceptance that scientific truth is merely, the best we've got at the moment, I think we're doing better on that front, too.

A starting point to see how this paradigm shift happens is in Kuhn's The Structure of Scientic Revolutions. — isomorph

I have a copy, and made it through quite a bit awhile ago :smile: I get what you're saying, but more people are starting to understand and accept that science is composed of the best guess given the data, and shifts in how we understand the world can happen at any time.

This was not the case in Bacon's time.

Fill up life with things that pertain to life. — isomorph

I think we take the same meaning here...more or less :smile: and I don't disagree that we really ought to fill our lives with an appreciation for meaningful engagement with one another, in order to determine how best we can all live together.

By calling her work: The Human Condition, she's saying that this is the position we are all in, aka this is the environment that we exist in, and that enables us a unique freedom that other beings don't have. She thinks this unique position in some sense constitutes our proper place of action, which borrowing from the ancient Greeks, established one's telos.

I don't think we have a "telos", and while I do agree we find ourselves in a unique environment relative to other beings, and that it does influence how we developed, think, and engage with the world, I am uncertain as to whether or not that's truly what makes a human a human.

To your point, Witt never thought that Frege or Russell understood the work. The historical account, as documented by Ray Monk, shows he was devastated that neither understood it, which is the only reason he even sought to translate it, and have it published.

Russell, again as you mention, had a particularly positivistic take on the work (since he himself, at the time, was more or less one). He, like many early commentators, see the work as trying to establish the logical empiricist agenda, which was born from positivism, and had many of the same tenants. From that perspective, Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said...but, that's because this isn't the agenda of the work, despite discussing many relevant positivist ideas, and problems.

The relationship between a means of expression and what is shown by it is what is being discussed. — Paine

Wittgenstein speaks of language in the context of it doing something. — Paine

This is one reason why I, personally, see a common thread between the earlier and later work. The distinction between saying and showing in the Tractatus is reestablished in the PI by the fact that the meaning of a word is its use; how it is used shows us what it means, despite perhaps it overtly saying something else.

In the Tract Witt says:

"The sign determines a logical form only together with its logical syntactic application" (3.327).

The sign, aka what an expression says, doesn't determine meaning...only together with how its being used, can we glean its meaning - what it shows through its use, or "logical syntactic application".

Between the world as pictures in the mind and reality as not made up of pictures in our mind. — Fooloso4

"The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (1.1).

"The facts in logical space are the world" (1.13).

"We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (2.1).

"The picture presents the facts in logical space" (2.11)

"The picture is a fact" (2.141)

"Thus the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it" (2.1511).

"It is like a scale applied to reality" (2.1512).

I hope this helps.

What is the case is often subject to perspective. — DifferentiatingEgg

What is the case, is the case. What I believe to be the case is subject to perspective, hence the word subjective, as opposed to objective.

↪013zen See how facts change? — DifferentiatingEgg

A fact did not change, a belief did. The fact are the definite, unchanging, words that compose the Tractatus, in this case. What we believe about those facts, is another question entirely.

Tractatus is positivism simply by the first few lines. — DifferentiatingEgg

If you would like to believe that the work is positivistic, that's okay. I believe that you will have a difficult time maintaining that belief once you take into account more than the first few lines :razz:

If it's not positivism, defend how it's not with something other than a deflection? Show us how it's not. — DifferentiatingEgg

Well, there have been a few points brought up in this thread already on that subject. There are clear historical records, commentary, and textual evidence which suggests otherwise.

With that being said, I have no interest in defending anything. I am, however, interested in discussion on the matter. It's not my responsibility to show you anything about the text; I can only provide quotes and my own thoughts on the matter. Whether or not those incline you to change your own views, is neither here nor there, in my opinion.

I said that it used to be thought that the Tract was pro positivist, which is where that belief comes from...it does seem there is a shift, if you read that Tract in that manner. But, nobody really sees Witt as espousing a pro-positivist framework in the work any longer.

Bacon's idols were, as Bacon thought, mental errors, and that is an appropriate human concern no matter what era. — isomorph

Yes, that's what I said :P I did say that, while I personally, think Bacon was being a tad bit extreme (for good reason, at his time), that today, these idols are becoming (I hope) less perverse. I could totally be wrong about that, I just wanted to establish that we understanding the term "idols" in the same way. :smile:

It is apparent from the growth of knowledge about the universe that many ideas held in sacrosanct have been demolished. — isomorph

So, it is apparent then that ideas have been replaced with ideas. But, by what mechanism does this replacement occur? Do we always outrightly discard ideas, or do we instead develop and cull certain aspects of ideas like we might prune and cultivate a tree? Isn't it simply an evolution of thought over time? Taking what is useful and discarding what is not?

Hannah Arendt gave an appropriate analysis of the human condition from the perspective of western philosophy — isomorph

Yes, and while perhaps appropriate, the question remains...she thinks that we are "apparently" beings meant to engage in praxis.


Do you, personally, agree with this sentiment?

I am saying there is an overarching human condition — isomorph

Agreed :smile: What that subsists in, is the question.

I don't think this distinction is correct. — Fooloso4

Which distinction? The one between reality and the world?

"The total reality is the world" (2.063).

This would make no sense to say if there were no distinction between the two.

Or do you mean how I am interpreting the distinction? This might be fair...my only real thinking about it stems back to a work Frege wrote on the topic of "thoughts". I think that Witt might have something similar in mind, but I can't be certain.

↪013zen And of course, doesn't all of this rely upon Wittgenstein's presupposition of what a "fact" is? — DifferentiatingEgg

A fact, is what is the case.

What do you think that a fact is? :razz:

Doesn't Wittgenstein himself later overturns the logic of the Tractatus once he realizes the inherent bias in his presupposition? — DifferentiatingEgg

Later in Wittgenstein's life, while translating the Tractatus to English he went through the work line by line with Frank Ramsay....Wittgenstein, after much frustration with Ramsay, does say in his diaries that he saw certain errors, but he never says what those consisted in.

In the Philosophical Investigations, he overtly refers to the Tractatus only a handful of times, and its rarely to outright dismiss a previous idea. If anything, he occasionally provides some commentary on previous remarks.

The idea that Witt had a distinct early and late period wherein he outrightly dismissed his previous work developed when there was still good reason to wonder if the work was "pro-positivistic"....which the PI clearly is not.

In modern discussions of the work, which take him to either be taking a "therapeutic" approach to philosophy or a truly "constructive" one, these two camps really see more commonalities between the PI and Tractatus than was previously thought.

This also makes more sense, and passes the "smell" test, so to speak. Typically, people expand on, and make corrections to previous thoughts, rarely outright rejecting entire mindsets. PI is, I personally think, an attempt to say something similar but, in his own style, so to speak. While structurally, the works are very similiar, the manner in which the ideas are presented is clearly not only written for people like Russell and Frege.

As are we... — schopenhauer1

Yes :grin:

From what I can gather...you're talking about a couples of things, but ultimately I take it to be an epistemological question?

You mention Bacon as reference to your usage of idols, and to my understanding Bacon was using the term to identify examples of metaphysical thinking that really had no business in serious metaphysics, meant to assist the sciences - these idols do not give us knowledge.

With that being said, I don't quite agree with his agenda - I think that it is a truism that can be taken as a cautionary tale, but it was ultimately written for a different audience than today. That's just an aside, though.

I am interesting in hearing more about how you're using the term. Are you calling attention to the fact that there are degrees of certainty that we can have regarding various claims? If so, I am also curious to hear more about how this ties back to Arendt. I read the book many moons ago, but from my memory, praxis and all that jazz seems a different problem entirely.

Supposing that Arendt is even right about the human condition, what does this have to do with the thesis?

Also, hello :smile:

This is even more perplexing then. — schopenhauer1

It's not particularly perplexing, I don't think. Considering it from the perspective of the idealism/realism debate, which was contemporaneously relevant. It's a commentary on that distinction, ultimately saying that logic bridges the gap, therefore there need not be that debate as to where we ultimately derive our knowledge from. Whether or not he is right about that is another question, but ultimately he is simply restating what he takes the dominant views of his audience to be. He isn't trying to explain every aspect of these views...this is why he says in the preface:

"[The Tractatus] is...not a text-book".

The work is written in a manner that its meant for those who can understand it without extra teaching...

"This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it - or similar thoughts".

He understand that it won't be for everyone, and that ultimately he failed to accomplish what he set out to do with the work.

But he does explain why he doesn't provide sources or exegetical remarks:

"How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will not decide. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in points of detail; and therefore I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before me by another".

Whether or not you, personally, think its fine for someone to choose to write a text in that manner in personal predilection. But, you can't conclude that this is a fault with the text when he states that he won't be digging into certain things too deeply in the preface to the work. He admits not everyone will understand it, or see the value in it.

He thinks there is value insofar as he is, after all, doing philosophy - thinking through ideas that his contemporaries were dealing with.

"If this work has a value it consists in two things. First that in it thoughts are expressed, and this value will be the greater the better the thoughts are expressed. The more the nail has been hit on the head.

Here I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task. May others come and do it better".

That's how he ends his preface. His only wish for the text was that others come and do better than he did. Not that it somehow settled "metaphysics" for everyone. He is expressing his ideas, and as it turns out is reading and commenting on the ideas of others is philosophy.

But then why even bring up "Substance of the world" in relation to objects? This puts it in the metaphysical camp, not simply "logical object". Which is it? You seem to mix form (the relation of objects to predicates.. how they "hang together"), and the objects themselves. And perhaps Wittgenstein is doing the same. — schopenhauer1

Remember, objects may be the “substance of the world”, but “the world” exists in logical space (1.13).

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. Nowhere in the text does Wittgenstein say that objects form the substance of reality...its only ever tied to the world.

To me that is a very anemic, yet present metaphysics in what he is conveying. — schopenhauer1

Well, let’s be clear.... Metaphysics is an attempt to acquire knowledge of reality above, or beyond, what we can directly experience. To present a metaphysical thesis is to attempt to explain some phenomena by appealing to extrasensory reasoning. This is precisely what Newton did with his theories, and why he was taken as exemplary of proper metaphysics, despite having many critiques.

After Kant’s noumena left scientists truly left to concede that we have no, direct, access to reality folks were left to wonder how we could be certain of even Newton’s ideas. Einstein, still feeling the positivists ripples, wrote his theory of relativity to challenge the metaphysically bankrupt notion of “absolute space”, for example.

My point is, whether or not anything has any philosophical merit depends entirely on it being a commentary on the ideas of its time. We don’t study Aristotle’s metaphysics because we think he was right about nature being made of fire, water, earth, or air. We read him to see how we have thought about these problems in the past, and take from them lessons which are applicable to our thinking today. Sometimes we do read a thinker because we think they got something right despite disregarding mostly everything else they said.

I think, at least, we can see Witt wrestling with the ideas of his time, and he does a decent job of capturing the common-place ideas held by his contemporaries but also offers his own approach. That is philosophy, after all. Now, whether it offers us anything useful? I think yes.

I think by applying some of his ideas, we can derive useful thought processes that aren’t nearly as anemic.

If I’m puzzled about how its possible that a person can read a musical score and sing into a microphone, and have that sound be translated into electrical signals, which are then translated into vibrational energy before being re-translated into etchings on a material surface….and that we could then put a needle attached to another machine that would translate those patterns back into electrical signals and then back into sound again I can understand that there is a logical relation that must be what's common between them. What do I mean by logical relation? Well, in the Tract, Witt says that we can only think of uniform relations...that is logically uniform relations. To each note a specific sound wave must correspond, and to that a specific electrical signal, and a specific material vibration, and to that a specific etching on a material surface. And the total number of notes are same same total number of sound waves, and electrical signals, etc.

Notice how the explanation makes sense because of that logical balance between parts. That’s at least a step in the right metaphysical direction when trying to understand the phenomenon.

Anyways, you keep referencing a less anemic metaphysics, and I’m curious which might apply? Certainly by anemic you don’t mean simply more robust at the expense of being...to put it bluntly, misguided?

At least what little Witt does provide can be reasonably said to be, like, well, “yea”, from our contemporary standpoint. Perhaps it was less so in the past, I don’t know.

I'm sorry, none of this makes much sense and the only way to make sense of it is to "reach beyond what Wittgenstein provides" (to borrow your phrasing of objects :wink:). — schopenhauer1

Haha, perhaps you're right. I may be taking certain liberties with my current thinking, but once I have more time, I'll dig back into the text properly :P But, I think that we've come a long way, and the discussion has taken interesting avenues! I certainly have a fuller appreciation, and thinking regarding the work, than i had previously, I think. Hopefully, the same is true of you, as well.

I think its interesting that you find we, more-or-less have similar ideas regarding the text, when you also admit that I might be reaching a bit here and there :P I have nothing much to say about that, I just wasn't expecting you to say that after starting out by saying the first part lol

Anyways, to your point...

Wittgenstein views objects of the "aboutness" of the atomic facts. That is to say, the atomic facts has to be about something (the substance of the world), and so he proposes an anemic metaphysics (objects), which is scarcely explained, but is considered sort of fundamental and brute and simple. — schopenhauer1

I don't think this is quite right. Remember, Wittgenstein gave clear examples of atomic sentences; they have to do with the underlying logic of propositions. Proposition are about something...an atomic fact is merely the underlying logical form of that "about" relation, as stated by the proposition. A Wittgensteinian object is a logical object, or rather, the manner in which its discussed is meant to show what he has in mind as his focus.

Consider one of the areas of the work associated with dispelling "Russell's paradox". The "paradox" that caused Frege to have a nervous breakdown and, more-or-less resign his attempts at constructing a type-script in Leibniz's vision. The colloquial take:

The barber shaves every man that does not shave himself. Does the barber shave himself? We know either leads to a contradiction. But this was a contradiction that first showed up in Russell's logical notation, and also occurred in Frege's.

Wittgenstein's response is to look at the atomic propositions associated with the paradox. Suppose some set f(x) containing only men that do not shave themselves. Then the barber shaving them would add: F(fx). Now, if we supposed this set could contain itself, we'd write F(F(fx)). But, Wittgenstein remarks that this can't be correct, because while these two "F"'s have different meaning's entirely. By re-writing the atomic facts in his own notation:

(∃ϕ) :F(ϕu) . ϕu = F u

He says the paradox vanishes.

Russell originally thought about the problem as:

{x | x ∉ x}

The set of all sets that don't contain themselves. Does it contain itself? If it does, then it doesn't and if it doesn't it does.

Using Wittgenstein's comments, we see that he find's Russell's take rather wrong headed. We must conclude

1. The original set has one meaning, and the outer an entirely different one, but the two sets are equal to one another: they contain the same members.

2. Because of this, we cannot even ask the question that lead Russell to the paradox in the first place: "Is the set a member of itself?" Well, if you're asking about all the sets that do not contain themselves, I'm not sure what you even mean. A set is a mathematical concept containing elements. Russell supposed that any set could have the property of either containing itself or not. While weird, it doesn't appear wrong. We can, actually, think of sets that either contain themselves, or not. Okay, whatever, so what? Well, could we have a set of all sets that don't contain themselves? Wittgenstein says this doesn't even make sense to ask. If so, containing is being used in two different senses, but nonetheless, the members between the two sets is equal.

In the barber example, we see when it's drawn out properly...

The set of men shaved by the barber has a different meaning than the set of all men that do not shave themselves, and are also shaved by the barber. They may have the common expression "shaved by the barber", but really, they are two different sets, in a logical sense.

I think Wittgenstein thought the "paradox" itself was a great example of an instance of unclear thinking leading to too much time and effort on the part of his mentors.

I think that at Wittgenstein's time, there was a huge identity crisis in mathematics, science, and philosophy...an erosion that took centuries to wear away at the foundations of some of these disciplines.

Serious scientific and philosophic metaphysics was reduced to postulations of "simple elements" composing an experience of reality divorced from the reality which its supposed to be an experience of.

Wittgenstein's approach suggests, despite not overtly saying that much of the concerns at this time were ill-founded. We might not experience reality "directly", but how we experience it shares the same logic. We can be certain that we will not discover a paradox in reality, only a paradox in our understanding. But we can tease it out by properly analyzing what's going on. Russell's hiccup was in some sense, short sighted. The question was formulated incorrectly.

Perhaps the same is true of the simple objects of Mach which influenced Russell. We might not be able to say what the ultimate constituents of reality are, but we can be certain that their logic will be contained in how the operate within our minds if and when we understand them. In some sense, the question doesn't make sense: "Is my experience of reality identical to reality?" Of course not, but whatever you understand of reality at least came from reality, and therefore must contain the same logical relation amongst its parts. The sets contain the same logical relation amongst elements, but the sets are different.

What's the point of "objects" for Wittgenstein, if he already has "atomic facts" as the primary constituents of his language? — schopenhauer1

From my understanding...

Objects form the substance of the world. Witt tells us:

"Substance is what exists independently of what is the case" (2.024).

And several lines later:

"The object is the fixed, the existent; the configuration is the changing, the variable" (2.0271).

Consider it this way...

Pseudo concepts are in some sense, fixed. What can fall under them is changing and variable, and this is what's shown in atomic facts.

I can say: "Socrates is mortal" or "schopenhauer1 is mortal" or "013zen is mortal" the logic expressed by the atomic sentence these analyze into is the same; it exists beyond individual instances of the atomic sentence.

A particular atomic fact either obtains or it does not obtain. We can imagine it obtaining, even if it doesn't. But, there are possible atomic facts outside of our imagination, and yet the logic will persist to cover those new examples when we discover them. The "objects" reach past our experience, and past the atomic facts. This allows the pseudo-concept to be open to change and creation.

Suppose we had a world with 1 ball. We'd have perhaps a handful of atomic facts.

One about a ball existing, one about its shape (identifying it as a ball), one perhaps about its color. We'd have simple pseudo-concepts that supply the base level of the analysis. Things like existence, shape, color, number, would be within the pseudo-concept's logical framework, so to speak, ..if, somehow later on, some other entity came into existence, the simple pseudo-concepts would still contain the new complex object. The logic pervades all possible reality, in a sense. I cannot imagine an entity without some shape if it exists in space. I cannot imagine an entity existing without being able to count it.

Or consider hearing a melody. There is a specific vibration in your ear translated by a particular agitation in the air. This same agitation can be translated onto a record which is just scratches in a record caused by the agitation as translated by some device. We can also write the melody out on a musical score. In each instance, we can imagine the atomic facts associated with 1.) the original sound wave 2.) the vibration on your ear drum 3.) the scratches in the record 4.) the written notes of the musical score.

each has its own associated atomic fact, but the form between them must be the same, right? The logic of the scratches in the record must correspond to the logic of the air molecules being agitated by a sound wave, as must it correspond to the logic of a particular vibration on the meaty apparatus of your ear drum, or notes on a written musical score. To wildly different atomic facts, belong the same internal logic between individual aspects that compose the atomic facts.

I want to state that I am still working through this, so don't take what I am saying as definitive in any sense, but thus far this is how I am imagining it.

The above discussion was very helpful, and I agree with a lot of what was said.

The way I understand it, when Witt is talking about the distinction between formal or pseudo-concepts, and proper concepts he is trying to get the reader to understand the logical form of each one, but he's running into problems due to language.

Its as Fooloso pointed out, I think, when he uses variable names such as "x", in proper analysis, the variable would be replaced by a proper concept which could logically fall under the pseudo concept. Because of this, we can see that pseudo concepts like "number" or "fact" cannot be talked about in the traditional sense. We can't say what a "number" is - we can give examples of proper concepts that fall under it...like 5 or 3, but we can't define their structure in any meaningful way. We either know what they mean, or we don't, but we bring this knowledge to the table, so to speak.

Again, I want to emphasize that I do think that Witt saw value in the project, but maybe had his doubts regarding it being possible in the sense that Leibniz and perhaps Frege envisioned such a language. They thought it could do more work perhaps?

I think Witt def shows us certain things - the isomorphism between thought, language, and reality.

Language can be analyzed into atomic statements featuring simple objects that are indefinable, and to these can correspond simple parts of thoughts - logically simple thoughts. But, knowing this doesn't teach us anything new or helpful...except, perhaps, for clarification purposes.

Sorry, I've been busy with work lately.

Leibniz did present a 'universal character' suitable for a principle of sufficient reason to be up to the task of sorting out what things are. Or at least provide a ground for talking about the fundamental elements in a coherent way. — Paine

To my understanding, Leibniz did at least provide the coherent framework for what he envisioned. So, in that sense, I agree. He tried to express what he imagined as being possible. Thinkers definitely tried to develop this, with Frege being one of them; other thinkers, like Mach, might have even been influenced by this, because I know that he, like Leibniz, thought this "possible language" should be something like differential equations.

Wittgenstein is taking a step backwards. Regrouping after failed attempts. — Paine

I get the sense that Witt might be trying to challenge the idea a bit. He seems to follow after Frege's and Russell's attempt, but ultimately seems to conclude that the idea is actually incoherent. It seems, at face value, that the idea has merit, but if you try and develop something of the sort, you're left with nothing more than a framework for parsing language syntactically, but you don't learn anything new, like Leiniz envisioned. I can only show you, for example, that an argument is valid - that it has the proper truth preserving form - but, I cannot determine its soundness; I only fancy it sound if already presuppose its truth.


Anyways, interesting post :)

What leads you to say this? He does say:

It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false. — Fooloso4

This is what I'm trying to get at. He's doesn't seem to be putting forth a correspondence theory. At least not in the traditional manner. He seems to want to say that while we might measure a proposition against reality in order to determine whether or not it's "true", we don't ever get, say capital T "truth" insofar as the picture tells you nothing about the reality it presents.

I can, for example, refer to electromagnetic "waves" as waves, and it seems true to refer to them as such. It seems obvious, in fact. But, calling them waves is just a way we conceptualize what's going on, and it seems to in some sense get at what's occurring, but we can be almost certain that they aren't behaving like traditional waves.

Perhaps this is a bad example, but hopefully you can understand what I'm trying to get at. Or I'm not making sense... I'm tired, I was out late last night lol

Any philosopher writing on some topic has a different degree of assumptions, taken as starting points without need for explication. These are the bedrock of the discussion and represent the general positions of some tradition...in Witt’s case, its the assumption that one could, in theory, develop a logical notation capable of syntactically only admitting of true statements, with which you could then use to calculate what must be true, necessarily, without appealing back to ordinary language.

Leibniz first postulated the idea, calling is the “characteristica universalis”. This is chiefly what influenced Frege, and why he developed his concept-script which postulated simple objects in functional relations as underlying and furnishing the logic of our general language.


I called attention earlier, to a commonality I see between the two positions in this thread, namely that Witt seems to want to ultimately criticize the project, despite still seeing some utility in its development. The analysis of language can never furnish us with anything new – we cannot, for example, discover what’s true after the fact, so to speak. There are no surprises in logic. If we understand the premises, the conclusion is always obvious. We do not, therefore, discover what is true from analysis.

I get the sense that the work is set up sort of like an argument from contradiction. He starts by assuming the general framework of the analytic project, simply stating some common assumptions that school of thought takes, before showing that this line of reasoning admits of a contradiction, namely that:

1. analysis should tell us what's true, by culling any signs which don’t represent aspects of reality
2. analysis does not tell us what's true, rather, it tells us what’s possible. Truth seems to come before analysis.

Truth is presupposed, not proven by logical analysis. That some propositions are true, and others false, must be determined outside of logic.

Why does this matter?

Again, the entire tradition was geared towards trying to guarantee what we can know. Can we know whats true of the world? Hume said, only insofar as we can experience it, and there’s no guarantee. Kant said we could know whats true, even beyond experience, and there could be some guarantee. But, we don’t directly experience reality, like Hume thought.

Witt seems to want to say that “truth” is nothing more than a manner of situating things in the world based on what we perceive as logically possible. Not only do we not experience reality directly, but we are also incapable of knowing whether our picture is true or not, because its exactly that, just one picture of reality.

This is why Witt seems to make comments regarding solipsism, and the individual being a microcosm. We are each, individually, limited by how we can logically situate things...this is why some things “make sense” to some people, and are utterly nonsensical to others. It’s not that some additional facts are needed on one side or the other, rather a way of seeing the facts and situating them.

The development of a new theory, like evolution, didn’t discover, for example, the differences and similarities between species – that was always apparent. Rather, it considered as possible a relation between them that wasn’t considered possible before.

I take your point, and I think looking at one side of the work, there are a lot of questions on can bring to bear. There is good reason to wonder whether the analytic project as a whole was a misguided effort, despite seeming reasonable at its roots.

But, considering your point, and reading other remarks that Witt makes, I'm beginning to get the sense that, perhaps, he was critiquing that very project.

I think that Fooloso4 put it well when they pointed out:

Can we know that all objects are given? Can we know all possible states of affairs? At best we can know what states of affairs have occurred. But actual states of affairs are not the only states of affairs that are possible. If that were the case nothing new could occur.

Without making it explicit Wittgenstein has drawn a limit to human knowledge. This limit is distinct from that of what can be said and what is shown. — Fooloso4

Witt. seems to ultimately say that one cannot provide all the elementary propositions apriori; because you can never predict beforehand if you'll find yourself in a situation which needs a new sign. The world is logical, and human logic mirrors its form; we cannot say what that form is though. We cannot even think it. So, regarding epistemology we're limited to only possibilities we can think, but things could always turn out otherwise.

Concepts like "evolution" are one possible description of the world - we can arrange things in this way; but this is only one possible description, and we could always discover some new, better, description. We can, however, be certain that it will make sense, once given all the pieces; it will be logically in order.

All the point about the elementary propositions is now left in such state that all they can accomplish is, perhaps, as you've said: useful for making sure that scientific discourse is culled of unnecessary signs ...that is, they are simply a useful tool, but one cannot glean anything meaningful from them, because there could always be more. Science is meant to discover the states of affairs, first, for which the elementary propositions will follow insofar as if we understand anything it must be logical, and our language will mirror that logic when we attempt to express our ideas. We will always be able to analyze language and eliminate unnecessary signs, better displaying the logic that was always present, but this comes after the fact.

I'll just end with this quote from the work that I think is helpful insofar as its not technical, and also that it seems to express a general sentiment that Witt wanted to express for the work:

"All propositions of our colloquial language are actually, just as they are, logically completely in order. That most simple thing which we ought to give here is not a simile of truth but the complete truth itself.
(Our problems are not abstract but perhaps the most concrete that there are)" (5.5563).

We cannot abstract our problems away. We are always in a situation where we are forced to adopt the best picture we have of the world, and furnish the objects accordingly. Analysis cannot show whether you've got the right description, only whether the picture is logically in order.

Few...been out of town for a bit, and it seems I’ve missed a lot. A quick glance of the topics is interesting, and a lot to consider. I like a lot of the manners in which RussellA considers the ideas, but there are a few things here and there that I don’t think are quite right...I generally think the manner in which you’re thinking is fruitful, though. So, thank you...I'll try and work through it more.

I think Fooloso4 does a good job of raising some of the issues I have, as well as more I hadn't considered. I'll have to work through the discussion a bit.



While I firmly believe that you’re right – that in order to fully appreciate what's going on with a lot of the ideas in the Tractatus, that a familiarity with Kant is particularly helpful – I don’t agree that the analytic tradition was, in some sense, a watered down version of many of the ideas we see developed in Kant, though.

These thinkers were responding to Kant; this is why the neo-kantian movement finds its roots at this time in thinkers like Helmholtz, despite him being primarily a physicist.

Again, I really think its best to consider the discussion as part of, well, a discussion; not some philosopher or scientist screaming into a vacuum.

The question that scientists had been asking, at least, as far back as Francis Bacon was: “Can metaphysics supply us with genuine knowledge?”

That is:

“Can we know why something occurs, and not simply how it occurs?”

Hume answered: “No.”

Genuine knowledge only comes to us via the senses. We can only ever say how things happen, and never why. Therefore, we can never be certain of any of our knowledge, because despite seeing something a hundred times, it could always be the case that I am ignorant of the true inner workings of the phenomena, and in fact, it only repeats a certain pattern 100 times before evolving into some other pattern.

Kant didn’t like this. He thought we could have genuine metaphysical knowledge.

Kant answered the question: “Yes. We can know why things occur, and therefore be certain about them.”

Yes, we do gain knowledge through the senses, but this knowledge is a synthesis of empirical data that is categorized by the mind via independently existing mental structures. An internal logic, if you will, that orders and categorizes information we gain from experience. This is how we can be certain of things like “Cause and effect” and “1+1=2”.

This was awesome, but left us in a position where we could never untangle reality from what we supply. Sure, we could have certainty regarding why things occurred, but we could never know to what extent we are right regarding our picture of the world.

Hegel (I think) had a clever idea...basically, borrowing from Hume’s copy principle, he said we copy direct aspects of reality, but categorize and manipulate them with an inherent logic which we can study, isolate, and thereby know what exactly the mind supplies of experience. What remains will be reality, or the supposedly unknowable reality Kant left us with.

This was cut short, however, when studies during the tail end of the 1800s showed that we do not, in fact, copy reality in any sense. We translate the experience via sensory organs into electrical signals that are then reinterpreted by the brain. We could show, for example, that by stimulating specific nerves via controlled electric shocks, we could cause patients to “see” light where there wasn’t any.

This caused the “back to Kant” movement during the early 1900s.

This is why Mach starts trying to consider how we might break up ideas into elements which constitute them without appealing to atoms.

Which sets the stage for the neo-positivism / neo-kantian debate during the 1900s.

Witt’s Tract is certainly responding to this since he no doubt was familiar with the debate via Russell. Insofar as I don’t consider him to be sympathetic to the neo-positivism angle, I do wonder if the work can be read in a neo-kantian light? My tertiary knowledge leads me to think that Witt is trying to bridge the gap, somehow, but I cannot be certain of this.

Really interesting ideas....i'll have to catch up more when I have time.

Okay, so looking over it once more...

If, as Russell stipulates, x is a book, then there are no formal concepts in "T(x)". I don't know what () on the table means. — Fooloso4

A formal concept defines how the variables "T" and "x" are to "behave" or perhaps a better way to say it, is how they are to be understood.

These aren't like "proper concepts", such as "red", "hard", etc. which settles the external properties of complex objects.

In the proposition:

"The grass is green"

We have the presentation of a complex object with the material property of being red.
If we analyze the proposition into the elementary proposition we can the presentation of a "proper concept", which takes as input a simple object:

Fx

Now, we can in some sense talk about the structure of the elementary proposition, and we can note that whatever can be taken as input for "x" must be of a certain type, or kind. To this type corresponds a formal concept. We cannot, for example, input a proper number to which corresponds the formal concept of number for say, a simple object.

So, while we can say:

"There are two red fruits"

this analyzes into:

∃x(P(x)) ∧ ∃y(P(y) ∧ (x≠y))

There is no sign corresponding to the formal concept "number" despite what appears to be a number presented in the proposition.

Ah, yes, I think I've misread that bit, now that I've looked at it again.

I'll look it over again later :)

determined, like a law—even if just a law I give myself (with Kant). If you follow the law, you are good, even if you just try for something good. — Antony Nickles

I wouldn't say this.

You can fully believe you're doing the right thing, or that you're on the side of "good" and be completely wrong about this.

I don't believe that ethics is characterized by rule following, in general, but rather by the inherent struggle we have when faced with ethically challenging situations. It's rather, that there is no rule to follow for every situation. I cannot know prima facie if whatever action I choose will be good or bad, and its this very uncertainty that makes moral situations difficult to navigate.

Ethics springs from the desire to bring about the best situation in an uncertain world, and is characterized by the difficulty to act, even if we believe that we are right.

If an AI ever feels something that we might characterize as an internal conflict regarding what makes the most sense to do in a difficult situation, that will affect people's lives in a differing but meaningful manner, then perhaps I might consider it capable of moral agency.

In the function T (x), where T is on a table, the function T (x) is true if the variable x satisfies the function T (x). For example, T (x) is true if the variable x is a book.

As I understand it, the variable x is what Wittgenstein is defining as a formal concept. — RussellA

You're close, but this isn't quite right, I don't believe.

In the function: "T(x)", both "T()" and "x" show that to each corresponds a different formal concept.

"That anything falls under a formal concept [such] as an object belonging to it, cannot be expressed by a proposition. But it shows itself in the sign of this object itself. (The name shows that it signifies an object, the numerical sign that it signifies a number, etc.)

Formal concepts cannot, like proper concepts, be presented by a function. For their characteristics, the formal properties, are not expressed by the functions. The expression of a formal property is a feature of certain symbols. The sign that signifies the characteristics of a formal concept is, therefore, a characteristic feature of all symbols, whose meanings fall under the concept. The expression of the formal concept is therefore a propositional variable in which only this characteristic feature is constant" (4.126).

So, we cannot, for example, say:

"Red is a color" or "C(r)"
or
"1 is a number" or "N(1)"

for this is senseless.

Nor can we say:

"Color is a formal concept" or "F(c)".

The formal concepts are presupposed by the objects that already contain the characteristic features of the formal concept under which they fall.

This is why:

4.1271 – Every variable is the sign for a formal concept — RussellA

In: "F(x)"

"x" is a simple object in that it presupposes the general form, or general characteristics necessary of any input which can satisfy the function. This is to say, that there is a formal concept associated with it, but "x" is not itself a formal concept, nor does it name a formal concept.

:clap: :halo: :razz:

Objects are there behind the facts, but they are only useful for his idea of facts and propositions. Why doesn't he delve deeper into these initial beliefs? — schopenhauer1

And his ideas regarding facts and propositions is only useful insofar as it facilitates his goal of logically clear thoughts. I can't think of an object in space without a shape, for example so if I want to argue that some objects exists beneath my facts to explain it, I better construct them out of elements that have explanatory power, and tie back to reality. When I talk to others, explaining my ideas regarding what I think could account for the experience, if I can explain it by appealing to simple, necessary, elements of experience such as shape if it exists spatially and that shape must help to explain how it brings about the phenomenon in question.

Well, of course it's done through language. But that is not his major point. That is just a truism. — schopenhauer1

I wholly agree with this. This line of discussion came up in order to clarify my original statement that Witt is concerned with is the logical clarification of thoughts, because I cited him as doing so through language, to which you cast me as calling him a simple grammatician. Later on you say:

It's not just a matter of how they are grammatically phrasing their words. It's not just that Plato could have kept his theory coherent if he had just worded his ideas of Forms more syntactically correct, but rather, that the content of his thoughts are non-sense, and thus are beyond the bounds of language. — schopenhauer1

and I also agree with this. I, personally, do think that Plato’s theory of forms is nonsense – and I suspect that the framework presented by the Tractatus would label it as such. But, its important to note, that while it might be nonsense, it is not meaningless according to Witt. We can still talk about Platos theory of forms in meaningful language, but its wholly unclear.

His major point is that it is invalid to attempt to talk about the world outside certain bounds, that he sets out to limit. — schopenhauer1

While I can understand why you draw this conclusion, I think it’s slightly off in a few important ways.

1. Its not so much that its invalid to attempt to talk about the world outside of certain bounds, rather, it is unclear; that is, it lacks logical clarity.

2. He is not setting out to limit language. He thinks language is already limited, and those limits impose themselves on our understanding. Rather, he is attempting to investigate those limits, and show what needs to be the case in order for language to be clear. With this, one can draw an internal limit within the wider bounds of possible, meaningful, language. This is what science does, manufacturing more precise terminology than the wider sphere of language.

However, what I don't really agree with is just because he was an engineer, this confers greater approaches to philosophy. As RussellA quoted: — schopenhauer1

I agree with this, which is why I originally qualified my statement with:

(This is not a value judgement, btw). — 013zen

I don’t think it makes him any better or worse, it just makes him different in how he presents and thinks about certain issues.

Perhaps it's the acolytes that are more to blame. — schopenhauer1

This is a tale as old as time, my friend. Lol That’s why its best to focus on as much primary literature as possible, I feel.

Where do you think Witt stands? I present as evidence the "Whereof.." quote. — schopenhauer1

To circle back to my pointing out the version of the quote in the preface, wherein Witt ties the statement directly to the main project of “logical clarification”:

“What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.”

The spark notes on my take is this:

1. Around the time of Bacon, metaphysics began getting criticized for allowing things like religion into proper discussion meant to explain reality.

2. Little by little, philosophers stripped metaphysics of this, that, or the other thing.

3. By the second wave of positivism (Mach, etc), metaphysics was considered totally irreparable, and not fit to aid in meaningful scientific inquiry and explanation. This left us in a position where we could only talk about facts – ie experiences in science.

4. Some scientists formed an opposing view, saying that we could, in fact, speak meaningfully in science about things that we have no directly experienced of. They developed “picture theories” which supposedly were justified insofar as they followed logically from experience. Hertz’s only complaint about these “pictures” was that they contained useless aspects due to language.

5. Wittgenstein, familiar with this opposition via Boltzmann and Hertz, developed his own “picture theory” of language, which elucidated why one can be justified in using “pictures” in science (and what it even means for something to logically follow from experience), as well as tried to suggest ways to circumvent those useless aspects due to language that Hertz had commented on.

6. Picture theories were justified, Witt argued insofar as the pictures it was presenting were a possible arrangement of elements of experience, not simply whole experiences. What do I mean, what's the difference?

Consider the question:

“Does the sun orbit the earth or visa versa?”

Positivists, if placed in 600 BCE with no prior knowledge of the answer, could only report what is seen, and would have to concede that its a topic we can’t speculate regarding until we have more evidence. They would call the speculation of their contemporaries useless metaphysics.

A picture theory, however, would allow speculation, as long as you’re positing possibilities that logically follow from experience, and don’t introduce new elements without justification.

This difference is exemplified in the discussion between atomists and positivists, with the former saying they were justified in imagining atoms because atoms:

1. explained their experiences
2. were constructed using elements of experience, ie they had a shape, size, constitution (they were solid), they were movable, and they had properties like mass, all things science would expect something to have.

And by assuming some of these properties, we could explain what we experienced at the macroscopic level regarding gas expansion.

Positivist recoiled at this suggestion, with Mach calling them “useful fictions” – useful on paper, but in no manner suitable within serious scientific discourse.

7. Witt disagreed with this. Some metaphysics was admissible if it tied itself to reality by only using elements which we can make sense of, which as it turns out, means they are only constructed out of things we know are necessary from past experiences. Things like mass, weight, size, shape, etc.

This is, however, my personal line of thinking.

What I meant by this is that Socrates was not clarifying language itself but the notions and ideas of people, or its content. Wittgenstein is trying to determine what is in the bounds of language. — schopenhauer1

I hear you...What I am saying is that just as it isn't uncommon to flip through a Socratic dialogue, and see Socrates challenging what others say about certain things (such as the good), and through dialogue shows how the thought leads to problems, we see Witt doing the same. In the preface to the Tractatus, Witt says his concern is first and foremost thoughts, not language...he just happens to concede that it is through language that the analysis has to be conducted since that's how we communicate our ideas with one another.

Socrates would not even be deemed worthy of his discussions on Forms, The Good, and a whole range of other things, because they are not corresponding to a "State of Affairs" that can be determined as true — schopenhauer1

It's commonly accepted that we engage in metaphysics in order to arrive at an understanding of reality.
From the pre-socratics to today we have engaged in metaphysics, and our ideas have evolved with us. I wouldn't argue that studying Plato's forms isn't useful academically, but I wonder if its in any way equipped to be a supplement to the science of today.

My point is, let's assume that you're right and Witt is saying that metaphysics such as Plato's theory of forms, really doesn't belong in a modern day metaphysics. Wouldn't you agree? (I, personally, wouldn't necessarily take Witt to be committing to this view)

I was commenting on the idea that he was such an outlier that he was wholly different from the projects of other analytics of the time. — schopenhauer1

I am not saying that his project was different, but rather his approach, and some of his conclusions.

Is it so strange that someone that:

1. Graduated from a mechanical engineering program
2. Enrolled in an aeronautics doctorate program with the intent to design his own plane
3. Designed and patented his own propeller (tbh it was kinda a stupid design though lol)

And only after 5-6 years of this, when trying to manufacture his propeller, did Witt become interested in extremely complicated mathematics and learned about Frege and Russell.

After another 6~ years he wrote the Tractatus.

So, to the original point, I don't find it even remotely odd that someone that worked in mechanical engineering for 5-6 years and then worked on philosophy for another 6 years wrote something that was somewhat of an outlier when compared to a lot of the other analytics at the time. He explicitly references Heinrich Hertz in the Tractatus, and is quoted elsewhere saying that his line of thinking was influenced heavily by Ludwig Boltzmann alongside Frege and Russell.

Just as I would be surprised if someone were to tell me that some analytic philosopher from the 1920s developed some of his philosophy from physicists who were, for example, proving the existence of electromagnetic waves, and postulating theories of atoms in an attempt to explain thermodynamics, I am equally unsurprised that just such a philosopher came to some different conclusions than your standard philosopher. (This is not a value judgement, btw).

A defense of any ambiguously phrased sentence can always be said, "No, THIS is what the author TRULEY meant" — schopenhauer1

You've just summarized, like, 75% of the philosophy papers that I have read. xD

But, while I agree that its particularly bad in Witt's case, there is I think a reason that Witt considered philosophy, in some sense, a personal activity.

But if he is misunderstood so thoroughly, this whole project of trying to interpret the "right" Wittgenstein itself is insipid to me because it just speaks to the lack of good communication of the author; it's a lack of quality explanation of ideas. — schopenhauer1

Here I'd like to point out that, again, in the preface to the Tractatus, Witt literally says:

"Here I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task. May others come and do it better."

He was well aware that he wasn't the most articulate, but he thought there was something of value in his thoughts. I'd like to say that just as each of us is articulate to differing degrees, that being less articulate than another neither preclude one from engaging in philosophy, nor does it inherently suggest that the ideas are wrong, or not useful at their core.

I've read plenty of philosophers that I couldn't make heads nor tales of (I'm looking at you Hegel), but others are able to discover some merit within. There is a reason that Witt says:

"This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it - or similar thoughts."

You are extrapolating that, but I did not say that. — schopenhauer1

Truthfully, I was being a bit tongue in cheek :P

They are committing to a form of philosophy whereby any metaphysical or epistemological claims cannot be stated without being non-sense. — schopenhauer1

Positivists are. Not all analytic philosophers are positivists... it just so happens that historically, a lot of them have been.

Naturally. If philosophy started with "Naturally this that and the other..." that begs the question and is simply taking one's assumptions as given by fiat. — schopenhauer1

This is hardly the case. All philosophy, from Aristotle to Putnam has always started with some set of basic assumptions before moving forward. Its a perennial belief that can be endlessly quoted, and pointed out, whether it be a scientist assuming materialism or Aristotle assuming first principles.

Would you say what Socrates was doing and what Wittgenstein were doing were equivalent? This is itself some clever word-play. — schopenhauer1

Now you're not even trying to be charitable to what I'm saying, if you take that bit to be me simply saying, "Witt and Socrates were doing exactly the same thing in every regard" :P

This is hipster fandom talk — schopenhauer1

Idk what that means. Providing historical context is this "hipster fandom talk"?

I don't care that Wittgenstein felt misunderstood. — schopenhauer1

Then it sounds like you don't care to try and understand him, or the difference between his view and the other. If, when a philosopher says: "I don't mean x", the response is: "whatever, idc, sounds like you're saying x" then where else can one go? Seems the discussion is over.

This is an engineer or programmer doing philosophy like an engineer and programmer. — schopenhauer1

I'm sure you wouldn't want to say the analytic tradition is nonsense, despite being the result of logicians and scientists "doing philosophy " like logicians and scientists.

These folks were interested in what science could say about reality and how we can ensure that our theories map to reality. So, naturally they start from the assumption that our words should somehow tie back to reality in some guaranteed fashion.

Thank goodness we had physicists like Helmholtz, Hertz, and Boltzmann engaging in philosophy otherwise the atomic theory would have continued to be ridiculed by positivists and younger thinkers like Einstein would have never engaged with the concept of atoms, particles, fields, etc. In the first place since they lacked empirical evidence.

I think this is recasting Wittgenstein as just trying to be a simple corrector of grammar — schopenhauer1

This is a recasting of my position :P I take him to be concerned with the logical clarification of thought, which might occasionally involve critiquing how one uses a term, and whether or not it makes sense. This isn't new to philosophy, in any sense, with Socrates objecting to how folks use the word "good", Aristotle to how others use the word "cause", etc. How else are we meant to clarify the thoughts in our heads, except, by occasionally engaging in correction of language. This is not to say that correcting grammar is the goal in and of itself.

I think that it is the latter that is exactly what he is doing. — schopenhauer1

This is one possibility, and you're certainly welcome to it. As I've said, my personal opinion differs. I can understand, and see reasons to believe your position, I can however also see other evidence which steers my thoughts in another direction.

He was indeed basically a logical positivist. — schopenhauer1

One might wonder why then, upon returning from the war, and having his work acclaimed by the positivists, that Wittgenstein so vehemently rejected them. Why, Witt considered Russell's atomist interpretation so foreign to his own in spirit that he spent three years of his life trying to get the work published, despite being poor from having given his fortune away - in the hopes that he'd find someone that understood the work. That's a pretty strong response to a bunch of people basically understanding what you were trying to do.

He might protest such a label, and find value in various forms of "non-sense", but he still labeled it "non-sense" — schopenhauer1

The two groups are using the expression in two different manners. Again, without getting too in the weeds, the Tract uses three expressions:

1. nonsense
2. senseless
3. meaningless

these are not interchangeable. The positivists saw no distinction between these at the end of the day, they were all what you'd call meaningless. Wittgenstein, however, distinguishes these, and there's good reason to believe that Witt is using the expression nonsense similar to Frege in that its tied to elucidations which accomplish definite pre-scientific work in terms of settling terminology.

Basically, I think you are playing apologetics and putting early Wittgenstein as more heterodox than he was. — schopenhauer1

Rather, I am doing what we do in philosophy, which is try and furnish a reading of another's work with as much context as possible, whether it be historically or contextually. This is why there exist "readings" of philosopher x, and certain topics are discussed and debated. Why there are conferences, people researching and writing papers, etc.

You know, historically, positivism was actually very pervasive in society. What I mean, is that it had real "pull" in the scientific community. Einstein's theory of special and general relativity was influenced by positivism, believe it or not. Einstein says that concepts like "space" and "time" were not clear at all, and he prepossess redefining them in a relativistic fashion ala Ernst Mach. He argued that absolute space and absolute time were meaningless concepts, in that they were in no manner tied to reality. That's how we arrived at space-time today. But, Einstein was a student of not only positivism but also its main competitor, exemplified by people like Boltzmann and Hertz which was typically referred to as "bild theories" or "picture theories".

Boltzmann argued that positivism left science bankrupt, unable to furnish true understanding. He posited the existence of 'atoms' claiming that science could move past experience by developing "pictures" to represent reality based on logic. Ernst Mach was against the atomic theory, saying there was no evidence for the existence of such things, and for most of the early 1900s the atomic theory was ridiculed, and Boltzmann actually committed suicide from depression.

Einstein, younger than the old Mach and Boltzmann, took Boltzmann's picture theory as permissible and developed his own conception of the atom which was later proven to be the case. I don't think it's any accident that Wittgenstein also develops what he calls a "picture theory" and furnishes it with Frege's logic in a manner that echoes Hertz's development of pictures as logical pictures in his Principles of Mechanics. Witt also says that he was influenced by Boltzmann and Hertz, and he studied to be a mechanical engineer prior to studying philosophy, so he was no doubt familiar with the contemporaneous argument between positivism of Ernst Mach and the up and coming "picture theory" of Boltzman and Hertz that challenged it in an attempt to provide science with metaphysical speculation once again.